TORTS AND DAMAGES

40
JOCSON VS. GLORIOSO
22 SCRA 316, GR # L-22686

TOPIC: Pertinent provisions from other laws | Culpa Contractual vs. Culpa
Aquilana vs. Culpa Criminal

FACTS:

For the death of a 3-year old boy who was run over by a passenger jeepney two
(2) actions were filed by the parents: (1) a civil case for damages against the
owner of the jeepney and the driver for culpa aquiliana; and (2) a criminal
action against the driver for homicide thru reckless imprudence—which was
filed while said civil case was still pending hearing. The civil case was
dismissed, the lower court being of the opinion that "in conscience" it could not
"hold the defendant guilty of negligence resulting in, or contributory to, the
said accident." The parents appealed the civil case to the Court of Appeals but
the appeal was dismissed for their failure to pay the docketing fees. In the
criminal case, however, the trial court convicted the driver of homicide thru
reckless imprudence and aside from the prison sentence imposed upon him, he
(driver) was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased son in the sum of
P6,-000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The driver
appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as one of the issues "the propriety of
sentencing the driver to pay the indemnity to the parents of the deceased child,
considering the fact that the civil action for damages brought by the parents of
the child against the driver and the owner of the jeepney was dismissed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with respect to the civil indemnity; it
also modified the duration of the prison sentence. The judgment of the latter
court having become final, a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability was
issued but the same was returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the
driver. Hence, the parents brought in an action against the owner of the
jeepney to enforce such civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the previous dismissal of an action based on culpa

aquiliana precludes the application of the plain and explicit command of Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

No, the previous dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana DOES NOT
precludes the application of the plain and explicit command of Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code is quite explicit. For a felony committed
by servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties, the employers, teachers, persons, and corporations are made
subsidiarily liable. As authoritatively Interpreted in Martinez v. Barredo, 81
Phil. 1, 3 (1948), "judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion
between the defendant and the offended party, should bind the person
subsidiarily liable." Such a decision is of a conclusive nature (Nagrampa, v.
Mulvaney McMillan & Co., 97 Phil. 724 (1955); it is "binding and conclusive
upon def endant not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to
its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows
that of his employee" (Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670
[1956]).

Diana v. Batangas Transportation Co., 93 Phil. 391 (1953) while not decisive,
furnishes some light. In the Diana case, this Court held that the civil case
stems from a criminal case in which the driver of the defendant was found
guilty of multiple homicide thru reckless imprudence and was ordered to pay
an indemnity of P2,000.00 for which the defendant is made subsidiarily liable
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, while the other civil case is an
action for damages based on culpa aquiliana which underlies the civil liability
predicated on Articles 1902 to 1910 of the old Civil Code. These two cases
involve two different remedies. Considering the distinguishing characteristics of
the two cases, which involve two different remedies, it can hardly be said that
there is identity of reliefs in both actions as to make the present case fall under
the operation of Rule 8, section 1 (d) of the Rules of Court. What clearly
emerges then is the controlling force of the principle that once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer, according to the
command of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is subsidiarily liable , if it
shown that the commission thereof was in the discharge of the duties of such
employee.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:

Revised Penal Code; Subsidiary liability under Article 103; Effect of judgment of
conviction of employee upon person subsidiarily liable.—Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code is quite explicit. For a felony committed by servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties,
the employers, teachers, persons, and corporations are made subsidiarily
liable. As authoritatively Interpreted in Martinez v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1, 3
(1948), "judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the
defendant and the offended party, should bind the person subsidiarily liable."
Such a decision is of a conclusive nature (Nagrampa, v. Mulvaney McMillan &
Co., 97 Phil. 724 (1955); it is "binding and conclusive upon def endant not only
with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the
liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee"
(Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670 [1956]). The latest
manifestation of approval of the Martinez doctrine appears in Bantoto v. Bobis,
L-18966, Nov. 22, 1966.
Same; Effect of a previous dismissal of an action based on culpa aquilian a up
on the application of Article 103, Penal Code; Bar by former judgment; Case at
bar.—For the death of a 3-year old boy who was run over by a passenger
jeepney two (2) actions were filed by the parents: (1) a civil case for damages
against the owner of the jeepney and the driver for culpa aquiliana; and (2) a
criminal action against the driver for homicide thru reckless imprudence—
which was filed while said civil case was still pending hearing. The civil case
was dismissed, the lower court being of the opinion that "in conscience" it
could not "hold the defendant guilty of negligence resulting in, or contributory
to, the said accident." The parents appealed the civil case to the Court of
Appeals but the appeal was dismissed for their failure to pay the docketing
fees. In the criminal case, however, the trial court convicted the driver of
homicide thru reckless imprudence and aside from the prison sentence
imposed upon him, he (driver) was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased son in the sum of P6,-000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The driver appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as one of the
issues "the propriety of sentencing the driver to pay the indemnity to the
parents of the deceased child, considering the fact that the civil action for
damages brought by the parents of the child against the driver and the owner
of the jeepney was dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with
respect to the civil indemnity; it also modified the duration of the prison
sentence. The judgment of the latter court having become final, a writ of
execution to enforce the civil liability was issued but the same was returned
unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the driver. Hence, the parents brought in
an action against the owner of the jeepney to enforce such civil liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The novel question presented is whether
the previous dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana precludes the
application of the plan and explicit command of Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. Held: We do not think so. Diana v. Batangas Transportation Co.,
93 Phil. 391 (1953) while not decisive, furnishes some light. In the Diana case,
this Court held that the civil case stems from a criminal case in which the
driver of the defendant was found guilty of multiple homicide thru reckless
imprudence and was ordered to pay an indemnity of P2,000.00 for which the
defendant is made subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, while the other civil case is an action for damages based on culpa
aquiliana which underlies the civil liability predicated on Articles 1902 to 1910
of the old Civil Code. These two cases involve two different remedies.
Considering the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve
two different remedies, it can hardly be said that there is identity of reliefs in
both actions as to make the present case fall under the operation of Rule 8,
section 1 (d) of the Rules of Court. What clearly emerges then is the controlling
force of the principle that once there is a conviction for a felony, final in
character, the employer, according to the command of Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, is subsidiarily liable , if it shown that the commission
thereof was in the discharge of the duties of such employee.
Remedial Law; Lower court cannot reverse judgment of higher court.—The
principle is undisputed that a lower court judge cannot enforce different
decrees than those rendered by the superior court. If each and every Court of
First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of a higher
court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. It is
elementary that an inferior court has no legal authority to set aside a f inal and
executory decision of a higher court.

47
MANLICLIC VS. CALAUANAN
GR # 150157

TOPIC: Pertinent provisions from other laws | Culpa Contractual vs. Culpa
Aquilana vs. Culpa Criminal

FACTS:

The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by
petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-
type jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right
side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the
latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage. Respondent suffered minor injuries
while his driver was unhurt. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was
filed charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and
PRBLI. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. When the civil case
was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be received in evidence in
the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the
civil case. The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as
follows:

Respondent’s version:
According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the
speed of 60 to 70 kilo meters per hour on the slow lane of the expressway
when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of
overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on
the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was
about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
 corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was
on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of
plaintiff when the incident took place. He testified that the jeep of
plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine
Rabbit bus from behind.
Petitioner’s version:
The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about
to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the
left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Petitioner PRBLI
maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee

RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed
the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the
collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the
CA in the criminal case that there was an absence of negligence on his
part.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due diligence and
supervision of its employee.

HELD:

The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly liable for the damages for his negligence or
reckless imprudence based on quasi-delict. The PRBLI is held solidarily liable
for the damages caused by the petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

(1) Civil liability arising from crime v. Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana

The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already
acquitted by the CA of the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property with physical injuries.

From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one
arising from or based on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner
PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employees. It appears that petitioner Manliclic
was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
 (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the
mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from
crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana.

The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers

exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused.

In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that
arising from quasi-delict:

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

a) If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt,
his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
b) If an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author
of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on
the crime or ex delicto.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT
- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime.
- The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. The
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict.
- Civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will
not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist).
 - An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant
in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the
story however, as they constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a
subject for a petition for review. Findings of the trial court and appellate court
are binding on the Supreme Court. The testimony of the petitioner about the
jeep of the respondent overtaking another vehicle in the criminal case was not
consistent with what he gave to the investigator which is evidently a product of
an after-thought. If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio
Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of
collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather
than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself
rather than having been forced off the road.

(2) PRBLI’s liability

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection
or both.

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees. In the matter of selection, it
showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he
became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision
of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators is sufficient
proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its
employees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine

them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the
supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures
for the breach thereof.

As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence

on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has
been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work.

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It
seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of
recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no
evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel.
- No evidence introduced that there are rules promulgated by the bus
company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its
driver should manage and operate the vehicles
- No showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to
oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles
- The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident
is not enough. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth with
regard to the supervision.
- Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should
have been shown and established.
- The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only
one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is
held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:

Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay Evidence; Testimony at Former Proceeding;

Requisites.—For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or
deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the
former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on
different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former
trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
Same; Failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law; Hearsay evidence alone may be
insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto,
it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.—It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection
shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which
the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does
not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being
hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted
and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and
given the importance it deserves.
Same; Though Section 47 of Rule 130 speaks only of testimony and deposition,
it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be
admitted—documents which are part of the testimonies of witnesses that have
been admitted may also be admitted.—Petitioners contend that the documents
in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case
because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to “testimony or deposition.” We
find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of
testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case
or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being
part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they
shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.
Quasi-Delicts; Extinction of Civil Liability; The extinction of civil liability
referred to Section 2(b) of Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused.—From the foregoing
declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author
of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure which reads: (b) Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable
for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising
from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section
3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Same; Same; Same; A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime—a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual; It is now settled that
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi-delict.—A
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime—a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled
that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his
guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was
not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist),
said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto.
In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability
based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any,
may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
Pleadings and Practice; As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in
a petition for review; Exceptions.—As a general rule, questions of fact may not
be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on
the Supreme Court. Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review
thereof unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Quasi-Delicts; Employer-Employee Relationship; Vicarious Liability; Under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence
of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both.—
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the
smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good
father of a family. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.
Same; Same; Same; In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records, and in the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.—In the case at bar, petitioner
PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic.
In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner
Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of
due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of
ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised
the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees. In the selection
of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees,
the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To
fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent
on them.
Same; Same; Same; The presence of investigators after the accident is not
enough supervision by a public transportation company—regular supervision
of employees, that is, prior to any accident should be shown and established.—
The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of
petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the
cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is
not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any
accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do.
The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one
set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI.
How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually
informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all
the drivers.

53
DE ROY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR # 80718

TOPIC: Articles 2183-2194, Civil Code of the Philippines

FACTS:

The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa Perdosa De

Roy, collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis
Bernal, Sr., et al., resulting in injuries to their family and death of Marissa
Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop but the former failed to do so.

Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. This
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the
15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of tie to
file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. They
again filed for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

Petitioner filed for a special civil action for certiorari to declare null and void
the previous decision and claimed that the appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion. They contended that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas
case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. Also they argued
that the petitioners had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the warning to vacate the shop.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last clear chance is application in the case at bar.

HELD:

No, the last clear chance is application in the case at bar.

The contention on the “last clear chance” of private respondents to avoid the
accident, this should be disregarded, since the doctrine of “last clear chance”,
which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case. The
Supreme Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court’s decision holding petitioner
liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that “the proprietor
of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total
or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.”

As to the Publication Contention

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not
be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Habaluyas and Lacsamana cases,

reiterated; Motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, not allowed; Under the Habaluyas and
Lacsamana cases, the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be ex-tended.—This Court finds that the Court of
Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners’
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry
of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied
the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895,
August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on May 30, 1986 (142
SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule. x x x Lacsamana
v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R.
Nos. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went
further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prospective application of the Habaluyas rule.—
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986, 144
SCRA 161], stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the
operation of the grace period.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette; There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding; Duty of lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of Supreme Court decisions.—Petitioners
contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision
in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Civil Law; Damages; Petitioner is liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code for
damages resulting from the total or partial collapse of a building if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs.—This Court likewise finds that the Court
of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court’s
decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
lack of necessary repairs.”

59
LIWAYWAY VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO (December 23, 2008 – EN BANC)
GR # 141309

TOPIC: Human Relations | Articles 19-63, Civil Code of the Philippines

FACTS:

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654),
which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands
Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days
before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying
Champion, Hope, and More as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected
Hope, More, and Champion cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically,
to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of 55%
provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per
pack.

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A.

Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it
was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20,
1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of
RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter
assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00
(computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days
from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an
injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated
August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and
unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax
assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has
fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter
should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering
that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no

cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance
of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that
she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one
responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum
shopping was signed by respondents counsel in violation of the rule that it is
the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding
that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the
merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further
held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by
respondents submission of the corporate secretarys certificate authorizing its
counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. x x x x

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of
the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice
or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers
while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant
case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for
damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the
certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the
corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the
same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally liable to the
damages.

HELD:

No, the petitioner should NOT be held personally liable to the damages because
the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the
petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be
assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the
nature of a suit against the State.
To further understand the disposition of the Supreme Court, the following are
enlightening:

Determination of the Duty of the Public Officer at Bar

There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the “duty owing to
the public collectively” (the body politic), and the “duty owing to particular
individuals.”

In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or

non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes
of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs,
“[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon
and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or
the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability.” Stated
differently, when what is involved is a “duty owing to the public in general,” an
individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer,
even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer.
In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In
performing or failing to perform a public duty, the officer has touched his
interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an individual.
The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.

What is involved is a public officer’s duty owing to the public in general. The
petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is
being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which
she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 (1996),
we declared as having “fallen short of a valid and effective administrative
issuance.” A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative
or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are
compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a
duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would
be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.

Damages allegedly suffered by the Respondent because of the Petitioner

To have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must
allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-
performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint
filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been
sustained by the respondent. The phrase “financial and business difficulties”
mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and
cannot translate into a “particular injury.” In contrast, the facts of the case
eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent,
as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the
former by virtue of RMC 37-93.

With no “particular injury” alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no

delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would
violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act
or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.

The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under
Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if
he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional
rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 602 (1999), where
we said: Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer
acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.

The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without
any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondents complaint
(specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof – that only respondents Champion, Hope
and More cigarettes were reclassified.) for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code would be premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA), where we ruled that RMC No.
37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, had fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. This
is a logical inference. Without the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in
the complaint that respondents rights to due process of law and to equal
protection of the laws were violated by the petitioners administrative issuance
would be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in
her motion to dismiss.

But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional;
certainly not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the laws
perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that RMC 37-93
was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC No.
10-86) requiring prior notice before RMCs could become operative. However,
this Court did not make an express finding of violation of the right to due
process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: Not
insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of
taxation; a statement that does not amount to a positive indictment of
petitioner for violation of respondents constitutional right. Even if one were to
ascribe a constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on the non-uniformity of
tax provisions, the nature of the constitutional transgression falls under
Section 28, Article VI not Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02 of

respondents complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of
action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is merely the
allegation that only respondents Champion, Hope and More cigarettes were
reclassified.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Two Kinds of duties exercised by public

officers: the “duty owing to the public collectively” (the body politic), and the
“duty owing to particular individuals.”—There are two kinds of duties exercised
by public officers: the “duty owing to the public collectively” (the body politic),
and the “duty owing to particular individuals.”
Same; Same; In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper
performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of
the two classes of duties is involved.—In determining whether a public officer is
liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first
be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the
eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, “[t]he liability of a public officer to an
individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the
individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one
he can incur no liability.” Stated differently, when what is involved is a “duty
owing to the public in general,” an individual cannot have a cause of action for
damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by
the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the
individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public
duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes
no duty to him as an individual. The remedy in this case is not judicial but
political.
Same; Same; Exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual
suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer’s improper
performance or non-performance of his public duty.—The exception to this rule
occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury
on account of the public officer’s improper performance or non-performance of
his public duty. An individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury which,
technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which he specially
suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. A contrary precept
(that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still
institute an action against a public officer on account of an improper
performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will
lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might
have the like—the complaining individual has no better right than anybody
else. If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule
restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a public
officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds
upon which all actions are founded.
Same; Same; A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-
legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules
which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative
regulations.—What is involved is a public officer’s duty owing to the public in
general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No.
37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication,
and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261
SCRA 236 (1996), we declared as having “fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance.” A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with
quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate
rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative
regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire
body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative
rule.
Same; Damages; To have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner,
respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on
account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty.—To have a
cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must allege that
it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by
petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the
trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by
the respondent. The phrase “financial and business difficulties” mentioned in
the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate
into a “particular injury.” In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently
demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter
did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by
virtue of RMC 37-93.
Same; Same; With no “particular injury” alleged in the complaint, there is,
therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner
that would violate the primary rights of the respondent; Elements of a cause of
action.—With no “particular injury” alleged in the complaint, there is,
therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner
that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or
tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action,
because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.
Damages; Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer
may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of
constitutional rights.—The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein
reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public
officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a
violation of constitutional rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 309
SCRA 602 (1999), where we said: Under the aforecited article, it is not
necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it
is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
duties.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, Dissenting Opinion:

Civil Law; Damages; As long as there was a violation of constitutional rights, a

public officer may be held liable for damages, and it is not even required that
he/she acted with malice or bad faith.—Jurisprudence is settled that to be
liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, a public officer or a private individual
must have an act in violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights regardless of
whether he/she acted in good faith or whether the act was done within or
beyond the bounds of authority of said public officer. The act may have been
committed in any manner; what is pivotal is that the act resulted in a violation
of another person’s constitutional rights. No distinction was made whether the
public officer acted within or beyond the scope of authority in order to hold
him/her liable. As long as there was a violation of constitutional rights, a
public officer may be held liable for damages, and it is not even required that
he/she acted with malice or bad faith. That the Legislature did not intend to
hold the public officer liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code for
violation of constitutional rights only if he/she acted beyond the scope of
authority, is further made clear by the fact that under Article 32, a private
individual is similarly held accountable.

59
LIWAYWAY VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO (June 19, 2007 – THIRD DIVISION)
GR # 141309

TOPIC: Human Relations | Articles 19-63, Civil Code of the Philippines

FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall
be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not
be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway
issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured
by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to
the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette
brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent
has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed
the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of
his/her office
(2) Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book
I, Administrative Code

HELD:

(1) On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads
is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment
for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior
public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise
where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with
malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.

(2) On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it
being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative
Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly,
in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated
that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental
state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of
the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for
the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not
the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly

deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article
32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the
instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional
rights.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The general rule is that a public
officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks;
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which being outside the scope of
his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.— The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages
which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official
duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within
his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not
liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually
be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.
Same; Same; Same; A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad
faith; Instances Where a Public Officer May Be Validly Sued in His/Her Private
Capacity for Acts Done in the Course of the Performance of the Functions of
the Office.—In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
309 SCRA 602 (1999), that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates
the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or
bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be
validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the
performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted
with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Special law must prevail over a general
law.—A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and
does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special
statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular
persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state
only. A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes inpari
materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible,
with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts,
one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing
alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act,
the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly
than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the
more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely
necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.
Same; Same; Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down
the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts
done in the performance of their duties; while said provisions deal in particular
with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e.,
“acts” done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action
or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.—
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid
down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers
for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and
subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence
are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said
provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the
subject thereof is general, i.e.,“acts” done in the performance of official duties,
without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit
against the official concerned.
Same; Same; Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with
violation of constitutional rights by public officers.— Contrarily, Article 32 of
the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an
“act” that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and
that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the
special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by
public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by
Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code,
specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the
same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer
liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may
be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors
in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific
provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.
Remedial Law; Cause of Action; Considering that bad faith and malice are not
necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to
specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of
action.—The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the
Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an
action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the
same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below
therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation
of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

65
HEIRS OF REDENTOR VS. ALBAYDA
GR # 172200

TOPIC: Damages | Temperate or Moderate Damages

FACTS:

Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi
driver of a Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a
bike on his way to the office, when Completo’s taxi bumped and sideswept him,
causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force
General Hospital, but he was transferred to the AFP Medical Center because he
sustained a fracture and there was no orthopedic doctor available in the first
hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in 23
Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months].

Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for

physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of
damage to property through reckless imprudence against Albayda. The Office of
the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for Albayda’s
complaint, and Completo’s complaint [against Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against
Completo and Abiad.

Albayda alleged that Completo’s negligence is the proximate cause of the

incident. He demanded the following damages and their respective amounts:
Actual damages – 276,550; Moral damages – 600,000; Exemplary damages –
200,000; Attorney’s fees – 25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance.

On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab
when he heard a strange sound from the taxicab’s rear right side. He found
Albayda lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air
Force General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver,
and that he already reduced his speed to 20km even before reaching the
intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him
to lose control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no cause of
action.

Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony
of the owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a
soldier, he also held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being
a taxicab operator, he would wake up early to personally check the taxicabs.
When Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his
bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license. Completo never figured in a
vehicular accident since he was employed, and according to Abiad, he
[Completo] was a good driver and good man.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to
pay actual [46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney’s fees [25k]. Upon
appeal at the CA, the court affirmed RTC’s decision with modifications [no more
actual damages; awarded temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k;
Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay Albayda; added legal interest].

ISSUE:

(1) WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the
collision. NO
(2) WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father
of the family. YES
(3) WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney’s fees for
Albayda had no basis. NO / NO / YES

HELD:

On Negligence

It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence
required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the
question of the motorist’s negligence is a question of fact. Usually, more will be
required of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr =
15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care because of the physical advantages
the former has over the latter.

It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise

reasonable diligence. He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda’s bicycle;
he did not slow down even when he approached the intersection. Such
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by
Albayda. It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the
intersection ahead of Completo. NCC 2180 cited – obligation imposed by NCC
2176 is demandable also for those persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers are liable for damage caused by employees, but the responsibility
ceases upon proof that employers observed the diligence of the good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of employees. The burden of proof is
on the employer. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
QD is solidary. The employer’s civil liability for his employee’s negligent acts is
also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and
supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is not in the
vehicle at the time of collision. In the selection of employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. With respect to supervision, employers should formulate SOPs and
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches.
To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious [secondary]
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.

ABIAD’S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE,

AND THIS IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION
THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
COMPLETO.

On Damages

CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because Albayda failed to

present documentary evidence to establish the amount incurred. Temperate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moral damages
are awarded in QDs causing physical injuries, so the award is proper. The
award of attorney’s fees is deleted for failure to prove that petitioners acted in
bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent’s just and valid claim.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:

Appeals; Conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence,
as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case.—The issues raised by petitioners essentially delve into factual matters
which were already passed upon by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the
Court of Appeals (CA). Conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying in the case. The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact of
the trial court makes the same binding upon this Court. Well-settled is the rule
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. To be sure, findings of fact of
lower courts are deemed conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court, save
only for clear and exceptional reasons, none of which is present in the case at
bar.
Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; It is a rule in negligence suits
that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the
motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was
negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the
plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
suffered.—The instant case involved a collision between a taxicab and a bicycle
which resulted in serious physical injuries to the bicycle rider, Albayda. It is a
rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence
required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides
that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of the motorist’s negligence is a
question of fact.
Same; Same; Same; Bicycles; Right of Way; The bicycle occupies a legal
position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway,
and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a motorist
than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other because of the
physical advantages the automobile has over the bicycle; While the duty of
using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to the
inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from the motorist
to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist.—The bicycle occupies a legal
position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway,
and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be required of a motorist
than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other because of the
physical advantages the automobile has over the bicycle. At the slow speed of
ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet per second, while a car
traveling at only twenty-five miles per hour covers almost thirty-seven feet per
second, and split-second action may be insufficient to avoid an accident. It is
obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than
vice versa. Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a
motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles,
more care is required from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from
the bicyclist. Simply stated, the physical advantages that the motor vehicle has
over the bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist than vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Vicarious Liability of Employers; When an injury is caused
by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent, which presumption may be rebutted only by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.—Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease upon
proof that they observed all the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employees. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. If the
employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he is
relieved of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the employer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The civil liability of the employer for the negligent
acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in
selecting and supervising his employee.—The trial court’s finding that
Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda at
the intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part
of Completo, as driver, and his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. The civil liability of the
employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct,
owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil
liability of the employer attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle
at the time of the collision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to the supervision of employees,
employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.—In
the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand,
with respect to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial
involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.
Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate damages, more than nominal but
less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature
of the case, be proved with certainty—the damages must be reasonable under
the circumstances.— While the amount of actual damages was not duly
established with certainty, the Court recognizes the fact that, indeed, Albayda
incurred a considerable amount for the necessary and reasonable medical
expenses, loss of salary and wages, loss of capacity to earn increased wages,
cost of occupational therapy, and harm from conditions caused by prolonged
immobilization. Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty. Temperate damages must be reasonable under
the circumstances. Thus, the Court finds the award of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) as temperate damages reasonable under the
circumstances.