ROGELIO P.
MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on
accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan
[1]
City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. We nullify the proceedings
in the court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant
Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder for
the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ,
being then armed with a butchers knife, with intent to kill one
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy
place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter
by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said
weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to
Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab
Wound as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued
by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to
the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other
consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
[2]
Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994.
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellants counsel,
the Public Attorneys Office, filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital. It was alleged that accused-appellant could not
properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from
a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was
confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in
Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and
[3]
the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital.
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial
court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused-
appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered
[4]
by him intelligently, the court denied the motion that same day.
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by
[5]
the court on accused-appellants behalf.
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr.
Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who
issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim;
(2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1
Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended
accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victims
sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral,
Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being performed
by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of
Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand
people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went
down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front
rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the
crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar. He
stopped beside the Bishops chair, turned around and, in full view of
the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishops chair. The man was
accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy
at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached accused- reported the following findings:
appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishops chair. Gripping
the chairs armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: No EXTERNAL FINDINGS
matter what will happen, I will not move out! Hearing this, Santillan
[6]
moved away.
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security
intercostal space, left, 1 x 1 penetrating. The edge of
guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant and one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
told him to vacate the Bishops chair. Accused-appellant stared
intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to 2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, x
tap accused-appellants hand on the armrest. Appellant did not x . The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and
budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latters hand. Still no pointed.
reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly accused-
appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed INTERNAL FINDINGS
him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant
went over the victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac parried
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper
his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up,
and lower lobe of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was
went to the microphone and shouted: Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one [10]
severely cut.
can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishops chair and sat on it
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave
again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself
[7] of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He claimed that the
down the altar.
prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic
no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there
outside, received a report of a commotion inside the
was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-
cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man,
appellants hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did
accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one
not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he
hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused- [11]
was of unsound mind.
appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant
The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public
obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon,
prosecutor. He alleged that the accused pretended to be weak, tame
Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City,
and of unsound mind; that after he made the first stab, he furiously
who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near
continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off
accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant
undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious
embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each
ceremony was being conducted; and the plea of unsound mind had
other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-
already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of January 6,
appellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant, they [12]
[8] 1995.
found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist. He was brought
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F.
to the police station and placed in jail.
Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the
Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was
hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of
confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital
cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab
[9] to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to
wound. He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one
some other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not
comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual
behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and
[13]
see his family.
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment
to the jail wardens letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of
accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless
a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should
proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to
[14]
determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not.
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the
[15]
Demurrer to Evidence. Accused-appellant moved
reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26,
1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine
Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.
Appellants counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had
been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would
shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates
and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that
his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for
fear of being attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they
were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste
matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic
among the inmates. Appellants counsel prayed that his client be
confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the
[16]
Baguio General Hospital. Attached to the motion were two (2)
letters.One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito
Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge
informing him of appellants irrational behavior and seeking the
issuance of a court order for the immediate psychiatric and mental
[17]
examination of accused-appellant. The second letter, dated
February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the
Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the
Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president, secretary and
adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of appellants
unusual behavior and requested that immediate action be taken
[18]
against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail.
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the
order denying the Demurrer to Evidence. The court ordered
[19]
accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996.
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his
[20]
counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a
resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio
General Hospital, and accused-appellants medical and clinical
[21]
records at the said hospital. Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant
had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February
22, 1993 and that he suffered from Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid
[22]
type; and after four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged in
[23]
improved physical and mental condition. The medical and clinical
for records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy,
Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del
Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and
[24]
treatment after a relapse of his violent behavior; (2) the clinical
[25]
cover sheet of appellant at the BGH; (3) the consent slip of
[26]
appellants wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; (4) the
[27]
Patients Record; (5) the Consent for Discharge signed by
[28]
appellants wife; (6) the Summary and Discharges of
[29] [30]
appellant; (7) appellants clinical case history; (8) the admitting
[31] [32]
notes; (9) Physicians Order Form; (10) the Treatment Form/
[33] [34]
medication sheet; and (11) Nurses Notes.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld
the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the
crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not
offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P50,000.00.
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing
actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
[35]
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
STABBING TO DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED
WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY,
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA
OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING
[36]
CIRCUMSTANCE.
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally
[37]
liable for a felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on
which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is
[38]
human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an
[39]
absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he
commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is
[40]
presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom,
[41]
intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
[42]
unimpaired.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that
[43]
every person is of sound mind and that all acts are
[44]
voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our law is that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a
[45]
person. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other
factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from
[46]
criminal liability.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has
acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act
which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order
his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established
for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has
acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused
insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted
but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for
treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of
the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a
verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental
institution.
[47]
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of
[48]
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused
must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal
[49]
intent. He must be deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
[50]
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes
insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and
[51]
positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the
time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.
[52]
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a
[53]
reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony
[54]
is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential
[55]
to establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear
and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be
known by overt acts. A persons thoughts, motives, and emotions
may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these
[56]
conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant
was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence
of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the
probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From
[57]
the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan attached to the Information, there
are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on
notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his
mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for
a sane person to go up to the altar and sit on the Bishops chair while
the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to
children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and
ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from
the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental
rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did
not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly
approached the microphone and, over the public address system,
uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have
made. He then returned to the Bishops chair and sat there as if
nothing happened.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the
courts attention on the day of the arraignment. Counsel for accused-
appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground
that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to
his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be
suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case,
the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time
thereof he appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
of such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these
circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order
the mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be
necessary for examination, order such confinement and examination.
If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the
time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, the process is itself a felo de se, for he can
neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an
[58]
intelligent plea thereto.
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the
[59]
discretion of the trial court. And the test to determine whether the
proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether
the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair
trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the
proceedings against an accused person on the ground of present
insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of
the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such
suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the
accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the
law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a system of
procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel,
it is not necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England
[60]
where the accused had no advocate but himself. In the American
jurisdiction, the issue of the accuseds present insanity or insanity at
the time of the court proceedings is separate and distinct from his
criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the act. The
defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendants mental
condition at the time of the crimes commission. Present insanity is
[61]
commonly referred to as competency to stand trial and relates to
the appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of
the defendants present inability to participate meaningfully and
[62]
effectively. In competency cases, the accused may have been
sane or insane during the commission of the offense which relates to
a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to
stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be
found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it
[63]
merely postpones the trial.
In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is
whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, understand
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his
defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with,
and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be
[64]
interposed. This test is prescribed by state law but it exists
generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common
[65]
law. Thus:
[I]t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant [is]
oriented to time and place, and [has] some recollection of events, but
that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual
[66]
understanding of the proceedings against him.
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1)
whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel
with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and
[67]
his relation to it. The first requisite is the relation between the
defendant and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to
confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the
defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a
[68]
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings.
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the
[69]
protection of the accused, rather than of the public. It has been
held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God
[70]
to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a
[71]
violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of
[72]
law; and this has several reasons underlying it. For one, the
[73]
accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent
defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not
appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence.
Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights
afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively
consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the
right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for
the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the
proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions
in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected
to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of
the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is
likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may
destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains
passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the
functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially
an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and
intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a
reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and
becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is
important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a
comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding
of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not realize the
moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of
institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the
state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its
[74]
significance.
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should
[75]
be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. Mere
allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or
[76]
circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt or a bona fide
[77]
doubt as to defendants competence to stand trial. Among the
factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendants irrational
behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities,
previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the
defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the
[78]
issue of competency in a particular case.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental
condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the
questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by
him. The court declared::
xxx
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding
Judge asked questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered
intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he
answered, in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the
questions asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
[79]
SO ORDERED.
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions
asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was
competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section
12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that effectively
renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. It is not clear whether accused-
appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand the charge
against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made
intelligently. The plea of not guilty was not made by accused-
[80]
appellant but by the trial court because of his refusal to plead.
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of
accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized
knowledge of determining the state of a persons mental health. To
determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the
court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the
examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latters
history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in
the judges mind of accused-appellants competency to stand trial,
subsequent events should have done so. One month after the
prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote
the trial judge informing him of accused-appellants unusual behavior
and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine
whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some other
institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-
appellants counsel filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical,
Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Attached to this motion was a
second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied
by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway
[81]
Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters, the
judge ignored the Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental
and Psychiatric Examination. The records are barren of any order
disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered
[82]
accused-appellant to present his evidence.
Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e.,
schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a lifetime illness and that this
[83]
requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. After
accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never
[84]
returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up.
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel
manifested that accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify in
[85]
his own behalf because he was suffering from mental illness. This
manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after
the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the
trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-
appellants state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal
assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-
appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found
appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
[86]
speaks of a mental examination. The human mind is an entity, and
understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to
a large degree upon emotional and psychological
[87]
appreciation. Thus, an intelligent determination of an accuseds
capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and
more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen
can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical
or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of
incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time, the
accuseds abilities may be measured against the specific demands a
[88]
trial will make upon him.
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly
[89]
and properly made, it may have served a dual purpose by
determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the
time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and
clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of
the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the
[90]
accused. The crime in the instant case was committed way back in
December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a
medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate
appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission for
him to avail of the exempting circumstance of
 [91]
insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-
appellants competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to
enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court
effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial courts
negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process;
and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be
[92]
nullified. In People v. Serafica, we ordered that the joint decision
of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a
quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two
(2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered
a plea of guilty to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We
found that the accuseds plea was not an unconditional admission of
guilt because he was not in full possession of his mental faculties
when he killed the victim; and thereby ordered that he be subjected
to the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of
[93]
insanity at the time of commission of the crime.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D
convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to
death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-67766 August 14, 1985
ISIDRO T. HILDAWA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE; CHIEF
OF STAFF, GEN. FABIAN C. VER AND GEN. PROSPERO
OLIVAS, CHIEF, THE PC METROCOM & METROPOLITAN
POLICE FORCE, respondents.
G.R. No. 70881 August 14, 1985
RICARDO C. VALMONTE, petitioner,
vs.
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE AND BRIG. GEN. NARCISO
CABRERA, respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte in these
Special Civil Actions for "Declaration of Nullity of
Executive/Administrative Order Creating Secret Marshals with
Prayer for Restraining Order" and for "Certiorari/Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order," pray that a "preliminary
injunction issue directing respondents to recall the crimebusters
and restraining them from fielding police teams or any of this sort
with authority/license to kill and after hearing, declaring the order
of respondents fielding crimebusters null and void and making the
injunction permanent." They alleged that the formation and
fielding of secret marshalsand/or crimebusters with absolute
authority to kill thieves, holduppers, robbers, pickpockets and
slashers are violative of the provisions of the New Constitution, to
wit:
a. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law nor shall any
persons be denied the equal protection of the
laws. (Constitution, Article IV, Section 1)
b. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law. (Id., Section
17)
c. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trail may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified. (Id., Section 19)
d. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No forced, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence. (Id., Section 20)
 e. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel
or unusual punishment inflicted. (Id., Section 21)
f. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in-
xxxxxxxxx
(d) all criminals cases in which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment. ...
(Id., Section 5)
In their comment, respondents denied the existence of an
executive or administrative order authorizing secret marshals or
crimebusters to shoot and disable suspected criminals. They are
subject to the same law as other peace officers. They do not
enjoy any more immunity than are enjoyed by all law enforcement
officials. The formation and fielding of these special operation
teams in Metro Manila, or the crimebusters as they are now
known "was impelled by the proliferation of robbery/holdups and
other crimes against passengers of public conveyance." (p. 4,
Respondents' Comment in G.R. No. 70881)
Petitioner failed to present copies of the alleged executive or
administrative order. They even admitted in Court that they have
not seen, much less, read one.
There is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of special
operation teams to counter the resurgence of criminality, as there
is nothing wrong in the formation by the police of special
teams/squads to prevent the proliferation of vices, prostitution,
drug addiction, pornography and the like. That is the basic job of
the police. It is the alleged use of violence in the implementation
of the objectives of the special squads that the court is concerned
about. They have the support, commendation and applause of
the people when they, apprehend violators of the law to be
brought to the courts of justice for their prosecution and
punishment it found guilty. What is bad is if kill these "criminals"
because then they are not only law enforcers but also the
prosecutors. the judges and the executioners. For, if in
maintaining peace and order, the peace of becomes the person
to be feared the citizen will find himself between the criminal and
the lawless public official. Violence does not find support in a
democratic society where the rule of law prevails. It is our way of
life that a man is entitled to due process which simply means that
before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he must
be given an opportunity to defend himself. Due process of law
requires that the accused must be heard in court of competent
jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly process of law,
and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to
him. with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of a constitutional law. (Ong Chang Wing vs.
U.S., 40 Phil. 1049)
Thus, when a person is killed by another the burden of proving
self-defense is on the assailant. It becomes his duty to establish
this justifying circumstance by evidence clear and convincing. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence. It matters not that
the People's evidence is weak. He must show that (1) he is not
the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on his part; and, (3) he employed reasonable means
to prevent or repel the aggression.
Considering the allegations of the petition as well as the comment
of the respondents and after hearing the parties, We repeat that it
is lawful on the part of respondents to form special operation
teams of whatever name they may be called to combat the
upsurge of crimes against passengers of public utility vehicles.
What is disagreeable and cannot be tolerated, for it is uncivilized,
is the license to kill because it is violative of our fundamental law
and the universal human right. In fact, "no violence or
unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest, and the
person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint that is
necessary for his detention (Section 2, par. 2, Rule113 of the
Rules of Court)."
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, in his
COMPLIANCE to the resolution of this Court, dated June 11,
1985, requiring him "to submit the data and updated report(s)
conducted thereon by the authorities relative to the killing of the
victims by the 'Secret Marshals' or 'Crime Busters' operations,"
reports that from May 4, 1985 to May 9, 1985, fifteen (15) alleged
holduppers were killed by Policemen; that the cases against the
latter have been filed with the Judge Advocate General's Office
(JAGO); and, that in the meantime, the said policemen involved
have been ordered released.
In this connection, whenever a person suspected of a crime is
killed under the circumstances alleged during the hearing, the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) should investigate to
find out who the assailant was and the reason for the death of the
victim. It need not wait for a formal complaint to be lodged by the
relatives of the deceased. In fact, the alleged killings by the
special operation teams (popularly known as crimebusters) as
reported in the dailies should be looked into for determination of
the truth of the reports and for proper action. Once the Identity of
the killer(s) has been established and the latter having admitted
that he is the author of the death of the deceased, the
investigating officer should file a case in the proper court or
tribunal which will determine whether or not the killing was made
in self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of stranger or in the
fulfillment of a duty.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are directed to exercise strict
supervision and control over these special operation teams,
formed to conduct a concentrated campaign against criminal
elements preying on passengers of jeepneys, buses, taxis and all
other forms of public conveyance and, members of these special
teams are ordered that in making arrests they should not use
unnecessary force, should comply strictly with the law, and
accord to the suspects all their constitutional rights.
Further, should death or injury result from the apprehension of the
suspected criminal(s), respondents are hereby enjoined to
immediately report the matter to their superior officers and the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for investigation and
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, C.J., concurring.
Since it is not established that the respondents have authorized
the killing of criminals in violation of their constitutional rights, they
should be merely reminded, not directed, to always respect the
constitutional rights of criminals.
AQUINO, J., dissenting
I dissent. In the Valmonte case, the petitioner has no cause of
action for certiorari and prohibition.
In the Hildawa case this Court has no jurisdiction over the petition
for "declaration of nullity of executive/administrative order
creating secret marshals."
These two cases should have been DISSMISSED OUT-RIGHT.
Petitioner' remedy is in other forums.
GUTIERREZ, JR. J., concurring
I am in full concurrence with the Court's decision penned by my
disguished colleague, Justice Lorenzo Relova, whose concern for
human rights is not only deep and abiding but is also a matter of
public knowledge in legal circles.
The organization of special police teams to combat resurgent
forms criminality is valid, proper, and necessary. Considering the
wide publicity given by media to victims of apparent "salvaging,"
there is also a need to always remind police and military officers,
whatever their assignments, to sculpulously respect the
constitutional and statutory rights of apprehended criminals,
never to take the law into their own hands. No matter how
reprehensible a criminal's acts may be, he is still entitled to due
process and to the constitutional protection accorded to all
citizens. In the process of curbing criminality, the police and the
military should not themselves descend to acts of criminality.
I am writing this separate opinion only to emphasize that there is
no evidence whatsoever that the special teams have been given
orders to liquidate robbers, hold-uppers and the like. On the
contrary, General Narciso Cabrera has strongly cautioned his
men to respect the rights of criminal elements they may
encounter or apprehend. If the members of the special teams or
the "crimebusters" commit lawless acts., they do so against the
orders of the respondents and should be prosecuted for their
acts. The Compliance filed by the Solicitor General of July 23,
1985 shows that even in specific cases where the policemen
claimed to have been shot at or attacked by hold-uppers and
criminal elements, the incidents were still ordered fully
investigated. I agree that in such cases an investigation by
officers other than the police themselves is more appropriate.
In truth, the vicous nature of some killings described in the
affidavits submitted by the petitioners is such that it should not be
attributed to special operations team who are fielded on a regular
or indifferent basis and who have absolutely no Idea whom they
may encounter in the course of their assignments. Assuming that
these police teams immediately shoot robbers and holduppers
caught in flagrante, the killing would not be characterized by
torture or barbaric brutality. Whoever kills with vicous brutality
does so with vengeance in mind, not because he is assigned to a
special operations teams. To me, it is apperent that lawless
persons, be they police or criminal elements, are passing on their
savage acts as having been perpetrated by special teams of
crimbusters. This is most unfair and fraught with undesirable
consequences.
The problems of criminality in Manila and other urban centers are
herculean in their formidability. Not only have criminality elements
been drawn like flies to the metropolis, but the police have been
hampered in their work by lack of logistic and incentives. The job
of the police is difficult enough without our doing or stating
anything that may tend to lower their morale. The Manila Police
Department has a well earned tradition of excellence and
discipline. It sets the pace for police forces all over the country.
Dedicated officers have headed the Department, now Western
Police District, Commanders of others districts have been drawn
from its ranks. The present commander, respondent Brigidier
General Narciso Cabrera, is a quietly competent gentlemen who
maintains the honorable traditions of his predecessors.
Even as we call for the investigation and prosecution of those
responsible for the vicous killings mentioned by the petitioners,
we should set the record straight and at the same time commend
the majority of police officers who perform their tasks faithfully
and who are as appalled as anybody by any indiscriminate and
lawless acts of violence. A few bad eggs in the police force or
worse, non-police or civilian criminals taking advantage of the
situation should not diminish the people's respect for Manila's
Finest as an institution.
TEEHANKEE, J.,
The Court's opinion penned by Mr. Justice Relova recognizes
that "there is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of
special operation teams to counter the resurgence of criminality"
but stresses that "what is bad is if they kill these 'criminals'
because then they are not only law enforcers but also the
witnesses, 1 the prosecutors, the judges and the executioners.
For, if in maintaining peace and order, the peace officer becomes
the person to be feared the citizen will find himself between the
criminal and the lawless public official. Violence does not find
support in a democratic society where the rule of law prevails. It is
our way of life that a man is entitled to due process which simply
means that before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or
property, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself." 2
After taking note of respondents' comment denying that the
secret marshals formed by the Police in Metro Manila (and
renamed as "crimebusters" this year) were given a license to kill
or enjoy any more immunity than other law enforcement officials,
but that their fielding "was impelled by the proliferation of
robbery/holdups and other crimes against passengers of public
conveyances," 3 the Court's judgment likewise lays down specific
injunctions and norms of conduct and procedure in the event of
any killings by these teams of secret marshals or "crimbusters,"
which may be succinctly summarized as follows: 4
1. ... the respondents are directed to exercise
strict supervision and control over these special
operation teams ... and, members of these special
teams are ordered that in making arrests they
should not use unnecessary force, should comply
strictly with the law, and accord to the suspects all
their constitutional rights;
2. Whenever there is killing or infliction of injury by
such secret marshals or "crimebusters",
"respondents are hereby enjoined to immediately
report the matter to their superior officers and the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for
investigation and appropriate action;
3. The National Police Commission as the entity
charged with direct authority over the members of
the Integrated National Police should forthwith
"investigate to find out who the assailant was and
the reason for the death of the victim. It need not
wait for a formal complaint to be lodged by the
relatives of the deceased;" and
4. Once the Identity of the killer(s) has been
established and the latter having admitted that he
is the author of the death of the deceased, the
investigating officer should file a case in the
proper court or tribunal which will determine
whether or not the killing was made in self-
defense, defense of relatives, defense of stranger
or in the fulfillment of a duty," bearing in mind that
"when a person is killed by another, the burden of
proving self-defense or some other justification
lies on the assailant.
I fully concur with the Court's above remedial measures ordering
the secret marshals or "crimebusters" to accord due process and
respect for the constitutional rights of suspects and discharge in
court the burden of proving the justification for taking their lives.
These are preventive and deterrent measures which normally
should suffice to curtail the substantive evils sought to be curbed.
But given the background facts and the environmental
circumstances as herein set forth, I would further grant the
petition for the disbanding of the secret marshals by whatever
name they may be called.
As stated in the Court's judgment, these "special operation teams
(were) formed to conduct a concentrated campaign against
criminal elements preying on passengers of jeepneys, buses,
taxis and all other form of public conveyance." The reactivation of
the marshals was admittedly upon mere verbal orders of the
President "to intensify the drive against roberry-holdups." 5 But
there was over-reaction far beyond the pale of the law and the
Constitution. Then Major Genral Prospero Olivas, Chief of the PC
Metrocom and the Metropolitan Police Force pursuant thereto
fielded 760 " secret marshals" in Metro Manila as designated
over-all commander, among them: "The 160 INP field force
members were assigned to protect bus passengers in the 13
principal bus routes in Metro Manila. Trained in ranger tactics and
jungle warfare, they will be in uniform with their nameplates, and
will be adequate armed." 6Troops trained in "ranger tactics and
jungle warfare" have no place in the urban centers and should not
be utilized in plain police action involving tens of thousand of daily
commuters and students ( on whose behalf petitioners have filed
the present action, including themselves and their families, fearful
or "exposing themselves to the risk and danger of encountering
secret marshals or be caught in the crossfire" 7). The cure is thus
worse than the ailment. The only logical way to counter the
greater danger thus created for the innocent populace is to
dismmantle and outlaw the existence of such a dangerous strike
force, whome they cannot distinguish from the criminal elements
themselves. The record, too, of 160 lives of alleged holdup men
killed is far too costly and reflects an apparent wanton disregardd
for the sanctity of human life: "RECORD. The secret marshals
were first organized on August 8, 1982. During their activation up
to May 31, 1984 the force reportedly had killed 106 holdup men
and arrested 128 others." 8 In a number of these reported cases,
it readily appears that the means used to apprehend the suspects
cannot be justified: instead of merely disabling the suspects, the
marshals had no compunction about shooting them fatally in the
head and other vital parts of the body. A striking instance of the
low regard for human life is the recent case of Juan P,
Anunciacion, 26, a detainee at the Quezon City jail facing
carnapping charges, who was "so depressed over his life inside
the jail" and over his failure to raise bail. He was shot dead in the
head by his police escort, as he allegedly tried to escape on his
way to attend a court hearing. According to the press report,
"(P)robers recovered from Anunciacion's body two letters, one
coming from his wife, Rosy and another to his mother which
implied that he was intending to escape or commit suicide." The
police cynically concluded that the suspectfatality "had intended
to commit 'suicide by escaping from his escort.' " 9 As the writer
stressed at the hearing of these cases in relation to respondents'
remark on the perversity of the criminals nowadays: "In a
democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we
stoop to what they do, then we're no better than they. . . there
would be no difference."
Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte, and
former Senator Ambrocio Padilla and Atty. Emmanuel Mendoza,
as collaborating counsels, all members of the Philippine Bar. are
to be commended for their civic-minded initiative and concern for
basic constitutional values and the primacy of human rights over
property rights in filing the petitions at bar. The Supreme Court
stands as the guarantor of the constitutional and human rights of
all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic role
under the Constitution that these rights be respected and
enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as
contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a
person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second
even if he is caught in flagrante delicto-unless it was called for as
an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means
to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased. 9-a
Ever since the metropolitan newspapers reported in 1978
incidents of alleged carnappers, holduppers, robbers, drug
pushers or other suspected criminal elements with handguns
reportedly engaging well-armed military or police or other law
agents in shootouts and getting riddled with armalite bullets in the
process, there has been great concern that there appeared to be
no-official investigation and verification of the incidents and
confirmation or otherwise of the justification for the killings and
that it behooves the authorities and all who believe in the inherent
dignity and worth of every human being and in his God-given and
inviolable human rights the essence of which is the right to life,
liberty and security of person as declared in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to see to it that the military and the
police do not think that they have a license to kill with impunity
and do not constitute themselves as law enforcer, witness,
prosecutor, judge and executioner. Death is so final and
irreversible and the common concern is: "What if the man killed
by the police is innocent and not a criminal after all" simply
because he struck them as "suspicious-looking."
The press has long taken note of such killings. In its October 20,
1981 editorial entitled "Salvage Operation: Is it moral, legal?", the
Philippines Daily Express flatly stated that
What appears certain at this point is that some
law enforcers do engage in salvage operations.
The past several years particularly, many
suspected carnappers, cop killers, holdup men,
and notorious characters have been reportedly
killed by law enforcers in alleged shootouts and
escape attempts.
The very nature of the salvage operation-that of
doing away with a recalcitrant troublemaker-
presumably precludes official sanction or
authorization. But whether all the salvage
operations had the knowledge or the blessings of
higher-ups in the police command is not known.
It would seem that some people in the force have
accepted the salvage operation as an effective
and swift way of instilling fear in the hearts of
criminals or doing away with hopelessly notorious
and dangerous thugs.
But is it? Does it not push criminals to the wall
and make them more desperate and vicious? Will
not this ultimate violence beget the same
violence, as probably it has already done? Does it
not contribute to a climate of viciousness where
the rule of the gun is supreme?
And what of the moral and legal aspects? Isn't a
suspect deemed innocent until proven guilty?
What happens to due process of law? Can law
enforcers be judges and executioners, too? Were
all salvage victims hopelessly notorious and
dangerous to society? Were they really guilty of
the crimes imputed to them?
A debate on the practical, moral, and legal
implications of the salvage operation would have
to summon a legion of arguments. The debate, in
fact, could be endless. We feel, though, that it
should at least be initiated. A reassessment of the
practice by some law enforcers is in order.
Earlier, on April 12, 1981, the writer had proposed to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines 5th House of Delegates that "it
would be worthy of the Integrated Bar to consider the creation of
a committee that would monitor and follow up such incidents
which are reported practically daily and see to it that they be
officially and thoroughly investigated and assure that human life is
not taken with impunity under the guise of police or military
operations by the very persons called upon to uphold and enforce
the law." This drew an affirmative response from the IBP top
officers (although with a weak implementation at the time), as well
as from the PC Chief, Major General Fidel V. Ramos, who issued
the following basic guidelines:
SE
LF-
DE
FE
 NS
E violence and many have raised the alarm.
1. The only justification for law enforcers to kill
criminals is self- defense which can only be
resorted to when the risk of subduing them
peacefully will result in the death of law enforcers
or citizens.
2. The primary duty under the criminal-justice
system is to arrest offenders and initiate court
action against them.
Ramos said that the PC will not tolerate lawmen
becoming prosecutors, judges and executioners
of offenders.
3. All cases of encounters with criminals being
arrested or escaping prisoners, as a matter of
standard operating procedure, shall be covered
by autopsy and investigation reports. 10
The reactivation of close to a thousand secret marshals was
announced last June, 1984 following a wave of robberies on
public transportation vehicles. In five days, June 18-22, 1984,
they chalked up a record "body count" of 24 suspected criminals
in Metro Manila, including a youth, who, according to his parent,
was about to return to his job in Saudi Arabia. 11 The 25th victim
gunned down at early dawn of Sunday, June 24, 1984, was
reportedly about to hold up jeepney passengers at F.B. Harrison
and aimed at the marshals what turned out to be a toy pistol
(shaped like a .45 caliber). They shot him dead on the spot with a
bullet in the forehead and two in the chest. 12 This is a record of
some sort: 25 suspects gunned down in one week as against only
about 32 suspected holduppers killed by the marshals when they
were first activated during the period of five months between
August and December, 1982. 13 Indeed, violence breeds more
The Catholic Bishops Conference in their joint pastoral letter to
the nation entitled "Let there be Life" denounced the fielding of
secret, marshals which led to the "further eroding of the sanctity
of life" with these words "(W)e cannot but be disturbed and
apprehensive at the Idea of appointing officers of law,
unrecognizable as such to the general public, with full
authorization-if they indeed have such authorization-to hunt
people down and summarily dispose of them. This goes against
our Christian concept of man and the value we put on human life.
'Criminals', no matter how base, do not become by the fact of
their crime (unproven in any case) brute animals, losing all claims
to rights, to bodily integrity, due process and the like."
With the resurgence of activities of holduppers and robbers this
year, the secret marshals were reactivated once more as
"crimebuster operations" in May of this year. As stated in the
Court's decision, 14 the last report submitted by the Solicitor
General covering the period of six days from May 4, 1985 to May
10, 1985 listed a total of fifteen (15) alleged holduppers killed by
policemen; cases against them have been filed with the Judge
Advocate General's Office but in the meantime the policemen
involved have been ordered released. The total number of
suspected holduppers killed by secret marshals in these
operations which had been described "as an anomaly that could
easily turn into a nightmare to the citizens and no assurance can
dispel this dread," has been estimated at over forty. 15The
operations have given rise to protests from no other than the City
Mayor of Manila, Ramon Bagatsing himself, who denounced the
use of marshals as a "violation of human rights" and urged the
use by the Manila police force of "more civilized" ways saying that
"you do not kill a person on mere suspicion of committing a crime.
the death penalty is imposed only after a person has been
charged, tried and convicted." 16 Metro Manila Vice Governor
Ismael Mathay, Jr. in reportedly calling for the dismantling of
these secret marshals is qouted as saying that "no one is
licensed to kill." 17
The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines and the
Commission of Bishops and Religious in their statement of June
7, 1985 urged the disbanding of the "so-called crimebusters or
special operation teams ... once, and for all," saying that they "...
join heir voices to an ever increasing number of Filipinos, both
public officials such as Vice Gov. Ismael Mathay and Manila
Mayor Ramon Bagatsing and private citizens in condemning the
summary executions of suspected criminals, some of whom were
peace-loving citizens and not trouble makers at all (and) the
bishops, as pastors of their flock, cannot condone the violation of
the people's human rights which law officers are supposed to
uphold and defend. 18
It is imperative as a matter of basic justice to the victims, as well
as to the majority of conscientious and law-abiding police officers
who faithfully perform their duties against all odds that the
investigation and filing of the proper cases in court against the
killers-marshals be expedited and duly decided, as now enjoined
by the Court. With the transfer of authority particularly
"administrative control and supervision' over the Integrated
National Police from the Ministry of National Defense to the
President through the National Police Commission and the
corollary transfer of exercise of "operational supervision and
direction" over them to the city and town mayors, 19 it is hoped that
the permanent dismantling of such secret marshals or
"crimebusters" as urged by the Metro Manila Vice Governor and
the City Mayor of Manila and their replacement by uniformed and
Identifiable policemen may soon become a reality. I vote to grant
the petition.
Respondents are directed to exercise strict supervision and
control over these special operation teams.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, C.J., concurring.
Since it is not established that the respondents have authorized
the killing of criminals in violation of their constitutional rights, they
should be merely reminded, not directed, to always respect the
constitutional rights of criminals.
AQUINO, J., dissenting
I dissent. In the Valmonte case, the petitioner has no cause of
action for certiorari and prohibition.
In the Hildawa case this Court has no jurisdiction over the petition
for "declaration of nullity of executive/administrative order
creating secret marshals."
These two cases should have been DISSMISSED OUT-RIGHT.
Petitioner' remedy is in other forums.
GUTIERREZ, JR. J., concurring
I am in full concurrence with the Court's decision penned by my
disguished colleague, Justice Lorenzo Relova, whose concern for
human rights is not only deep and abiding but is also a matter of
public knowledge in legal circles.
The organization of special police teams to combat resurgent
forms criminality is valid, proper, and necessary. Considering the
wide publicity given by media to victims of apparent "salvaging,"
there is also a need to always remind police and military officers,
whatever their assignments, to sculpulously respect the
constitutional and statutory rights of apprehended criminals,
never to take the law into their own hands. No matter how
reprehensible a criminal's acts may be, he is still entitled to due
process and to the constitutional protection accorded to all
citizens. In the process of curbing criminality, the police and the
military should not themselves descend to acts of criminality.
I am writing this separate opinion only to emphasize that there is
no evidence whatsoever that the special teams have been given
orders to liquidate robbers, hold-uppers and the like. On the
contrary, General Narciso Cabrera has strongly cautioned his
men to respect the rights of criminal elements they may
encounter or apprehend. If the members of the special teams or
the "crimebusters" commit lawless acts., they do so against the
orders of the respondents and should be prosecuted for their
acts. The Compliance filed by the Solicitor General of July 23,
1985 shows that even in specific cases where the policemen
claimed to have been shot at or attacked by hold-uppers and
criminal elements, the incidents were still ordered fully
investigated. I agree that in such cases an investigation by
officers other than the police themselves is more appropriate.
In truth, the vicous nature of some killings described in the
affidavits submitted by the petitioners is such that it should not be
attributed to special operations team who are fielded on a regular
or indifferent basis and who have absolutely no Idea whom they
may encounter in the course of their assignments. Assuming that
these police teams immediately shoot robbers and holduppers
caught in flagrante, the killing would not be characterized by
torture or barbaric brutality. Whoever kills with vicous brutality
does so with vengeance in mind, not because he is assigned to a
special operations teams. To me, it is apperent that lawless
persons, be they police or criminal elements, are passing on their
savage acts as having been perpetrated by special teams of
crimbusters. This is most unfair and fraught with undesirable
consequences.
The problems of criminality in Manila and other urban centers are
herculean in their formidability. Not only have criminality elements
been drawn like flies to the metropolis, but the police have been
hampered in their work by lack of logistic and incentives. The job
of the police is difficult enough without our doing or stating
anything that may tend to lower their morale. The Manila Police
Department has a well earned tradition of excellence and
discipline. It sets the pace for police forces all over the country.
Dedicated officers have headed the Department, now Western
Police District, Commanders of others districts have been drawn
from its ranks. The present commander, respondent Brigidier
General Narciso Cabrera, is a quietly competent gentlemen who
maintains the honorable traditions of his predecessors.
Even as we call for the investigation and prosecution of those
responsible for the vicous killings mentioned by the petitioners,
we should set the record straight and at the same time commend
the majority of police officers who perform their tasks faithfully
and who are as appalled as anybody by any indiscriminate and
lawless acts of violence. A few bad eggs in the police force or
worse, non-police or civilian criminals taking advantage of the
situation should not diminish the people's respect for Manila's
Finest as an institution.
TEEHANKEE, J.,
The Court's opinion penned by Mr. Justice Relova recognizes
that "there is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of
special operation teams to counter the resurgence of criminality"
but stresses that "what is bad is if they kill these 'criminals'
because then they are not only law enforcers but also the
witnesses, 1 the prosecutors, the judges and the executioners.
For, if in maintaining peace and order, the peace officer becomes
the person to be feared the citizen will find himself between the
criminal and the lawless public official. Violence does not find
support in a democratic society where the rule of law prevails. It is
our way of life that a man is entitled to due process which simply
means that before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or
property, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself." 2
After taking note of respondents' comment denying that the
secret marshals formed by the Police in Metro Manila (and
renamed as "crimebusters" this year) were given a license to kill
or enjoy any more immunity than other law enforcement officials,
but that their fielding "was impelled by the proliferation of
robbery/holdups and other crimes against passengers of public
conveyances," 3 the Court's judgment likewise lays down specific
injunctions and norms of conduct and procedure in the event of
any killings by these teams of secret marshals or "crimbusters,"
which may be succinctly summarized as follows: 4
1. ... the respondents are directed to exercise
strict supervision and control over these special
operation teams ... and, members of these special
teams are ordered that in making arrests they
should not use unnecessary force, should comply
strictly with the law, and accord to the suspects all
their constitutional rights;
2. Whenever there is killing or infliction of injury by
such secret marshals or "crimebusters",
"respondents are hereby enjoined to immediately
report the matter to their superior officers and the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for
investigation and appropriate action;
3. The National Police Commission as the entity
charged with direct authority over the members of
the Integrated National Police should forthwith
"investigate to find out who the assailant was and
the reason for the death of the victim. It need not
wait for a formal complaint to be lodged by the
relatives of the deceased;" and
4. Once the Identity of the killer(s) has been
established and the latter having admitted that he
is the author of the death of the deceased, the
investigating officer should file a case in the
proper court or tribunal which will determine
whether or not the killing was made in self-
defense, defense of relatives, defense of stranger
or in the fulfillment of a duty," bearing in mind that
"when a person is killed by another, the burden of
proving self-defense or some other justification
lies on the assailant.
I fully concur with the Court's above remedial measures ordering
the secret marshals or "crimebusters" to accord due process and
respect for the constitutional rights of suspects and discharge in
court the burden of proving the justification for taking their lives.
These are preventive and deterrent measures which normally
should suffice to curtail the substantive evils sought to be curbed.
But given the background facts and the environmental
circumstances as herein set forth, I would further grant the
petition for the disbanding of the secret marshals by whatever
name they may be called.
As stated in the Court's judgment, these "special operation teams
(were) formed to conduct a concentrated campaign against
criminal elements preying on passengers of jeepneys, buses,
taxis and all other form of public conveyance." The reactivation of
the marshals was admittedly upon mere verbal orders of the
President "to intensify the drive against roberry-holdups." 5 But
there was over-reaction far beyond the pale of the law and the
Constitution. Then Major Genral Prospero Olivas, Chief of the PC
Metrocom and the Metropolitan Police Force pursuant thereto
fielded 760 " secret marshals" in Metro Manila as designated
over-all commander, among them: "The 160 INP field force
members were assigned to protect bus passengers in the 13
principal bus routes in Metro Manila. Trained in ranger tactics and
jungle warfare, they will be in uniform with their nameplates, and
will be adequate armed." 6Troops trained in "ranger tactics and
jungle warfare" have no place in the urban centers and should not
be utilized in plain police action involving tens of thousand of daily
commuters and students ( on whose behalf petitioners have filed
the present action, including themselves and their families, fearful
or "exposing themselves to the risk and danger of encountering
secret marshals or be caught in the crossfire" 7). The cure is thus
worse than the ailment. The only logical way to counter the
greater danger thus created for the innocent populace is to
dismmantle and outlaw the existence of such a dangerous strike
force, whome they cannot distinguish from the criminal elements
themselves. The record, too, of 160 lives of alleged holdup men
killed is far too costly and reflects an apparent wanton disregardd
for the sanctity of human life: "RECORD. The secret marshals
were first organized on August 8, 1982. During their activation up
to May 31, 1984 the force reportedly had killed 106 holdup men
and arrested 128 others." 8 In a number of these reported cases,
it readily appears that the means used to apprehend the suspects
cannot be justified: instead of merely disabling the suspects, the
marshals had no compunction about shooting them fatally in the
head and other vital parts of the body. A striking instance of the
low regard for human life is the recent case of Juan P,
Anunciacion, 26, a detainee at the Quezon City jail facing
carnapping charges, who was "so depressed over his life inside
the jail" and over his failure to raise bail. He was shot dead in the
head by his police escort, as he allegedly tried to escape on his
way to attend a court hearing. According to the press report,
"(P)robers recovered from Anunciacion's body two letters, one
coming from his wife, Rosy and another to his mother which
implied that he was intending to escape or commit suicide." The
police cynically concluded that the suspectfatality "had intended
to commit 'suicide by escaping from his escort.' " 9 As the writer
stressed at the hearing of these cases in relation to respondents'
remark on the perversity of the criminals nowadays: "In a
democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we
stoop to what they do, then we're no better than they. . . there
would be no difference."
Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte, and
former Senator Ambrocio Padilla and Atty. Emmanuel Mendoza,
as collaborating counsels, all members of the Philippine Bar. are
to be commended for their civic-minded initiative and concern for
basic constitutional values and the primacy of human rights over
property rights in filing the petitions at bar. The Supreme Court
stands as the guarantor of the constitutional and human rights of
all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic role
under the Constitution that these rights be respected and
enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as
contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a
person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second
even if he is caught in flagrante delicto-unless it was called for as
an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means
to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased. 9-a
Ever since the metropolitan newspapers reported in 1978
incidents of alleged carnappers, holduppers, robbers, drug
pushers or other suspected criminal elements with handguns
reportedly engaging well-armed military or police or other law
agents in shootouts and getting riddled with armalite bullets in the
process, there has been great concern that there appeared to be
no-official investigation and verification of the incidents and
confirmation or otherwise of the justification for the killings and
that it behooves the authorities and all who believe in the inherent
dignity and worth of every human being and in his God-given and
inviolable human rights the essence of which is the right to life,
liberty and security of person as declared in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to see to it that the military and the
police do not think that they have a license to kill with impunity
and do not constitute themselves as law enforcer, witness,
prosecutor, judge and executioner. Death is so final and
irreversible and the common concern is: "What if the man killed
by the police is innocent and not a criminal after all" simply
because he struck them as "suspicious-looking."
The press has long taken note of such killings. In its October 20,
1981 editorial entitled "Salvage Operation: Is it moral, legal?", the
Philippines Daily Express flatly stated that
What appears certain at this point is that some
law enforcers do engage in salvage operations.
The past several years particularly, many
suspected carnappers, cop killers, holdup men,
and notorious characters have been reportedly
killed by law enforcers in alleged shootouts and
escape attempts.
The very nature of the salvage operation-that of
doing away with a recalcitrant troublemaker-
presumably precludes official sanction or
authorization. But whether all the salvage
operations had the knowledge or the blessings of
higher-ups in the police command is not known.
It would seem that some people in the force have
accepted the salvage operation as an effective
and swift way of instilling fear in the hearts of
criminals or doing away with hopelessly notorious
and dangerous thugs.
But is it? Does it not push criminals to the wall
and make them more desperate and vicious? Will
not this ultimate violence beget the same
violence, as probably it has already done? Does it
not contribute to a climate of viciousness where
the rule of the gun is supreme?
And what of the moral and legal aspects? Isn't a
suspect deemed innocent until proven guilty?
What happens to due process of law? Can law
enforcers be judges and executioners, too? Were
all salvage victims hopelessly notorious and
dangerous to society? Were they really guilty of
the crimes imputed to them?
A debate on the practical, moral, and legal
implications of the salvage operation would have
to summon a legion of arguments. The debate, in
fact, could be endless. We feel, though, that it
should at least be initiated. A reassessment of the
practice by some law enforcers is in order.
Earlier, on April 12, 1981, the writer had proposed to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines 5th House of Delegates that "it
would be worthy of the Integrated Bar to consider the creation of
a committee that would monitor and follow up such incidents
which are reported practically daily and see to it that they be
officially and thoroughly investigated and assure that human life is
not taken with impunity under the guise of police or military
operations by the very persons called upon to uphold and enforce
the law." This drew an affirmative response from the IBP top
officers (although with a weak implementation at the time), as well
as from the PC Chief, Major General Fidel V. Ramos, who issued
the following basic guidelines:
SE
LF-
DE
FE
NS
E
1. The only justification for law enforcers to kill
criminals is self- defense which can only be
resorted to when the risk of subduing them
peacefully will result in the death of law enforcers
or citizens.
2. The primary duty under the criminal-justice
system is to arrest offenders and initiate court
action against them.
Ramos said that the PC will not tolerate lawmen
becoming prosecutors, judges and executioners
of offenders.
 3. All cases of encounters with criminals being
arrested or escaping prisoners, as a matter of
standard operating procedure, shall be covered
by autopsy and investigation reports. 10
The reactivation of close to a thousand secret marshals was
announced last June, 1984 following a wave of robberies on
public transportation vehicles. In five days, June 18-22, 1984,
they chalked up a record "body count" of 24 suspected criminals
in Metro Manila, including a youth, who, according to his parent,
was about to return to his job in Saudi Arabia. 11 The 25th victim
gunned down at early dawn of Sunday, June 24, 1984, was
reportedly about to hold up jeepney passengers at F.B. Harrison
and aimed at the marshals what turned out to be a toy pistol
(shaped like a .45 caliber). They shot him dead on the spot with a
bullet in the forehead and two in the chest. 12 This is a record of
some sort: 25 suspects gunned down in one week as against only
about 32 suspected holduppers killed by the marshals when they
were first activated during the period of five months between
August and December, 1982. 13 Indeed, violence breeds more
violence and many have raised the alarm.
The Catholic Bishops Conference in their joint pastoral letter to
the nation entitled "Let there be Life" denounced the fielding of
secret, marshals which led to the "further eroding of the sanctity
of life" with these words "(W)e cannot but be disturbed and
apprehensive at the Idea of appointing officers of law,
unrecognizable as such to the general public, with full
authorization-if they indeed have such authorization-to hunt
people down and summarily dispose of them. This goes against
our Christian concept of man and the value we put on human life.
'Criminals', no matter how base, do not become by the fact of
their crime (unproven in any case) brute animals, losing all claims
to rights, to bodily integrity, due process and the like."
With the resurgence of activities of holduppers and robbers this
year, the secret marshals were reactivated once more as
"crimebuster operations" in May of this year. As stated in the
Court's decision, 14 the last report submitted by the Solicitor
General covering the period of six days from May 4, 1985 to May
10, 1985 listed a total of fifteen (15) alleged holduppers killed by
policemen; cases against them have been filed with the Judge
Advocate General's Office but in the meantime the policemen
involved have been ordered released. The total number of
suspected holduppers killed by secret marshals in these
operations which had been described "as an anomaly that could
easily turn into a nightmare to the citizens and no assurance can
dispel this dread," has been estimated at over forty. 15The
operations have given rise to protests from no other than the City
Mayor of Manila, Ramon Bagatsing himself, who denounced the
use of marshals as a "violation of human rights" and urged the
use by the Manila police force of "more civilized" ways saying that
"you do not kill a person on mere suspicion of committing a crime.
the death penalty is imposed only after a person has been
charged, tried and convicted." 16 Metro Manila Vice Governor
Ismael Mathay, Jr. in reportedly calling for the dismantling of
these secret marshals is qouted as saying that "no one is
licensed to kill." 17
The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines and the
Commission of Bishops and Religious in their statement of June
7, 1985 urged the disbanding of the "so-called crimebusters or
special operation teams ... once, and for all," saying that they "...
join heir voices to an ever increasing number of Filipinos, both
public officials such as Vice Gov. Ismael Mathay and Manila
Mayor Ramon Bagatsing and private citizens in condemning the
summary executions of suspected criminals, some of whom were
peace-loving citizens and not trouble makers at all (and) the
bishops, as pastors of their flock, cannot condone the violation of
the people's human rights which law officers are supposed to
uphold and defend. 18
It is imperative as a matter of basic justice to the victims, as well
as to the majority of conscientious and law-abiding police officers
who faithfully perform their duties against all odds that the
investigation and filing of the proper cases in court against the
killers-marshals be expedited and duly decided, as now enjoined
by the Court. With the transfer of authority particularly
"administrative control and supervision' over the Integrated
National Police from the Ministry of National Defense to the
President through the National Police Commission and the
corollary transfer of exercise of "operational supervision and
direction" over them to the city and town mayors, 19 it is hoped that
the permanent dismantling of such secret marshals or
"crimebusters" as urged by the Metro Manila Vice Governor and
the City Mayor of Manila and their replacement by uniformed and
Identifiable policemen may soon become a reality. I vote to grant
the petition.

Respondents are directed to exercise strict supervision and

control over these special operation teams.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V. JIMENEZ, ESTER
MISA-JIMENEZ, CARLOS LAZARO, REYNALDO MACLANG,
MAGDALENA DE LOS SANTOS-MACLANG, TEODORICO N.
DIESMOS, RENE J. MARCIANO, DANILO R. DE OCAMPO,
VICTORIANO C. AMADO and MAC ACERON, petitioners,
vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, THE TRIAL COUNSEL OF
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, and THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.
No. L-69882 May 22, 1987
EDUARDO OLAGUER, OTHONIEL JIMENEZ, REYNALDO
MACLANG and ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34,
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, AFP, MINISTER OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondents.
Sabino Padilla, Jr. and Jose B. Puerto for petitioner Othoniel
Jimenez.
Fulgencio Factoran for petitioners Maclang and Magdalena de los
Santos-Maclang
Rene Saguisag for petitioner Mac Aceron.
Joaquin Misa for petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez.
Jejomar Binay for petitioners Reynaldo Maclang and Magdalena
de los Santos-Maclang.
Jaime Villanueua for petitioner Danilo R. de Ocampo.
Joker P. Arroyo, Lorenzo M. Tanada and Rene Sarmiento for
petitioners Eduardo Olaguer and Othoniel Jimenez.
Wigberto Tanada for petitioners Olaguer and Maclang
GANCAYCO, J.:
Filed with this Court are two Petitions wherein the fundamental
question is whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to
try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. The
two Petitions have been consolidated inasmuch as the issues
raised therein are interrelated.
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B.
Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos
Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos Maclang,
Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo
and Victoriano C. Amado were arrested by the military authorities.
They were all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City.
They were subsequently transferred to the detention center at
Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who
remained in detention at Camp Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities sometime in June, 1980
and was, thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All
of the petitioners are civilians.
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for
subversion 1 upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General
and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense.2 The case was designated
as Criminal Case No. MC-34-1.
On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines 3 created the respondent Military
Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed against the
petitioners. 4 On July 30, 1980, an amended charge sheet was
filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession of
explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate
President, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate
cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and
Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo
Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine
buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,
Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver;
and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting
to rebellion. 5 Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19, 1980,
the petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for
prohibition and habeas corpus." 6 They sought to enjoin the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the
trial of their case. They likewise sought their release from
detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments
is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have
been committed during the period of martial law. They also maintain that the proceedings
before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their
constitutional right to due process of law.
On September 23, 1980, the respondents filed their Answer to the
Petition. 7 On November 20, 1980, the petitioners submmitted
their reply to the Answer. 8 In a Motion filed with this Court on July
25, 1981, petitioner Olaguer requested that the Petition be
considered withdrawn as far as he is concerned. 9 In the
Resolution of this Court dated July 30, 1981, the said prayer was
granted." 10 On August 31, 1984, the respondents filed a Rejoinder to the Reply
submitted by the petitioners. 11
On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the Petition, the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the
penalty of death by electrocution. Thus, on February 14, 1985, petitioners Olaguer, Maclang
and Othoniel and Ester Jimenez went to this Court and filed the other instant Petition, this
time for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They also sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.12 The respondents named in the Petition are the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Military Commission No. 34, the Judge
Advocate General, the Minister of National Defense and the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons.
In sum, the second Petition seeks to enjoin the said respondents
from taking any further action on the case against the petitioners,
and from implementing the judgment of conviction rendered by
the respondent Military Commission No. 34 for the reason that
the same is null and void. The petitioners also seek the return of
all property taken from them by the respondents concerned. Their
other arguments in the earlier Petition are stressed anew.
On August 9, 1985, the respondents filed their Answer to the
Petition. 13 On September 12, 1985, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from executing the Decision of the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 14 On February 18, 1986, the petitioners submitted an extensive
Brief. 15 Thereafter, and in due time, the cases were submitted for decision.
In resolving these two Petitions, We have taken into account
several supervening events which have occurred hitherto, to wit
—
(1) On January 17, 1981, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045 officially
lifting martial law in the Philippines. The same
Proclamation revoked General Order No. 8
(creating military tribunals) and directed that "the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto are
hereby dissolved upon final determination of
case's pending therein which may not be
transferred to the civil courts without irreparable
prejudice to the state in view of the rules on
double jeopardy, or other circumstances which
render prosecution of the cases difficult, if not
impossible."; and
(2) Petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty in January, 1981. On the other
hand, petitioners Eduardo Olaguer and Othoniel
 Jimenez obtained provisional liberty on January
23, 1986. 16The rest of the petitioners have been released
sometime before or after President Corazon C. Aquino assumed office
in February, 1986.
The sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is detention. 17 When
the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their
confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
We come now to the other matters raised in the two Petitions.
The main issue raised by the petitioners is whether or not military
commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for
offenses allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts
are open and functioning.
The petitioners maintain that military commissions or tribunals do
not have such jurisdiction and that the proceedings before the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of
their constitutional right to due process of law. The respondents,
however, contend otherwise.
The issue on the jurisdiction of military commissions or tribunals
to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed before, and more
particularly during a period of martial law, as well as the other
issues raised by the petitioners, have been ruled upon by a
divided Supreme Court in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No.
2. 19 The pertinent portions of the main opinion of the Court are as follows —
We hold that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been
lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the
cases against civilians, including the petitioner.
l. The Court has previously declared that the
proclamation of Martial Law ... on September 21,
1972, ... is valid and constitutional and that its
continuance is justified by the danger posed to the
public safety. 20
2. To preserve the safety of the nation in times of
national peril, the President of the Philippines
necessarily possesses broad authority compatible
with the imperative requirements of the
emergency. On the basis of this, he has
authorized in General Order No. 8 . . . the Chief of
Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to create
military tribunals to try and decide cases "of
military personnel and such other cases as may
be referred to them." In General Order No. 12 ... ,
the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction
"exclusive of the civil courts," among others, over
crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-
Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms,
and other crimes which, in the face of the
emergency, are directly related to the quelling of
the rebellion and preservation of the safety and
security of the Republic. ... These measures he
had the authority to promulgate, since this Court
recognized that the incumbent President
(President Marcos), under paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Section 3 of Article XVII of the new (1973)
Constitution, had the authority to "promulgate
proclamations, orders and decrees during the
period of martial law essential to the security and
preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the
political and social liberties of the people and to
the institution of reforms to prevent the
resurgence of the rebellion or insurrection or
secession or the threat thereof ... " 21
3. Petitioner nevertheless insists that he being a
civilian, his trial by military commission deprives
him of his right to due process, since in his view
the due process guaranteed by the Constitution to
persons accused of "ordinary" crimes means
judicial process. This argument ignores the reality
of the rebellion and the existence of martial law. It
is, of course, essential that in a martial law
situation, the martial law administrator must have
ample and sufficient means to quell the rebellion
and restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial
and punishment of offenders have been
considered as necessary in a state of martial law,
as a mere power of detention may be wholly
inadequate for the exigency.22 " ... martial law ...
creates an exception to the general rule of
exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and
renders offenses against the law of war, as well
as those of a civil character, triable, ... by military
tribunals. 23"Public danger warrants the
substitution of executive process for judicial
process." 24 . ... "The immunity of civilians from
military jurisdiction must, however, give way in
areas governed by martial law. When it is
absolutely imperative for public safety, legal
processes can be superseded and military
tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction
normally vested in courts. 25 . ..."
xxx xxx xxx
5. ... The guarantee of due process is not a
guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in
criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent
jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and
opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial
tribunal, adequately meet the due process
requirement. Due process of law does not
necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the
regular courts. 26 ...
This ruling has been affirmed, although not unanimously, in at
least six other cases, to wit: Gumaua v.Espino, 27Buscayno v.
Enrile, 28 Sison v. Enrile, 29 Luneta v. Special Military Commission
No. 1, 30 Ocampo v. Military Commission No. 25, 31 and Buscayno
v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25. 32
These rulings notwithstanding, the petitioners anchor their
argument on their prayer that the ruling in Aquino, Jr. be
appraised anew and abandoned or modified accordingly. After a
thorough deliberation on the matter, We find cogent basis for re-
examining the same.
Some recent pronouncements of this Court could be considered
as attempts to either abandon or modify the ruling in Aquino, Jr.
In De Guzman v. Hon. Leopando, et al., 33 an officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and several other persons were charged
with Serious Illegal Detention before the Court of First Instance of
Maguindanao sometime in October, 1982. The military officer
sought to effect the transfer of the case against him to the
General Court Martial for trial pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1850. The trial court disallowed such
transfer for the reason that the said Decree is unconstitutional
inasmuch as it violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional
provisions on social justice, the speedy disposition of cases, the
republican form of government, the integrity and independence of
the judiciary, and the supremacy of civilian authority over the
military,
When the matter was elevated to this Court by way of a Petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the Court decided that a
ruling on the constitutional issues raised was not necessary. With
the view that practical and procedural difficulties will result from
the transfer sought, this Court resolved to dismiss the Petition for
lack of merit.
In Animas v. The Minister of National Defense, 34 a military officer
and several civilians were charged with murder alleged to have
been committed sometime in November, 1971. All of the said
accused were recommended for prosecution before a military
tribunal. in the course of the proceedings, the said accused went
to this Court on a Petition for certiorari and challenged the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal over their case. The petitioners
contended that General Order No. 59 upon which the jurisdiction
of the military tribunal is anchored refers only to the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and explosives in relation to other
crimes committed with a political complexion. They stressed that
the alleged murder was devoid of any political complexion.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
ordered the transfer of the criminal proceedings to the civil courts
after noting that with martial law having been lifted in the country
in 1981, all cases pending before the military tribunals should, as
a general rule, be transferred to the civil courts. The Court was
also of the view that the crime alleged to have been committed
did not have any political complexion. We quote the pertinent
portions of the Decision of the Court, to wit —
Inspite or because of the ambiguous nature of ...
civilian takeover of jurisdiction was concerned and
notwithstanding the shilly-shallying and vacillation
characteristic of its implementation, this Court
relied on the enunciated policy of normalization in
upholding the primacy of civil courts. This policy
meant that as many cases as possible involving
civilians being tried by military tribunals as could
be transferred to civil courts should be turned over
immediately. In case of doubt, the presumption
was in favor of civil courts always trying civilian
accused.
xxx xxx xxx
The crime for which the petitioners were charged
was committed ... long before the proclamation of
martial law. ... Now that it is already late 1986,
and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully
never more to return, there is no more reason why
a murder committed in 1971 should still be
retained, at this time, by a military tribunal.
We agree with the dissenting views of then Justice, now Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee 35 and Madame Justice Cecilia Munoz
Palma 36 in Aquino, Jr. in so far as they hold that military
commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions
(where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the
accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. 37 The trial
contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in
relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not
by executive or military process. Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within
the Philippine judicial system. As explained by Justice Teehankee
in his separate dissenting opinion-
... Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for
civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial
by judicial process, not by executive or military
process.
Judicial power is vested by the Constitution
exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as are duly established by law.
Judicial power exists only in the courts, which
have "exclusive power to hear and determine
those matters which affect the life or liberty or
property of a citizen. 38
Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are
we under a military government and even on the
premise that martial law continues in force, the
military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
committed by them which are properly cognizable
by the civil courts that have remained open and
have been regularly functioning.39 ...
And in Toth v. Quarles,40 the U.S. Supreme Court
furtherstressed that the assertion of military
authority over civilians cannot rest on the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on
any theory of martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed out ... , in
ruling that discharged army veterans (estimated to
number more than 22.5 million) could not be
rendered "helpless before some latter-day revival
of old military charges" and subjected to military
trials for offenses committed while they were in
the military service prior to their discharge, that
"the presiding officer at a court martial is not a
judge whose objectivity and independence are
protected by tenure and undiminished salary and
nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military
law officer. Substantially different rules of
evidence and procedure apply in military trials.
Apart from these differences, the suggestion of
the possibility of influence on the actions of the
court martial by the officer who convenes it,
selects its members and the counsel on both
sides, and who usually has direct command
authority over its members is a pervasive one in
military law, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate
the danger."
The late Justice Black ... added that (A) Court-
Martial is not yet an independent instrument of
justice but remains to a significant degree a
specialized part of the over-all mechanism by
which military discipline is preserved," and that
ex-servicemen should be given "the benefits of a
civilian court trial when they are actually civilians
... Free countries of the world have tried to restrict
military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining
discipline among troops in active service.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department
of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as
Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army
and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his
orders or those of his authorized military
representatives. 41 Following the principle of separation of powers
underlying the existing constitutional organization of the
Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of
interpreting the laws as when an individual should be considered
to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. 42 It
is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department,
through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in
the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so
today and as they did during the period of martial law in the
country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts. 43 To have it otherwise would be a
violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian
concerned.
In addition to this pronouncement, We take note of the
observation made by the Solicitor General to the effect that the
death penalty imposed upon the petitioners by the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 appears to have been rendered too
hastily to the prejudice to the petitioners, and in complete
disregard of their constitutional right to adduce evidence on their
behalf. We quote the pertinent portions of the Manifestation
submitted by the Solicitor General, to wit —
Prior to the session of December 4, 1984, when
the respondent Commission rendered its
sentence, petitioners have requested the
prosecution to provide them with copies of the
complete record of trial, including the evidences
presented against them, but the prosecution
dillydallied and failed to provide them with the
document requested. According to petitioners,
they needed the documents to adequately
prepare for their defense.
But a few days before December 4, 1984 the
prosecution suddenly furnished them with certain
transcripts of the proceedings which were not
complete. Petitioner Othoniel Jimenez was
scheduled to start with the presentation of his
evidence on said date and he requested that his
first witness be served with subpoena. The other
petitioners, as agreed upon, were to present their
evidence after the first one, Othoniel Jimenez, has
finished presenting his evidence. But on that
fateful day, December 4, 1984, the witness
requested to be served with subpoena was not
around, because as shown by the records, he
was not even served with the requested
subpoena. But in spite of that, respondent Military
Commission proceeded to ask each one of the
petitioners if they are ready to present their
evidence.
Despite their explanation that Othoniel Jimenez
cannot proceed because the prosecution, which
performs the duties and functions of clerk of court,
failed to subpoena his witness, and that the other
petitioners were not ready because it was not yet
their turn to do so, the Commission abruptly
decided that petitioners are deemed to have
waived the presentation of evidence in their
behalf, and considered the case submitted for
resolution.
After a recess of only twenty-five (25) minutes, the
session was resumed and the Commission
rendered its sentence finding petitioners guilty of
all the charges against them and imposing upon
them the penalty of death by electrocution. 44
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction to try the
petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its
jurisdiction when, as observed by the Solicitor General, the said
tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that rendered the
judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction. 45
Moreover, We find that Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January
17, 1981) officially lifting martial law in the Philippines and
abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the national
emergency effectively divests the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that matter) of its
supposed authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners.
The main opinion in Aquino, Jr. is premised on the theory that
military tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians as long as the
period of national emergency (brought about by public disorder
and similar causes) lasts. Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 2045 is
an acknowledgment on the part of the Executive Department of
the Government that the national emergency no longer exists.
Thereafter, following the theory relied upon in the main opinion,
all military tribunals should henceforth be considered functus
officio in their relationship with civilians.
By virtue of the proclamation itself, all cases against civilians
pending therein should eventually be transferred to the civil courts
for proper disposition. The principle of double jeopardy would not
be an obstacle to such transfer because an indispensable
element of double jeopardy is that the first tribunal which tried the
case must be of competent jurisdiction.46 As discussed earlier, the
military tribunals are devoid of the required jurisdiction.
We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as the civil
courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
committed by them. Whether or not martial law has been
proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no
moment. The imprimatur for this observation is found in Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit —
A state of martial law, does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This provision in the fundamental law is just one of the many
steps taken by the Filipino people towards the restoration of the
vital role of the judiciary in a free country-that of the guardian of
the Constitution and the dispenser of justice without fear or favor.
No longer should military tribunals or commissions exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by
them when the civil courts are open and functioning. No longer
may the exclusive judicial power of the civil courts, beginning with
the Supreme Court down to the lower courts 47 be appropriate by
any military body or tribunal, or even diluted under the guise of a
state of martial law, national security and other similar labels.
At this juncture, We find it appropriate to quote a few paragraphs
from the ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez inAnimas v. The
Minister of National Defense , 48 viz —
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over
common crimes and civilian(s) accused at a time
when all civil courts were fully operational and
freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest
chapters in the history of the Philippine judiciary.
The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by
the glorification of military tribunals, the instability
and insecurity felt by many members of the
judiciary due to various causes both real and
imagined, and the many judicial problems
spawned by extended authoritarian rule which
effectively eroded judicial independence and self-
respect will require plenty of time and determined
efforts to cure.
The immediate return to civil courts of all cases
which properly belong to them is only a beginning.
And in his separate concurring opinion in Animas, Mr. Chief
Justice Teehankee had this to say —
I only wish to add that the great significance of our
judgment in this case is that we reestablish and
reinstate the fundamental principle based on
civilian supremacy over the military as urged in
vain in my dissent in the case of Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, et al.
that "Civilians placed on trial for offenses under
general law are entitled to trial by judicial process,
not by executive or military process. Judicial
power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in
the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
are duly established by law. Military commissions,
or tribunals, are not courts and do not form part of
the judicial system. Since we are not enemy-
occupied territory nor are we under a military
government and even on the premise that martial
law continues in force, the military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for civil offenses committed by them which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts that have
remained open and have been regularly
functioning.
xxx xxx xxx
The terrible consequences of subjecting civilians
to trial by military process is best exemplified in
the sham military trial of the martyred former
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., whereby he was
deprived (1) by the summary ex parte
investigation by the Chief prosecution staff of the
JAGO of his right to be informed of the charges
against him and of his right to counsel as
expressly recognized by Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution; (2) of his vested
statutory right to a preliminary investigation of the
subversion charges against him before the proper
court of first instance as required under Section 5
of the Anti-Subversion Act, R.A. 1700 and of the
other charges against him before the proper
civilian officials and to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him under R.A.
5180; (3) of the right to be tried by judicial
process, by the regular independent courts of
justice, with all the specific constitutional, statutory
and procedural safeguards embodied in the
judicial process and presided over not by military
officers; and (4) of the right to appeal to the
regular appellate courts and to judicial review by
this Court in the event of conviction and
imposition of a sentence of death or life
imprisonment which the charges carry and
wherein a qualified majority of ten (10) votes for
affirmance of the death penalty is required. In fine,
he was denied due process of law as guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights which further ordains that
"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law."Worse, his
trial by a military tribunal created by the then
President and composed of the said President's
own military subordinates without tenure and of
non-lawyers (except the law member) and of
whose decision the President is the final
reviewing authority as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces deprived him of a basic
constitutional right to be heard by a fair and
impartial tribunal, considering that the said
President had publicly declared the evidence
against petitioner "not only strong (but)
overwhelming" and thereby prejudged and
predetermined his guilt, and none of his military
subordinates could be expected to go against
their Commander-in-Chief's declaration.
Hopefully, an these aberrations now belong to the
dead and nightmarish past, when time-tested
doctrines, to borrow a phrase from the then Chief
Justice, "shrivelled in the effulgence of the
overpowering rays of martial rule. 49
As stated earlier, We have been asked to re-examine a previous
ruling of the Court with a view towards abandoning or modifying
the same. We do so now but not without careful reflection and
deliberation on Our part. Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is
entitled to respect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable.
Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as precedent,
cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest
demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned Padilla, J., took no part.
or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After
all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be
right. 50

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a

military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for
offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts
are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by
such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. 51 For the
same reasons, Our pronouncement in Aquino, Jr. v. Military
Commission No. 2 52 and all decided cases affirming the same, in
so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should
be deemed abandoned.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petitions for habeas

corpus are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
The Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are hereby GRANTED.
The creation of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try
civilians like the petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional
and all its proceedings are deemed null and void. The temporary
restraining order issued against the respondents enjoining them
from executing the Decision of the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 is hereby made permanent and the said
respondents are permanently prohibited from further pursuing
Criminal Case No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence
rendered by the respondent Military Commission No. 34 imposing
the death penalty on the petitioners is hereby vacated for being
null and void, and all the items or properties taken from the
petitioners in relation to the said criminal case should be returned
to them immediately. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernando, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, ***
SUPREME COURT , respondents.
Manila
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.
EN BANC
Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P.
BENGZON, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
BERNAS; S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B.,
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ,
FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA. JAIME V.
ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ, JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J.
ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS
VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE JAYME, Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.
**, petitioners,
vs. RESOLUTION
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice
Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores
and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO
FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A.
CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B.
TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the
KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS first time in freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous
CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE assassination of foremost opposition leader former Senator
MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years
FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then
ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death by
LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to
DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO have been committed long before the declaration of martial law
MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC CORDOVA G. ESTELO, and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by
judicial process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in
vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but mere
instruments and subject to the control of the President as created
by him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had
already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the
President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held
on August 24, 1971 when he declared the evidence against Ninoy
"not only strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda
bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party
candidates for the November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and
practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many
more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly
attributed to the communists but the truth has never been known. But the then President
never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980
to leave the country to undergo successful heart surgery. After
three years of exile and despite the regime's refusal to give him a
passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a genuine
national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-
bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his
plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on
that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet
fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous
assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight
security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint,
it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino
(whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as
Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who
picked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and
that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of
the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels
as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military version
and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of
August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in
the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation
and outraged the free world. The large masses of people who
joined in the ten-day period of national mourning and came out in
millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's
funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning
for the truth, justice and freedom.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding
Board 3 to investigate "the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a national
tragedy and national shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in
both foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate
the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on October 22, 1983
which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo
and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses
recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and majority
reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark another first
anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead by
the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then
President who treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report
of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the
legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court;
and the majority report of the four other members was submitted on the following day to the
then President who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of
their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what
you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in
rejecting the military version as propounded by the chief
investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was
the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the
contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations."
They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase
with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's
"fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the
SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who
escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in
conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us
regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the
mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot The only difference between the two reports is
that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then
AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA
on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would
exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons
who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was
descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the
criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented
without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat
prophetically) that "The epilogue to our work lies in what will
transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the
President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-member
majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after
warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political
ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our
traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our
eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what
unchecked evil would be capable of doing." They wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal.
This task was not only to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the death of the late
former Senator. Of greater significance is the
awesome responsibility of the Board to uphold
righteousness over evil, justice over injustice,
rationality over irrationality, humaneness over
inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test,
the inevitable result of which will restore our
country's honored place among the sovereign
nations of the free world where peace, law and
order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.
More than any other event in contemporary
Philippine history, the killing of the late former
Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus,
the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the
concretization of the horror that has been
haunting this country for decades, routinely
manifested by the breakdown of peace and order,
economic instability, subversion, graft and
corruption, and an increasing number of abusive
elements in what are otherwise noble institutions
in our country-the military and law enforcement
agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by
and large, the great majority of the officers and
men of these institutions have remained decent
and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in
the service of our country and people.
The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time
confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil
would be capable of doing. As former Israeli
Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody
who has great authority can be trusted not to go
beyond its proper limits." Social apathy, passivity
and indifference and neglect have spawned in
secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the
values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it
is imperative that public officials should regard
public service as a reflection of human Ideals in
which the highest sense of moral values and
integrity are strictly required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21,
1983, and the crisis that followed, would have
normally caused the resignation of the Chief of
the Armed Forces in a country where public office
is viewed with highest esteem and respect and
where the moral responsibilities of public officials
transcend all other considerations.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his
recorded public acts and statements from the beginning
disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings and
insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin.
In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in
his government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then
AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on September 9,
1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my government
were involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly
low level, I would have known. I know how they think. I know what
they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact
Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
CBS: But indeed there has been
recent evidence that seems to
contradict earlier reports, namely,
the recent evidence seems to
indicate that some of the guards
may have been responsible (for
shooting Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course
wrong. What you have been
reading are the newspapers and
the newspaper reports have been
biased. The evidence still proves
that Galman was the killer. The
evidence also shows that there
were intelligence reports
connecting the communist party to
the killing. 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the
same date going on leave of absence upon release of the Board's
majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even
more aware, general, that the circumstances under which the
board has chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with
doubt and great contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we
are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you
have been so accused by some members of the Board," and
extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a
speedy resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return
the general to his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an
interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing
the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses
(against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners
Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son,
respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29)
other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court,
five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP
Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and
solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging
that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed
serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the
Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he
failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and
important testimonial and documentary evidence for the
prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased,
prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts
"clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to
find out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners
prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a
decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had
scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered
declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal
by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it,
the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order
prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit
a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the
signature page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same
nine-to- two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift
the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision.13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day
period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution
(which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very material to the
question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply thereto
and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez
joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the
legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a
full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and
bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence
by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to
the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due process
which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor.
If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
convict because certain material evidence is suppressed by the
prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the
Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as
scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to
comment on the motion for reconsideration but issued no
restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled,
respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the
accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally
absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another unusual
first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the
very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the
assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4,
1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad
Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their
second motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust
of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and
theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila
Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had
ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by
Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26
respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the
second motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents
to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his
Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold
office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced
by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his
position in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the
reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged
attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having
instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert
pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigation, and
actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder
cases below against herein private party respondents." He
candidly admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much
that need be said about the existence of pressure. That there
were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been
denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any
direct or indirect complicity or participation in any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash
the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the
reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that any
wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of
herein respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel
the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto
14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature.
urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a
resolution charging all the respondents as
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on
collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the January 10, 1985.
criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the
basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but 2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED
manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the SCENARIO OF TRIAL
Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were
pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably
alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr.
interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former President)
allow justice to take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo
Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan
asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice)
bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with and an the members of the Panel
the writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any
lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel
for an investigation by this Court to settle the note passing issue Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R.
once and for all. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left
again. The former President had a copy of the
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as
1986 affirmed the allegations in the second motion for principals), evidently furnished him in advance,
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and with prepared notes on the contents thereof.
and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his The former President started by vehemently
revelations, as follows: maintaining that Galman shot Aquino at the
tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued
1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL! against the theory, to remain silent was the more
discreet posture when the former President
became emotional (he was quite sick then).
Incidents during the preliminary investigation
showed ominous signs that the fate of the criminal
case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino During a good part of the conference, the former
and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was President talked about Aquino and the
doomed to an ignominous end. Malacanang communists, lambasting the Agrava Board,
wanted dismissal-to the extent that a prepared specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to the military
he rumbled on such statements as: "It will be
bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is
getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know
what to do". . . 'our understanding with Gen.
Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is
becoming ambitious "the boys were frantic when
they heard that they will be charged in court, and
wig be detained at city jail."
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered
towards a more pragmatic approach. The former
President more or less conceded that for political
and legal reasons all the respondents should be
charged in court, Politically, as it will become
evident that the government was serious in
pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion,
and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the
other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not
IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would
inure. The former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente
lite the Coordinator was ordered to get in touch
with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo
and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that
they had no place in their respective institutions.
The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to
commanding officers of members of AFP charged
in court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First
Division) would personally handle the trial, and
assurance was made by him that it would be
finished in four to six months, pointing out that,
with the recent effectivity of the New Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and
after the script had been tacitly mapped out, the
former President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na
lang kayo."
The parting words of the former President were:
"Thank you for your cooperation. I know how to
reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out,
the undersigned manifested his desire to the
Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the
office. This, as well as other moves to this effect,
had always been refused. Hoping that with
sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently
presented by the prosecution, all involves in the
trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the
futility and injustice of proceeding in accordance
with the script, the undersigned opted to say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the
script," such as the holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18
minutes of the filing of the Informations with the Sandiganbayan
at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members of the
media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to
Malacanang; the installation of a "war room" occupied by the
military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the
prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given
by U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the
suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of
the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it
"should not decide these cases on the merits without first making
a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding
Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all
accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations,
and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability,"
adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has
been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the
only occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of
acquittal. " He "associated himself with the motion for
reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25,
1986 submitted that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the
veracity of the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of
suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this
would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or
designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was
done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No.
61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case);
and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of
the double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice
since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a
double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for
reconsideration and prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas
contended that the proper step for the government was to file a
direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular
trial present its evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double
jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and
academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's
judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December 2,
1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as
Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of
acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to
annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the
plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence
the cause of the nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court
resolved per its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-
member commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice
Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate
Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as
members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and
documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and
relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit
their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission
conducted hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and
ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day, respondents
announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking
of the projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his
testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of
respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On
July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16 wherein it
discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in
capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly
Justice Fernandez and the Special Investigating
Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal
Bernabe and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was
originally of the view that all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents named in the Agrava Board majority
report should all be charged as principals of the
crime of double murder for the death of Senator
Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending
filing of the said charge before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel
having already prepared a draft Resolution
recommending such course of action, President
Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree
members of the Special Investigating Panel, and
justice Pamaran to a conference in Malacanang in
the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially
expressed his disagreement with the
recommendation of the Special Investigating
Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava
Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno
Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President
Marcos was convinced of the advisability of filing
the murder charge in court so that, after being
acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer
be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of double
jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all
of the accused would be denied bail during the
trial, considering that they would be charged with
capital offenses, President Marcos directed that
the several accused be "categorized" so that
some of them would merely be charged as
accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos
ordered that the case be handled personally by
Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the
earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang
conference were followed to the letter; and
compliance therewith manifested itself in several
specific instances in the course of the
proceedings, such as, the changing of the
resolution of the special investigating panel, the
filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its
assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of
some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses,
recantation of witneses who gave adverse
testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of
defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of
proceedings, and even in the very decision
rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos'
desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-Galman
case to be handled and disposed of constituted
sufficient pressure on those involved in said task
to comply with the same in the subsequent course
of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice
Fernandez manifested no revulsion against
complying with the Malacañang directive, justice
Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent
feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to
show a scripted and pre-determined manner of
handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case, as stage-managed from
Malacañang and performed by willing dramatis
personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones
whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of
an authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
Considering the existence of adequate credible
evidence showing that the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it
could have otherwise presented, but also
predetermined the final outcome of the case, the
 Commission is of the considered thinking and
belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment
of this Honorable Court that the proceedings in
the said case have been vitiated by lack of due
process, and hereby respectfully recommends
that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a
mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et
al.," be granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the
parties with copies of the Report and required them to submit
their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their
objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was
submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and
holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and
appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by the facts
of public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter,
that the then President (code named Olympus) had stage-
managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-
determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-
Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same
acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist', and which not only prevented the
prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the
evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-
determined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of
the twenty-six respondents accused of all criminal and civil
liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated
herein by reference) and findings and conclusions are duly
substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record.
Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a
combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law
(55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services (86 years
in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from
the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and denials
made by public respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the
Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a manner
suitable to his purposes was quite understandable
and was but to be expected. The case had stirred
unprecedented public outcry and wide
international attention. Not invariably, the finger of
suspicion pointed to those then in power who
supposedly had the means and the most
compelling motive to eliminate Senator Aquino. A
day or so after the assassination, President
Marcos came up with a public statement aired
over television that Senator Aquino was killed not
by his military escorts, but by a communist hired
gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that
President Marcos would want the case disposed
of in a manner consistent with his announced
theory thereof which, at the same time, would
clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to
accomplish this purpose. . . .
President Marcos made no bones to conceal his
purpose for calling them. From the start, he
expressed irritation and displeasure at the
recommendation of the investigating panel to
charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as
principals of the crime of double murder. He
insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator
Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board
were not supported by evidence that could stand
in court. He discussed and argued with Justice
Herrera on this point. Midway in the course of the
discussion, mention was made that the filing of
the charge in court would at least mollify public
demands and possibly prevent further street
demonstrations. It was further pointed out that
such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and
subsequently acquitted, they may claim the
benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and
thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is
no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was reached as to filing the
case, instead of dismissing it, but with some of the
accused to be charged merely as accomplices or
accessories, and the question of preventive
custody of the accused having thereby received
satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up
the matter of who would try the case and how
long it would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos
told Justice Pamaran 'point blank' to personally
handle the case. This was denied by Justice
Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice
Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day
testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such
order could not have been given inasmuch as it
was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan
would try the case and, besides, cases therein are
assigned by raffle to a division and not to a
particular Justice thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to
admit having received such presidential directive.
His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of
the fact that the case was indeed handled by him
after being assigned to the division headed by
him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once
dispelled by the circumstance that he was the
only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the
Malacanang conference wherein the said directive
was given. . . .
The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran
may also be inferred from his admission that he
gave President Marcos the possible time frame
when asked as to how long it would take him to
finish the case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the
conference, and after an agreement was reached
on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the
accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag
moro-moro na lamang kayo;" and that on their
way out of the room President Marcos expressed
his thanks to the group and uttered "I know how to
reciprocate," did not receive any denial or
contradiction either on the part of justice
Fernandez or justice Pamaran. (No other person
present in the conference was presented by the
respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by
the respondents of their intention to present Fiscal
Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was
abandoned without any reason having been given
therefor.)
The facts set forth above are all supported by the
evidence on record. In the mind of the
Commission, the only conclusion that may be
drawn therefrom is that pressure from
Malacanang had indeed been made to bear on
both the court and the prosecution in the handling
and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The
intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from
the personality of the one who exerted it, his
moral and official ascendancy over those to whom
his instructions were directed, the motivation
behind such instructions, and the nature of the
government prevailing at that time which enabled,
the then head of state to exercise authoritarian
powers. That the conference called to script or
stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the
Aquino-Galman case was considered as
something anomalous that should be kept away
from the public eye is shown by the effort to
assure its secrecy.None but those directly
involved were caned to attend. The meeting was
held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First
Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice
Lazaro were with the President. The conferees
were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to
escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall
waiting to see the President. Actually, no public
mention alas ever made of this conference until
Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen
(15) months later when the former president was
no longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly realized the
importance of the matter he wanted to take up
with the officials he asked to be summoned. He
had to do it personally, and not merely through
trusted assistants. The lack of will or
determination on the part of Justice Fernandez
and Justice Pamaran to resist the presidential
summons despite their realization of its
unwholesome implications on their handling of the
celebrated murder case may be easily inferred
from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No
effort to resist was made, despite the existence of
a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame
excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or
"out of respect to the Office of the President," or
that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons
from the President.' Such frame of mind only
reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure
and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very
acts of being summoned to Malacanang and their
ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves
pressure dramatized and exemplified Their abject
deference to President Marcos may likewise be
inferred from the admitted fact that, not having
been given seatsduring the two-hour conference
(Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but
did not say how long) in which President Marcos
did the talking most of the time, they listened to
him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to
presidential pressure became illusory from the
very moment they stepped inside Malacanang
Palace on January 10, 1985. 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the
more significant inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the
Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure,
as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their
respective handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the
pressure exerted by President Marcos in the conference held on
January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino
Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific
incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the
heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution
charging all the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by
categorizing and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and
Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as
accomplice, and recommending bail for the latter two categories:
"The categorization may not be completely justified by saying
that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient
evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as
principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence
of conspiracy and recommended that all of the accused be
charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding,
it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in
accordance with the standard practice of the prosecution to
charge accused with the most serious possible offense or in the
highest category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in the
event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his guilt of
the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of action
should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera
panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out,
Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not
surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacañang instruction."
It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual
categorization came only after the then President's instruction at
Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty. Coronel, had been
asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November,
1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that
time, [the Malacanang conference on January 10, 1985], his own
view was in conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel
to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of
the crime of double murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice
Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10,
1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of a
press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the
summons for them to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date."20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt, that a party's case is as strong
as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent
efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case
of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the accused's]
eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were sought to
be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being
ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or
threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner
favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution
witnesses:21 Cesar Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter
who recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as
prosecution witnesses before at the trial. Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified
before the Board "disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The
Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied
Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and
display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on
August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was deported as an
undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to
Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in accordance with
their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English transcription of his
testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was inaccurate
and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of
the discrepancy from the original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at
the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a
shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect
Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to
leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him
stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal
eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable
significance of her proposed testimony and its
unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense,
the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as
much as, if not more than those in the case of
Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in
constant fear of her life, having been hunted by
armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay
was ransacked, her family harassed by the
foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the
local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she
ignored the request of its manager to talk with her
about her proposed testimony; that a certain
William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a trip
abroad; that Mayor Rudy Fariñas of Laoag City
kept on calling her sister in the United States to
warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and
William Fariñas offered her two million pesos
supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a
house and lot in Baguio, the dropping of her
estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of
the persons responsible for the death of her
father, if she would refrain from testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such
cajolery and harassments, or perhaps because of
them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the
Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by
justice Fernandez of the displeasure expressed
by Olympus at justice Herrera's going out of his
way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his
refusal to honor the invitation to attend the
birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985,
as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May
2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with
her testimony, however, did not end with her
taking the witness stand. In the course of her
testimony several notes were passed to Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-
examined her, one of which suggested that she
be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa
who was suspected of having coached her as to
what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another
occasion, at a crucial point in her testimony, a
power brownout occurred; which lasted for about
twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into
darkness, and making most of those present to
scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass over
the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave
the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout
was limited to the building housing the
Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby
Manila City Hall and the Finance Building. Justice
Herrera declared that the main switchboard of the
Sandiganbayan electrical system was located
beside the room occupied by Malacañang people
who were keeping track of the proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that
August 26th hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and
Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984,
two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the
name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the
number of the car that took them away, also disappeared. On
January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina
Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was
kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They
have been missing since then, despite his attempts to find any of
them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five
persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his
appeal to the Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today,
still no one is looking for these people." And he appealed to the
new leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While
it is true that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show
an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa
Airfield or some other place, such showing would not necessarily
contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that
Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila International Airport.
Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such attempt of
scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of
conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans
designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator
Aquino. In any event, even assuming that the said piece of
evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully
contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the
prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite
minor inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could
have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that
it would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice
Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would
have been totally uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse
developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of
Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given
by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media
that he was not filing a motion for the reconsideration of said
denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy
to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in
the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of
finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of
something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran:
"Justice Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice
Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by
Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality
of such directive having been complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was
ordered by President Marcos to handle the case personally by
explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle
and not to a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The
evidence before the Comission on how the case happened to be
assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that
such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by
virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of
Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an announcement that Justice
Escareal would be presented by the respondents to testify on the
contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No
reason was given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like
to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the
Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were present
during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of
Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double
murder case were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985,
at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle Committee were
summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of the
two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the
case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary,
considering that before a case filed may be included in the raffle,
there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be
undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this
case within the limited time available therefor, the charge that the
raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people would
ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might
have been actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of
the case to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the
Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision
thereof, and not by any one of the two other members of his
division. . . .
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military
camp, instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody
came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter
issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in the
City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the
information given by the Warden of the City Jail that there was no
space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same
information was given when the custody was proposed to be
given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the
National Bureau of Investigation. At that point, the defense came
up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the
custody of the accused military personnel with their respective
Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said
Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan
Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice
Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given
such copy only after sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel: "There is
an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings
in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case
outside the Court had been monitored by Malacañang
presumably for it to know what was happening and to take
remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had
candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the
label of 'Office of the President of the Philippines' " were installed
in the courtroom for that purpose. There was a room in the
Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military
and Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the
proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacañang showed its
results on several occasions specified in the Report. Malacañang
was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's
presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and
forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese
Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once.
Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief,
suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office
when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by
NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody
of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted
"that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of
the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the
prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's
inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear that President Marcos
did not only give instructions as to how the case should be
handled He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be
complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That
President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be
acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said
manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly
designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly
conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then
administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of
the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be
charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that
they may again be prosecuted for the same offense in the event
that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in
favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of
the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by
the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. ... It was
deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six
accused on the standard ground that their guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and
appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not
being a total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the
part of the accused. The decision had to pronounce them
'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations,
and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a
rare phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be
favored with such total absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the
two justices who concurred with the majority decision penned by
Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified
that in October, 1985, when the decision was being
prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of the view
that some of the accused should be convicted he having found
difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice
Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice
Vera Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the
twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores
also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this
statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to
the Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN,
June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera
remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the
then President used, or more precisely, misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian
powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in
the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the
Report, supra, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitur22) since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against
all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 )
and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario
for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang
conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public
clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their
acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the
authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire
prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and
told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the
close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and
precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase
from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for
habeas corpus, 25"This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code
penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial
authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first which would
otherwise be inexplicable:—
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very
Fact Finding Board that he himself appointed to investigate the
"national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and
vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by
prestigious and free investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one
day ahead of the four majority members and instantly referred it
to respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if
it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four
majority members when they presented to him the next day their
report calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by
Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the
chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated
verdict of acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority
and minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the
military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy
Aquino and sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence
and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast
to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and
searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect
convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding
that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very
information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed
by Justice Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused)
granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them
"innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability,"
notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact
Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of
Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately
and in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10,
1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire
prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal
charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by
respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to
the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the
preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was
illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the
very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court
headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the
Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to
Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure
dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential
pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped
inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or
suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory
decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on
November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the
Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory
required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses
committed by military men 26-a) made it possible to refer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law.
As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not
by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot
and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly
Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no
evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as
police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the
appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed.
There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the
remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict
and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all
alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in
the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had
pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of
law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and
sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for
due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the
sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the
pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People
vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case its
right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of
the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan.
30, 1971]which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-
30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs.
Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27,
1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded
as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it
exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7,
1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction,
the same does not constitute a proper basis for a
claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of
its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated,
and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy
hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial
was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of an the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the
laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end
"deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its
eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they
could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming
powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and
threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them
from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in
locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and
reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan
maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced
its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time
or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly
hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of
warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to
the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of
being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making
assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to
produce their witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period
of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases
before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer
time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not
maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people
were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the
constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to
assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no
judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which
can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the
people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide
law-breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto
himself, he invites anarchy. the case on the merits without first making a final ruling on the
Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between him
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script
judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or of Malacanang.
re-opened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully
disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is PJ PAMARAN
fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and
presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, Well the court believes that we
respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment should proceed with the trial and
for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy then deal later on with that. After
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no all, the most important thing here
judgment at all By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights is, shall we say, the decision of the
can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it case.
are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. J. HERRERA

|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx I think more important than the

decision of the case, Your
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to Honor, is the capacity of the
prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the justices to sit in judgment. That is
accused alone. The interests of the society, which they have more important than anything
wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985)
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of (Emphasis supplied by
acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the Herrera). 31
party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean
injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then
justice where justice is due.30 wrongly blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly not having
joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.- stated, as follows:
The private prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for
inhibition of respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on ... the motion for inhibition above referred to
grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising related exclusively for the contempt proceeding.
from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution
Justice Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to defense neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time
counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at manifest a desire to file a similar motion prior to
the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution the submission of these cases for decision. To do
 it now is not alone out of season but is also a
confession of official insouciance (Page 22,
Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the
disqualification of respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure
recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs.
Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a verdict of
acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the double
jeopardy rule, not to mention the overiding and transcendental public interest that would
make out a case of denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of
the Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt
dismissal of their petition and lifting of the temporary restraining
order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision
had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required
the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments.
Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision
of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of
this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the
court in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent
judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to
imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without
awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of
respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's
declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-
determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to
annul the judgment, instead of the present action which was
timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition
of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such
judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the
presentation of competent proof heard by the Commission and
the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the
beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by the
collusion between the public respondents (court and
Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of
acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere
irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings or errors of
judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the
judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and
the sovereign people are not entitled to due process is clearly
erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence
cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not
exerted the pressure applied by the authoritarian president on
public respondents and that no evidence was suppressed against
them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot
now exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The
writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not
speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once more,
since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no
second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept
pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion
for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial
under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was
admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five
months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were
heard by the Court only last August 26th. The second motion for reconsideration is based
on an entirely new material ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the
petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacañang
conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March,
1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits
of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final
outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration.37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases
must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor.-There has been the long dark night of authoritarian
regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then
Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile
himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law and
authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and
the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in
his valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In the
past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an
extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege,
lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered
to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was
overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and
naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task
of restoring public faith and confidence in the courts. The
Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the
purse. Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the
truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its
cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiallity integrity and
fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of
law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by
the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the
Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the
nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new
trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming
instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its
victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become
simply the beginning of another. This simply means that the
respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged
against them before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied
the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now
be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties.
The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice
has prevailed as well as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed
to public office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing
authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people
or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the
appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our
system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the
appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus
given of rendering public service, the appointing authority
becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed
must be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in
accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late
Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court,
the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the
public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of
office, guided only, the Constitution and their own conscience and
honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation
with thanks for the invaluable services rendered by the
Commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals
Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In
the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and
without remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service
in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence,
evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to
the Court within the scheduled period and greatly easing the
Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is
granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the
petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment
is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent
Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said
cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and
with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that
the truth may be finally known and justice done to an

This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Feria, **** Fernan and Narvasa , ***** JJ., took no part.

 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003]
ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
[1]
1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Order of the Regional Trial
[2]
Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5, dated November
[3]
19, 2001, and its Order dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the civil
aspect thereof and to allow her to present evidence thereon.
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against
herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian
Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7474 which reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to
defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA
JAUCIAN TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK,
LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996,
in the amount of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O.
YAO, and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said
check as payment of 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS
MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said
check was issued and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount called
for therein and without informing the payee of such circumstance; that
when said check was presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same
was consequently dishonored and refused payment for the reason of
ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite demands, accused failed and refused
and still fail and refuse to pay and/or make arrangement for the payment of
the said check, to the damage and prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS
MARKETING CORPORATION.
[4]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution
On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased
300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through
Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner
gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the
Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by
one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao
accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was a
good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the
petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it
was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner
was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank
check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi
Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn
Against Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a
[5]
Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could
not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a)
she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario,
and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of
the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient
evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the
check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private
complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner
replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore
been effectively novated by the issuance of the second
check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for
insufficiency of funds, but for DAUD, which in banking parlance
means drawn against uncollected deposit. According to the
petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was
still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been
cleared.
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners
demurrer to evidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment
acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to
remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment
for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the
prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check,
her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding
the private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao,
admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained
at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of
the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with
the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under
Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial courts judgment
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the
value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore
ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum
[6]
of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a
plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order
denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial
court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the
trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly
liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the
applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case,
contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended
party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief
granted in Rule 33.
The Petition Is Meritorious
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused
by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without
specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing
fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required
for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted,
the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this
Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
[7]
may arise did not exist.
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment
of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant
and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of
the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent
to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal
actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the
sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the
vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the
offender. On the other hand, the action between the private
complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the
[8]
former.
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The
first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The
parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the
accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second
is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is
the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of
the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action,
the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. Under
[9]
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said
rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or
criminal.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil
liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution
has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only
on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on
the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall
state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages
caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
[10]
liability might arise did not exist.
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused
is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,
the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the
judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the
option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave
of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the
same. The aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court
may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2)
upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to
evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically
state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the
motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The
prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period
from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence
or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari
before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the
nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the
accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he
thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case
for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the
other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to
evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the
criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer
is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court,
the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of
the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues
an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment
on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that
the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby
[11]
violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b)
that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment
is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and
are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns,
[12]
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is
the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to
issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial
for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case,
and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of
rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal
evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the
proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if
any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and
sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits
them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to
submit written memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint
or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of
the case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the
accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action
arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no
waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a
reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before
the institution of the criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its
finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only
civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the
case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the
private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce
evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her
right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19, 2001 and January 14,
2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case
No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the reception of the
evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case and
for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the sur-
rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-
Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 charged in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00).

SO ORDERED.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit3 executed by
Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State
EN BANC Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia,
Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement
G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015 vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among
the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses
PEOPLE OF THE of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ former mayor of Bacolod City, particularly:
AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION), Respondent. 1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to
P80,000.00;
DECISION
2. D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to
PERALTA, J.: P68,000.00;

3. D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to

This special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
P19,350.00; and
Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to nullify and set aside the
October 10, 2014 Resolution1 of public respondent
4. D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to
Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, the dispositive portion of
P111,800.00 for Cash Slip No. 193402.4
which states:

Based on the verification conducted in the establishments

WHEREFORE, the (i) Motion to Set Aside No Bail
that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail and the
slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive
(ii) Urgent Supplemental Motion to the Motion to Set Aside
reimbursement from the Government the total amount of
No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with
P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate
Additional Prayer to Recall/List Warrant of Arrest filed by
overclaim of P274,306.75.
accused Luzviminda S. Valdez, are GRANTED.
The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office
Let the Order of Arrest issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-
(PACPO), Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas received the
CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 adopting the "no bail"
joint affidavit, which was thereafter resolved adverse to
recommendation of the Office of the Ombudsman
Valdez.
be RECALLED. Instead, let an Order of arrest in said cases
be issued anew, this time, fixing the bail for each offense
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of
which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining
half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents under Articles 2175 and 171,6 in
relation to Article 487 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). All
the cases were raffled before public respondent.
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-
CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez, who is still at-large,
caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.8 She
argued that the three cases are bailable as a matter of right
because no aggravating or modifying circumstance was
alleged; the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall
be taken from the medium period that ranged from 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying Article
48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is 20 years, which is
the maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition9 that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable as the
attending circumstances are immaterial because the charge
constituting the complex crime have the corresponding
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary.
Instead of a motion to fix bail, a summary hearing to
determine if the evidence of guilt is strong is, therefore,
necessary conformably with Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules.
Due to the issuance and release of a warrant of arrest,
Valdez subsequently filed an Urgent Supplemental Motion to
the Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix
the Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to Recall/Lift
Warrant of Arrest.10 Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition
thereto.11 Later, the parties filed their respective
Memorandum of Authorities.12
As aforesaid, on October 10, 2014, public respondent
granted the motions of Valdez. It recalled the arrest order
issued in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and
0324. In lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing
the bail for each offense charged in said cases in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner
elevated the matter before Us to resolve the lone issue of
whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
The Court shall first tackle Valdez's procedural objection.
She avers that the petition must be dismissed outright on
the ground that it was filed without first filing a motion for
reconsideration before public respondent, and that, even if
there are exceptions to the general rule, this case does not
fall under any of them.
We disagree.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may
lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a
quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid
down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition
for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a
motion for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, involves not just the right of the State to prosecute criminal
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the offenders but, more importantly, the constitutional right of
lower court; the accused to bail.

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of Now, on the main issue:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the The controversy is, in fact, not one of first
subject matter of the petition is perishable; impression. Mañalac, Jr. v. People14 already resolved that an
accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount
reconsideration would be useless; involved exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right because it has an actual imposable penalty
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there of reclusion perpetua.
is extreme urgency for relief;
In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is allowed to post bail since reclusion perpetua is not the
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is prescribed penalty for the offense but merely describes the
improbable; penalty actually imposed on account of the fraud involved.
It was also posited that Article 48 of the RPC applies "only
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity after the accused has been convicted in a full-blown trial
for lack of due process; such that the court is mandated to impose the penalty of
the most serious crime," and that the reason for the
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the imposition of the penalty of the most serious offense is
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, "only for the purpose of determining the correct penalty
upon the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law."
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public This Court, through the Third Division, however, denied the
interest is involved.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary petition and resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether
The issue being raised here is one purely of law and all the the constitutional right to bail of an accused is restricted in
argument, pros and cons were already raised in and passed cases whose imposable penalty ranges from reclusion
upon by public respondent; thus, filing a motion for temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Citing People v.
reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. Likewise, as Pantaleon, Jr., et al.,15 in relation to Section 13, Article III
petitioner claims, the resolution of the question raised in of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules, it
this case is of urgent necessity considering its implications was held that Mañalac, Jr. is not entitled to bail as a matter
on similar cases filed and pending before the of right since he is charged with a crime whose penalty
Sandiganbayan. As it appears, there have been conflicting is reclusion perpetua.
views on the matter such that the different divisions of the
anti-graft court issue varying resolutions. Undeniably, the To recall, the amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were
issue is of extreme importance affecting public interest. It manifestly in excess of P22,000.00. We opined that the
Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an
indivisible penalty. The Court's pronouncement is consistent
with the earlier cases of People v. Conwi, Jr.,16People v.
Enfermo,17 and People v. Pajaro, et al.18 as well as with the
fairly recent case of Zafra v. People.19
The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous cases are in
keeping with the provisions of the RPC. Specifically, Article
48 of which states that in complex crimes, "the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period." Thus, in Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents,
the prescribed penalties for malversation and falsification
should be taken into account. Under the RPC, the penalty
for malversation of public funds or property if the amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, aside from
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.20 On the other hand, the penalty
ofprision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00 shall be
imposed for falsification committed by a public
officer.21 Considering that malversation is the more serious
offense, the imposable penalty for Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents if the
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion
perpetua, it being the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling
in Mañalac, Jr. should be revisited on the ground that
Pantaleon, Jr. (as well as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo, Pajaro, et al.,
and Zafra) was disposed in the context of a judgment of
conviction rendered by the lower court and affirmed on
appeal by this Court. As will be shown below, the
appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an
accused who is charged with a complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
22
required. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant thereto, Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons
in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment. (4a)
SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (7a)23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term
"punishable" under the provisions above-quoted?
In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer
to prescribed, not imposable, penalty. People v.
Temporada,24 which was even cited by petitioner,
perceptibly distinguished these two concepts:
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general
prescription for the felonies defined therein which consists
of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as
the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249
of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years
of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending
or modifying circumstances which when present in the
commission of a felony affects the computation of the
penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus
modified, is referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the
case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances,
the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed
penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable
penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called
a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually
imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to
serve.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one
provided by the RPC before conviction to determine whether
the charge is bailable or not, while the penalty actually
imposed pertains to the prison sentence upon
conviction.26 Hence, it is maintained that the penalty
imposable for the offense charged against private
respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes Criminal
Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-bailable.
The argument is erroneous.
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00,
the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua. After trial, should
the commission of such crime be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt, the "imposable penalty"
is reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporalmaximum
to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its maximum.27 The
falsification, which is the means used to commit the crime
of malversation, is in the nature of a generic aggravating
circumstance that effectively directs the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period.28 The phrases
"shall be applied" and "shall impose," found in Articles 63
and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are of similar import as
the phrase "shall be imposed" found in Article 48. Both
Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be imposed after
considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s.
Finally, the "penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion
perpetua, considering that the ISL finds no application as
the penalty is indivisible.29
The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is
spot on had it not confused imposable penalty
with prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, reading through the
text of the assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-graft
court actually meant prescribed penalty whenever it
referred to imposable penalty. Therefore, in essence, the
ruling is correct. Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be
imposed in its maximum period, there is no doubt that, in
case of conviction, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The cases, however, are still at their inception.
Criminal proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the
proper time, therefore, to call for the application of the
penalty contemplated under Article 48 by imposing the
same in its maximum period.
For purposes of determining whether a person can be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is the imposable
penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which
should be considered and, not the penalty to be actually
imposed. Illustrative cases such as Catiis v. Court of
Appeals, et al. and People v. Hu Ruey Chun evidently
confirm this to be so.
x x x x
In both cases, therefore, it is the penalty imposable for
the offense charged that was considered for purposes of
bail.
A circumspect reading of substantive law validates this
view. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides
that: x x x x
On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
Notably, the word used is ["punishable,"] which practically
bears the same meaning as "imposable." It is only logical
that the reference has a direct correlation with the time
frame "before conviction" since trial is yet to begin; hence,
it can only be the penalty imposable of the offense charged
that can be considered for purposes of bail.
In these cases, the offenses charged are the complex
crimes of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents. In determining the penalty
imposable, it is the penalty for the most serious crime which
is considered. Between Malversation and Falsification, it is
Malversation which provides the graver penalty. As thus
provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, "[i]f
the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua."
The penalty, however, cannot be immediately applied in its
maximum period, or reclusion perpetua, since this will
already consider the application of the penalty in the event
of a conviction.
A clear perusal of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
The word used is "imposed," not imposable. Thus, the
reference can only point to the time when a judgment of
conviction is impending. If and when "the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period," is thus applied in the
proper application of the penalty to be imposed on the
accused. Certainly, this cannot be considered for purposes
of bail.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must
still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not amiss to point that in charging a complex crime,
the information should allege each element of the complex
offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent
offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions.31 Where
a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to
support the charge as to one of the component offenses,
the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.32
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be
found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved
during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would
be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is
a complex crime since it is only when the trial has
terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a
means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible
that only the elements of one of the constituent
offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse,
none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right
to bail and grant her the same only after trial if it turns out
that there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is
unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the
accused person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly
committing a complex crime that is not even considered as
inherently grievous, odious and hateful. To note, Article 48
of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature
of the constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition
of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law.
When committed through falsification of official/public
documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation
as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic
Act No. 7659.33 If truly a non-bailable offense, the law
should have already considered it as a special complex
crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape
with homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide,
which have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of
right to an accused charged with Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable
when compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which
is a heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080,34 as
amended by R.A. No. 765935 and R.A. No. 9346.36 Observe
that bail is not a matter of right in plunder committed
through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate
amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is alleged to
have committed malversation of public funds thru
falsification of official/public documents, which is not a
capital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a matter of
right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as
P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could
not have been contemplated by the law.
The foregoing interpretation is more favorable to Valdez as
an accused following the rule of lenity:
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the
rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the
37
accused. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused.38 When there is doubt on the interpretation of
criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused.39 Since penal laws should not be applied
mechanically, the Court must determine whether their
application is consistent with the purpose and reason of the
law.40
For having ruled that an accused charged with the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents that involves an amount in excess
of P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right, a
summary hearing on bail application is, therefore,
unnecessary. Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao,41 an
affirmative relief may be obtained from the court despite
the accused being still at-large. Except in petition for bail,
custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of
reliefs sought by the defendant (such as a motion to set
aside no bail recommendation and to fix the amount of bail
in this case) where the mere application therefor constitutes
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. Private respondent Luzviminda
S. Valdez is entitled to bail, as a matter of right, in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324. Public
respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division should be guided
by the latest Bailbond Guide. In any case, the amount
should correspond to the medium penalty multiplied by Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for every year of
imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Villarama.

Carpio,Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on official leave.
Villarama, Jr., J., pls. see Dissenting Opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissent of J. Villarama.
Leonen, J., see separate Dissenting opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and
during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and
determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
1
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14,
2 3
2014 and August 8, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged
with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
4
(PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively
5 6
filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause
be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition.
7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying
Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
8 9
law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination.
10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
11 12
Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail , both dated July 7, 2014,
13
which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In
support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to
post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that
the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged
with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal ,
not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed
resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its
evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand

bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-
bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In
fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily,
no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly
premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail
because while he is charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty
that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70)
years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be
said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances
will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after
trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his
bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must
also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a
flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior
showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s
Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
14
SO ORDERED.
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed
resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis
15
the July 14, 2014 resolution.
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for
certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to
fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two
(2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is
strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight
16
risk.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is
entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the
Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes
under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right
to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with
proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and
that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that
he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
standing. Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:

17
In its Comment , the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to
bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be
granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to
determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of
it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
regardless of the attendant circumstances.
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

24
Ruling of the Court This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court , as follows:
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
1. perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
Bail protects the right of the accused to with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
due process and to be presumed innocent perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
18
until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted
in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that,
19 under the law existing at the time of its commission and the
constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the 25
court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
20
accused.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
from committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
22 retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
26
before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has
23 been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail
accused’s presence at trial. 27
shall be recognized.
2.
Bail may be granted as a As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the
matter of right or of discretion Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of
right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
28
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
29
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided
none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section
5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or
not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the
30
Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma , "such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that
bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the
part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
31
the Prosecution. The indispensability of the hearing with notice has
32
been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court
already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is
mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged
with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder
case without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without
bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on
the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court
possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended
only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits
the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must
be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation
of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute
it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or
not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114,
Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate
these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is
neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the
discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a
summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
33
examination.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
34
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the
presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated
in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.
35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution,
whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that
might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the
presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the
presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not
consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant
clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has
bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being
36
appreciated in the accused’s favor.
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s
averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could
entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being
37
punishable with reclusion perpetua , simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made
by the trial court.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court
is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from
the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.
38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights
as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized
the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but
also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2
) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
39
circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction
is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his
utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not
ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
40
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation
in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
41
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the
Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as
a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations
conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following
conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure
levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed
of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with
carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4,
4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat)
documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal
drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular
s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
44
at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, was not
even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist
doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the
medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following: The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications; Hospital?

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia; DR. SERVILLANO:

c. Alpha thalassemia; No, Your Honor.

d. Gait/balance disorder; JUSTICE MARTIRES:

e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued
uncertain) in 2014; confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented PSUPT. JOCSON:

42
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).
No, Your Honor.
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) JUSTICE MARTIRES:
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, Why?
because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications PSUPT. JOCSON:
associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate
a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4)
exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen the best.
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma
43
or COPD. JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
age and ill health required special medical attention. His confinement Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the
present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the
hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but
probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities
45
to do those things, Your Honor.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The
People’s Court:
46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular
case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should,
regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence
47
the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute
to the effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal,
early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases,
later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and
medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that
the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the People’s
Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent
and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s
Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical
examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was
evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for
bail; and considering further that the said People’s Court has
adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-
quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against
Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in
which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that
they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison
would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident
and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with grave
48
abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed
and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of
his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his
defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in
court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be
had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused
to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail
49
without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the
scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time
realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored

the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during
the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s
Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
50
jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
51
reason of passion or hostility. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS
the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING
and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon
posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful
cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION the dubious interval, often years long, between arrest and final

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122 adjudication?[2] Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both
Petitioner,
Present: the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring

CORONA, J the accusedspresence at trial.[3]

., Chairperso
n,
VELASCO, JR.,
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
- v e r s u s - NACHURA,
PERALTA and
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
MENDOZA, JJ.

THE COURT OF APPEALS accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time
and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.[4] An accused not
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 17, 2010 released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his

x---------------------------------------------------x conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is

denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never
DECISION
owed.[5] Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however,

CORONA, J.: the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending

judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for potential hardships of prison.[6] On the other hand, society has a compelling

his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is

required,[1] is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant

what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in prison time.[7] Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail

pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court
custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment.[8] Under what circumstances an accused
may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the
[9]
interests of society and those of the accused.
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of
bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In
the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.[10]
THE FACTS
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11]
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12] Pending appeal, he
filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or
possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.[13] It invoked
the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-established
jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It
found that petitioner
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity
that his continued confinement during trial will
permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.
x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does
not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be
attended by his personal physician.[14]
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for
bail could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered
the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of
petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[15]

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial
of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by
the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent,
bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
THE ISSUE
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for
bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty
of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the
trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail
subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
 Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
(emphasis supplied) denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by

the prosecution,[17] however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply

in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in

application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third

a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,

granted. petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and

prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground that
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of
the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
procedural and substantive rules.
We disagree.
BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
FORBID GRANT OF PETITION It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution

without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by

Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is

application for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or

may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the

only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate

jurisdiction.[16] court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve
petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals

committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed

bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail
pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in
judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.[18] Ordinary abuse of
discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility.[19] It must be so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition
for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.[20]
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously
and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such
implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of
Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial
of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but
was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of
granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or
not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not
exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of
this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous
application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued
to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or
fact.[21] In this connection, Lee v. People[22] is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown
that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not
correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute
errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and
conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed
by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally
frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review
by certiorari will not only delay the administration of
justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.[23] (emphasis supplied)
WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,
RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where
the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment
exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances
enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement,
evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The
second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity
in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the
availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in
the following rules:
xxxxxxxxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but
not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said
court (Sec. 5); x x x[24] (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another
authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It
is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may
be denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial
of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not,
by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a
more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other
option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will
exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application
for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the
exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the basis
thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second
scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise
thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the
presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of
bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by
itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of
the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the
grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two
different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly
dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy
governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it
interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all
situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the
grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is,
one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if
any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by

will be granted pending appeal. death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere

fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in

the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily

114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be

checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its

all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the

appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners matter.[31] In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should

interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be

requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. [32] It should

bail-negating circumstances is present. also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the

particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the

However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice.[28] Choice
applicant,[33] among other things. More importantly, the discretion to
occurs where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number
determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily
(of options), there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of
includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
the outcome left to the decision maker.[29] On the other hand, the
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of
determined by the appellate court.[34] In other words, a threshold
[30]
discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and
requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro
relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail
forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable
pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court
issue.[35] This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged
on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory
with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking
effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon conviction by the
advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of

significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed
the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where

sound,[36]specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made

judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending
substantial error.[37] appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years

imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations

mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that

restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, bail pending appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious

petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius[38] rule in offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?

statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of

PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY
Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five
AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL
situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically

refers to the following or other similar circumstances. Hence, under the

Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history
rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third
and evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance,
denial or revocation of bail pending appeal. The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under
Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result conviction by the Court of First Instance. After judgment
by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court
from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by
of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as
the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted of right.

if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail

 Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by
the Court of First Instance. After conviction by the Court The significance of the above changes was clarified in
of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be
Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
bailed at the discretion of the court.
The basic governing principle on the right of the
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital
accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of
offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which, under the law existing at the time of its
which provides:
commission, and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right;
exception. All persons in custody, shall
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in
before final conviction, be entitled to
custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be
bail as a matter of right, except those
admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time
of its commission and at the time of the
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence
Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 of guilt is strong.

Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an
accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
follows:
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All
be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals
persons in custody, shall before final conviction be
the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law
strong.
at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar
when evidence of guilt is strong.
with respect to future as well as pending cases before the
trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital
policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the
offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an offense
accused, to wit:
which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be
1) When an accused is charged with an offense
admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
which under the law existing at the time of its commission
(emphasis supplied)
and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain
free on his original bail pending the resolution of his
appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant
to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense which under the law at the time
of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on
bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a
lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, the same rule set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense which under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail
is punishable by reclusionperpetua and is out on bail and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall
be placed in confinement pending resolution of his
appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third
rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before his
Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the
following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to
surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to
the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform
this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the
cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the
accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain
under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered
within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall
be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this
Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules
of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail.
(emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in
the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons
in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by
law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more
than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
accused, of the following or other similar admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
circumstances: prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-

recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to
circumstance of reiteration;
Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they
(b) That the accused is found to have do now.
previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence or has violated the conditions The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a
of his bail without valid justification;
more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful
(c) That the accused committed the offense adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon; allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or reasons.

his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after
(e) That there is undue risk that during the conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance
pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime. (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988

The appellate court may review the resolution of amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the
the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the
adverse party. (n) appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-

capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital
offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an offense matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage
which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to be of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not
admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
punished by reclusion perpetua.[39]
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94
not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant

imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph
down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail. of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown

by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications for on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States

bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail

More importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal emanated.[41] While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it

configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different

amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled from that in other democratic societies.

the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. [40] Under the In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the

present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial

Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not

imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.[42] In fact, it has

the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation even been pointed out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of

of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated

grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114,
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. Section 5.[43]

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity with The importance attached to conviction is due to
the underlying principle that bail should be granted only
an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed
by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that admit to bail. After a person has been tried and
 convicted the presumption of innocence which may be
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being
burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only
properly argued that the probability of ultimate
punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if
liberated on bail than before the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by
conviction.[44] (emphasis supplied)
a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of
relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the
[45]
Appeals (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already
trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in
effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise
prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction
discretion.
may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially

germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate

A FINAL WORD
sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites
be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our

criminal justice system and court processes.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. [46] From
 The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on

the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to
nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.)
issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order
dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002
denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20,
2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department
of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders
were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision
in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the
then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement
for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took
effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong
Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August
23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of
private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest
of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an
Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the
NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that
the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting
the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of
Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and
executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by
Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent
filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed
by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued
an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This
was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December
20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further
erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to
the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition
that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at
all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes
of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused
fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this
Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice
and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding;
and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if
they further desire, manifest before this Court to require
that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed
with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the
accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in
his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited
solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained
that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to
a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to
bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court
has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark
B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later
Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does
not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section
4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17,
1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the
right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of
the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th
century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty
of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the
other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity
of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now
taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of
international law are limited only to states was dramatically
eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts
characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against
peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and
all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed.
While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3the
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the
land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and
due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of
nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities
are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of
this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a
Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal.
After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no
crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as
a person who has committed the most serious crime known to
law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding,
some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law."
Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom
no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on
bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously
stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of
Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained
is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in
this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties,
the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal
of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him
at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign
power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not
by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty
on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the
machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if
such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that
Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask
for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of
the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional
arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused
if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December
20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In
other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard,
such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of
his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to
an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be
the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is
from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of
the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing,
the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations,
the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of
proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence
used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion
in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear
and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove
by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and
will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case
is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of
his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 104492-93 May 31, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ORLANDO FRAGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
V. Dennis M. Socrates for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ORLANDO FRAGO was charged before the court a quo with
rape and attempted rape, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 9144
and 9145, respectively.
In Crim. Case No. 9144, the Information states that in the
early morning of 26 September 1990, at about four o'clock, in
the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the accused Orlando
Frago —
. . . entered the sleeping room of the house
belonging to Fortunato Moral where JICELYN
LANSAP was sleeping, thereby Jicelyn Lansap
was bodily carried by accused Orlando Frago
to a nearby house belonging to Dado Andor
and with lewd design did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with
and have carnal knowledge with said Jicelyn
Lansap who at that time was deeply asleep,
against her will and without her consent, to
the damage and prejudice of Jicelyn Lansap.
In Crim. Case No. 9145, the Information alleges that in the
early morning of 26 September 1990, at about three forty-
five, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the accused
Orlando Frago —
. . . entered the room of the dwelling house of
Philip Pastera where one RONALYN
PASTERA, a girl 9 years of age, was sleeping,
and once inside the room, with lewd design
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously hold her head and bodily carry
said Ronalyn Pastera, thus commencing the
commission of a felony of Rape directly by
overt acts but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the said
felony by reason of causes other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused, that
is, Ronalyn Pastera was awakened and
shouted for help, thus forcing the accused to
release Ronalyn Pastera and ran away.
On 1 October 1991, after trial, the court a quo rendered its
decision finding the accused guilty of rape in Crim. Case No.
9144 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life and perpetual
absolute disqualification, to pay Jicelyn Lansap P30,000.00
for moral damages, and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 9145 for attempted rape, the accused was
acquitted on "reasonable doubt occasioned by lack of clear
and convincing evidence that the accused Orlando Frago
indeed performed against Ronalyn Pastera overt acts
constituting commencement of the commission of the crime
of rape."
In view of the acquittal of the accused in Crim. Case No.
9145, we are here called upon to review only his conviction
in Crim. Case No. 9144 for rape.
In holding appellant liable for rape, the trial court based its
decision mainly on its finding that the accused was
positively identified by his victim, complaining witness
Jicelyn Lansap, and that there was no ill motive on her part
to testify against him.
Jicelyn Lansap, a 15-year old high school student, was
boarding in the house of one Fausto Morales in
thepoblacion together with her cousins Susan and Adea
Bansil. The version of the prosecution is that before
proceeding to the boarding house of Jicelyn Lansap, the
accused, an ice cream vendor, first went to the residence of
Ronalyn Pastera at around three forty-five in the morning
and surreptitiously entered Ronalyn's bedroom where she
was sleeping. He fanned her face with his handkerchief and
then lifted her bodily from the floor. He was about to take her
out of the room when she suddenly woke up and screamed
for help thus prompting her father to respond immediately by
switching on the lights. As a consequence, the accused had
to drop Ronalyn on the floor and run out of the house. The
prosecution would seem to infer that from the house of
Ronalyn where he failed in his alleged attempt to defile her,
the accused next went to the boarding house of Jicelyn
some fifty meters away.
According to Jicelyn, she and her cousins went to bed at
about eight o'clock in the evening of 25 September 1990.
Then at around five-thirty the following morning, she was
awakened by appellant who was already strangling her. She
shouted for help so that he immediately ran away. She felt
pain all over her body, more particularly in her private part,
and discovered that she was no longer wearing her skirt and
underwear. To her consternation, she found herself in the
vacant house of a certain Dado Andor. So she lost no time
looking for her way home. Upon reaching her boarding
house, she narrated her harrowing experience to her cousins
who in turn related the incident to her mother.
At eight o'clock that morning, Jicelyn and her mother went to
the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Marcela
Remegio who found Jicelyn with "Labia Majora and Minora
still coaptated and with sign of external struggle . . .
contusion, abrasion all over face . . . around neck . . . scratch
marks on both medial surface of thigh . . . vulva swollen . . .
presence of fresh hymenal laceration at six o'clock . . .
[e]xamination for the presence of spermatoza was positive . .
. physical virginity lost." 1
On the same day, Ronalyn's father and Jicelyn reported the
incidents to the police authorities. Both Ronalyn and Jicelyn
identified the accused as
their attacker in the police line-up on 28 September and 8
October 1990, respectively, and then filed their formal complaints
against him.
On his part, appellant seeks sanctuary in the alcove of denial and
alibi. He claims that at nine o'clock in the evening of 25
September 1990, he was already asleep with his wife and
children. He woke up at six o'clock the following morning. He was
very tired that night because he was vending ice cream in
the poblacion the whole day.
In his appeal, appellant imputes error to the trial court in
convicting him on the basis of an identification which was made
without the assistance of counsel and according credence to the
story of Jicelyn, which he considers fantastic, thereby denying his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that it was during his detention, when he was
not assisted by counsel, that he was identified by Jicelyn. Thus
he invokes People v. Hassan 2 where this Court affirmed the right
of an accused to counsel at all stages of the proceedings, the
most crucial of which is his identification, and denial thereof
entitles him to acquittal.
We cannot sustain the argument. We quote hereunder the
pertinent portions constituting the ratio decidendi in the Hassan
case —
. . . The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr., was
made to confront and identify the accused alone
at the funeral parlor, without being placed in a
police line-up, was "pointedly suggestive,
generated confidence where there was none,
activated visual imagination, and, all told,
subverted his reliability as eyewitness. This
unusual, coarse and highly singular method of
identification, which revolts against the accepted
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates
the esteem of every just man, and commands
neither our respect nor acceptance" (citing People
v. Cruz, No. L-24424, 30 March 1970, 32 SCRA
181, 186; People v. Olvis, et al., G.R. No. 71092,
30 September 1987; Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-29169, 24 SCRA 663, 679).
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the
police investigator between the self-proclaimed
eyewitness and the accused did violence to the
right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the
investigation into the commission of a crime
especially at its most crucial stage — the
identification of the accused. 3
While the infringement of the constitutional protection to the rights
of the accused should result in the acquittal of the accused in
proper cases as a matter of course, appellant's reliance
on Hassan is misplaced and shows a deficient comprehension of
our rationalization therein. We acquitted the accused in that case
because, among other things, of its peculiar factual milieu. There
was no line-up of suspects. There was only the accused. Thus,
we observed:
As it turned out, the method of identification
became just a confrontation. At that critical and
decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped
unevenly against the young, poor, and
disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
adopted in this case in which only the accused
was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral
parlor, and in the presence of the grieving
relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an
uncounselled confession . . . (italics supplied) 4
In contrast, Orlando Frago was singled out by Jicelyn in a police
line-up composed of ten persons. 5 Some were stout while others
were slim, but almost all of them were mustachioed and five were
long-haired. 6 In Gamboa v. Cruz, 7 we were explicit —
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation,
i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions
or admissions from the respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being interrogated
must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among
other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-
cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They
leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in
several cases, this Court has consistently held
that no custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged
by the person arrested, or by any person in his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his
behalf, and that, while the right may be waived,
the waiver shall not be valid unless made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor
General, the police line-up (at least, in this case)
was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to
counsel. The Solicitor General states:
When petitioner was identified by
the complainant at the police line-
up, he had not been held yet to
answer for a criminal offense. The
police line-up is not a part of the
custodial inquest, hence, he was
not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it
was held that when the process
had not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory as
when police investigation does not
elicit a confession the accused
may not yet avail of the services of
his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of
the United States Federal
Supreme Court, 378 US 478,
1964).Since petitioner in the
course of his identification in the
police line-up had not yet been
held to answer for a criminal
offense, he was, therefore, not
deprived of his right to be assisted
by counsel because the
accusatory process had not yet
set in. The police could not have
violated petitioner's right to
counsel and due process as the
confrontation between the State
and him had not begun. In fact,
when he was identified in the
police line-up by complainant he
did not give any statement to the
police. He was, therefore, not
interrogated at all as he was not
facing a criminal charge. Far from
what he professes, the police did
not, at that stage, exact a
confession to be used against him.
For it was not he but the
complainant who was being
investigated at that time. He "was
ordered to sit down in front of the
complainant while the latter was
being investigated" (par. 3.03,
Petition). Petitioner's right to
counsel had not accrued (Italics
supplied). 8
This ruling was reiterated in the recent case of People
v. Santos. 9 We similarly find in the case at bench. There is
nothing in the records which shows that in the course of the
identification from the police line-up the police investigator sought
to extract any admission or confession from appellant. Thus far,
we agree with the prosecution.
But we sustain the defense on the insufficiency of the
identification of appellant Orlando Frago.
A careful dissection of the testimony of Jicelyn herself indubitably
shows that she has no reliable basis for pointing to the accused
as the person who raped her. She says that his face was
covered; that he had long hair; that while the person who raped
her had high nose (matangos) his nose is just "katamtaman"; that
she did not have the opportunity to observe the height of the
rapist; and, that the only evidence of sexual intercourse is the
result of the medical examination.
Appellant argues that the "contusion, abrasion all over the face,
around the neck, presence of scratch marks on both medial
surface of thigh" 10 did not necessarily indicate resistance on her
part, contending further that it is a matter of judicial notice that
passionate kissing and petting could normally produce "injuries."
According to him, Jicelyn herself disclosed that she had a suitor
for whom she had "feelings of affection," thus concluding that she
may have submitted herself to him.
A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction, reverence to which
remains undiminished to this day, is that the Court will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the
record some fact or substance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. This is due to the fact that the trial court is in a
better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. 11
There are indeed reasons to deviate from the general rule. We
have examined carefully the entire transcript of stenographic
notes and we do not hesitate to conclude that the exception to the
rule must be applied. There was no positive identification of
Orlando Frago by Jicelyn. Her testimony on direct examination
supports this conclusion. While she would make it appear that
she was able to positively identify the accused, her account of the
incident proved otherwise.
There seems to be no question that, on the part of the Pastera
sisters, they may have recognized appellant positively because
their room was lighted with a wick/gas lamp 12 and he was not
wearing anything on his face. 13They identified him on 28
September 1990, 14 whereas Jicelyn pointed him out only on
8 October 1990. 15 The possibility that Jicelyn had conferred with
the Pastera sisters regarding the identity of the accused before
she testified is not remote because they were neighbors. 16 As a
consequence, when Jicelyn testified on
13 August 1991, she gave the same description of her attacker as
that given by Ronalyn Pastera.
Under the circumstances, we are inevitably drawn to the
conclusion that Jicelyn's identification of Orlando Frago was
merely patterned after the identification made by the Pastera
sisters. This is then a derivative, not positive, identification. The
identification then of appellant by Jicelyn is doubtful. 17 Her
testimony, standing alone, does not satisfy that quantum of proof
required to support a judgment of conviction. The material
discrepancies therein engender perplexity as to its veracity and
reliability.
Besides, it appears highly incredible that Jicelyn could be bodily
lifted from her room in her boarding house and taken some three
hundred meters away to the vacant house of Dado Andor where
she was supposedly abused 18without awakening her and her two
cousins who were all sleeping side by side with
her. 19 Moreover, we find the following observations of the Solicitor
General decidedly speculative, hence, unacceptable —
. . . appellant's earlier act of fanning his
handkerchief over the face of Ronalyn Pastera
evidently shows that there was something in it,
most likely drug, to induce her to remain sleeping.
This same method was apparently employed by
appellant to Jicelyn Lansap that kept her sleeping
while being taken to another house and therein
raped by him, 20
because a mere reading of Ronalyn's testimony on cross-
examination would indicate that she did not smell any substance
emanating from her attacker.

Appellant's denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the

prosecution cannot rely on their frailty to enhance its cause. The
prosecution must draw its strength from its own evidence. As has
been oft-repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of
the accused must be taken into account and the proof against
him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience is
satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial
should the sentence be for conviction. 21 Unfortunately for the
prosecution, its evidence has miserably failed to pass that
conscience test.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-

appellant ORLANDO FRAGO guilty of rape in Crim. Case No.
9144 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is ACQUITTED as
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It
appearing that he is detained, his immediate release from
custody is ordered unless he is held for another cause.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital
punishment is the amplitude of legal protection accorded to the
offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed
to minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of
human fault. Indeed, there is no critique on the plethora of rights
enjoyed by the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he
committed the crime. Any margin of judicial error is further
addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But, even before
that, all convictions imposing the penalty of death are
automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving
two death sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the role of
this ultimate judicial intervention.
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate
informations filed before the Regional Trial Court, for Palawan
and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping
with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles
335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of
January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center,
Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused by means
of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife
and by means of deceit, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with one Mia Taha to her damage and
prejudice.1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with
Serious Illegal Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994,
at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, a private individual, and being a teacher
of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha,
a girl of 17 years old (sic), for a period of five (5)
days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her
liberty against her will and consent and without
legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of
said Mia Taha.2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded
not guilty to said charges and, after the pre-trial was terminated, a
joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of
January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin,
Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is
near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where
she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she
decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because
she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened
the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her
neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was
then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark,
complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light
coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-
appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty
with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened
the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside
her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her
first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could
not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was
continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead
with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and
she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the
incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that
her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to the
gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding
house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went
after she left him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding
house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything
about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went
home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise
did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant
might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same
day, appellant arrived at the house of her parents and asked
permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to
solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot."
When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with
appellant because she did not want her parents to get into
trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in
silence, with Mia following behind appellant, towards the highway
where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except
for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep
because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board
the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the
poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a
room where they staye d for three days. During the entire
duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not
allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She
was continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She
was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she
was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was
always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to
the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was
raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked
inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days,
or on January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant
came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated
as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a
certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same
day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle
the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District
Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined by Dr.
Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished,
cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.
 BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored
areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly
developed labia majora and minora, hymenal
opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration
superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis,
approximately 1/2 cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in
shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits
2 fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal
rugae, cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2
fingers with slight resistance, presence of
laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis
approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening
can admit an average size penis in erection with
laceration.4
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in
stellate shape and that there was a laceration, which shows that
complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis
of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock
position, he could not say that there was force applied because
there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old
laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign
of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote
the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she never loved
appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he
did to her; and that she did not notice if there were people near
the boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when
appellant started to remove her panty, she was already lying
down, and that even as appellant was doing this she could not
shout because she was afraid. She could not remember with
which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely silent
from the time she was made to lie down, while her panty was
being removed, and even until appellant was able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not
know if he was armed but there was no threat made on her or her
parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked
permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house
with appellant walking ahead of her. When she was brought to
the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid.
However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not
pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset
Garden but she did not notice if there were other people inside.
She likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary
doorknob, similar to that on the door of the courtroom which, even
if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added
that there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her,
they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights but
she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she
woke up, appellant was always beside her. She never saw him
close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the
latter arrived at their house in the morning of January 22, 1994,
she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen.
When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the
latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go
with appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However,
when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected
time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan.
When they could not find them there, she went to the house of
appellant because she was already suspecting that something
was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did not come
home.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) station at Pulot, Brooke's Point
and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following
day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the police station near the
NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan
program where she made an appeal to appellant to return her
daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting
there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He
further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so
he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily
acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of
Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified that
when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was
raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she
did not return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately
brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and
then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for
rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed
separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and
offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part,
her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them,
Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave
them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed
an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for
kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to
before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified
that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her
husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and
was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.
The defense presented a different version of what actually
transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in
August, 1993 at the Palawan National School (PNS). Although he
did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told
him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a
serious relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else.
It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual
intercourse as lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra
Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the
coach of the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M.
of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters allegedly because
she missed him, and she then decided to spend the night there
with him.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January
20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at the PNS, was looking
inside the school building for her husband, who was a security
guard of PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from
the Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she heard a
girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang
iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately
opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny
Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they were doing
there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously
caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly closed
the door and left. According to this witness, complainant admitted
to her that she was having an affair with appellant. Desirous that
such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed
appellant's wife about it when the latter arrived from Manila
around the first week of February, 1994.
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an
affidavit in connection with the present case, but the same was
not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was
executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her
sworn statement, later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna
Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia
Taha about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that
appellant is a married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang
pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much.
Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M.,
Mia Taha went to his office asking for help with the monologue
that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He
agreed to meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan. However, when he reached the place, the house
was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly,
they just sat on a bench near the road where there was a lighted
electric post and they talked about the matter she had earlier
asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after
which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the
street while appellant headed for home some fifteen meters
away.
It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant,
Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of Mia at PNS and who was
then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and
asked what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant
merely replied that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena
proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday
Zapanta watering the plants outside the porch of her house.
When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking
with appellant and she noticed that they were quite intimate
because they were holding hands. This made her suspect that
the two could be having a relationship. She, therefore, told
appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and was
already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home.
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them
seated on the same bench. Filomena further testified that she had
tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had
a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She
had likewise told complainant's grandmother about her activities.
At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant
appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming
that she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former
student. On cross-examination, Filomena clarified that when she
saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were
talking naturally, she did not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if
appellant was pleading with her.
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant
met Mia's mother on the road near their house and she invited
him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted.
Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission
from her mother for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion,
and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a
plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it
contained her things which she was bringing to her cousin's
house. Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they
solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan
Store.
Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and
there was no more available transportation, so she suggested
that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was
nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations,
aside from the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would
commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon
to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who
arranged their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for
their bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening, however,
appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going
out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth,
he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home
to Pulot. He did not bring complainant along because she had
refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the
house of complainant's parents and informed them that Mia spent
the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they
would just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and
waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did
not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw
while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with
Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to
Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the
room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door
until it was opened by her.
Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they
were doing, but she merely answered that what she was doing
was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was
not supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her.
What complainant did not know, however, was that appellant had
already reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not
to tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions.
Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and
complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple looked very
happy.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their
entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from January 22 to 24,
1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really
wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing
was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her
threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus,
according to appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani
Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a
policeman, to report the matter.
Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him
at his aunt's house to ask for assistance in procuring
transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of
Mia were already looking for them and so they intend to go to
Puerto Princesa City. Virey accompanied them to the house of
Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife,
but the latter refused to help because of the complicated situation
appellant was in.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a
complaint had been filed against appellant and after finding out
that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain
Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at
Vallan's house that same day and bared everything about him
and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in
Muslim rites but appellant refused because he was already
married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate
in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement
with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents
of complainant at the latter's house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because
complainant could no longer afford to pay their hotel bills, the
couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's
friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they
stayed for two days. They just walked along the national highway
from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five
hundred to seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house,
Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified
that the couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to
each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that
they were having a relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called
appellant "Papa." While they were there, she would buy food at
the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes
watch television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she
chose to go with appellant despite the fact the he was a married
man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She never told
him, and Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that
she was supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later
claimed. He also testified that several police officers lived within
their neighborhood and if complainant had really been kidnapped
and detained, she could have easily reported that fact to them.
Mia was free to come and go as she pleased, and the room
where they stayed was never locked because the lock had been
destroyed.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant
was merely an acquaintance of his; that it was Naem who went to
the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that
complainant's mother never went to his house; and that it was
Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the
lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with
appellant at Edward's Subdivision and informed him that
complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house
the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994,
appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents because
they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and
to tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to
see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her
that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the
municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of
Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo
Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at
the police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her
parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not
given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of
January 27, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and
he was detained at the police station after Mia and her parents
lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered
to appellant on different occasions two letters from complainant
dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As
Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able
to identify the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After
a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of
desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However,
he claims that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him,
not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid
P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade
them, neither did he request his mother to talk to complainants in
order to settle the case.
Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife
at and raped Mia Taha on January 21, 1994. However, he
admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that
was already on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's
Subdivision, they never had sexual relations. Appellant was told,
when complainant visited him in jail, that her father would kill her
if she refused to testify against him, although by the time she
testified in court, her father had already died.
Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit
relations in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he
decided to have a relationship with her because he wanted to
change her and that was what they had agreed upon. Appellant
denied that, during the time when they were staying together, Mia
had allegedly asked permission to leave several times but that he
refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994
when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily
gave her permission to go.
He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they
left her parents' house on January 22, 1994, but which she left
behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on
January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the
provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the
provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest
was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit
a counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty.
Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the complainants had
already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having
signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in
connection with these cases.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied
that she delivered any letter to appellant when the latter was still
detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-
examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for
her, although she clarified that she does not have any quarrel or
misunderstanding with appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the
testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the incident at the Orchids
Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at
the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She
likewise negated the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on
January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant
contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day.
Similarly, she disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona
Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She vehemently
disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with
intimate relations, since there never was a time that they became
sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following
testimonies of the defense witnesses: that she told appellant
"iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered
"wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about
her relationship with appellant; that she was the one who
registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that
appellant left her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22,
1994; that Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed there for
five minutes, because the only other person who went there was
the room boy who served their food; that they went to the house
of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and that she
was free to roam around or to go out of the lodging house at
Edward's Subdivision.
Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that
she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to have sex with him and
claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still
in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako
sa iyo" when she allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him,
since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that
she threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her
since she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset
Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded
by appellant.
However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her
signature on her test paper marked as Exhibit "4" and admitted
that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing
on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous
disclaimers, she also admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1"
and "2" all belong to her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the
Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to testify in these cases,
identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant
in jail on February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on
duty at that time, he asked her what she wanted and she said she
would just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told
him he had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at
the visiting area which is around ten meters away from his post,
and then he saw her hand over to appellant a letter which the
latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant
never requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver,
testified that in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, he was plying
his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed
by Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there
were already several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got
off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to
the Sunset Garden.
On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape
and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him
to the maximum penalty of death in both cases.6 By reason of the
nature of the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this
Court on automatic review.
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for
rape7 and kidnapping with serious illegal detention8 filed by Mia
Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of
Brooke's Point issued a resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding
the existence of a prima facie case against appellant. On
February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha
executed an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention.10 However, pursuant to a
joint resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II
Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with
serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant
Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment
of the court below, on the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-
appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the
doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence
adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape as
cited in its decision reiterating the case of People
vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).
III. The trial court erred in concluding that the
accused-appellant had consummated the crime of
rape against private complainant.
IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any
credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of
the defense.
V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-
appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention as the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and
credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and completely ignoring the testimonies
of the defense witnesses.
VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there
was implied admission of guilt on the part of the
accused-appellant in view of the offer to
compromise.
VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the
complainant be indemnified in the sum of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each
of the alleged crimes committed.
IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the
death penalty for each of the crimes charged on
the accused-appellant despite the fact that the
crimes were allegedly committed prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659.12
A. The Rape Case
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences.
It exposes both the accused and the accuser to humiliation, fear
and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have
to bear for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or
acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. 14This
notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal
prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which
the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times
upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material
element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this
evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the
accused must be acquitted.15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of
State authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of
innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against
him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is
the weakness of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution
must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused
may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated
testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is
clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate
court in reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the
crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable
crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must
be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to
be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent;17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.19
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply
demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there was
no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the
charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than
a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of rape under
paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first,
that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and,
second, that the same was accomplished through force or
intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond
peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress with
complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night
of January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in
the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation
and contends that on said date and time, he merely talked with
complainant outside that house. We find appellant's version more
credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the
boarding house, appellant was already inside apparently waiting
for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have
known that she was going there on that particular day and at that
time, considering that she does not even live there, unless of
course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on
anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be
stretching the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a
generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established
nor even intimated by the prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is
precluded by the implausibility that plagues it as regards the
setting of the supposed sexual assault.20 It will be noted that the
place where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary
residence but a boarding house where several persons live and
where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did
not even bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral
break or that the boarding house had remained closed for some
time, in order that it could be safely assumed that nobody was
expected to arrive at any given time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he
went to the boarding house upon the invitation of complainant
because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue
for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go
inside the house because it was locked and there was no light, so
they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This
testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense
witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of
January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant
seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even
advised them to go home because it was already late and
appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of witness Pielago,
was waiting for him at the school building. On rebuttal,
complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night.
Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.21
It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged
ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly
accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they
eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural
tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he
had raped,22and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given
the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further
exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the
felon is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as
practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be
expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to
dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the
crime, and from all other things and circumstances related to the
offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even
the slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where
no man pursueth.
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove
that the accused was at the scene of the crime are admissible as
relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as
a circumstance tending to identify the appellant.23 Consequently, it
is not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let
himself be seen with the complainant immediately after he had
allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the
notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany
complainant up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic
location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just
across the street,25 and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only
around thirty meters away.26
Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the
incident she went directly to her boarding house where she saw
her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness
to corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the
former was the very first person she came in contact with from
the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan
boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though
they supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have
testified on complainant's physical appearance and to attest to
the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date
and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's
version that it was Mia Taha who invited him to the boarding
house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the
school contest. This is even consonant with her testimony that
appellant fetched her the following day in order to solicit funds for
her candidacy in that same school affair.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the Q Conversing with whom?
boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that
she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, A With my cousin, Your Honor.
later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again
wavered and said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Q Your cousin's name?
Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at
around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with
A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your
her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another
Honor.
version and said that when she reached the boarding house it
was dark and there was nobody inside.
xxx xxx xxx
The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her
answers in order to cover up or realign the same with her prior PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony
even on this single episode, thus: Q You said that this Dane or
Danny Godoy raped you, will you
Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, please relate to this Honorable
at about 7:00 o'clock in the Court how that rape happened?
evening, do you remember where
you were? A On Friday and it was 7:00
o'clock in the evening.
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q Where were you?
Q Of what date?
A I was in the boarding house of
Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir. A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Q Why were you there? PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

A I was conversing with my friend Q Then what happened?

there, Sir.
A I went to the boarding house of
COURT: my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I
passed (through) the kitchen and
 then when I opened the door
somebody grabbed me suddenly.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During that time were there
other people present in that
boarding house where you said
Danny Godoy raped you?
A None, Sir.
COURT:
Q So, the house was empty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q I thought your cousin was there
and you were conversing?
A When I went there she was not
there, Your Honor.27 (Corrections
and emphasis supplied.)
2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use
of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her
neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as
corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are
undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio
Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said
findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so
committed through forcible means by appellant against
complainant on January 21, 1994.
The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr.
Divinagracia, was a week old and already healed, and the
conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse
with a man on the date which she alleged, do not establish the
supposed rape since the same findings and conclusion are
likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took
place with the consent of complainant at Sunset Garden on
January 24, 1994.28 Further, rather than substantiating the
prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of
commission of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs
of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more credence to
appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the
absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical
force.29In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the
testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical
evidence showing use of force.30
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial
at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-legal expert opined
that it could not be categorically stated that there was force
involved. On further questioning, he gave a straightforward
answer that force was not applied.31 He also added that when he
examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of
bruises.32 The absence of any sign of physical violence on the
complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to
the act.33 While the absence in the medical certificate of external
signs of physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape,34 the instant case is clearly an
exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt
on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the
laceration corroborated complainant's assertion that there was
sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the
alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative
evidence is not considered sufficient, since proof of facts
constituting one principal element of the crime is not corroborative
proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important
element of the crime.35
Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not
really strong because she was afraid of appellant. Again
assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we
nevertheless strongly believe that her supposed fear is more
imaginary than real. It is evident that complainant did not use the
manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her honor
and chastity.36 She failed to make any outcry when appellant
allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is
likewise no evidence on record that she put up a struggle when
appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty,
opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside
her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in
committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force of
whatever nature or form.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is
too conveniently general and ruefully unconvincing to make this
Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual
attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any
struggle or objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such was
not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a woman
defending her virtue and honor.37 Her failure to do anything while
allegedly being raped renders doubtful her charge of
rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in
the context of her asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained
dress are not essential, and need not be presented, as they are
not indispensable evidence to prove rape.39 We incline to the
view, however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist
other corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving
the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the
other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of
complainant is inherently weak and no other physical evidence
has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except
for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated
the existence of one of the essential elements of the crime. We
cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the
deliberate non-presentation of complainant's blood-stained skirt, if
it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's
cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the
alleged assault is of the utmost importance as tending to
establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted
whether a conviction for the offense of rape should even be
sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the woman
unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the
time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately
thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her
under all the circumstances of the
case. 40
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape,
appellant went to her parents' house and asked permission from
them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy.
Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply
that appellant was armed and that by reason thereof she was
forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor
intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the
supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire
belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on that occasion
and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make
good his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On
the contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant
respectfully asked permission from her parents for her to
accompany him.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment
can only be described as paradoxical: it was so strangely normal
as to be abnormal.41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon
seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only the day
before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage,
revulsion, and disgust.42Instead, she meekly went with appellant
despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of
neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have
deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From her
deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by
appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of complainant. Such a
nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the
demeanor that would naturally be expected of a person who had
just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood.43
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human
reactions to it are categorical: admiration and sympathy for the
courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous
violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being
interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look
at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with
extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free
themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every
woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and
demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be
cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes
through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in
mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the
law.44
The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from
disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to
support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and
conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome
of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts.46
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone
testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994
incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man.
All that the victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a
knife at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted and under these
threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The
question then that confronts the trial court is whether or not
complainant's testimony is credible.47 The technique in
deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated
parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can
often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire testimony.
Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in relation
to what else has been stated.48
In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much
to be desired. The court below made no serious effort to
dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence
for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that
in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be
accepted with precipitate credulity.49 In finding that the crime of
rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that
portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the January 21,
1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly,
there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But
if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony
concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which
unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or
declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily
exposed.
There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's
testimony which inveigh against its being accorded the full credit
it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any
other, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's
judgment of conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as
logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion
towards reversal of said judgment.50 Thus:
1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein
appellant at the Sunset Garden and around three times at
Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the
same allegations. If this were true, it is inconceivable how the
investigating prosecutor could have overlooked these facts with ATTY. EBOL:
their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information
charging appellant with only one count of rape. The incredibility of Let it be recorded that the lock is a
complainant's representations is further magnified by the fact that doorknob and may I ask that the
even the trial court did not believe it, as may be inferred from its door be locked and opened from
failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to the inside.
uncharitably assume that it was similarly befuddled.
COURT:
2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was
never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a Alright (sic) you go down the
manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his witness stand and find out for
innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape yourself if you can open that door
cases, this claim that complainant now advances appears to be a from the inside.
common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.
CLERK OF COURT:
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days
and three nights and that she never noticed if appellant slept
Witness holding the doorknob.
because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if
she slept side by side with appellant, complainant admitted that
everytime she woke up, appellant was invariably in bed beside COURT:
her.51
The key is made to open if you are
4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it outside, but as you're were (sic)
was always locked and it could not be opened from the inside. inside you can open it?
But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:
A Yes, sir.
Q And yet the door could be
opened by you from the inside? Q Is there no other lock aside from
that doorknob that you held?
A No, Sir, it was locked.
A There was, Your Honor.
Q Can you describe the lock of
that room? Q What is that?

A It's like that of the door where A The one that slides, Your Honor.
there is a doorknob.
 Q And that is used when you are
already inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases
ours.)
5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at
Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly offering token or futile
resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry,
no attempt to flee or attract attention to her plight.53 In her own
declaration, complainant mentioned that when they checked in at
Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information counter
where appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the
fact that appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She
likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and
brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from
appellant, she could have grabbed every possible opportunity to
escape. Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling
is the prosecution's failure to present these two people she
mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or
corroborated complainant's story.
6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of
January 22, 1994, they left the house together and walked in
going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated
that appellant went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if
appellant really had evil motives, that he would be that careless. It
is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable of
instilling such fear in complainant that she could not dare take
advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant, and
run as far away from him as possible despite all the chances
therefor.
7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the
filing of the rape case, complainant was dropped from school and
was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support
and commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear
that the school authorities were heartless people who turned their
backs on her and considered her an outcast. That would be
adding insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is
that Mia and her parents were never heard to complain about this
apparent injustice. Such complacency cannot but make one think
and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid
justification for the drastic action taken by the school and the
docile submission thereto by the Taha family.
On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial
court's decision was replete with sweeping statements and
generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of
appellant's testimony, declared them to be preposterous and
abnormal, and then hastened to conclude that appellant is indeed
guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction
based, not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on
the weakness of that of the defense, which is totally repugnant to
the elementary and time-honored rule that conviction should be
made on the basis of strong, clear and compelling evidence of the
prosecution.54
IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and
complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart theory"
does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the
case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim
are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most
cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are
against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the
relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for
that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal
action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them
than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And
this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to
appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified
by the highly credible testimonies of several witnesses for the
defense, viz.:
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21,
1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a bench in
front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place,
and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia
about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of
the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia
why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married
man. Mia answered that she really loves him.55 He heard her call
appellant "Papa".56 The couple looked happy and were sweet to
each other.57
3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on
redirect examination that he asked Mia if she knew what she
getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she
really loved Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative.
When he was trying to give counsel to appellant, complainant
announced that if appellant left her, she would commit
suicide.58 He could see that the couple were happy together.59
4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal
Engineering Office where he worked was located within the
premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple
and that when he was advising appellant that what he was doing
is wrong because he is married and Mia is his student,
complainant reacted by saying that no matter what happened she
would not leave Godoy, and that if she went home her father
would kill her.60 He also observed that they were happy.61
5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the
day before the alleged rape incident, inside one of the classrooms
and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant,
"Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas
tayo."62 She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with
her relationship with appellant.63
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an
intimate relationship with complainant, which were substantially
corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully
confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted
of bare, unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent
and detailed assertions of appellant.64 Mere denials are self-
serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight
greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses.65
Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have
supplied. They were replete with details which could have been
known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability
thereto.66 His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the
earmarks of truth. This is not to say that the testimony of
appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must
have colored his account, even on the assumption that he could
be trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much
in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity. More to
the point, there is enough to raise doubts that do appear to have
some basis in reality.67
Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony
is improbable, ridiculous, nonsensical and incredible is highly
uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not
mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible
one.68 It does not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on
many grounds of the testimony and the supposed inconsistencies
arise merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself
although not completely.69
Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied
by the evidence presented by the defense, the most telling of
which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which
she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail.
For analysis and emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:
27 Feb. 94
Dane,

Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis

sa sakit.

Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong

malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo
ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa
bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed
ang mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako
ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila
na hindi ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako.

Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng

Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana
ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay
kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila
kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko
ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi
ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong
luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na
gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi
manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay
dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo
lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor
Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas Dane,
na lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng
bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa
disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo
kay Lorna. nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil
naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil
gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila. sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si
nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa
Please sir . . . Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo
itong si Arquero sa DECS para matanggal ka sa
pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan
kong lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong
tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi
sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden
na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot
samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang
nalaman dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko
nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil
nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila
ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat
kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal
lang kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo
nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon
ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang
kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya,
nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng
damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin ka
pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas
ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa
may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano
ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong
puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga
magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba
akong hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang
laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong
hangarin sa iyo.
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin
eloquently speak for themselves. It was complainant's
kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi
handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from
mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil
appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the handwriting
kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay
on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena
ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si
Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former
Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa
teachers of complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting.
no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko
The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring
rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong
the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give
makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya.
any probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the
dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert was
presented to analyze and evaluate Lthe same.
o
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned A Yes, sir.
document examiners, more familiarly called handwriting experts,
is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are Q And they have been your
not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting.72 This is teachers for several months
so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the before this incident of January 21,
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who 1994, am I not correct?
believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his A That is true, sir.
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said
Q And you have (sic) during these
section further provides that evidence respecting the handwriting
past months that they have been
may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
your teachers you took
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
examinations in their classes in
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to
their particular subject(s)?
the satisfaction of the judge.73
A Yes, sir.
The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's
handwriting on the basis of the examination papers submitted to
them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise Q And some of those test papers
carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters are in the possession of your
with the standard writing appearing on the test papers as teachers, am I correct?
specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and
conclusions of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt A Yes, sir.
that they were written by one and the same person. More
importantly, complainant herself categorically admitted that the Q I will show you Exhibit "4"
handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her. previously marked as Exhibit "4", it
appears to be your test paper and
It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the with your signature and the
trial court again chose to turn a deaf ear to this conclusive portion alphabet appears in this exhibit
of complainant's testimony: appears to be that of Mia Taha,
please examine this and tell the
ATTY. EBOL: Honorable Court if that is your test
paper?
Q Did I get you right on rebuttal
that Mrs. Erna Baradero and A Yes, sir.
Filomena Pielago were your
teachers? Q That signature Mia Taha I
understand is also your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will
you please examine this Exhibit
"4-A" and tell this Honorable Court
if you are familiar with that.
A What subject is that?
Q I am just asking you whether
you are familiar with that.
A I cannot remember if I have this
kind of subject, sir.
Q How about this signature Mia
Taha, are you not familiar with that
signature?
A That is min(e), sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C"
which appears to be that in Math,
are you familiar with that
signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, these letters in alphabet
here are in your own handwriting?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny this Exhibit "1"
your signature?
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny that this is your
handwriting?
A That is my handwriting, sir.
Q Also Exhibit "2"?
A Yes, sir.74
While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never
delivered any letter of complainant to herein appellant, the
witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando
Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that
time, testified of his own accord because he knew that what
Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never talked to
Amando Pasion nor requested him to testify for the defense, as
related by the witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason
whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion to the
effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail
and in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters
marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by
appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference
does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of
the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise
whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has
long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a
claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth
an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.75
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense
overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense
charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come
from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem,
who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed
appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could
marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first
made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was
already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until
the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the
settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen
Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself,
her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was
never present in any of said meetings.76
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the
time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of
compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.77 In
another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be
drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court,
where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations
and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the
established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and
traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the
relations between the parties.78
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not
looked upon with favor. It may, however, create serious doubts as
to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's
explanation about the filing of criminal charges.79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant
are very revealing. Most probably written out of desperation and
exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents,
complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo,
aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil
nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila,
hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously
referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out
of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that
the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her
parents of the intimate relationship between her and appellant. In
order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the
moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced
to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas
in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal
which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire
families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted
to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody
else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and
escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she
had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not
sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of defloration, that is not
always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The
books disclose too many instances of false charges of
rape.81 While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the
judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges,
especially where the offended parties were very young and
presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure
indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise
reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused
when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that
the rape charges were merely motivated by some factors except
the truth as to their commission.82 This is a case in point. The
Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the
prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty
and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of
appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of complainant's
feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As
her teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to
complainant and helped her develop in manners and virtue
instead of corrupting her.83Hence, even as he is freed from
physical detention in a prison as an instrument of human justice,
he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a
measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do
not rule out such other legal options against him as may be
available in the arsenal of statutory law.
VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on
the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a
person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally
disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that
an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more
presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions conflict,
one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other
his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis
for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis
exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be
regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the
other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the
presumption against innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack of any
evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence continues.84
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been
explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is
accorded the testimony of the complaining
witness, on the theory that she will not choose to
accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to
the stigma and indignities her accusation will
entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape
victim who decides to speak up exposes herself
as a woman whose virtue has been not only
violated but also irreparably sullied. In the eyes of
a narrow-minded society, she becomes a
cheapened woman, never mind that she did not
submit to her humiliation and has in fact
denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be
the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want
to be titillated by the intimate details of her
violation. She will squirm through her testimony as
she describes how her honor was defiled, relating
every embarrassing movement of the intrusion
upon the most private parts of her body. Most
frequently, the defense will argue that she was not
forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual
act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity
will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the
outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted
woman, a pariah because her purity has been
lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why
many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet,
suppressing her helpless indignation rather than
denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason
why, if a woman decides instead to come out
openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth
regardless of its consequences. . . .85
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded
upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a
substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion
or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the
crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so.86 Its
purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an
uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the
People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable
mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the
prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his
guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.87 This is in
consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be
resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory
of guilt when it is possible to do so.88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and
in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence in favor of herein
appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that
the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused
must prevail in this particular indictment.
B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable
proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty.89 In the present charge for that crime,
such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution.
Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from
pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several
grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's
evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of
appellant, as hereunder explained:
To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to
fetch her at her parents' house the day after the alleged rape
incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her
parents to permit her to help him solicit contributions for her
candidacy. When they left the house, appellant walked ahead of
her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing
their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one could
deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any
felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty.
One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was
committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described
by complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha
family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which
later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind
by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was
later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot
conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first
allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely
leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the
knowledge and consent of her parents who passively looked on
without comment.
Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside
the room which they occupied, whether at Sunset Garden or at
Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door
from the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was
asked on cross-examination about the kind of lock that was used,
she pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then
ordered that the door of the courtroom be locked and then asked
complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do
so and, in fact, she admitted that the two locks in the room at
Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the same
manner. This demonstrably undeniable fact was never assailed
by the prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of
Fernando Rubio that the room which was occupied by the couple
at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the
lock thereof was broken.
When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they
walked along the national highway in broad daylight.
Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek
the help of other people and free herself from appellant if it were
true that she was forcibly kidnapped and abused by the latter.90 In
fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves
from the time they left complainant's home and during their
extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house.
According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant
the day after they went to Sunset Garden to inform them that Mia
spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor
impugned by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On
the other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha that she made a
report to the police about her missing daughter was not supported
by any corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was
the police officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever
identified or presented in court.
We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed
to prove any motive on his part for the commission of the crime
charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge
where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime.91 It
is true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case
is immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not
have to be proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak,
without any motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of
the accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an
acquittal is in order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the
complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature
be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement
or a lovers' tryst, immoral though it may be.
As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to
admit in evidence the bag of clothes belonging to complainant
which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its
announced supposition that the clothes could have easily been
bought from a department store. Such preposterous reasoning
founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact
that on rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an
explanation or clarification from complainant about said clothes,
strengthens and reinforces our impression of an apparently
whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters which
could have been easily verified were thus cavalierly dismissed
and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a
conclusion was then drawn by said court.
We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly
regarded disquisition of this Court against the practice of
excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial
court:
It has been observed that justice is most
effectively and expeditiously administered where
trivial objections to the admission of proof are
received with least favor. The practice of
excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of
the questions should be avoided. In a case of any
intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development
of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
the testimony is relevant or not; and where there
is no indication of bad faith on the part of the
attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a
rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof offered
will be connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the battle over
which he presides, a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of
proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact
shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of the error
without returning the case for a new trial, a step
which this court is always very loath to take. On
the other hand, the admission of proof in a court
 of first instance, even if the question as to its form,
materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never
result in much harm to either litigant, because the
trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its
duty, upon final consideration of the case, to
distinguish the relevant and material from the
irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed
and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme
Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
materials before it necessary to make a correct
judgment.94

At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records

of these cases sufficient and substantial evidence which warrant
and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto, we take
this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience
of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital
punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.

Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No.

7659 which reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous
crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days
after its publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the
Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Times
Journal,95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes
misinterpreted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny
Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in Criminal
Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court for
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby
ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless he is otherwise
detained for any other valid cause.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION The Facts

Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC

On July 17, 2006, the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City rendered a
ANGELES,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Decision[2] in Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-69655-56 convicting respondent of
BRANCH 121, CALOOCAN CITY Present:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.[3] The criminal cases are now on
Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA).[4]
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, andOn July 25, 2006, Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP
REYES, JJ. Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter [5] to then Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible for this
Court, in the public interest, motu proprio to order the immediate
Promulgated:
suspension of the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC Decision.
January 31, 2008
SSP Velasco opined:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
x 1. Judge Angeles now stands convicted on two counts of a
crime, child abuse under Republic Act 7610, which
involves moral turpitude. Until she clears her name of
DECISION such conviction, her current moral qualification to do the
work of a judge is under a dark cloud. Litigants seeking
NACHURA, J.: justice in our courts are entitled to a hearing by judges
whose moral qualifications are not placed in serious
doubt.

Before this Court is yet another administrative case confronting respondent 2. Although her conviction is not yet final, the
presumption of innocence that Judge Angeles enjoyed
Adoracion G. Angeles (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
during the pendency of the trial has already been
Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City (sala) filed by the Office of the overcome by its result. The presumption today is that she
is guilty and must clear her name of the charges.
Court Administrator[1] (OCA) recommending that she be suspended pending
the outcome of this administrative case. xxxx
It simply would not be right to have a person presumably
guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude to hear and
adjudicate the cases of others.
 3. Under section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, since the RTC of Quezon City convicted
Judge Angeles of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, she no longer has
a right to bail and, therefore, should ordinarily be held in
prison pending adjudication of her appeal. That the RTC
of Quezon City chose
to exercise its discretionary power to nonetheless grant
her bail does not change the fact that, except for the bail,
Judge Angeles rightful place by reason of conviction is
within the confinement of prison.
It would seem incongruous for the Supreme Court to
allow convicted felons out on bail to hear and adjudicate
cases in its courts.
4. Finally, as a sitting judge who wields power over all
persons appearing before her and has immeasurable
influence within the judicial system as one of its
members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure
to bear, not only on the members of the Court of Appeals
and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office
of the Solicitor General that prosecutes her case on
appeal. Only temporary suspension from official function,
pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial
clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice
is not going well in her case.
On July 27, 2006, the matter was referred to the OCA for comment and
recommendation.[6]
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter and by virtue of this Court's
Resolution[7] dated March 31, 1981, the OCA submitted to this Court a
Report[8] dated August 25, 2006 with an attached Administrative
Complaint,[9] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this
administrative complaint be given due course and,
respondent be ordered to file her Comment within ten
(10) days from receipt. Considering the evidence is prima
facie strong, it is respectfully recommended that she
be INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED pending the outcome
of the instant case or until further orders from this Court.
It is further recommended that after the Comment is filed,
the administrative proceeding be suspended to await the
final outcome of the criminal cases filed against her.
In a Resolution[10] dated September 18, 2006, this Court's Second Division
approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from
performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final resolution of her
criminal cases or until further orders from this Court.
On October 6, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration[11] of the aforementioned Resolution. Respondent claimed
that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the
opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's
letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted
that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested
that the two criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and
have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with
this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt.

On the other hand, on October 11, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Urgent
Appeal/Manifestation[12] to the Court En Banc on the alleged unethical
conduct of respondent, seeking the immediate implementation of this
Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006. On October 16, 2007, SSP
Velasco filed an Opposition to the said Motion for
[13]
Reconsideration, manifesting that respondent continuously defied this
Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006 as she did not desist from
performing her judicial functions despite her receipt of said Resolution on
October 6, 2006. SSP Velasco stressed that an order of suspension issued by
this Court is immediately executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. Moreover, SSP Velasco reiterated that due to her
conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in
order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to obtain a
favorable decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in
the integrity of the judiciary.
Correlatively, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Caloocan, Malabon,
Navotas Chapter (IBP-CALMANA Chapter), through its Public Relations
Officer (PRO) Atty. Emiliano A. Mackay, wrote a letter [14] dated October
18, 2006 addressed to the Second Division of this Court inquiring as to the
effectivity of the Resolution suspending the respondent so as not to sow
confusion among the legal practitioners and party litigants with pending
cases before the respondent's sala. Likewise, the IBP-CALMANA Chapter
manifested that respondent did not cease to perform her judicial functions as
evidenced by a Commitment Order[15] issued by respondent on October 16,
2006, and handwritten manifestations[16] of some party litigants attesting
that on various dates they attended hearings before respondent's sala. In the
same vein, in an undated letter[17] addressed toAssociate Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, the Concerned Trial Lawyers in the City
of Caloocan raised the same concern before this Court.
In her Reply[18] to SSP Velasco's Opposition, respondent admitted that she
continued discharging her bounden duties in utmost good faith after filing
her motion for reconsideration. She averred that she did not have the
slightest intention to defy or ignore this Court's Resolution which did not
categorically state that the said suspension is immediately executory.
Respondent reiterated her arguments against the suspension order on the
grounds that she was deprived of due process; that her conviction is not yet
final; and that the crimes for which she was convicted have nothing to do
with the discharge of her official duties. Lastly, respondent claimed that the
instant case is but another harassment suit filed against her by SSP Velasco
because she earlier filed an administrative complaint against the latter for
maliciously indicting respondent with respect to another case of child abuse.
On October 25, 2006, respondent filed a Manifestation of Voluntary
Inhibition[19] stating that she is voluntarily inhibiting from handling all cases
scheduled for hearing before her sala from October 25, 2006 to November
13, 2006.
On October 27, 2006, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in respondent's
[20]
sala. Per Report of the judicial audit team, it was established that
from October 6, 2006 to October 23, 2006, respondent conducted hearings,
issued orders, decided cases and resolved motions, acting as if the order of
suspension which the respondent received on October 6, 2006 was only a
mirage. The Report was brought to the attention of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (CA Lock). [21]
On October 30, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Administrative Complaint
against respondent for violation of the Court's Circulars, the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, and the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and for
Gross Misconduct, asseverating, among others, that the suspension order
[22]
was immediately executory and that integrity as mandated by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
In her Comment,[23] respondent, in addition to her previous contentions,
argued that the Resolution dated September 18, 2006 ordering her
suspension was issued only by a Division of this Court contrary to Section
11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
On November 9, 2006, SSP Velasco filed a Supplement to the
Opposition to Respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[24] of the
Resolution dated September 18, 2006. Thereafter, numerous
[25]
pleadings were filed by both parties practically repeating their previous
allegations.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated February 19, 2007, this Court lifted the
suspension of respondent on the ground that:
Upon verification, it appears that the Office of the Clerk
of Court, Second Division, indeed failed to attach a copy
of the OCA complaint to the copy of our resolution
dated September 18, 2006sent to Judge Angeles. Due
process requires that Judge Angeles be accorded the
opportunity to answer the complaint.
Respondent was then given a fresh period of ten (10) days from the receipt
of the OCA Administrative Complaint within which to file her comment.
On March 15, 2007, respondent filed her Comment[26] with the following
material assertions: (1) that CA Lock as Court Administrator and who in
behalf of the OCA stands as the complainant in this case, has no personal
knowledge of the facts, issues and evidence presented in the criminal
cases; (2) that the instant case, filed eleven (11) years after the criminal
charges for child abuse were filed by Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay,
smacks of malice and bad faith on the part of CA Lock; (3) that CA Lock is
a friend and former subordinate of then National Bureau of the Solicitor General (OSG) that prosecutes her case on appeal. Only her
Investigation (NBI) Director Epimaco Velasco (Director Velasco), father of suspension from official function, pending resolution of her case, will
herein party SSP Velasco, thus, CA Lock's ill motive against respondent is neutralize her judicial clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that
clear; (4) that CA Lock should not use the OCA to harass a member of the justice is not going well in her case.[28]
judiciary; (5) that the decision in the aforementioned criminal cases has not
yet become final; (6) that the acts for which she was convicted are totally
In response, respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion
alien to her official functions and have nothing to do with her fitness and
with a Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in contempt of Court [29] due to this
competence as a judge; (7) that there is no wisdom in the imposition of the
aforementioned statement. Respondent argued that such statement betrays
suspension which in this case is preventive in character because respondent
SSP Velasco's cheap and low perception of the integrity and independence
cannot do anything through her office that could possibly cause prejudice to
of this Court, of the CA and of the OSG. It also shows his utter lack of
the prosecution of the child abuse case; (8) that the lifting of the suspension
respect for the judicial system. Moreover, respondent added that since she
order retroacts to the date of its issuance; (9) that the instant case should be
was not furnished a copy of the OCA Administrative Complaint, the
struck down because the judgment of conviction was contrary to law and
issuance of the suspension order deprived her of her right to due process
jurisprudence; and (10) that under the circumstances, all the charges were
and prevented her from fully ventilating her arguments. Respondent,
merely concocted by respondent's detractors in order to embarrass,
likewise, questioned SSP Velasco's legal personality in this case as it was
humiliate and vex her.
the OCA which, motu proprio, initiated the filing of the said case.

In his Motion for Reconsideration[27] of this Court's Resolution

In a Resolution dated July 4, 2007, this Court, among others, directed SSP
dated February 19, 2007, SSP Velasco argued that respondent's deprivation
Velasco to file his comment on respondent's motion to cite him for
of her right to due process was cured when she filed her motion for the
contempt. On August 21, 2007, SSP Velasco filed his Comment claiming
reconsideration of the suspension order; thus, there is no need to lift such
that he has legal personality to file pleadings before this Court because it
order. He reiterated his previous statement that as a sitting judge who wields
was he who initiated the filing of this case through his letter to then Chief
power over all persons appearing before her and thus has immeasurable
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban on July 25, 2006. He admitted that the
influence within the judicial system as one of its members, Judge Angeles
allegedly contemptuous statements were merely lifted from said letter. He
could definitely cause pressure to bear, not only on the members of the
argued that the former Chief Justice or the Court for that matter, did not find
Court of Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of
any contemptuous statement in the letter. Taking the letter in its entire
context, SSP Velasco posited that he did not commit any act of
disobedience to the orders of this Court; neither did he bring the Court's
authority and the administration of law into disrepute nor did he impede the
due administration of justice. Nowhere in the letter was it stated that this
Court, the CA and the OSG could be pressured; the letter merely stated that
respondent could cause pressure. SSP Velasco pointed that the letter to the
then Chief Justice, in itself, shows his respect for the judiciary and the
promotion of the administration of justice.
[30]
In her Reply to said Comment, respondent argued that it cannot be said
that somebody could cause pressure if no one is believed to be susceptible
to pressure. Thus, the use of this kind of language tends to degrade the
administration of justice and constitutes indirect contempt. She stressed that
SSP Velasco's act of misrepresenting himself as the complainant in this case
while it is clear from the Resolution of this Court that the OCA motu
proprio filed the same, is per se contemptuous.
Meanwhile in its Memorandum,[31] the OCA reiterated its earlier position
that respondent should be suspended pending the outcome of this
administrative case. The OCA opined that the Resolution lifting the
suspension order was basically premised on the ground that respondent was
not accorded her right to due process. By filing her Comment raising
arguments against her suspension, respondent has fully availed herself of
such right. However, the OCA submitted that respondent's arguments are
devoid of merit on the following grounds: (1) the Court Administrator need
not personally know about the criminal cases of respondent because the
instant case is based on a public document, i.e., the decision of the RTC
convicting the respondent of child abuse; (2) the fact that said decision has
not attained finality is of no moment for what is being sought is merely
preventive suspension. Thus, in the event that respondent is acquitted in the
criminal cases of which she stands accused, she will receive the salaries and
other benefits which she would not receive during her suspension; (3) even
if the acts of child abuse have no connection with respondents official
functions as a judge, it is established that the private conduct of judges
cannot be dissociated from their official functions; (4) respondent's
preventive suspension shall serve an important purpose: it will protect the
image of the judiciary and preserve the faith of the people in the same; and
(5) citing the case of Leonida Vistan v. Judge Ruben T. Nicolas,[32] the RTC
decision convicting respondent of child abuse is prima facie evidence that
respondent committed the said crime which indicates the moral depravity of
the offender and, as such, warrants the punishment of dismissal from the
service. Thus, the OCA recommended that respondent be suspended
pending the outcome of this administrative case and that the CA be directed
to resolve the criminal cases with dispatch.
The Issues
There are two ultimate issues in this case:
First, whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP Velasco for indirect
contempt of Court; and
Second, whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the
respondent pending the resolution of this administrative case.
The Court's Ruling
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
In Pilar Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Romeo C. Albarracin,[33] we held:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their
witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct
contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive
contempt is that which is committed out of the presence
of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice would constitute indirect
contempt.
In her Comment/Opposition with Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in
contempt of Court, respondent espoused the view that SSP Velasco is guilty
of indirect contempt for using language which tends to degrade the
administration of justice. But if this were so, respondent should have
availed herself of the remedy in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent
to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall
be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance
with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings
for civil actions in the court concerned . . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
A charge of indirect contempt must be filed in the form of a verified
petition if it is not initiated directly by the court against which the
contemptuous act was committed. On previous occasions, we clarified that
such petition is in the nature of a special civil action. Certified true copies of
related documents must be submitted with the petition and appropriate
docket fees must be paid. The requirement of a verified petition is
mandatory. As Justice Florenz D. Regalado has explained:
This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the
proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings.
 While such proceeding has been classified as a special
civil action under the former Rules, the
heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been
for any party to
file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful
fees therefor and without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now
required in the second paragraph of [Section 4].[34]
On the charge of indirect contempt of court, we therefore find that SSP
Velasco's statement, while irresponsible, did not necessarily degrade the
administration of justice as to be considered contumacious. The salutary
rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position
in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of
contempt that justifies the courts exercise of the power of contempt. [35] We
note that SSP Velasco's statement was made in support of his argument for
the imposition of preventive suspension, i.e., to prevent the respondent from
using her current position to alter the course of the investigation and the
disposition of the appealed criminal cases.
Nevertheless, SSP Velasco must bear in mind that as a lawyer, he must be
circumspect in his language. We remind him of our admonition to all
lawyers to observe the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
Canon 8. Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to
help build and not unnecessarily destroy the peoples high esteem and regard
for the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
A lawyer's language may be forceful but should always be dignified;
emphatic but respectful, as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether
written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel, and
should use such language as may be properly addressed by one person to
another.[36]
We likewise resolve the second issue in the negative. The Court cannot
fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA.
Pertinent is our ruling in Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles,[37] which involved the same parties and where we held:
An act unrelated to a judge's discharge of judicial
functions may give rise to administrative liability even
when such act constitutes a violation of penal law. When
the issue is administrative liability, the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to support a
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the
dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an
administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the
administrative case. Conversely, conviction in the
 criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding
of guilt in the administrative case. We emphasize the
well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, and each
must be disposed of according to the facts and the law
applicable to it.
In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,[38] the Court held that the mere existence
of pending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a
ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would
open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondents conviction by the RTC does
not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's
argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently
on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she
still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the
accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the
evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence continues. [39] In Mangubat
v. Sandiganbayan,[40] the Court held that respondent Sandiganbayan did not
act with grave abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when it ruled
that despite her convictions, "Preagido has still in her favor the
constitutional presumption of innocence x x x (and until) a promulgation of
final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails." The Court
therein further held that such ruling is not bereft of legal or logical
foundation and cannot, in any sense, be characterized as a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment. So also must we hold in this case.
Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint leveled against
a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or
disbarment.[41] As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against
judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create
adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove
that other than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was
rendered against the respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other
lawful grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension. Based
on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true
that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty,[42] the rules
on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in
the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.[43]Likewise, we consider
respondent's argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive
suspension as the criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she
cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to
influence the CA to render a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive
suspension has also been rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: A reading of
administrative case.
the motion for reconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly anchored
on SSP Velascos malicious speculations about the guilt of the
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly
undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate from the
and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the imposition of
poisonous intentions of attention-seeking individuals, are no different from
preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in
garbage that should be rejected outright;[49] and His malicious
respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against
insinuation is no less than a revelation of his warped mindset that a persons
former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent,
position could cause pressure to bear among government officials. This
her use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below the
brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the
standard expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a
DOJ to cause pressure to bear and obtain a favorable disposition of the
magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in
administrative cases lodged against him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of
conduct and in language.[44] Illustrative are the following statements: CA
his own ghost?[50]
Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex;[45] In a frenzied display of
arrogance and power;[46] (CA Lock's) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of
It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent should
the findings of the trial court;[47] and when (CA Lock) himself loses his
exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting
objectivity and misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the object
language. She must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial office
of his fancy, then it is time for him to step down. [48] In the attempt to
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of
discredit CA Lock, respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the
restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for accepting and occu
controversy, to wit:
pying their exalted positions in the administration of justice.[51]
It is noteworthy to mention that CA Locks hostile attitude
was aggravated by his embarrassment when the
undersigned mentioned to him that she knew how he used One final word. The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings
his influence to secure a position for his son at the RTC
Library of Pasay City which was then managed by Judge that they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge
Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son be them the prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion,
assigned to the library to enable the latter to conveniently
adjust his schedule in reviewing for the bar examination. may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this privilege
must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds,
and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give
them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-G.R. CR No. 30260
their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of involving respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles with dispatch.
two irresponsible children.
SO ORDERED.
Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should bear in mind that they are high-
ranking public officers whom the people look up to for zealous,
conscientious and responsive public service. Name-calling hardly becomes
them.

Cognizant of the adverse impact and unpleasant consequences this

continuing conflict will inflict on the public service, we find both officials
wanting in the conduct demanded of public servants.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Nevertheless, respondent Adoracion
G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the RegionalTrial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 121, is hereby REPRIMANDED for her use of intemperate
language in her pleadings and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall merit a more severe sanction.

Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of Justice

is hereby WARNED that he should be more circumspect in the statements
made in his pleadings and that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely. The motion to cite him for contempt is DENIED for lack of
merit.
 United States Supreme Court
UNITED STATES v. ASH, (1973)
No. 71-1255
Argued: January 10, 1973 Decided: June 21, 1973
The Sixth Amendment does not grant an accused the right to have
counsel present when the Government conducts a post-indictment
photographic display, containing a picture of the accused, for the
purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the
offender. A pretrial event constitutes a "critical stage" when the
accused requires aid in coping with legal problems or help in meeting
his adversary. Since the accused is not present at the time of the
photographic display, and, as here, asserts no right to be present,
there is no possibility that he might be misled by his lack of
familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional
adversary. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , distinguished. Pp.
306-321.
149 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 461 F.2d 92, reversed and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 321. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 326.
Edward R. Korman argued the cause for the United States. With him
on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney
General Petersen, and Jerome M. Feit.
Sherman L. Cohn, by appointment of the Court, 408 U.S. 942 ,
argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case the Court is called upon to decide whether [413 U.S. 300,
301] the Sixth Amendment 1 grants an accused the right to have
counsel present whenever the Government conducts a post-
indictment photographic display, containing a picture of the accused,
for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of
the offender. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, held, by a 5-to-4 vote, that the
accused possesses this right to counsel. 149 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 461
F.2d 92 (1972). The court's holding is inconsistent with decisions of
the courts of appeals of nine other circuits. 2 We granted
certiorari [413 U.S. 300, 302] to resolve the conflict and to decide
this important constitutional question. 407 U.S. 909 (1972). We
reverse and remand.
I
On the morning of August 26, 1965, a man with a stocking mask
entered a bank in Washington, D.C., and began waving a pistol. He
ordered an employee to hang up the telephone and instructed all
others present not to move. Seconds later a second man, also wearing
a stocking mask, entered the bank, scooped up money from tellers'
drawers into a bag, and left. The gunman followed, and both men
escaped through an alley. The robbery lasted three or four minutes.
A Government informer, Clarence McFarland, told authorities that
he had discussed the robbery with Charles J. Ash, Jr., the respondent
here. Acting on this information, an FBI agent, in February 1966,
showed five black-and-white mug shots of Negro males of generally
the same age, height, and weight, one of which was of Ash, to four
witnesses. All four made uncertain identifications of Ash's picture. At
this time Ash was not in custody and had not been charged. On April
1, 1966, an indictment was returned charging Ash and a codefendant,
John L. Bailey, in five counts related to this [413 U.S. 300,
303] bank robbery, in violation of D.C. Code Ann. 22-2901 and 18
U.S.C. 2113 (a).
Trial was finally set for May 1968, almost three years after the crime.
In preparing for trial, the prosecutor decided to use a photographic
display to determine whether the witnesses he planned to call would
be able to make in-court identifications. Shortly before the trial, an
FBI agent and the prosecutor showed five color photographs to the
four witnesses who previously had tentatively identified the black-
and-white photograph of Ash. Three of the witnesses selected the
picture of Ash, but one was unable to make any selection. None of the
witnesses selected the picture of Bailey which was in the group. This
post-indictment 3 identification provides the basis for respondent
Ash's claim that he was denied the right to counsel at a "critical
stage" of the prosecution.
No motion for severance was made, and Ash and Bailey were tried
jointly. The trial judge held a hearing on the suggestive nature of the
pretrial photographic displays. 4 The judge did not make a clear
ruling on suggestive nature, but held that the Government had
demonstrated by "clear and convincing" evidence that in-court
identifications would be "based on observation of [413 U.S. 300,
304] the suspect other than the intervening observation." App. 63-
64.
At trial, the three witnesses who had been inside the bank identified
Ash as the gunman, but they were unwilling to state that they were
certain of their identifications. None of these made an in-court
identification of Bailey. The fourth witness, who had been in a car
outside the bank and who had seen the fleeing robbers after they had
removed their masks, made positive in-court identifications of both
Ash and Bailey. Bailey's counsel then sought to impeach this in-court
identification by calling the FBI agent who had shown the color
photographs to the witnesses immediately before trial. Bailey's
counsel demonstrated that the witness who had identified Bailey in
court had failed to identify a color photograph of Bailey. During the
course of the examination, Bailey's counsel also, before the jury,
brought out the fact that this witness had selected another man as
one of the robbers. At this point the prosecutor became concerned
that the jury might believe that the witness had selected a third
person when, in fact, the witness had selected a photograph of Ash.
After a conference at the bench, the trial judge ruled that all five color
photographs would be admitted into evidence. The Court of Appeals
held that this constituted the introduction of a post-indictment
identification at the prosecutor's request and over the objection of
defense counsel. 5 [413 U.S. 300, 305]
McFarland testified as a Government witness. He said he had
discussed plans for the robbery with Ash before the event and, later,
had discussed the results of the robbery with Ash in the presence of
Bailey. McFarland was shown to possess an extensive criminal record
and a history as an informer.
The jury convicted Ash on all counts. It was unable to reach a verdict
on the charges against Bailey, and his motion for acquittal was
granted. Ash received concurrent sentences on the several counts,
the two longest being 80 months to 12 years.
The five-member majority of the Court of Appeals held that Ash's
right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, was violated
when his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present at the
photographic displays conducted in May 1968 before the trial. The
majority relied on this Court's lineup cases, United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967), and on Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
The majority did not reach the issue of suggestiveness; their opinion
implies, however, that they would order a remand for additional
findings by the District Court. 149 U.S. App. D.C., at 7, 461 F.2d, at
98. The majority refrained from deciding whether the in-court
identifications could have independent bases, id., at 14-15 and nn.
20, 21, 461 F.2d, at 105-106 and nn. 20, 21, but expressed doubt that
the identifications at the trial had independent origins.
Dissenting opinions, joined by four judges, disagreed with the
decision of the majority that the photographic identification was a
"critical stage" requiring counsel, and criticized the majority's
suggestion that the in-court identifications were tainted by defects in
the photographic identifications. Id., at 14-43, 461 F.2d, at 106-
134.[413 U.S. 300, 306]
II
The Court of Appeals relied exclusively on that portion of the Sixth
Amendment providing, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." The right to counsel in Anglo-American law has a rich
historical heritage, and this Court has regularly drawn on that history
in construing the counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. We re-
examine that history in an effort to determine the relationship
between the purposes of the Sixth Amendment guarantee and the
risks of a photographic identification.
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 -66 (1932), the Court
discussed the English common-law rule that severely limited the
right of a person accused of a felony to consult with counsel at trial.
The Court examined colonial constitutions and statutes and noted
that "in at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English
common law, in the respect now under consideration, had been
definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all
criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the right was
limited to capital offenses or to the more serious crimes." Id., at 64-
65. The Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee, thus, was derived from
colonial statutes and constitutional provisions designed to reject the
English common-law rule.
Apparently several concerns contributed to this rejection at the very
time when countless other aspects of the common law were being
imported. One consideration was the inherent irrationality of the
English limitation. Since the rule was limited to felony proceedings,
the result, absurd and illogical, was that an accused misdemeanant
could rely fully on counsel, but [413 U.S. 300, 307] the accused
felon, in theory at least, 6could consult counsel only on legal
questions that the accused proposed to the court. See Powell v.
Alabama,287 U.S., at 60 . English writers were appropriately critical
of this inconsistency. See, for example, 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *355.
A concern of more lasting importance was the recognition and
awareness that an unaided layman had little skill in arguing the law
or in coping with an intricate procedural system. The function of
counsel as a guide through complex legal technicalities long has been
recognized by this Court. Mr. Justice Sutherland's well-known
observations in Powell bear repeating here:
"Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence." 287 U.S., at 69 .
The Court frequently has interpreted the Sixth Amendment [413 U.S.
300, 308] to assure that the "guiding hand of counsel" is available
to those in need of its assistance. See, for example, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 -345 (1963), and Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
Another factor contributing to the colonial recognition of the
accused's right to counsel was the adoption of the institution of the
public prosecutor from the Continental inquisitorial system. One
commentator has explained the effect of this development:
"[E]arly in the eighteenth century the American system of judicial
administration adopted an institution which was (and to some extent
still is) unknown in England: while rejecting the fundamental juristic
concepts upon which continental Europe's inquisitorial system of
criminal procedure is predicated, the colonies borrowed one of its
institutions, the public prosecutor, and grafted it upon the body of
English (accusatorial) procedure embodied in the common law.
Presumably, this innovation was brought about by the lack of
lawyers, particularly in the newly settled regions, and by the
increasing distances between the colonial capitals on the eastern
seaboard and the ever-receding western frontier. Its result was that,
at a time when virtually all but treason trials in England were still in
the nature of suits between private parties, the accused in the
colonies faced a government official whose specific function it was to
prosecute, and who was incomparably more familiar than the
accused with the problems of procedure, the idiosyncrasies of juries,
and, last but not least, the personnel of the court." F. Heller, The
Sixth Amendment 20-21 (1951) (footnote omitted). [413 U.S. 300,
309]
Thus, an additional motivation for the American rule was a desire to
minimize the imbalance in the adversary system that otherwise
resulted with the creation of a professional prosecuting official. Mr.
Justice Black, writing for the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462 -463 (1938), spoke of this equalizing effect of the Sixth
Amendment's counsel guarantee:
"It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel."
This historical background suggests that the core purpose of the
counsel guarantee was to assure "Assistance" at trial, when the
accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the
advocacy of the public prosecutor. 7 Later developments have led this
Court [413 U.S. 300, 310] to recognize that "Assistance" would be
less than meaningful if it were limited to the formal trial itself.
This extension of the right to counsel to events before trial has
resulted from changing patterns of criminal procedure and
investigation that have tended to generate pretrial events that might
appropriately be considered to be parts of the trial itself. At these
newly emerging and significant events, the accused was confronted,
just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary,
or by both. In Wade, the Court explained the process of expanding
the counsel guarantee to these confrontations:
"When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police
forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the
prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was
marshalled, largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law
enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal
prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to apply to `critical' [413 U.S. 300, 311] stages of the
proceedings."388 U.S., at 224 (footnote omitted).
The Court consistently has applied a historical interpretation of the
guarantee, and has expanded the constitutional right to counsel only
when new contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave
birth initially to the right itself.
Recent cases demonstrate the historical method of this expansion. In
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), and in White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), the accused was confronted with the
procedural system and was required, with definite consequences, to
enter a plea. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the
accused was confronted by prosecuting authorities who obtained, by
ruse and in the absence of defense counsel, incriminating statements.
In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), the accused was
confronted by his adversary at a "critical stage" preliminary hearing
at which the uncounseled accused could not hope to obtain so much
benefit as could his skilled adversary.
The analogy between the unrepresented accused at the pretrial
confrontation and the unrepresented defendant at trial, implicit in
the cases mentioned above, was explicitly drawn in Wade:
"The trial which might determine the accused's fate may well not be
that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation, with the
State aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and the
accused unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or
unintentional, and with little or no effective appeal from the
judgment there rendered by the witness - `that's the man.'" 388 U.S.,
at 235 -236. [413 U.S. 300, 312]
Throughout this expansion of the counsel guarantee to trial-like
confrontations, the function of the lawyer has remained essentially
the same as his function at trial. In all cases considered by the Court,
counsel has continued to act as a spokesman for, or advisor to, the
accused. The accused's right to the "Assistance of Counsel" has meant
just that, namely, the right of the accused to have counsel acting as
his assistant. In Hamilton and White, for example, the Court
envisioned the lawyer as advising the accused on available defenses
in order to allow him to plead intelligently. 368 U.S., at 54 -55; 373
U.S., at 60 . In Massiah counsel could have advised his client on the
benefits of the Fifth Amendment and could have sheltered him from
the overreaching of the prosecution. 377 U.S., at 205 . Cf. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). In Coleman the skill of the lawyer
in examining witnesses, probing for evidence, and making legal
arguments was relied upon by the Court to demonstrate that, in the
light of the purpose of the preliminary hearing under Alabama law,
the accused required "Assistance" at that hearing. 399 U.S., at 9 .
The function of counsel in rendering "Assistance" continued at the
lineup under consideration in Wade and its companion cases.
Although the accused was not confronted there with legal questions,
the lineup offered opportunities for prosecuting authorities to take
advantage of the accused. Counsel was seen by the Court as being
more sensitive to, and aware of, suggestive influences than the
accused himself, and as better able to reconstruct the events at trial.
Counsel present at lineup would be able to remove disabilities of the
accused in precisely the same fashion that counsel compensated for
the disabilities of the layman at trial. Thus, the Court mentioned that
the accused's memory might be dimmed by "emotional tension," that
the accused's credibility at [413 U.S. 300, 313] trial would be
diminished by his status as defendant, and that the accused might be
unable to present his version effectively without giving up his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S., at 230 -231. It was in order to compensate for these
deficiencies that the Court found the need for the assistance of
counsel.
This review of the history and expansion of the Sixth Amendment
counsel guarantee demonstrates that the test utilized by the Court
has called for examination of the event in order to determine whether
the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance
in meeting his adversary. Against the background of this traditional
test, we now consider the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
III
Although the Court of Appeals' majority recognized the argument
that "a major purpose behind the right to counsel is to protect the
defendant from errors that he himself might make if he appeared in
court alone," the court concluded that "other forms of prejudice,"
mentioned and recognized in Wade, could also give rise to a right to
counsel. 149 U.S. App. D.C., at 10, 461 F.2d, at 101. These forms of
prejudice were felt by the court to flow from the possibilities for
mistaken identification inherent in the photographic display. 8 [413
U.S. 300, 314]
We conclude that the dangers of mistaken identification, mentioned
in Wade, were removed from context by the Court of Appeals and
were incorrectly utilized as a sufficient basis for requiring counsel.
Although Wade did discuss possibilities for suggestion and the
difficulty for reconstructing suggestivity, this discussion occurred
only after the Court had concluded that the lineup constituted a trial-
like confrontation, requiring the "Assistance of Counsel" to preserve
the adversary process by compensating for advantages of the
prosecuting authorities.
The above discussion of Wade has shown that the traditional Sixth
Amendment test easily allowed extension of counsel to a lineup. The
similarity to trial was apparent, and counsel was needed to render
"Assistance" in counterbalancing any "overreaching" by the
prosecution.
After the Court in Wade held that a lineup constituted a trial-like
confrontation requiring counsel, a more difficult issue remained in
the case for consideration. The same changes in law enforcement
that led to lineups and pretrial hearings also generated other events
at which the accused was confronted by the prosecution. The
Government had argued in Wade that if counsel was required at a
lineup, the same forceful considerations would mandate counsel at
other preparatory steps in the "gathering of the prosecution's
evidence," such as, for[413 U.S. 300, 315] particular example, the
taking of fingerprints or blood samples. 388 U.S., at 227 .
The Court concluded that there were differences. Rather than
distinguishing these situations from the lineup in terms of the need
for counsel to assure an equal confrontation at the time, the Court
recognized that there were times when the subsequent trial would
cure a one-sided confrontation between prosecuting authorities and
the uncounseled defendant. In other words, such stages were not
"critical." Referring to fingerprints, hair, clothing, and other blood
samples, the Court explained:
"Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is
sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough,
that the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation
of the Government's case at trial through the ordinary processes of
cross-examination of the Government's expert witnesses and the
presentation of the evidence of his own experts." 388 U.S., at 227 -
228.
The structure of Wade, viewed in light of the careful limitation of the
Court's language to "confrontations," 9 [413 U.S. 300, 316] makes it
clear that lack of scientific precision and inability to reconstruct an
event are not the tests for requiring counsel in the first instance.
These are, instead, the tests to determine whether confrontation with
counsel at trial can serve as a substitute for counsel at the pretrial
confrontation. If accurate reconstruction is possible, the risks
inherent in any confrontation still remain, but the opportunity to
cure defects at trial causes the confrontation to cease to be "critical."
The opinion of the Court even indicated that changes in procedure
might cause a lineup to cease to be a "critical" confrontation:
"Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police
departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional
suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful
confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding the
stage as `critical.'" 388 U.S., at 239 (footnote omitted).
See, however, id., at 262 n. (opinion of Fortas, J.).
The Court of Appeals considered its analysis complete after it
decided that a photographic display lacks scientific precision and
ease of accurate reconstruction at trial. That analysis, under Wade,
however, merely carries one to the point where one must establish
that the trial itself can provide no substitute for counsel if a pretrial
confrontation is conducted in the absence of counsel. Judge Friendly,
writing for the Second Circuit in United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d
888 (1969), recognized that the "criticality" test of Wade, if applied
outside the confrontation context, would result in drastic expansion
of the right to counsel:
"None of the classical analyses of the assistance to be given by
counsel, Justice Sutherland's in Powell v. Alabama . . . and Justice
Black's in Johnson v. [413 U.S. 300, 317] Zerbst . . . and Gideon v.
Wainwright . . . suggests that counsel must be present when the
prosecution is interrogating witnesses in the defendant's absence
even when, as here, the defendant is under arrest; counsel is rather
to be provided to prevent the defendant himself from falling into
traps devised by a lawyer on the other side and to see to it that all
available defenses are proffered. Many other aspects of the
prosecution's interviews with a victim or a witness to a crime afford
just as much opportunity for undue suggestion as the display of
photographs; so, too, do the defense's interviews, notably with alibi
witnesses." Id., at 899-900.
We now undertake the threshhold analysis that must be addressed.
IV
A substantial departure from the historical test would be necessary if
the Sixth Amendment were interpreted to give Ash a right to counsel
at the photographic identification in this case. Since the accused
himself is not present at the time of the photographic display, and
asserts no right to be present, Brief for Respondent 40, no possibility
arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with
the law or overpowered by his professional adversary. Similarly, the
counsel guarantee would not be used to produce equality in a trial-
like adversary confrontation. Rather, the guarantee was used by the
Court of Appeals to produce confrontation at an event that previously
was not analogous to an adversary trial.
Even if we were willing to view the counsel guarantee in broad terms
as a generalized protection of the adversary process, we would be
unwilling to go so far as to extend the right to a portion of the
prosecutor's trial-preparation interviews with witnesses. Although
photography [413 U.S. 300, 318] is relatively new, the interviewing
of witnesses before trial is a procedure that predates the Sixth
Amendment. In England in the 16th and 17th centuries counsel
regularly interviewed witnesses before trial. 9 W. Holdsworth,
History of English Law 226-228 (1926). The traditional
counterbalance in the American adversary system for these
interviews arises from the equal ability of defense counsel to seek
and interview witnesses himself.
That adversary mechanism remains as effective for a photographic
display as for other parts of pretrial interviews. 10 No greater
limitations are placed on defense counsel in constructing displays,
seeking witnesses, and conducting photographic identifications than
those applicable to the prosecution. 11 Selection of the picture of a
person other than the accused, or the inability of a witness to make
any selection, will be useful to the defense in precisely the same
manner that the selection of [413 U.S. 300, 319] a picture of the
defendant would be useful to the prosecution. 12 In this very case, for
example, the initial tender of the photographic display was by
Bailey's counsel, who sought to demonstrate that the witness had
failed to make a photographic identification. Although we do not
suggest that equality of access to photographs removes all potential
for abuse, 13 it does remove any inequality in the adversary process
itself and thereby fully satisfies the historical spirit of the Sixth
Amendment's counsel guarantee.
The argument has been advanced that requiring counsel might
compel the police to observe more scientific procedures or might
encourage them to utilize corporeal rather than photographic
displays. 14 This Court has[413 U.S. 300, 320] recognized that
improved procedures can minimize the dangers of suggestion.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 n. 6 (1968).
Commentators have also proposed more accurate techniques.15
Pretrial photographic identifications, however, are hardly unique in
offering possibilities for the actions of the prosecutor unfairly to
prejudice the accused. Evidence favorable to the accused may be
withheld; testimony of witnesses may be manipulated; the results of
laboratory tests may be contrived. In many ways the prosecutor, by
accident or by design, may improperly subvert the trial. The primary
safeguard against abuses of this kind is the ethical responsibility of
the prosecutor, 16 who, as so often has been said, may "strike hard
blows" but not "foul ones." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 -88 (1963). If that
safeguard fails, review remains available under due process
standards. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S.
1 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). These same
safeguards apply to misuse of photographs. See Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S., at 384 . [413 U.S. 300, 321]
We are not persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of
photographic displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary system
of safeguards is required.
We hold, then, that the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to
counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for
the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the
offender. This holding requires reversal of the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. Although respondent Ash has urged us to examine this
photographic display under the due process standard enunciated in
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S., at 384 , the Court of Appeals,
expressing the view that additional findings would be necessary,
refused to decide the issue. 149 U.S. App. D.C., at 7, 461 F.2d, at 98.
We decline to consider this question on this record in the first
instance. It remains open, of course, on the Court of Appeals' remand
to the District Court.
Reversed and remanded.
 United States Supreme Court
ROCK v. ARKANSAS, (1987)
No. 86-130
Argued: March 23, 1987 Decided: June 22, 1987
Petitioner was charged with manslaughter for shooting her husband.
In order to refresh her memory as to the precise details of the
shooting, she twice underwent hypnosis by a trained
neuropsychologist. These sessions were tape-recorded. After the
hypnosis, she remembered details indicating that her gun was
defective and had misfired, which was corroborated by an expert
witness' testimony. However, the trial court ruled that no
hypnotically refreshed testimony would be admitted, and limited
petitioner's testimony to a reiteration of her statements to the doctor
prior to hypnosis, as reported in the doctor's notes. The Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed her conviction, ruling that the limitations on
her testimony did not violate her constitutional right to testify, and
that criminal defendants' hypnotically refreshed testimony is
inadmissible per se because it is unreliable.
Held:
1. Criminal defendants have a right to testify in their own behalf
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 49-53.
2. Although the right to present relevant testimony is not without
limitation, restrictions placed on a defendant's constitutional right to
testify by a State's evidentiary rules may not be arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Pp. 53-
56.
3. Arkansas' per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed
testimony infringes impermissibly on a criminal defendant's right to
testify on his or her own behalf. Despite any unreliability that
hypnosis may introduce into testimony, the procedure has been
credited as instrumental in obtaining particular types of information.
Moreover, hypnotically refreshed testimony is subject to verification
by corroborating evidence and other traditional means of assessing
accuracy, and inaccuracies can be reduced by procedural safeguards
such as the use of tape or video recording. The State's legitimate
interest in barring unreliable evidence does not justify a per se
exclusion because the evidence may be reliable in an individual case.
Here, the expert's corroboration of petitioner's hypnotically
enhanced memories and the trial judge's conclusion that the tape
recordings indicated that the doctor did not suggest responses
with [483 U.S. 44, 45] leading questions are circumstances that the
trial court should have considered in determining admissibility. Pp.
56-62.
288 Ark. 566, 708, S. W. 2d 78, vacated and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE,
O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 62.
James M. Luffman argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
J. Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, argued the cause for
respondent. With him on the brief was Clint Miller, Assistant
Attorney General. *
[ Footnote * ] John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold O. Overoye, Assistant
Attorney General, and Shirley A. Nelson and Garrett Beaumont,
Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
David M. Heilbron and Christopher Berka filed a brief for the
Product Liability Advisory Council et al. as amici curiae.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented in this case is whether Arkansas' evidentiary rule
prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony
violated petitioner's constitutional right to testify on her own behalf
as a defendant in a criminal case.
I dropped, without the trigger's being pulled. Tr. 662-663, 711.
Petitioner Vickie Lorene Rock was charged with manslaughter in the
death of her husband, Frank Rock, on July 2, 1983. A dispute had
been simmering about Frank's wish to move from the couple's small
apartment adjacent to Vickie's beauty parlor to a trailer she owned
outside town. That night a fight erupted when Frank refused to let
petitioner eat some pizza and prevented her from leaving the
apartment to get something else to eat. App. 98, 103-104. When
police arrived on the scene they found Frank on the floor with a
bullet wound in his chest. Petitioner urged the officers to help [483
U.S. 44, 46] her husband, Tr. 230, and cried to a sergeant who took
her in charge, "please save him" and "don't let him die." Id., at 268.
The police removed her from the building because she was upset and
because she interfered with their investigation by her repeated
attempts to use the telephone to call her husband's parents. Id., at
263-264, 267-268. According to the testimony of one of the
investigating officers, petitioner told him that "she stood up to leave
the room and [her husband] grabbed her by the throat and choked
her and threw her against the wall and . . . at that time she walked
over and picked up the weapon and pointed it toward the floor and
he hit her again and she shot him." Id., at 281. 1
Because petitioner could not remember the precise details of the
shooting, her attorney suggested that she submit to hypnosis in order
to refresh her memory. Petitioner was hypnotized twice by Doctor
Bettye Back, a licensed neuro-psychologist with training in the field
of hypnosis. Id., at 901-903. Doctor Back interviewed petitioner for
an hour prior to the first hypnosis session, taking notes on
petitioner's general history and her recollections of the shooting.
App. 46-47. 2 Both hypnosis sessions were recorded on [483 U.S. 44,
47] tape. Id., at 53. Petitioner did not relate any new information
during either of the sessions, id., at 78, 83, but, after the hypnosis,
she was able to remember that at the time of the incident she had her
thumb on the hammer of the gun, but had not held her finger on the
trigger. She also recalled that the gun had discharged when her
husband grabbed her arm during the scuffle. Id., at 29, 38. As a
result of the details that petitioner was able to remember about the
shooting, her counsel arranged for a gun expert to examine the
handgun, a single-action Hawes .22 Deputy Marshal. That inspection
revealed that the gun was defective and prone to fire, when hit or
When the prosecutor learned of the hypnosis sessions, he filed a
motion to exclude petitioner's testimony. The trial judge held a
pretrial hearing on the motion and concluded that no hypnotically
refreshed testimony would be admitted. The court issued an order
limiting petitioner's testimony to "matters remembered and stated to
the examiner prior to being placed under hypnosis." App. to Pet. for
Cert. xvii. 3 [483 U.S. 44, 48] At trial, petitioner introduced
testimony by the gun expert, Tr. 647-712, but the court limited
petitioner's own description of the events on the day of the shooting
to a reiteration of the sketchy information in Doctor Back's notes. See
App. 96-104. 4 The jury convicted petitioner on the manslaughter
charge and she was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected petitioner's claim
that the limitations on her testimony violated her right to present her
defense. The court concluded that "the dangers of admitting this kind
of testimony outweigh whatever probative value it may have," and
decided to follow [483 U.S. 44, 49] the approach of States that have
held hypnotically refreshed testimony of witnesses inadmissible per
se. 288 Ark. 566, 573, 708 S. W. 2d 78, 81 (1986). Although the court
acknowledged that "a defendant's right to testify is fundamental," id.,
at 578, 708 S. W. 2d, at 84, it ruled that the exclusion of petitioner's
testimony did not violate her constitutional rights. Any "prejudice or
deprivation" she suffered "was minimal and resulted from her own
actions and not by any erroneous ruling of the court." Id., at 580, 708
S. W. 2d, at 86. We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 947 (1986), to
consider the constitutionality of Arkansas' per se rule excluding a
criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony.
II
Petitioner's claim that her testimony was impermissibly excluded is
bottomed on her constitutional right to testify in her own defense. At
this point in the development of our adversary system, it cannot be
doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense. This, of course,
is a change from the historic common-law view, which was that all
parties to litigation, including criminal defendants, were disqualified
from testifying because of their interest in the outcome of the trial.
See generally 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 576, 579 (J. Chadbourn rev.
1979). The principal rationale for this rule was the possible
untrustworthiness of a party's testimony. Under the common law,
the practice did develop of permitting criminal defendants to tell
their side of the story, but they were limited to making an unsworn
statement that could not be elicited through direct examination by
counsel and was not subject to cross-examination. Id., at 579, p. 827.
This Court in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573 -582 (1961),
detailed the history of the transition from a rule of a defendant's
incompetency to a rule of competency. As the [483 U.S. 44,
50] Court there recounted, it came to be recognized that permitting
a defendant to testify advances both the "`detection of guilt'" and
"`the protection of innocence,'" id., at 581, quoting 1 Am. L. Rev. 396
(1867), and by the end of the second half of the 19th century, 5 all
States except Georgia had enacted statutes that declared criminal
defendants competent to testify. See 365 U.S., at 577 and n. 6, 596-
598. 6 Congress enacted a general competency statute in the Act of
Mar. 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, as amended, 18 U.S.C. 3481, and similar
developments followed in other common-law countries. Thus, more
than 25 years ago this Court was able to state:
"In sum, decades ago the considered consensus of the English-
speaking world came to be that there was no rational justification for
prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused, who above all others
may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case." Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S., at 582 . 7 [483 U.S. 44, 51]
The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources
in several provisions of the Constitution. It is one of the rights that
"are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process."
Faretta v. California,422 U.S. 806, 819 , n. 15 (1975). The necessary
ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law include a right
to be heard and to offer testimony:
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court -
are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as
a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel." (Emphasis added.) In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). 8
See also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S., at 602 (Clark, J., concurring)
(Fourteenth Amendment secures "right of a criminal defendant to
choose between silence and testifying in his own behalf"). 9 [483
U.S. 44, 52]
The right to testify is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, which grants a defendant the right to call
"witnesses in his favor," a right that is guaranteed in the criminal
courts of the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17 -19 (1967). Logically included in the accused's
right to call witnesses whose testimony is "material and favorable to
his defense," United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
867 (1982), is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is in his
favor to do so. In fact, the most important witness for the defense in
many criminal cases is the defendant himself. There is no
justification today for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity
to offer his own testimony. Like the truthfulness of other witnesses,
the defendant's veracity, which was the concern behind the original
common-law rule, can be tested adequately by cross-examination.
See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L.
Rev. 71, 119-120 (1974).
Moreover, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S., at 819 , the Court
recognized that the Sixth Amendment
"grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is
the accused, not counsel, who must be `informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation,' who must be `confronted with the witnesses
against him,' and who must be accorded `compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.'" (Emphasis added.)
Even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-
representation, which was found to be "necessarily implied by the
structure of the Amendment," ibid., is an accused's right to present
his own version of events in his own words. A defendant's
opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is
incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness.
The opportunity to testify is also a necessary corollary to the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony. In Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971), [483 U.S. 44, 53] the Court
stated: "Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so." Id., at 225. Three of the dissenting
Justices in that case agreed that the Fifth Amendment encompasses
this right: "[The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination] is fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed the
right `to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will.' . . . The choice of whether to testify in one's
own defense . . . is an exercise of the constitutional privilege." Id., at
230, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). (Emphasis
removed.) 10
III
The question now before the Court is whether a criminal defendant's
right to testify may be restricted by a state rule that excludes her
posthypnosis testimony. This is not the first time this Court has faced
a constitutional challenge to a state rule, designed to ensure
trustworthy evidence, that interfered with the ability of a defendant
to offer testimony. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the
Court was confronted with a state statute that prevented persons
charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime
from being introduced as witnesses for one another. The statute, like
the original common-law prohibition on testimony by the accused,
was grounded in a concern for the reliability of evidence presented by
an interested party:
"It was thought that if two persons charged with the same crime were
allowed to testify on behalf of each [483 U.S. 44, 54] other, `each
would try to swear the other out of the charge.' This rule, as well as
the other disqualifications for interest, rested on the unstated
premises that the right to present witnesses was subordinate to the
court's interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions
were best avoided by preventing the jury from hearing any testimony
that might be perjured, even if it were the only testimony available on
a crucial issue." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 21, quoting Benson v.
United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335(1892).
As the Court recognized, the incompetency of a codefendant to testify
had been rejected on nonconstitutional grounds in 1918, when the
Court, refusing to be bound by "the dead hand of the common-law
rule of 1789," stated:
"`[T]he conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more likely to be
arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent
understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts
involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to
be determined by the jury or by the court . . . .'" 388 U.S., at 22 ,
quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
The Court concluded that this reasoning was compelled by the Sixth
Amendment's protections for the accused. In particular, the Court
reasoned that the Sixth Amendment was designed in part "to make
the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in
court." 388 U.S., at 22 .
With the rationale for the common-law incompetency rule thus
rejected on constitutional grounds, the Court found that the mere
presence of the witness in the courtroom was not enough to satisfy
the Constitution's Compulsory Process Clause. By preventing the
defendant from having the benefit of his accomplice's testimony, "the
State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness
who was [483 U.S. 44, 55] physically and mentally capable of
testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose
testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense."
(Emphasis added.) Id., at 23.
Just as a State may not apply an arbitrary rule of competence to
exclude a material defense witness from taking the stand, it also may
not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand,
but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony. In
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the Court invalidated a
State's hearsay rule on the ground that it abridged the defendant's
right to "present witnesses in his own defense." Id., at 302. Chambers
was tried for a murder to which another person repeatedly had
confessed in the presence of acquaintances. The State's hearsay rule,
coupled with a "voucher" rule that did not allow the defendant to
cross-examine the confessed murderer directly, prevented Chambers
from introducing testimony concerning these confessions, which
were critical to his defense. This Court reversed the judgment of
conviction, holding that when a state rule of evidence conflicts with
the right to present witnesses, the rule may "not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice," but must meet the
fundamental standards of due process. Ibid. In the Court's view, the
State in Chambers did not demonstrate that the hearsay testimony in
that case, which bore "assurances of trustworthiness" including
corroboration by other evidence, would be unreliable, and thus the
defendant should have been able to introduce the exculpatory
testimony. Ibid.
Of course, the right to present relevant testimony is not without
limitation. The right "may, in appropriate cases, bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."
Id., at 295. 11 But restrictions of a [483 U.S. 44, 56] defendant's
right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules
a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify
the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to
testify.
IV
The Arkansas rule enunciated by the state courts does not allow a
trial court to consider whether posthypnosis testimony may be
admissible in a particular case; it is a per se rule prohibiting the
admission at trial of any defendant's hypnotically refreshed
testimony on the ground that such testimony is always
unreliable. 12 Thus, in Arkansas, an accused's testimony is limited to
matters that he or she can prove were remembered before hypnosis.
This rule operates to the detriment of any defendant who undergoes
hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the circumstances
under which it took place, or any independent verification of the
information it produced. 13 [483 U.S. 44, 57]
In this case, the application of that rule had a significant adverse
effect on petitioner's ability to testify. It virtually prevented her from
describing any of the events that occurred on the day of the shooting,
despite corroboration of many of those events by other witnesses.
Even more importantly, under the court's rule petitioner was not
permitted to describe the actual shooting except in the words
contained in Doctor Back's notes. The expert's description of the
gun's tendency to misfire would have taken on greater significance if
the jury had heard petitioner testify that she did not have her finger
on the trigger and that the gun went off when her husband hit her
arm.
In establishing its per se rule, the Arkansas Supreme Court simply
followed the approach taken by a number of States that have decided
that hypnotically enhanced testimony should be excluded at trial on
the ground that it tends to be unreliable. 14 Other States that have
adopted an exclusionary rule, however, have done so for the
testimony of witnesses, not for the testimony of a defendant. The
Arkansas [483 U.S. 44, 58] Supreme Court failed to perform the
constitutional analysis that is necessary when a defendant's right to
testify is at stake. 15
Although the Arkansas court concluded that any testimony that
cannot be proved to be the product of prehypnosis memory is
unreliable, many courts have eschewed a per se rule and permit the
admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 16 Hypnosis by
trained physicians or psychologists has [483 U.S. 44, 59] been
recognized as a valid therapeutic technique since 1958, although
there is no generally accepted theory to explain the phenomenon, or
even a consensus on a single definition of hypnosis. See Council on
Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by the
Use of Hypnosis, 253 J. A. M. A. 1918, 1918-1919 (1985) (Council
Report). 17 The use of hypnosis in criminal investigations, however,
is controversial, and the current medical and legal view of its
appropriate role is unsettled.
Responses of individuals to hypnosis vary greatly. The popular belief
that hypnosis guarantees the accuracy of recall is as yet without
established foundation and, in fact, hypnosis often has no effect at all
on memory. The most common response to hypnosis, however,
appears to be an increase in both correct and incorrect
recollections. 18 Three general characteristics of hypnosis may lead
to the introduction of inaccurate memories: the subject becomes
"suggestible" and may try to please the hypnotist with answers the
subject [483 U.S. 44, 60] thinks will be met with approval; the
subject is likely to "confabulate," that is, to fill in details from the
imagination in order to make an answer more coherent and
complete; and, the subject experiences "memory hardening," which
gives him great confidence in both true and false memories, making
effective cross-examination more difficult. See generally M. Orne et
al., Hypnotically Induced Testimony, in Eyewitness Testimony:
Psychological Perspectives 171 (G. Wells & E. Loftus, eds., 1984);
Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a
Prospective Witness, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 313, 333-342 (1980). Despite
the unreliability that hypnosis concededly may introduce, however,
the procedure has been credited as instrumental in obtaining
investigative leads or identifications that were later confirmed by
independent evidence. See, e. g., People v. Hughes, 59 N. Y. 2d 523,
533, 453 N. E. 2d 484, 488 (1983); see generally R. Udolf, Forensic
Hypnosis 11-16 (1983).
The inaccuracies the process introduces can be reduced, although
perhaps not eliminated, by the use of procedural safeguards. One set
of suggested guidelines calls for hypnosis to be performed only by a
psychologist or psychiatrist with special training in its use and who is
independent of the investigation. See Orne, The Use and Misuse of
Hypnosis in Court, 27 Int'l J. Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis
311, 335-336 (1979). These procedures reduce the possibility that
biases will be communicated to the hypersuggestive subject by the
hypnotist. Suggestion will be less likely also if the hypnosis is
conducted in a neutral setting with no one present but the hypnotist
and the subject. Tape or video recording of all interrogations, before,
during, and after hypnosis, can help reveal if leading questions were
asked. Id., at 336. 19 Such guidelines do not guarantee the accuracy
of the testimony, because they cannot control the subject's own [483
U.S. 44, 61] motivations or any tendency to confabulate, but they do
provide a means of controlling overt suggestions.
The more traditional means of assessing accuracy of testimony also
remain applicable in the case of a previously hypnotized defendant.
Certain information recalled as a result of hypnosis may be verified
as highly accurate by corroborating evidence. Cross-examination,
even in the face of a confident defendant, is an effective tool for
revealing inconsistencies. Moreover, a jury can be educated to the
risks of hypnosis through expert testimony and cautionary
instructions. Indeed, it is probably to a defendant's advantage to
establish carefully the extent of his memory prior to hypnosis, in
order to minimize the decrease in credibility the procedure might
introduce.
We are not now prepared to endorse without qualifications the use of
hypnosis as an investigative tool; scientific understanding of the
phenomenon and of the means to control the effects of hypnosis is
still in its infancy. Arkansas, however, has not justified the exclusion
of all of a defendant's testimony that the defendant is unable to prove
to be the product of prehypnosis memory. A State's legitimate
interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se
exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case. Wholesale
inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction
on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State
repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections. The State
would be well within its powers if it established guidelines to aid trial
courts in the evaluation of posthypnosis testimony and it may be able
to show that testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that
exclusion is justified. But it has not shown that hypnotically
enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to
the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a
defendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is
on trial. [483 U.S. 44, 62]
In this case, the defective condition of the gun corroborated the
details petitioner remembered about the shooting. The tape
recordings provided some means to evaluate the hypnosis and the
trial judge concluded that Doctor Back did not suggest responses
with leading questions. See n. 3, supra. Those circumstances present
an argument for admissibility of petitioner's testimony in this
particular case, an argument that must be considered by the trial
court. Arkansas' per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony
infringes impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his
own behalf. 20

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is vacated, and the

case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120468. August 15, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOPE
LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, SANDY SIMBULAN y
GARCIA and RAMIL VENDIBIL y CASTRO, accused.
LOPE LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura, and his co-accused
Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil, were charged with the crime of
highway robbery with multiple rape in an Information[1]which reads, thus:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1992, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an icepick,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take,
rob and divest from the complainant, Corazon Hernandez y Delfin the
amount of P60.00; That on the occasion thereof, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and each of them mutually helping
and aiding one another and by means of force and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously one at a time have carnal
knowledge of the said complainant, inside the Levitown Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila, against her will and consent;
That accused Randy Simbulan y Garcia, who is allegedly 14 years old, has
acted with discernment in the commission of the offense; and
That the aggravating circumstance of that means employed or circumstance
brought about which add ignominy to the natural effect of the act where one
of the accused, by means of force and intimidation, caused the victim to
suck his penis made the effect of the crime more humiliating to the victim,
attended the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During the arraignment, all of them pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Accused Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil were earlier released
on recognizance, and were later ordered rearrested for their failure to appear
at the scheduled hearings. However, the warrants for their arrest were not
implemented. Trial on the merits, thus, ensued only against accused-
appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura.
Complainant Corazon Hernandez was on her way home to Paraaque at
around 1:00 oclock in the early morning of April 27, 1992. Upon reaching
the tricycle terminal at Doa Soledad St., Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila, she was offered by tricycle driver Ramil Vendibil
a special trip, which means that she would be brought right in front of her
house. She agreed and boarded the tricycle.While they were about to leave,
Randy Simbulan and Lope Liwanag also rode the tricycle behind the
driver. When they reached India Street, Lope Liwanag entered the sidecar
and sat beside complainant. He immediately grabbed complainants
shoulder, pointed an instrument at the side of her neck, and declared a hold-
up. Surprised and fearing for her life, complainant told accused-appellant
that she only had sixty pesos (P60.00) in her bag. Accused-appellant Lope
Liwanag instructed Randy Simbulan to get her bag.
While the tricycle was traversing the road leading to the municipal
building of Paraaque, accused-appellant informed complainant that since
they could not get anything from her anyway, she might as well submit
herself to them. Then, accused-appellant began kissing complainant and
touching her private parts. Randy Simbulan, meanwhile, inserted his finger
into complainants vagina.
As they were entering Levitown Subdivision, accused-appellant
ordered complainant to act naturally while they passed the
guardhouse. Once they got through, accused-appellant asked her to give in
to his desire, and then, he again began touching her private
parts. Complainant answered that she would rather be killed than accede to
his desire. This prompted accused-appellant to hit her with an icepick on the
abdomen.
Upon reaching a vacant lot, accused-appellant ordered Vendibil to stop
the tricycle. He then tried to strangle complainant, causing her to fall down
from her seat and lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness,
she was forced to board the tricycle. Again, they rode around the
village. Accused-appellant tried to strangle her with a bandana and ordered
her to remove her underwear. When she refused, accused-appellant himself
removed her underwear, opened his pant zipper and forced her to sit on his
lap. Complainant struggled, so accused-appellant ordered the tricycle to
stop and dragged complainant out. Accused-appellant then brought
complainant to a grassy vacant lot and forced himself on her. After
satisfying his lust, they again boarded the tricycle and accused-appellant
informed complainant that his companions would follow. Complainants
pleas were in vain. After a few minutes of driving around, they came upon
another vacant lot where accused-appellant and Vendibil dragged
complainant. There, Vendibil forced complainant to put his penis into her
mouth. Unsatisfied, Vendibil forced her to lie down and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her while accused-appellant and Simbulan
watched. Thereafter, Simbulan took his turn. After he satisfied his lust, they
talked of killing complainant.
Complainant pleaded for her life and, in desperation, she offered them
money in exchange for her life. Accused-appellant asked her if she can
produce P10,000.00, but she said she could not. Accused-appellant lowered
his demand to P5,000.00. They negotiated until they finally agreed on the
sum of P2,000.00. Accused-appellant instructed complainant to deliver the
money at Guadalupe, Makati. She was to place the amount inside a bag
together with a sandwich she was to buy at Burger Machine. They agreed to
meet at 11:30 that same morning. When they finally let go of her,
complainant proceeded to a church. At daybreak, she went home and told
her mother the whole incident. Together, they proceeded to the Fort
Bonifacio police station and reported the matter. The police, in turn, devised
an entrapment operation.
At the appointed hour, complainant went to Guadalupe, Makati,
bringing with her an envelope containing pieces of plain paper. Accused-
appellant arrived after 45 minutes. Complainant handed the envelope to
him, then she ran away. Accused-appellant also ran and boarded a bus, but
he was collared and arrested by the police.
Dr. Louella Nario, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation conducted an examination on the complainant and issued a
medical certificate[2] with the following findings:
Extragenital Physical Injuries:
Abrasions, linear, leg, right, upper third, anterior aspect, 4.8 cms., in length
and left, lower third, anterior aspect, 4.7 cm. in length.
Contused abrasion, epigastric region, 2.4 x 0.3 cm.
Contusions, reddish, mandibular region, right side, 1.8 x 1.5 cm. and left
side, 2.0 x 1.0 cms.; neck, lateral aspect, right side, 5.5 x 0.5 cms., and 9.8 x
0.5 cms. and 2.5 x 0.5 cms. deltoid region, left side, 2.4 x 1.3 cms. purplish,
deltoid region, left side, 4.2 x 2.5 cms.
Genital Examination:
Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and minora,
gaping. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa, congested, with fresh
superficial abrasion at the fossa navicularis. Hymen, thick, short,
intact.Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube, 2.0 cms., in diameter with
moderate resistance. Vagina walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
Conclusion:
1. The above-described extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of
the subject at the time of examination.
2. Genital injury present.
Accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that
at around 12:00 oclock midnight of April 27, 1992, he was at his house at
Texas Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. His
uncle, Emilio Changco, dropped by and, together with Ponciano
Buenaventura and Hermenegildo Liwanag, they had a drinking session up
to 3:00 oclock in the morning. At around 4:00 oclock in the morning,
Changco left and accused-appellant went to sleep. He woke up at 7:30 in
the morning to prepare for his trip to San Miguel, Bulacan to see his
grandfather.
He alleged that while waiting for a ride in front of Jollibee at
Guadalupe, Makati, he was arrested by policemen in civilian clothes for
being a rebel soldier, based on a mark on his right fist indicating his
membership in the Guardians Luzon, an association of soldiers. He was
brought to Fort Bonifacio where he allegedly met for the first time Randy
Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil. He claimed that the three of them were
beaten and subjected to electric shocks. He also claimed that policemen
forced his co-accused to point to him.
On April 17, 1995, a decision[3] was rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 138, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Presidential Decree
No. 532, known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974. Considering that on the occasion of the highway robbery, rape was
committed, a situation which calls for the imposition of death penalty under
Presidential Decree No. 532 but which penalty was still proscribed at the
time of the commission of the offense alleged in the Information, said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
penalty next lower in degree (People v. Miranda, 235 SCRA 202). He is
further ordered to indemnify the complainant Corazon Hernandez of the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) representing moral damages;
P20,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorneys fees and to return the
P60.00 taken from her. Filing fees due on the award shall be a lien on the
amount which may be recovered by the complainant from the accused.
As to the two other co-accused, Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil, trial
of the case shall therefore continue.
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, accused-appellant interposed
the instant appeal assigning as errors the following:
1. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding the
fact that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective and
competent counsel, and, consequently, other constitutional rights afforded
an accused;
2. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding that
there was no sufficient evidence positively identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crime charged;
3. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the
inconsistencies that tainted the evidence for the prosecution;
4. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the
improbability of the manner by which the crime was allegedly committed;
5. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant inspite of
complainants failure to offer any resistance prior to and even during her
alleged rape; and
6. The trial court erred in disregarding the defense of accused-appellant as a
mere alibi.
Accused-appellant submits that he was deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel under Article III, Section 14, (2) of the 1987 Constitution
which provides, thus:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, x x x. (Italics supplied)
As a consequence, accused-appellant claims that from the time he was
arrested up to the time of his conviction, he was deprived of his other
constitutional rights, particularly his right to be secure in his person against
unreasonable searches and seizures,[4] his right to preliminary
investigation,[5] and his right to bail.[6]
In addition, accused-appellant claims that the assistance extended to
him by his former counsel was ineffective to the extent that private
complainant, as well as prosecution witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla
and Editha Hernandez, were hardly cross-examined, while Dra. Louella
Nario was not cross-examined at all.
 In any case, accused-appellant claims that he could not have
committed the crime being imputed to him as he was engaged in a drinking
session at the very moment when the alleged crime was committed.
Accused-appellant maintains that the trial court erred in convicting
him because: 1) the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence
positively identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime; 2) inconsistencies
tainted the prosecution evidence; 3) the manner by which the crime was
committed was improbable; and, 4) complainant failed to offer any
resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape.
This appeal revolves primarily on the issue of whether accused-
appellant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by
himself and counsel. He argues that his right to be heard through his
counsel means that he should be effectively assisted by counsel throughout
the proceedings, from the time he was arrested up to the time judgment is
rendered.
The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the trial
court, accused-appellant was represented by counsel de officio, Atty.
William T. Uy of the Public Attorneys Office. In the middle of the trial,
accused-appellant retained the services of counsel de parte Atty.
Bienvenido R. Brioso, replacing Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered the
judgment of conviction, Atty. Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on behalf of
accused-appellant. Atty. Brioso, however, failed to file the appellants brief
because of the refusal of accused-appellants mother to transmit the entire
records of the case to him. Thus, accused-appellant was required to manifest
whether he still desired to be represented by Atty. Brioso in this
appeal. Upon accused-appellants failure to reply, Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was
appointed counsel de officio.
There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a
counsel de officio who assisted him during the arraignment and conducted
the cross examination of all prosecution witnesses as well as his direct
examination. Thereafter, from the time he was cross-examined up to the
presentation of other defense witnesses, he was assisted by a counsel of his
choice.
Accused-appellants citation of People v. Holgado[7] and Powell v.
Alabama,[8] insofar as the right to be heard by counsel is concerned, is
misleading. Both cases only defined the right to be heard by counsel as the
right to be assisted by counsel. It cannot be inferred from these cases that
the right to be heard by counsel presupposes the right to an intelligent
counsel. The requirement is not for counsel to be intelligent, but to be
effective.
Jurisprudence defined the meaning of effective counsel only in the
light of Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which refers to the
right of persons under custodial investigation. In People v. Lucero,[9] the
rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated by this Court, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the
commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have
constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the
use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them
inadmissible. In providing for said right, this Court has held in the same
case that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean
any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The requirements of
effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage before arraignment
were for the purposes of guarding against the use of duress and other undue
influence in extracting confessions which may taint them and render them
inadmissible. (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel. The reason for the latter provision was explained in People v.
Holgado, thus:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that
no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law, and that all accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be
of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right
and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough
for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own.[10] (Italics supplied)
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the right to
be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not
denied the collateral right to due process, a fundamental right which cannot
be waived by an accused. The underlying basis for due process is the
concept of fairness, without which there can be no justice. In other words,
there can be no due process accorded an accused if he is not given the right
to be heard through counsel or assisted by counsel. It follows that in order
to be heard, and therefore be accorded due process, the assistance given by
counsel must be effective as implied in the rationale of Article III, Section
14 (2). In this sense, this Court subscribes to American jurisprudence when
it held that [t]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a
fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of
little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his
other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.[11]
In the light of the above ratiocination, accused-appellant contends that
the right to be heard by counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Citing Strickland v. Washington,[12] accused-appellant contends
that the assistance rendered by counsel is ineffective or is defective if the
following elements are present: (1) that counsels performance was deficient,
which requires a showing that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that
counsels errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial which result is reliable. Accused-appellant claims that the assistance
afforded him by his counsel during the course of the trial was ineffective
since the counsel de officio failed to safeguard his rights necessary for the
reversal of his conviction.
One of the rights which accused-appellant contends his counsel de
officio failed to safeguard was his right to be secure in his person against
unreasonable searches and seizures as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. He
claims that his right was violated when he was arrested without a warrant
which his counsel should have contested.
Accused-appellants argument is not well-taken. As reiterated
in People v. Costelo:[13]
[A]ppellants failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial
and presenting evidence in his behalf, placed him in estoppel to make such
challenge. He has patently waived any objection or irregularities and is
deemed as having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. It
should be noted that the legality of arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused.Consequently, if objection on such
ground is waived, the illegality of the arrest is not sufficient reason for
setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after the trial, free from
error. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and
deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when the facts on the
record point to the culpability of the accused. (Italics supplied)
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[14]
Accused-appellant, likewise, claims that he was deprived of his right
to a preliminary investigation. Had his counsel de oficio been effective, he
should have filed the proper motion on his behalf.
There is no merit in this contention.
Considering that accused-appellant submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, he is deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.
As aptly stated in People v. Buluran:[15]
The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation did
not impair the validity of the information nor affect the jurisdiction of the
trial court. While the right to preliminary investigation is a substantive right
and not a mere formal or technical right of the accused, nevertheless, the
right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails
to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. It
appearing that appellants only raised the issue of lack of preliminary
investigation during appeal, their right to a preliminary investigation was
deemed waived when they entered their respective pleas of not guilty. [16]
 Accused-appellant next contends that he was deprived of his right to
bail. He contends that had his counsel de officio been effective, he would
have filed the proper motion.
The contention is without any merit. As ruled by this Court in People
v. Manes:[17]
The issue of bail has been rendered academic by the conviction of the
accused. When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and
evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of
right nor of discretion.
In the case of Strickland,[18] the United States Supreme Court:
Judicial scrutiny of counsels performance must be highly deferential. It is
all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsels assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsels defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsels
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsels perspective
at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsels conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. There are
countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the
best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the
same way.
In showing the ineffectiveness of the assistance rendered by
counsel de officio, accused-appellant points out the following:
The private complainant, whose testimony was the principal basis of the
conviction, was hardly cross-examined. The same is true with prosecution
witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla and Editha Hernandez.In fact,
prosecution witness Dra. Louella Nario was not cross-examined at all.
As a result of the insufficient cross-examination of the witnesses for the
prosecution, particularly the private complainant, the defense of the
accused-appellant failed to bring to the attention of the trial court several
matters which amplify the improbability, if not impossibility, in the
complainants testimony on how the crime was allegedly committed. Thus,
the defense was not able to highlight several crucial points, among which
are: (1) the impossibility that the alleged crime, particularly the rape, was
committed in a populated area - an inhabited and well-developed
subdivision in Paraaque, with a 24-hour store (Burger Machine) at that -
without being noticed; (2) the fact that, assuming that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of the complainant, the latter did not offer any form of
resistance; and (3) the impossibility that after the crime charged was
allegedly committed, accused-appellant and his co-accused gentlemanly
accompanied complainant to a place of her choice (the church).
Moreover, several questions remained unanswered. For example (1) What
time did the complainant report the incident to the police?; (2) How long
did the police plan the alleged entrapment?; (3) Were there other officers
involved in the entrapment?; and (4) Why was the money and other
materials used for entrapment not presented in evidence?
Furthermore, there were also no attempts to impeach the testimony of the
private complainant on the scene of the crime through the use of
contradictory evidence as provided in the Rules. For instance, accused-
appellants counsel could have presented a resident of the subdivision where
the crime was allegedly committed to describe the area. Such witness can
establish: (1) whether or not the area where the crime was allegedly
committed was indeed too dark for anyone to notice the commission of the
alleged crime; (2) whether or not the houses in the subdivision are indeed
too far apart that occurrences outside one house would not be discernible
from within; and (3) whether or not the location of the houses in the
subdivision is such that it would indeed be useless for a woman, faced with
the threat of rape to even attempt to ask for help.
We are not convinced. The assistance extended by Attorney Uy of the
Public Attorneys Office was sufficiently effective. As noted by the Office
of the Solicitor General, to wit:
The pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes would show that appellants (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him,
counsel de oficio, Atty. William Uy, cross-examined the private such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
complainant extensively as well as two other prosecution witnesses (SPO1 mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of
Sevilla and Edith Hernandez). That said counsel opted not to cross-examine fact or law;
the prosecution expert witness, Dr. Louella Nario, is of no moment because
said witness merely explained in court her findings and conclusions that she xxxxxxxxx
had arrived at after conducting the medical examination on the private
complainant [Exhibit C] (TSN, March 30, 1993, pp. 10-12). In fact, at one
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of
point, Atty. Uy raised an objection to the private prosecutors question on the defenseless or oppressed;
how private complainants genital injuries were sustained for being
incompetent to answer, which objection was impliedly sustained by the trial
judge (Ibid., p. 13). (i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable
means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to
present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be
In assessing the effectiveness of counsels assistance, deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. (Italics supplied)
the Strickland standard invoked by accused-appellant is too stringent for
application in Philippine judicial setting. Strickland only seeks to ensure
that the adversarial testing process is present in a case by requiring that the The following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
assistance rendered by counsel be effective. The presence of an adversarial likewise, provide:
testing process, in other words, ensures that the trial is fair by according the
accused due process through the effective assistance of counsel. Canon 2 -- A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient
and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and
While fairness is likewise the object of Article III, Section 14 (2) of effectiveness of the profession.
the Philippine Constitution, the assistance afforded by counsel to an accused
in light of the Philippine constitutional requirement need only be in
xxxxxxxxx
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. In
Philippine judicial setting, a counsel assisting an accused is presumed to be Canon 12 -- A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
providing all the necessary legal defense which are reasonable under the assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
circumstances in accordance with said norms.
xxxxxxxxx
In this regard, a counsel assisting an accused is guided by the
following provisions of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
Canon 17 -- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. -- It is the duty of an attorney:
Canon 18 -- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
Canon 19 -- A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
debatable under the law;
of the law.
 Lastly, the Canons of Professional Ethics provide:
4. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to
be excused for any trivial reason and should always exert his best efforts in
his behalf.
5. It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused
of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused;
otherwise, innocent persons, victims only of suspicious circumstances,
might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the
lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense
that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived
of life or liberty but by due process of law.
15. x x x x x x x x x
The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his
duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.
The above-cited norms are more than adequate to guide a counsels
conduct in the performance of his duty to assist a client in an effective
manner as required by Article III, Section 14 (2). Said constitutional
provision is patterned after the Sixth Amendment of the American
Constitution. As in Article III, Section 14 (2), the Sixth Amendment refers
simply to counsel, not specifying particular requirements of effective
assistance. It relies instead on the legal professions maintenance of
standards sufficient to justify the laws presumption that counsel will fulfill
the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. The proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms. [19]
Coupled with the presumption that counsels performance was
reasonable under the circumstances, as long as the trial was fair in that the
accused was accorded due process by means of an effective assistance of
counsel, then the constitutional requirement that an accused shall have the
right to be heard by himself and counsel is satisfied. The only instance
when the quality of counsels assistance can be questioned is when an
accused is deprived of his right to due process. Otherwise, there is the
danger that questioning counsels acts or omissions in the conduct of his
duties as counsel for an accused may breed more unwanted consequences
than merely upholding an accuseds constitutional right or raising the
standard of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants right to due process has been
observed and the trial was conducted in a fair manner. Corollarily, this
Court sees no reason to doubt or overcome the presumption that counsel de
officio reasonably assisted accused-appellant in accordance with the
prevailing norms of professional conduct and his sworn duties as an officer
of the court.
Based on the findings of the trial court, accused-appellant was not at
all prejudiced by the alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. The alleged
failures by his counsel to safeguard his rights from the time he was arrested
up to the time he was sentenced and the alleged inadequacies in the direct
and cross-examinations of prosecution witnesses were ultimately
inconsequential to the eventual outcome of the case. If at all, the outcome
was the result of the strength of the prosecution evidence rather than the
failures and inadequacies in the conduct of the defense as shown by the
following:
First, counsels decision to adopt the defense of denial and alibi as part
of the trial strategy merely highlighted the strength of the prosecution
evidence. While its adoption may have been dictated by the factual
circumstances of the case as perceived by accused-appellant, however,
denial is an inherently weak defense vis--vis the positive and categorical
assertion of prosecution witnesses. In fact, the trial court found accused-
appellants denial to be self-serving.
Like denial, accused-appellants alibi was not looked upon with favor
by the trial court. Not only is it one of the weakest defenses due to its being
capable of easy fabrication, it also cannot prevail over witnesses positive
identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any
event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused
can prove his being at another place at the time of its commission, it is
likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at
the locus delicti.[20] The trial court found accused-appellants and his
witnesses testimonies on the formers alibi unconvincing.
In the instant case, accused-appellant claims that he was engaged in a
drinking session with some persons at their house in Texas Street, Better
Living Subdivision at about the time when the crime was committed until
3:00 oclock in the morning. However, Better Living Subdivision is adjacent
to Levitown Subdivision, where the rape was committed. In fact, it was in
Better Living Subdivision where complainant was robbed and sexually
molested prior to being raped at Levitown Subdivision.
Second, accused-appellant also points to alleged discrepancies
between some of complainants accounts in her sworn statement and some of
her declarations in her direct testimony regarding the position of accused
relative to that of complainant, the kind of instrument used to threaten
complainant and the person who got complainants money. The apparent
discrepancies, however, only refer to immaterial or irrelevant
details. Complainant was consistent in her narration in her sworn statement
as well as during her direct examination and even in the cross-examination
regarding the roles played by the three accused in the commission of the
crime.
A Sinumpaang Salaysay or a sworn statement is merely a short
narrative subscribed to by the complainant in question and answer
form. Thus, it is only to be expected that it is not as exhaustive as ones
testimony in open court. The contradictions, if any, may be explained by the
fact that an affidavit can not possibly disclose the details in their entirety,
and may inaccurately describe, without deponent detecting it, some of the
occurrences narrated. Being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and
sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. It has thus been held
that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed when an affiants mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford her a fair opportunity of
narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not
complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are
generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs
them after the same have been read to her.[21]
In People v. Mangat,[22] this Court has reiterated the doctrine that
discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witness. Sworn
statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed when an affiants mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of
narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Testimonies given during
trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus testimonial evidence carries
more weight than statements/affidavits.
Third, accused-appellant alleges that complainant failed to offer any
resistance prior to or even during her alleged rape thereby concluding that it
could have been consensual. She did not ask for help when the alleged rape
took place in a populated area. She likewise did not try to escape when she
had the opportunity to do so.
This Court finds the above argument specious and unmeritorious. It
should be noted that accused-appellant was brandishing an icepick which
clearly showed his readiness to use the same by hitting complainant with it.
Besides, she testified that she was already weak and tired to be able to do
anything against three malefactors who were stronger than her. It would
have been foolhardy for complainant to resist the accused considering her
weakened condition. The workings of a human mind placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently - some may
shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility while
others may openly welcome the intrusion. In any case, the law does not
impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised
upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust
because of fear for life and personal safety.[23]
Lastly, complainant positively pointed at accused-appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime. Accused-appellant could not show any reason
why complainant would point him as one of the perpetrators of the crime. It
is settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an
accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.[24]
 The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay complainant moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. This award must be reduced to
P50,000.00. The purpose of this award is not to enrich the victim but to
compensate her for injuries to her feelings. Moreover, moral damages for
rape is fixed at P50,000.00.[25]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, finding accused-appellant
Lope Liwanag guilty of violating P.D. No. 532 and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Corazon
Hernandez P20,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorneys fees and to
return the P60.00 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.