6 pwup vs usec

FACTS

-The CBA between the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI and
Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU) was about to expire. Other unions were
seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting
their moves.

-Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The
consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days
after the petition.

-Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.

-Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and
Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted 35 days after the
filing of the petition. The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision.
APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the
requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book

V of the Implementing Rules, which requires that the signatures be submitted upon filing of
petition.This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter.

-PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not
require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification
election., DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and
dismissed PWUP’s appeal.

-Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement,
which was ratified by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, and subsequently registered
with the DOLE.

ISSUE/S

WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in application of Art 256 of the Labor Code

HELD

YES

-Pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and
collective bargaining, “the constant and unwavering policy of this Court” has been “to require a
certification election as the best means of ascertaining which labor organization should be the
collective bargaining representative.”

-The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers
can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the
establishment where they are working. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy
that should not be circumvented.
-In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission
of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be
strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers.
Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement.
This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom
period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, 8
subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

-It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent
signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. As long
as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not
cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose
of the Motion for Intervention is to participate in the Certification Election.

-The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions
had complied with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence,
its intervention should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of
SAMADA and PEALU.

-It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be
deemed automatically dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical
rule should be allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of the workers
in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization and collective bargaining.

-Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is
clearly shown to be imperative. Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of
the authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain
indication of the will of the workers.

-Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the
representation case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or
during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation
case. As the new CBA was entered into at the time when the representation case was still pending,
it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.

-There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of public respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because the
consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of majority
representation thus remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-quoted, we
hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding of a
certification election.

-Any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers must be resolved in favor of the
holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the
workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over substantial
justice.
7 samahan ng manggagawa vs noriel

It is quite manifest that the reliance of petitioner organization and its two officials 1 in this
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus proceeding is on the constitutional right to freedom of
association 2 as well as the constitutional mandate of protection to labor, more specifically
insofar as it assures unionization and collective bargaining. 3 The Solicitor General 4 on behalf of
respondent Director Noriel of the Bureau of Labor Relations would view the matter in a narrower
perspective. For him, what is primarily involved is the authority of such official to order the
holding of a referendum through secret ballotting to ascertain the alleged disaffiliation of the
workers from one union to join a new labor organization, that of petitioner, then still in the
process of registration. He pointed out that such a power must be conceded. The Court is of the
opinion that the inquiry into the alleged failure to respect what is ordained by the Constitution
deserves priority. In that context, the petition is impressed with merit. To put an end to a
festering labor controversy, the challenged order is set aside, its prohibition enjoined, and
mandamus is granted so that a certification election could be forthwith conducted.

According to the petition, on October 12, 1978, petitioner Jose Valenzuela filed an application
for a certificate of registration of petitioner union composed of the rank and file employees and
workers of the respondent company at its place of business in Oliveros Drive, corner of Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue. 5 There was an opposition filed on October 17, 1978 by respondent
Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization. 6 On December 22, 1978, a certificate
of registration of petitioner union was approved by the Ministry of Labor, hence it was ready for
issuance or release. 7 It came as a surprise, therefore, when petitioner Valenzuela learned on
December 26, 1978 that such issuance or release was withheld by respondent Director. 8 The
first conference was called by respondent Director on January 4, 1979.) 9 A conference was
scheduled on January 9, 1979. 10 Respondent Director then, on January 25, 1979, issued an
order for a
referendum. 11 Petitioner union filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 9, 1979, praying
among the release of the certificate of registration. 12 Respondent Director denied the motion on
May 8, 1979. 13 A complicating factor was the notice of a commencement of a strike on June 16,
1979, at respondent company's glass division by members of respondent Federation of Free
workers by virtue of a notice of strike filed on May 17, 1979 to compel the negotiation of a
collective bargaining agreement for a group of rank-and-file employees at the glass division
constituting a minority of the rank-and-file employees of the respondent company, allegedly to
the prejudice and detriment of petitioner union. 14

Private respondent Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization would justify the
order as it had a "certified collective bargaining agreement" in existence. 15 As to the facts set
forth in the petition, there was the claim that the solicitation of the signatures for disqualification
was attended by "deception, force, and intimidation." 16 It asserted, however, that the issuance
of a certificate of registration is not an absolute right and is, therefore, not mandatory being
subject to regulatory police power of the State. 17 Private respondent Union Industries Workers
Association affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers disclaimed interest in the litigation,
maintaining that it "should not be drawn into this case. It should not be included] as party
respondent [as it] is the bargaining agent by majority choice of another bargaining unit of the
company concerned (Union Industries, Inc.). On the basis of the facts, that the bargaining unit
petitioners seek to represent being different, separate and apart from the bargaining unit that
private respondent FFW has been representing, we firmly submit that the petition must
necessary fail. 18Public respondents, in the answer filed by Solicitor General Mendoza, is
equally of the view that the issuance of a certification of registration is "not an absolute right but
one which is subject to the regulatory power of the State. 19 It argued that there was no abuse of
discretion, secret ballotting being the "most efficacious and fairest mode of ascertaining the
membership of the contending unions. 20

As set forth at the outset, the petition is impressed with merit.

1. According to U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers UnionTrade Unions of the Philippines
v. Noriel: 21 "Nor is the different outcome caned for just because at the time of the challenged
order, there was as yet no registration of petitioner Union. If at all, that is a circumstance far
from flattering as far as the Bureau of Labor Relations is concerned. It must be remembered
that as admitted in the comment of respondent Director, the application for registration was filed
on July 19, 1974. The challenged order was issued seven months later. There is no allegation
that such application suffered from any infirmity. Moreover, if such were the case, the attention
of petitioner should have been caused so that it could be corrected. Only thus may the right to
association be accorded full respect. As far back as Umali v. Lovina a 1950 decision, it was held
by this Court that under appropriate circumstances, mandamus lies to compel registration. * * *
In the absence of any fatal defect to the application for registration, there is no justification for
withholding it from petitioner to enable it to exercise fully its constitutional right to freedom of
association. * * * What is decisive is that the members of petitioner Union did exercise their
fundamental right to self-organization and did win in a fair and honest election. 22 Such a
doctrine calls for application. Moreover, considering the long period that had elapsed, it would
not suffice just to compel registration. It is even more essential that thereafter a certification
election be conducted. This approach dictated by equity no less than by the authoritative
doctrines has recommended itself to the Court.

2. Respondent Director of Labor Relations, in the memorandum of authorities submitted by

Solicitor General Mendoza, objected to the characterization of his order as constituting a grave
abuse of discretion. Litex Employees Association v. Eduvela 23 can be cited in support of such a
stand. For in that case, under the facts disclosed, this Court held that the competence of
respondent Director under Article 226 of the Labor Code to order the holding of a referendum
election among the members of a labor union on the question of disaffiliation was conceded. As
stated at the beginning of this opinion, however, the right to freedom of association is a
preferred right and permits of no further denial where as is so clearly shown, because of the
intra-union rivalry, no certification election had been held for some time. To permit further delay
could, under the circumstances, defeat two of the prime objectives of the protection to labor
mandate, namely the right to self-organization and the right to collective bargaining by the union
that would emerge triumphant in a certification election.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted declaring without force and effect the challenged order as
well as the denial for the motion for reconsideration. Prohibition, therefore, lies against the
enforcement thereof. mandamus is likewise available to compel the registration and thereafter
the holding of the certification election in the appropriate bargaining unit of respondent
company. This decision is immediately executory.

Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

8 united cmc workers vs blr

The question to resolve is whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election despite: (a) the
pendency of an unfair labor practice case filed by petitioner charging respondent PAFLU as
being company-dominated; (b) the existence of a deadlock in negotiations for renewal of the
collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and the Central Textile Mills, Inc. (CENTEX,
for short); and (c) a reasonable doubt as to whether the 30% requirement for holding a
certification election has been met.
Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the incumbent collective bargaining representative
of all rank and file workers of CENTEX since 1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a legitimate labor
organization seeking representation as the bargaining agent of the rank arid file workers of
CENTEX.
On August 31, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (R4-LRD-C-8-1493-78)
(the ULP Case, for brevity) against CENTEX and PAFLU alleging that CENTEX had "helped and
cooperated in the organization of the Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing the
organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit signatures of employees of the company who are
members of the complainant union to disaffiliate from complainant union and join the
respondent PAFLU, during company time and inside the company premises on August 21, 1978
and the following days thereafter."[1]
While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU, on September 5, 1978, filed a Petition for Certification
Election (R4-LRD-M-9-432-78) (the Certification Case, for short) among the rank and file
workers of CENTEX, alleging that: 1) there has been no certification election during the 12 months
period prior to the filling of the petition; 2) the petition is supported by signatures of 603 workers,
or more than 30% of the rank and file workers of CENTEX; 3) the collective bargaining agreement
between CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978; 4) the petition is filed within the
60-day-freedom-period immediately preceeding the expiration of the CBA, and 5) there is no legal
impediment to the filing of the petition.[2]
Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 27,
1978 on the grounds that: 1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union
is a prejudicial question and bars the holding of the certification election; and 2) PAFLU failed to
comply with the 30% requirement for mandatory certification election since only 440 of the 603
are valid signatures and that 719 signatories are required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and
file workers totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU.[3]
On October 16, 1978, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations for
deadlock in the CBA negotiations with CENTEX. The parties having failed to effect a conciliation,
the Labor Minister assumed jurisdiction on November 9, 1978 in Case No. AJML-033-
78[4] (referred to hereafter as the Deadlock Case).
A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss in the Certification Case was filed by petitioner on December
7, 1978 alleging that the Labor Minister had already taken cognizance of the deadlock in the CBA
negotiations and constituted an impediment to the holding of a certification election.[5]
On December 18, 1978, in the Deadlock Case, the Deputy Minister of Labor released a Decision
directing petitioner and CENTEX to execute and sign a CBA to take effect on November 1, 1978
up to October 30, 1981 based on the guidelines enumerated therein, and to furnish the Office of
the Minister of Labor with a signed copy of the renewed agreement not later than January 31,
1979.[6]
On January 23, 1979, in the Certification Case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding
of a certification election among CENTEX rank and file workers, whereby qualified voters could
choose either PAFLU or petitioner as the collective bargaining representative or No Union at
all.[7] This was affirmed by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal, in the
challenged Resolution, dated May 25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau has discretion to order
certification election where several unions are contending for representation and when there is
doubt as to whether the 30% requirement has been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a petition
for certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in CBA negotiations must occur prior to
the petition.[8]
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of
August 20, 1979[9] , also assailed herein.
Hence, this petition, on the general proposition that public respondent has committed serious
error of law and acted with grave abuse of discretion, and that petitioner has no plain and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the conduct of the certification election, and
eventually gave the Petition due course.
The issues raised are: (1) is the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating union in the
certification election proceedings as company-dominated a prejudicial question to the conduct of
the election? (2) Does the decision in the Deadlock Case directing the parties to execute a CBA
have the effect of barring the certification election? (3) Does respondent Director have the
discretion to call for a certification election even if the 30% consent requirement is lacking?
The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which must be answered in the
affirmative. Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination
is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars proceedings for a certification election [10] , the
reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.[11] The ULP
Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was
presented on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to respondent public
official by virtue of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification
Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case vas instituted in bad faith to forestall the
Certification Case. The following ruling is thus squarely in point:
"There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith filed purposely to
forestall the certification election. So, no reason existed for the Industrial Court to depart from its
established practice of suspending the election proceeding. And this seems to be accepted rule in
the law of labor relations, the reason being, in the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, 'if there is a
union dominated by the company, to which some of the workers belong, an election among
workers and employees of the company would not reflect the sentiment and wishes of the said
workers and employees because the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be
free.' (Manila Paper Mills Employees vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10).
"And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company domination is
a pre-judicial question that until decided, shall suspend or bar proceedings for certification
election. (Standard Cigarette Workers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126).
"Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta's complaint in Case No. 255-ULP, the Workers Union should be
ordered dissolved as a company-dominated union, any election held in the meantime would be a
waste of energy and money to all parties concerned."[12]
The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further amplified as follows:
"What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of
Industrial Relations (101 Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting
to the participation in a certification election of a company-dominated union, as a result of which
a complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter
union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take place. In the
language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: 'As correctly pointed out by Judge Lanting in his
dissenting opinion on the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, a complaint for unfair
labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification election
when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being
aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is that the certification election
may lead to the selection of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees'
bargaining representative, and when the court finds that - said union is employer-dominated in
the unfair labor practice case, the union selected could be decertified and the whole election
proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.' (Ibid., 128). The next year, the same jurist
had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers Association
v. Court of Industrial Relations (104 Phil. 10[1958]), thus: 'We agree with the CIR on the reasons
given in its order that only a formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop
a certification election, the reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to
which some of the workers belong, an election among the workers and employees of the company
would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees from the
standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the members of the company dominated
union, the vote of the said members in the election would not be free. It is equally true, however,
that the opposition to the holding of a certification election due to a charge of company
domination can only be filed and maintained by the labor organization which made the charge of
company domination, because it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the
certification election, the reason being that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by
the other members controlled and dominated by the Company,' (Ibid., 15). It is easily
understandable why it should be thus. There would be an impairment of the integrity of the
collective bargaining process if a company-dominated union were allowed to participate in a
certification election. The timid, the timorous, and the faint-hearted in the ranks of labor could
easily be tempted to cast their votes in favor of the choice of management. Should it emerge
victorious, and it becomes the exclusive representative of labor at the conference table, there is a
frustration of the statutory scheme. It takes two to bargain. There would be instead a unilateral
imposition by the employer. There is need therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization
that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative is company-dominated before the
certification election."[13]
With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for by reason of a prejudicial
question, the necessity of passing upon the remaining issues is obviated.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued by public respondent affirming the
Order of the Med-Arbiter, dated January 23, 1979, calling for a certification election is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court
shall continue to be in force and effect until the status is cleared of respondent Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (July Convention) in Case No. R4-LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled
"In the Matter of Certification Election Among Rank and File Workers of Central Textile Mills,
Inc., Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner, United CMC Textile Workers Union,
Intervenor."
No costs. SO ORDERED.
9 samahan ng manggagawa sa filsystems vs sole

TOPIC
:
APPEAL;
A dismissal of a petition for certification election seasonably appealed shall stop the holding of
any certification of election, pursuant to Rule V§10, which provides that the filing of the appeal
from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election.
1.
Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU) filed a
petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of Filsystems. It submitted
the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, copies of union membership signed by 33
rank-and-file employees of the company, the Charter Certificate showing its affiliation with the
NAFLU, the list of union officers, the certification of the union secretary of the minutes of the
general membership meeting, the Books of Accounts and its CBL.
2.
Filsystems opposed the petition, questioning the status of petitioner as a legitimate labor org on
the ground of lack of proof that its contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU has been
submitted to the BLR within 30 days from its execution. Petitioner replied that as a duly
registered labor union, it has all the rights and privileges to act as representative of its members
for the purpose of collective bargaining with employers.
3.
The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election. He ruled that petitioner, as an
affiliate of NAFLU-KMU, has no legal personality on account of its failure to comply with pars
(a), (b), and (e) of Rule II sec 3 of the Implementing Rules of the LC.
4.
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the SOLE, reiterating its contention that as an independently
registered union, it has the right to file a petition for certification election regardless of its failure
to prove its affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU. Filsystems opposed the appeal.
5.
On Feb. 7, 1996, the Filsystems Workers Union (FWU) filed a PCE in the same bargaining unit,
which the Med-Arbitration – NCR Branch granted on April 19, 1996.
6.
Filsystems filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeall of petitioner as it has become moot and academic.
It invoked Rule V sec 3 of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the LC stating that “once a
union has been certified, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of
issuance of a final certification election”.
7.
In its opposition, petitioner contended its appeal is not moot as the certification election held on
April 19, 1996 was void as
a. It violated Rule V sec 10 of the Implementing Rules of the LC, which provides that the filing of
the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election.
b.The CBA executed between FWU and Filsystems could not affect its pending representation
case pursuant to Rule V sec 4 which provides that the representation case shall not be
adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during the last 60 days of the subsisting
agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.

SOLE:
Dismissed SAMAFIL’s appeal as it has been rendered MOOT by the subsequent certification of
FWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the R&F workers of respondent company
ISSUE:
Whether or not SOLE acted with GAD in holding that the pending appeal in the representation
case was rendered moot and academic by a subsequently enacted CBA in the company (YES)

Petitioner’s appeal was not rendered moot and academic by virtue of the subsequent
certification election later held on April 19, 1996. The order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing
petitioner’s petition for certification election was seasonably appealed. The appeal stopped the
holding of any certification election.

There was an unresolved representation case at the time Filsystems entered into a CBA with
FWU. Following Rule V sec 4 of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the LC, such CBA cannot
and will not prejudice petitioner’s pending representation case or ender the same moot. This
rule was applied in Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano where the Court held that
“There should be no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a certification election
at the proper time, which is 60days prior to the expiration of the life of a certified CBA x x x, not
even by a collective agreement submitted during the pendency of the representation case
10 california mfg corp vs hon usec of laber

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the (a) resolution * of the Department of Labor
and Employment dated October 16, 1990 in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled
"In Re: Petition for Certification Election Among the Supervisors of California Manufacturing
Corporation, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp. Supervisors Union
Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California Manufacturing Corporation, employer-
appellant" which denied herein petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia
Q. Ocampo dated August 22, 1990 directing the conduct of a certification election among the
supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b) the Order ** of the
same Department denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:

On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of California
Manufacturing Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW)
— California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO),
alleging inter alia, that it is a duly registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP,
while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry certificate no. 1-
AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC employs
one hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union existing in the
company; that the petition is filed in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial
member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).

In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the petition for the holding
of a certification election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five
percent (25%) of all its supervisors and that a big number of the supposed signatories to the
petition are not actually supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise, nor do they
have the powers and functions which under the law would classify them as supervisors (Annex
"D", Ibid., P. 25).

On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under the law, when
there is no existing unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the time a petition for certification
election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories does not apply; that the "organized
establishment" contemplated by law does not refer to a "company"per se but rather refers to a
"bargaining unit" which may be of different classifications in a single company; that CMC has at
least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and the rank-and-
file (organized); that the signatories to the petition have been performing supervisory functions;
that since it is CMC which promoted them to the positions, of supervisors. it is already estopped
from claiming that they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were excluded from the
coverage of the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the
contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in the "CMC Master List of Employees"
of January 2, 1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).

On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that a certification
election be conducted among the supervisory employees of California
Manufacturing Corporation within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the
usual pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics of the
election The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to the filing of the
petition shall be used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.

The choices are:

1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing

Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO); and

2. No union.

SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).

CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which, however,
affirmed the above order in its assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a
18) CMC's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in its order dated November
17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15), hence, his petition.

a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in Article 257 of the tabor
Code refers to a bargaining unit or a business establishment;

b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a supervisor's certification

election; and

c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of herein petitioner in
Parañaque and Las Piñas can be treated as a single bargaining unit.

The petition must be denied.

The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable
to unorganized labor organizations and not to establishments where there exists a certified
bargaining agent which had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989,
179 SCRA 127) (Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must
have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja G.R. No. 82260,
July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of
CMC which constitute a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have
no such agent. thus they correctly filed a petition for certification election thru union FFW-
CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's insistence on the
25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The same has been expressly deleted by
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized
establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining agents. Compliance with the said
requirement need not even be established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently
ruled that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor force
asking for a certification election had not been strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-
Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which
of the contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining agent (Atlas
Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26, 1981, 104
SCRA 565). The requirement then is relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a
certification election. In all other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this
Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for certification (National Mines
and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83
SCRA 607).

In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification election (Asian
Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174
SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer
has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor
Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter, the role of the employer in
the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander. Oft-quoted is the
pronouncement of the Court on management interference in certification elections, thus:

On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a

collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder, His
participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be
the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with purely
internal affair of labor. (Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA
64 citing Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752 July 31, 1978, 84
SCRA 469, 473).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.