Fascismo Transnacional

East Central Europe 37 (2010) 214–246 brill.
nl/eceu
Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations

between Regimes and Movements in Europe,
1922-1939*
Arnd Bauerkämper
Freie Universität, Berlin
Abstract
In recent debates about transnational and inter-cultural approaches in historiography, cross-
border relations have usually assumed a positive connotation for mutually enriching the parties
involved. However, research on bilateral relationships between Italian Fascism and German
National Socialism and of fascist movements in other European states demonstrate that transna-
tional exchange is normatively ambivalent, i.e. it can comply with our aims, wishes and expecta-
tions or not. This contribution will present evidence for the attractiveness of Italian Fascism and
German Nazism throughout Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Beyond high politics, cooperation
between fascists extended to other areas, like recreation and public relations. Nevertheless, fascist
movements and regimes appropriated foreign doctrines and policies selectively in order to avert
the charge of copying foreign models. They also stressed their nationalist credentials. Yet hyper-
nationalism was deeply ingrained in fascist ideology, too. Thus, cooperation between European
fascists was continuously hampered by mutual antagonism. Altogether, fascist nationalism and
transnationalism were interrelated rather than mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, cross-border
cooperation between fascist movements should not be underestimated or reduced to wartime
collaboration.
Keywords
German Nazism, Italian Fascism, cross-border cooperation, transnationalism
In ten years Europe will be Fascist or Fascisized1

—Il Popolo d’Italia, 30 October 1932
*) Some of the material in this contribution has been drawn from my article “Ambiguities of
Transnationalism: Fascism in Europe Between Pan-Europeanism and Ultra-Nationalism, 1919-
39,” German Historical Institute Bulletin, 29 (2007), no. 2, 43-67.
1)
“In dieci anni l’Europa sarà fascista o fascistizzata”.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187633010X534469

A. Bauerkämper / East Central Europe 37 (2010) 214–246 215
Introduction
Benito Mussolini was so impressed by the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution

(Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista) after his inaugural visit to the Mostra on
October 1932, that he claimed it represented the new universal civilization of
the twentieth century. This stance, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of
the glorified “March on Rome,” is a stark contrast to prevailing negative inter-
pretations of transnationalism in the historiography of cross-border fascist
relationships. In fact, research on cross-border cooperation between fascists
and communists highlights transnational exchange as normatively ambiva-
lent, as the expansion of civil society across territorial, social and cultural
boundaries (Foley, Edwards 1996: 38-52; Trentmann 2000: 3-46; Keane
2004: esp. 89-127; Bauerkämper, Gosewinkel and Reichardt 2006: 22-32).2
As I will suggest in this contribution, the relationship between transnational
relations and cross-border entanglements on the one hand and nationalist
delimitation on the other is not contradictory, but rather is complementary
and even dialectical (Kocka 2006: 305-16; Kocka 2005: 275-86).This will be
demonstrated by reconstructing the ties and barriers between fascists in Europe
in the interwar period. Besides dealing with the failure to institutionalize
cooperation between the fascist leaders, the contribution will present evidence
of the attractiveness of Italian Fascism and German Nazism throughout
Europe in the 1920s and 1930s.3 I will focus on the fascist universe in Europe
and elsewhere, but will also deal with those movements in Central and South
Eastern Europe.
Along with collaboration in top-level foreign affairs, as well as in policing,
surveillance and repression, the interchange between fascists extended to fields
like the organization of labor, leisure and public relations. Nevertheless, fascist
movements and regimes appropriated foreign doctrines and policies selectively
in order to avoid the impression of co-opting National Socialism. Indeed,
hyper-nationalism was deeply ingrained in fascist ideology, continuously sti-
fling cooperation between European fascists. Nationalism and transnational
exchange were therefore complimentary, not contradictory, as demonstrated
by attempts among National Socialists to mobilize protest against colonial
2)
On the Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista, see Stone 1993: 215-43. Also see Fogu 2003: esp.
165-206, 250-59; Fogu 1996: 317-45.
3)
When capitalized, “Fascism” refers to the Italian variant, whereas “fascism” denotes the generic
concept.
216 A. Bauerkämper / East Central Europe 37 (2010) 214–246
rule in the non-European world. Yet Italian Fascists and German National
Socialists shared a common conceptual framework as well as mutual relations
that reached beyond the sphere of foreign policy. The Nazis and some other
right-wing groups in Weimar Germany were fascinated by Mussolini’s success-
ful “March on Rome” and the emergence of a full-fledged dictatorship in Italy.
On the other side of the Alps, Italian Fascists closely watched the rapid rise of
the National Socialist movement in the early 1930s and Hitler’s seizure of
power in January 1933. Moreover, they selectively adopted features of the
Nazi regime that seemed to have worked to strengthen the German dictator-
ship. Perceptions as well as processes of adaptation and appropriation fre-
quently resulted in new cognitive lessons by both the Italian Fascists and the
German Nazis, respectively. Besides considerations of explicitly processing
experiences, theories of cognitive learning allow for unconscious and implicit
learning by regular interactions—especially learning from mistakes and fail-
ures (see Bandura 1965: 589-95; Bandura, Walters 1963; Aust, Schönpflug
2007: 9-35, esp. 21-4). The relationship between Italian Fascists and the
German National Socialists merits such a case study, because it was shaped not
only by mutual ideological affinity, and even friendship, but also by competi-
tion and rivalry in the fascist universe.
Thus, cross-border perceptions, interactions, learning, transfers and appro-
priations between Mussolini’s “Blackshirts” and Hitler’s “Brownshirts” should
be integrated into a multilateral framework. Although neither Italian Fascism
nor German National Socialism can be adequately explained within the con-
fines of a national paradigm, historiography has largely stuck to such concepts,
emphasizing fascism’s singularity and national uniqueness. Most studies of
fascism have included only passing references to cross-border interrelations
and transfers.4 Historians have generally underestimated the role and impact
of fascist transnationalism. In Italy and in Germany, in particular, historical
writing has been based on the common view that “international fascism is
unthinkable, a contradiction in terms.”5 It has even been argued that fascism
4)
For an overview, see Bauerkämper 2006: 1-31. Transfers have not been systematically dealt
with by Eatwell 2002; Griffin 2007; Paxton 2004; Blinkhorn 2000; Payne 1995; or Laqueur
1996. For exceptions, see the introduction and some chapters in Iordachi 2010a: esp. 1-51 and
316-57; Morgan 2003: 159-89; Woller 1999: 148-90; Borejsza 1999: 252-70; and Bauerkämper
2006: 166-82. For more explicit comparisons and transfer studies, see the contributions to
Reichardt and Nolzen 2005.
5)
Laqueur 1996: 218. For similar interpretations, see Borejsza 1981: 579-614, esp. 607; Morgan
2003: 159; Ioanid 1990: 190; Borejsza 1999: 267; Woller 1999: 172f.
did not exist as a transnational movement but was “largely a construction of

political opponents” (Eatwell 2006: 127-37, 128). These interpretations
underestimate the scale of fascist transnationalism: despite their undisputed
nationalistic and xenophobic foundations, cross-border aspirations and activi-
ties of fascists are not longer to be belittled as mere propagandistic camouflage.
After the “March on Rome,” in late October 1922, the Italian capital mobi-
lized fascists throughout Europe. And Italian Fascism became a model—
especially for the Nazis—for fascist groups across the continent. Despite his
disappointment about the military failures of his Italian alliance partner, Hitler
cherished Mussolini as his friend as late as April 1945 when Nazi Germany lay
in ruins.
In contrast to structural approaches to the study of fascism, as well as
traditional political history of diplomatic relations and the newer concepts
of cultural history, this essay will reconstruct and explain agency in cross-
border relations between fascists, examining how fascist groups interacted in
various arenas and on different levels. From 1922 to 1933, Italian Fascists,
who came into power in October 1922, had forged important informal con-
tacts with leaders and members of other fascist movements. After the Nazis
had seized power in January 1933, more official relations between repre-
sentatives of the German and Italian governments emerged. At the same
time, however, functionaries of the Nazi and Fascist parties continued to
entertain relations with representatives of smaller fascist movements, which
became targets of foreign propaganda and initiatives to influence fascist pro-
grams and policies. Yet relations were asymmetrical, both between the two
major fascist powers and between those and more minor groups. Between
1935 and 1939, Nazi Germany was indeed the dominant power in relation
to Fascist Italy. This dominance encouraged Nazi leaders to strongly criticize
Mussolini and his lieutenants, for instance, regarding their bonds to the Italian
court and their treatment of Jews. Although the Italian Fascists did not suc-
cumb to German demands to enter the Second World War in late August
1939, Nazi officials cultivated a friendship with their Italian “comrades”
beyond official foreign policy and diplomatic relations. The last section of this
contribution demonstrates how in fact European fascists found enthusiastic
followers all over the world, especially in Islamic states, India and Latin
America.
In order to properly explore these different types of interactions, I rely
on multiple sources, including studies on diplomatic relations between
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, publications on the comparative history of
fascist parties and movements, as well as investigations of entanglements
between these movements, and archival sources on German Nazism and

British fascism.
The Impact of Italian Fascism, 1922-1933
Although he was only able to establish a full-fledged dictatorship in the second

half of the 1920s, Mussolini’s seizure of power in October 1922 caused con-
siderable attention throughout Europe. In the view of many contemporaries,
Italian Fascism seemed to offer a promising alternative to liberal democracies
struck by wartime acrimony and the economic and social crises of the early
1920s. From 1922 to 1925, while Mussolini consolidated his power at the
expense of his conservative coalition partners, the Duce found an increasing
number of admirers in a broad spectrum of European states, such as Britain,
France and Serbia. The impression of strong leadership, the vision of a “new
era” and the aggrandizement of Italian power seemed to compare favorably to
the performances of Western and Central European democracies. The new
political style of a plebiscitary dictatorship also aroused the admiration of nas-
cent fascist groups. The Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF), which had been
established in November 1921, soon became a model leading to the founda-
tion of numerous fascist groups and parties in various European and even
non-European states. According to a contemporary estimate, parties which
designated themselves as “fascist” had been founded in 40 states by April 1925
(Mack Smith 1981: 108). Italy had in fact become the epicenter of a network
of fascist groups evolving throughout Europe following Mussolini’s “March
on Rome.” Although relations between these groups were unequal, increasing
cross-border exchange lent the project of fascist universalism legitimacy
(Morgan 1999: 162; Woller 1999: 97).
Even though Mussolini and his supporters initially emphasized the national
character of Italian Fascism, their political ambitions transcended Italy’s bor-
ders. They busily propagated the model of a new transnational fascist civiliza-
tion embodied by the new dictatorship. Mussolini therefore encouraged
Fascists in foreign states to rally in support of the doctrines and claims of the
new regime. In London, a local Fascio had even been founded before Mussolini’s
“March on Rome.” After the Fascists had seized power, organizations like the
Fascio Italiani all’Estero, which was set up by the prominent Fascist Giuseppe
Bastianini, not only integrated Italians living in foreign states into Italian
Fascism, but they also spread its claim of comprehensive renewal beyond Italy’s
confines. Although they refrained from direct intervention into domestic
political affairs, the Fascio unequivocally espoused Mussolini’s regime as they

propagated it as a model for other fascist movements. Italian Blackshirts were
delegated in countries as distant as India in order to mobilize such support for
the Fascist regime.6
It is therefore not surprising that Italian Fascism was greeted with both sup-
port and sympathy among politicians, high-ranking officials and journalists,
even in strong parliamentary democracies like Britain where the monarchical
prerogative had been undermined as early as the seventeenth century. Right-
wing politicians, journalists and intellectuals, but also liberals and democrats,
admired the Italian Fascists’ determination to tackle pressing economic and
social problems caused by the First World War. They also sympathized with
the Fascists efforts to overcome the frictions of incessant party conflicts in
European nation-states. Despite strong criticism of Italy’s occupation of the
Greek island of Corfu, the dismay over the murder of Italian opposition poli-
tician Giacomo Matteotti and the establishment of one-party rule in 1925,
some Conservative politicians, like Winston Churchill, applauded Mussolini’s
anti-socialist and anti-communist stance.
Frightened by the Bolshevik Revolution, industrial unrest in Britain and
the General Strike of 1926, British journalists and intellectuals also expressed
their admiration for the Fascist dictatorship. Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative
Party leader, had agreed to form the National Government with the Labor
Party’s Ramsay MacDonald in 1931. As Baldwin’s moderate policies met
increasing criticism from Conservatives, Italian Fascism was increasingly
espoused by radical British Conservatives. Support for the corporate state
propagated by the Duce, in particular, even transcended the Conservative
Party’s ranks. For many, a corporate system of government seemed to combine
key political integration with a powerful foreign policy. Newspapers like the
Morning Post and magazines such as National Review, which had already
applauded Mussolini’s “March on Rome,” as well as press baron Lord
Rothermere’s dailies Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph became committed pro-
ponents of Fascism, which, with its adulation of the state and national strength,
seemed to compare favorably to the pre-war liberal consensus politics of Italian
Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti (Pugh 2005).
After Mussolini concluded the Lateran Treaty with Pope Pius, settling the
long-standing church-state conflicts in Italy, Catholic intellectuals and
6)
Caprariis 2000: 151-83, 152-54, 177. For a case study, see Baldoni 2003: 9, 27, 25, 187;
Baldoni 2004: 147-161, 148.
journalists throughout Europe proved especially susceptible to Italian Fascism.

In Britain, for instance, journals like the Saturday Review strongly supported
Italian Fascism in the early 1930s. The English Review, which was incorpo-
rated into the National Review in 1937, became a mouthpiece for conservative
and Catholic intellectuals, too. Douglas Jerrold and Sir Charles Petrie (who
also championed the Action Française) as well as Major James Strachey
applauded Mussolini’s stringent rule. Writer G.K. Chesterton, an advocate
of “distributionism” (i.e. favoring the wide-ranging redistribution of land
in order to return rural land to the urban population) and passionate anti-
German, hailed Italian Fascism as a bulwark against money-lenders and com-
munism. Similarly, Roy Campbell, a poet who fought for the Nationalists in
the Spanish Civil War, viewed contemporary European politics as a struggle
between communism and Christendom, a struggle he believed was repre-
sented and protected by Mussolini. Some of these figures and Conservative
politicians, such as Leopold Amery, were members of Italophile group, the
“British Union of Friends of Italy.” Major James Strachey, who was raised in
Italy and glorified Fascism as the incarnation of divine providence, was even a
member of the Italian Fascist Party and a friend of Mussolini’s. All these sup-
porters of Fascism called for a return to Christian faith and sharply distin-
guished between Italian Fascism and German Nazism, which they regarded as
a new form of paganism.7
Unlike Catholic intellectuals, writers like T.S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis,
Aldous Huxley and H.G. Wells, were not attracted to Italian Fascism for its
Catholic romanticism but for its aesthetic modernism. Yet most of these intel-
lectuals viewed the Nazi movement and regime as contrary to British tradi-
tions. As it was seen as “foreign” and thus externalized, their support for certain
aspects of fascist ideology did not translate into enthusiasm for Mosley’s British
Union of Fascists (BUF). Yet the party was at least temporarily hailed as a
promising political movement by prominent conservatives like press baron
Lord Rothermere.8
Scared by the Bolshevik Revolution and repelled by the internationalist
claims and policies of Soviet rulers, some British diplomats and leading offi-
cials of the Foreign Office also expressed their admiration for the Fascist regime
that seemed to infuse Italians with new prowess and national strength.
7)
Allitt 1997: 221, 223-28; Webber 1986: 63f.; Baldoni 2003: 170-2; Bussfeld 2001: 211-31.
For an autobiographical account, see Petrie 1950: 176-90.
8)
Coupland 2000: 541-58; Lineham 2000: 269-87. On the leanings of English Catholics
towards the radical right in France, see Griffiths 2004.
However, they usually differentiated between “moderate” and “extreme” Fascists.

This distinction, which re-emerged after the Nazis seized power, seemed to leave
some hope for efforts to tame the new rulers. Thus, the British Ambassador to
Rome, Ronald Graham, in his diplomatic reports to Foreign Secretary Austen
Chamberlain in 1926 miscalculated Mussolini’s dictatorship as an audacious
experiment. Nevertheless, Graham maintained that the Fascist regime could
not be transferred to Britain. In 1929, he and Chamberlain were therefore
pleased by Mussolini’s assurance that Fascism was “not for export.” Whereas
the conservative and Catholic admirers of Italian Fascism ultimately clung to
the British tradition of parliamentary rule and liberal political culture, which
they regarded as endemic to their national heritage, British and French fascists
showed less restraint (Edwards 1970: 153-61; Bosworth 1970: 163-82).
Ardent admirers of the Duce, like Rotha Lintorn Orman, the founder of the
British Fascists in 1923, and Pierre Taittinger, who set up the Jeunesses Patriotes
in France two years later, founded organizations modeled on the PNF. Yet
these organizations appropriated Italian Fascism selectively, borrowing those
elements which suited their specific needs. Italian Fascism also served as a
political tool in the feud between competing fascist groups in European coun-
tries. Thus, the Action Française embraced Italian Fascism and denounced
other fascist movements as deviations. When the Faisceau of Georges Valois,
who occasionally invited Italian Fascists to speak at his meetings, emerged as a
mighty rival in 1925, Charles Maurras, who had set up the Action Française in
1899, for instance, denied the feasibility of Fascism in France while still
expressing his admiration for Mussolini’s regime. Nevertheless, the Action
Française themselves highlighted their national roots in their propaganda cam-
paigns in order to evade being stigmatized as a foreign import. Collectively,
the French fascists did not closely or publicly align themselves with the Italian
dictatorship in the 1920s. This cautious approach and tactical silence was
followed, too, by the new fascist organizations in France in the 1930s, the
rise of which reflected the “cross-fertilization of the French tradition of
authoritarian-populism with German and Italian fascism” (Passmore 1997:
306). Contrary to Hitler, however, the Duce had by the late 1920s officially
discarded political ambitions of extending his rule beyond Italy’s borders. His
reluctance contributed to the dissolution of the Fascio Italiani all’Estero in
1927, the result of administrative wrangling between its General Secretariat
and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs over emigration.9
9)
Blatt 1981: 263-92. Also see Soucy 1986: 65f., 109; Soucy 1995: 19, 140, 148. On the British
Fascisti, see Thurlow 1987: 51-57; Blinkhorn 2000: 60.
Nevertheless, Italian Fascism continued to aid the formation of fascist groups

throughout Europe. In Portugal, for instance, the Integralismo Lusitano was
strongly influenced by Fascist ideology, especially its ideal of social harmony
and cooperation, as well as the notion of the corporate state. Similarly, Miguel
Primo de Rivera’s successful coup d’état in Spain 1923 had been inspired by the
Italian Fascists’ “March on Rome” in the previous year. Although Mussolini
refrained from explicitly advising his Spanish counterpart, the Duce did not
hide his pride in serving as a role model. After the collapse of the short-lived
dictatorship in 1930, however, leading Italian Fascists reverted to traditional
notions of “Spanish backwardness” (Schulze 2009: 134-56, esp. 138, 144,
153-5).
But a new star soon emerged in the fascist universe. Like his father Miguel,
José Antonio Primo de Rivera and his Falange Española (FE), set up in 1933,
espoused a strand of nationalist socialism. Although he denied any connec-
tions to Italian Fascism, Primo de Rivera visited Italy in May 1935 and
accepted subsidies from the Fascist regime in the month following. The FE
defended Italy’s aggression in Abyssinia and fought for the Nationalists in the
Spanish Civil War. Like the British Union Fascists (BUF), the FE increasingly
turned to Nazi Germany: Primo de Rivera visited Berlin as early as April 1934
to hold talks with Hitler. In April 1937, General Francisco Franco forced
the FE to merge with the traditional conservatives in the new state party of
Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS. In the early 1940s, the Spanish
fascists supported the war effort of the Axis powers and increased exchanges of
delegations with Italy and Germany. Spanish fascists hoped to participate in
the new world order that they anticipated Italy and Germany would establish.
But their ties to Latin America were equally important, as the fascist move-
ment aimed to form a transnational Hispanic community.10
Italian Fascism had struck a particularly strong chord among German
nationalist conservatives and völkisch groups aiming at anti-parliamentarian
authoritarian rule and a strong state. Thus, academics like Erwin von Beckerath
and Carl Schmitt admired Mussolini’s dictatorship that appeared to ensure
political stability and prosperity and to safeguard the peninsula’s cultural herit-
age. These intellectuals and radical right-wing politicians, frustrated over
political turmoil and social unrest in the Weimar Republic, found a solu-
tion in what they saw as a flawless Italian model. Moreover, Fascist schemes
influenced legislation on other fields in Germany—for instance, German
10)
Ellwood 1987: 19-21, 78f.; Preston 1990: 115; Puhle 1995: 191-205, 193. For an overview,
see Payne 1999, esp. 469-79. On Portugal, see Costa Pinto 2000: 225-43; Blinkhorn 2000: 78.
nationalists demanded the same pro-family tax the Italian Fascists had imposed
on individuals. Chancellor Heinrich Brüning decreed the tax as early as
1930.11
It was the Nazis, however, who unreservedly espoused the Italian model.
Thus, in an opinion poll in 1929, members of the Nationalsozialistische
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) named Mussolini third behind Bismarck and Hitler
(Schieder 1996: 73-125, 84) in a list of great personalities of history. Yet
adherents of the Duce and his dictatorship were also found in the German
bourgeoisie, especially among entrepreneurs and liberals. After winning 36.9
percent of the vote in the Reichstag elections in July 1932, Hitler’s movement
aroused considerable attention among leading Italian Fascists, especially
among the Duce himself. Mussolini, who had supported the paramilitary
Stahlhelm before 1930, increasingly favored Hitler. In October 1930, the Duce
directed Giuseppe Renzetti, who had organized the first convention of the
Fasci all’Estero in Germany in May 1926, to set up an “Italian Chamber of
Commerce for Germany” in Berlin, with Renzetti as its president, and to
establish secret contacts with Hitler. Renzetti pressed Hitler and some other
leading National Socialists to wage a coup d’état when his popularity declined
in late 1932. By contrast, Mussolini had continuously advocated a ‘legal’
seizure of power, according to the Italian model. The Duce had therefore
ordered Renzetti to initiate a closer cooperation between the National Socialists
and the other organizations of the German right, especially the increasingly
radical politicians of the Conservative Party and the leaders of the Stahlhelm.
Although this procedure was also supported by Hitler, Mussolini’s Fascist
regime significantly contributed to the Nazi seizure of power in late January
1933. Like Mussolini, Hitler had been able to convey to his conservative coali-
tion partners the impression of continuity and the promise of stability
(Schieder 2005: 28-58, esp. 37-53).
The spectacular ascendancy of the Nazi Party raised the interests but also
the concern of Italian Fascists in Rome. In order to counter the growing
National Socialist challenge, Mussolini in 1932 declared that Europe would
either be Fascist or “Fascisized” in ten years.12 As he claimed political leader-
ship in Europe, the Duce extended subsidies to fascists in some major states.
Thus, Italian Ambassador to London, Dino Grandi, passed considerable funds
to the BUF in 1933-1934, although he did not share Mussolini’s enthusiasm
for universal fascism. The BUF had been officially founded by former
11)
This information is based on a presentation given by Patrick Bernhard at the Freie Universität
Berlin on 31 May 2010. Also see Schieder 2008: 185-202; Schieder 2008: 203-21.
12)
On Mussolini’s statement of 1932, see Laqueur 1996: 66.
Conservative and Labor politician Sir Oswald Mosley in October 1932. He

unreservedly espoused the doctrines of Italian Fascism. After talks with
Mussolini in Rome in January 1932, Mosley disbanded the New Party, which
he had set up after his resignation from the Labour Party in 1931, and founded
BUF. The model of the corporate state, which Mussolini had established in
Italy, was particularly attractive to British fascists, who were disenchanted by
parliamentary politics and yearning for a stronger state. When Italy attacked
Abyssinia in October 1935, the BUF defended Mussolini’s colonial claims.
Demanding a policy of non-intervention, Mosley called on his compatriots to
“mind Britain’s business”. In turn, the Italian press published long and com-
prehensive articles on the BUF’s activities. Yet rulers in Rome discontinued
their financial and political support after the British fascists had openly
espoused anti-Semitism in October 1934 and increasingly committed them-
selves to National Socialism over the next two years (Bauerkämper 1991: 193,
226-8; Baldoni 2003: 11, 19f., 169, 191f.; Baldoni 2004: 147, 157).
The Duce also lent his support to some other fascist groups and parties in
Europe, like the Austrian Heimwehr and Léon Degrelle’s Rexist movement in
Belgium. In the early 1930s, both the leaders of these movements and intel-
lectuals admired Mussolini’s regime, as a renewal by universal fascism took
priority over their national loyalties. In fact, scholars and writers favoring fas-
cism as a solution to the perceived crises were part of the transnational fascist
network. For instance, French intellectual Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, who joined
various nationalist ligues and fascist organizations in France, was obsessed with
the ‘decadence’ of modern civilization. He shared this profound disaffection
with British writer Aldous Huxley, whose novel “Point Counter Point” La
Rochelle had praised in his review published in the Nouvelle Revue française in
November 1930. As a corollary, he condemned the seemingly all-pervasive
alienation in western “mass society.” These concerns led La Rochelle to pro-
mote action and leadership of fascist movements, which he contrasted to fee-
ble parliamentary democratic rule. Likewise, for other intellectuals like Mircea
Eliade, a distinguished theorist of comparative religion and a proponent of
“Romanianism” in the 1930s, Mussolini’s dictatorship seemed to embody the
Roman Empire of antiquity and its warlike virtues, and the cultural ideal of
Romantità made Mussolini’s dictatorship increasingly attractive to fascist
groups throughout Europe.13
13)
Baldoni 2004: 150f.; Bauerkämper 2006a: 69. On Eliade, see Mann 2004: 278. On Drieu La
Rochelle and Huxley, see Leal 1985: 247-59.
Even in the 1920s, however, Mussolini’s regime was not the sole model for
European fascists. The radical nationalist, royalist and Catholic Action Française
and its paramilitary units, the Camelots du Roi, for instance, inspired many
fascists in Europe, particularly Romania’s Legion of the Archangel Michael
(the Iron Guard) founded by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu in 1927. Although
condemned by Pope Pius XI in 1926, the Action Française also had close rela-
tions with and influence over the Iron Guard, especially during its early years.14
Reorganized as the paramilitary, fascist Iron Guard in 1930, the movement led
by Codreanu gained 16 percent of the vote as the Fatherland Party in parlia-
mentary elections of December 1937. Moreover, between 1935 and 1937 the
number of local groups had risen sharply from 4,000 to 34,000 (Lampe 2006:
114). The Iron Guard had adopted an anti-Semititic and xenophobic platform
from the Action Française, which was also popular among right-wing conserva-
tives like Nicolae Iorga as well as radical anti-Semites like A. C. Cuza. In addi-
tion, as new research points out, the Legion inherited a Romantic palingenetic
vision of Romanian nationalism from nineteenth century thinkers but reinter-
preted it in view of novel political themes, most importantly, with the added
emphasis on charismatic leadership, militarism, and a drive for a violent, anti-
systemic revolutionary change (Iordachi 2004; 2010c: 317-354). Like most
other minor fascist movements, however, the Legionaries were increasingly
drawn into the orbit of German National Socialism from the mid-1930s
onwards. It was only in January 1941 that Hitler opted for the authoritarian
regime of General Ion Antonescu and withdrew his support for Horia Sima
who had succeeded Codreanu in 1940, yet without totally eliminating the
latter from the political scene (Iordachi 2004: 34f.; Woller 1999: 192).
The Common and Divided Fascist Universe: Initiatives of Cooperation

and the Fight for Leadership, 1933-1935
As Hitler quickly marginalized his conservative coalition partners in Germany

in 1933-1934, Italy’s Fascists were increasingly confronted by a mighty rival—
Nazi Germany. The Duce therefore reinvigorated plans for a transnational
campaign in order to strengthen support for Italian Fascism. Fascist officials
like Guiseppe Bottai, who in the 1920s had demanded Italian Fascism
14)
On this point, see Iordachi 2004: 34-5. For the numerous Romanian émigrés active in the
Action Française on French territory, see Weber 1962: 530-1, cited in Iordachi 2004: 35,
ft.; 126.
be exported to foreign states, were given free reign. Bottai, Minister for
Corporations, glorified Fascism as a youth movement of spiritual renewal
(Novismo),15 and as such, the Fascists established their goal of creating a global
order of the “new man.” Mussolini’s brother, Arnaldo Mussolini, who had set
up the “School of Fascist Mysticism” (Scuola di Mistica Fascista) in 1931, pro-
posed to educate a new elite capable of raising enthusiasm for ‘young Italy’ in
foreign states. In fact, the Fascist regime continued to arouse international
attention in the early 1930s, as demonstrated by visits from European fascists
who came to Italy in order to see the Exposition of the Fascist Revolution
(Mostra della rivoluzione fascista) opened on the tenth anniversary of the March
on Rome (Stone 1993: 215-43, 238).
In 1933-1934, the doctrine of fascist universalism, aimed at a transnational
alliance dominated by Italian Fascism, was organized primarily to combat
increasing international influence of German Nazism. Thus, Mussolini in
February 1934 imposed restrictions on the activities of the Nationalsozialistische
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) in Italy. Antagonism between Italy and Germany
grew after talks between Mussolini and Hitler in Venice in June 1934 had
ended in a profound disagreement. The assassination of Austrian Chancellor
Engelbert Dollfuß in July 1934 and the failed coup d’état by Austrian National
Socialists raised Mussolini’s suspicions about Germany’s foreign policy pur-
suits. At the core of the conflict between the two powers was Mussolini’s con-
tempt for Nazi anti-Semitism on the one hand and the German repudiation
of Italian claims of political leadership on the other (Borejsza 1981: 579-86).
However, attempts to promote the concept of universal fascism were also a
reflection of the specific dynamics of Italian Fascism.16 A new generation of
Fascists advocated a comprehensive renewal aimed at transcending the com-
promises of Mussolini’s regime. New magazines like La Sapienza, Il Saggiatore
und l’Universale served as outlets to promote fascism as a universal ideology
and a panacea to modernization. In October 1932, these Fascists received sup-
port by a new magazine, Ottobre, edited by Asvero Gravelli and relaunched as
a daily in February 1934. Ottobre presented Italian Fascism as a movement of
spiritual and cultural renewal next to the racism espoused by the National
Socialists. Gravelli also rejected German claims of unification with Austria and
15)
As Education Minister (1936-1943), Bottai was responsible for the expulsion of Jewish schol-
ars from Italian universities. Nevertheless, he was widely regarded as almost an “antifascist fas-
cist.” See Sassoon 2003: 287.
16)
For the following, see Ledeen 1972: 3-63; Leeden 1969: 137-54; Wanrooij 1987: 401-18,
esp. 414. For an overview, see Bauerkämper 2006a: 170-2.
defended Italy’s control over South Tyrol. Altogether, the leading Fascist
officials claimed the Italian civilization’s superiority over the Third Reich.
Although the Fascist regime allegedly embodied the aspirations of European
youth in their search for spiritual and cultural renewal, Gravelli did not com-
pletely exclude the Third Reich from his concept of universal fascism (Gravelli
1933: 74, 116, 124). He also invited European fascists to Rome in November
1932 for the Volta conference, which was attended by right-wing politicians
such as the Germans Hermann Göring and Alfred Rosenberg. Encouraged by
the response to Gravelli’s initiative, Mussolini established the Comitati d’azione
per l’universalità di Roma (CAUR) in July 1933, an organization meant to
strengthen ties between European fascists and Mussolini’s regime. Headed by
Eugenio Coselschi, an ardent Fascist who had presided over the association of
the Italian veterans of the First World War in the 1920s, CAUR’s founding
initially met with strong reactions from leading fascists like Degrelle, Codreanu
and Horia Sima of the Romanian Iron Guard.
In December 1934, CAUR therefore held a conference of European fascists
at Montreux. Gravelli was joined by Vidkun Quisling, leader of the Norwegian
Nasjonal Samling, the BUF’s Oswald Mosley, General Eion O’Duffy, founder
of the Irish “Blueshirts,” and French fascist Marcel Bucard, among other par-
ticipants. Yet the German National Socialists had refused to support the con-
vention and sent only a minor delegate, Hans Keller of the Internationale
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Nationalisten, to Montreux. The Arbeitsgemeinschaft
had been constituted with the explicit intention of stonewalling CAUR’s
efforts. At the Montreux conference profound disagreements surfaced, with a
resolution favoring the corporate ideology of the Italian Fascists meeting
strong opposition–especially from Quisling, who unequivocally demanded
the völkisch doctrine of ‘Nordic’ racism espoused by the Nazis be officially
endorsed. He and Romanian Guardist Ion Moţa also strongly condemned
Jewish influence and proposed a number of anti-Semitic policies. These con-
flicts could not be resolved at Montreux, and the conference ended with only
a vague, non-binding resolution being passed and with the creation of a com-
mittee for coordinating fascist programs and policies—a move, however, that
failed to unify fascists in Europe. In a similar effort, the last congress of
European fascists in Amsterdam in April 1935 was also unable to motivate its
participants to collaborate with other fascist groups. Reflecting the growing
tensions, Gravelli, who had propagated the concept of universal fascism in
1933, began in 1935 to differentiate between a Roman (Italian) and a
Protestant or Teutonic (German) type of fascism, a distinction also drawn by
the leaders of minor fascist parties. Yet CAUR was not only an endeavor meant
to safeguard Italy’s independence from German interference and domination

but also an attempt to embrace National Socialism through cooperation.17
Yet Italian Fascists themselves had remained divided over what initiatives
would achieve international cooperation between European fascists. The com-
mitment to fascist universalism had been half-hearted, and the vague anti-
Semitic demands encapsulated in the resolution of the Montreux conference
fuelled criticism of Italy. Moreover, Italian foreign propaganda continuously
lacked institutional coordination. Apart from CAUR, agencies like the
Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign States, the Institute for Universal
Fascism, the Institute of Propaganda for Universal Fascism and the intellectu-
als of Europa Giovane (Young Europe) all pursued their own activities.
Moreover, Fascist propaganda was weakly linked to foreign and economic
politics. In the Balkans, in particular, this lack of cooperation significantly
impeded efforts to mobilize support for Italy’s political ambitions in states like
Bulgaria, where King Boris III refused to abandon his political inclinations
towards the Soviet Union in favor of aligning with Fascist Italy. Likewise, the
Greek National Social Party failed to seize power, despite massive Italian sup-
port. General Ioannis Metaxas, who established an authoritarian dictatorship
after his coup d’état in August 1936, shared Mussolini’s claims of equality with
the Third Reich, but rejected Italy’s efforts to form an alliance. As he aligned
himself with Nazi Germany, the authoritarian dictatorship that Metaxas had
set up was denounced by the British government in 1938 (Kofas 1983: 80f.;
Spiliotis 1998: 123-210).
Similarly, propaganda campaigns initiated by the National Socialists in for-
eign states were continually impeded by internal frictions, tensions and ambi-
guities. In the polycratic structure of the Third Reich, leading officials
competed to win Hitler’s favor by “working towards the Führer” (Kershaw
1997: 88-106). Parallel initiatives and bureaucratic inefficiency impeded
efforts to strengthen bonds with foreign fascists (Orlow 1986: 427-68, 442).
Party functionaries in the Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP (AO) the Büro des
Stellvertreters des Führers and Alfred Rosenberg’s Außenpolitisches Amt rejected
more cautious policy proposals by officials in the Auswärtiges Amt and enter-
tained separate relations to fascists in Europe. Like the party authorities, the
Ministry of Propaganda, set up by Joseph Goebbels in 1933, as well as the
17)
For a contrary interpretation, see Cuzzi 2005. See also Ledeen 1972: 64-132; Morgan 2003:
168-71; Borejsza 1999: 252, 258-61; Baldoni 2003: 191; Baldoni 2004: 157. On the
Arbeitsgemeinschaft and German suspicions about the Montreu meeting, see Politisches Archiv
des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin), Inland II A/B, 25/1, 82-22.
Gestapo, preferred fascist groups that shared and supported the anti-Semitism
of the Nazis. They also attempted to bully German nationals in foreign states
(particularly the Netherlands) into compliance or even recruit them as spies.
Not only did the Ministry of Propaganda promote radical anti-Bolshevism
across national borders, but it also funded the radically anti-Semitic group and
journal Welt-Dienst. To the dismay of Italian Fascists, calls for the social exclu-
sion of Jews and the rabid anti-Bolshevism of the Nazis met with increasingly
strong support among European fascists, although relations between these
groups and major fascist regimes were grossly asymmetrical.
Collectively, Fascist and Nazi propaganda outside Italy and Germany lacked
coordination. In democratic states, it was met with open public opinion char-
acteristic of pluralistic societies, and a public that confronted fascists and their
ideas with few obstacles. For this, Fascist and Nazi propaganda had a limited
political impact outside Italy and Germany. In fact, it worked more often in
reverse, with foreign models influencing Nazi agitation propaganda. Thus,
Goebbels repeatedly paid tribute to Soviet international propaganda cam-
paigns, and he and officials in his ministry adapted methods and narrative
strategies from political campaigns pursued by the Bolshevik regime in foreign
states.18
Nevertheless, the idea of fascist internationalism had by no means com-
pletely failed before 1935. Even as fascists had failed to institutionalize top-
level cooperation in Europe, avenues for interaction, exchange and transfer
remained in place. Despite an acrimonious rivalry, cooperation between Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy continued and even intensified in certain areas.
Advertising, for example, was reorganized to achieve controlled consumption
in the autarchic economies of the two states. Similarly, the intensified exchange
between Italian and German experts reshaped advertising as a tool of political
education and indoctrination. In addition, the National Socialist leisure
organization Kraft durch Freude was largely modeled on the Italian Dopolavoro,
established in May 1925. Once in power, Italian Fascists promoted various
18)
These transfers and entanglements have not been studied in detail. For partial overviews,
see Behrends 2009: 527-56, at 528, 535f., 551f. Also see Laqueur 1996: 59; Borejsza 1999: 253,
262-4. On the organizations that were to promote anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism beyond
Germany’s borders, see Schörle 2009: 57-72; Waddington 2007: 573-94. On the rivalry between
German foreign policy institutions, see Schwarz 1993: 80-9; Jacobsen 1976: 137-85. On the
Arbeitsgemeinschaft, see Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Inland II A/B, 25/1, 82-22.
For case studies of Germans in foreign states, see Moore 1987: 45-70; Perkins 1991:
111-29.
social policies within the International Labor Organization (Internationale

Arbeitsorganisation), which had been installed by the terms of the Versailles
Peace Treaty of 1919 in order to spread knowledge on labor relations among
the governments of various states. The IAO advocated a combination of state
policies in order to transform leisure activities without abandoning individual
freedom. In this institutional framework of cross-border cooperation, Italian
experts had succeeded in impressing their German colleagues with the
Dopolavoro. It was only in 1933-1934 that the National Socialists clearly dis-
entangled their Deutsche Arbeitsfront from the model of Italian social policies.
The ambiguous relationship between Fascism and National Socialism was to
continue after the rapprochement between Italy and Germany that led to the
formation of the “Rome-Berlin Axis” in October 1936 (Sennebogen 2005:
119-47; Liebscher 2005: 94-118).
Pupil Becomes Teacher: National Socialism as the New Model of

European Fascists, 1935-1939
The rapprochement between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in 1935-1936

seemed to promise new opportunities for cross-border cooperation between
the two major powers—and even for the universal fascist project. After its
invasion of Abyssinia, Italy was largely isolated from international politics, as
the unequivocal indictment of that country by the League of Nations and the
ensuing embargo of the Italian peninsula demonstrated. Despite some tempo-
rary overtures, leaders in France and Britain sharply criticized Italian expan-
sionism. The public outcry against the initiative of British Foreign Secretary
Sir Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Pierre
Laval to reach an agreement with Italy in December 1935 completely thwarted
Italy’s relations to the western democracies, although the British government
did by no means abandon its appeasement policy (Morgan 2001: 617).
Popular support for the Nationalist insurrection by General Francisco Franco
against Spain’s Republican government linked the Fascist regime even closer to
the National Socialists from late 1936 onwards. Beyond the cooperation
between these two major powers, however, the Spanish Civil War became an
important arena of transnational collaboration between European fascists.
Ireland’s O’Duffy sent 700 Blueshirts to Spain, who withdrew in 1937 after
suffering heavy casualties. The Romanian Iron Guard also sent fighters to help
the Spanish Nationalists. Leading Legionaries Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin,
who were killed in combat near Majadahonda in December 1936, were even
touted as fascist martyrs for their sacrifice in Spain. Fascist support for Franco
was bolstered by strong anti-communism in Western democracies and by
indifference of the British government to the conflict.19
As the Fascist regime increasingly depended on the official support of
Nazi rulers, Mussolini’s son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano, who was
appointed Foreign Secretary in 1936, curtailed the activities of CAUR, which
continued to meet despite German objections. After the Axis between Berlin
and Rome had been established in October 1936, CAUR re-directed its prop-
aganda against communism and Bolshevik Russia. Following the publication
of the Manifesto on Race and the enactment of strict racial laws in 1938, meas-
ures half-heartedly supported by Bottai and Gravelli, Italian initiatives to
institutionalize transnational cooperation between fascist leaders in Europe
under Italian tutelage had foundered. Rivalry between the two nations inten-
sified, as competition in sports clearly demonstrated. Track and field in par-
ticular became a point of fierce competition between Fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany, which obstructed efforts to consolidate non-political relations
between the two nations. Nevertheless, Italy had become Germany’s favorite
sporting partner and rival by 1939 (Teichler 2004: 95-124, 100; Oeldrich
2003: 406, 435, 589).
The increasingly subordinate position of Fascist Italy to Nazi Germany
affected the development of the minor fascist groups across Europe. Initially,
the racist anti-Semitism of the Nazis had been strongly rejected by Italian Fascist
leaders and fascists of most other European states. Yet, political suppression in
Germany in 1933 did not arouse similar protests among fascist groups. After
the “Night of the Long Knives” of June 30, 1934, when opponents of Nazism
were arrested and imprisoned in concentration camps, and Ernst Röhm and
his storm troopers murdered, fascist sympathizers of the Third Reich came
under heavy pressure in their respective states. In particular, they were sus-
pected as a possible “fifth column” after Germany had invaded the demilita-
rized Rhineland in 1935, merged with Austria and annexed the Sudetenland
in Czechoslovakia. Supported by domestic fascists, these aggressive acts had
been organized by strong factions of German minorities. Pressured by the
general outrage at German expansionism, however, most fascist leaders had
carefully distanced themselves from Nazi extremism without disclaiming their
sympathies for Germany’s new rulers.
19)
Ornea 1999: 288-90. On the role of European fascists in the Spanish Civil War, see Collado
Seidel 2006: 97f., 197. For an account of British policies, see Edwards 1979; Little 1988: 291-1;
Lammers 1971: 66-86.
The rapprochement between Italy and Germany deprived the critics of

anti-Semitism among Northern and Western European fascists of its distinc-
tive Italian model. At the same time, their leanings towards Nazism gained
speed. In the unequal alliance with Fascist Italy, German National Socialism
incessantly increased its clout and prestige among European fascists. When
the Third Reich attacked Poland in September 1939, CAUR was immediately
disbanded. From the mid-1930s onwards, when Fascist Italy ceased to be a
model, small fascist movements had increasingly vied for German support.
Thus, in 1936 the BUF, which the Nazi leaders initially criticized for Mosley’s
suspected relations with Jews, was renamed the “British Union of Fascists and
National Socialists.” In the summer of 1936, Hitler gave the party a subsidy of
£10,000, and helped facilitate Mosley’s secret marriage to Diana Mosley in
Berlin that October. As their affiliation with National Socialist Germany
became obvious, ties between the London Fascio and BUF were loosened, and
Grandi shifted his allegiance from the British fascists to the Conservatives.
Similarly, in the mid-1930s the Belgian Rexists, who previously had been given
Mussolini’s support, began to receive German funding.20
As a result of increasingly strong claims of allegiance, fascists in the other
European states were largely associated with Italian Fascism or German Nazism
and seen as copies of foreign regimes. These groups were therefore excluded
from dominant national traditions. The majority of Britons, for instance,
largely saw Mosley’s “Blackshirts” as pale imitations of the Italian Fascists (who
also wore black shirts). Moreover, demands for a corporate state, which was to
replace the deep-seated tradition of parliamentary rule, reminded many Britons
of the doctrines of the Duce. Even more importantly, violent confrontations at
BUF meetings and the rabid anti-Semitism, which British Fascists had inte-
grated into their propagandistic arsenal in 1934, contradicted the concepts of
fair play and civility. Likewise, BUF clearly threatened the popular perception
of ‘Englishness,’ an image based on individual freedom. During World War II,
fascists had to cope also with the even more serious charge of treason, which
undermined their popularity and ability to secure a mass base. In order to
avoid the impression of serving as Hitler’s or Mussolini’s lackeys, these groups
stressed their indigenous roots. They thereby attempted to cautiously dissociate
20)
Fröhlich 1987: 629f., 632, 649; Griffiths 1980: 104-107, 173; Bauerkämper 1991: 232.
On the change in the programmatic orientation of the BUF, see Baldoni 2004: 147–61,
236-9. On official German attitudes to the BUF in 1933, see Bundesarchiv Koblence,
R 43II/1432a/55, 55f.
themselves from the dominance of Italian Fascism and German National

Socialism, which became a threat to their influence within their national cul-
tures. With the demise of fascism following the Second World War, historians
reiterated this exclusionist view, interpreting fascism in most European states
as a “foreign import” and thereby overrating the strength of indigenous tradi-
tions of democracy, pluralism, civility and parliamentarian rule in states with
strong fascist movements.
Although many fascist groups opposed the National Socialists’ social
Darwinist doctrines, along with its anti-Semitic and expansionist agendas
explicitly aimed at comprehensive subordination, many still enthusiastically
applauded Hitler’s seizure of power. In 1933, leaders of fascist movements in
France and the Netherlands did not hesitate to approach the new rulers of
Germany. After they had rapidly established their undisputed dictatorship in
1933-1934, the Nazis considerably increased their influence among European
fascists. The seemingly unbeatable Third Reich emerged as the dominant
model, surpassing Italian Fascism, with the turn to anti-Semitism as a keynote
of its growing attractiveness. In the Netherlands, Anton Mussert’s Nationaal
Socialistische Beweging (NSB), although initially inspired by Italian Fascism,
launched a propaganda campaign in 1935 against the Jews. Anti-Semitism
was also promoted by the NSB’s Rost van Tonningen, who was received by
Hitler in Berlin in August 1936. Germans in the Netherlands were organized
by the Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP run by Ernst Bohle and (after it was
banned in Holland in November 1933) by the Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft,
which also established and maintained contacts to the NSB. The activities of
the AO extended to countries as distant as Australia, where it forged connec-
tions to the British-based pro-Nazi organization “The Link.”21
Through personal contacts, financial support, tourism, and cultural events
organized by friendship and bilateral societies like the Anglo-German Fellow-
ship, the German-French Society and the German-Dutch Society, European
fascists became increasingly connected to the Third Reich. However, sympathies
and admiration for the new German state was not confined to fascists and its
fellow-travelers. In fact, laudatory statements regarding National Socialist
policies by widely respected politicians like former British Prime Minister
Lloyd George in 1936 and the Duke of Windsor, who abdicated in
December 1936 and visited Germany with his wife Wallis Simpson in
21)
Moore 1987: 45-70; Perkins 1991: 111-29. On Bohle’s AO, see Döscher 1987: 166-74. On
the strongly pro-German “Link” in 1939-40, see Griffiths 1998: 170f., 219-24; Thurlow 1987:
179-83. On the NSB, see Wusten and Smit 1980: 524-41; Blinkhorn 2000: 62.
October 1937, lent the Nazi rulers legitimacy and clout that reached
beyond Germany. Swedish liberals like Bertil Ohlin also studied the
Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD). Even U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked
the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to send him a report of the activities of the (obliga-
tory) Nazi labor organization in 1938. Roosevelt had founded the Civilian
Conservation Corps in 1933, a volunteer workforce in the United States, and
he remained interested in Nazi work schemes.22 The Nazi regime’s social poli-
cies, the new political stability and national regeneration it offered had strong
support among respectable politicians in Europe and beyond. Hence, lead-
ers of the Third Reich attempted to exploit this image in their foreign
propaganda.23
These overtures aroused the suspicion of the Duce and his supporters in
Italy. German initiatives to forge links with minor fascist movements directly
challenged Fascist rulers, who bowed repeatedly to German pressure. Thus,
Italian Ambassador to Germany, Bernardo Attolico, opposed any extension of
CAUR activities, voicing strong German reservations. Coselschi was forced to
give in. Open and lingering suspicions were a strain on German-Italian rela-
tions even after the formation of the ‘Axis Berlin Rome’ in 1936. Thus, Italian
authorities propagated the model of Fascism in South Eastern and East Central
European states, especially in Czechoslovakia. After Mussolini had lifted his
protection of Austria, he aimed at establishing a bloc of allied powers in the
Balkans. Yet these initiatives clashed with German policies of economic extrac-
tion. By setting up a system of barter trade, Nazi leaders were able to secure
vital resources for the war economy (Sundhaussen 1983: 340-344).
Mussolini, in response, attempted to strengthen ties with anti-Semites in
the Romanian Iron Guard, with Ferenc Szálasi’s Hungarian Arrow Cross Party
and with the Croat Ustaša movement of Ante Pavelić, who had found refuge
in Italy after King Alexander had set up his royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia
in 1929. The Fascist regime in Rome had in fact financially supported the
Ustaša, who participated in the assassination of Alexandar in Marseille in
October 1934. By sponsoring the fascists of South Eastern Europe, the
Italian regime attempted to claim cultural superiority over Nazi Germany.
22)
Götz and Patel 2006: 53-73; Patel 2007: 234-52. For an overview of some other fields of
selective transfer, see Schivelbusch 2008.
23)
Linne 2009: 237-54. In 1934, Lloyd George had declared that Hitler was the “best thing that
had happened to Germany since Bismarck, nay since Frederic II”. Cf. Laqueur 1996: 71;
Griffiths 1980: 222-4. Also see Schwarz 1993: 100-6, 381-92. On the Duke of Windsor’s stay
in Germany, which included a visit to a concentration camp, see Higham 2005: 249-62.
As Mussolini’s prestige as the founding father of fascism declined in the 1930s,

Italian culture allegedly rooted in ancient Rome was increasingly juxtaposed
to German power in Fascism’s foreign propaganda (Laqueur 1996: 63; Lampe
2006: 113).
But the Duce’s efforts to ensure the support and loyalty of fascists tran-
scended South Eastern Europe. Italian Fascists also funded the Belgian Rexist
movement and Mosley’s BUF, at least temporarily. Arguably, these attempts to
expand the influence of Italian Fascism in Europe and to stonewall the ambi-
tions of the Third Reich ultimately contributed to Mussolini’s decision to take
on an anti-Semitic stance in 1938. Inadvertently, however, his commitment to
racist anti-Semitism undermined the exclusive claims of Italian Fascism with
regards to National Socialism. After the Italian military assault on Greece and
Albania had foundered in late 1940s, the attractiveness of Fascism steeply
declined. Even Italy’s protectorate over the Independent Croat State, established
by Pavelić in April 1941, was gradually undermined by the political hegemony
and military superiority of National Socialist Germany. Nevertheless, the
Fascist regime insisted on Italy’s cultural superiority contrasting the heritage of
Ancient Rome to the Germanic tribes (König 2007).
After the German occupation of Norway, and when the Netherlands,
Belgium, France and Italy entered the war, exchanges between fascists were
increasingly focused on higher-level military cooperation and collaboration.
More grassroots exchanges between domestic fascists and the Nazi or Fascist
occupiers were largely regarded as treason, and fears of such subversion led to
the internment of fascists in states like Britain. In occupied Europe, volunteers
were recruited into the German army as well as the armed SS in different
European states, and many fascists consented to defend “Europe against
‘Bolshevism.’” The Nazis effectively utilized the symbol of Europe to legiti-
mize their dictatorial supremacy of the continent (Schmale 2005: 13-34, 17f ).
However, the National Socialists ultimately aimed to be a new Germanic
empire that would leave the European nations little autonomy. The doctrine
of universalistic fascism was therefore mere camouflage for German claims of
superiority, and of Hitler’s expansionist policy, or Lebensraum, although many
foreign supporters genuinely believed in the vision of a new civilization that
would transcend and ultimately demolish national borders. After Germany
had occupied many European states, however, fascists who had retained their
national loyalties found themselves at odds with the National Socialists’ claims
of political sovereignty. Parties like the Dutch NSB, the DNSAP in Denmark,
the Belgian Rexists and the Norwegian Nasjonal Samlimg demonstrated how
European fascists had hoped in vain to achieve political autonomy under
German occupation. In their attempts to mobilize the population, these

“patriotic traitors” (Littlejohn 1972) finally declared themselves saviors of
their respective homelands, and glorified their collaboration with Nazi
Germany as their “national duty.” Yet even the puppet regimes collaborating
with the German occupiers during the Second World War were not willing
to completely subordinate themselves to German occupation policies. Thus,
the tensions and fissures between fascists again broke up in Europe, and the
idea of fascist internationalism proved to be irreconcilable with nationalist
ideals. Confronted with this dilemma, National Socialist policies regarding
European fascists were contradictory at best and aggressive at worst. Overall,
the concept of the fascist universe ultimately served as a tool in the strug-
gle about political leadership between the two major powers (Laqueur
1996: 54, 63).
Fascists beyond Europe: Fellow-Travelers and the Fight against Western

Colonialism and Hegemony
The ambiguity of fascist transnationalism emerged even more clearly in the

non-European world. The collaboration of Subhas Chandra Bose in particular
highlighted the intricacies of nationalism and the fissures of anti-colonialism
in India. Bose, who had initially espoused a doctrine that fused Communist
and Fascist ideas (Samyavada), turned to Mussolini in the 1930s, setting up
the Indian Legion in Berlin in 1941 and reconstituting the Indian National
Army under Japanese tutelage in Burma. Other Hindu nationalists, like the
leader of the pro-Nazi militant Mahasabha party V.D. Savarkar, were impressed
by the irresistible advance of National Socialist Germany, too. Nazi leaders
appealed to Indian nationalism and promised to free the subcontinent from
Britain’s colonial domination.24
Such transnational collaboration emerged even more clearly in the Arab
world. Particularly in Palestine, German propaganda presented the Nazi
regime as a champion of secular anti-colonialism and Arab nationalism. In
their attempts to instigate revolts against British rule, leaders of the Third
Reich appealed both to Arab nationalism and to select radical Islamic tradi-
tions. After Raschid Ali Kilani’s uprising against Britain in Iraq in the spring
24)
Delfs 2008: 143. On Bose and the Indian Legion, see Hauner 1981: 56-70, 237-58, 357-76,
592-619, 620-31.
of 1941 had been suppressed, however, he and Nazi sympathizers like

Mohammed Amin el-Husseini fled into exile. El-Husseini, the Mufti of
Jerusalem, and Kilani escaped to Nazi Germany. The Mufti, who had strongly
opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine, met Hitler and Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop in Berlin in November 1941, and made closer alli-
ances with the Third Reich. Although he rejected the Mufti’s demands for an
official German declaration in support of Arab independence from Britain in
late 1941, Hitler elaborated on his plans for a two-pronged attack on British
forces in the Middle East following a German victory in Egypt that was
intended to annihilate the Jews in Palestine. El-Husseini, in turn, seized the
opportunity to recruit Muslims for special units of the Waffen-SS. In the end,
the Nazis succeeded in establishing strong bonds with official Palestine leaders
by appealing to Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism (Herf 2009; Jeffrey
2009a: 709-36, esp. 709, 711, 721, 726, 735; Herf 2010: 259-86, esp. 259,
261-5, 274, 284; Herf 2006: 275; Gensicke 2007; Mallmann and Cüppers
2007).25
In Latin America, the Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB), in particular, were
outwardly supportive of Mussolini’s Fascist regime. The AIB reinforced nega-
tive perceptions of parliamentary democracy, which enabled General Getúlio
Vargas to establish his “New State” (Estado Novo) in November 1937. The
Estado Novo showed distinct traits of “fascist internationalism” (McGee
Deutsch 1999; Trindade 2001: 469-528, 519): Vargas abolished the oligarchic
Republic in favor of a military dictatorship based on a corporate political sys-
tem, and supported the strong nationalist stances of European fascists. He also
promoted their anti-communist, anti-liberal, capitalist ideas, the myth of
social transformation, and an allegiance to traditional Brazilian values. Yet the
liberal opposition succeeded in ousting the dictator from power in 1945.
International Fascism: A Field of Changing Relations
Fascists in Europe oscillated between international cooperation and exchange

on the one hand and national aspirations on the other. After Mussolini’s spec-
tacular “March on Rome,” Italian Fascism served as a model for like-minded
fascists in Europe. From the mid-1930s onwards, however, minor fascist
movements and groups aligned themselves with the seemingly superior
25)
For a research report, see Botsch 2009: 280-6. In the last few months of the Second World
War, the number of foreign soldiers in the German military units (army and Waffen-SS)
amounted to as much as one fifth. See Müller 2007: 244.
National Socialist regime. Even the Italian Fascists could not escape the tenta-
cles of the Nazi regime, as the official adoption of anti-Semitism in 1938
clearly indicated. Despite the growing rivalry between the Fascist and Nazi
regimes, however, their relationship was also continuously marked by prag-
matic cooperation, pursued largely out of the public spotlight and the realm
of foreign politics. Goebbels, for instance, complained about the increasing
number of high-ranking Fascists and National Socialists who visited Germany
and Italy, respectively, in 1937 (Woller 1999: 192f.; Sennebogen 2005:
127-30, 144, 146).
Although Mussolini had gained new reputation as mediator in the Munich
Agreement of September 1938, his political status had been diminished among
fascists in Europe by the late 1930s. They increasingly favored German
National Socialism over Italian Fascism as a political model, which they appro-
priated in accordance with their prevailing national preconditions and con-
texts. All in all, cross-border interactions between European fascists remained
significant, especially in preparing and facilitating their wartime collabora-
tion. The fascists not only regarded and portrayed themselves as the vanguard
of a new universal creed, but also developed the sense of a common destiny.
Therefore, rather than to analyze fascist movements as separate regimes,
emphasizing the national paradigm in historiography, scholars should high-
light the transnational and cooperative efforts between European fascist
groups. Apart from comparative analyses, recent approaches to the investiga-
tion of interconnections are now more able to address this key dimension of
fascism which has been largely neglected by historians.26
Generally, the history of fascism highlights the normative ambivalence of
transnationalism. In particular, ideas, policies and ideologies of European
unity served different political purposes in the course of the twentieth century,
and employed by democratic governments and dictatorial rulers alike.
Although the gulf between these political systems should not be ignored, his-
torians are still yet to realize the multifaceted nature of claims promoting the
project of European unity. Not by coincidence, some Nazi ideas spread beyond
26)
On the resilience and persistence of national paradigms in historiography, see Berger 2005:
629-78; Berger, Donovan, and Passmore 1999. On different approaches highlighting intercon-
nectedness, see Bauerkämper 2008; Cohen and O’Connor 2004: IX-XXIV; Kocka 2003: 39-44;
Randeria 2002: 284-311; Ther 2003: 45-73; Werner and Zimmermann 2004; Werner and
Zimmermann 2006: 30-50. For a recent call for transnational approaches to fascism, with a
focus on East Central and Southeatern Europe, see Iordachi 2010b: 1-50, and his introduction
to this special issue.
Germany’s borders and even beyond their sphere of power in the Second
World War and were taken up by some mainstream politicians in Europe as
late as the 1950s. For instance, the concepts of economic planning, autarky
and social regulation that were important roots of the European Economic
Community had also been proposed by both German National Socialists and
Italian Fascists. Although these continuities should not be overstated and
Europeans cherished their national independence in the immediate postwar
years, a strict separation between a “democratic” and a “dictatorial” Europe
would be misplaced. Hence, the transnational dimension of fascism merits
serious consideration in historical scholarship.27
In particular, the Balkan states deserve more attention in this realm. In
Southeastern Europe, multiple relations and various interactions between
fascists evolved most markedly and obviously. On the one hand, the Nazis
competed with Italian Fascists in this region. By the late 1930s, the Third
Reich had successfully propped up the economies of some Balkan and Central
European states like Hungary and Romania in order to gain the necessary
resources for warfare. On the other hand, domestic fascists in these regions
established contacts and bonds to both the Italian Fascists and the German
National Socialists. The Ustaša movement of Ante Pavelić most clearly
represents the ambiguities and dilemmas that resulted from these multi-
level exchanges. Croat fascists embodied the scope, as well as the limits
and contractions, of asymmetrical cross-border exchange and cooperation
between like-minded leaders and their supporters. Scholars tracing these inter-
actions have turned to new and lucrative sources, like diaries of prominent
and ‘ordinary’ fascists, offering new studies that shed light on the various
dimensions of contacts, links, relations as well as transfers and processes of
learning between movements and regimes that were both strongly national
and transnational.
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27)
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East Central Europe 37 (2010) 214–246 brill.

Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations

In ten years Europe will be Fascist or Fascisized1

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187633010X534469

Benito Mussolini was so impressed by the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution

did not exist as a transnational movement but was “largely a construction of

between these movements, and archival sources on German Nazism and

The Impact of Italian Fascism, 1922-1933

Although he was only able to establish a full-ﬂedged dictatorship in the second

political aﬀairs, the Fascio unequivocally espoused Mussolini’s regime as they

journalists throughout Europe proved especially susceptible to Italian Fascism.

However, they usually diﬀerentiated between “moderate” and “extreme” Fascists.

Nevertheless, Italian Fascism continued to aid the formation of fascist groups

Conservative and Labor politician Sir Oswald Mosley in October 1932. He

The Common and Divided Fascist Universe: Initiatives of Cooperation

As Hitler quickly marginalized his conservative coalition partners in Germany

to safeguard Italy’s independence from German interference and domination

social policies within the International Labor Organization (Internationale

Pupil Becomes Teacher: National Socialism as the New Model of

The rapprochement between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in 1935-1936

The rapprochement between Italy and Germany deprived the critics of

themselves from the dominance of Italian Fascism and German National

As Mussolini’s prestige as the founding father of fascism declined in the 1930s,

German occupation. In their attempts to mobilize the population, these

Fascists beyond Europe: Fellow-Travelers and the Fight against Western

The ambiguity of fascist transnationalism emerged even more clearly in the

of 1941 had been suppressed, however, he and Nazi sympathizers like

International Fascism: A Field of Changing Relations

Fascists in Europe oscillated between international cooperation and exchange

Gosewinkel, Dieter (2008). “Zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie. Wirtschaftliches

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