Lagman vs.

Medialdea

FACTS

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress
on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagudd with rebellion and lawless violence
which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.

Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. In more recent
years, we have witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the
duly constituted authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano carnage,
and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. Two armed groups have
figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute Group.

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a governmeµt operation to capture the high-
ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been
unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at
sowing violence aimed not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians
and their properties

On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG, and
Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed
resistance which escalated into open hostility against the government. Through these groups' armed
siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities, institutions and
establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and political foundations of
Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the groundwork
for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao

The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to conclude
that:

These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat
of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the
entire Mindanao.

The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further
expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout
Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of
DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and
eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.
 There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power,
authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire
Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in
said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory
powers over local govemments.

The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the easy
access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces
adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.

Considering the network and alliance-building act1v1tles among terrorist groups, local criminals, and
lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute
control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure
the s~fety ~}ecurity of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no
compelling reason to revoke the same".

The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments.

Lagman’s petition are as follows;

- there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of
terrorism ih Mindanao do not constitute rebellion 12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to
remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory.
13 It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as
mere propaganda1 1 4 and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to t
Philippine Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion an exercise of his powers
and prerogatives therein.
- The Lagman Petition also avers that L~. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the
current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to
capture Hapilon.
- That all the acts of terrorism found in the report of Duterte are fake
- the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any
ranking officiai27 before making the proclamation.
- Based on the review by senate, there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which
indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the
Maute Group

Culamat’s Petitions:

- In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described i Proclamation No. 216 relates to
events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that
Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in th
 entire Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Maraw'· City, much less x x x
allege that public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao".
- The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel
groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property"37 does not rise to the level of
rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao. 38 It also posits that there is
no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.
- In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the
Report of the President to Congress.

Mohamad’s Petitions:

- It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e.,
first, the power to call out the arme,d forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habejs corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.48 It maintains that t~e
President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to us~; moreover, his choice
must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, t1e exigencies of the situation
- It asserts that th Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessit brought
about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition at 1f martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habea corpus".
- Report of Duterte regarding martial law is bereft of substantiation
- Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency oe the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the\ privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions,
[and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".

Government’s petition:

- The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the
authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial
law.60 The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the
exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the
vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be
resorted to.
- Sufficiency of facts in the proclamation should be reviewed under the lens of grave abuse of
discretion
- Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis musk be assessed from the
trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the
decision was made.69 It argue that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined not
based on th facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martfa law
because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretio to an impossible
standard. 70 It reiterates that the President's decision shoul be guided only by the information
and data available to him at the time h made the determination. 71 The OSG thus asserts that
facts that wer established after the declaration of martial law should not be considered i the
review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law.
o The OSG fears that i~ the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers
of the Congress to determine whether martial law should be revoked or extended.
 - Since the power to declare martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief,
the lack of recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not
nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual
basis.
- Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts cited by
the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely citing news
reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the
happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay evidence, twice
removed,"75 and thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the
"legal presumption bestowed on governmental acts".
- Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the petitioners. (He who alleges
must prove)

ISSUES

- W/N the petition to review the validity of declaring martial law is appropriate
- W/N petitioners has locus standi
- W/N respondents has the burden of proof
- W/N the facts which the proclamation was based depends on the approval of the defense
secretary; that facts on which it is based must include future facts: that facts are correct
- W/N the power to review by the court is independent on the power to review by the legislature
- W/N the power to review by the court calibrates the power of the president
- W/N there is an actual rebellion
- W/N the proclamation fits the void for vagueness doctrine

RULING

o LOCUS STANDI ISSUE

 YES, ALL PETITIONERS HAS LOCUS STANDI

One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question is brought before [the
Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement."80 Over the years, there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a
prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the
appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the
validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer."

Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic;"82 similarly,
petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of
Marawi City".

In the Lagman petition, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely
referred to themselves as duly elected Representatives

Considering, however , the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well as i e transcendental
issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into
this matter.
In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are at!
citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement fof them to be elected as representatives.
We will therefore consider them a! suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondent did
not question petitioners' legal standing.

 APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING TO QUESTION MARTIAL LAW

o IT DOES NOT REFER TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI it is SUI GENERIS

During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. 87 It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from
those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law. 89 Unless
jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has
the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence
of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It
must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist.91

A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court
to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the
proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. Put differently, if this
Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the sartje would emasculate its
constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the
exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from
the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third
paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the
ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court
the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual
basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in
an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis , and to render its decision thereon within a limited
period of 30 days from date of filing

The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the
Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.

While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time,
there are specific provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the
Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to
place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution
added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top ofthe expanded jurisdiction of
this Court.

The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For
instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII.102 The power of the
Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections and Commission on
Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as
sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it.
Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the
Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise
not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this
Court has to promulgate its decision.

In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court

 REVIEW OF THE COURT INDEPENDENT FROM REVIEW OF CONGRESS

o YES, IT IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM REVIEW CONDUCTED BY CONGRESS

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the/ extraordinary powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President' extraordinary
powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto
powers of the Court1 and Congress.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in anl appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
ground of lack 01 sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by th e President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation o~ suspension, the Court considers only the
information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On thd other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I
which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could
probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it , may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but
likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with
veto powers independently from each other

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately be applied for, and
the Supreme Court shall also review the factual basis

By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the
same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just
on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray
declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this proceeding.

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from,
the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not
deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

 CALIBRATION OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER

o NO, IT DOES NOT CALIBRATE THE PRESIDENT’S POWER VESTED BY THE CONSTITUTION

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police
action. 114 The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115
the only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting
grave abuse of discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is xx x not
subject to judicial review.

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law
may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it.

Limitations of martial law and or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (1) time limit of 60
days, (2) review and possible revocation of congress, (3) review and possible nullification of SC

The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of tle writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment
and suppression of civil rights a d individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a wami g to
citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the military ~o assist in the maintenance of law and
order, and while the emergen~1y remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a
manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce t e law.122 As such, their exercise requires
more stringent safeguards by t e Congress, and review by the Court

What really happens during the imposition of martial law?

Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a vali declaration of
martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may ordet the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on publi assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and ( d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the Presidenf may perform do not give him unbridled
discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspen the
operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation o civil courts or legislative assemblies.
Moreover, the guarantees under th Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instanc where
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, sue suspension applies only to those judicially
charged with rebellion or offense d . h. . 129 connecte wit mvas10n.

 GRADUATION OF POWERS

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-,. Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated
power[s]'.

It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not
in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This
socalled "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which
power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it
therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere
exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President.
The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a
judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his
prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.
132

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount
to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at
least initially, lies with the President.

The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress
in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports
the conclusion that judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his
graduated powers be availed of in a given situation.

It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations

In necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege I of the writ of habeas corpus. It
was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus

Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or
in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the
country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into
the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive Department.
 RECOMMENDATION OF DEFENSE SECRETARY
o NO, IT IS NOT A CONDITION BEFORE THE PRESIDENT CAN PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW

Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking
military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition
except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be
contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere
alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-
in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

In any event, the President initially employed the most benign action -the calling out power before he declared
martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless
violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the
foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his part to
use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis still the President made the conscious and
deliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among hjs extraordinary powers. As the initial and
preliminary step towar ,s suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to
use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened.
Thus, exercising his sol~ and exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law an~ suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that thf armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual
rebellion and publif safety requires it.

 VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

o NO, IT IS NOT VOID ON ITS FACE

Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase
"other rebel groups" 139 in it~ Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actua'
operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making thtj proclamation susceptible to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, 01 confusion.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: ( 1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible ' "'chilling effect' on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime
under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence."
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds void for vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation
No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facial challenged.
148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad interpretation,
misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.

The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the
words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in
Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has no guidelines
specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will
serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation.

Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, generql orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being,
irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders i violation of the Constitution and the
laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there
is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed a~ trespassing into the sphere that is
reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

 NULLIFYING THE PROCLAMATION HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON PREVIOUS ACTIONS

COMMENCED BY THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO THE SITUATION.
o NO, IT WILL HAVE NO EFFECTON THE PREVIOUS PROCLAMATION AND OR DECISION OF
PRESIDENT DUTERTE

The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the! President's declaration of a state of national
emergency on account of 1 lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016,
where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National1 Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to
suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from
spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines

In Kulayan v. Tan, 152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different category from the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law:

Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power
in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification

In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be
a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces
necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 154 the President's exercise of his power to call out
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the
Court as to whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion.

This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's jurisdiction to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law

But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basi$ for the declaration of martial law in this
case, such ruling could not affect tht President's exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.

Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President done
pursuant thereto. Under th~ "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative
fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.158

'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration .

 SCOPE OF THE POWER TO REVIEW

o ONLY TO FACTUAL BASIS EXISTING PRIOR TO PROCLAMATION

Th 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on th determination of the sufficiency of the
factual bases, has in fact done awa with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.

Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are
presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase
"sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test
for judicial review of the. President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the
President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient
factual bases.

As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court Since
the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the ' determination of this Court as to whether
there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by o
available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found
in the proclamation as well as that written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on that
situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As tq how far the past events should be
from the present depends on the President

As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the President.165 As
Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and what not to include in the
proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security.
He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential infonnation that may prejudice the operations
and the safety of the military.

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report,
cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already
issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination
of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the
Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the
urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him
and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that
only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the
President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him.

Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even
only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events
prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.

In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would
be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e.,
whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him
to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

 IS THERE REBELLION
o YES, THERE IS REBELLION

Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual
invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of
the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down

Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer t~ rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the
RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create confusion but would also give the President wide
latitude of discretion, which may be abused -a situation that the constitution seeks to prevent

Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public uprising and
(b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove
from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii)
any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."

Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the
standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial
law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the
President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law
or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would
require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the
requirement of probable cause is much simpler.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or
veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President
that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency
and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President As such, he is not expected to completely
validate all the information h~ received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City. 179 However, they insist that the
armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the
removal from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any
part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following conclusions, as
mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:

1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government
this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws
of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion."221

2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly
constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao
-starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur -from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and
depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of the
people therein and the nation as a whole."222

3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic
State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities -the President, foremost -of their
powers and prerogatives. "223

4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups'
seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the
entire Mindanao. "224

5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further
expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout
Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of
DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and
eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government

6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting tp deprive the President of his
power, authority, and prerogatives withih Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the
enti~e Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executi~~e departments, bureaus, and
 offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensu e that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his
supervisory powe s 226 ' over local governments." · I

i i 7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now faqe pronounced difficulty sending their
reports to the Chief Executive due to tlle city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been
prevente from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals,
medical services in Marawi City have been adverse! affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by
the groups effective! deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizen .... Troop
reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government fro restoring peace and order in the
area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered.
"227

8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-
based terrorists and illegal drug mone , and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed
groups_ ~n Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety · n Marawi City; they
have likewise compromised the security of the enti e Island ofMindanao."228

I 9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities amojlg terrorist groups, local criminals, and
lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolu e
control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swi and decisive action to ensure the
safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity."229

Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable
purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to
deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative~, leading the President to believe that there
was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation
No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion,
that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of
the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his
powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.

The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated f n Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false,
inaccurate, simulated, and/ r hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concern d about
absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the
President in responding to an urgent situation.

Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with
these alleged false data is arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion
exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law r suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion
and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the
ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise
against civilians and their properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were
issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set up;244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian
hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were
forced to join their group;248 medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements
of government troops and civilian movement were hindered;250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island
was compromised.25

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires
the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive or all-
encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has
possession of documents and information classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in
the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security. These documents may contain information detailing
the position of government troops and rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and
operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court,
some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report. But then again, the
discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the President. In
fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of
facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President

In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the right,
prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his positions
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine
the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may
put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.

The significance of martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all,
martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty
and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal
enemies but also against those enemies~ lurking from beyond our shores

Conscious of those fears ~d apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered
down the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief
because of [the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion
r,· r rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless soon r revoked, nullified, or extended; at the
same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention of
and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger,
injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any
physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds.

Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be limited to the particular
vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as
a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves.

Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is
actual rebellion; it extends ~o other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It 'is not
intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Mara i City, but also to avoid enemy
reinforcements and to cut their supply lines

The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to overreach is to infringe upon another's
territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court
cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence,
undermining the foundation of our republican system

To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical
value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an
act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial
law.

Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic
and strategic reasons. , Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report,
"[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines,
and backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of
Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to
various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping,
and the murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance
of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.

Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and tbe linkages established among rebel groups,
the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marmfi. The Court
therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano
massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulµ, and Basilan,
among others.298 The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without
predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well
as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary,
effective, and called for by the circumstances.

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is
political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish
a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the
President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of
rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same
will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as
the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a
curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the
government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the
existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 whiJh states that rebellion and terrorism are
mutuallty exclusive of each other ?r that they cannot co-exist together. RA 93 72 does not expressly or impliedly
repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the
other as they have differett elements. 300

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

Original case: FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC. vs. CA

[G.R. No. 127022. November 14, 2000]

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated NOV 14 2000.

G.R No 127022 (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA.) and

G.R.No.127245 (Republic vs. CA.)

Francisco C. Nieto filed the instant petition/motion praying that he be allowed to intervene in these consolidated
cases for having legal interest in the land subject of these cases. He alleges that the subject land forms part of
the San Pedro Estate under "Composicion Con el estado" Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894
which is under his administration under Special Proceeding No.312-B. He prays for the annulment of our decision
dated September 2, 1999 contending that the parties in the instant cases have no valid titles in their names in
view of the existence of the titulo de propriedad no. 4136.

We deny Nieto's prayer.

It appears that Nieto is asking for the reconsideration of the Court's decision dated September 2, 1999, but he
has no personality to do so considering that he was never a party in these consolidated cases, either in the Court
of Appeals or in this Court. He cannot be allowed to intervene at this very stage of the proceedings, 1 Section 2
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Time to intervene- The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.and he has not shown legal interest in the subject matter of these cases considering that he failed to
show the relevance of the alleged titulo de propriedad no. 4136 to the subject land after the same titulo had
already been declared null and void in 1996. 2 Nieto relies on the titulo de propriedad no. 4136 which was
already declared null and void in the case of Intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs CA
265 SCRA 733 the dispositive portion reads

xxxx

In G R No 106496 judgment is hereby rendered as follows

(1) Titulo de Propriedad No 4136 is declared null and void, and therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;

(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;

(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is,
hereby closed and terminated.

(4) The heirs, agents, privies and for anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership to otherwise, dispose of in any
manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby
ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.

This judgment is immediately executory.

WHEREFORE, Francisco Nieto's prayer for reconsideration and intervention is DENIED for lack of merit.

Further, the Court Resolved to DENY the handwritten letter dated 11 October 2000 of Ms. Emiliana Acosta de
FelicidarIo requesting that Mr. Francisco C. Nieto be furnished with resolutions/decisions at their given address, in
view of the denial of the request.

The Court (a) NOTED and GRANTED the manifestation and motion to adopt comment dated 19 October 2000
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner Republic of the Philippines requesting to comment on the
manifestation and Motion filed by the Espinosas, in compliance with the resolution of 3 October 2000 and (b)
GRANTED the letter dated 25 October 2000 of Mr. Rabbi E. Deloso of Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc &
de los Angeles Law Offices, requesting photocopy of OCT No. 4216 allegedly contained in the records of these
cases. Mendoza, J., is on leave, abroad.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

[G.R. No. 127245. June 28, 2000]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT
BUREAU, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCNIO E. MARGOLLES,
ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA A. LAPERAL, NORMA C.
ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(formerly CFI) of RIZAL, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PURISIMA, J.:

This resolves petitioners Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases, which the Third Division
decided on September 2, 1999. The motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioners, Republic of
the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.

Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of November 18,
1993:

xxx, the following are considered en banc cases:

1.....Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;

2.....Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;

3.....Cases raising novel questions of law;

4.....Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;

5.....Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission
on Elections, and Commission on Audit;

6.....Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of
the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;

7.....Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed;

8.....Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit
the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of
the court en banc; and

9.....All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.

The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court
alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of title as well
as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it
was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order.
The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question, when the herein private
respondents obtained their decree of registration thereover.

In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded that it is not infallible. Should any error
of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and the parties adversely affected thereby are
not precluded from seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction,
rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of paramount importance.

Here, there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these
consolidated cases for the consideration of the Court. A pleading, entitled "FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA," was presented but when the same was first brought to its attention on March
7, 2000, the Court opined that since the Third Division had not yet acted on subject motions to refer the cases to
the Banc, it was then premature for the Court to resolve the consulta. However, the Court succinctly cautioned
that the action of the Third Division on the matter would just be tentative.

On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners motion to transfer these cases to the Banc.
Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases for
the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its
attention. Evidently, the action of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL
POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which
reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention." (underscoring supplied)

Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices who
voted to treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any cogent or compelling reason for
such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated November 18, 1993, has been
cited to support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found to be of
sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer
of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the Court en banc to hear and resolve their
pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the Court constitutes a reason
cogent and compelling enough to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide
petitioners motions for reconsideration.

It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and
disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair
justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and
consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It
was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership -
that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court. It is,
of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest
of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of
the Court to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be observed.

Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the Sumilao case is misplaced. The said case is not
on all fours with these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc en consulta, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision therein rendered had been voted upon by the Second Division with a vote of 2-2.
The Court ruled that the stalemate resulting from the said voting constituted a denial of the motion for
reconsideration.

In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners,
Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and unresolved.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone the enormous value of the
area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their
pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.

WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc cases; and petitioners motions
for reconsideration are hereby set for oral argument on July 18, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Let corresponding notices
issue.

SO ORDERED.

(1)

In re Edillon

(A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978])

Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?

Held:
It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is a ready a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was
greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article
X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

(2)

FACTS:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 1975, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the name of
Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding
multiple due notices sent to him.
ISSUES:

Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom
to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program —
the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered to be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.
RAUL H. SESBREO, G.R. No. 161390
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PROVINCE OF AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CEBU, GOV. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, THE CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PROVINCIAL TREASURER, THE REYES, JJ.
PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, THE PROVINCIAL
ENGINEER PATROCINIO BACAY (sued Promulgated:
both in their official and personal
capacities), April 16, 2008
Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 23, 2003 and its Resolution[2] dated January
12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287. The assailed decision reversed the decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, Cebu City in Civil Case R-19022 insofar as the RTC held the Province of Cebu liable for damages
to petitioner Raul H. Sesbreo. The assailed resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
 On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros[4] hired the petitioner to prosecute Civil
Cases Nos. R-10933[5] and R-11214,[6] evidenced by an Agreement,[7] the terms of which read as follows:

AGREEMENT

WE, the undersigned, hereby agree to pay Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, thirty (30%) percent of
whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that we may recover in the mandamus and other cases
that we are filing or have filed against the Province of Cebu, the Provincial Governor, etc.,
whether or not the said cases will be amicably settled or decided by the courts by final
judgment. We shall take care of all expenses in connection with the said cases. [8]

During the pendency of the aforesaid cases or on April 17, 1979, petitioner registered his charging/retaining lien
based on the Agreement.[9]
The camineros obtained favorable judgment when the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Cebu ordered
that they be reinstated to their original positions with back salaries, together with all privileges and salary
adjustments or increases.[10] Aggrieved, the Commissioner of Public Highways and the District Engineer
filed certiorari cases before this Court where the petitioner willingly rendered further legal assistance and
represented the camineros.

When respondent Eduardo R. Gullas (Gov. Gullas) assumed the position of governor of Cebu, he
proposed the compromise settlement of all mandamus cases then pending against the province which included
Civil Cases Nos. R-10933 and R-11214 handled by the petitioner.

On April 21, 1979, the camineros, represented by the petitioner, and the province of Cebu, through then Gov.
Gullas, forged a Compromise Agreement,[11] with the following terms and conditions:

1. The respondent Province of Cebu represented in this act by Gov. Eduardo R. Gullas,
duly authorized by proper resolution of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, hereby agrees to
immediately appropriate and pay full backwages and salaries as awarded by the trial court in its
decision to all the private respondents-employees from and after July 1, 1968, the date of their
termination, up to the date of the approval of the herein Compromise Agreement by the
Honorable Supreme Court, except for those who are qualified for compulsory retirement whose
back salaries and wages shall be limited up to the effective date of their retirement.

xxxx

9. That the amounts payable to the employees concerned represented by Atty. Raul H.
Sesbreo is subject to said lawyers charging and retaining liens as registered in the trial court and
in the Honorable Court of Appeals.

xxxx
 11. That upon request of the employees concerned, most of whom are in dire actual
financial straits, the Province of Cebu is agreeable to paying an advance of P5,000.00 to each
employee payable through their counsel, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, deductible from the total amount
that each will receive from the Province of Cebu, effective upon confirmation by the Honorable
Solicitor General, the Supreme Court and the Philippine National Bank where the JJ (now
infrastructure funds) are now in deposit under trust. [12]

Apparently, the camineros waived their right to reinstatement embodied in the CFI decision and the province
agreed that it immediately pay them their back salaries and other claims. This Court adopted said compromise
agreement in our decision[13] dated December 18, 1979.[14]

In view of the finality of the above decision, the camineros, through their new counsel (who substituted for the
petitioner), moved for its execution. The court then ordered the issuance of a partial writ of execution directing
the payment of only 45% of the amount due them based on the computation of the provincial engineering office
as audited by the authority concerned. [15] The court did not release the remaining 55%, thus holding in abeyance
the payment of the lawyers fees pending the determination of the final amount of such fees. [16] However, instead
of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the
full amount of their adjudicated claims.[17]

Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for Damages (Thru Breach of Contract) and Attorneys Fees against the
Province of Cebu, the provincial governor, treasurer, auditor, and engineer in their official and personal
capacities, as well as against his former clients (the camineros).[18]

Petitioner anchored his claim on the provision of the Civil Code, specifically Article 19 [19] thereof. He alleged that
by directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, the respondents induced the camineros to violate their
written contract for attorneys fees.[20] He likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement approved
by the Court by computing the camineros money claims based on the provincial instead of the national wage rate
which, consequently, yielded a lower amount. [21] Petitioner went on to say that although he was not a party to the
above contracts, by virtue of the registration of his charging lien, he was a quasi-party and thus, had legal
standing to institute the case below.[22]

On August 23, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case against the camineros after he had entered into an
agreement with them and settled their differences.[23] The case, however, proceeded against the respondents.

On October 18, 1992, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondent province of Cebu, the pertinent portion of which reads:
 Wherefore, for all the foregoing, judgment is rendered, ordering
the defendant Province of Cebu to pay the plaintiff the following sums:

(a) P669,336.51 in actual damages; with interest of 12% per annum

from date of demand until fully paid;
(b) P20,000.00 in moral damages;
(c) P5,000.00 in litigation expenses; and
(d) To pay the costs.[24]

While maintaining the validity of the compromise agreement, the trial court found that the petitioners
money claims should have been computed based on the national and not the provincial rate of wages paid
the camineros. Accordingly, the court declared that the petitioner was prejudiced to the extent of the difference
between these two rates. The court further upheld the petitioners status as a quasi-party considering that he had
a registered charging lien. However, it did not give credence to the petitioners claim that the respondent public
officials induced the camineros to violate their contract, and thus, absolved them from liability.

On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint. [25] The appellate court
concluded that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his allegation that the respondents induced
the camineros to violate the agreement for attorneys fees and the compromise agreement, and that he suffered
damage due to respondents act of directly paying the camineros the amounts due them.[26]

Hence, the instant petition. In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT

DECISION DUE TO LONG DELAY IN DECIDING CA-G.R. CV NO. 43287.

2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE APPEAL IN CA-

G.R. CV NO. 43287 FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND DUE TO THE FATALLY-DEFECTIVE
APPELLANTS BRIEF.

3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT

DECISION BY DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT FIX THE ATTORNEYS FEES OF
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS CLEAR THAT WHAT
WAS ADJUDGED WAS THE DECLARATION THAT THERE WAS BREACH OF THE COMPROMISE
CONTRACT AND DAMAGES ARE TO BE AWARDED THE PETITIONER.

4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING RESPONDENTS

GULLAS, RESENTES, SANCHEZ AND BACAY AS PERSONALLY LIABLE AND THAT THEIR
PERSONAL LIABILITY IS SOLIDARY WITH THAT OF RESPONDENT PROVINCE OF CEBU.

5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS ARE SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PAY TO PETITIONER ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY,
MORAL, EXEMPLARY, NOMINAL, TEMPERATE DAMAGES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND LOSS OF
EARNINGS AND INTERESTS.[27]
 The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioner insists that the CA should have affirmed the trial courts decision in view of the delay in
resolving the case, and should have denied the appeal because of the formal defects in the appellants brief.
[28]
Petitioner cites the cases of Malacora v. Court of Appeals[29] and Flora v. Pajarillaga[30] where this Court held
that an appealed case which had been pending beyond the time fixed by the Constitution should be deemed
affirmed.

We cannot apply the cited cases to the one at bench because they were decided on the basis of Section
11 (2), Article X of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 11. x x x

(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the
applicable maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding decision
or resolution because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order, or resolution
appealed from shall be deemed affirmed x x x.

That provision is not found in the present Constitution. The court, under the 1987 Constitution, is now mandated
to decide or resolve the case or matter submitted to it for determination within specified periods. [31] Even when
there is delay and no decision or resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is no automatic affirmance
of the appealed decision. The appellate court, therefore, cannot be faulted in not affirming the RTCs
decision. While we do not tolerate delay in the disposition of cases, we cannot dismiss appealed cases solely
because they had been pending in court for a long period, especially when the appeal is highly meritorious as in
the present case.

Likewise, we cannot agree with the petitioner that the appealed case be dismissed on account of the
formal defects in respondents appellants brief filed before the CA. The requirements laid down by the Rules of
Court on the contents of the brief are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper
conclusion of the case.[32]However, despite its deficiencies, respondents appellants brief is sufficient in form and
substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts and nature of the case, as well as the issues
raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same. [33] Thus, we sustain the CAs decision to rule on the
merits of the appeal instead of dismissing it on mere technicality.

Now, on the main issue of whether or not respondents are liable for damages for breach of contract.

Petitioner clarifies that he instituted the instant case for breach of the compromise agreement and not for
violation of the agreement for attorneys fees as mistakenly concluded by the appellate court. He also
cites Calalang v. De Borja[34] in support of his right to collect the amounts due him against the judgment debtor
(the respondents).[35]Lastly, petitioner argues that the respondent public officials acted beyond the scope of their
authority when they directly paid the camineros their money claims and failed to withhold the petitioners
fees. There is, according to the petitioner, a showing of bad faith on the part of the province and the public
officials concerned.
After a careful scrutiny of the record of the case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts
conclusion. We would like to stress at this point that the compromise agreement had been validly entered into by
the respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court. Its
validity, therefore, had been laid to rest as early as 1979 when the Court promulgated its decision
in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos .[36] In fact, the judgment had already been fully satisfied by the
respondents. It was precisely this full satisfaction of judgment that gave rise to the instant controversy, based
primarily on the petitioners claim that he was prejudiced because of the following: 1) the wrong computation in
the camineros money claims by using the provincial and not the national wage rate; and 2) the mode of
satisfying the judgment through direct payment which impaired his registered charging lien.

Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for attorneys fees voluntarily
executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay the former thirty (30%) percent of whatever back
salaries, damages, etc. that they might recover in the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have
filed. Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a specified rate agreed upon
on how the money claims were to be computed. The use of the word whatever shows that the basis for the
computation would be the amount that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the
parties agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed upon by them in
the compromise agreement approved by the court. And since the compromise agreement had assumed finality,
this Court can no longer delve into its substance, especially at this time when the judgment had already been
fully satisfied. We cannot allow the petitioner to question anew the compromise agreement on the pretext that he
suffered damage. As long as he was given the agreed percentage of the amount received by the camineros, then,
the agreement is deemed complied with, and petitioner cannot claim to have suffered damage.

Petitioner likewise claims that he was prejudiced by respondents act in directly paying the camineros the
amounts due them, as it rendered inutile the charging lien duly registered for his protection.

To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with
his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession until what is due him has been
paid, but also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued pursuant to such
judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been retained by the client. [37] Section 37, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court specifically provides:

Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers
of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim
 of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions
as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.

A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer for services in a suit secured to
him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff
should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the
services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.[38]

In this case, the existence of petitioners charging lien is undisputed since it was properly registered in the
records. The parties even acknowledged its existence in their compromise agreement. However, a problem arose
when the respondents directly paid in full the camineros money claims and did not withhold that portion which
corresponds to petitioners fees.

When the judgment debt was fully satisfied, petitioner could have enforced his lien either against his clients
(the camineros herein) or against the judgment debtor (the respondents herein). The clients, upon receiving
satisfaction of their claims without paying their lawyer, should have held the proceeds in trust for him to the
extent of the amount of his recorded lien, because after the charging lien had attached, the attorney is, to the
extent of said lien, regarded as an equitable assignee of the judgment or funds produced by his efforts. [39] The
judgment debtors may likewise be held responsible for their failure to withhold from the camineros the amount of
attorneys fees due the petitioner.
In the instant case, the petitioner rightly commenced an action against both his clients and the judgment
debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn on
the ground that he had settled his differences with them. He maintained the case against respondents because,
according to him, the computation of the camineros money claims should have been based on the national and
not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should be made liable for the
difference.

While the respondents may have impaired the petitioners charging lien by satisfying the judgment without regard
for the lawyers right to attorneys fees, we cannot apply the doctrine enunciated in Calalang v. Judge de Borja,
[40]
because of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case. In Calalang, this Court stressed that the
judgment debtor may be held responsible for his failure to withhold the amount of attorneys fees in accordance
with the duly registered charging lien. [41] However, there is a disparity between the two cases, because, in this
case, the petitioner had withdrawn his complaint against the camineros with whom he had a contract for legal
services. The withdrawal was premised on a settlement, which indicates that his former clients already paid their
obligations. This is bolstered by the certification of the clerk of court that his former clients had deposited their
passbooks to ensure payment of the agreed fees. Having been paid by his clients in accordance with the
agreement, his claim against the respondents, therefore, has no leg to stand on.

Neither can the petitioner rely on Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, etc. [42] where this court declared
that satisfaction of the judgment, in general, does not by itself bar or extinguish the attorneys liens, as the court
may even vacate such satisfaction and enforce judgment for the amount of the lien. [43] However, the satisfaction
of the judgment extinguishes the lien if there has been a waiver, as shown either by the attorneys conduct or by
his passive omission.[44] In the instant case, petitioners act in withdrawing the case against the camineros and
agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien. No rule will allow a lawyer to
collect from his client and then collect anew from the judgment debtor except, perhaps, on a claim for a bigger
amount which, as earlier discussed, is baseless.

Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yields
profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike
mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.[45]

Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and considering further that he had settled
his case as against his former clients, we cannot sustain his right to damages for breach of contract against the
respondents, even on the basis of Articles 1191 [46] or 1311.[47] Although we sustain his status to institute the
instant case, we cannot render a favorable judgment because there was no breach of contract. Even if there was
such a breach, he had waived his right to claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving
from liability those who were primarily liable to him. Thus, no liability can be imputed to the province of Cebu or
to the respondent public officials, either in their personal or official capacities.

Lastly, we cannot ascribe bad faith to the respondents who directly paid the camineros the amounts due
them. The records do not show that when they did so, they induced the camineros to violate their contract with
the petitioner; nor do the records show that they paid their obligation in order to cause prejudice to the
petitioner. The attendant circumstances, in fact, show that the camineros acknowledged their liability to the
petitioner and they willingly fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for the petitioner to
have acceded to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving the agreed attorneys fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 23, 2003 and its Resolution dated January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287 are AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 161390. April 16, 2008.]
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
PROVINCE OF CEBU, GOV. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, THE
PROVINCIAL TREASURER, THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, THE
PROVINCIAL ENGINEER PATROCINIO BACAY (sued both in their
official and personal capacities), respondents.
-Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner to prosecuteCivil Cases against Commissioner of
Public Highways and the District
Engineer
-agreement: pay Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, thirty (30%) percent of
whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they may recover; take care of
all expenses in connection with the said cases.
-during pendency petitioner registered his charging/retaining lien based
on the Agreement.
-camineros obtained favorable judgment in CFI
-certiorari cases filed by aggrieved party
-Gov. Gullas assumed the position of governor of Cebu, he proposed the
compromise settlement of all mandamus cases then pending against the
province which included Civil Cases handled by the petitioner.
-Under the Comp Agreement executed by Guillas and pet:

– immediately appropriate and pay full backwages and

salaries as awarded by the trial court

– amounts payable to the employeesis subject to said
lawyer's charging and retaining liens as registered in the
trial court and in the Honorable Court of Appeals
– agreeable to paying an advance of P5,000.00 to each
employee payable through their counsel,
-camineros, through their new counsel (who substituted for the
petitioner), moved for its execution.
- court then ordered the issuance of a partial writ of execution directing
the payment of only 45% of the amount due them and hold 55%
-However, instead of complying with the court order directing partial
payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full
amount of their adjudicated claims.
-petitioner filed the complaint for Damages (Thru Breach of Contract)
and Attorney's Fees against the Province of Cebu and its officials and
against the camineros. (alleged that by directly paying the camineros the
amounts due them, the respondents induced the camineros to violate
their written contract for attorney's fees.)
- claimed that they violated the compromise agreement approved by the
Court
-although he was not a party to the above contracts, by virtue of the
registration of his charging lien, he was a quasi-party and thus, had legal
standing to institute the case
-dismiss case against the camineros after they had entered into an
agreement but continued against province of Cebu
RTC: favored petitioner and ordered the province to pay him
CA: reversed (petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his allegation that
the respondents induced the camineros to violate the agreement for
attorney's fees and the compromise agreement, and that he suffered
damage due to respondents' act of directly paying the camineros the
amounts due them. )
SC:
-compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the respondents
and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment
rendered by this Court.
-evidenced by an agreement for attorney's fees voluntarily executed by
the camineros where the latter agreed to pay the former "thirty (30%)
percent no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract
nor was a specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to
be computed. --- use of the word "whatever" shows that the basis for the
computation would be the amount that the court would award in favor of
the camineros
-Since they agreed to compromise, payment would have to be based on
the amount agreed upon by them in the compromise agreement
-Considering that petitioner's claim of higher attorney's fees is baseless
and considering further that he had settled his case as against his former
clients, cannot sustain his right to damages for breach of contract against
the respondents, even on the basis of Articles 1191 46 or 1311.
cannot render a favorable judgment because there was no breach of
contract. Even if there was such a breach, he had waived his right to
claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving
from liability those who were primarily liable to him.
-The records do not show that when they did so, they induced the
camineros to violate their contract with the petitioner; nor do the records
show that they paid their obligation in order to cause prejudice to the
petitioner.
– petition is hereby DENIED..CA AFFIRMED
EN BANC

RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE

ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA

X----------------------------X

ATTY. ROBERTO C. PADILLA,

Complainant,

-versus- A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. Present:

ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent. PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 20, 2007

x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Cases

Before Us are two (2) administrative cases against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals [CA].

The first, docketed as A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, stems from an unsigned letter dated February 17, 2006,
addressed to Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, complaining that Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion has been sitting
on motions for reconsideration for six months to more than a year unless the parties come across. [1] On July 18,
2006, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to retired Supreme Court Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt thereof.

Subsequently, on August 29, 2006, the Court also referred to Investigator-designate Justice Pardo an
unsigned letter dated August 17, 2006, allegedly from an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, fully
supporting the investigation of Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and citing one particular case pending in his division
that will show how he operates.[2] The case mentioned in the letter is Bank of Commerce v. Hon. Evelyn Corpus-
Cabochan, et al., CA-G.R. No. 91258, allegedly involving an irregularly issued temporary restraining order [TRO].

The second administrative case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is based on a verified complaint dated August 22,
2006 [3]
filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla with the Office of the Court Administrator, charging Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion with culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice and gross ignorance of
the law in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled Philippine National Bank v. NLRC and Erlinda
Archinas. The Court likewise referred this complaint to Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On March 1, 2007, Justice Pardo submitted to this Court his Report and Recommendation [Report]
dated February 28, 2007.

Justice Pardo reports that he conducted an investigation of the cases on August 10 and 30, September 14
and 27, October 4, 16 and 26, December 8, all in 2006, and on January 18, 2007. On each of these dates, the
respondent was present, and in connection with A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, respondent Justice Asuncion was
represented by counsel.

Justice Asuncions Antecedents

From the record, it appears that respondent Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion was appointed Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals on May 24, 1999, and assumed office on May 25, 1999. On July 5, 2004, he was assigned
as Chairman, 18th Division of the CA, stationed in Cebu City. In an order dated July 7, 2004, CA Presiding Justice
Cancio C. Garcia directed that all Manila cases left by Justice Asuncion shall automatically be assigned to Justice
[Monina Arevalo] Zenarosa.[4] On November 3, 2004, Justice Asuncion was re-assigned to Manila, as Chairman,
17th Division, CA. From August 4, 2006 to date, he has been Chairman, 11th Division, CA, Manila.

The Investigation

A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA

The unsigned letter complaint, that gave rise to the instant case, reads:

February 17, 2006

Hon. Artemio V. Panganiban

Chief Justice, Supreme Court
Padre Faura, Manila

Sir:
 Please direct an immediate judicial audit on Court of Appeals Justice Elvi Asuncion.

This magistrate has been sitting on motions for reconsideration for six months to more than a
year unless the parties come across.

This CA Justice is an unmitigated disgrace to the judiciary. How he ever reached his lofty position
is truly disconcerting. He is a thoroughly CORRUPT person who has no shame using his office to
extort money from litigants. He is equally, if not more, deprave than Demetrio Demetria who was
dismissed by the Supreme Court. Asunciondeserves not only dismissal but DISBARMENT as
well. Because the law profession should also be purged of CROOKS like him.

I hope you can terminate his service in the judiciary ASAP to save the institution. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

AN AGGRIEVED PARTY

To the foregoing complaint, respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated August 30, 2006[5] in
which he strongly denied the charge of deliberate inaction on pending motions for reconsideration in cases
assigned to him unless the parties came across. He adverted to the unsigned letter as the work of the same
group that previously instigated false accusations which also resulted in my being investigated by the Supreme
Court through the Hon. Justice Carolina C. Grino-Aquino. He admitted, however, to some delays in the resolution
of some motions for reconsideration, and cited the following justifiable reasons: (1) The heavy caseload initially
assigned to CA justices, coupled with the newly assigned cases raffled daily and the re-raffled cases originally
handled by promoted or retired justices; (2) The reorganization of the CA and his assignment as Chairman of the
18th Division based in Cebu City, which created some confusion in the status of cases assigned to him; (3) The
physical transfer of his office, aggravated by a lapse in the monitoring system of my office; and (4) The various
administrative assignments, especially in helping organize special events, given to him by the CA Presiding
Justice, which demanded time and attention.

On September 11, 2006, respondent filed his Comment [6] on the unsigned letter dated August 17, 2006 of
an alleged CA Associate Justice. He denied that there was any irregularity in the issuance of the temporary
restraining order and of the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction, stating that the same was done in the
sound exercise of the Courts discretion. The respondent stressed that the cited case, CA-G.R. SP No. 91258, was
still pending in his division and not germane to the on-going investigation against him for supposed deliberate
inaction on pending motions for reconsideration.
 In this connection, the Investigating Justice reports that after making inquiries, he found that the Court
of Appeals had not acted on the approval of the injunction bond in this case, thus, no writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued to date.[7]

Meanwhile, in the August 31, 2006 investigation, Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, Clerk of Court, CA en
banc, submitted to the designated Investigator the list of cases raffled to respondent since his assumption of
office in 1999, as follows:

a) Master List of Criminal Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 11 June 1999 to 25 May
2006, consisting of 112 cases;

b) Master List of Heinous Crimes Raffled to J. Asuncion from 20 Nov. 2004 to 22 June
2006, consisting of 33 cases;

c) Master List of Civil Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 14 June 1999 to 16 August 2006,
consisting of 625 cases; and

d) Master List of Special Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 14 June 1999 to 31 July 2006,
consisting of 651 cases.

The Investigating Justice also required the respondent to submit a report on the status of the cases
contained in the handwritten list given to the respondent on September 14, 2006. In his written compliance,[8] the
respondent reiterated his plea that justifiable reasons attended the delay in the resolution of some cases.

Subsequently, on October 4, 2006, the respondent submitted a report on the status of the cases in a new
list given to him after the September 27, 2006investigation[9]

This, and earlier reports on the status of cases assigned to respondent Justice Asuncion, would be the
basis of the findings of the Investigating Justice.

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J

As mentioned above, this second case is based on a verified complaint filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, charging
Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice and
gross ignorance of the law, in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC
and Erlinda Archinas.

The facts, as culled from the Investigating Justices Report [10], are as follows:
On June 27, 2000, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decided in her favor the claim of Ms.
Erlinda Archinas for reinstatement and payment of back wages against the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), affirming in toto the ruling of Labor Arbiter Celestino Daing ordering her
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of back wages.

On August 25, 2000, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the NLRC (CA-G.R. SP No. 60573).

Meantime, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment making final and executory the decision of the
labor arbiter as of July 17, 2000, pursuant to Sec. 2[c], Rule VIII of the NLRC Rules. Ms. Archinas
filed a motion for a writ of execution for the uncontested amount of P1,096,233.97. PNB opposed
the motion. In view of the pending petition with the CA, the labor arbiter deferred action on the
motion for execution.

On May 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through respondent Justice Asuncion, dismissed the
petition of PNB and affirmed in toto the decision of NLRC in favor of Ms. Archinas.

On June 13, 2001, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision, to which Ms. Archinas filed, on June 25, 2001, an opposition. On June 25, 2001, PNBs
motion for reconsideration was deemed submitted for resolution.

In the interim, on June 18, 2001, the labor arbiter granted Ms. Archinas motion for execution of
the uncontested amount of P1,096,233.97, for which the Sheriff of the NLRC levied upon
personal property of the PNB and scheduled an auction sale on July 25, 2001. Upon motion of
PNB, on July 24, 2001, respondent Asuncion issued the questioned resolution, which granted a
temporary restraining order to stop the auction sale by directing the labor arbiter to temporarily
enjoin implementation of the writ of execution. It likewise ordered the parties to maintain
the status quo pending resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration.

On October 30, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion issued another resolution which reiterated the
July 24, 2001 resolution ordering the parties to maintain the status quo in this case pending
resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration.

On November 5, 2001, Ms. Archinas filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
of the October 30, 2001 resolution.

Despite Ms. Archinas filing with the Court of Appeals of numerous motions for early resolution of
the motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion failed to
act and resolve the motion.
Finally, on August 7, 2006, respondent Justice issued a resolution denying PNBs motion for
reconsideration dated June 13, 2001. It, however, failed to directly address and resolve
Archinas November 5, 2001 motion for reconsideration. At any rate, it is noted that the denial of
PNBs motion would render moot Mrs. Archinas motion for reconsideration.

Respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated November 15, 2006 on the Padilla complaint,
raising the following arguments: [1] That the July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No.
60573 were collegial acts of the First Division, CA, duly concurred in by the two other CA justices of the division;
[2] That the July 24, 2001 resolution did not grant PNBs motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order,
and the October 30, 2001 resolution is not tantamount to a preliminary injunction issued ex parte; and [3] The
delay in resolving the motion for reconsideration was not deliberate or maliciously motivated. The respondent
restated therein the reasons he proffered in his Comment in A.M. No. 06-8-08-CA.

The Findings of the Investigating Justice

In the first administrative case, A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, the Investigating Justice submits the
following findings:

After meticulous analysis of the record and the evidence submitted, the investigation
would show that, as related in the unsigned letter of February 17, 2006, there were indeed
several cases assigned to respondent Justice Asuncion with motions for reconsideration still
remaining unresolved way beyond the ninety day period prescribed in Rule 52, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. Moreover, there were also numerous motions for reconsideration which
respondent Justice resolved beyond the reglementary period.

The master lists of cases submitted by the Clerk of Court, CA, en banc, disclose that, as
of September 30, 2006, there were seventy one motions for reconsideration
still pending resolution; further, there were one hundred seventy nine motions for
reconsideration which were resolved beyond the ninety-day period[11]

xxxxxxxxx

What is more, there are several cases assigned to respondent Justice Asuncion which are
still undecided, and those that were decided beyond the one (1) year period prescribed in the
1987 Constitution.

xxxxxxxxx

As of September 30, 2006, the following eighty-two cases remain undecided[12]:

xxxxxxxxx

Further, there were four hundred nine cases which had been decided beyond the
twelve month period prescribed in the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII, Section 15[1]), to wit [13]:

xxxxxxxxx

In his comments dated August 30, 2006, and November 15, 2006, respondent Justice
Asuncion admitted delay in the resolution of some motions for reconsideration of cases assigned
to him albeit with obvious pride in his massive record of disposition of cases x x x In fact,
respondent Justice Asuncion listed only nine cases that were still unresolved and pending as of
his reassignment to the CA-Cebu Station.

However, the record would show that there were motions for reconsideration filed as far
back as 2000 that were still pending resolution, as of the (sic) July 18, 2006, when the Supreme
Court took cognizance of the complaint. One was resolved on August 7, 2006, the PNB vs. NLRC
and Ms. Erlinda Archinas docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, which is the subject of the verified
complaint of Atty. Roberto C. Padilla (A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J). Such inaction in resolving motions
for reconsideration for years in contrast to the ninety day prescribed period in the Rules of Court
constitutes gross inefficiency and serious dereliction of duty that undermines the peoples
faith in the judiciary. x x x

There are also cases that were raffled to respondent Justice Asuncion before July 7,
2004, that remained undecided. More so, there were several cases that were ordered transferred
to Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa but remained with, and unexplainedly decided by respondent
Justice Asuncion, albeit beyond the reglementary period. How such cases supposedly transferred
to Justice Zenarosa remained or returned to Justice Asuncion is not explained, obviously in
contravention of Office Order No. 212-04-CG of the Presiding Justice, CA (Annex E). Indeed,
respondent Justice Asuncion should have acted in such a manner as to avoid suspicion in order
to preserve faith in the administration of justice[14]
xxxxxxxxx

As excuses or justification, respondent Justice stated that the delay in resolving cases is
partly due to the heavy initial caseloads of CA justices, the continuous raffling of new cases and
the re-raffling of old cases handled by promoted and retired CA justices. We find this position
unacceptable. It is necessary for newly-appointed justices to be assigned initial caseloads. No
one is exempted. Further, in the raffling and re-raffling of subsequent cases, these are more or
less equally distributed to all justices. Hence, not only respondent Justice, but all CA Justices are
swamped with cases. This, however, is not a reason to violate the clear mandate in the
Constitution and the Rules of Court to decide cases promptly and resolve motions for
reconsideration within their reglementary period. x x x

Again, respondent Justice attributes his admitted delay in resolving pending motions for
reconsideration to various administrative functions assigned to him by the Court or Presiding
Justice that took much of his time and attention. x x x

We are not impressed or swayed that these administrative functions greatly burdened
respondent Justice to the extent that he failed to discharge the basic duty of a justice with
diligence and efficiency. It is evident that such additional tasks are seasonal in nature, hence,
need not consume too much of his time to the detriment of pending cases. x x x

Consequently, respondent Justice Asuncion must be reminded that decision-making is the

primordial duty of a member of the bench. All other tasks must give way thereto. What is
alarming is that respondent Justice seemed to have reveled in his extra-curricular
activities of spearheading various celebrations and events that are not judicial functions. These
cannot take precedence over decision-making. [15]

In the second case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, the findings of the Investigating Justice are, as follows:

Complainant Padilla contends that respondent Justice Asuncion committed gross

ignorance of the law in issuing the October 30, 2001 resolution which extended indefinitely the
duration of the TRO issued on July 24, 2001, by ordering the parties to maintain the status
quo, pending resolution of the PNBs motion for reconsideration, in violation of Rule 58, Section 5
of the Rules of Court. Atty. Padilla further contends that respondents failure to speedily resolve
PNBs motion for reconsideration dated June 13, 2001, Archinas motion for reconsideration dated
November 5, 2001 and her numerous motions for early resolution thereof constitute culpable
dereliction of duty. Atty. Padilla stressed that respondent Justices reliance on Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals, [16] decided in 1988, to justify the issuance of the
two resolutions constitutes gross ignorance of the law, considering that the ruling thereon was
set aside by the Supreme Court in 1993 in the case of Santiago v. Vasquez[17].Further, he averred
that the Eternal Gardens ruling was superseded by Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court (1997
Rules of Civil Procedure) which states that the petition [in the Supreme Court or in the Court of
Appeals] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case.

Respondent Justice Asuncion stressed that the July 24, 2001 and October 30,
2001 resolutions were the collegial acts of the First Division of the Court of Appeals, composed of
three justices, unanimously approved by them after due deliberation, and not the acts of
respondent justice alone. He denied that the July 24, 2001 resolution was, in fact, a TRO and
maintained that the purpose thereof was merely to remind the parties to observe the status quo
while PNBs motion for reconsideration was pending resolution. He also claimed that complainant
Padilla mistook the October 30, 2001 resolution as extending the TRO, whereas there was no
indication in the July 24, 2001resolution that a TRO was ever granted. Respondent Justice
stressed that the admonition to the parties to maintain the status quo was merely directory in
view of the pending motion in the CA, following the principle of hierarchy of courts. Respondent
justice cited Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. CA, Ibid., as basis for his action in
issuing the July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions, which directed the parties to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration.

We are not convinced. The July 24, 2001 resolution was in fact and in reality essentially a
TRO and the October 30, 2001 resolution effectively extended the same indefinitely. This
dispositive portion of the July 24, 2001 resolution clearly states:

WHEREFORE, to prevent irreparable injury, the public

respondent is temporarily enjoined from implementing the
assailed Writ of Execution dated June 19, 2001. The parties are ordered
to maintain the status quo in this case pending the resolution of
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Technically, status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful and uncontested
status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the
case[18] However, the Supreme Court has ruled that a status quo ante order has the nature of a
temporary restraining order[19]. Thus, the decretal portion of the resolution of July 24, 2001,
specifically ordered that the public respondent is temporarily enjoined from implementing the
assailed writ of execution. Respondent justice must be playing with words. When a judge or
justice uses technical or legal terms with a well-defined meaning, such as a temporary restraining
order or a status quo order, he must have intended those meaning; he cannot impute a directory
meaning to confuse the parties. x x x On the other hand, he ought to know that a temporary
restraining order cannot exist indefinitely; it has a lifetime of a non-extendible period of sixty
days and automatically expired on the sixtieth day [20]. No judicial declaration that it has expired is
necessary[21], and, the lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, have no discretion to extend
the same[22]. A second TRO by the Court of Appeals after the expiration of the sixty day period is
a patent nullity.[23]

Respondent Justice cannot seek refuge behind the Eternal Garden case to justify
the October 30, 2001 resolution. The Eternal Garden case involves a petition for
certiorari filed before the Supreme Court, which could issue a temporary restraining order or
a status quo order effective indefinitely or until further orders (Rule 58, Section 5, par. 4, Rules
of Court. On the other hand, a temporary restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals is
 effective only for sixty days. ( Ibid.) Hence, when respondent Justice Asuncion issued the October
30, 2001 resolution ordering the parties to maintain the status quo pending the resolution of
PNBs motion for reconsideration, he extended the restraining order

until respondent could act on the PNB motion for reconsideration which he did only as late
as August 7, 2006, a glaring five years from submission. His interest in the case is manifest in
that, despite his assignment to Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to Justice
Zenarosa. (Office Order No. 212-04-CG, dated July 7, 2004).Worse, he recalled the case upon his
return to the CA Manila station. (Underscoring supplied.)

We agree with complainant Padilla that the deliberate act of respondent Justice Asuncion
in extending indefinitely the temporary restraining order or the status quoorder pending
resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance of the law. x x x

x x x Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial
competence requires no less. Unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules
must be at the palm of his hand. x x x When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law is the mainspring
of injustice.[24] Worse, respondent justices ignorance of procedural law is exacerbated by
his sloth in resolving PNBs motion for reconsideration (See Garchitorena case, 422 Phil. 246
[2001], on reconsideration, 426 Phil. 01 [2002]) To compound matters, Ms. Archinas motion for
reconsideration date November 5, 2001, was not resolved at all.[25]

THE COURTS RULING

We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice.

The Constitution mandates lower collegiate courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within twelve
months from date of submission.[26] Section 3, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court requires motions for
reconsideration to be resolved within ninety days. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that (J)udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.

Indeed, the essence of the judicial function, as expressed in Section 1, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of
Court is that justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.

In Arap v. Judge Amir Mustafa,[27] We held that:

The Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the
disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges
 are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency
and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against them.

The record shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent had not resolved seventy-one (71)
motions for reconsideration within the prescribed ninety-day period, and he had resolved one hundred seventy-
nine (179) motions for reconsideration beyond the reglementary period. As of the same date, eighty-two (82)
cases submitted for decision were still undecided, even after the lapse of the twelve-month period prescribed by
the Constitution. He had also decided four hundred nine (409) cases beyond the one-year period.

Notably, of the seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration pending resolution, forty-six were filed in
2004 or earlier, with one dating all the way back to 2000. Five were filed in 2001, sixteen in 2002, ten in 2003,
and thirteen in 2004. Respondents proffered justification is that the delay was caused by the reorganization of
the CA, his assignment to the CA Cebu Station and his transfer back to Manila which, allegedly, caused some
confusion in the assignment of cases and a lapse in the monitoring system. The explanation miserably fails to
persuade because the CA reorganization took place only in 2004, and at that time, there were at least thirty-two
(32) motions for reconsideration crying out for resolution..

This intolerable inaction is aggravated by misrepresentation. Upon his assignment to the CA Cebu Station,
respondent listed only nine (9) cases allegedly unresolved by and pending with him. The findings of the
Investigator belie this assertion.

The excuse that respondent was burdened by a heavy caseload, owing to the cases initially assigned to
him, those raffled daily and those re-raffled from among the cases originally handled by promoted or retired
justices, must also fall flat. As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice, other CA justices are likewise subjected to
such a heavy caseload, and yet, have not incurred such inexcusable delay. As to respondents other administrative
assignments, including organizing special events, the respondent should only be reminded that decision-making is
the primordial and most important duty of a member of the judiciary. [28]

The delay incurred by respondent Justice Asuncion in deciding or resolving the numerous cases and matters
mentioned above is, therefore, unjustified. Even in the case of PNB v. NLRC and Archinas alone, the respondents
failure to resolve PNBs June 13, 2001 motion for reconsideration until after the lapse of more than five (5) years,
despite Archinas four (4) motions urging immediate resolution of the same, truly smacks of gross inefficiency and
serious dereliction of duty. Worse, it invites suspicion of malice, and casts doubt on the justices fairness and
integrity.
We have already ruled that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency[29] which, if the case remains undecided for years, would become serious misconduct that would
justify dismissal from the service.[30]

In the case of respondent Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in deciding or resolving such a
staggering number of cases/matters assigned to him, borders on serious misconduct which could subject the
respondent to the maximum administrative sanction.

In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, We agree with the Investigating Justice that respondents deliberate act of
extending indefinitely the temporary restraining order or the status quo order pending resolution of PNBs motion
for reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance of
the law.

As correctly put by Investigating Justice Pardo, Eternal Gardens is totally inapplicable. The July 24, 2001
resolution, which temporarily enjoined the public respondent from implementing the assailed writ of execution,
was a temporary restraining order, regardless of the nomenclature Justice Asuncion used to characterize it. As
such, its full life span can only be sixty (60) days. Section 5, par. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is explicit: the
Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order only for a limited period of sixty days which cannot be
renewed or extended. After sixty days, the restraining order immediately ceases, without need of any judicial
order terminating it.

The October 30, 2001 resolution, which ordered the maintenance of the status quo, effectively extended
the temporary restraining order, in complete defiance of the aforesaid Rule. It was not a writ of preliminary
injunction, because respondent Justice Asuncion himself disclaims that it was such. Besides, in the event of an
injunctive writ, an injunction bond is required, unless exempted by the Court (Section 4, Rule 58, Rules of
Court). Furthermore, there would have been no cause to issue such a writ, because earlier, on May 28, 2001,
respondent Justice Asuncion had already dismissed the principal action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Yet, the purpose was clear; the October 30, 2001 resolution was intended to extend the effectivity of the July 24,
2001 restraining order. It was, as the Investigating Justice would characterize it, a renewed or second temporary
restraining order proscribed by the rule and extant jurisprudence.
Such failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the
law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. [31] In Genil v. Rivera,[32] We declared that judges owe
it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence they are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules.

While a judge is presumed to act with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions, a blatant
disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining strict
compliance therewith, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to administrative sanctions. [33]

Citing Castanos v. Escano, Jr.,[34] this Court, in Macalintal v. Teh,[35] had occasion to state:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.In both cases, the judges dismissal is in
order.

The respondent Justice would seek to extricate himself from any liability by invoking the convenient excuse that
the resolutions of July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 were the collegial acts of the First Division of the Court of
Appeals, composed of three justices, and not the acts of respondent justice alone. This, in fact, was the only
significant subject dwelt on by respondents lawyer in the cross-examination of the complainant Atty.
Padilla. What respondent Justice Asuncion, in effect, is saying is that if he, as ponente in PNB v. NLRC and
Archinas, were to be adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law, then the two other justices in the Division
should be held equally culpable. Perhaps, under ordinary circumstances, such logic would be impeccable.

However, what We said in Guerrero v. Villamor[36] is instructive:

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the
judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most
importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or
some other like motive.[37] x x x

Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not
prosper against a judge acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous
judgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not
being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.[38]

Using this pronouncement as the norm, We now must consider the totality of the charges against the
respondent, as well as the convergence of attendant and subsequent events. On May 28, 2001, with respondent
Justice as ponente, the First Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the PNB petition for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, affirming in its entirety the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission. On June 13, 2001, PNB filed a motion for reconsideration. On June 25, 2001, Archinas
(private respondent in the petition for certiorari) filed her opposition to PNBs motion for reconsideration. On July
24, 2001, acting upon PNBs urgent motion for issuance of a TRO, respondent issued the resolution enjoining the
public respondent from implementing the Writ of Execution. On October 30, 2001, the resolution ordering the
maintenance of the status quo was issued. On November 5, 2001, Archinas filed her motion seeking
reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution. Archinas filed four (4) urgent motions for early resolution of
the pending motion/s for reconsideration, on December 28, 2001, June 13, 2002, September 24, 2002,
and August 23, 2005, Meantime, on July 5, 2004, respondent Justice Asuncion was assigned to CA Cebu
Station. With this transfer, respondents caseload was assigned to Justice Zenarosa. On November 3, 2004,
respondent was reassigned back to Manila. It was only on August 7, 2006 that respondent finally resolved the
PNB motion for reconsideration.

From this sequence of events, a number of questions arise. If the respondent could issue the resolutions
of July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 why did respondent not simply resolve the PNB motion for reconsideration
of June 13, 2001? After all, he finally did so on August 7, 2006, with a mere three-page resolution. Why did it
take more than five years to resolve this PNB motion? Why were the four motions for early resolution never
addressed? If the Manila cases of respondent Justice Asuncion were automatically assigned to Justice Zenarosa,
how did Justice Asuncion continue to hold on to this case upon his reassignment in Manila?

The Investigating Justice supplies the answer in his Report thus: His (respondents) interest in the case is
manifest in that, despite his assignment in Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to Justice
Zenarosa (Office Order No. 212-04-CG). Worse, he recalled the case upon his return to the CA Manila station.

To the Court, these are badges of bad faith and manifest undue interest attributable only to the respondent, and
not to the other two justices of the CA Division.Accordingly, only the respondent must be made to suffer the
consequences.

Besides, the five-year delay in the resolution of the PNB motion for reconsideration would already constitute
serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from the service[39]
 Administrative Penalties

In A. M. No. 06-6-08-CA, respondent is charged with undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Under Rule
140 of the Rules of Court,[40] undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious charge
which may be penalized by (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.

On the other hand, gross ignorance of the law, for which respondent is being faulted in A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is
considered a serious charge, and carries the penalty of (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.

The Investigating Justice recommends the maximum penalty for each of the two offenses.

WHEREFORE, in A. M. No. 06-6-08, for having incurred undue delay in the disposal of pending motions
for reconsideration in several cases, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is SUSPENDED from office without pay, allowances and other monetary
benefits for a period of THREE MONTHS.

In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, for gross ignorance of the law and manifest undue interest, Associate Justice Elvi John
S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except leave credits.

This Decision is final and immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA March 20, 2007

RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

x----------------------------x

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J March 20, 2007

ATTY. ROBERTO C. PADILLA, Complainant,
vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

FACTS:

These are 2 administrative cases against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals.

The first one stemmed from an unsigned letter complaining that Justice Asuncion has been sitting on motions for
reconsideration for six months to more than one year unless the parties come across. Justice Asuncion strongly
denied this charge of inaction but admitted to somedelays in the resolution for some MRs and cited “justifiable
reasons” such as the CAs reorganization and his heavy caseloads.

An investigating committee asked Justice Asuncion to make a report on his backlogs and he only reported 9 cases
allegedly unresolved by and pending with him. The findings of the investigator belie this assertion. The record
shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent had not resolved seventy-one (71) motions for
reconsideration within the prescribed ninety-day period, and he had resolved one hundred seventy-nine (179)
motions for reconsideration beyond the reglementary period. As of the same date, eighty-two (82) cases
submitted for decision were still undecided, even after the lapse of the twelve-month period prescribed by the
Constitution. He had also decided four hundred nine (409) cases beyond the one-year period. Notably, of the
seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration pending resolution, forty-six were filed in 2004 or earlier, with one
dating all the way back to 2000. Five were filed in 2001, sixteen in 2002, ten in 2003, and thirteen in 2004

The second case is based on a verified complaint filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, charging Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion with "culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice and gross ignorance of
the law", in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled "Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC and Erlinda
Archinas". To better follow the complaint, the gist of the above mentioned case is the following:

On May 28, 2001, with respondent Justice as ponente, the First Division of the Court of Appeals
dismissed the PNB petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, affirming
in its entirety the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. On June 13, 2001, PNB filed a motion for
reconsideration. On June 25, 2001, Archinas (private respondent in the petition for certiorari) filed her opposition
to PNB’s motion for reconsideration. On July 24, 2001, acting upon PNB’s urgent motion for issuance of a TRO,
respondent issued the resolution enjoining the public respondent from implementing the Writ of Execution. On
October 30, 2001, the resolution ordering the maintenance of the status quo was issued. On November 5, 2001,
Archinas filed her motion seeking reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution. Archinas filed four (4)
urgent motions for early resolution of the pending motion/s for reconsideration, on December 28, 2001, June 13,
2002, September 24, 2002, and August 23, 2005, Meantime, on July 5, 2004, respondent Justice Asuncion was
assigned to CA Cebu Station. With this transfer, respondent’s caseload was assigned to Justice Zenarosa. On
November 3, 2004, respondent was reassigned back to Manila. It was only on August 7, 2006 that respondent
finally resolved the PNB motion for reconsideration. The Investigating Justicein his Report also found out that:
"His ‘interest’ in the case is ‘manifest’ in that, despite his assignment in Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not
unload the case to Justice Zenarosa (Office Order No. 212-04-CG). Worse, he recalled the case upon his return to
the CA Manila station."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure of a Judge/justice to decide a case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency and would later on become serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from the service?
RULING:

In this case of Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in deciding or resolving such a staggering number of
cases/matters assigned to him, borders on serious misconduct which could subject the respondent to the
maximum administrative sanction. To the Court, these are badges of bad faith and manifest undue interest
attributable only to the respondent, and not to the other two justices of the CA Division. Accordingly, only the
respondent must be made to suffer the consequences.

Besides, the five-year delay in the resolution of the PNB motion for reconsideration would already constitute
serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from the service. Such failure to follow basic legal commands
embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and
surely not a judge. While a judge is presumed to act with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial
functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court
circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to
administrative sanctions.

WHEREFORE, in A. M. No. 06-6-08, for having incurred undue delay in the disposal of pending motions for
reconsideration in several cases, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is SUSPENDED from office without pay, allowances and other monetary benefits
for a period of THREE MONTHS.

In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, for gross ignorance of the law and manifest undue interest, Associate Justice Elvi John
S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except leave credits.