GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006

PER CURIAM:
1. In 1995, while Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez (respondent) was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID), Gisela Huyssen (complainant) together with her three sons, who are all American Citizens, applied for Philippine
Visas under Section 13 of Immigration Law.
2. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they
needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year.
3. The complainant believed that it is required under the law, she deposited with respondent on six different occasions
from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepare receipts as proofs of the amount
deposited but he refused to give the complainant her own copies.
4. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000. When respondent failed to return
the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money.
5. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to
comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent
complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited
amount.
6. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts.
When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent
had stopped payment on the same.
7. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment
on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored.
Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent.
8. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to
a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.
9. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).

10. In RESPONDENTS' COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT - In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations
in the complaint claiming that having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not
have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining
the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:
a. A friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor introduced to me the complainant at my office at the Bureau of
Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one
of which is already of major age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was
they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas
(9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related policies of the
government.
b. Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a permanent
visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law provided them with list of the requirements
in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the
bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the
same amount of show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while her
two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised them
to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their
application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job
for the complainant and her family.
c. The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was
finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family.
Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made
as dependents of the complainant. I became the intermediary between complainant and their
counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was
coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of
 money given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason
why my signature appears in the vouchers.
d. That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I
myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from
him regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me: 45415454
1. That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close
to undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;
That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not really
her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation
of the Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later
when the said entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned affiant and which is
attached to the complaint-affidavit;
2. That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount used
by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the
complainant and her son could have been a ground for deportation and likewise
constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the Revised Penal Code.
These could have been the possible reason why complainant was made to pay for quite
huge amount.
e. However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and surprisingly
they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he
died sometime 1997;
f. That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount of
money is now being sought to be recovered from me;
g. That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having signed
the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to
the present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed that the same
would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been released last March
but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the complainant
has now become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.
h. Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal
Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.
i. There were 11 hearings for the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but it
were all reset because the respondent was allegedly out of the country to attend his client’s need.
Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and
again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.
j. On 5 November 2004, INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONER MILAGROS V. SAN JUAN’S REPORT:
She recommended for the disbarment of respondent. There is no doubt that the respondent
received the $20,00 from the complainant because he himself admitted that he signed the receipt.
Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the
said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering
the documentary evidence submitted by complainant.
From the evidences, the letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said
Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said
amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the
inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal
use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-
Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant
and his family, and complainant has also testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.
It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."
11. On 4 November 2004, the IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS approved 6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report with
modification, thus:
 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to
return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to
the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.

COURT’S RULING
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.7
It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures
in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that that it was needed in complainant’s
application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that he
delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID.11 Such
defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already
died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to
someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the
opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any
plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-
serving and is with nil evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. (There
were four different letters stating the reasons why did the check was dishonored and that he will pay on another said date.)
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As correctly observed by
the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially deposited
with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.
Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is
violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or
participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code
which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren
in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing
several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 20 as the effect
"transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an
unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." 21
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or
she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment,
is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.22
 Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the
gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve
to continue, being a member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in
his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully
perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession
subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of
good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 24
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring
individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct
of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in
the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing
also that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government
lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in
the public eye.26
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court
for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 27
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a
certain person.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus
preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.30
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received
from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice
for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of
the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
 PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
1. On 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification
of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary
public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
2. The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent,
in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the
following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San
Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name –
agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee
recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed
use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan
which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
3. Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being
a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate
violation of the Code
4. In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him
upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because respondent refused to act as
complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and
notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

IBPs REPORT and RECOMMENDATION

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years
old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only
means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on
the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

SUPREME COURT
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to
uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. 11Yet, in his
motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier.
Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would
guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect,
respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands 14 by
preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to
achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an
affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended
from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of
separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDGAR ALLAN C. MORANTE, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Las Pias City, Branch 275, respondent.
[A.M. No. P-02-1555. April 16, 2004]

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

The case began when a letter from concerned law practitioners gave an anonymous letter to the Chief Justice dated
September 10, 2001 stating the alleged corrupt practices of respondent Edgar Allan Morante, Clerk of Court of RTC. Attached
with the letter was a news issued by The Metro Daily Tribune, entitled NBI Agents Nab Las Pias Clerk of Court for Extort which
reported that the respondent was caught by government agents in the act of receiving some 2Million Pesos to fix a court
decision.

The Court found that the respondent is guilty of grave and serious misconduct recommending that the respondent be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, with prejudice to his appointment in any branch of the government or
its agencies or instrumentalities.

The Case for the Complainant

1. Luz Amper filed a criminal complaint against Tetsuo Momma, a Japanese citizen, was the president of the Montec
International Corporation, her former employer, for libel with the Las Pinas City Prosecutor on January 28, 2000 with the
Regional Trial Courtof Las Pias City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-0117.
2. The case was raffled to Branch 255 of the court, presided by Judge Ambrosio Alumbres. Momma posted a cash bail
bond of P80,000. On March 29, 2000, the court issued a hold departure order against him.
3. Momma filed a petition for review of the resolution of the Las Pinas City Prosecutor finding probable cause for libel
against him, which was granted by the Secretary of Justice on November 7, 2000 and reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor.
4. Private complainant Luz Amper, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice in the RTC and CA, but the lower courts issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
5. On December 1, 2000, Momma filed a letter-complaint with the Court against Judge Ambrosio Alumbres, alleging, inter
alia, that the Judge pressured him into settling the libel case for P7,000,000. According to Momma, the Judge would
even call his representative to his chambers in an effort to convince him to settle the case. When he refused, the Judge
agreed to reduce the offer to P3,000,000.00.He also complained that the Judge was eager to issue warrants for his
arrest although there were no valid reasons therefor.
6. On December 2, 2000, Jose Joey Olavere, in behalf of Momma as his executive secretary and personal interpreter, filed
a motion with the RTC Branch 255, for the inhibition of the presiding judge. Acting on the complaint of Momma, the
OCA wrote him on February 5, 2001, requesting that his complaint be executed under oath within ten days. Momma
complied with the request.
7. On March 12, 2001, the State Prosecutor filed a motion with the trial court in Criminal Case No. 00-0117 for the
withdrawal of the information, conformably with the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and the lifting of the hold
departure order.
8. Momma, through his counsel Atty. Roberto Garay, filed a motion on April 17, 2001 for the release of his cash bail bond
in the amount of P80,000.Because the private complainant was not notified of the hearing of the public prosecutors
motion on May 2, 2001, the court reset the hearing to May 16, 2001, and then reset it anew to June 25, 2001.
9. On June 3, 2001, Judge Ambrosio Alumbres, retired from office, Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda assumed the office as
Acting Presiding Judge thereof.
10. Judge Maceda at times required Ms. Joselita P. Macaldo, Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Office of the Deputy Clerk of
Court of Branch 255, to make a case summary or a preliminary statement of pending incidents thereon before resolving
the same.
11. On June 25, 2001, Momma filed a motion for the lifting of the hold departure order. On July 3, 2001 OIC Macaldo
transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 00-0117 to respondent Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante, who was the Deputy
Clerk of Court of Branch 255, for the resolution by Judge Maceda of the pending incidents.
12. Olavere and Mommas counsel, Atty. Garay, followed up the case with the respondent several times for the early
resolution of the pending incidents therein. According to Olavere and Momma, the ninety-day period for the resolution
thereof had long since elapsed.
13. On August 20, 2001, Atty. Garay arrived in the house of Olavere, and informed the latter that the respondent had a
message that in order to have a favorable decision they need to pay P250,000.
14. When Olavere relayed the respondent message to Momma, the latter replied that he would have to see the order of
dismissal first. Olavere, then make an agreement with the respondent that Momma would have to pay P50,000 in
exchange for an unsigned copy of the order of dismissal of the court. The balance of P200,000 would then be paid to the
respondent upon delivery to Olavere of the order of dismissal bearing the signature of Judge Maceda. Olavere informed
Momma of the respondents message. The two agreed to report the matter to the NBI, so that the respondent could be
apprehended in flagrante delicto.
15. On August 27, 2001, Momma arrived at the NBI where he executed a complaint-affidavit against the respondent for
robbery/extortion.
16. At about 11:00 a.m. on August 28, 2001, Olavere saw the respondent in his office at the second floor of the Justice Hall
in Las Pias City. Olavere gave the P50,000 to the respondent who then gave Olavere an unsigned copy of the Order
dated July 19, 2001 granting the motion to withdraw information filed by the State Prosecutor, Mommas motion for the
release of his cash bond, as well as the lifting of the hold departure order.
17. The respondent told Olavere that he would call him as soon as the order had already been signed by Judge Maceda. In
the afternoon of the same day, Olavere proceeded to the Special Action Unit of the NBI and gave a sworn statement to
Senior Agent Nelson Pacada, alleging, that the respondent had demanded P250,000 in exchange for the order of
dismissal of the libel case against Momma, and that he, Olavere, had already given P50,000 to the respondent earlier
that morning in exchange for an unsigned order of the dismissal of the libel case, the balance payable to the respondent
upon delivery by him of the order of dismissal duly signed by Judge Maceda.
18. Momma and NBI Agent Pineda decided to conduct an entrapment operation against the respondent at his office.
Momma gave four P500 bills, with fluorescent powder markings, to Pineda bearing Serial Numbers RU582077,
RU582078, SW730103 and TX016250 for the operation. The latter, in turn, placed the four P500 bills on top of other
peso bills amounting to P198,000. Since the bills were so bulky, Pineda placed the P200,000 in a brown envelope and
sealed the same. The forensic chemist, however, did not dust the envelope with fluorescent powder.
19. In the meantime, Olavere was able to talk with the respondent over the telephone a couple of times. They agreed that
Olavere would deliver the balance of P200,000 to the respondent at his office in the morning of August 31, 2001. In
exchange, the respondent would give Olavere the order dismissing the case bearing the signature of Judge Maceda.
20. On August 29, 2001, Judge Maceda signed an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information, the State
Prosecutors Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order, as well as Mommas motion for the release of his cash bond of
P80,000. The respondent affixed his initials on the order below the typewritten name of Judge Maceda. Instead of
returning the records of Criminal Case No. 00-0117 to Branch 255 of the RTC for the release of the said order, the
respondent kept the said records, including the order of Judge Maceda, and waited Olavere to return with the
P200,000.
21. When Olavere informed Pineda that the respondent had agreed to a meeting in the morning on August 31, 2001 for the
payoff, Pineda called the other NBI agents to a pre-entrapment conference and agreed on the mechanics of the
operation.
22. Shortly before noon of August 31, 2001, Olavere and NBI Agents Timoteo Pineda, Jr. Marlon Toleda, Joel Toresa, and
Dante Sonbar arrived at the second floor of the Justice Hall in La Pias City. Judge Maceda was absent because he was ill.
The respondent met Olavere outside the office and brought him inside. The respondent then gave Olavere a copy of the
Order in the libel case signed by Judge Maceda, dated August 29, 2001. Olavere handed over to the respondent the
brown envelope containing the P200,000 and gave the pre-arranged signal to the NBI agents who were waiting outside.
Instead of opening the envelope and counting the money contained therein, the respondent placed the envelope on top
of his table.
23. When the NBI agents heard Olaveres pre-arranged signal, they entered the office of the respondent. They saw the
brown envelope containing the P200,000 on the respondents table. They took custody of the respondent and the brown
envelope, including the money inside. The chemist was unable to examine the brown envelope which contained the
bribe money because the NBI agents failed to deliver the same to her.
24. Olavere gave a sworn statement to NBI Agent Toledo. The NBI agents executed their joint affidavit of the respondents
arrest the same date, the NBI Director transmitted to Inquest Prosecutor Roberto D. Lao of the Department of Justice
the complaint of Momma and Olavere charging the respondent of violating Section 3(b) in relation to paragraph (c) of
Republic Act No. 3019. The respondent submitted his counter-affidavit and rejoinder during the preliminary
investigation

The Case for the Respondent

1. The respondent vehemently denied the charges hurled against him. He adopted the counter-affidavit he submitted to
the Inquest Prosecutor as his testimony on direct examination before the Investigating Justice. His version of the
incident is as follows:
 2. When Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of RTC, Branch 275 took over the numerous cases pending before the sala of Judge
Alumbres after the latter retired as Presiding Judge of RTC,
3. One case being followed up with unusual persistence was the criminal case for libel against Momma. The respondent
met Atty. Roberto Garay during the third or fourth week of June 2001 when the latter followed up the resolution of the
pending incidents
4. Olavere began telling stories that his employer had already spent almost P1,000,000 to settle or dispose of the said libel
case, particularly the hold departure order issued by the court. Olavere showed to him a list containing the names of the
recipients and the amounts received by each: Judge, P300,000; Clerk of Court, P100,000; sheriff, P20,000; fiscal,
P50,000. Olavere even admitted that he was being paid a bonus for the arrangements that he had facilitated with the
said officials. He also revealed that Momma wanted to go back to Japan to visit his father who was seriously ill.
5. After this first visit, Olavere came to his office several more times. Olavere and Atty. Garay also started calling the said
office frequently. It got to a point where the respondent evaded their calls.
6. The respondent denied that he received the sum of P50,000 from Olavere in exchange for an unsigned Order dated July
19, 2001.He denied ever preparing and giving the said unsigned order to Olavere. He claimed that the records of
Criminal Case No. 00-0117 were inside the chambers of Judge Maceda from July to August 2001.
7. At around 9:00 a.m. of August 28, 2001, Olavere arrived in his office and asked the respondent if there was already an
order lifting the hold departure order issued against his employer duly signed by Judge Maceda. He replied in the
negative. He was in a hurry at the time because he had an appointment with the City Legal Officer, Atty. Zardi Melito
Abellera. Before he left the office, he advised Olavere to check the matter out with Branch Sheriff Josefino Ortiz.
8. Sheriff Ortiz heard him say, Theres no resolution yet. Better follow up with Branch 255. Olavere then told him that he
would be back on Friday to find out if an order had already been issued. There was no talk about money.
9. In the morning of August 29, 2001, the respondent arrived in his office and saw a draft of an order for Judge Macedas
review bearing his corrections. The said order was appended to the records. The respondent corrected the draft and
gave the records to the stenographic reporter for the typing of the final draft. The next day, August 30, 2001, he saw the
Order dated August 29, 2001, already signed by Judge Maceda.
10. On or about 11:20 a.m. on August 31, 2001, Olavere again came to his office to follow up the libel case. At around11:30,
he summoned RTC Sheriff Roberto Galing of Branch 255 to have the order certified by OIC Joselita R. Macaldo of Branch
255. Sheriff Galing had the copy of the order certified by Macaldo, and handed the same to him. The respondent, in
turn, gave a copy of the Order to Olavere. Olavere placed the envelope on top of the respondents desk. The latter
immediately said, Ano yan?
11. Court Process Server Leon Matienzo of RTC, Branch 255, had entered the office to inform the respondent that he was
able to get a schedule for the civil service examination and stood in front of the copy machine located beside the
respondents table.
12. The respondent turned his attention back to Olavere and repeated his query about the envelope, Ano yan? Bakit may
letterhead pa yan ng Garay Law Office? Olavere replied, Eh galing kay Garay yan, e! Suddenly, a group of about eight
persons barged into the office, approached his desk and introduced themselves as agents of the NBI. They surrounded
the desk and one of them took hold of the brown envelope. The seal was removed and the envelope was opened in
front of the respondent. The latter saw that the envelope contained bundles of money..
13. People began to gather in the office. One of them, Branch Sheriff Josefino Ortiz, pointed to the NBI agents for setting
him up, and asked to accompany the latter to the NBI Headquarters in Manila
14. The respondent underwent interrogation and testing for fluorescent powder marks. While he was being questioned at
the NBI office, he noticed a foreign-looking individual who was freely going in and out of the office of NBI Division Chief
Atty. De Guzman.
15. According to the respondent, the case against him was weakened by Olaveres execution of an affidavit retracting his
sworn statement and supplemental statement to the NBI, the latters testimony, and by the affidavit of desistance
executed by Momma datedMarch 5, 2001.

The Issues

The issues for resolution in this case are the following: (a) whether or not the complainant adduced substantial evidence to
prove that the respondent gave the unsigned Order dated July 19, 2001 to Olavere on August 28, 2001 after receiving P50,000
from the latter; (b) whether or not the respondent promised and agreed to give to Olavere on August 31, 2001 a certified copy of
the August 28, 2001 Order signed by Judge Bonifacio Maceda and in consideration of P200,000; (c) whether or not the
respondent received the brown envelope containing P200,000 from Olavere on August 31, 2001 after giving to Olavere the
certified copy of the August 28, 2001 Order signed by Judge Maceda; and, (d) whether the respondent is guilty of grave and
serious misconduct in office.
The Ruling of the Court

On the first issue, the respondent asserts that in administrative cases, where the acts subject of the complaint are criminal
in nature such as bribery or violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
respondent asserts that the complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
demanded P50,000 in consideration for the delivery of an unsigned order granting the motion of the State Prosecutor for the
withdrawal of the Information and for the granting of the motion for the lifting of the hold departure order, and that he actually
gave to Olavere on August 28, 2001 an unsigned order after receiving P50,000 from him. The respondent contends that the
affidavit-complaint of Momma was hearsay because the latter failed to testify. He also asserts that Olaveres claim, as contained
in his affidavit, that he had an agreement with the respondent to give P50,000 in consideration of an unsigned order, is belied by
Olaveres testimony during the investigation, that the agreement was for the delivery of a signed copy of the Order to
Olavere. Furthermore, Toledos allegation that Olavere arrived in the NBI on August 27, 2001 is belied by the latters testimony
that it was only on August 28, 2001 when he made a report to the NBI. The respondent concludes that Olavere could not have
given him P50,000 on August 28, 2001 because Olavere admitted that it was entirely possible that he did not give the P50,000 to
the respondent but pocketed the money himself.

The contention of the respondent does not persuade.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Bautista,[50] this Court, citing its ruling in Mamba v. Garcia,[51] held that in
administrative proceedings only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conviction, is required. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, as
the standard of integrity demanded of members of the Bench is not satisfied which merely allows one to escape the penalties of
criminal law. The dismissal of any criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case, for the prosecutions failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. The affidavit-
complaint[52] of Momma was admitted by the Investigating Justice as part of the testimony of Toledo and Olavere and, more
specifically, Momma submitted the said affidavit-complaint against the respondent to the NBI and subscribed and swore to the
truth of its contents before Toledo.[53]

The complainant adduced substantial evidence that the respondent himself gave to Olavere the unsigned order [54] after
receiving P50,000 from the latter. As gleaned from Olaveres affidavit, the respondent gave the unsigned order to him in the
morning of August 28, 2001 after he had given P50,000 to the respondent.

T: Papaano naman aayusin ni ATTY. MORANTE ang kaso?

S: Sinabi niya sa akin na mapapadismiss niya ang kaso ng boss ko bastat magproduce lang ako ng P250,000. Sinabi ko
ito sa boss ko pero ang sabi niya, gusto niyang makita ang papeles.
T: Ano ang nangyari pagkatapos?
S: Ang sabi ni ATTY. MORANTE magbigay ako ng P50,000 kapalit ang walang pirmang papeles at pagkatapos yong
balanseng P200,000 ay itatawag niya sa akin.
T: Pumayag ba naman ang boss mo?
S: Opo, sa katunayan ay binigay ko na kaninang umaga ang P50,000 at itatawag ni ATTY. MORANTE sa akin kapag
pirmado na ang desisyon para maibigay ko ang balanseng P200,000.
T: Mayroon ibinigay bang papeles si ATTY. MORANTE?
S: Opo, ito pong walang pirmang Order ni Judge MACEDA. (Affiant submits an unsigned six-page Order dated July 19,
2001 under Judge BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, RTC, Branch 255, Las Pinas City marked as Annexes A to A-5).[55]

We reject respondents contention that Olavere was impeached as a witness, and that the entirety of his sworn statement
and supplemental statement to the NBI and his testimony during the investigation was weakened, merely because in answer to
one of the questions of respondents counsel on cross examination, Olavere stated that he went to the office of the respondent
on August 28, 2001 with the intention of getting a signed copy of the Order of Judge Maceda,[56] contrary to his earlier
declaration in his sworn statement that he was at the office of the respondent on the said date, with the intention of getting
an unsigned order. We find no basis for the respondents assertion that since the case against him is based principally on Olaveres
testimony and sworn statement, the complaint against him must be dismissed.

It is true that in response to one of the questions of the respondents counsel on cross examination on whether Olavere had
intended to secure an unsigned order from the respondent on August 28, 2001, Olavere declared that he was expecting a signed
orderfrom the respondent. Indeed, the answer of Olavere contradicts his sworn statement to the NBI in which he stated that he
went to the office of the respondent on August 28, 2001 to get an unsigned order. It bears stressing, however, that in answer to
the subsequent questions on cross examination, Olavere testified that he intended to secure an unsigned decision from the
respondent on August 28, 2001, thereby corroborating his sworn statement. [57]

To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in its
entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to prevail as the truth, the other
evidence received must be considered. In People v. Ubia,[58] the Court held that contradicting testimony given subsequently does
not necessarily discredit the previous testimony if the contradiction is satisfactorily explained. There is no rule which states that a
previous testimony is presumed to be false merely because a witness now says that the same is not true. A testimony solemnly
given in court should not be lightly set aside. Before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one
should be carefully scrutinized in other words, all the expedients devised by man to determine the credibility of witnesses should
be utilized to determine which of the two contradicting testimonies represents the truth.

Also, under Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by showing that such two
contradicting statements are under oath. However, in order to impeach Olaveres testimony to be inconsistent with the sworn
statement, the sworn statement alleged to be inconsistent with the subsequent one should have been shown and read to him
and, thereafter, he should have been asked to explain the apparent inconsistency. This was not done in this case, and the
respondent cannot derive any benefit from the supposed contradiction in Olaveres testimony. [59] We reiterate our own ruling
in People v. De Guzman:[60]

In People vs. Resabal, this Court explicitly ruled that the mere presentation of the prior declarations of a witness without the
same having been read to the witness while he was testifying in court is insufficient for the desired impeachment of his
testimony. As explained therein, the apparent contradiction between the declarations of the witness before the former justice of
the peace court and those before the then court of first instance was insufficient to discredit him since he was not given ample
opportunity, by reading to him his declarations before the lower court, to explain the supposed discrepancy.

The rule which requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a
witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the
necessary inquiries, which enables him to explain the statements referred to, and to show that they were made under a mistake,
or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.

It would be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible witness as a result of the unauthorized procedure
adopted by appellant. It is evidentiarily proscribed to discredit a witness on the bases of purportedly prior inconsistent
statements which were not called to the attention of that witness during the trial, although the same are supposedly contained
in a document which was merely offered and admitted in its entirety without the requisite specifications.

Through such a somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can expediently offer in evidence at the trial the whole document
containing allegedly variant statements and then point out much later on appeal the supposed contradictory statements which
were not specified, intentionally or otherwise, in the same trial. That sub silentio gambit would necessarily deprive a witness of
the chance to explain the seeming divergencies, which is the paramount consideration of the rule mandating the laying of the
proper predicate.

Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the supposed differences in her
statements. Without such explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her
credibility on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached. As things stand before us and the court a quo, therefore, complainants
credibility remains unimpeached.

On the foregoing considerations, we confirm the validity of the doctrine articulated by the Court of Appeals in Villaruel vs.
Bascon that, unless the proper predicate is laid during the trial by calling the attention of a witness to his alleged inconsistent
statements given outside of his testimony in court and asking him to explain the contradiction, the supposed inconsistencies
cannot be pointed out on appeal for the purpose of destroying the credibility of the witness. This pronouncement was actually
based upon and in line with the holdings of this Court in Escosura and People vs. Lim Quingsy.

We have calibrated, in light of the other evidence on record, the entirety of Olaveres testimony on cross-examination and
have arrived at the conclusion that, indeed, Olavere intended to receive an unsigned Order of Judge Maceda from the
respondent on August 28, 2001. The evidence on record shows that when Olavere arrived at the respondents office on August
28, 2001, he received the unsigned order from the respondent after the latter had received the P50,000. We, therefore, rule that
Olavere was not impeached as a witness and his sworn statement rendered of no probative weight merely because of his
erroneous answer to one of the questions of respondents counsel on cross-examination. We also note that the Investigating
Justice gave credence and full probative weight to the sworn statement of Olavere, that he received the unsigned order[61] from
the respondent on August 28, 2001.

The probative weight of the sworn statement of Olavere that the respondent gave him the unsigned Order on August 28,
2001 cannot be overcome by the latters bare denials.

This Court is convinced, as the Investigating Justice was, that the respondent himself prepared the unsigned order. The
evidence on record shows that the respondent, as the Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch 275, received from Macaldo, the Branch
Clerk of Court of Branch 255, the records of Crim. Case No. 00-0117 on July 3, 2001, as Judge Maceda was to resolve the pending
incidents, including the Motion to Resolve Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion to Quash, Lift Hold Departure Order and to Recall Warrant
of Arrest and Release Bond filed by the State Prosecutor. After receiving the records of the case from Macaldo, the respondent
kept the same in his custody. The respondent failed to adduce credible evidence that he parted with the records from July 3,
2001 to August 28, 2001and turned over the same to Judge Maceda.

Even a cursory reading of the unsigned Order will show that it contained facts culled from the records of Criminal Case No.
00-0117. As the records were in the custody of the respondent, only he could have prepared the said order. Moreover, on the
last page, on the left bottom side of the order, contain the initials of the stenographic reporter who typed the said order,
followed by the initials of the respondent himself: EACM corresponding to his full name, Edgar Allan C. Morante. We agree with
the perceptive disquisitions of the Investigating Justice in his Report to this Court on the utter untenability of the respondents
bare denial, thus:

The denial of the respondent, and even a thousand more, cannot alter the fact that his initial eacm which stands for Edgar Allan
Ching Morante and the initial of one of the stenographers of Branch 275 which reads, cgl appeared at the left bottom portion of
the last page of the unsigned order (Exhibit B-5, p. 131, Rollo). The stenographer with cgl initial appeared to be the favorite
stenographer of Judge Maceda as shown by the fact that all the orders that the judge issued which were marked as Exhibits H to
H-23, only Exhibit H-22 did not bear said initial. The initial of the respondent eacm that appeared in the unsigned order is a mute
but a very persuasive and convincing witness that, indeed, the unsigned order was prepared by him (respondent) and, he was
the one who gave it to Olavere in exchange of the Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. Moreover, the signed order except for two
or three significant paragraphs was bodily lifted from the unsigned order. The signed order also bore the initial (cgl) of the same
stenographer at the bottom of the last page and of the respondent below the typewritten name, BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA
(TSN, p. 6, Nov. 8, 2002).[62]

The respondent foisted on the Court a tattle-tale when he claimed that the records of Criminal Case No. 00-0117 had been
in the chambers of Judge Maceda from July to August 2001 and, as such, it was physically impossible for him to have prepared
the unsigned order and later gave it to Olavere. The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove that Judge
Maceda received the records of said case from Macaldo or from the respondent before August 28, 2001. The respondent should
have adduced in evidence the record book of Branch 275 showing when the records were transmitted to Judge Maceda. It
behooved the respondent to have presented Judge Maceda as a witness to corroborate his claim that the records were in the
chambers of the Judge from July 3, 2001 up to August 28, 2001. The respondent could have elicited from Judge Maceda that he
kept the records of said criminal case in his chambers during the said period. Judge Maceda could have identified the person who
prepared the draft of the signed order which he corrected before he signed the same on August 28, 2001. The respondent failed
to do so. The respondents culpability became more evident when he was confronted by the Investigating Justice with the
unsigned order. The Investigating Justice noticed that the respondent blushed and started to stammer when the latter answered
clarificatory questions.[63]

A reading of both the unsigned order[64] and the signed order[65] reveals that there can be no other conclusion than that the
two orders were prepared by one and the same person using the same typewriter, and the records of Criminal Case No. 00-
0117. As gleaned from the encompassing Report of the Investigating Justice:

When respondent was confronted with the two (2) orders unsigned and signed with his initials in both and, asked whether he
noticed that the 2nd par. of page 2 of the signed order was verbatimly copied from the 3 rd par., p. 1 of the unsigned order,
respondent blushed and started to stammer in answering further questions.

A careful examination of the two (2) orders would show that par. 2, p. 1 of the unsigned order is the same as par. 1, p. 3 of the
signed order; par. 1, p. 3 of the unsigned order is the same as par. 2, p. 3 of the signed order except that the cited authority in
the unsigned order reads Luspo vs. Mogue, while in the signed order the authority cited reads, Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA
462. The cited authority which reads Luspo vs. Mogue can be concocted only by a devious mind. Par. 2, p. 3 to p. 4, of the
unsigned order is similar to par. 1, p. 2 of the signed order; and, the last paragraphs of both the unsigned and signed orders are
the same.

The respondent resorted to twisting the testimony of Olavere to prove his claim that the latter pocketed the P50,000
intended for the respondent.

When asked by counsel for the respondent if it was possible that he, Olavere, did not give the P50,000, Olavere testified it
was possible, but insisted that he gave the same to the respondent.

When Olavere saw the NBI agents on August 27, 2001 as claimed by Toledo about the denial of the respondent
for P250,000 in consideration of an unsigned order is not of such importance. Olavere went to the NBI on said date and executed
an affidavit-complaint against the respondent and filed the same to the NBI. Olavere closely coordinated all their moves with the
NBI, including the giving of P50,000 for the unsigned order.

Indeed, immediately after receiving the unsigned order from the respondent on August 28, 2001, Olavere gave the
unsigned order to the NBI as evidence against the respondent. The culpability of the respondent is, likewise, evidenced by his
failure to follow procedure when he made arrangements with Olavere to release the order signed by Judge Maceda himself. As
ruled by the Investigating Justice:

Respondent violated procedure when he personally released the signed order to Olavere. According to Ms. Macaldo, the release
of the order should have been made by the court where it was filed. Since the Momma case was filed with Branch 255 and the
pending incidents were resolved by Judge Maceda only as a pair judge, the order should be released by the staff of Branch
255. This procedure was followed in all cases with pending incidents from Branch 255 that were resolved by Judge Maceda,
except the Momma case.[68]

Anent the second and third issues, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice in his Report that the complainant
was able to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the respondent promised to Olavere and agreed to give and did give and
actually gave to the latter on August 31, 2001 a certified copy of the August 28, 2001 Order already signed by Judge Maceda after
receiving the brown envelope containing the P200,000 from Olavere. In his affidavit-sworn statement on August 31,
2001 Olavere declared, thus:

T Pagkatapos na maibigay mo ang P50,000 noong August 28, 2001 kapalit ang walang pirmang desisyon, anong
nangyari?
S Nakipagset ng schedule si ATTY. MORANTE na ibibigay niya ang pirmadong desisyon kapalit ng P200,000 sa
biyernes, August 31, 2001.
T Ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?
S Ngayon araw na ito, August 31, 2001, bandang alas-onse y medya ng umaga (11:30 AM) ay nagpunta ako sa opisina
ni ATTY. MORANTE.
T Ano naman ang ginawa mo sa opisina ni ATTY. MORANTE?
S Ayon sa usapan ay kinuha ko ang pirmadong desisyon ni Judge BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA kapalit ng
P200,000. Tinanggap niya ang pera na nasa loob ng envelop at ipinatong sa ibabaw ng kanyang mesa. (Affiant
submits Order of Judge BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA datedAugust 29, 2001 marked as Annexes A to A-3)
T Ano ang sumunod dito?
S Dumating na ang mga taga-NBI at hinuli si ATTY. MORANTE.
T May ipapakita ako sa iyong tao, kilala mo ba siya?
S Opo, siya po si ATTY. ALLAN MORANTE ang Branch Clerk of Court ng Branch 275, RTC, Las Pias City, na tumanggap
ng P200,000 nasa loob ng envelope.
T Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong nais na itanong pa sa inyo, mayroon ba kayong nais na idagdag o ibawas dito
sa inyong salaysay?
S Wala po.[69]
To the clarificatory questions of the Investigating Justice, Olavere replied, viz:
Q When you went inside the room, there is (sic) a door?
COURT
Door to the office?
Q Door to the office of Atty. Morante from the outside? There must be a door.
 A Yes, of course.
Q The door was not locked.
A Presumably it was not locked.
Q You did not lock it when you enter (sic)?
A No.
Q Then you went to the office of Mr. Morante?
A Yes, he led me inside.
Q Then according to you, you got the signed copy of the decision given to you allegedly by Atty. Morante?
A After the exchange of the money.
Q Then you got the money from your back contained in an envelope, and you gave it to Atty. Morante?
A I handed it to him.
Q He got it and then placed it in (sic) the table. That is the statement that you swore and I quote: Tinanggap niya ang
pera na nasa loob ng envelope at ipinatong sa ibabaw ng kanyang mesa. He did not hide it in his drawer. He did
not pocket it. And after receiving the money, he placed it there on top of the table. And you swore to that
statement?
A Yes.
Q When was the money given to you by the NBI? We are referring to the P200,000.00. Who gave to (sic) you the
money?
A Mr. Momma gave the money.
Q Did you give it to the NBI?
A I showed it to them and then they had it dusted for (sic) fluorescent powder. All the proceedings were done with
proper paper works. And I had the money with me and I went to Las Pinas.
Q When you handed the money contained in an envelope, you know that it was already dusted for (sic) fluorescent
powder and everything in order to show?
A Yes.[70]
Respondent belabored on the evidence on record that after the entrapment operation in the office of the respondent, the
dorsal and palmar aspects of his left and right hand were subjected to ultraviolet light test and were found negative for
fluorescent powder.However, the result of the test does not enfeeble the case for the complainant. In the first place, the
absence of fluorescent powder on the dorsal and palmar aspects of the respondents hands is not conclusive evidence that he did
not hold the brown envelope at all before the NBI agents arrived in his office. The evidence on record shows that the NBI agents
referred the white mailing envelope with the P1,000 bills to the NBI Forensic Chemist Section for the application of fluorescent
powder.[71] The said bills and the white mailing envelope were dusted with fluorescent powder. However, the NBI agents
discovered that the white mailing envelope was too small to contain bundles of bills amounting to P200,000, and placed the
bundles of bills in a 6x8-inch size brown envelope, which, however, was no longer dusted with fluorescent powder. After
receiving the envelope from Olavere, the respondent placed it on top of his table. Had the respondent opened the envelope
containing the four P1,000 bills dusted with fluorescent powder, for sure, the palmar aspects of his hand would have tested
positive for fluorescent powder.

The respondent claimed that one of the NBI agents who barged into his room took hold of the brown envelope, removed
the seal and opened it in front of him, and that the said agent grabbed his right hand and attempted to place it inside the
envelope, but was foiled when stenographer Leticia B. Agbayani entered the room and shouted, Whats happening here? (Anong
nangyayari dito?) to which the respondent replied, Entrapment daw.[72] The claim of the respondent is belied by his testimony
that before Agbayanis arrival, an NBI agent had already taken the money from the brown envelope and placed the bundles of
money on top of his table. Thus, when Agbayani barged into the respondents room, Agbayani must have seen the bundles of
money on his table. In her affidavit,[73] she stated that when she barged into the respondents room after the NBI had gained
entry, she asked the respondent, Alam mo ba kung anong laman niyan? to which the respondent replied, Hindi, does not bolster
the respondents defense, but on the contrary, weakens the same. It is incredible that the respondent would respond that he did
not know what was contained in the envelope, when, according to his testimony, Agbayani barged into the room and the
bundles of P200,000 had already been taken out of the envelope and were placed on his table. The respondent even failed to
identify the NBI agent who filed an administrative or criminal charge against him for attempting to falsely implicate the
respondent.

Apart from the presumption that the NBI agents performed their duties in accordance with law, the bare statement of the
respondent cannot prevail, especially since Leon Matienzo, the principal witness, whose testimony the respondent principally
relied on to corroborate his, was found by the Investigating Justice incredible. We agree with the following disquisition of the
Investigating Justice in his Report to the Court:
To corroborate respondents defense that he did not received (sic) the money inside the bulky brown envelope, another tutored
and perjured witness in the person of Leon Matienzo was presented.

Leon Matienzo admitted that his affidavit was prepared by Atty. Cayton, counsel for the respondent. Witness was not sure
whether his affidavit was prepared in August or September 2001. When the witness finally decided that his affidavit was
prepared September 2001, on a Monday after talking to Atty. Morante, yet he cannot remember the date. The witness was
warned not to talk to anybody while still testifying (TSN, pp. 22-23, July 22, 2001). The witness was even ambivalent when asked
as to the time his affidavit was prepared (TSN, p. 24, Ibid.) which is a proof that he was tutored and was just asked to sign it.

Witness Matienzo is the Process Server of Branch 254. He claimed that at about 11:30 oclock in the morning on August 31, 2001,
he went inside the office of the respondent to inform him that they were able to get a schedule for their civil service
examinations. Almost simultaneous with his arrival in said office, he heard Atty. Morante asked (sic) the person he was talking to,
ano yan? He asked to be excused and told the respondent, boss ipapaalam ko lang na nakapagpa-schedule na kami para sa civil
service examination and, he (Morante) answered, Okay. And he asked permission to leave.

The role assigned to Matienzo in the defense of respondent was just to say/testify that he heard Atty. Morante asked (sic), ano
yan? and, nothing more. The witness is the Process Server of Branch 254 presided by Judge Fernandez, the Executive
Judge. According to him, he was already permitted by the Executive Judge and the Branch Clerk of Court to take the civil service
examination. Why then would he still go to the office of Atty. Morante, who was not his superior, on the fateful day of August 31,
2001 just to inform him that he had a scheduled civil service examination?

Hereunder are portions of the testimony of the witness that would show the limited role assigned to the witness in respondents
defense:
Q What was the reaction of the person who was inside (the office) when Atty. Morante say (sic), ano yan?
A Nakatingin po sa kanya, sir.
Q He did not react?
A Hindi ho kasi mabilis lang po ako doon, eh. Nang sabihin po nag-excuse na po ako.
Q Why were you in a hurry to leave the place when at that point, Atty. Morante was already asking, what was that?
A Dahil sa nag-excuse po ako, sir. Excuse me, sir, sabi ko sa kanya at sa kanyang kausap, me sasabihin lang po ako
(TSN, p. 32, July 22, 2002).
Q Now, are you sure that what you heard was, ano yan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Nothing else?
A Nothing else, sir. (TSN, p. 35, Ibid.)

The witness cannot even remember the date when the affidavit was prepared, the day he signed it and, the date when it was
subscribed before a person authorized to administer oath. These only show that all the facts stated therein were supplied by
counsel to corroborate the testimony of the respondent
]

The case for the complainant is not enfeebled by the affidavit of Olavere dated December 5, 2002 where he retracted his
sworn statement, the supplemental sworn statement to the NBI and his testimony before the Investigating Justice; and desisted
from being a witness against the respondent on his claim that the statements therein are not only hearsay but were brought
about by grave mistake and misapprehension of fact and any lack of knowledge of court procedures; [75] nor by the affidavit of
desistance executed by Momma on his claim that:
However, the said statement was merely provided by my interpreter, which is turned out and was later on discovered,
was a result or was brought about by mistake and grave misapprehension of facts and his lack of knowledge of court
procedure, Atty. Morante did not request nor received money directly from me to have the said case dismissed and I
have never met him in my life; [76]

First. In People v. Ballabare,[77] we held that a retraction of a witness does not necessarily negate an original testimony. For
this reason, the Court looks with disfavor upon such retractions because testimonies can easily be obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, any reconsideration must be tested in a public trial, with
sufficient opportunity given to the adverse party affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness. Hence, when confronted
with a situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on
the basis of recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.[78] We have also held that it is absurd to disregard a
testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the Court and the parties simply because an affiant withdraws his
testimony. Olavere and Momma executed their affidavits only after the formal investigation had been concluded and the case
submitted for report and recommendation by the Investigating Justice.

Second. The respondent failed to file a motion for the reopening of the investigation to enable him to present Olavere and
Momma to testify on their affidavits to prevent the Investigating Justice and the Court Administrator, which were not even
furnished with copies of said affidavits, from conducting examination of Olavere and Momma on their affidavits.

Third. Olavere had personal knowledge of the facts contained in his sworn statement, supplemental sworn statement and
his testimony and, hence, the said statement and testimony are not hearsay. Olavere dealt personally with the respondent, gave
him the total amount of P250,000 after receiving the unsigned and signed orders from the respondent.

Fourth. Olavere and Momma did not explain their affidavits why it took them until December 11, 2002 or after the lapse of
more than a year from the entrapment of the respondent on August 31, 2001 to execute the same. It is incredible that it took
Olavere more than one year to realize that the facts contained in his sworn statement and as testified to by him were hearsay
and of his lack of knowledge of procedure. Being a mere secretary and a functionary of Momma, Olavere has not explained how
he came to the conclusion that his sworn statement and testimony are hearsay.

Fifth. The desistance of witnesses does not automatically result in the dismissal of an administrative case. This Court, in
fact, looks with disfavor at affidavits of desistance filed by complainants, especially if done as an afterthought. Contrary to the
submission of the respondent, the withdrawal of the complaint on the recantation of Olavere does not have the legal effect of
exonerating him from any administrative disciplinary actions for acts/omissions meriting disciplinary sanctions by the
respondent. It does not operate to divest this Court of jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in the
complaint. The Courts disciplinary authority cannot be dependent on or frustrated by private arrangements between parties. An
administrative complaint against an official or employee of the judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a complainant who
suddenly claims a change of mind.

On the last issue, we agree with the Investigating Justice that the respondent, based on the substantial evidence on record,
is guilty of grave and serious misconduct: for extorting P50,000 from Momma through Olavere for the unsigned order, and
anotherP200,000 for the order duly signed by Judge Maceda. Such abominable acts of the respondent warrant his dismissal from
the service and the imposition of accessory penalties therefor. [80]

The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the
faith of the people in the Judiciary.[81]

Time and again this Court has stressed that those involved in the administration of justice must conduct themselves in a
manner that is beyond reproach since their office is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. [82] Public office is a
public trust. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial
office. Clerks of court, in particular, being the chief administrative officers of their respective courts, must be individuals of
competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. [83] As
essential and ranking officers of our judicial system, they perform delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and
proper administration of justice.[84] Clerks of court serve as an exemplar for other court employees, whose duties and
responsibilities must be strictly performed. They play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to
slacken on the job under one pretext or another.[85]
Furthermore, it must be stressed that a member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. The Code of Professional Responsibility was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers, including those in government service.[86] Lawyers in government are public servants who owe utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is
subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.[87]

Under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC[88] Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,[89] which took effect on October 1, 2002,
the respondent would have been required to comment on the complaint and to show cause why he should not also be
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the bar. However, the complaint was filed before this
Court on September 21, 2001, long before the said resolution took effect. Thus, it cannot be applied in the instant case. 90
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Las
Pias City, Branch 275, having been found GUILTY of grave and serious misconduct, is DISMISSED from the service effective
immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to his reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality in the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

BERNARDO A. TADLIP, A.C. No. 5708

- versus -
ATTY. FIDEL H. BORRES, JR., CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Respondent
RESOLUTION

Tinga, J.:
The facts of the case are as follows:
1. On 3 October 1987, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27), the Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-106 (OCT No. P-106), Emancipation Patent No. A-028380 to Eusebio E. Arceconveying to him
Three Thousand Nine Hundred Eight (3,908) square meters of agricultural land situated in Mambajao, Camiguin. The
land was formerly owned by Angel Madarieta.
2. Subsequently, on 14 December 1987, a Deed of Transfer under PD 27 was executed by Angel Madarieta, as represented
by his wife, Pelagia Madarieta (Madarieta) and Eusebio E. Arce.[3] The parties agreed that the land would be given to
Arce in consideration of Seven Hundred Fifty (750) kerosene cans of palay.
3. Arce died on 23 December 1993. As he was succeeded by two minor daughters ages 5 and 6 years old,
herein complainant Tadlip, who is his nephew, assumed the responsibility of tilling the land. Tadlip caused the
reallocation of the disputed land through the aid of the Bureau of Legal Assistance, Department of Agrarian Reform,
Yuming, Mambajao, Camiguin (BLA-DAR) in a petition dated 9 October 1997 and docketed as DARAB Case No. X-861.
4. Respondent, as PARAD of the DARAB, issued an Order dated 3 April 1998 granting the petition of
complainant reallocating the land to him and the heirs of Arce.
5. However, the title to the parcels of land was never transferred to complainant and the heirs of Arce because unknown
to them, respondent rendered another Orderdated 26 January 1999 canceling the registration of the same OCT No. P-
106 and ordering the issuance of a transfer certificate of title ex parte in favor of Madarieta in DARAB Case No. X-99-
02.
6. Madarieta filed two pleadings on 22 January 1999. The first was aPetition entitled In the Matter of Cancellation of
Original Certificate of Title No. EP-106/Emancipation Patent No. A-028380 and Retention Right docketed as DARAB Case
No. X-99-02. Madarieta based her Petition on the ground that she was not able to exercise her right of retention, the
land is idle, abandoned, unattended and unproductive and that the late Eusebio Arce did not comply with the agreed
monthly amortization as payment for the lot. By the nature of the pleadings filed, Madarieta obviously executed an ex
parte proceeding. Hence, no attempt was made to implead Tadlip or the Arce heirs, despite the existence of their legal
interest over the property and reality that a clear deprivation of such right would ensue should the petition be granted.
7. The second was a Complaint entitled Pelagia Madarieta v. Heirs of Eusebio Arce/Bernardo A. Tadlip, docketed as DARAB
Case No. X-99-04 for Cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. EP 106 and Retention. In the said
complaint, Madarieta substantially alleged the same facts and prayed for the same remedies except that she included
one more allegation, that which pertains to the reallocation of the land to complainant.
8. Complainant alleged that the Complaint was filed by Madarieta upon the instruction of respondent, to correct the
procedural flaw attending to her initial Petition.
9. According to him, respondent PARAD, after rendering the Order dated 26 January 1999, advised Madarieta to file a
complaint impleading complainant and the heirs of Arce so as to make it appear that the cancellation of the title of
the emancipated land was regular and legal. In effect, complainant maintains that the filing of the petition and the
complaint by Madarieta on 22 January 1999 was not simultaneous but successive, where after respondent rendered the
Order for the petition, Madarieta thereafter filed the complaint at a later date but made it appear that the same was
also filed on 22 January 1999.
10. In any event, the Petition, despite its obvious flaws, was decided by respondent in favor of Madrieta just four (4) days
after it had been filed. Thus, OCT No. P-106 was ordered cancelled even before Tadlip or the heirs of Arce had any
possible opportunity to be heard.
 11. Complainant discovered this fact only when the DARAB-Camiguin furnished the BLA-DAR a copy of theOrder in DARAB
Case No. X-99-02 on 25 February 1999. Complainant filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by
respondent in an Order dated 19 March 1999.
12. Matters were aggravated when Madarieta filed a motion for execution pending appeal on 25 May 1999. The same
was granted by respondent on 11 June 1999 despite the vehement opposition of complainant who cited procedural
irregularities according to the DARAB Rules of Procedure, particularly the rule that any motion for execution of the
decision of the Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed with the DARAB, and not the adjudicator.
13. Hence, on 20 March 2002, complainant filed this instant administrative complaint. On 7 August 2002, this Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint
14. Respondent, in his comment dated 9 December 2002, denied all the accusations hurled against him. He related
that complainant filed an appeal and certiorari case relative to the land dispute but instead of waiting for the result,
the latter filed another case before the Ombudsman and subsequently this administrative case.

In a resolution dated 19 February 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP found that respondent violated Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility by disregarding and failing to apply
the specific provisions of the 1994 New Rules of Procedure[20] (DARAB Rules) in disposing of DARAB Case Nos. X-99-02 and X-99-
04 and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

COURT’S RULING

We agree with the findings of the IBP but hold that the recommended penalty is quite slight for the infractions done by
respondent.

This Court cannot delve into the factual or legal questions raised by complainant. We can only rule on its administrative aspect.
However, for us to fully dispose of the case, the multiple violations of respondent must be subjected to scrutiny and scorn.

Respondent is not only a lawyer practicing his profession, but also a provincial adjudicator, a public officer tasked with the duty
of deciding conflicting claims of the parties. He is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government. Thus, by analogy, the
present dispute may be likened to administrative cases of judges whose manner of deciding cases was similarly subject of
respective administrative cases.

To hold the judge liable, this Court has time and again ruled that the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an
inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision.[22] It must be so grave and on so
fundamental a point as to warrant condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or negligent.[23] Otherwise, to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that the judge erred, would be nothing
short of harassment and that would be intolerable.[24]
However, it has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. The disregard of established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of law makes a judge subject to
disciplinary action.

In Pesayco v. Layague[26] the Court had the opportunity to declare that:

A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack
of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the
law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. . . . Basic
rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judges hands.

Needless to say, respondent was sorely remiss in his duties as the PARAD of Camiguin in the disposition of cases filed by
Madarieta.
He violated Rule VI of the DARAB Rules, to wit:
SECTION 1. Issuance of Summons, Time to Answer and Submission of Evidence. Upon the filing of the complaint or petition, the
hour/time, day, month, and year when it was filed shall be stamped thereon. The corresponding summons and notice of hearing
to the adverse party, attaching therewith a copy of such complaint or petition, affidavit and documentary evidence if any, shall
be served by personal delivery or registered mail to the defendant or respondent within two (2) days therefrom. The summons
and notice of hearing shall direct the defendant or respondent to file an answer to the complaint or petition and submit counter
affidavit and other documentary evidence, if any, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof furnishing
a copy to the petitioner or the complainant. The summons shall also specify the date, time and place of the hearing and order
the parties and their witnesses to appear at the scheduled date of hearing. The aforementioned affidavits and counter-affidavits
of the witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimony. Failure of any party to submit his affidavits or counter affidavits as
herein directed will be interpreted by the Adjudicator or Board as a waiver to present evidence or that he has more evidence to
submit and the case could be considered submitted for decision.
Clearly, complainant was a party in interest in the two DARAB cases filed by Madarieta as he stood to be adversely affected by
the decision of respondent. Yet, he was never summoned in DARAB Case No. X-99-02, which was decided against him just four
(4) days after it was filed. Evidently complainant had no reasonable opportunity to be heard before he was divested of the land
over which respondent, just a few months earlier, had affirmed complainants rights thereto.

It would be absurd to accept the reasoning of respondent that since complainant was not impleaded as a party to DARAB Case
No. X-99-02, the latter was not entitled to be notified of the hearing and the eventual disposition of the case. The DARAB Rules
requires the joinder of all parties-in-interest whether as defendants or respondents. Parties-in-interest are defined as (a)ll
persons who claim an interest in the dispute or subject matter thereof adverse to complainant or petitioner, or who are
necessary to a complete determination or settlement of the issue involved therein.[28] Complainant, as the holder of title and
possession of the property sought to be reconveyed, is ineluctably a party-in-interest.

Respondent should have dismissed Madarietas petition for failure to implead complainant, the heirs of Arce, and all others ho
derive title from them.

Complainant intimates that the Complaint was instituted precisely to cure the defect attending the Petition. The Court cannot
conclude definitively that this remedial measure was instigated on the suggestion of the respondent. But assuming this were
true, respondents undue haste in granting the Petition just four days after it was filed practically obviated whatever curative
effect the Complaint may have served, since the relief sought in the latter was the same already granted in the former. Whatever
proceedings may have transpired in the hearing of the Complaint, these were a redundancy, considering that the relief prayed
for had already been granted.

Furthermore, as correctly observed by the IBP Commissioner, complainants urgent motion for reconsideration may very well be
considered by respondent as a motion for intervention and yet respondent denied the same.

Remarkably, respondent, nine months prior to his Order dated 26 January 1999, has rendered an Orderdated 3 April 1998
reallocating the land in question from Arce to complainant. Respondent himself had vested complainant with an interest in the
lot with all the rights therewith accompanying the order of reallocation. He, therefore, cannot afterwards deny such right or
interest from complainant to defend the latters claim and subsequently cancel OCT No. P-106 unilaterally. In doing so,
complainants possession, if not ownership of the land has been adversely affected.

Complainant has also alleged that he was able to obtain positive action on his petition for reallocation only after paying the
respondent One Thousand (P1,000.00) pesos.[30] He also categorically states that there was a rumored pay-off between
respondent and the Madarieta Family.[31] Admittedly through, no other evidence was given to corroborate the alleged pay-off
and his payment of P1,000.00. Thus, we cannot deem these serious allegations as proven. Still, the dubious nature of the
decisions is inescapable, and on that basis administrative liability can ensue.

Compounding respondents liability is the fact that in granting execution pending appeal, he also disregarded Rule XII of the
DARAB Rules, which states:
SECTION 2. Execution pending appeal. Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed
before the Board, and the same may be granted upon showing good reasons under conditions which the Board may require.
(Emphasis ours.)

It is unmistakably stated in unequivocal terms that execution pending appeal must be filed before the Adjudication Board.
Respondent violated this rule in rendering an order of execution pending appeal when such authority has been given to the
Board alone. Even the respondent cited the said provision of the DARAB Rules in his position paper[32] and yet it seems that he
merely dispensed of the rules and replaced it with his own system of procedure contrary to the DARAB Rules.
In addition, on 14 May 1993, the DAR Region X, Macanhan, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro received an advisory through an official
radiophone message addressed to all Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARADs) and PARADs of the DAR from the then
Undersecretary Lorenzo Reyes not to execute any ejection proceedings promptly appealed to the DARAB.[33] On 15 September
1993, the same undersecretary issued another official radiophone message addressed to RARAD Jimmy Tapangan of DAR Region
X, Cagayan de Oro which is faithfully reproduced as follows:
HELLO, PLEASE ADVISE OUR ADJUDICATORS NOT TO EXECUTE DECISIONS WHERE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED WITHIN
THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD INSTEAD THE RECORDS OF THE CASE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY FORWARDED TO THE
BOARD PD SOME MEMBERS OF THE BOARD ARE CONTEMPLATING OF THROWING THE BOOKS TO THOSE WHO INSIST
ON EXECUTING DECISIONS THAT ARE PROMPTLY INSPITE OF OUR PREVIOUS ADVISES NOT TO DO SO PD THE BOARD
HAS CONSISTENTLY RULED IN SO MANY DECISIONS ALREADY THAT DECISIONS THAT ARE PROMPTLY APPEALED CAN NO
LONGER BE EXECUTED BY THE ADJUDICATOR CONCERENED PD THESE RADIOMESSAGE IS THE OFFICIAL ADVISE VERBAL
OF THE BOARD PD KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK WARMEST REGARDS END. . . .

Hence, as early as 1993, the RARADs and PARADs have been aware that executions pending appeal was to be acted upon by the
DARAB and not by them.

Respondents non-observance of the DARAB Rules on notice and hearing and his grant to Madarieta of her motion for execution
pending appeal in effect deprived complainant of the land he tills and the source of his income. Complainant woke up one day
not knowing that the emancipated land which he thought was already reallocated to him was lost by order of respondent. He
was not given the chance to defend his claim over the property. This is tantamount to deprivation of property without due
process of law, a constitutional guarantee available to every individual.

The actual review of the subject issuance of the respondent should be undertaken in the proper judicial proceedings, and not by
this Court at this time via an administrative action. Nevertheless, respondents culpability under the Code of Professional
Responsibility is indubitable. As a lawyer, the IBP determined, and we subscribe to such determination, that respondent violated
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states:
Canon 1A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws is an obligation imposed upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes
responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make
himself an exemplar of others to emulate.

A member of the bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on 21 June 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of the said Code. Lawyers in government service are
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondent, as a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB, was reposed with a higher gravamen of responsibility than a lawyer in
private practice. The recommended penalty of two months suspension is too light under the circumstances, and a penalty of six
(6) months suspension more appropriate.

As held in recent cases, the penalty for a judge found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law is six (6) months. In the case at
bar, after due consideration of the facts involved, the Court believes and so holds that the same penalty should be imposed upon
respondent as he disregarded pertinent rules of procedure of the DARAB that led to the unjust deprivation of complainant of his
property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. Let
a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.