Peter Keller

Señalar que la autoconciencia empírica es dependiente de la autoconciencia trascendental.

La autoconciencia trascendental y la autoconciencia empírica son lo mismo que la
apercepción trascendental y la apercepción empírica.
Cualquier contenido cognitivo depende de su relación con la autoconciencia trascendental.
La autoconciencia establece las demandas para la experiencia, es normativa. A partir de las
demandas que establece es posible para nosotros integrar distintas experiencias en una
experiencia objetiva.
2. I argue that the key to a proper understanding of the thesis that our experience is subject
to the demands of self-consciousness is a proper understanding of the fundamentally
impersonal carácter of our representatiton of self.
3. When each of us refers to him- or herself by means of the expression “I”, each of us refers
to him- or herself in a way that could, in principle, apply to any one of us. This is the basic,
minimal, idea that Kant tries to express with his notion of trascendental self-consciousness.
3. I argue that our very ability to form concepts in feneral is base don our capacity for
trascendental self-consciousness. This capacity for concept formation and use is displayed in
judgments and inferences that themselves depend on our capacity for representing ourselves
imprsonally. I then go on to make the even stronger claim that the very notion of a
representational content that has any cognitive relevance is parasitic on our ability to form
an impresonal consciousness of self.
4. The fact that I am able to represent the point of view of another rational being does not
mean that I am no longer the particular individual that I am. But it does mean that I represent
myself and other persons in an impersonal manner. For, in representing what it might have
been like for things to appear to me in the way that they appear to the other being to which I
wish to attribute rationatility, I represent myself as an arbitrary self-consciousness, that is just
one person among many posible other persons. But at the same time I am also able to
represent myself as the particular individual who I happen to be.
6. The kind of self-consciousness expressed by the statement “I think p,” where p is any
proposition, is, for Kant, the basis for all use of concepts, judgments, and inferences. In using
concepts, and making judgments and inferences, we commit ourselves to a representation of
what we are representing by means of our concepts, judgents, or inferences that is not just
true for our own individual point of view, but is also true for any arbitrary point of view.
Kant refers to this notion of a representatios that is a representation for any arbitrary point of
view as a representation that belongs to “a consciousness in general” (Bewuβtsein
überhaupt), as opposed to a representation that belong to one consciousness alone.
LA capacidad de usar conceptos consiste en nque nos representamos algo que es accesible,
en principio, para todos. Pues con el uso conceptual pretendemos afirmar algo sobre el
mundo, mediante juicios, que sea accesible para todos. En eso consiste la capacidad de
formarnos conceptos.
Los juicios tienen un valor de verdad.
Los principios normativos se basan en el compromiso que tenemos cuando hacemos un
juicio.
7. This commitment expresses itself in a willingness to offer reasons for our belief that
something i sor is not thus and such. In taking on the obligation to offer reasons for what w
judge to be the case, we acknowledge that judgment is govened by nomative principles.
7. Normative principles provide procedures for distinguishing judgment that succeeds in
articulating truth from judgment that is false.
7. To judge is to place oneself in the space of reasons and thus to take on a commitment to
offer reasons for what one judges to be the case. But this means that, in making a judgment,
the judger implicity taker her-, him-, or itself to be not just conforming to rules but also tacitly
or overtly obeying rules.
8. In forming a judgment, the individual is not merely stating a fact about the way that
individual interprets matters, the individual is also making a claim that others ought to
interpret things in the same way. The individual is thus committing him-, her-, or itself to the
possibility of providing reasons for why he, she, or it has judged in that way rather than in
another way. These reasons operate as norms governing the judgments in question. Norms
are principls governing the responses of individuals that apply to individuals in different
situations.
8-9: […] in order to be able to recognize norms as norms governing one’s behavior, one must
be able to recognize principles that trascend a particular point of view. These principles that
trascend a particular point of view depend on one’s ability to recognize not only one’s own
point of view, but lso the possibility of other points of view to which those norms apply.
La apercepción trascendental es una condición para la formación de conceptos.
10: I argue that the notion of trascendental apperception that is introduced in the A-Deduction
is not to be understood as a representation of personal identity. Isntead, it is to be understood
as a condition under which it is posible for us to form concepts of objects. As such, it is a
representation of self that is the same for all of us.
Los conceptos de primer orden son los conceptos empíricos; los conceptos de segundo orden
son las categorías.
12. The B-Deduction makes the connection between being a potential candidate for
impersonal self-consciousness an being a potential candidate for judgment explicit in a way
that is lacking in the A-Deduction.
14. The dependence of inner experience on outer experience allows him to argue that even
our perceptions and other inner episodes are subject to the same necssary conditions to which
intersubjectively available objects must be subject.
19. I then argue that the numerical identity that Kant ascribes to trascendental self-
consciousness in the A-Deduction is not to be understood as committing him to any specific
claims about my individual personal identity. It is rather to be understood as an enabling
condition of conceptal recognition of objects.
20. […] empirical self-consciousness involves some kind of intuition. Since Kant defines an
intuition as a representation “that relates immediately to an object and is singular”
(A320/B377), the implication is that empirical self-consciousness is an immediate
consciousness of oneself as an individual. This immediate representations is a representation
of oneself at a certain time, but it is not a representation of oneself over time.
La autoconciencia empírica es temporal, son los distintos estados que se suceden unos a otros.
La autoconciencia trascnednetla es la condición bajo la que es posible el reconocimiento de
objetos.
23. The necessary representation of numerical identity in transcendental sel-consciousness
is, rather, the necessary representation of a shared point of view from which we can make
sense of an objective space and time and, indeed, of the communicability of the contents of
concepts to different spatio-tempotal points of view.
Las catergorías unifican las representaciones por medio del juicio.
45. Our ability to use concepts, as Kant understands them, depends on our capacity to
represent things in the same way from any standpoint that is intelligible.
RECORDAR QUE LA APERCEPCIÓN TRASCENDENTAL IMPLICA LA
REPRESENTACIÓN DE LA IDENTIDAD DEL YO.
LAS CATEGORÍAS SE REQUIEREN PARA LA CONEXIÓN NECESARIA DE LA
SÍNTESIS.
51. Concepts serve as rules for organizing the data of intuition by providing us with the
capacity to recognize items in different situations.
59. Kant’s argument to the transcendental affinity of nature suggests that nature must be
uniform in every respect if there is to be self-consciousness. He wants to claim that there is
sufficient uniformity in cinnabar with respect to its properties for us to have the notion of
how cinnabar looks to standard observers under standard circumstances.
65. Judgments make an implicit claim to objectivity by making a truth claim. In forming a
jugdment, we commit ourselves to the truth of the proposition that is asserted by the
judgment. It might be thought that this truth could merely be a truth for me or for someone
else. In this case, the truth would be merely subjective. However, such a subject-relative
conception of truth would not do the job that we assign to the notion of truth, namely to cature
the way things are independently of an individual point of view or take on the way the world
is.
LA unidad de la conciencia es una fuente normativa del contenido que puede ser
epistemológcamente significativo.
Pensar sobre algo es hacer un juicio sobre eso.
Todos los pensamientos contienen potencialmente un yo pienso.
Si una representación en mí representa algo para mí entonces es posible que se pueda conocer
esa representación como mía.
67. The point to note here is that the existence of representations that are nothing for me,
representations of which I am not conscious, is consistent with the principle that I can think
all my representations so long as one restricts the meaning of mine to those representations
in me that are something for me. The validity of Kant’s argument thus depends on the
assumption that representations in me that would be nothing for me cannot be mine at all.
Lo que es mío lo es en el siguiente sentido: es accesible cognitivamente a mí.
68. Kant clearly does asume that representations which happen to be in me, but that I cannot
think of as mine, are without cognitive significance.
La segunda edición de la deducción muestra que hay representaciones que no tienen un
contenido significativo para nadie, o sea muestra a las representaciones subjetivas.
La autoconciencia del yo pienso es una apercepción originaria.
71. He links the spontaneity of thought,its originality, to a consciousness of self that is
context-independent. The “I think” is supposedto be “one and the same in all consciousnes”
(B 132). It must therefore also be the same in the different states of consciousness that
characterize different persons. This context-independence of the “I think” reflects its
Independence from any particular facts about the causal history of particular agents.
El contenido de mis estados representacionales está determinado por ciertas condiciones. Sin
esas condiciones no podrían ser parte de una única conciencia.
72. Minimally a general ( “allgemeines”) self-consciousness must involve a consciousness
that the members of a set of representations belong to oneself.
76. A represenation is cognitively significant for me only if I can think of that representation
as a representation that could be mine in the sense that it is connectible to other
representations that I ascribe to it myself.
78. Judgment involves the possiblity of areement o disagreement between different persons
about some purported state of affairse. As such, jusgment involves an implicit commitment
to the idea that there is some normative ground that allows one to determine whether the
judgment is right or wrong, whether it is true or false.
80. Judgment represents ítems in a way that commits one to those ítems being the same for
everyone, that is to their unifiability in an “I think p” that could be anyone’s. This capacity
to abstract grom what is the case for me as a particular individual and to take things as they
would be represented by anyone else is what is expressed by the “is” of assertion.
En (B 140), Kant identifica la autoconciencia empírica con la conexión asociativa.
81. In general how I happen to connect different words or other representations with objects
in my consciousness is a contingent matter that depends on the circumstaces under which I
have come to connect those words with those objects. Such accidental connection by
association is not sufficient for an objective unity of consciousness, that is, for a
consciousness of what we reresent that can be the sae for all of us. Kant identifies this
objective unity of consciousness with the trascendental unity of apperception.
Los juicios de experiencia son juicios necesarios e intersubjetivos.
89. […] according to the Henrich interpretation, the argument of the first step is synthetic,
but is restricted to the applicability of categories to unitary intuitions, while in the second
step the applicability of categories to all of our sensible intuitions is demostrated.
93. At the same time, self-knowledge ad knowledge in general must be restriced to objects
as they must appear to us spatially and temporally, if the categories are to apply necessarily
to all the objects to whicht they do apply.
Según la interpretación de Keller, el primer paso intenta mostrar que todos los contenidos
que son cognitivamente significativos de nuestras representaciones son candidatos para
juicios determinados por categorías.
93. Why then is a second step needed on Kant’s proof? Kant needs to show how all sensible
representational contents can be candidates for judgment requiring categories. In this way,
Kant can sustain the claim of judgment to objctivity and still provide room for subjective
experiences.
100. In section 24 Kant makes it clear that all non-empirical concepts have content only in
respect to appearances which are given o us through our inner sense and outer sense, that is
through our experience of objects in time and space. He specifically argues that self-
knowledge requires a figural synthesis of trascendenta imagination. The imporant thing about
this synthesis of the sensible contents of experience is that it is contrasted with the kind of
“intelectual sythesis” involved id applying categories to objects of an intuition in general.
While it takes places “in accordance with the categories,” and depends on the “original
synthetic unity of apperception,” it is independent of the actual application of the categories
in the forming of judgments (B 151).
102. […] in section 25 Kant attempts to establish a sense in which one can be conscious of
oneself without knowing who one is. If I am conscious of myself then it is ragmatically
necessary that I exist, whoever I might be. This existence is not restricted to how I appear to
myself or to anyone. In thinking about myself I am thinking about someone an hence
reffering to a particular individual. However, I do not know who that individual is unless I
know some further self-locating facts about myself. In self-consciousness I am consious of
someone who is a basic rather than a dependent particular, since I am conscious of whoever
it is who is the beare of that self-consciousness. This, in self-consciousness I am conscious
of myself as a thing in itself n the trascendental sense, although any description I have of
myself will apply only to the way I must appear to myself spatially and temporally.
103. Kants treats self-knowledge on the model of a subject that represents itself as an object:
“I as intelligence an thinking subject know myself as thought object” (section 24, B 155).
This has suggested to many interpreters that empirical self-consciousness or even
trascendental self-consciousness is to be understood on the subject-objetc model, or the
reflection theory as it is generally called. Accordin to the reflection theory, self-
consciousness is capable of a reductive analysis into a two-termed relation between the
subject of consciousness and the object of consciousness.
104. Those who have interpreted Kant as a defender of the subjetc-object model and
reflection theory of self-consciousness have come to the conclusión that Kant’s conception
of either empirical or trascendental self-consciousness is incoherent. While I sal largue that
Kant did not hold a subject-object or reflection theory of self-consciosness, I do think that he
held a reflection theory of self-knowledge. The reflextion heory of self-knowledge is
defensible so long as it is base don a non-reductive theory of self-consciousness. The subject-
object schema applies to self-knowledge because self-knowledge is constrained by criteria
governing the recognition of oneself as an individual person distinct from other persons. The
criteria for identifying and reidentifying persons are parasitic on the criteria for identifying
and reidentifying material bodies, since the only way we have of identifying and reidentifying
different times is in realtion to material objects that occupy spaces. However, since self-
knowledge requieres self-identification, the object to be identified under a certain
descriptionmust not only be identified in spatio-temporal terms but also be thought of as
oneself. It is here that the subject-model needs supplementation if it is to provide a coherent
account of self-knowledge.
Las categorías dinámicas son constituitvas de cualquier concepto que podamos tener de un
objeto en la experiencia.
El conocimiento de las substancias no nos informa de cuáles eventos son anteriores,
posteriores o sumultáneos con otros eventos, para eso se requiere de la causalidad.
El yo pienso da lugar a la ilusión trascendental.
163. With Descartes, Kant notes that the self-consciousness expressed in the tought “I am
thinking” has existential import and is self-verifying at the time the proposition expressed by
the thought “I am thinking” is asserted by me. The referential force of the proposition “I
think” is base don the epirical fact that I am thiking provided by inner perception. And “this
inner percpetion is nothing more that the mere apeperception: I think” (A 343/B 401). Taken
in this sense, which Kant refers to as the asserotic use of the expression “I think,” “the I think,
is, as was already said, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, I exist, in
itself” (B 422). There is, however, another sense in which the thought tha I am thinking may
be understood. Kant refers to the usage in question as taking the proposition “I think”
“problematically”
167. Kant diagnoses the four basic paralogisms of rational psychology as fallacies of
ambiguity (cophismat figurae dictionis: A 402; B 411) that are base don a confusión on the
problematic use of the proposition “I think” with the assertoric use of that proposition.
169. When I am conscious of myself merely as subject of self-consciousness, there is no
room for reference failure.