The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.

Navarra and the

Bishop Himself in his Personal Capacity VS. Commission on Elections and the Election Officer
of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon
GR No. 205728

SUMMARY OF THE PETITION

FACTS: Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this
petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing
this petition in his individual and personal capacity as the questioned orders are personally
directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of
paramount and transcendental importance to the public which must be settled early given the far-
reaching implications of the unconstitutional acts of the respondents.

Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its Election Officer of
Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon.

On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the front wall of the Bacolod
Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the messageConscience Vote (Team
Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin). The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both
Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates.

In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by respondent Atty.
Majarucon, which orders them to remove the supposed oversizedTeam Patay Tarpaulin of the
Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February 2013 order issued by the
COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay
Tarpaulin and threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if
he fails to cause its immediate removal.

On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team Patay Tarpaulin.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:

Respondents’ orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay
Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioners’ right to freedom of expression
on their own private property.

Respondents’ orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay

Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and
State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:

The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay
Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that the mention of the candidates in the
infringes on the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their own private property:

the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins “are not electoral campaign materials,” stressing that the
mentioning of candidates’ name in the second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners’
campaign against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even when it was just a
bill being deliberated in Congress;

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subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are “covered by the broader constitutional guaranty of freedom of
expression and of conscience and not by the more narrow and limited election laws, rules, and
regulations”;

petitioners “have the constitutional right to communicate their views and beliefs by posting the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod Cathedral, a private property owned by the Diocese of
Bacolod”;

the RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013 National Elections who
supported and who opposed its passage into a law are matters of public concern and a legitimate
subject of general interest and of discussion;

citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998),
the petitioners’ argued that that public concern “…embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know…”

citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Adiong v. COMELEC ( G. R. No. 103956, March 31,
1992), the petitioners’ further argued that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open.”

the content and the message of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin “plainly relates to broad issues of
interest to the community especially to the members of the Catholic community” and that the
subject tarpaulin “simply conveys the position of the petitioners on the RH bill and the public
officials who supported or opposed it as it gains relevance in the exercise of the people’s right of
suffrage” in the advent of the 2013 polls;

considering the petitioners’ message, through the Team Patay Tarpaulin, was a matter of public
concern, the message being conveyed and the mode used for its communication and expression to
the public is entitled to protection under the Free Expression clause of the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution;

not being candidates or political parties, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in Adiong v. COMELEC, is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party;

there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered or which will be
endangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify the
infringement of the preferred right of freedom of expression.

The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay
Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and
State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution:

petitioners’ petition against the RH Law “is not only a matter of exercise of its freedom of
expression and of conscience but is also a matter of Catholic faith, morals, belief, and of duty”;

the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the RH Law as part of her mission as part of its
continued advocacy and obedience to the Catholic Church’s teachings;

in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the petitioners have declared the RH
Law as being anti-life, anti-morals, anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of the
Catholic Church. Consequently, petitioners have called on its members and followers not to
support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life;

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considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is inextricably connected
to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings, the posting of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere exercise of freedom of expression and of conscience, but
also of the right and privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings which should be
insulated from any form of encroachment and intrusion on the part of the State, and its agencies
and officials;

section 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the principle of separation of
Church and State;

at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of Life which is a matter of Catholic
doctrine, creed and dogma;

the petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times when there is a great conflict
between a culture of death and a culture of life, the Church should have the courage to proclaim
the culture of life for the common good of society;

the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the Church and constitute
serious violations of the principle of separation of Church and State which the State and its
officials, including the herein respondents, are bound to respect, observe, and hold sacred.

PRAYER:

Petition be given due course;

Issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining

respondents from further proceedings in enforcing their orders for the removal of the subject Team
Patay Tarpaulin;

Declare the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void and permanently
restrain the respondents from enforcing them or any other similar orders; and

Issue other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.

THE ISSUES TO BE ARGUED AS PER ADVISORY OF THE COURT EN BANC DATED MARCH
12, 2013

Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and the 27
February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law Department are considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC which would warrant a review of this Court via a Rule 65
Petition.

(a) Whether or not petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine and jurisprudential rules
governing appeals from COMELEC decisions;

(b) Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned Orders are not considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would
allow this Court to take cognizance of the case.

Whether or not it is relevant to determine whether the tarpaulins are “political advertisement” or
“election propaganda” considering that petitioner is not a political candidate.

Whether or not the tarpaulins are a form of expression (protected speech), or election
propaganda/political advertisement.

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(a) Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of expression, whether or not the COMELEC
possesses the authority to regulate the same.

(b) Whether or not this form of expression may be regulated.

Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and the 27
February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law
Department violate the Constitutional principle of separation of church and state.

Whether or not the action of the petitioners in posting its tarpaulin violates the Constitutional
principle of separation of church and state.

OSG COMMENT: DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners availed of the proper remedy in assailing respondents’ notice and letter
ordering the removal of the subject tarpaulin.

Whether or not the assailed order and notice issued by respondents are valid and constitutional
considering that the same allegedly violate the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression and the
principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this
Honorable Court is not the proper remedy to question the subject notice and letter of respondents.

Petitioners filed the petition before the Honorable Court, claiming that they have no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to assail the notice and letter issued by the respondents. Contrary to
their claim, prior resort to the COMELEC constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate remedy that
bars the petitioners from directly asking relief from the Honorable Court from the alleged injurious
effects of the subject letter and notice.

In filing the instant suit, the petitioners violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Petitioners should have first
brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or to any of its Divisions before going directly to the
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari and prohibition.

The letter and notice issued by the respondents are not subject to review by the Supreme Court, as
the power of the Court to review the decisions of the COMELEC is limited only to final decisions,
rulings and orders of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power (citing Ambil Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398 October 25, 2000). Considering that
the assailed letter and notice are not final orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise
of its adjudicatory and quasi-judicial functions but mere issuances of Atty. Marjucom and the
COMELEC Law Department, the same are not reviewable by the Honorable Court but by the
COMELEC itself.

Granting that the assailed notice and letter are subject to review by the Honorable Court,
petitioners must be able to show that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the same. Petitioners have not shown facts essential to
prove that the assailed notice and letter were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious”
manner or the abuse of discretion is so “patent and gross” to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

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The respondents issued the notice andletter pursuant to the COMELEC’s mandate to regulate and
supervise the use of mass media during election period as embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

The subject tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by respondent COMELEC

pursuant to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, respondent’s
notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.

In furtherance of COMELEC’s mandate to supervise and regulate elections, Congress enacted RA

9006Â (the Fair Elections Act), giving the COMELEC power to promulgate its own rules and
regulations. Pursuant to this, COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 (Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 9006, in connection to the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections, and
Subsequent Elections). Resolution 9615 defines the following terms:

Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity- “an act designed to promote the election of defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office, and shall include, among others, the act of
directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges of support for or against any candidate”

Political Advertisement or Election Propaganda- “ any matter broadcasted, published, printed,

displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia,
motif, initials,and other symbol or representation, that is capable of being associated with a
candidate or a party, and is intended to draw the attention of thepublic or a segment thereof to
promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a
public office”

From the definitions, the subject tarpaulin is a form of election propaganda subject to regulation by
the COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

The subject tarpaulin contains the message “CONSCIENCE VOTE” and classifies the candidates
into two groups, “Team Buhay” (with a check mark) and “Team Patay” (with a cross mark). The
check mark on “Team Buhay” and the cross mark on “Team Patay” convey to the public that those
belonging to the “Team Buhay” should be voted while those under “Team Patay” should be
rejected. On its face, it is obvious that the tarpaulin is petitioners’ way of endorsing those
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for the said law.
Petitioner also admitted in their petition that they “have called on its members and followers not to
support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life”. These
declarationsconfirm that they put up the tarpaulin not merely to promote the Church’s position on
the RH Law but to express their support for or against the candidates listed therein, depending on
who they voted on the RH Law.

Section 6 of Resolution 9615 sets the size limit for campaign posters to two feet by three feet. This is
also embodied in section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code. The subject tarpaulin has the estimated
size of six feet by ten feet, which is beyond the maximum allowable size for campaign posters for
private properties. In ordering the removal of the tarpaulin, Atty. Marjucom, in her capacity as
election officer, merely enforcedsection 6 of Resolution 9615 and section 82 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Similarly, in issuing the assailed letter, the COMELEC Law Department only acted pursuant
to COMELEC’s regulatory and supervisory functions under the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners cannot claim that their right to freedom of expression has been violated. Petitioners are
completely free to express their support for or against any candidate through the use of campaign
posters and other forms of propaganda, provided they comply with the limitations provided by
law as regards their size.

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The assailed notice and letter are not forms of censorship. The only reason that the respondents
sought the removal of the tarpaulin is that it failed to comply with the maximum allowable size
provided by law.

Assuming that the assailed notice and letter amount to infringement of the petitioners’ right to
freedom of expression, such encroachment is authorized by the Constitution itself. The supervisory
and regulatory powers of the COMELEC under the Constitution set to some extent a limit on the
right to free speech during the election period. By ordering the petitioners to comply with the size
requirement, the COMELEC was exercising its supervisory and regulatory authority for the
purpose of ensuring equal opportunity for candidates for political office.

The assailed notice and letter do not intrude into purely religious and ecclesiastical matters. They
do not seek to regulate the content the subject tarpaulin, but only the size, which respondents
found to be in violation of Resolution 9615 and the Omnibus Election Code. On its face, the subject
tarpaulin does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. Rather, it is an election
propaganda. The fact that the tarpaulin did not comply with Resolution 9615 and the Omnibus
Election Code gave respondents reason to order its removal, consistent with COMELEC’s mandate
to regulate and supervise all form of media communication and information during election
period. Thus, respondents did not violate the principle of separation of Church and State provided
in the Constitution.

PRAYER: The Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

(1st Digest) Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under
Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation
was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang
Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on
moral grounds. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution,
stating that “the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation,
its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.” That “the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that
some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It
also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

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 The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”

Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be
applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

(2nd Digest) ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field
personnel.

Issues:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors

7
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-
list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or
any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to
support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of
Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who
had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other
hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or
Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their

8
religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since
1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was
completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three
witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross
and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling
that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

Aglipay v. Ruiz - A case digest

GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order
the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner,
Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment
of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine
9
Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the
greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by
the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these
officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still,
the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and
the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement
as to costs.

Garces v Estenzo 104 SCRA 510 (1981)

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc Citywere passed:a. Resolution
No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the
said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.b. Resolution No. 6-
The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente
Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his
successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the
saint’s feast day.These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were
implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the
barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the
barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in its
acquisition.Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin
case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the
said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that
Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image
was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal.
Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to
any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the
council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the
determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no
violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which
involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
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constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.

[A.M. No. 2440-CFI : July 25, 1981.]

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF ABRA, Respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is easily understandable why Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr. on behalf of the Iglesia ni Cristo would
take umbrage on the portion of the opinion of respondent Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella in the
course of acquitting the defendants accused of Triple Rape. Thus: "it will also be observed that
Florencio Ola was released on July 27, 1979, yet no action was taken by him from July 28, 1979, to
August 21 to denounce to the proper authorities what allegedly had happened to his wife Merlinda
Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo. Her husband Florencio Ola and
her in-laws were still in the process of being convinced to become members of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted her brothers of the Iglesia ni Cristo
as it was thru their assistance that made possible the institution of this action. Her husband and in-
laws are now members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of
the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing to the community of La Paz, Abra in particular
and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her
problem." 1 There was absolutely no need for the last sentence therein being included. Respondent
judge was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench.
While the offending portion of such opinion is not impressed with such gravity, disciplinary action
nonetheless is warranted.

As noted in the report of Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova, adopting the memorandum of
Deputy Court Administrator Romeo D. Mendoza: "Respondent judge, in his comment dated
January 20, 1981, alleged that the charges made against him by herein complainant are unfair and
unfounded as the decision rendered by him in Criminal Case No. 2003, acquitting the
three cranad(3) accused of Triple Rape, was prepared by him in the honest conviction that the
evidence adduced at the trial of said case was not sufficiently clear to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent judge further contended that the statements
complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution,
particularly the statement of the complainant witness cranad(Merlinda Ola), in addition to the fact
that she had always been accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo
and numerous members of the sect." 2 There was a reply on the part of complainant, Teofilo
Ramos, Sr. who, according to the report, "claimed that the statement made by the herein
respondent judge that the complaining witness had always been accompanied in court during the
trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of said sect, was uncalled for and
intended to further malign the Iglesia ni Cristo, thereby seriously putting under doubt respondent
judge's competency and integrity as a magistrate of the law. He also claimed that the
inconsistencies in the testimony of the rape victim in the said criminal case were minor matters that
did not disprove the commission of the crime of rape by the members of the police authorities as
well as their identities. Complainant proferred as an excuse for said inconsistencies the fact that the
victim is a simple and unlearned housewife and no malicious motive or evil intent had been shown
at the trial which had impelled said victim to point an accusing finger against the three cranad(3)
accused in the subject criminal case." 3 In the state of the record, it was submitted in such report
that "on the basis of the pleadings and other documents of record, respondent judge's liability or

11
lack of it can already be determined without need of further investigation. Accordingly, the
undersigned finds it unnecessary to refer this case to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for
investigation. This Court, in the case of Sta. Maria. v. Ubay, held that 'cumbersome, time-
consuming procedure of investigation need not be resorted to if the allegations in the complaint,
the comments thereon, and the documents presented provide ample basis for a resolution of the
complainant's charges.

This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the word "gimmick"
could offend the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as
understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity.
It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be
acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could
have that effect. The Latin maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri, comes to mind. It is to be
expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts would
certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion 5 implies respect for every creed. No one, much
less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory
sense. It should not be lost sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a
religious sect finds support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial is safeguarded by the
fundamental law. 6 No adverse implication can arise from such an occurrence. It goes without
saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to
maintain the proper decorum.

The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the right of a court to give expression to
its views is equally deserving of protection. At any rate, it is not an affront to rationality if note be
taken that not all members of the bench are possessed of such an extensive vocabulary in the
English language that the misuse of a word is to be followed automatically by reprisal of a severe
character. While under the circumstances, some members of the Court are of the opinion that
censure is warranted, it is the view of the majority that an admonition would suffice.

WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby admonished to be much more careful in the
use of language likely to offend an individual or religious sect.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Gironella –Digested

Respondent’s opinion in a case provoked Ramos to charge him of ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming a member of the bench.

Facts: Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., on behalf of the INC, charged respondent Judge due to his opinion
in the course of acquitting the defendants-accused of Triple Rape. In his opinion, Gironella said
that, “it cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of
showing the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni
Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem. Respondent, in so doing, was charged
with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench.

Ruling: The use of the word “gimmick” could offend the sensibilities of the members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly
complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a
course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. It is to be expected that a religious sect
accused of having to resort to a “gimmick” to gain coverts would certainly be far from
pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official, is
privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost

12
sight to either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the
Constitution

(1st Digest) American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

Facts: American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation
duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in
Manila in November, 1898. City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be
exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila. American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine
dialects. City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several
Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the
corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953. To
avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license
fees under protest. American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality
of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of
Manila. They contended they had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay
any license fee or sales tax it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. City of Manila
prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in
question. Trial Court dismissed the complaint. American Bible Society appealed to the Court of
Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

Ruling: NO. Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity
engaged in any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a
Mayor’s permit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible Society’s business is not
among those enumerated. However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other
businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not
empowered to license or to tax P5.00. Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend
upon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.

Provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:

Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is
empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books

Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including
importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of
some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a)
wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general
merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury
articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be
prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same
establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays
the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license
tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance.

13
The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee
that a retail dealer has to pay per annum. As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose
a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent
as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee
imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is
in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of
activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice
and evil of this flat license tax. Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of
a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its
maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism
can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth
Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code,Corporations or associations organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the
income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity
conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed
under this Code shall not be taxed. The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
American Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for
profit. Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible
Society’s free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs. Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations,
We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of
P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.

(2nd Digest) American Bible Society v City of Manila GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

FACTS: In the course of its ministry, the Philippine agency of American Bible Society (a foreign,
non-stock, non-profit, religious,
missionary corporation) has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof
throughout the Philippines. The acting City Treasurer of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945, without providing itself
with the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364. The society paid such under protest and filed
suit questioning the legality of the ordinances under which the fees are being collected.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are constitutional and valid

Whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar

RULING:

1. Yes, they are constitutional. The ordinances do not deprive defendant of his constitutional right
of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits
him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as part of his
religious system. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff society.

14
2. The ordinance is inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. Even if
religious groups and the press are not altogether free from the burdens of the government, the act
of distributing and selling bibles is purely religious and does not fall under Section 27e of the Tax
Code (CA 466). The fact that the price of bibles, etc. are a little higher than actual cost of the same
does not necessarily mean it is already engaged in business for profit. Thus, the Ordinances are not
applicable to the Society.

Pamil vs Teleron

Facts: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque,
Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo
warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided
for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:

…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works
of the municipality.

In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that the
Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to
run.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer
operative?

HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, “No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” If the the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy is to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may
run for elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court because
it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of
the RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the
decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the
mayoralty position.

It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who swore to serve the
Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with
church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised
Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.

Dissenting Opinion

J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public
elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease
in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they
are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to
the two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code,
“ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal
elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in
the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons

15
possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are
eligible to run for public office.”

Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 59 SCRA 54 (1974)

Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from
his affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to
become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement in
their collective bargaining agreement with their employer that all permanent employees of the
company must be a member of the union and later was amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with
the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union
wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was informed
by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be
dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract
stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to be
affiliated with any labor unions.

Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.

Held: The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely: first,
liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself
without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may join or refrain
from joining an association. Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic Act is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members
of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this exception does not
infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association but instead reinforces it.

(1st Digest) German vs. Barangan

Facts: One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and
worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering
the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And considering that
German’s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing
yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but
rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacañang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a
violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion.
HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief
or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the
same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow German et
al to practice their religious belief but not in the manner that German et al impressed. Such manner
impresses “clear and present danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even
at the expense of curtailing one’s freedom to worship.

16
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando – It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held
in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most
fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the
relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim.
More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith
that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without
that faith, man’s very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.
J. Teehankee – The right to freely exercise one’s religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of
Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable
assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on
the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and
deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course,
dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign prerogative
of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on
the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is
no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the
premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are
prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence.

(2nd Digest) German v. Barangan

G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985

Facts:
1. In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and
office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St.
Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow T-
shirts, they started to march down with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government
invectives. The marchers were barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his superiors
and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St.
Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area. Despite plea, they were not allowed
in the church.

2. Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt
by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this
present recourse.

3. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St.
Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that
they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and
worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to
perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place
close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic.

4. Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the
issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside
St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin
respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in said church.

17
ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction to petitioners to attend church is a violation of their freedom
to religious worship

HELD: NO.

1. The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was established in the interest of national
security. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.
This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education.

2. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious
freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good
faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties ... observe honesty and good faith."

Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION

106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when
they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO
No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag
ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to
reinstate their children. This was denied.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and
Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional.

Held: DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine,
not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it
and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and
state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest
with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group
or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many
interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious
groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners,
there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school
regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being
criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute
regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of
their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave

18
it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right
to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that
the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and
pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the
Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955;
that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department
Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of
religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and
school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in
public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were
properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Facts: In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which
refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her
Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District
Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from
service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils
from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t
obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious
belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu
officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As
a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated
July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness
teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the
Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not
answer to their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in
violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom
of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or
‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent
from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to
admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the
expulsion orders issued by the respondents.

19
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing
their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in
the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.

Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates
right receive free education.

Held: The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are enrolled
will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education,
for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education,
and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If
they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the
flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
possibly disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to
prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino,
regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed
before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our
history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.

The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled
and set aside.

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