1) Naval vs. CA 483 SCRA 102 a.
a. It is not disputed that the subject land belonged to Ildefonso and that it was
G.R. No. 167412 | February 22, 2006 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
1. In 1969, Ildefonso Naval sold a parcel of land located in Camarines Sur
to Galarosa. The sale was recorded in the RD pursuant to Act No. 3344,
the law governing registrations of all instruments on unregistered lands.
2. Subsequently, Galarosa sold portions of the land to respondents Balilla,
Nacion, spouses Moya, and Camalla. All buyers occupied the portion
they bought, built improvements thereon, and paid the taxes due thereto.
3. The controversy arose when petitioner Juanita Naval, the great
granddaughter of Ildefonso, was issued by the RD an OCT covering a
portion of the subject land. She claimed that she bought the subject land
from Ildefonso in 1972.
4. Petitioner Juanita filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
Aguirre, Balila, Moya, and Nacion. However, the case was dismissed
without prejudice for failure to prosecute the action for an unreasonable
length of time.
5. Almost 20 years later petitioner re-filed the complaint for recovery of
possession with damages before the MCTC, against Camalla, Balila,
Aguirre, Nacion and Moya. After trial, the MCTC rendered its decision
in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants, declaring: the plaintiff to
be the legal owner of the land, ordering defendants Camalla, Balila,
Balila, Aguirre and Nacion to vacate the property in question and to
deliver its possession to the plaintiff, and ordering Moya to vacate the
land occupied by her and to relinquish its possession to the plaintiff;
6. Aggrieved, respondents appealed the decision to the RTC of Naga City,
which affirmed in toto the assailed decision. Respondents thereafter
elevated the case to the CA. Finding the prior registration of the deed of
sale between Ildefonso and Galaura with the RD as a constructive notice
to subsequent buyers, the appellate court reversed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Who has the superior right to a parcel of land sold to different buyers
at different times by its former owner?
RULING AND RATIO: RESPONDENTS
The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA and the denial of the motion
for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
not registered under the Torrens System when it was sold to Gregorio in 1969
and to the petitioner in 1972. Further, the deed of sale between Ildefonso and
Gregorio was registered with the RD of Camarines Sur pursuant to Act No.
3344.
In holding that respondents have a better right to possess the subject land in
view of the bona fide registration of the sale with the RD of Camarines Sur
by Ildefonso and Gregorio, the CA applied Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
While we agree with the appellate court that respondents have superior right
over the petitioner on the subject property, we find Article 1544 inapplicable
to the case at bar since the subject land was unregistered at the time of the
first sale. The registration contemplated under this provision has been held to
refer to registration under the Torrens System, which considers the act of
registration as the operative act that binds the land. Thus, in Carumba v. Court
of Appeals, we held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to
land not registered under Torrens System.
The law applicable therefore is Act No. 3344, which provides for the
registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish
Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System. Under this law, registration by the
first buyer is constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right
as such buyer in good faith; it binds third person who may subsequently deal
with the same property.
b. Even if petitioner argues that she purchased and registered the subject land
in good faith and without knowledge of any adverse claim thereto,
respondents still have superior right over the disputed property. We held in
Rayos v. Reyes32 that:
“[T]he issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where the
subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same
from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean x x x in such case
the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected
if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.” Since the properties in question
are unregistered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers thereof did so at their
peril. Their claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e., without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not
protect them if it turns out, as it actually did in this case, that their seller did
not own the property at the time of the sale.
c. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly held that an action for reconveyance
nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or does not prescribe when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller reconveyed, as in this case. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
can transfer legally. In the case at bar, since Ildefonso no longer owned the possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until
subject land at the time of the sale to the petitioner, he had nothing to sell and his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
the latter did not acquire any right to it. vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
d. Even if we apply Article 1544, the facts would nonetheless show that ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest registered first the source of its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
their ownership and possession, i.e., the 1969 deed of sale, and possessed the possession.
subject land at the earliest time. Applying the doctrine of “priority in time,
priority in rights” or “prius tempore, potior jure,” respondents are entitled to We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek
the ownership and possession of the subject land. its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only
from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his
e. True, Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that “[u]pon the own, and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences
expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the to run against such possessor.
certificate of title shall become incontrovertible.” However, it does not
deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. What cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title or ownership which is
represented by such certificate. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not
operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land. Registration of a piece
of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence
of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot
be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons
not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person
by the registered owner.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the indefeasibility
of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey
the registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that
reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of
the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration
is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a
better right.
2) Republic vs. Munoz
G.R. No. 151910 | October 15, 2007 | Azcuna J.
FACTS:
1. On June 14, 1996, Munoz filed an application for registration of title of
a parcel of residential land before the RTC of Albay. Munoz alledgedly
acquired the property through donation from her parents, and his parents
and predecessors in interest have been in possession of the property since
time immemorial for more than 70 years. The residential lot originally
owned and possessed by Paulino Pulvinar and Geronimo Lozada, who
subsequently both sold their share of unregistered land to the parents of
Munoz.
2. The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG opposed the
application, among his contentions were that muniments of title, tax
payments and receipts of applications do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition.and that the parcel applied
for is part of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation.
3. The Regional Trial Court rendered decision in favour of Munoz, noting
that the a report submitted by the Director of Lands, that as per records
of the Land Management Bureau in Manila the subject property is
covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero,
mother of Munoz. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the failure to present the original tracing cloth plan
is fatal omission which necessarily affected the trial court’s
jurisdiction.
2) Whether or not in proving the alienable and disposable nature of the
property there has to be a certification from the DENR and
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office.
RULING AND RATIO:
As to the first issue, it bears stressing that the constructive
seizure of land accomplished by posting of notices and processes upon all
persons mentioned in notices by means of publication and sending copies
to said persons by registered mail in effect gives the court jurisdiction
over the lands sought to be registered. It is true that the best evidence to
identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing
cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, in this case however, the
presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with
since the blue print copy of the survey plan approved by the Bureau of
Lands and the technical descriptions duly verified and approved by the
Director of lands were presented and provide sufficient identification.
As to the second issue, the CA ruled that Munoz need not adduce
documentary proofs for the property to be declared alienable and
disposable because of the fact that it had once been covered by Free
Patent application in the name of the mother of Munoz, which was
unfortunately not acted upon by the proper authorities. This court
however cannot sustain this argument. As well settled in jurisprudence,
it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should
show a positive act of the government such as presidential proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigations, legislative act or a statue or certification from
the government that the land applied for is alienable and disposable
which the respondent failed to secure. The court cannot approve the
application for registration due to failure to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
3) Vda. De Melencion vs. CA and Znar Brothers Realty Company
G.R. No. 148846 | September 25, 2007 | Nachura J.
FACTS:
1) The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land particularly
denominated as Lot No. 3368, located at Suba-basbas, Marigondon,
Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of 30,777 square meters
covered by TCT No. 20626 in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim
Chuan.
2) The entire property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who
had only one child, Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the late
Leoncia Amodia and petitioners Amodias. The entire property was
brought under the operation of the Torrens System. However, the title
thereto was lost during the Second World War.
3) On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale whereby they extra-
judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed the
subject property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company for a
consideration of P10,200.00. On August 10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under
Act 3344 as there was no title on file at the Register of Deeds of Lapiu-
Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made some improvements and
constructed a beach house theron.
4) On February 18, 1989, petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale, conveying the subject property in favor
of Go Kim Chuan for and in consideration of P70,000.00. Aznar then
filed a case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for
Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 20626 alleging that the
sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid second sale.
crucial to relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be reasonably and liberally
construed to avoid a patent denial of substantial justice, because it cannot be
denied, that the ends of justice are better served when cases are determined
on the merits- after all parties are given full opportunity to ventile their causes
and defenses – rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification
against forum shopping. The general rule is that the certification must be
signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to
the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions merely underscored its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid certification and verification by only one of

the plaintiffs?

RULING AND RATIO: Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of
Iglesia ni Cristo, 505 SCRA 828, that Commonality of interest is material and

4) Ong vs. Republic 548 SCRA 160
G.R. No. 175746 | March 12, 2008 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
July 1, 1999 – petitioner Charles Ong, in behalf of his brothers, filed for an
application of Registration of Title over Lot 15911.
 Ong alleged that his brothers and him are the co-owners of the land,
which they purchase from the spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia
Villamil.
 And they and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and peaceful possession of the lot in the concept of
owners for more than 30 years.
Only respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG,
opposed the application for registration.
Respondent contends that:
 Neither the applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The trial court favored Petitioner Ong and declared the land in the name of
the applicant. Respondent appealed before the Court of Appeals and the
appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, together with his brothers, have registrable
ownership over the real property subject matter?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held in this case that although there is no question that
the land is alienable and disposable. Possession alone is not sufficient to
acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended,
provides —
SEC. 14. Who may apply? –The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from
spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers
actually occupied the subject lot. No improvements were made thereon and
the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must
show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession
and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.
Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this nature.
The Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial court
and in denying his application for registration of title over the subject lot.
5) De Guzman vs. Agbagala
G.R. No. 163566 | February 19, 2008 | Corona, J.
6) Aniceto Bangis, substituted by his heirs, namely Rodolfo B. Bangis, et The transaction was one of Mortgage, not Antichresis. For the
al. vs. Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo, namely: Luz A. Banniester, et contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires
al. that:
G.R. No. 190875 | June 13, 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe
“Article 2134. The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be
specified in writing; otherwise, the contract of antichresis shall be void.”
FACTS:
In this case, the heirs of Adolfo were indisputably unable to produce
1. Serafin Adolfo, Sr. allegedly mortgaged a land he owned for the sum of any document in support of their claim that the contract between Adolfo and
Php 12,500.00 to herein Private Respondent Ancieto Bangis, who Bangis was an antichresis.
immediately took possession of the land. The said transaction was,
however, not reduced into writing. The Supreme Court held that the possession of the subject land by
2. When Serafin, Sr. died, his heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Bangis is for the security of Adolfo’s obligation to return the money he
Partition covering the same subject property and a Torrens Certificate of loaned.
Title was issued to them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on
3. In June 1998, the Heirs of Adolfo expressed their intention to redeem the
certiorari is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated March 30, 2009 of the
mortgaged property from Bangis but the latter refused, claiming that the
Court of Appeals Mindanao Station (CA) and its Resolution dated December
transaction between him and Adolfo was one of SALE.
2, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00722-MIN are AFFIRMED with
4. During the conciliation meetings in the barangay, Bangis showed them
MODIFICATION: (1) cancelling TCT No. T-10567; and (2) ordering
a copy of a deed of sale and a certificate of title of the disputed lot.
respondent Heirs of Adolfo to pay petitioner Heirs of Bangis the sum of
5. The Heirs of Adolfo filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
P12,500.00 with legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from March 30,
for annulment of the deed of sale and declaration of the purported
2009 until the finality of this Decision and thereafter, 12% annual interest
contract of sale as antichresis.
until its full satisfaction.
6. The Trial Court declared the contract between the petitioners and
respondents as a mere mortgage or antichresis and since the respondents
have been in the possession of the property in 1975 up to the present time
enjoying all its fruits or income, the mortgaged loan of Php 12,500.00 is
deemed fully paid. Aggrieved, the Heirs of Bangis appealed the decision.
7. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC in ruling that the contract
between the parties was a mortgage, not a sale. It noted that while Bangis
was given the possession of the subject property, the certificate of title
remained in the custody of Adolfo and was never cancelled.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transaction between Bangis and Adolfo was one
of antichresis?

RULING AND RATIO:

7) Heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr., etc. vs. Sps. Simon D. Encinas and
Esperanza E. Encinas
G.R. No. 182716 | June 20, 2012 |
8) Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio
Santos, Jr. G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012
9) Heirs of Alejandra Delfin, namely, Leopoldo Delfin, et al. v.
Avelina Rabadon, G.R. No. 165014, July 31, 2013
10) Republic of the Philippines v. Ricordito N. De Asis, Jr., G.R. No.
193874, July 24, 2013.
11) Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc., represented by its
Incumbent President Greg Seriego v. Bases Conversion
Development Authority, G.R. No.192896, July 24, 2013
12) Sps. Cusi vs. Domingo; de Vera vs. Domingo and Sps. Sy; G.R.
NO. 195825 & G.R. NO. 195871, Feb. 27, 2013
13) In First Gas Power Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines,
Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, G.R. No.
169461, September 2, 2013
14) Crisanta Guido-Enriquez v. Alicia I. Victorino, et al., G.R. No.
180427, September 30, 2013
15) Sps. Bernadette and Rodulfo Vilbar v. Angelito L. Opinion, G.R.
No. 176043. January 15, 2014
16) Francisco Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank, now known as Banco De Oro
Unibank, Inc., G.R. No. 183918. January 15, 2014
17) The Heirs of Victorino Sarili, namely, Isabel A. Sarili, et al. v.
Pedro F. Lagrosa, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Lourdes Labios Mojica, G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014
18) Republic of the Philippines-Bureau of Forest Development v.
Vicente Roxas, et al./Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Vicente Roxas,
et al., G.R. Nos. 157988/160640, December 11, 2013
19) Laura F. Paraguya v. Sps. Alma Escurel-Crucillo and Emeterio
Crucillo and the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, G.R. No. 200265,
December 2, 2013
20) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Cresencia Sta. Teresa
Ramos, assisted by her husband, Ponciano Francisco, G.R. No.
179181, November 18, 2013.