8. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V.
SULLIVAN defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff) sued
the Defendant, the New York Times Co. (Defendant), for
printing an advertisement about the civil rights movement
in the south that defamed the Plaintiff.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees
require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.
Facts: The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of
Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was defamed
in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The
advertisement was entitled, “Heed Their Rising Voices” and
it charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror
had been directed against those who participated in the
civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars
of the advertisement were false. Although the
advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he
claimed that it referred to him indirectly because he had
oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant
claimed that it authorized publication of the advertisement
because it did not have any reason to believe that its
contents were false. There was no independent effort to
check its accuracy. The Plaintiff demanded that the
Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant was
puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the advertisement
reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad libe
lous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The jury
awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed. The Defendant appealed.
Issue: Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an
advertisement, which criticized a public official’s official
conduct?
Ruling: No. Reversed and remanded.
* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are
required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action
brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct.
* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the
words tend to injure a person in his reputation or to bring
him into public contempt. The jury must find that the words
were published of and concerning the plaintiff. Once libel
per se has been established, the defendant has no defense
as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they
were true in all their particulars.
* Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the breathing space that the need to survive.
* The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
he proves that the statement was made with actual malice
– that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
* The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
holds that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to
award damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct. In this case,
the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.
* The Defendant’s failure to retract the advertisement
upon the Plaintiff’s demand is not adequate evidence of
malice for constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not
adequate evidence of malice that the Defendant failed to
check the advertisements accuracy against the news stories
in the Defendant’s own files. Also, the evidence was
constitutionally defective in another respect: it was
incapable of supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly
libelous statements were made of and concerning the
Plaintiff.
Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution do
not merely “delimit” a State’s power to award damages,
but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a
power. The Defendant had an absolute, unconditional right
to publish criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and
officials.
Discussion. In order for a public official to recover in a
defamation action involving his official conduct, malice
must be proved. Without the showing of malice, the
Supreme Court felt that a defamation action in this case
would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom speech
and expression that are guaranteed in the First Amendment
of the Constitution and applicable to the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
9. ROSENBLOOM V. METROMEDIA INC.
Facts:
George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the
Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on
obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A
local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on
the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or
“reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent
broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other
similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut
distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the
obscenity charges.
Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district
court held that the First Amendment standard, which
allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and
recklessly false statements, did not apply because
Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court
instead instructed the jury to award damages where
Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the
truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom
general and punitive damages, although the district court
reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly
and recklessly false standard applied.
Issues:
(1) Should the knowingly and recklessly false standard for
defamatory statements apply to private individuals?
(2) If so, is the evidence presented at trial enough to
support the damages originally awarded to Rosenbloom?
Ruling:
Yes, No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote
the judgment of the court affirming the Third Circuit
decision. The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and
recklessly false standard applied because the story was a
matter of public concern. It did not matter that
Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that
the evidence in the case did not support the damages
award under the proper constitutional standard.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating
that the First Amendment protected the news media from
libel judgments even where the broadcaster knows their
statements were false. Justice Byron R. White also wrote a
special concurrence, asserting that the press have the
privilege to comment on official actions of public servants,
such as the police, in full detail.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that
states should be free to impose a duty of reasonable care in
defamation actions involving private citizens. He would
remand the case for further consideration of whether
Rosenbloom sustained actual harm and whether
Metromedia acted with actual malice. Justice Thurgood
Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court should
limit damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual
losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.
10. TULFO V. PEOPLE
Facts:
Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed and
charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan
Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor,
Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as
president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily
tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel. That private
respondent was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt
public official, smuggler and having acquired his wealth
illegally.
RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. CA
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Hence, Tulfo
appealed and raised that the said article is a qualified
privileged communication and is written without malice.
Issue:
Whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified
privileged communication or are defamatory and written
with malice, for which he would be liable.
Ruling:
Freedom of the press was given greater weight over the
rights of individuals however, such freedom is not absolute
and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal
burden of responsible exercise of that right. The
recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming
it to run roughshod over the rights of others.
The exercise of press freedom must be done consistent
with good faith and reasonable care. This was clearly
abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles.
This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case
of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story
and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be
allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their
profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every
defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the
furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover
total abandonment of responsibility.
Petition is dismissed. The CA decision is affirmed with
modification.
11. AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. V. CAPULONG
Facts:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for
Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion
picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed
by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted.
Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film
production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series
television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating
four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and
utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor
McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name,
or picture, or that of any member of his family in any
cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded
to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from
the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the
projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed
by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any
reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked
resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Ruling:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the
freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit
such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
television. Furthermore thecircumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not
a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and
of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and
hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in
other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation
of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly
critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events,
clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film
were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public
figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their
right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant
case between the constitutional freedom of speech and
of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out
in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture
must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events.
12. BARTNICKI V. VOPPER
Facts:
An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone
call between the chief union negotiator and the union
president (the petitioners) during collective-bargaining
negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local
school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was
accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the
intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both
federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an
unknown person using an electronic device had
surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation.
Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the
District Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were
content-neutral laws of general applicability containing "no
indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech."
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid
because they deterred significantly more speech than
necessary to protect the private interests at stake.
Issue:
Does the First Amendment provide protection to speech
that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted
communication?
Ruling:
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens,
the Court held that the First Amendment protects the
disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by
parties who did not participate in the illegal interception.
"In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public
importance," wrote Justice Stevens. "[A] stranger's illegal
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment
shield from speech about a matter of public concern."
Noting that the negotiations were a matter of public
interest, Justice Stevens wrote that the "debate may be
more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired
Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California,
but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection."
13. MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
Facts:
Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to
advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of
violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of
obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's
brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal
proceedings.
Issue:
Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail
protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech
guarantee?
Ruling:
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials
did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court
modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v.
United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that
"[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The
Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value"
test of the Memoirs decision.
14. PTA V. CA
Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and
the Manila Police, seized and confiscated from dealers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed to be obscene.
These were later burned. One of the publications was
Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to
enjoin him from confiscating more copies of his magazine
and claimed that this was a violation of freedom of speech.
The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an
Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining
order against indiscriminate seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and
burning of obscence reading materials but admitted that
these were surrendered by the stall owners and the
establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco
Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting
the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to
adduce evidence on the question of whether the
publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized,
confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence
per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order
appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that
freedom of the press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could
without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate
petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their
determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of
the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court
could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing
thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was
merely the application of petitioner for the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Was the seizure constitutional?
Ruling:
No. Petition granted
Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that
ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment
of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
(Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or
when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have
neither been drawn nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from
Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms
of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated
passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both
cases are agreed that "contemporary community
standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene").
Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question
and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion
Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v.
California, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and
established "basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the
average person, applying contemporary standards' would
find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what
constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the
reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional
dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is
not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption
that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions
among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague
theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the
State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to
suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons,
smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is
it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to
wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid
advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say,
five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present
generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no
pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the
divergent perceptions of men and women that have
probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within
the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In
free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on
the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would warrant State interference and
action. But the burden to show this lies with the authorities.

"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or

conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
present danger."

As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the

delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the
speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to
demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must
not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State
action to stop the speech.

The Court is not convinced that the private respondents

have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory
injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were
not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to
carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene

works under Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This
not answered, one can conclude that the fact that the
former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police
power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due
process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the permission
to execute high-handed acts.

It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only

through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become
unreasonable and subject to challenge.

There is of course provision for warrantless searches under

the Rules of Court but as the provision itself suggests, the
search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest and it
must be on account fo a crime committed.

The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no

constitutional nor legal provision which would free the
accused of all criminal responsibility because there had
been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak
of, who ought to be "punished".

Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have

validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut
campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to
make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner
rolled into one.