GMA NETWORK, INC. vs.
It is also particularly unreasonable and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the
press, airtime limits
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in
issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast
and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate
total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They
contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowablebroadcast time violates freedom of the
press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as
their right to information relative to the exercise of
their right to choose who to elect during the forth
coming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate
total” airtime instead of the previous “per
station” airtime for political campaigns or
advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings
and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 on airtimelimits violates freedom
of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on
“aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out
and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-
based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does
not constitute a compelling state interest which would
justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their
ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of
a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure.
whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines
is not only composed of so many islands. There are
also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the
citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national
candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through his
advertisements in languages and dialects that the
people may more readily understand and relate to.
To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would
greatly hamper the ability of such candidate
to express himself – a form of suppression of his
political speech.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech,
right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two
(2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a checkmark, or “(Pro-
RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “TeamBuhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin
was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its
reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
 question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the
principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first
before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate
expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter
for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the
tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of
petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message
are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does
not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by
this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted
to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never
precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose
the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question,
it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction,
the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly
acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions
of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the
utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands
judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness
is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come
into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech,
given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of
the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of
their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had
the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the
Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate
in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
 The Court held that every citizen’s expression
with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that
the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for
it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that
personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech
has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers
to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved
at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will
it passconstitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test,
respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is
no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of
the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the
tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right
to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as
an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement
of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a
restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses
even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines
relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence
and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on,
or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the
“government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech,
posting of campaign materials on PUV and public
terminals, captive-audience doctrine
DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a
basic and fundamental right in any democracy. It
includes not only the right to vote, but also the right
to urge others to vote for a particular candidate. The
right to express one’s preference for a candidate is
likewise part of the fundamental right to free
speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the
right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries
with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the
May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which
enumerates the prohibited forms of election
propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. –
During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election
campaign or propaganda material outside of
authorized common poster areas, in public places, or
in private properties without the consent of the
owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection
(f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys,
trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals,
such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers,
train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g)
shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility
franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of
the transportation service and/or terminal liable for
an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these
Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as
regards the application of REsolution No. 9615
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation
to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility
vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The
petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider
the implementation of the assailed provisions and
allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals
to post election campaign materials on their vehicles
and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No.
13-0214, which denied the petitioner’s request to
reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6),
in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of
Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on
speech
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on
the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in
their property, and convince others to agree with
them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No.
9615, posting an election campaignmaterial during an
election period in PUVs and transport terminals
carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public
utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof
liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on
the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. As a result of the
prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals
are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of
indictment for an election offense and the
revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election
campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral
regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is
merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place or manner,
and under well-defined standards,
is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the
right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9
615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely
control the place where election campaign materials
may be posted. However, the prohibition is still
repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no
necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or
permit to operate and not the ownership per se of
PUVs and transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the
constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As
worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only
grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers
over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or
permits for the operation,” inter alia, of
transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC’s constitutionallydelegated powers of
supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but
only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
are not within the constitutionally delegated power
of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
franchise or permit to operate of transportation
utilities. The posting of election campaign material on
vehicles used for public transport or on transport
terminals is not only a form of political expression, but
also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with
the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
are not justified under the captive-
audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a
listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from
intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The
“captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a
listener has a right not to be exposed to an
unwanted message in circumstances in which
the communication cannot be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is
in the guise of censorship, which undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech on the ground that they are more offensive
than others. Such selective restrictions have been
upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy
of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either
impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-
audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed
“captive audience” may avoid exposure to the
otherwise intrusive
speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read
the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the
posted election campaign materials since they may
simply avert their eyes if they find the same
unbearably intrusive.
Lehman’s case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to
restrict the posting of election campaign materials on
PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government,
which prohibits political advertisements on
government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
advertising space on the buses was not a public
forum, pointing out that advertisement space on
government-run buses, “although incidental to the
provision of public transportation, is a part of
commercial venture.” In the same way that other
commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of
advertising from the general public, the city’s transit
system has the discretion on the type of advertising
that may be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended
for PUVs owned by the city government; the city
government, as owner of the buses, had the right to
decide which type of advertisements would be placed
on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of
the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in
choosing the types of advertisements that would be
placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail
the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals on the advertisements that may be posted
on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right,
nay the duty, to refuse political advertisements on
their buses. Considering that what were involved
were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a
necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs
and transport terminals remains private; there exists
no valid reason to suppress their political views by
proscribing the posting of election campaign materials
on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals
from posting election campaign materials violates
the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but
also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic
principles on which this government was founded is
that of the equality of right, which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
limited to existing conditions and applies equally to
the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible
since it is not based on substantial distinction and is
not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction
exists between PUVs and transport terminals and
private vehicles and other properties in that the
former, to be considered as such, needs to secure
from the government either a franchise or a permit
to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the
prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and
(6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership
per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the
prohibition does not in any manner affect the
franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and
transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial
distinction between owners of PUVs and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
properties. As already explained, the ownership of
PUVs and transport terminals, though made available
for use by the public, remains private. If owners of
private vehicles and other properties are allowed to
express their political ideas and opinion by posting
election campaign materials on their properties,
there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred
right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In
terms of ownership, the distinction between owners
of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of
private vehicles and properties is merely
superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made
available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from
private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly,
any election campaign material that would be posted
on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by
many people. However, election campaign materials
posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial
establishments, would also be seen by many
people. Thus, there is no reason to single out owners
of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition
against posting of election campaign materials.

Summary

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section

7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech
clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which
are not within the constitutional power of the
COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the
objective of ensuring equal time, space and
opportunity to the candidates. They are not only
repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no
substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles
and other properties.

On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to

advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a
significant part of our freedom of expression. A
restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is
a violation of the most valuable feature of the
democratic way of life.
#9 SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. VS. JUDGE
MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 104, QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1049
FACTS: Published under the by-line of one Marichu
Villanueva and titled “Judiciary worse than PNP,” an
item in the June 17, 1993 issue of the Manila
Standard, a metropolitan daily, reported that the
results of the latest opinion polls conducted by the
Ateneo Social Weather Station, as Social Weather
Stations, Inc. (or SWS) is also known, showed the
Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating that
the Philippine National Police. The item went on to
state that the President and his Cabinet had been
briefed on the results of the survey by Professors
Mahar Mangahas and Felipe Miranda of the SWS, and
that Malacanang had expressed concern over the
Judiciary’s law standing. Press Secretary Jesus Sison
was also quoted as saying that this was “most
puzzling,” although he could not, recall the exact
rating, noting only that the PNP had “a better image
that the judiciary.”
Said report appears to have prompted Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion, presiding judge of Branch 104
of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, motu
proprio to initiate on the same date of June 17, 1993
proceedings ordering the President of the SWS to:
“explain why you should not be held in contempt for
distributing to the general public without prior
permission from any court your findings that the
people have more confidence with the police than
with judges thereby tending directly or indirectly to
degrade the administration of justice”.
On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar Mangahas
through Atty. Antonio M. Abad, Jr. submitted his
comment and explanation that it was not true that
the Social Weather Stations, Inc. distributed to the
general public the alleged survey. Said survey was
privately given to Pres. Ramos and the cabinet and
was not intended for publication nor for public
consumption and that if ever it reaches the media, he
had not authorized anyone to do so.
The hearing was had a scheduled on June 23,
1993, after which Judge Asuncion promulgated an
Order dated July 2, 1993, finding Professor Mangahas’
explanation satisfactory and dismissing the contempt
charge against him.
After three weeks or so, or more precisely on
July 26, 1993, Professor Mangahas addressed a letter
to the Chief Justice intended “as a formal complaint
against Honorable Maximiano C. Asuncion for grave
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, in
connection with his issuance of an Order dated 17
June 1993.
ISSUE: Whether the Order dated 17 June 1993 is
violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech and freedom from prior restraint.
HELD: No.
What was clearly implicit in the newspaper
report about the results of the SWS poll - in the
words of Judge Asuncion, “that the people have more
confidence with the police than with the judges” – in
light of the fact, of which judicial notice is taken, that
said report came out at a time when there already
was widespread publicity adverse to the judiciary,
there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade
the administration of justice.
Thus, Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted
for what, at a minimum, he must have felt duty-bound
to do in the circumstances. No question of prior
restraint or violation of the guarantee of free speech
arises here, what he did being, in essence, merely to
initiate an inquiry into the source and basis of the
derogatory news report. And he forthwith abated
the proceedings upon receiving an explanation he
deemed satisfactory.
Upon the facts, and under applicable law and
principle, the complaint fails to make a prima facie
showing of the charges made therein, and must
perforce be as it is hereby, DISMISSED.
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court.”
Facts:
SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L.
Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court
denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino
comfort women to compel certain officers of the
executive department to espouse their claims for
reparation and demand apology from the Japanese
government for the abuses committed against them
by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys.
Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the
subject of a motion for reconsideration.
UP Law Faculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law published a statement on
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation
relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of
Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the
face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the
educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism
against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth.
In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over
Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the
primary sources of the quoted portions and yet
arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was
aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the
basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of
the Court for even the most basic values of decency
and respect.
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable
purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion
for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP
Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not
reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court
to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the
oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions
constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Held:
Issuance of show cause order resolution to the
respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar per issues
stated above.
[case is ongoing]
Dissenting Opinion:
(1) Serreno, J.
This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly
how its ability to view the motion for reconsideration
of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by
the UP Law Faculty’s statement. It must also state
plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders
would be eroded by the release of the UP Law Faculty
Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision
was received by the public is well-known. It is not as if
any outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the
UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It is also incredible
how the Court can claim that its honesty, integrity and
competence could be eroded by an extraneous act of
any person other than itself. Either one is honest, has
integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can
undermine those qualities other than the one in
whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the
apparently redemptive intent of the UP Law Faculty
when it issued its statement. The statement is
headlined by the phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In the
second paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court’s
recent history and the controversy that surrounded it,
it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious
plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this would only
further erode faith and confidence in the judicial
system.” In the next paragraph, it says: “The Court
cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral
authority without ensuring that its own conduct,
whether collectively or through its members, is
beyond reproach.” In the same paragraph, it further
says: “It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the
position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of
all controversies: a position that requires competence
and integrity completely above any and all reproach,
in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial
and professional ethics.”
Carpio Morales, J.
The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive
flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly be
characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response
from the Court stares back at its own face, since this
judicial act is the one that is “totally unnecessary, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of
uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.” court.

Fortun v. Quinsayas, et.al.

Held: Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule, but
G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013
the media men and companies are not liable thereto.
(Confidentiality Rule in Disbarment Proceedings;
Exception)
The Court recognizes that publications which
Facts: Petitioner Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun, the lead
are privileged for reasons of public policy are
defense counsel of Ampatuan, Jr. in the prominent
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom
"Maguindanao Massacre Case," filed this present
of speech. As a general rule, disbarment proceedings
petition for contempt against Atty. Prima Jesusa
are confidential in nature until their final resolution
Quinsayas, et.al., including media men and
and the final decision of this Court. In this case,
broadcasting companies.
however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against
petitioner is itself a matter of public concern
Quinsayas, et.al. filed a disbarment case
considering that it arose from the Maguindanao
against Fortun for dishonest and deceitful conduct
Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement
They alleged that Fortun is "engaging in activities
and participation as defense counsel in the case.
misleading the prosecution and the trial court."
Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint
Pending the disbarment case, Quinsayas was invited
relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the
to a show "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the
Maguindanao Massacre case. Since petitioner is a
Maguindanao Massacre," where he discussed the
public figure or has become a public figure because
disbarment case against Fortun, including its principal
he is representing a matter of public concern, and
points. This tempted Fortun to file this present
because the event itself that led to the filing of the
petition against him and various media men and
disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of
companies.
public concern, the media has the right to report the
filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It
Fortun alleged that Quinsayas, et al. actively
would have been different if the disbarment case
disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner was about a private matter as the
against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
media would then be bound to respect the
Court on the confidential nature of disbarment
confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings
proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that
under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
respondent media groups and personalities conspired
with Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential
Said provision of the Rules of Court is not a
materials on their respective media platforms. He said
restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a
that the public circulation of the disbarment
legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited
complaint against him exposed this Court and its
from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of
investigators to outside influence and public
a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate
interference.
public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of
the media must preserve the confidentiality of
In their comments, respondents, among
disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
others, contended that the filing of the disbarment
complaint against petitioner was already the subject
As to Quinsayas, he is bound by Section 18,
of widespread news and already of public knowledge,
Rule 139-B both as a complainant in the disbarment
and that petitioner is a public figure and the public
case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer
has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and
and an officer of the Court, Quinsayas is familiar with
character.
the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, he
Issue: Whether or not respondents violated the
disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings,
against petitioner to members of the media which act
constitutes contempt of court. The premature
disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency
of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the
confidentiality rule.

The purpose of the rule is not only to enable

this Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to
protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants. It is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority.

In view thereof, the court found Quinsayas

liable for indirect contempt of court, with a fine of
P20,000.