01 Leonardo v CA

FACTS:
Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late Sps. Tomasina Paul and
Balbino Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, et. al, all surnamed
Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she separated
from Balbino Leonardo.

In 1988, private respondent Corazon Sebastian with her niece and a certain Bitang, came to
Restituta’s house to persuade her to sign a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the document, Restituta allegedly insisted
that they wait for her husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the document which was
written in English. Subsequently, she proceeded to sign the document even without her
husband and without reading the document, on the assurance of private respondent Corazon
that she will get her share as a legitimate daughter. Petitioner then asked private respondent
Corazon and her companions to wait for her husband so he could read the document. When
petitioner’s husband arrived, however, private respondent Corazon and her companions had
left without leaving a copy of the document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they
were able to secure a copy and read the contents thereof.

Petitioner refuted private respondents’ claim that they were the legitimate children and sole
heirs of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul since the latter were never married to each other,
thus, the extrajudicial partition was therefore unlawful and illegal. Petitioner also claimed that
her consent was vitiated because she was deceived into signing the extrajudicial settlement.
She further denied having appeared before a Judge of MTC of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to
acknowledge the execution of the extrajudicial partition.

ISSUE:
Whether the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of estate was given
voluntarily.

HELD:
No. Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud are voidable. These circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of
which impairs the freedom, intelligence, spontaneity and voluntariness of the party in giving
consent to the agreement. In determining whether consent is vitiated, Courts are given a wide
latitude in weighing the facts considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship
and the conduct of the parties at the time of making the contract and subsequent thereto,
irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private writing.

In this case, private respondents failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial
settlement of estate was explained in a language known to the petitioner, i.e. the Pangasinan
dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who only finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give her free,
voluntary and spontaneous consent without having the document, which was in English,
explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect.
02 Pascual v Pascual-Baustista- G.R. No. 84240, Mar 25, 1992

FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both
surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter
being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Petitioners filed their Motion
to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate
Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued
an order, the dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this motion reiterating their
hereditary rights. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners appealed their
case to the Court of Appeals, but like the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration was
also dismissed. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall
squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized (and acknowledged) natural children as their illegitimacy is
not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
NO. Petition is devoid of merit.

RATIO:
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, where this Court
ruled that under Art.992 of the Civil Code, there exists a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestado between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
[T]he interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are
clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children and the term
“illegitimate” refers to both natural and spurious. It may be said that the law may be harsh but
that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
03 Santillon v Miranda- G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

FACTS:

November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one
son, Claro Santillon, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land
located in that province.

Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition
was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the
following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which
Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents
had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses
Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition
pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner
was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed
administrator of the estate.

March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and distribution
of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.

April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties
with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after
deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as
follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half,
she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro
claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which is hereby ruled and ordered that in the
intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-
HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be interpreted as “child” in accordance with Art. 892?

HELD:

Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996 could or should be
read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same
share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not
included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child".

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the
Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the
first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation,
thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.
04 Bicomong vs Almanza- G.R. No. L-37365, Nov 29, 1977

Facts:

Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 Of this marriage
there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic.
Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. On June 3, 1885, Simeon
Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa
Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir.
Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino,
Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945. Surviving her are
her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and
Gervacio Bicomong.

Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952
leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the
second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the
present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband,
the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.

The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she
inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. After the death of Maura Bagsic, the
above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the
administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the
partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not
to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had
not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out
the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request
as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division
of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of
the same to the defendants.

Issue:

What Civil Code provisions are applicable in the case at bar?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New
Civil Code are applicable to the admitted Facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
 Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.
But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers
and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the
latter.

Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half-blood shall succeed per capita or
per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full
blood.

In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,

Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of
her brother and two (2) sisters of half-blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the
New Civil Code.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965,
14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether
their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the
deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half-blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil
Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double
that of the nephews and nieces of half-blood.

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half-blood citing
Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true
as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
05 Bacayo vs Borromeo- G.R. No. L-19382, Aug 31, 1965
Facts:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros,
Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on
December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of
and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she
was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession
and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of
her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special
Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct
descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia,
Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children
of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two
classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said
Melodia Ferraris.

Issue:

Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by
collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her?
Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the
former be excluded by the latter?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews
from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong
degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil
Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:

ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall
inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

In case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces
inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the
widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with
the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred
position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.

Therefore, under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed.
06 Borromeo-Herrera vs Borromeo- G.R. No. L-41171, July 23, 1987

FACTS

Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by
incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the Borromeo’s.
In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The
petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without force and effect because there
can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the
inheritance from the heirs who intend to transfer the same.

ISSUE

Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid acceptance from
the heirs in question.

RULING

YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the properties included
in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to
the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the
deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the
death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989
of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
corresponding hereditary portion.
07 Dizon-Rivera vs Dizon- G.R. No. L-24561, Jun 30, 1970

The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of
partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the
testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific
properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I
bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as
an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full
or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises.

The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which
reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is
couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the
testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each property.
Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is
thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following decision)
with Article 886.

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6
legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were
the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries
were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million)
which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar
Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the
deceased’s estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was
comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less
the cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate
where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907
NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall
be completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator,
when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all
questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words,
unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed
clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be
faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and
neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's
will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION:The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a
partition. In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the
probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid,
she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified
each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This
was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of
Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act
inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of partition as the oppositors were
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her
will and the differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of
Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-
appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary
disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would
consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion,
and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify
the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights
and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law

DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific
heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and
the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value
already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole
estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary dispositions were
by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said
dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is
expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any
of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs
under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased."
COLLATION:Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of the
entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during
her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left
merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil
Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely
to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share
from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally
to the executrix-appellee.
08 De Roma vs CA- G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987

FACTS:

1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda.
Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was
opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.1

2. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth

P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree
upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues
that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062,
claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the
donation was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have
so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.

3. The trial court resolved the issue in favor of the petitioner. The donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters and such donation was imputed to the free portion of
Candelaria’s estate. The CA reversed the decision holding that the deed of donation
contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Art. 1962. It ordered the
collation and the equal division of the net estate of the decedent, including the donated
property between Buhay and Rosalinda.

4. The deed of donation stated:

“ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili

at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga
lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang
nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja
declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga
nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking
ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat
magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking
kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
Disposicion.”

ISSUE: WON there was an express prohibition to collate

HELD: No express prohibition to collate.

1. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and equivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Art. 1962. Anything less than such express
prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Art. 1062. The suggestion that there
was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion
of the decedent’s estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it
claimed that the disputed donation is officious.

2. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from
the collation required under Art. 1061. We surmise that We agree with the respondent court
that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay
na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable
does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

3. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal
consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise
language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to
collate if that had been the donor's intention.

4. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
09 Locsin vs CA G.R. No. 89783, Feb 19, 1992

FACTS

Mariano Locsin married Catalina Jaucian. They had no children. In his will, Mariano instituted
Catalina as his sole universal heir. They both agreed that after death, their properties that they
had from their respective sides of the families would revert to their families (Locsins and
Jaucians). 9 years after Mariano’s death, Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or
assignment, their properties to their respective nieces and nephews.

6 years after Catalina’s death, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate filed action to recover properties
that Catalina had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging they were inofficious,
w/o consideration, and intended solely to circumvent laws on succession. Those closest to
Catalina did not join the action.

The TC and CA declared private respondents entitled to inherit the property Catalina had
disposed of more than 10
years before her death

ISSUE

WON respondents were entitled to inherit the property Catalina had disposed of

HELD

NO. The property Catalina disposed of more than 10 years before her death was not part of
her hereditary estate, that is, “the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at
the time of the decedent’s death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of
succession.” Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time
of death would have devolved to her legal heirs.

Even if all the transfers were treated as donations, the right arising under certain
circumstances to impugn and compel reduction/revocation of decedent’s gifts inter vivos does
not inure to respondents, who are not compulsory heirs. So there’s no basis for assuming
intention on her part to circumvent the law in violation of respondents’ right to succession.

In fact no legitimes could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her
life time. They had no kids.
10 Ibarle vs Po- G.R. No. L-5064, Feb 27, 1953

FACTS

- This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale
conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of land
which previously had been sold, along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's
grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff.

- Catalina Navarro sold the entire parcel of land, which was her and her deceased husband’s
conjugal property of the Canoy Spouses who later sold it to Bienvenido Ibarle. Both sales were
not registered. Catalina subsequently sold as her children’s guardian, one-half of the same
land belonging to the children to Esperanza Po.

ISSUE

WON the sale to Esperanza Po was valid

HELD
- The sale to the Canoy spouses was void. Therefore, when Catalina sold the entire parcel to
the Canoy spouses, one half of it already belonged to the seller’s children. No formal or judicial
being needed to confirm the children’s title, it follows that the first sell was null and void insofar
as it included the children’s share.

- On the other hand, the sale to Po having been made by authority of the competent court, was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence.

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina
Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who
later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her
appointment as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question,
which portion now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the
plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.
11 Alsua-Betts vs CA- G.R. Nos. L-46430-31, July 30, 1979

FACTS

- On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Florentina Rella, both of Ligao,
Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando
Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered
into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial , over the then present and
existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Florentina.

- On Jan. 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doña Tinay separately
executed their respective holographic wills, the provisions of which were in conformity and in
implementation of the extrajudicial partition of Nov. 25, 1949.

- On Aug.14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay executed their mutual and
reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wills. On Feb. 19,
1957, their respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.

- Doña Tinay died in October 1959. In early Nov. 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic
and instructed his attorney to draft a new will. This subsequent last Will and Testament of Don
Jesus executed on Nov. 14, 1959 contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of
Jan. 5, 1955 and the codicil of Aug.14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties
donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition
of his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific
properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in
the future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as
executrix without bond.

- Don Jesus Alsua died in 1964. Petitioner Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in
the will of Nov. 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua
before the CFI Albay and was docketed as. Oppositions thereto were filed by respondents
Pablo, Amparo and Fernando. CFI allowed the the probate of the will of Don Jesus Alsua. CA
reversed: denied the probate of the will, declared null and void the two sales subject of the
complaint and ordered the defendants-petitioners, to pay damages to the plaintiffs-private
respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WON CA erred in denying the probate of the will

HELD

YES. CA erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred
in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually
bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the
simple expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error
because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition;
neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only
be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
- Upon careful examination of the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doña Tinay,
there was no indication whatsoever that Doña Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the
husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets.

- Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of November 25,
1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making a holographic will and codicil with
exactly the same provisions as those of Doña Tinay, which CA sustained. However SC ruled
that Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as
such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will
may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this
right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke
his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such
previous will had as in the case at bar already been probated

- The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs
claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the contested will
belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to
whomsoever he may choose.

- If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he

was, We cannot and maynot sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in
doing so.
12 Dimayuga vs CA G.R. No. L-42542, Aug 5, 1991

FACTS

Genaro Dimayuga is married to Segunda Gayapanao in 1915 acquired a Torrens title for that
homestead in 1928. Segunda died intestate in 1940, survived by her son, Manuel, and her
husband, Genaro.

During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named Emerenciana Panganiban by whom he
begot five children, named Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaida, Remedios and Socorro. A sixth child,
Nelia Dimayuga, was born in 1944 or after Segunda's death Emerenciana cultivated a
homestead adjoining the thirteen-hectare homestead in question. So, it was not surprising that
she became the paramour of Genaro.

Genaro, 56, married Emerenciana, 37, on February 26, 1947. That marriage legitimated Nelia,
who had been a duly acknowledged natural child, but it did not improve the status of her
brother and four sisters who were adulterous or spurious children. On September 16, 1948, or
about a month before Genaro's death a "partition of real property" was executed in English. It
was duly notarized. It was signed by Genaro, Manuel, Filomeno and Pacita and thumbmarked
by Emerenciana, in representation of her minor children Adelaida, Remedios, Socorro and
Nelia (Exh. A), though Emerenciana had not been appointed judicial guardian of their property.

In that partition, which the petitioners also regard as a donation, Genaro treated the
homestead as his sole property and not conjugal, which it actually was. Manuel was even as
share five and one-half hectares of the homestead (southern portion adjoining Emerenciana's
separate homestead). The six illegitimate children were given seven and seven-tenth hectares
(northern portion also adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead). The partition was not
registered.

Nineteen years later, or on May 28, 1970, Manuel having been advised that the entire
homestead was inherited by him from his parents and freed from his father's moral
ascendancy, executed an affidavit of adjudication which he registered. He obtained a Torrens
title for the thirteen-hectare homestead. About two months later, the six illegitimate children
filed a complaint for the annulment of Manuel's title and for the division of the homestead
equally among Genaro's seven children including Manuel. The trial court annulled Manuel's
title, decreed that about one-half of the homestead should be divided equally among the six
illegitimate children and ordered Manuel to pay them P2,500 as moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
Manuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which adjudicated to him three-fourth of the
homestead and the other one fourth
to Nelia. The six illegitimate children appealed to the SC.

ISSUE

WON Manuel should be awarded three-fourth of the homestead and only one-fourth to Nelia

HELD
Yes. No portion of the homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by prescription. "No title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession."

Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator should make a partition of
his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand insofar, as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean
that a person who makes an inter vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is
void, the partition is void. With more reason would the partition be void if there was no
will.

The 1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the owner
of the entire homestead which is wrong. One-half of the homestead, subject to the husband's
usufructuary legitime, was inherited in 1940 by Manuel upon the death of his mother who was
married to Genaro for twenty-five years. Genaro could dispose by an act inter vivos only one-
half of the homestead. In that one-half portion, Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced
heirs, had a two-third legitime.

In "donating" the said one-half portion to his six illegitimate children, Genaro deprived Manuel
of his legitime in his estate or, in effect, made him renounce his future inheritance. The 1951
affidavit cannot be construed as a repudiation of his inheritance in his father's estate because
the document does not have that tenor. For this reason, Manuel is not estopped to ignore that
partition. The rule in Alforque vs. Veloso, 65 Phil. 272, cited by the petitioners, does not apply
to Manuel. The facts in the Alforque case are radically different from the facts of the instant
homestead case. The five illegitimate children (the sixth child Nelia was legitimated) have no
rights whatsoever to the said homestead. As already said, they were adulterous or spurious
children. As such, they are not entitled to successional rights but only to support (Art. 139, old
Civil Code)

Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, are entitled to inherit Genaro's one-half
portion. It cannot be said that the five adulterous children have no resources whatsoever. Their
mother, Emerenciana, has a homestead adjoining Genaro's homestead in question.
13 Mang-oy vs CA G.R. No. L-2742, Sept 12, 1986

FACTS

- Old Man Tumpao had a wife and begot 3 children , the respondents in this case. After his
wife's death, he married again. His second wife had 2 children she had adopted accodring to
the practice of igorots - On Sept 4, 1937, Old man tumpao executed a "last will and testament".
According to such, Bandao Tumpao shall be the one to carry or fulfill the Testament, and shall
have the power to see and dispose of the Old Man Tumpao's property.

- The will was read to the beneficiaries who were already occupying the lands allotted to them.
On Sept 7, 1937, they had an agreement recognizing the will and Bando’s appointment. 2 days
later, Old Man Tumpao died.

- The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in obedience to
the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last will.

- However, in 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition of the lands of Old Man
Tumpao. The latter’s title was cancelled and the respondents were given a new one. It is that
title which is the being questioned by the petitioners.

- The TC ruled for the petitioners. The CA reversed as it said that the will was void since it was
not probated. The agreement of partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was
nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.

ISSUE/S
1. WON the will was valid

HELD

1. NO
Ratio The will is not valid since it was not probated. However, the document may be sustained
on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said
document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937.

Reasoning
- Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by
win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs -
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his property,
and distribute them among his heirs, and that this partition is not necessarily either a donation
nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at
any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title
until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the
owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the
forced heirs
- It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition should be in writing. It does not have to be in a
public document except to affect third persons (Art. 1280), being valid between the parties who
signed it in its present form.

- as the trial court put it: The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was
not probated, However, when the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries
voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate.
and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be
held to be binding between them. Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a
prospective heir before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was
not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it
has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code. Any formal defect of the deed, was cured by
the lapse of time.

- The agreement entered into by the parties did not have to be approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was
not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a conveyance of
properties or property right.

- It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the
presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by
the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they
are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for
the lots occupied by the petitioners
14 Doromal vs CA G.R. No. L-36083 September 5, 1975

FACTS

- Lot 3504 of the cadastral survey of Iloilo, situated in the poblacion of La Paz (2.5 ha.), was
originally decreed in the name of the late Justice Antonio Horilleno.
- Before Antonio died, he executed a last will and testament attesting to the fact that it was a
co-ownership between himself and his brothers and sisters, so that the co-owners were
(besides Justice Horilleno): Luis, Soledad, Fe, Rosita, Carlos and Esperanza.

- Since Esperanza had already died, she was succeeded by her only daughter and heir herein
plaintiff, Filomena, Javellana, in the proportion of 1/7 undivided ownership each.

- Even though their right had not yet been annotated in the title, the co-owners (led by Carlos
and as to the deceased Antonio, his daughter Mary) sometime in 1967, had wanted to sell their
shares, or if Filomena were agreeable, to sell the entire property.

- The Doromals (Ramon Sr. and Jr.) were interested in the property. In preparation for the
execution of the sale, since the siblings were scattered in various parts of the country, they all
executed various powers of attorney in favor of their niece, Mary H. Jimenez. They also
caused preparation of a power of attorney of identical tenor for signature by Filomena
Javellana.

- Through a letter Carlos informed Filomena that the price was P4.00 a square meter, although
as early as October 22, 1967, Carlos had received in check as earnest money from defendant
Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum of P5,000.00 and the price therein agreed upon was five (P5.00)
pesos a square meter (In November 1967 Carlos told Filomena that P5,000 in earnest money
was paid for P6.00 a sq.m).

- Filomena did not agree to the sale, and did not sign the power of attorney. The rest of
the co-owners went ahead with their sale of their 6/7. Carlos saw to it first that the deed of sale
(by their common attorney in fact, Mary H. Jimenez) be signed and ratified in Candon, Ilocos
Sur, on January 15, 1968.

- Carlos in the same month tried to register the sale, but because the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo refused to register right away (since the original registered owner, Justice Antonio
Horilleno was already dead) he hired Atty. Arandela to file a petition within the cadastral case,
on February 26, 1968, for that purpose. Carlos returned to Luzon, and after compliance with
the requisites of publication, hearing and notice, the petition was approved.

- April 29, 1968: Carlos, back in Iloilo, went to the Register of Deeds and caused the
registration of the order of the cadastral court approving the issuance of a new title in the
name of the co-owners, as well as of the deed of sale to the Doromals, as a result of
which on that same date, a new title was issued in the name of the Horillenos to 6/7 and
plaintiff Filomena Javellana to 1/7.

- The next day the Doromals paid Carlos by check, the sum of P97,000.00. Besides this
amount paid in check, theDoromals (as evidenced) still paid an additional amount in cash of
P18,250.00 since the agreed price was P5.00 a square meter, thus consummating the
transaction.

- June 10, 1968: Filomena’s lawyer, Atty. Villanueva, went to the Doromals’ residence and
presented a letter by Filomena. In it Filomena offered to redeem the 6/7 of the property for the
sum of P30,000.00. The Doromals refused.

Petitioner’s Claim
- As a co-owner she had the right to redeem at the price indicated in the sale.

Respondent’s Comments
- Filomena had no more right to redeem, and that if ever she should have, that it should be at
the true and real price by them paid, namely, the total sum of P115,250.00.

ISSUE(S)

1. WON Filomena was still entitled to redeem the property. (YES)

2. The correct amount of redemption. (P30,000)

HELD

1. YES

Ratio The notice in writing to be made to other co-owners required by Article 1623 is not
only of a perfected sale but of the actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale. It is
from that which the 30-day period to redeem should be counted.

Reasoning
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.

- The Doromals do not question Filomena’s right to redeem. They contend however that the
redemption period has prescribed already. They say that the letters sent by Carlos to Filomena
(dated Oct. 22 and Nov. 5, 1967) constituted the notice required by the provision.

- However, there is no showing that said letters were in fact received by respondent and when
they were actually received. Besides, petitioners do not pinpoint which of these two letters,
their dates being more than two months apart, is the required notice. In any event, as found by
the CA, neither of said letters referred to a consummated sale.

- While the letters relied upon by the Doromals could convey the idea that more or less some
kind of consensus had been arrived at among the other Homeowners to sell the property in
dispute, it cannot be said definitely that such a sale had even been actually perfected. The fact
alone that in the later letter of January 18, 1968 the price indicated was P4.00 per square
meter while in that of November 5, 1967, what was stated was P5.00 per square meter
negatives the possibility that a "price definite" had already been agreed upon.

- Earnest money in this case must be construed in light of the definition under the Old Civil
Code—a guarantee that the buyer would not back out—considering that it is not clear that
there was already a definite agreement as to the price then and that petitioners were decided
to buy 6/7 only of the property should respondent Javellana refuse to agree to part with her 1/7
share.

2. P30,000.00, as indicated in the sale.

Ratio The redemption in controversy should be only for the price stipulated in the deed,
regardless of what might have been actually paid by petitioners.

Reasoning
- The trial court found that "the consideration of P30,000 only was placed in the deed of sale to
minimize the payment of the registration fees, stamps and sales tax."

- With this undisputed fact in mind, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction
petitioners' pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently violative of public policy and
injurious to public interest, the seemingly wide practice of understating considerations of
transactions for the purpose of evading taxes and fees due to the government must be
condemned and all parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer the consequences of their ill-
advised agreement to defraud the state.

- If it be argued that foregoing solution would mean unjust enrichment for plaintiff, it need only
be remembered that plaintiffs right is not contractual, but a mere legal one, the exercise of a
right granted by the law, and the law is definite that she can subrogate herself in place of the
buyer.

- this solution is not unjust because it only binds the parties to make good their solemn
representation to possible redemptioners on the price of the sale, to what they had solemnly
averred in a public document required by the law to be the only basis for that exercise of
redemption.
15 Gabila vs Perez- G.R. No. L-29541, Jan 27,1989

FACTS

-Sept 16, 1948: Pablo, Ramon and Mercedes, all surnamed Perez, executed in favor of
plaintiff-appellant Carlos Gabila, a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land registered in the name of
their deceased father Mariano Perez under TCT No. 899 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao,
which they inherited upon his demise.

-In the said deed of Sale (Exh. A), the vendors declared themselves the owners of the subject
parcel of agricultural land, having inherited the same as the legitimate children of their
deceased father. Said instrument contains, among others, the following provision: “It is hereby
agreed, covenanted and stipulated by and between the parties hereto that the Vendors will
execute immediately an Extra-Judicial Partition of all the properties of their deceased father,
and pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes so that the above - described title
could be cancelled and in its stead a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the
Vendee.” delivered to the vendee. The monthly installments of the price of the sale were
completely paid in due time. However, the vendors took no steps to comply with their promise
to execute an extrajudicial partition of their father's properties so that his title to the land in
question can be transferred in their names and from them, to the vendee Gabila.

-August 28, 1958: Gabila filed this action praying that the defendants be ordered to execute an
extra-judicial partition of all the properties of their deceased father or otherwise settle his estate
and pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, and execute the requisite instruments
for the registration and transfer of the title to him; and to pay him attorney's fees and expenses
of the suit, plus costs.

-Perezes’ Answer: that the deed of sale was intended merely to guarantee a loan of P2,500
contracted by one of the defendants; that Mercedes Perez, one of the vendors, was a minor
when the deed of sale was made; that the deed of sale was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture; and, that the consideration of P2,500 was unconscionable.

-Gabila’s Reply: that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, Mercedes Perez stated
that she was of age, and plaintiff had no reason to doubt that statement. But, assuming that
she was under age at the time, she ratified the sale by her failure to repudiate it in due time;
that the allegation that the deed was only a guarantee for a P2,500 loan was not true because
a part of the purchase price was paid to the defendants in ten (10) monthly installments; that
the price agreed upon in 1948 was fair and reasonable; and, that the approval of the sale by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource was not necessary.

-Despite due notice, neither defendants nor their counsel appeared during the trial. For that
reason, RTC allowed the plaintiff to adduce evidence ex parte before a commissioner.

-RTC decision, Jan 21, 1961: dismissed the complaint and held that the defendants could not
be ordered to execute an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of their deceased father
because the properties to be partitioned are not identified in the complaint, and, the defendants
can no longer partition the land described in TCT No. 899, because it has been sold to the
plaintiff. The court held that the extrajudicial partition of the property should have been done at
the time of the sale, in the same instrument.
ISSUE

WON the defendants should be ordered to execute an extra-judicial partition of all the
properties of their deceased father and execute the requisite instruments for the registration
and transfer of the title to plaintiff

HELD

NO. This action is not one for specific performance of the sale of the property to the appellant,
what the plaintiff seeks merely is the transfer of the title of the land in his name.

-Gabila, as vendee of the land, has a right to receive, and the Perezes the corresponding
obligation to transfer to him, not only the possession and enjoyment of the land but also the
certificate of title. The trial court recognized that right of Gabila, but it professed to be helpless
to enforce it. In dismissing his complaint and, in effect, denying him a remedy, the trial court
forgot a maxim which is as old as the law itself: Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right,
there is a remedy.

-The Perezes, as the only legal heirs of their father, the deceased Mariano Perez, became the
owners of the property in question upon his demise. The rights to the succession were
transmitted to them from the moment of his death (Art. 77, Civil Code). Their sale to Gabila of
the property described in TCT No. 899, which they inherited from their father put an end to
their co-ownership over it (Art. 1082 Civil Code). Consequently there is no further need for
them to partition it, the purpose of partition being to separate, divide, and assign a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong (Art. 1079, Civil Code). The Perezes may no
longer partition the land in question because they had already sold it.

-In this case, the deed of sale also serves the purpose of an affidavit of adjudication of the lot
in question to the Perezes as heirs of the former owner Mariano Perez. Their declaration
therein that the registered owner of the land described in TCT No. 899 Mariano Perez, who
died on October 11, 1942, is the father of the vendors, that "the vendors inherited said land
from their deceased father, being the legitimate children" and that "the Vendors are the
owners" of said land is, in effect, an adjudication of the land to themselves. Such adjudication
renders the stipulation in the deed of sale that "the Vendors will execute immediately an
Extrajudicial Partition of all the properties of their deceased father" superfluous and
unnecessary. It may be overlooked or deemed not written at all. All that needs to be done now
is to register on the TCT No. 899 of the late Mariano Perez the deed of sale which may also be
treated as an affidavit of adjudication of the land to the vendors in order that their father's title
may be canceled and a new one can be issued to their vendee, Carlos Gabila.
16 Chavez vs IAC G.R. No. L-68282, Nov 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her
6 children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold
each their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of
sale were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter
sold the entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent
sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which
later decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that
their mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will
supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must
be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person
makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or
written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the
legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect
to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela
Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos,
executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the
sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to
execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the
sale she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.
17 Bautista vs Griño- Aquino G.R. No. 79958, Oct 28, 1988

FACTS

Petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to declare the deed of
extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title Nos. 14182, 14186 and
15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void.

Based on the parties stipulation of facts:

The land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under TCT No.
2210, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista. On Dec. 22, 1966, a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the
deed, and the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that
document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial
Partition. Upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, T.C.T. No. 2210 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182 was issued. The private respondents, with the
exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista
of that property. Upon registration of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista.

On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private
respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T. C.T. Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T-
15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-15671, were issued to private respondents. Petitioner
Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo. Manuel Bautista and his second
wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949. the
property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property on December
22,1966, among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista.
Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property. On August 1,
1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista.

The NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.

The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs. CA affirmed

ISSUE

WON the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of the
estate of the deceased wife

HELD

NO

RATIO

Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies
only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the
heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If
the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject
matter of an extrajudicial partition.

As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial
partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive the
lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of
the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of an
extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel
Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista
as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is
difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her
daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the
said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-
sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith
hence the said partition must be rescinded.

The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and issuance of the
title in their names, private respondents except Manolito Bautista in turn executed a deed of
absolute sale of the property in favor of the latter in whose name the title was also issued. And
yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was executed this time by Manolito Bautista selling
back the same property to private respondents in whose names the respective titles were thus
subsequently issued. This series of transactions between and among private respondents is
an indication of a clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully
entitled thereto. Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the
property during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is
prohibited by law. 3

As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging exclusively to
petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all subsequent transactions
involving the same property between and among the private respondents are also null and
void. Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue their co-owners
for partition of the property is imprescriptible. 4 And even assuming that the present action may
prescribe as ruled by the respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline
Bautista who are not parties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered the same
only soon before they filed the complaint in court. Certainly the action has not prescribed.
18 Guilas vs Judge Lopez- G.R. No. L-26695, Jan 31, 1972

FACTS

-Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua, Pampanga was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco.
They had no children. On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband
Alejandro as her sole heir and executor.

-In a Resolution dated October 26, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now
married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the
spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the
testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as
one of her heirs. The aforementioned will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband,
Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga.

- Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed by both Alejandro
Lopez and Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was
recognized and lots belonging to Jacinta's paraphernal property, both situated in Bacolor
Pampanga, (two lots then assessed respectively at P3,070.00 and P5,800.00) were
adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free from all liens, encumbrances and
charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez, binding himself to free the said two parcels from
such liens, encumbrances and charges. The rest of the estate of the deceased consisting of 28
other parcels of lands with a total assessed valuation of P69,020.00, as well as personal
properties including a 1953 Buick car valued at P2,500.00 were allotted to Don Alejandro who
assumed all the mortgage liens on the estate. In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court
approved the said project of partition.

On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set
aside and annul the project of partition, in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on the
ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to
submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita lots nos.
3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, which were allocated to her under the project of
partition.

Meanwhile, in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964
praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots
nos. 3368 and 3441 as well as the 1,216 caverns of palay that he collected from the ten (10)
tenants or lessees of the said two lots.

In his opposition to the said petition, Alejandro Lopez claims that, by virtue of the order dated
April 23, 1960 which approved the project of partition submitted by both Alejandro and Juanita,
and the order of December 15, 1960 which "ordered closed and terminated the present case",
the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a
consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty
of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such
closure of the estate, when she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60)
days from December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court.
In her reply to said opposition, Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the
hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and
terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the probate proceedings (citing
Intestate estate of the deceased Mercedes Cano, Timbol vs. Cano, where it was ruled that "the
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all
the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same");
that the executor Alejandro is stopped from opposing her petition because he was the one who
prepared, filed and secured court approval of, the aforesaid project of partition, which she
seeks to be implemented; that she is not guilty of laches, because when she filed on July 20,
1964, her petition for the delivery of her share allocated to her under the project of partition,
less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition
was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the execution of judgment by motion.

In its order dated October 2, 1964, the lower court after a "pre-trial" stated that because the
civil action for the annulment of the project of partition was filed on April 13, 1964, before the
filing on July 2, 1964 of the petition for delivery of the shares of Juanita Lopez, "the parties
have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares
until; after the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled and decided", and forthwith
set the civil action for annulment for trial on November 25, and December 2, 1964.

On June 11, 1965, Juanita filed an amended complaint in Civil Case 2539 (pp. 78-110, rec.),
where she acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as the
allocation in her favor of the Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking.

In her motion dated November 17, 1965, Juanita sought the setting aside of the order dated
October 2, 1964 on the ground that while the said order considered her action for annulment of
the project of partition as a prejudicial question, her filing an amended complaint on June 11,
1965 in the civil case wherein she admitted the partial legality and validity of the project of
partition with respect to the adjudication to her of the two lots as her share, rendered said civil
case No. 2539 no longer a prejudicial question to her petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery
of her share

ISSUE

WON the probate court loses jurisdiction over the probate proceedings upon the order of such
court terminating such case.

HELD
No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate
the probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated; because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed. The better
practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through
a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of

REASONING
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the
heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited
doctrines.

The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control the present
controversy; because the motion filed therein for the removal of the administratrix and the
appointment of a new administrator in her place was rejected by the court on the ground of
laches as it was filed after the lapse of about 38 years from October 5, 1910 when the court
issued an order settling and deciding the issues raised by the motion (L-10018, September 19,
1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of
her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961
when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960
when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots
allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1
of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order
dated December 15, 1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the probate case did
not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has
not been delivered to her.

While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the parties suspended
resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the decision in the civil action
for the annulment of the project of partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10, 1964; the
said order lost its validity and efficacy when the herein petitioner filed on June 11, 1965 an
amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539 wherein she recognized the partial legality and
validity of the said project of partition insofar as the allocation in her favor of lots Nos. 3368 and
3441 in the delivery of which she has been insisting all along.
19 Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz G.R. No. L-29192, Feb 22, 1971

DOCTRINE: De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer relatives exclude the
more remote ones, except if the right of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate
succession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific
instance, is barred from exercising the right of representation.

FACTS: Gertrude de los Santos for specific performance against Maximino de la Cruz,
alleging that she and several co-heirs, including defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition
agreement over a portion of land and that the parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to the
defendant in addition to his share, on the condition that the defendant would undertake the
development of the estate, all expenses shall be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the
3 lots.

1. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the
agreement was void with respect to her, since the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de
la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition
agreement by mistake.
2. Defendant’s counterclaim alleged that since the plaintiff had sold her share in the estate
and that extrajudicial partition agreement being void as to the latter, he is entitled to ¼
of the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.
3. The court held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement,
was stopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent
Pelagia de la Cruz; hence he must abide by the terms of the agreement.
4. The parties admit that the owner of the subject matter of the extrajudicial agreement
was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died instestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant is a
nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her
mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being niece of the decedent. Plaintiff’s mother died on
September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing the decedent; and that the purpose of the
extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs
of Pelagia de la Cruz.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff-apellee Gertrude de los Santos is a heir of the decedent.

HELD: No, plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could
not inherit from the latter by right of representation, much less could plaintiff-appellee
inherit in her own right.

Applying Art. 972 and Art. 962 of the Civil Code, the Court in Linarty y Pavia vs. Ugarte y
Itturalde said:

In and intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and cannot participate with a
niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant
 grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain
beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters.

In the case at bar, the relatives “nearest in degree” to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is the defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a
grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

The legal effect of plaintiff-appellee inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial

partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action did not confer upon
her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate
among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz and in the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-
appellee was participating in representation of her deceased mother.

It is apparent therefore that the parties were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-
appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such heir,
the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code.

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner and
another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the
prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appelee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its
terms enforced.

The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may not
be heard to assert estoppels against defendant-appellant. Estoppels cannot be predicated on
a void contract, or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy.