Quasi-Judicial Power

Investigation and Adjudication

(1) Special Statutory Grant

G.R. No. L-36385 July 25, 1979

ARCADIO R. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMADO INCIONG, as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and DOMINGO CINCO,
respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

Facts of the Case:

This litigation started with private respondent Domingo Cinco filing a verified complaint with the
then National Labor Relations Commission, charging petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino with violating the
constitution of the Batangas Labor Union by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers
in the month of November, 1972, and praying that such election be conducted immediately. Upon
receipt of such verified complaint, petitioner on the same date sent an urgent telegram to the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission for the cancellation of the hearing of such complaint
as he had to appear on that very day before the then Court of Industrial Relations. Petitioner was not
informed of the action taken on such motion; instead, he was notified that respondent National Labor
Relations Commission issued an order directing the Batangas Labor Union "to hold its election of officers
within twenty (20) days from receipt of the order. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. As such
motion for reconsideration was not acted upon despite repeated requests, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal with the Secretary of Labor, praying at the same time that the pre-election conference set and
the election scheduled be suspended in the meanwhile. Respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, thru its then Chairman, Amado G. Inciong, informed the herein petitioner that the
elections of officers of the Batangas Labor Union would proceed as scheduled .

Subsequently, the Batangas Labor Union filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction, against the respondent Domingo Cinco
and the National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor, seeking to annul and to
prohibit the respondent National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor from enforcing
it. The court of first instance then presided by Judge Jaime delos Angeles, now retired, did not grant the
writ of preliminary injunction ex parte as prayed for in the petition but instead set the application
thereof for hearing . After such hearing, Judge Jaime delos Angeles reserved his resolution on the matter
at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. On the same date, shortly before noon
and within the court premises, petitioner and Judge Jaime delos Angeles were served with a copy of a
subpoena issued by respondent Amado Inciong, Chairman of the then National Labor Relations
Commission, requiring them to appear at the National Labor Relations Commission, to explain why he
should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly
ordered by the Commission under Presidential Decree 21.

A case was filed with the Supreme Court and said court issued this resolution: "Considering the
allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved: (a) to require the respondents to file an [answer] thereto
within ten (10) days from notice hereof, and not to move to dismiss the petition; and (b) to have a
[temporary restraining order issued], effective immediately until further orders from this Court." A letter
from respondent Inciong received in the Supreme Court which stated that “First of all the issue is not
[sic] academic since we do not intend to continue with the contempt proceedings against petitioner
Arcadio Tolentino. The union election has been held in accordance with our order and the winner duly
proclaimed. Second, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over us. Enclosed is a copy of Presidential
Decree 21 for your information and guidance. Third, under the New Society, we are evolving a de-
legalized labor management system in this country, and we expect the fullest cooperation of the
Supreme Court in this endeavour.” The Court Resolved: (a) to [expunge] said letter from the records of
this case; and (b) to require said respondent to [comply] with this Court's resolution of March 6, 1973,
within five (5) days from notice hereof.

Issue: Is the chairman of NLRC empowered to issue subpoena and cite person in contempt by virtue of
Presidential Decree 21?

Held:

The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 21 be
attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising a power not conferred by such decree. He ought to
have known that the competence, "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" certainly
cannot extend to a judge of the court of first instance. Correctly construed, it cannot cover the case
likewise of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. It
must ever be borne in mind by an administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there
be compliance with the law. That is the very essence of a judicial power. So the rule of law requires. It is
true that courts, like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction. In this
particular case, it is admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, after hearing the arguments on
the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, reserved his resolution in view of
the intricacies of the legal questions raised. The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek
a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the
domain of the powers conferred on it. Instead, respondent Inciong took the precipitate step of citing
him for contempt. That was an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules. Neither was
there any contumacious act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial remedy. It would be a reproach
to any legal system if an individual is denied access to the courts under these circumstances. The resort
of respondent Inciong to what has been derisively referred to as epithetical jurisprudence, seeking
shelter in the opprobrious term "old society tactics," is an implied admission of his actuation being
devoid of support in law. As was so well stated by Chief Justice Hughes: " It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute."

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted and the assailed order of February 28, 1973, citing the
then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, as well as petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino for contempt, declared void
and of no force or effect, both orders having been issued beyond the power of respondent Amado
Inciong to issue. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.

Warrant of Arrest/Administrative searches

G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963

QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO
alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying the petition for writs
of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel
Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King.

Facts of the Case:

Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the Deportation Board,
with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from
the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and
petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to
bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments.

Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued but
said aliens were provisionally set at liberty upon filing of a surety bond.

Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges for the reason, among others, that the
same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has
no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied, petitioners-
appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, but made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila . Petitioners upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation Board
from hearing Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas
corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.

The respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among others, that the
Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed against
petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee Gan was
acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was found in the same decision of
the trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force in order that
the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of
$130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was involved.

After due trial, the court rendered a decision, upholding the validity of the delegation by the president
to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether
the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State.
The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix
bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that
the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement
the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently,
the petitioners instituted the present appeal.

Issue: WON the deportation board has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the
authority to order their deportation and arrest
Held:

Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was
empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37).

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into
the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of
section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and
effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:.

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the
Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own
country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive
or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than
these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."

Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in
two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering,
hoarding or black marketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic
sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending
Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the deportation
of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.

There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear
from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." This gives rise to the
question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e., whether such
authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the
Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated to the
respondent Deportation Board.

Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it
equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, the probable cause upon
which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under
oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Constitution does not distinguish
between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if
one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against
him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a
violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then
the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for
example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance
of an order of contempt.

The contention that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is
valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly,
during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true
before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the
alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it
may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so
decide — on whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of
investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens
and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and
void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing
modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Imposition of Fines and Penalties

G.R. No. 4349 September 24, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant.

Facts of the Case:

In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of
paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the
Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was moving her lighter and
directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the
crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as
follows:

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River
without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.

Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is
unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission
bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as
constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
Issue: WON the act of the Collector of Customs in promulgating such a law are void as constituting an
illegal delegation of legislative power

Held:

NO. Rules for local navigation prescribed by the collector of a port as harbor master pursuant to
statutory authority may be sustained as not an undue exercise of a delegated legislative power.

The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is the exercise of a legislative power which cannot be
delegated to a subordinate authority.

By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged
in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain
exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as
follows:

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and
directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to
regulate the business herein licensed.

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and
issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be
punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section
or by both.

Under this statute, there is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the
terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was
engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of
Spain, in the city of Manila.

The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor
regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use
more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the
proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power.

The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner
of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in
execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. . . .

Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is
sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should pass on the questions discussed in
the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not
material, as we have frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an
additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.
We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid
section Act No. 1136.

So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts
Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine
of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-43653 November 29, 1977

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and DIEGO MORALES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-45378 November 29, 1977

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES. INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.

BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and PACIFICO INNOCENCIO, respondents.

Treñas & Aligaen for petitioner.
R. Mag. Bernardo for respondent Morales.
Silvestre T. de la Cruz for respondent Innocencio.
Primitivo C. Santos for respondent Board.

MARTIN, J.,

Facts of the Case:

These two petitions (G.R. No. L-43653 and G.R. No. L-45378) for review by certiorari of the decisions of
the Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01-OC, entitled "Diego T Morales vs. Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)" and BC Case No. 75-08-OC, entitled "Pacifica Innocencio
vs. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)," have been Consolidated as per as they involve
the same issue as to whether the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages
allegedly suffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short.

In BC Case No. 75-01-OC (G.R. No. L-43653) complainant respondent Diego Morales claims that while he
was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his
wife. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. Because of the failure of
the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional
expenses and prays for damages.

In BC Case No. 75-08-OC (G.R. No. L-45378) complainant respondent Pacifico Innocencio claim that
Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him
at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The
telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said
telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his
hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal
inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages.

After hearing the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was
inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200
pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. I and Letter
of Implementation No. 1.

The main thrust of the argument of petitioner is that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain
and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from
negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code 1 and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code 2 which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of
justice and not in the Board of Communications.

Issue: WON respondent Board has jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints

Held:

Court agrees with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its
successor in interest, the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court,
can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred
upon it by statute".3 The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in
nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon it by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of
Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public
Service Act for the Public Service Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of
the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue
certificate of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry
with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of
public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. In
the two cases before us petitioner is not being charged nor investigated for violation of the terms and
conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulations of the
respondent Board of Communications. The complaint of respondents in the two case was that they
were allegedly inconvenienced or injured by the failure of the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams
informing them of the deaths of close relatives which according to them constitute breach of
contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. The charges however, do not necessarily
involve petitioners failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or
regulation of respondent Board of Communication. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not
been charge of any violation or failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates of public
convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of the respondent Board. The charge does not relate
to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance
with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and
Pacifica Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising
from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of
damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications.
Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner. In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI
(G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice
Enrique Fernando, ruled:

There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications
as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer . The
only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio
company for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in
these two petitions lacked the impress of validity.

In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the
required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it
to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion.

WHEREFORE. both decisions of respondent Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01 OC and BC
Case No. 75- 08-0C are hereby reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of both cases.

Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards

(9) maintain monetary stability promote rising level of production and real income

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILLIAM ERNEST JOLLIFFE, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal taken by defendant William Ernest Jolliffe from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, convicting him of a violation of Republic Act No. 256, and sentencing him to imprisonment for
one (1) year, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs, as well as decreeing the forfeiture, in favor of the
Government, of four (4) pieces of gold bullion valued P35,305.46, and a travellers' check in the sum of
$100.00.

Facts of the Case:

Appellant was about to board a plane of the Pan American World Airways, four pieces of gold bullion
were found in his body. There was also found in his possession a $100 traveler’s check. He was charged
with and convicted of violation of RA 265 and sentenced to imprisonment, to pay fine and costs, as well
as decreeing the forfeiture in favor of the Gov’t of the gold bullion and the traveler’s check. He appealed
and among others challenged the validity of Circular No. 21 of the Central Bank on the ground that it is
an undue delegation of powers. That granting, without admitting, that the power to promulgate it was
granted to the Monetary Board by Republic Act 265, and granting without admitting, that the power to
so promulgate was validly exercised, still it is invalid because it constitutes an invalid delegation of
legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional and void
Issue: WON the assailed Circular No. 21 is legal and that the grant of authority to issue the same
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power

Held:

It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to local
governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be and
another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set
out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category,
if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field
within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in
compliance with the legislative will." Referring the case at bar, section 74 of Republic Act No. 265
conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions
in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an
exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive
measures to combat such crisis." The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial
measures" to protect the international stability of the peso, "whether the international reserve is falling,
as a result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary
to the national welfare" (section 70, Rep. Act No. 265). It should be noted, furthermore, that these
powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central
Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a
rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.)
These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of
administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the
category of a delegation of legislative powers

Due Process in Administrative Hearings

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS’
BROTHERHOOD, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., Respondents.

Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.

Antonio D. Paguia; for National Labor Union.

Claro M. Recto; for petitioner "Ang Tibay."

Jose M. Casal; for National Workers’ Brotherhood.

Facts of the Case:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a number of his employees. However,
the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was
merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

[G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000]

HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent. Ne-xold

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts of the Case: Secretary Gloria filed a complaint against respondent for dishonesty and grave
misconduct due to pilferage of some historical documents and the keeping of it on the respondents’
possession. Respondent then receive a copy of the resolution finding her guilty of administrative
offenses of dishonesty and was ordered dismissed from the service. Respondent did not appeal the
judgment and instead filed for Petition for the Production of the DECS investigation Committee Report.
The Petition was, however denied. She then filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS
Resolution, Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action,
but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. The appellate court sustained the trial court and
dismissed Secretary Gloria’s petition for lack of merit holding that -Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to be informed of the findings of the investigation
against him?

Held:

A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and

recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him-he is
only entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence presented against her
during the hearings of the investigation committee. There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty
on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report.

[G.R. No. 129914. May 12, 2000]

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (SECOND DIVISION) and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), petitioners, vs. POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE,
respondent.

DECISION

PARDO, J.: Scsdaad

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the
decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission affirming the summary dismissal
of Police Chief Inspector Leonardo W. Bernabe as ordered by the Chief, Philippine National Police for
grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a police officer. The Court of Appeals ordered respondent
reinstated, entitled to payment of his salary and allowances withheld from him by reason of the
erroneous dismissal, unless suspended for some other lawful cause.[

Facts of the Case:

In a news article respondent appeared to have headed a syndicate encashing THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY
SIC (376) pieces treasury warrants of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and jail personnel who were
already dead, on awol, suspended and separated from the service. President Fidel V. Ramos instructed
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government to conduct an investigation and prosecute
respondent if necessary. Acting thereon, the Secretary referred the directive to the PNP Director
General, who ordered the Criminal Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges. On the
same day, respondent was informed of the Batuigas article with the Presidents marginal note on it and
S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit. Respondent submitted his affidavit
answering point by point the charges against him. He alleged that all the cases against him were either
dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one which was pending before the
Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of seven treasury warrants. The Chief PNP ordered the
dismissal of respondent from the police service based on the following facts:

"x x x That he is in the head of the payroll syndicate; that this syndicate was responsible for the
encashing of PC/INP treasury warrants for personnel on leave, AWOL, deceased or terminated from the
police service; that the TWs were supposed to be cancelled not to be encashed x x x”

Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board but the National Appellate Board,
Second Division, rendered a decision sustaining the summary dismissal of respondent from the PNP. The
National Appellate Board denied his motion for reconsideration. Respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of
due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975.

After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of
Section 42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board for failure to
comply with the due process requirement of the Constitution. The dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Appellate Board is SET ASIDE. Let the original records
be remanded to the Chief, PNP for proper compliance with the Summary Dismissal Proceedings
provided for in NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006. In the meantime, petitioner is ordered
reinstated, entitled to payment of his salary and allowances withheld from him by reason of the
erroneous dismissal, unless he is suspended for some other lawful cause in another forum. Jurissc

Petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of
merit. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board,
National Police Commission, on the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of
the investigation of the charges filed against him.

Held:

SC regret that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the issue raised. As we held quite recently, "On
the question of due process, we find that the requirements thereof were sufficiently complied with. Due
process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."

In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him
and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against
him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him from the police service to the
National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum.

Consequently, respondent was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there
was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process.[25]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing respondent Police
Chief Inspector Leonardo W. Bernabe from the police service. No costs.

Notice of Hearing
When Required

[G.R. No. 130685. March 21, 2000]

FELIX UY et al vs COA

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners were among the more than sixty permanent employees of the Provincial Engineering Office,
Province of Agusan del Sur, who were dismissed from the service by then Governor Ceferino S. Paredes,
Jr. when the latter assumed office, allegedly to scale down the operations of the said office. A petition
for reinstatement was filed by petitioners before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) alleging
that Governor Paredes was motivated by political vengeance when he dismissed them and hired new
employees to replace them. It appears that during the pendency of the petition for reinstatement,
Governor Paredes issued Memorandum Order No. 3-A providing for the hiring of casual employees to
replace the dismissed employees, allegedly due to exigency of service.

The MSPB rendered a decision holding that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with
civil service rules and regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. While the Governor of
the Province of Agusan del Sur may take measures to retrench or reduce the work force yet this must be
done in accordance with law and rules. As the plantilla schedule for the period of January to December
1988 would show, there are 106 employees in the provincial Engineering Office and out of these, 53
employees were terminated. There is no showing that these employees were compared in terms of
relative fitness, efficiency and length of service. Thus, there is no basis in removing these employees
except for the reason of lack of funds.

Pursuant to a Motion for Clarification filed by petitioners, the MSPB issued an Order which directed the
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits
for the period that they had been out of the service until their reinstatement. The matter was thereafter
brought before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which issued an Order directing the Governor to
reinstate the employees with the caveat that should he fail to do so, the CSC would be constrained to
initiate contempt proceedings against him and other responsible officials.[5] As per its Resolution No.
94-1567, the CSC actually initiated indirect contempt proceedings against the Provincial Governor who
was by then Democrito Plaza. This prompted Governor Plaza to comply, and herein petitioners were
finally reinstated to their former positions. The Provincial Treasurer of Agusan del Sur made a partial
payment to the reinstated employees but refused to release petitioners remaining back salaries and
other monetary benefits.

The Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf of Governor Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent COA
through the Provincial Auditor, inquiring on whether or not the former Provincial Governor Ceferino S.
Paredes, Jr., who perpetrated the illegal act of dismissing the 61 PEO employees, would be personally
liable for payment of back salaries and other benefits. Respondent COA rendered its Decision No. 96-
351 holding “‘pursuant, however to CA. No. 327, as amended by PD No. 1445, the money claim should
first be brought to the Commission on Audit”. As a result, the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur,
through its Acting Provincial Treasurer, refused to release petitioners’ remaining back salaries and other
monetary benefits. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by respondent COA
hence petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari.

Issue: WON COA can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil
Service Commission; and WON Gov Paredes should be made personally liable to the backwages of the
illegally dismissed employees.

Held:

The jurisdiction of the MSPB to render said decision is unquestionable. This decision cannot be
categorized as void. Thus, we cannot allow the COA to set it aside in the exercise of its broad powers of
audit. The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Payment of backwages to
illegally dismissed government employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable.

A careful perusal of said Decision will disclose that the MSPB never made a categorical finding of fact
that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and hence, is personally liable for the payment of
petitioners’ back wages. Indeed, the MSPB even found that there was lack of funds which would have
justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural infirmities in its implementation.
If the MSPB found bad faith on the part of Governor Paredes it would have categorically decreed his
personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To be sure, even the petitioners did not
proceed from the theory that their dismissal is the personal liability of Governor Paredes. Familiar
learning is our ruling that bad faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of
proving it.

Accordingly, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process cannot be violated in proceedings
before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a
notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial
powers are not hidebound by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic
demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a
mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of
due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims
of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising
from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official
and personal capacities.

Notice and Hearing

When not Required

G.R. No. L-9430 June 29, 1957

EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. GARCIA, as Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs and left the Philippines for San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. A complaint charging the
petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary
investigation had been conducted and private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an
order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back
to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." Respondent Secretary cabled
the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to
cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer
the criminal charges against him. The Embassy was likewise directed to make representation with the
State Department that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is considered detrimental to the
best interest of this Government, that his passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not considered
under the protection of the Philippines while abroad. (Exhibit E.) However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceeding in order that the issues
raised may be judicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary
requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered and filed in the criminal case a motion praying
that the respondent Court reconsider its order. Respondent Secretary denied counsel's request, the
Court denied the motion for reconsideration Hence this petition.

Issue: WON the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport without hearing violates his constitutional right
to due process.

Held:

The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order
of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that
the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with
law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the
reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the
holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal
prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport
already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling
such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised
by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge
against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the
Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and
capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply
with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex
parte would be violative of the said clause.

Forms and Promulgation of Judgement

G.R. No. L-23545 November 7, 1979

BENITO SICHANGCO, for and in behalf of his minor children, SI BENG, SI SON and SI LUNA, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Facts of the Case:

The Bureau of Immigration recognized Benito Sichangco (Sy Te) as a Filipino citizen by birth. He was
married to Cheng Yok Ha and had 3 children—Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna—all born in China and
allegedly out of their marriage. The Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration admitted into
the Philippines these 3 minor children from Hongkong on the basis of the finding that they were children
of Sichangco, a Filipino citizen. When the decision was submitted to the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration (BCI), it “noted” the decision. The Secretary of Justice (Diokno) issued an order (Memo
Order No. 9) setting aside all decisions of the BCI, since it had not been collectively deliberating on the
cases filed before it. Thus, the BCI reversed the previous decision and ordered the exclusion from the
Philippines of the minor children. Thus, in behalf of these minors, Sichangco filed a petition for
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CFI of Manila to annul the decision of the BCI
excluding these minors from the Philippines. The CFI granted the petition.

Then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno issued Memorandum Order No. 9, wherein he found "that for
the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss
and deliberate on the cases coming before it," for which reason he set aside "all decisions purporting to
have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu propio of,
decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry," and directed the Board of Commissioners "to review in
accordance with Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of the Boards
of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give preference to all cases where entry
has been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines, following the principle
laid down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall be
upon such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion “

Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, findings were forwarded to the Commissioner of Immigration
recommending the exclusion of said minors, the revocation of the order declaring Sy Te or Benito
Sichangco a Filipino citizen, and the filing of deportation proceedings against him.

Hence, petitioner Benito Sichangco, in behalf of the minors Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna, filed a petition
for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul the
decision of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration excluding the above named minors from the
Philippines. After trial by the court a quo, reversed the decision of the previous Board of Commissioners
ruliong it illegal and null and void, and the injunction earlier issued was made permanent, with costs
against respondent Board. Respondent Board appealed.

Issue: WON the action of the Board of Commissioners in "noting" the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry on different dates was a valid decision of affirmance by the said Board of Commissioners in the
exercise of its power

Held:

The Board of Commissioners of Immigration was, and still is, under the supervision and control of the
Department of Justice. By virtue of his power of control, the Secretary of Justice can modify, nullify or
set aside the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, as well as the act of "noting" of the said decision
by the then members of the Board of Commissioners. The Department Head can even directly exercise
the powers of the chief of the bureau or office under him. Hence, then Secretary of Justice Jose W.
Diokno validly issued Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all decisions purporting to have been
rendered by the Board of Commissioners

Moreover, the individual action of the members of the previous Board of Commissioners in "noting" the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry on different dates was not a valid decision of affirmance by the
said Board of Commissioners in the exercise of its power of review motu proprio under Section 27(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940.
Respondent-appellant correctly stated that the word "noted" simply meant that the members of the
Board of Commissioners had taken cognizance of the existence of the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1, that a mere notation does not constitute an exercise of its powers of review, motu proprio
pursuant to Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended; and that a decision of the Board
of Commissioners, requires a judicious review and deliberation by said Board as a body, of the
proceedings, the evidence and the law involved, the formulation of findings of facts and conclusion of
law. Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as
a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should
deliberate collectively and in order that their views and ideas should be exchanged and examined before
reaching a conclusion. This process is of the essence of a board's action, save where otherwise provided
by law and the salutary effects of the rule would be lost were the members to act individually, without
benefit of discussion.

"The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual members
separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in session, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present." 'Where the action needed is not
of the individuals composing a board but of the official body, the members must be together and act in
their official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the board. 'Where a duty is
entrusted to a board, composed of different individuals, that board can act officially only as such, in
convened session, with the members, or a quorum thereof, present.

Hence, there was no decision rendered by the previous Board of Commissioners that could have been
reversed by the respondent Board of Commissioners, as found by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY, REVERSED, WITH COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.