G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015 - SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC.

AND OSCAR VIOLAGO, Petitioners, v. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015

SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR
VIOLAGO, Petitioners, v. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 23, 2010 decision1and the December 2,
2010 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332. The CA affirmed the
resolutions dated November 17, 2006 and July 26, 2007 of the Office of President in O.P. Case No.
06-D-160, which dismissed the appeal of petitioners San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers
Group, Inc. (SLR Builders) and Oscar Violago for having been filed out of time.

Facts

On April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders (then known as Violago Builders, Inc), as seller, and
respondent Ma. Cristina F. Bayang (Cristina), as buyer, entered into a "contract to sell" of a sixty
(60)-square meter lot in Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay Payatas,
Quezon City.

Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR
Builders the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot's certificate of title but the latter
failed to deliver, prompting Cristina to file a complaint for specific performance and
damages against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago (petitioners) before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

In a decision3 dated February 16, 2004, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor
ruled in Cristina's favor, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering the respondents (referring to the petitioners) to execute the

Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in the name of the
complainant (referring to the respondent) and deliver the title thereof
free from all liens and encumbrances;

2. In the alternative, in case of legal and physical impossibility of the

respondents to perform the aforementioned acts in the preceding
paragraph, respondent San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group,
Incorporated is hereby ordered to reimburse to the complainant the
amount of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
 SIXTY FIVE PESOS & 16/100 (P324,865.16) with legal interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum to be computed from the filing of the
complaint on November 04, 2002 until fully paid; and

3. Ordering respondent San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group,

Incorporated to pay the following sums:

a. FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages;

b. FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as exemplary damages;
c. FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees;
d. An administrative fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
payable to this Office fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this
decision, for violation of Section 18 in relation to Section 38 of
PD 957.

SO ORDERED.4

The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The
Board dismissed5 and denied,6 respectively, the petitioners' appeal and subsequent motion for
reconsideration. The petitioners then brought their case to the Office of the President (OP), which
was docketed as O.P. Case No. 06-D-160.

In a resolution7 dated November 17, 2006, the OP dismissed the petitioners' appeal for having
been filed out of time. The OP's resolution stated:

A review of the records shows that the HLURB Decision affirming the
Arbiter's decision was received by the respondents/appellants (referring
to the petitioners) on July 27, 2005. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive
period within which to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing
an appeal, respondents-appellants opted to file a Motion for
Reconsideration on August 10, 2005. Their filing of the said motion
interrupted the period of appeal by that time, however, fourteen (14)
days had already elapsed.

On April 17, 2006, respondents-appellants received the Resolution

denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Following the above rules,
respondents-appellants have only one (1) day left, or until April 18,
2006, within which to file their notice of appeal to this
Office. Unfortunately, they were able to do so only on April 27,
2006, or nine (9) days late8 (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in the case
of Domingo Neypes, et at. v. Court of Appeals, et al.9should be applied to their case.

The OP, in a resolution10 dated July 26, 2007, denied the petitioners' motion with finality, stating
that the "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals, such
as in petitioners' case. The petitioners then appealed to the CA via petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.

In its assailed decision, the CA denied the petitioners' petition for review. The CA, likewise, denied
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration; hence, the filing of the present petition for review
on certiorari with this Court.

Issue
Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal
filed from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.

Our Ruling

We DENY the petition. It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial
appeals and not to administrative appeals.

In Panolino v. Tajala,11 the Court was confronted with a similar issue of whether the "fresh period
rule" applies to an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR
Secretary, an appeal which is administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the "fresh period
rule" only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.

xxxx

As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision

in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40_(appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule
41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45
(appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these
Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an

appeal from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to
the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section
1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier
quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal
"during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the decision
is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to
perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
 In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners
to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does
not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765,
series of 2004, in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of
1987:

Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing
the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the Board of
Commissioners to the Office of the President, pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and
the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and
A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the

running of the period of appeal to the Office of the President.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of

1987, provides that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for
reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the said
party has the only remaining balance of the prescriptive period within
which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying
his/her motion for reconsideration.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the present case, we find that the CA correctly
affirmed the OP in dismissing the petitioners' appeal for having been filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision
dated July 23, 2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100332.

By ResIpsaLoquitor - August 03, 2013

Judith Yu vs Samson-Tatad

GR No. 170979 February 9, 2011

Facts:

An information for estafa against the petitioner (Judith Yu) was filed with the RTC which
convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new
trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would
exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted. The respondent judge denied the
petitioner's motion for new trial for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a fresh period of 15
days from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, within which to file a notice of
appeal. The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal fore being belatedly filed and a
Motion for execution of the decision.

Issue:

Does the fresh period rule apply to appeals in criminal cases?

Ruling:

Yes, to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion
as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal
is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration,
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period
to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the
private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint
on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a
copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court
issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice
of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September
3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed
the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was
the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five
days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court,
the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary
period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1,
1998 order dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.

(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:

(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be
deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial
court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon
receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the
omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion.
He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been
filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15
days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was
appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint
which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.
where the SC again considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the
order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order
contemplated in the Rules.

(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule
42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within
15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may
be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of
the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases.
The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to
have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order
(the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the
fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE: