March 2018

SPARK
R
Quarterly
Publication
of the
ADRInstitute
the key link between IDEAS and ACTION

the AFp Modernization program

after the battle for marawi:
a test case for the

flexible
duterte administration’s

defense policy?
adrinstitute.org
 the AFp Modernization program
after the battle for marawi:
a test case for the
duterte administration’s
flexible
defense policy?
Since it became an independent state in 1946, the Philippines has been bedeviled by the
perennial insurgency problem. As a result, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has long
focused its attention, efforts, and resources on addressing domestic security challenges. This was
highlighted during Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s nine-year presidential term when the AFP conducted
a single-minded campaign aimed at neutralizing the various insurgent movements in the country
by 2010. From 2001 to 2010, the AFP implemented the 2002 Operational Plan Bantay Laya
(Freedom Watch) to “intensify the conduct of counter-insurgency operations” and eradicate the
Abu Sayyaf and the New People’s Army (NPA), the Communist Party of the Philippines’ (CPP)
military arm. The anti-insurgency program also tasked the military with neutralizing the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to create a secure
environment in Mindanao conducive for national development. The AFP’s single-minded focus on
internal security coincided with China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia and the consequent
rapprochement in the Philippine-China relations during former President Arroyo’s term.

02 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2018


Image credit: pesoreserve.com
Image credit: newsinfo.inquirer.net
Prior to his presidential inauguration on
30 June 2016, many defense analysts and
pundits took it for granted that President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte would simply follow
former President Arroyo’s policy of
rapprochement with China and the AFP’s
refocusing from territorial defense to
neutralizing domestic security challenges
such as terrorism and insurgencies. This
was because AFP’s modernization program
was linked to President Benigno Aquino III’s
agenda of challenging China’s expansive
maritime claim in the South China Sea.
Albeit the dismal state of its military, the
Aquino administration pursued a balancing
policy vis-à-vis an assertive China. In mid-
2011, it decided to pursue the substantial
modernization of the AFP that still focused
on internal security operations against
domestic insurgent groups. President
Aquino ordered the Philippine Navy (PN) to
acquire second-hand cutters from the U.S.
Coast Guard, and the Philippine Air Forces
(PAF) to scour the international market
for affordable jet fighters to rebuild the
country’s air defense system.
Before his inauguration, President Duterte
declared that he wanted a closer relation
with China and that he will not continue the
military modernization program started by
his predecessor. Consequently, his early
statements indicated that he would not
pursue the modernization of the AFP with
as much vigor as former President Aquino.
Deep into the first year of his term, however,
President Duterte has not changed the
national security objective as he continued
the previous administration’s efforts
to modernize the AFP. He, however,
reoriented the AFP’s key missions by
returning the function of internal security
back to the Philippine military as it pursues
its goal of achieving a credible defense
posture. For President Duterte, both
internal security operations and territorial
defense should go hand-in-hand, since
1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 03
MARCH 2018 volume 11 issue 1
on the cover
Cover, title page and content page :
images from newsinfo.inquirer.net, news.
mb.com.ph, scmp.com and philnews.ph
about the author
Renato Cruz De Castro
is a full professor in the International
Studies Department of De La Salle
University and holds the Charles Lui
Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China
Studies. He earned his Ph.D. from the
Government and International Studies
Department of the University of South
Carolina as Fulbright Scholar on 2001,
and obtained hi B.A and two master’s
degrees from the University of the
Philippines. Professor De Castro has
conducted several courses on International
Relations and Security Studies in the
National Defense College and Foreign
Service Institute. He is also a member
of the Board of Trustees of Stratbase
Albert Del Rosario Institute for
Strategic and International Studies.
features
05
12
The shift in focus
from Internal to
territorial defense
Shortly after former President Gloria Arroyo signed
the bill into a law in March 2009, China deployed a
fishery patrol vessel, and in the following month, Pursuing the policy
sent six more patrol vessels allegedly to curb Of flexible defense
illegal fishing in the disputed area.
The battle for Marawi City also revealed the several
challenges the AFP is confronted with in the second
decade of the 21st century. Despite some efforts
07
to develop its territorial defense capabilities since
2010, the AFP remains deficient in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Enter the duterte
administration’s flexible
Defense policy
From the previous administration’s original goal of
territorial defense, the Duterte administration’s
initial policy was to revert to the old internal
defense posture, or more appropriately,
counter-insurgency operations.
10 14
The siege of marawi: IMPLICATION OF THE FLEXIBLE
The test case for DEFENSE POLICY
flexible defense
The most immediate impact of the Duterte
The occupation of Marawi City by local and foreign administration’s flexible defense policy is an
Islamic militants affiliated with ISIS forced the increase in defense budget especially for the
government to reconsider its plan to pursue the AFP modernization program.
second phase of the AFP modernization program.
CONTENTS
 Internal to
Territorial Defense
fighting or addressing threats from multiple fronts should be the AFP’s mandated task. This, in
turn, has led to the implementation of a flexible defense policy as President Duterte continued his
predecessor’s acquisition projects for territorial defense, while at the same time purchasing new
platforms for internal security like night-capable attack helicopters, precision guided
missiles, drones, and fast-attack crafts in the next three to five years.

In late May 2017, about 1,000 Islamic militants led by the Maute group and fighting under the
black flag of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control of the central business district of
Marawi City. The five-month battle for Marawi City tested the viability of Duterte administration’s
flexible defense policy as it made the government realize the necessity for capacity-building
in the AFP so that it can address both internal and external security challenges.

This article examines how the bloody and protracted battle for Marawi City tested the practicality
of the Duterte administration’s flexible defense policy. It also answers the following questions:
What was the Aquino administration’s defense policy? How was it implemented? What are the
efforts undertaken by the current administration to pursue its security objectives?
Finally, what is the future of its flexible defense policy?

The Shift in Focus from Internal to Territorial Defense

In early 2009, the Philippines was confronted by ubiquitous Chinese naval presence in the
country’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This encroachment became a
routine when the Philippine government passed Republic Act No. 9522 or the Philippine Baseline
Act. Shortly after former President Gloria Arroyo signed the bill into a law in March 2009, China
deployed a fishery patrol vessel, and in the following month, sent six more patrol vessels allegedly
to curb illegal fishing in the disputed area. Evidently, such brazen assertiveness underscored an
international reality—Chinese economic and naval power casts a long shadow over the Philippines
and Vietnam, which are at the forefront of a maritime dispute with China in the South
China Sea.1 This maritime gambit also unmasked China’s belligerent efforts to
consolidate its jurisdictional claims, expand its naval reach, and undermine
the positions of other claimant states through coercive diplomacy.2

Early on, the Philippines realized the need to develop the capability of the AFP to protect the
country’s vast maritime borders and its territorial claim over some islands in the Spratlys. The
AFP’s shift from internal to maritime security gained momentum when Benigno Simeon Aquino III
became president in 2010. His official pronouncements relative to modernizing the AFP
were geared toward redirecting the Philippine military from asymmetric/ low intensity conflicts
(LICs) to territorial defense/maritime security. Then President Aquino spoke of “enhanced
security” for national defense and put forward the country’s claim for territories in the
South China Sea through the modernization of its navy and the air force.

1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 05

The shift from LICs to territorial defense/
maritime security required providing the AFP
with the necessary equipment, technical
training, and expertise for external defense.
In turn, the Philippine military must train its
officers and personnel to broaden their skills,
knowledge, and capability in territorial defense
instead of merely discharging constabulary
functions and undertaking socio-civic
activities—a role it has performed since the
Philippines became independent in 1946.
The Aquino administration’s defense goal is
very modest— to develop a credible posture
for territorial defense and maritime security
06 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2018
through building a competent force capable of defending the country’s
interests and the land features it occupies in the South China Sea.3 It involved
the establishment of a modest but “comprehensive border protection program.”
This task is anchored on the surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol
capabilities of the PAF, PN, and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) that extend
from the country’s territorial waters to its contiguous EEZ.4 This objective
requires enhancing the AFP’s capabilities, prioritizing its needs, and gradually
restructuring its forces for territorial defense. The long-term goal, according
to the 2011 AFP’s Strategic Intent, is to maintain a “credible deterrent
posture against foreign intrusion or external aggression, and other
illegal activities while allowing free navigation to prosper.”5
Image credit: facebook.com/armedforcesofthephilippines/photos
In building up the country’s territorial defense capabilities, the Aquino
administration sunk its teeth into challenging China’s expansive claims in
the South China Sea as the latter directly encroaches into the country’s EEZ.
Although determined to shift the AFP’s focus from internal security to territorial
defense, the Aquino administration was constrained by insufficient financial
resources even with its modest defense acquisition goals. Since 2011, the
Philippine government could only acquire two former U.S. Coast Guard cutters.
It could not readily purchase war materiel such as blue-water missile-armed
ships, search-and-rescue vessels, naval helicopters, strategic sea lift ships, and
top-of-the-line interceptors that could be deployed to protect its oil exploration
ventures and territorial claims in the South China Sea. To acquire the
necessary equipment for territorial defense, the AFP waited for the Philippine
Congress to legislate the extension of the AFP Modernization Law.

In December 2012, the Philippine Congress passed and then-President Aquino

signed into law Republic Act No. 10349 extending the original AFP modernization
law. The law, however, allotted only Php 75 billion (an estimated US$1.5 billion) in
the next five years. This amount was miniscule for the purchase of modern
fighter planes, missile-armed frigates, sea-and-land based missile systems,
patrol vessels, and long-range reconnaissance planes along with support
facilities such as radar sites, forward operating bases, hangar,
communication, maintenance, and command and control facilities.

To enable the government and the AFP to focus on territorial defense, the
Aquino administration decided to put an emphasis on the importance of the
peace process with the country’s major insurgent groups. At the start of its
term in 2010, the Aquino administration restarted the peace negotiations with
the country’s two main insurgent movements—the communist-led National
Democratic Front (NDF) and the secessionist MILF. Preliminary talks between the
government peace-panel and the NDF’s negotiating team took place in January
2011 in Oslo, Norway. Similarly, initial talks between the Philippine Government
Panel and MILF also began in January 2011 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Enter the Duterte Administration’s

Flexible Defense Policy
Defense analysts and political observers assumed that President Duterte was
about to follow President Arroyo’s foreign policy gambit of gravitating towards
China. This would mean ignoring territorial defense by returning back to the AFP
its traditional tasks of containing domestic terrorism and insurgencies. President
Duterte’s agenda to improve bilateral relations with China might mean that public
investments in territorial defense would be decreased if not be terminated. This
would result to a complete change in focus for the defense establishment over a
wide spectrum of sensitive issues from the China challenge in the South China

1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 07

to the Abu Sayyaf; from the country’s EEZ in the West Philippines Sea/
South China Sea to Mindanao, particularly the island provinces of Sulu
and Basilan; from modern fighter jets to helicopters; and from much
needed bigger maritime surface combatants to small patrol craft.6

From the previous administration’s original goal of territorial defense,

the Duterte administration’s initial policy was to revert to the old internal
defense posture, or more appropriately, counter-insurgency operations.7
President Duterte publicly criticized the Aquino administration’s decision
to procure 12 FA-50 fighter planes from South Korea because he
claimed that the aircraft could not be used for counter-insurgency and
were not numerically sufficient to challenge China’s assertiveness in
the South China Sea. He said that the government money spent for the
fighter planes instead should have been used to buy helicopters or
boats that would pursue the Abu Sayyaf (bandits). For President
Duterte, the internal security problems should be solved first so the
country can promote tourism and lure more foreign investments.

Image credit: gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation

08 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2018

President Duterte’s then newly-
appointed chief of staff of the AFP,
Lieutenant General Ricardo Bisaya,
declared “that internal security will
take precedence over external defense
and that the military will invest more
in speed boats and helicopters.” In
July 2016, however, President Duterte
assured troops of the Sixth Infantry
Division that he will continue the
Aquino administration’s efforts to
modernize the AFP. He declared that
“there will even be no refocusing of
the modernization thrust. We will
only adjust our priorities (to internal
defense).” This policy statement is
reflected in the 15% rise in the 2017
defense spending with the allocation
for the modernization program being
increased from Php 15 billion (US$
333 million) to Php 25 billion (US$
555 million). In mid-September 2016,
the Department of National Defense
announced that it shall sign a Php16
billion (US$ 355 million) deal with
Hyundai Heavy Industries for the PN’s
acquisition of two new frigates and
their weapons systems. This project
was part of the Aquino administration’s
modernization program that aimed to
enhance the AFP’s territorial defense
and disaster response capabilities.
President Duterte’s high profile state
visit to Beijing in October 2017 caused
analysts, observers, and decision-
makers all over East Asia to conclude
that the Philippines have turned away
from its traditional treaty ally, the United
States and have embraced China.
During his visit, President Duterte
announced his separation from the
United States and declared that he
had realigned with China as the two
countries agreed to resolve their South
China Sea dispute through bilateral
negotiations. Immediately, this event
was seen as a big win for China as it will
enable China to consolidate its growing
political clout in East Asia. The event
was also seen as a new beginning in
Philippine-China relations as President
Duterte declared that “China is a great
country, and the long-lasting friendship
between the Philippines and China
is unbreakable.”8 Despite President
Duterte and President Xi Jinping’s
declaration that their countries’ long
lasting friendship is unbreakable, the
Philippines and China were still at odds
over matters such as fishing rights in
the Scarborough Shoal and on the
role of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration’s award to the Philippines
in the planned bilateral negotiations
to manage their territorial dispute
in the South China Sea.
During his working visit in Japan from
October 25 to 27, 2017, President
Duterte saw the signing for the lease
of five Japan Maritime Self Defense
Force’s (JMSDF) TC-90 maritime
reconnaissance planes to monitor the
Chinese activities in the South China
Sea.9 The leasing of the five TC-90
planes at US$7,000 per plane a year
was one of the important decisions of
the Duterte administration in terms
of territorial defense as the AFP lacks
valuable assets for maritime domain
awareness.10 Interestingly, while
President Duterte was in Tokyo seeking
military assistance for the PCG and PN,
Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin
Lorenza signed the Php 15.7 billion
(US$ 311 million) contract with South
Korean Ambassador Kim Jai-Shin for
the PN’s acquisition of its first missile-
armed ships.11 This is the first time
that the Philippines is buying brand
new modern ships that are armed
with surface-to-surface missiles. The
two frigates will have a length of 107
meters similar to the South Korea’s
Incheon class frigates and will be
armed with anti-aircraft missiles,
torpedo, guns, and sensors
for electronic warfare.12
According to the official statement,
the ships are tailor-made for the PN’s
requirements as they will have a
relatively shallow draft that will enable
them to get closer to the “islands which
it would likely defend in the event
conflict breaks out over these areas.13
Hyundai Heavy Industries added the
frigates will be diesel-powered and
will be capable of travelling at 25
knots and can negotiate waves at
the height of up to four meters. The
Duterte administration’s acquisition
of these two frigates is one of the
biggest budget items of the 15-year
AFP modernization program. The
Philippines’ efforts to build up the
territorial defense capabilities of the
AFP by acquiring two new frigates for
the PN underline its intent to build-up
its maritime capabilities while at the
same time establishing a détente with
its biggest maritime claimant state in
the South China Sea dispute, China.
The Duterte administration
announced in December 2016 that
the modernization of the Philippine
military will be pursued vigorously
as the program jibes with its plan
to develop a credible deterrence to
secure Philippine territory, especially its
1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 09
maritime borders.14 No less than Defense Secretary Lorenzana declared “that the
modernization of the AFP is not taking a backseat amidst the (domestic) initiatives
as the six-month administration of President Duterte has given the green-light for clash resulting to the deaths of 19 civilians,
the construction and acquisition of the country’s first two missile-armed frigates.”15 11 AFP troops, four policemen, and 61
militants.20 President Duterte was oblivious
Clearly, the Duterte administration is living up to the Philippine military’s of the pestering Islamic militant threat in
expectation for the continuance of the modernization prorgam prioritized by Mindanao which had been strengthened
the previous administration from 2011 to 2016.16 It is also introducing new by the arrival of combat-seasoned Muslim
administrative measures to facilitate the procurement of new military equipment militants from Indonesia, Malaysia,
given the tremendous delays experienced in the acqusition of big-ticket items such Chechnya, Yemen, and Saud Arabia.
as the two guided-missile frigates, 12 fighter planes, long-range patrol aircraft, Trained in jungle warfare and accustomed
and close-air support aircraft.17 Putting his money where his mouth is, President to operating in small-units, the government
Duterte announced to the 2017 graduating class of the Philippine Military forces found it difficult to dislodge the
Academy (PMA) that his administration will purchase radar, support, patrol, militants despite deploying ground troops,
and assault vehicles as well as new surveillance and fighter aircraft in armor personnel carriers, and bombing
the next two to three years to secure the country’s borders.18 the city from the air. Ten Philippine Army
troopers were killed by friendly air-force fire
As President Duterte did not change the national security objective, he has while 13 members of the Philippine Marines
intensified efforts to modernize the AFP. Indeed, instead of policy changes to lost their lives in one day of street-to-street
create a credible defense posture, he simply returned the function of internal fighting with the Muslim militants. Urban
security to the Philippine military. Although he made pronouncements that China fighting in Marawi City exposed the Philippine
is a friend and a benefactor of the Philippines and that the Philippines will military’s limitations. However, for the AFP,
never win militarily in a war against China, President Duterte has not defeating the ISIS militants in Marawi City as
actually scaled down the AFP’s modernization program.19 soon as possible was critical. A lengthy siege
might attract more militants to Mindanao to
reinforce their fellow fighters in the city or to
The Siege of Marawi: be deployed in other parts of the island.
The Test Case for Flexible Defense
At the onset of the battle, the PA deployed its
The AFP modernization program is divided into three horizons or phases. During elite American trained and equipped, Light
the Aquino administration, the government allocated Php 85 billion (US$ 1.75 Reaction Regiment (LRR) to neutralize the
billion) for the first horizon that entailed the acquisition of military hardware both militants who had taken control of Marawi
for counter-insurgency and territorial defense. The Duterte administration is City’s financial district of Banggolo, which is
supposed to implement the second horizon that would require the allocation of also the site of the city’s tallest and fortified
Php 125 billion (US$ 2.25 billion) for the acquisition of equipment primarily for buildings. Despite being trained for urban
territorial defense. However, the occupation of Marawi City by local and foreign warfare, however, the LRR experienced
Islamic militants affiliated with ISIS forced the government to reconsider its plan to tactical and operational challenges because
pursue the second phase of the AFP modernization program. of the vastness and complexity of urban
fighting.21 This forced the AFP to reinforce the
From 23 May to 23 October 2017, in Marawi City, the Philippine military clashed elite regiment with Army Scout Rangers and
with extremist and ruthless Muslim militants. Led by the Maute group, about Marines to provide vital support in clearing
1,000 militants supported by a portion of the Muslim population took control of the one house and building after another. The
city’s central business district. On the afternoon of 24 May, the militants wearing
masks and bearing assault rifles engaged the government in a sustained armed

10 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2018

Mechanized Infantry Division (MID) was also sent to Marawi City along with four Frustrated by its initial attempts to liberate
mechanized battalions, one cavalry squadron, and one light armor troop. To the city, the Philippine military adopted a
counter the government forces’ superiority in men and materiel, the militants strategy of destroying the city in order to save
used mosques and madrasas as strong-points in the urban fighting, including the it.23 The AFP waged and conducted a face-
placement of sniper nests in these religious places. Furthermore, the militants to-face urban warfare against the militants
blended with the urban population which made it extremely difficult for the as they cleared them out through house-
Philippine military to root out the militants from their strong points especially if it to-house and building-by-building fighting.
was instructed to limit civilian casualties in the fighting. Since the bulk of the The PAF used its attack helicopters and
AFP’s reinforcing units were engaged in counter-insurgency and were recently fixed-wing aircraft to bombard the militants’
pulled from the jungles of Bohol and Sulu, they were confronted with operational positions in the city. The Philippine Army
difficulties in Marawi City, and consequently, they incurred heavy casualties.22 and marines relied heavily on air-support,

Image credit: manilatimes.net

1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 11

 artillery, and armor personnel carriers
to neutralize the militants’ strongholds
in the city. After five months of
administration’s flexibility defense policy
bloody scorched-earth combat, the
of strengthening the AFP to address
AFP took control of Marawi City
both internal and external security
in late October 2017.
threats. With a budget amounting to
less than one percent of the Gross
In the aftermath of the fighting in
Domestic Product (GDP), the AFP finds
Marawi City, the Philippine military
it extremely challenging to address a
admitted that the militants have put
spectrum of security challenges such
up a much fiercer fighting than what
as insurgencies, natural disasters,
it expected.24 The AFP was taken
unresolved territorial and sovereignty
back by the resiliency of domestic
issues with neighboring states, and
insurgent groups as the fight for
increasing geo-strategic competition
Marawi City marked for the first time
among the great powers in East Asia.
that two distinct and geographically
A prominent analyst captured the gist
separated Islamic militant groups
of this strategic predicament when he
from eastern and western Mindanao,
noted: “there have been a long concern
joined by veteran fights from Indonesia,
about its ability to comprehensively
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and
manage a range of internal and external
Chechnya, were able to launch a
security threats following previous
major operation that involved the
decades of underinvestment. That
seizure and occupation of a major
presents an issue for the government
Philippine city. More significantly,
with any new challenge as it needs to
the drawn-out and sustained urban
ensure that even as it moves to secure
combat in Marawi City exposed the
certain areas under assault, it does not
vulnerability of the Philippine military
leave others vulnerable to attack.”28
to address this type of threat, which
could undermine the regional security
The battle for Marawi City also
balance.25 The battle for Marawi City
revealed the several challenges the
showed, as one American academic
AFP is confronted with in the second
commented, “the absolute limits of
decade of the 21st century. Despite
what the Armed Forces of Philippines is
some efforts to develop its territorial
capable of.”26 Unfortunately, the defeat
defense capabilities since 2010, the
of the militants in Marawi City has
AFP remains deficient in intelligence,
not eradicated the ISIS threat in the
surveillance, and reconnaissance
Philippines as several communities in
capabilities. It also lacks basic infantry
Mindanao are still bracing for the next
equipment such as bullet-proof vests,
battles between government forces and
helmets, night-vision goggles, bullets,
ISIS-affiliated insurgent groups.27
ordinance, modern ground-attack
aircraft, and even tanks. It showed
that even before the crisis, funds that
Pursuing the Policy of were needed to acquire for the army’s
Flexible Defense immediate needs had been diverted
for other long term projects. 29 It also
The five-month battle for Marawi City
exposed a major structural problem
showed that the AFP could not simply
that as the AFP tries to modernize its
shift away from internal security and
capabilities to confront a vast array
direct all its attention and resources to
of new challenges, the resilience
territorial defense. In a tragic manner,
of internal security threats has not
it showed the practicality of the current
only altered the country’s security
12 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2018
perceptions, but also imposed greater The AFP’s current acquisitions of defense materiel reflect
resource constraints as it seeks to the administration’s policy of flexible defense. Along with
its acquisition of weapon system for internal security,
improve its overall capabilities. the AFP is still continuing its acquisition of
weapon systems of territorial defense.
At the height of battle, Secretary
PAF’s fleet of modern fighter planes by it allocated Php 25 billion for the AFP
Lorenzana stressed that the AFP
acquiring 12 more FA-50PH aircraft modernization program with Php 9.4
would seek for an increase in funding
from South Korea. This means more billion allocated to the purchase of 44
to acquire capabilities that it lacked,
resources for the acquisition of units of medium tanks for the PA.36
especially in the realm of intelligence,
hardware for the Philippine military
i.e., facial recognition technology, more
as it battles domestic insurgent Along with its acquisition of weapon
capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
groups and prepares for its system for internal security, the AFP
(UAVs), and other means to enhance
mandated task of territorial defense. is still continuing its acquisition of
human intelligence on the ground
weapon systems of territorial defense.
including CCTV cameras and networks
The AFP’s current acquisitions The delivery of eight brand-new FA-50s
that extend deep into the village level.30
of defense materiel reflect the lead-in fighter planes from South Korea
Without a doubt, the AFP urgently
administration’s policy of flexible completed the PAF’s need to form a
needs to improve its intelligence,
defense. In November 2017, President squadron. The fighter planes proved
surveillance, and reconnaissance
Duterte mentioned that the AFP would useful in destroying ISIS strong holds
(ISR) capabilities that can address a
look to require a list of items including and providing valuable air support
wide spectrum of challenges that AFP
gunship helicopters, multiple rockets, for ground troops in their clearing
confronts from humanitarian assistance
and new firearms.33 The Department operation during the battle for Marawi
and disaster relief (HADR) to maritime
of National Defense (DND) announced City. The PAF has also ordered Php 1
security to counter-terrorism
that it planned to acquire 24 new attack billion worth of AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-
and counter-insurgency.31
helicopters, pending the approval of air missiles for the FA-50s from Diehl
its budget of Php 13.8 billion.34 The Raytheon of Germany. The PAF also
President Duterte recognized the AFP’s
DND’s decision to acquire these has plans to acquire six more FA-50PHs
limitations as he declared during his
new attack helicopters signaled the and 12 multirole fighters capable of air
second state-of-the-nation address that
administration’s willingness to advance superiority. The PN’s largest ships are
“security threats had increased in the
its military modernization and boost three former U.S. Coast Guard cutters
Philippines, and the military needed
its counter-insurgency capabilities as it of the Hamilton class (3,250 tons). In
more troops and modern equipment.
deals with the range of security threats, addition to these three frigates, the
I will build armed forces that can fight
including terrorism as well as battles PN also has five operational corvettes
[on] all fronts everywhere.”32 In August
with Islamic militants and communist and two strategic sealift vessels. The
2017, President Duterte asked the
insurgents. The DND also confirmed PN has continued the annual payment
Philippine Congress to provide funding
that it had finally awarded the for the two frigates it ordered from
for additional 20,000 troops. With only
Brazilian aircraft manufacturer for the South Korea and has purchased the
about 130,000 personnel spread all
acquisition of six Super Tocano close Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’
over the country, there is now a concern
air support (CAS) aircraft to replace Spike Extended Range (ER) missile
about the AFP’s inability to address a
the PAF’s obsolete OV-10 Bronco Turbo system from Israel that would be
range of internal and external security
reconnaissance and attack planes. mounted on its multi-purpose attack
threats following decades of strategic
Expected to be delivered to the PAF by craft (MPAC) in December 2017.
slack and underinvestment in national
2019, the aircraft would be turned over
defense. President Duterte ordered the
and used by the 15th Strike Wing and During the recent senate hearing
AFP to acquire more drones and planes
would be deployed for close air-support, on the acquisition of two frigates
to help neutralize Islamic militants and
light attack, surveillance, air-to-air from South Korea, the current flag-
communist insurgents. In his speech
interception, and counter-insurgency officer-in command, Rear Admiral
during the 70th Anniversary of the PAF
missions.35 In January 2018, the Robert Empedrad, revealed that the
in early August 2017, he reiterated
Philippine Congress announced that
the theme of capacity-building for the
Philippine military when he said that
he planned to double the size of the
1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 13
 PN is planning to acquire six more frigates armed with missiles and even, its own
fleet of submarines which, according to him, is the future of naval warfare. These
acquisitions for both internal security and territorial defense reflect the Duterte
administration’s flexible defense policy as the AFP acquires hardware ranging from
lead-in fighter planes, frigates, and missile system to UAVs, ground attack
fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters, rifles, medium tanks and other force
protection equipment for ground troops to address transnational threats.

Implications of the Flexible Defense Policy

The most immediate impact of the Duterte administration’s flexible defense policy
is an increase in defense budget especially for the AFP modernization program.
The DND originally proposed a defense budget of Php 224 billion. However, the
Department of Budget and Management only approved Php 195.4 billion. The
defense budget, however goes to personnel expenditures and operating expenses.
The acquisition of military hardware is taken from the separate allocation for the

Image credit: sputniknews.com

14 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2018

AFP modernization program. In 2018, Congress allocated Php 25 billion for the
payments of the multi-year obligation for the two frigates, an amphibious assault
vehicle and surveillance radar. A substantial portion of this year‘s allocation
for the AFP modernization program went to the emergency purchase of
44 medium tanks for the full-mechanization of PA units. According to Defense
Secretary Lorenzana, the DND actually needs about Php 200 billion
a year to complete the AFP’s modernization program.

Another implication of the policy is the greater need for the Philippines to foster
security ties not only with the U.S. but also with its new security partners like
South Korea, Australia, and more recently, Japan. During the height of the battle
for Marawi, the Philippine government admitted that American reconnaissance
planes and U.S. Special Forces were assisting the Philippine military in the bloody
urban fighting to retake Marawi city from the militants. The U.S. also delivered
about Php 7.3 billion worth of new military equipment to the PA and Marines
including a RQ-11B Raven UAV system consisting of three drones for exclusive
use and ownership of the AFP. South Korea provided the Philippines with flight
stimulators worth about US$ 7.8 million and other support equipment like cockpit,
navigation, video systems, manuals, and repair parts. Australia has sold to
the PN three Landing-Craft Heavy. Japan has provided the PCG several patrol
vessels and four Beechcraft King Air TC-90 reconnaissance planes for the PN.
Japan also gave the PAF several thousand dollars’ worth of spare
parts for its Vietnam War-vintage UH-1 helicopters.

Finally, efforts for the AFP to develop its flexible defense policy will not only make
the Philippine military capable of fighting on all fronts everywhere, it will also
make it a more powerful and potentially a more assertive partner of the civilian
government. During then President Arroyo’s term, the AFP became a viable partner
of the civilian government in trying to address the decades-old insurgency problem.
This gave the AFP the self-image that it is not subordinate to the civilian authorities,
but rather its partner in governance. In the near future, a Philippine military with
flexible capabilities might see itself not only as partner of the government
but as the only righteous and armed protector of the Filipino nation
against both internal and external security challenges.

1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 15

references 1
William Chong, “Path to Scarborough
Far from Fair: South China Sea Rivals no Match for
China’s Economic, Military Clout,” The Strait Times,
(21 April 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/
docview/1008636649/fulltext/1368A3A...
2
Chin-Hao Huang and Robert Sutter,
“China-Southeast Asia Relation: ASEAN and Asian
Regional Diplomacy,” Comparative Connection:
A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Rela-
tions (October 2009). p. 5. At http://csis.org/files/
publication/0904china_seasia.pdf (Searched date:
28 March 2010)
3
Secretary of National Defense Voltaire
T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013-2018
(Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 11
October 2011). p. 4.
4
National Security Council, National Secu-
rity Policy 2011-2016 (Quezon City: National Security
Council, April 2011). p. 39.
5
Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent
(Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011). p. 27.
6
Rene Acosta, “Duterte Administration Re-
focusing Defense, Security Priorities,” Business Mirror
($ July 2016). P. 2.
7
Ibid. p. 2.
8
People’s Daily, “Xi, Duterte Agree on Full
Improvement of Ties,” Global Security (October 20,
206). p. 2. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/news/2016/10/mil-161020-pdo01.m=3n%2e
002a%2e1849%2ehs0ao4c71%2e1p7j
9
“Japan-Philippines Joint Statement” Is-
sued in Tokyo, 26 October 2016.
10
Rene Acosta, “Duterte Pushes for Con-
tracts to Modernize Armed Forces,” New Nations (Oc-
tober 27, 2016). p.1.
11
Reuters, “PH Signs Contract with Korean
Firm for 2 Frigates,” Reuters (October 27, 2010). p.1.
12
Gulf News, “Philippines Signs Contract
with South Korean Shipbuilder for Two Missile Frig-
ates,” Gulf News (October 27, 2016).p.1.
13
Ibid. p. 1.
14
The Philippine News Agency, “AFP Mod-
ernization to Continue under the Duterte Adminis-
tration,” Philippine News Agency (4 January 2017). p.
1.
15
Priam Nepumuceno, “AFP Modernization
not Taking a Backseat in Duterte Administration,” The
16 SPARK 1ST QUARTER 2018
Philippine News Agency (19 December 2016). p. 1.
16
Philippine News Agency, “AFP Hopes
for Continuation of Modernization Program under
Duterte Administration,” Philippine News Agency (27
June 2016). p. 1
17
Jon Grevatt, “Philippines Looks to Accel-
erate Military Procurement,” Jane’s Defense Weekly
(30 November 2016). p. 1.
18
Asia News Monitor, “President Duterte
Tells PMA Graduates to Serve Nation with Utmost
Dedication, “Asia News Monitor (4 March 2017). p. 1.
19
Business Mirror, “Philippines Explores
Paths to Modern Defense,” Business Mirror (25 April
2017). p. 2.
20
James Griffiths, “ISIS in Southeast Asia:
Philippines Battles Growing Threat,” CNN Wire Service
(25 May 2017). p. 1.
21
“Frontline: Marawi” Albert Del Rosario
(ADR) Occasional Paper (November 2017) Issue 11. p.
9
22
Ibid. p. 9.
23
Richard Paddock and Felipe Villamor, “De-
stroying a Philippine City to Save it from ISIS Allies,”
New York Time (13 June 2017). p. 1.
24
Ibid. p. 1.
25
Thomas Maresca, “ISIS Expands Foothold
in Southeast Asia with Philippine Siege,” USA Today
(Online) (10 June 2018). p. 1.
26
Ibid. p. 2.
27
Felipe Villamor, “ISIS Threat in Philippines
Spreads in Remote Battles,” New York Times (23 Octo-
ber 2017). p. 1.
28
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Why has the
Philippines’ Military Struggled in its Terror Fight un-
der the Duterte Administration” The Diplomat (Au-
gust 8, 2017).p. 2.
29
Ibid. p. 1.
30
Ibid. p. 2.
31
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Old U.S.-Phil-
ippines Drone Hype Strikes Anew Under Duterte,”
The Diplomat (10 August 2017). p. 1.
32
Lindsay Murdoch, “Duterte to Beef Up
Military for Fight on all Fronts,” Sydney Morning Her-
ald,” (26 July 2017). p. 1.
 33
Prashanth Parameswararan, “What Will
Philippine Modernization Under Duterte Look Line in
2018? The Diplomat (November 29, 2017). p. 1.

34
Ibid. p. 1.

35
Prashanth Parameswararan, “Philippines
Military Modernization Gets Delayed Boost with At-
tack Aircraft Deal,” The Diplomat (4 December 2017).
p. 2.

36
Jestler P. Manalastas, “P25B for AFP Mod-
ernization” The Nation (10 January 2018). p. 1.

1ST QUARTER 2018 SPARK 17

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