CU(2017

ENTREGA DEL
CLASS 8. JUNE: 8/6/17
THE CONUNDRUM(S) OF CITIZENSHIP
Jason Keith Fernandes
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Portugal

Abstract
Running against the popular position this lecture, will seek to demonstrate how there is much
that is troubling about the contemporary regime of citizenship. Rather than offering all
individuals access to government, contemporary regimes of citizenship in most of the world
in fact offer merely a mirage of participation. Rather, what has been effected is a regime of
governmentality based on a continuing colonial order that has solidified problematic notions
of race and identity. Drawing on circumstances in the former Portuguese territory of Goa,
which is now an Indian possession, this lecture will offer ways in which to think of citizenship
against the dominant epistemological grain.

The context
In this lecture I would like to suggest that some of the conundrums of citizenship are the facts
that, citizenship has been reduced to a status, one that is granted by the state, and that all
too often the focus of citizenship studies is based on the experiences of the global North. A
response to this would be to point out that citizenship is best understood not as a status, but
as a process; that it is not limited to interaction with the state alone, but a variety of social
institutions.

I would like to explore these conundrums and the possible response to them in the context
of how residents of the contemporary state of Goa in the Indian Republic engage with
Portuguese citizenship. This engagement is the result of a long history that would require
some elaboration. The early modern Portuguese arrived in the subcontinent of South Asia in
1498 but after some time felt the need to establish their own base. Towards this end, Afonso
da Albuquerque conquered the port city of Goa in 1510. This city was the seed of a state that
conquered adjacent territories in various phases eventually giving these various territories
the name of Goa and its current dimensions.

This city of Goa was also the base from which diverse territories in the Indian Ocean world
were administered. As such, Goa was a special location, being what one could call a sub-
imperial centre. What is critical to Goa- and the native residents – was the enjoyments of a
variety of rights, and offices (Pearson 1972), first under the Crown, then under the
Constitutional monarchy (1834), and finally under the Portuguese Republic (1910). At first
limited to those who converted to Catholicism, the rights of all groups were subsequently
recognised. This resulted, among other things, in the election of natives to the Portuguese
parliament as representatives from Goa. All of this should be digested with the knowledge
that elite segments of the Goan population also operated as middlemen and entrepreneurs
in the oftentime dirty business of empire. As I will go on to underline, the process of citizenship
is not always the results of rights for all, but also results in the eclipse the rights of some
groups.

In 1961 the post-colonial state of India invaded the territory and Goa was integrated into the
Indian Union. This action was protested by the Portuguese state, then the Estado Novo
headed by Salazar, until the change in regime in April 1974. It was only then that the new
government in power acknowledged Indian state’s claims of sovereignty over Goa. Sometime
after Portugal joined the European Union in 1986 when it was realized that this turn of events
in the former metropole offered Goans interesting opportunities. A great number of Goans
realized that while the Portuguese had sovereignty over Goa they had in fact been citizens
of Portugal. They effectively lost their ability to assert themselves as citizens of Portugal when
India invaded the territory in 1961, but their continuing right of citizenship was recognized by
the Portuguese state subsequent to the normalization of diplomatic relations between
Portugal and India in 1975.

As a result of this continuing claim of citizenship, as Portuguese citizens Goans, could assert
their right to European citizenship and the ability to move between borders, and chose to do
so by migrating to countries such as France and the UK where they could avail of a variety
of livelihood options.

This practice largely continued unimpeded when in (get date) the election of Caetano Silva
to the state legislature of Goa was challenged on the grounds of his being a Portuguese
citizen. What should be noted is that the Indian state does not allow for “double nationality”,
i.e. Indian citizens have to give up their citizenship if they adopt the citizenship of another
country.

If citizenship is viewed primarily as a matter of rights, the Indian position that refuses to
acknowledge the pre-existing rights of citizenship enjoyed by Goans is perplexing. After all,
it is only logical that rights are inherent in the human person and that states merely recognize
them when we only learn of their existence as newer situations emerge. By this logic, rights
can only be gained, but never really lost. When a post-colonial state like India refuses to
recognize pre-existing rights of its subject population, it puts itself in the position of being a
colonial state. After all, the foundational logic of the post-colonial state is that it guarantees
rights that the colonial state denied.

The Indian state’s position reveals a crucial fact about contemporary regimes of citizenship,
which is marked by the collapse of two distinct concepts, citizenship and nationality. As
Hindess has also pointed out in the text that I had recommended, citizenship, is the condition
of asserting rights by virtue of an individual being recognized as a political actor; and
nationality, where the individual is recognized as a member of a politicized community, the
nation. In the first case, that of citizenship, it is rights that are central to the discussion, and
in the second, it is identity, that is national identity, that is critical to the discussion. It is in this
collapsing of two distinct concepts that we can see an example of what Hannah Arendt has
referred to as the conquest of the state by the nation where the state is transformed from an
instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation.

Once we are attentive to this distinction between citizenship and nationality, then all of a
sudden the whole situation around Caetano Silva and other Goans takes on a whole new
dimension. We realize that what the Indian state does is to block the citizenship rights of
Indians, and link citizenship rights to belonging in national community. Thus, if one takes on
the nationality of another country, then one loses one’s Indian nationality and subsequently
one’s rights of citizenship in India. Simultaneously, if one is deemed to be outside the national
community too one risks losing one’s rights of citizenship

Those familiar with the details of the politics of the Indian state wil know that while the Indian
republic is legally constituted as a secular republic, the quotidian practice is to imagine it as
a Hindu state. The ideal citizen of the Indian republic is effectively the upper caste, Hindu,
male. This is the subject who ideally embodies the nation. All other groups, and this includes
Muslims, Christians, and lower-caste Hindus do not quite fit into the imagined national
community. Indeed, in Goa because, as Santos has pointed out in the second text I
recommended, of the ways in which Portuguese colonialism is imagined – as marked by
miscegenation –Catholics in Goa are seen as not quite Indian, but “clones of colonizers”
(Ferrao 2011). The assertion of a pre-existing right to Portuguese citizenship therefore, is
fraught with not only question of legality, but also with the perceived threat to the health of
the nation.

What we also need to be attentive to in this case is that this linking of citizenship with
nationality, and the loss of citizenship rights in India can take place because it is not just India
that is linking citizenship to nationality, but as Hindess has points out, because other states
also link citizenship to nationality. This may be explicit in some cases, such as that of India,
or more subtle, but the linking of citizenship to nationality is pretty much universal and a mark
of the international system.

It is at this point that Barry Hindess’ discussion of citizenship as a conspiracy, and as part of
the international management of populations begins to make sense. Hindess’ argument is
that the collapsing of nation and state, race and citizenship is not natural, nor that it is
unplanned. Rather, the reducing of citizenship to a status, or belonging to a national
community, rather than seeing it as the exercise of political agency it is part of a conscious
way in which the post-colonial order is designed to enable a global management of
populations by dividing them into distinct population groups marked by race.

I would like to return to this idea about race and citizenship, but before that I want to make a
small detour to talk about the idea of governmentality and population groups.

Hindess is not the only scholar to stress that making individuals governable by recognizing,
and fixing, them as members of populations groups is a critical part of the project of
contemporary citizenship.

Another scholar who makes a similar argument, is the Indian theorist Partha Chatterjee in
his work “The Politics of the Governed” (2007). Like Hindess, Chatterjee too takes issue with
Marshall’s popular analysis of citizenship. Marshall’s account of citizenship was that there
was an expansion of citizenship from “civil rights in the eighteenth [century], political in the
nineteenth, and social in the twentieth”.

Chatterjee suggests that Marshall’s famous suggestion of the expansion of citizenship rights
was in fact an analytical error. What we saw was not the expansion of citizenship, but the
expansion of the state, and the expansion of governmentality. In this expansion, the nation
state asserted itself as the only body that could guarantee rights. Simultaneously, the political
community consisting of rights bearing individuals was broken up into discrete population
groups and catered to, through the extension of concessions. What most people enjoy are
not rights, but merely concessions that can be rolled back when the status quo is not
threatened. Chatterjee suggests that such persons who are beneficiaries of concessions are
not members of the state’s civil society, but are members of what he calls political society.

A critique of Chatterjee’s concept points out that civil society is in fact a context created by
the state that guarantees liberal, negative freedoms. If, he reasons, most people do not enjoy
these rights then in fact one does not have a civil society at all. Kutty’s argument is that what
Chatterjee labels civil society is merely “liberal clubs in an illiberal world, perpetually
vulnerable to the uncivil violence of other citizens and the state” (Kutty 2012). If this critique
of Chatterjee holds, then it goes to underline that in fact the regime of citizenship under-pined
by an international order of nation-states, which is premised on creating spaces of civil
society, is in fact a sham.

Even though Chatterjee’s work is focused on India he points out that the condition of the
majority of Indians is not very different from that of people in most of the world – his short
hand term for the global south. By reading Chatterjee and Hindess together the sense we
get is that the regime of citizenship is in fact quite compromised. State centric citizenship
regimes are about fixing individuals and restricting their mobility. Not only does it restrict us
from movement internationally, but nationally too, a vast part of the population is citizen only
in name, and defined by the population group that they are forced to occupy. What the
contemporary regime of citizenship effectively translates to, therefore, is an act of fixing. One
is given a fixed identity as a member of a population group, and one’s options are severely
restricted. Indeed, one can think of the limiting of the idea of citizenship as a status one
enjoys, as a fixing of the potential of citizenship. As I will elaborate, later on, this allows us to
conceive of citizenship as the right to manoeuvre, to have ability to move out of the population
groups within which one is fixed.

Another conundrum that we have to consider is how we begin thinking of rights as possible
only within the contexts of fixed societies and nations. The fact, however, is that these
formations themselves are flexible and imagined and it is precisely in forming them,
challenging socially dominant notions that citizenship as the right to manoeuvre is exercised.
Thus, for example, it is in the Goan asserting her Portuguese citizenship; but also in wanting
to retain Indian citizenship that we can see citizenship as the right to manoeuvre.

I would now direct our attention back to Hindess’ text, because what he suggests is that an
example par excellence of the population group is in fact society. In Hindess’ terms both
society, and especially national society, are an artefact of governance (Hindess 2000: 1494)

At this point of time I could be charged of making a suggestion like that of Margaret Thatcher
in 1987. I should therefore clarify that I am not suggesting that there is no such thing as the
social, but what I am trying to do is problematize the way in which society is constructed. In
this context, one should have regard to the debate moderated by Tim Ingold (1996) under
the title “The concept of society is theoretically obsolete”. What particularly appealed to me
in this debate, and this is why I recommend it is that rather than take the idea of society as
pre-formed, and the notion of society as fixed, the proposal was made to consider the way
particular persons both come into being through relationships and forge them anew. Thus,
we need to be attentive to the way in which individuals are formed and, more importantly for
our discussion here, how social groups are formed. This is to say, society is not natural or
static, but is constantly in the process of being made. This case will be made particularly
clear in the way Goan manoeuvring and its utilization of inter-identity has the potential to
remake both Portuguese and the Indian national identities.

With such an appreciation of how society is formed, it becomes easier to appreciate Hindess’
argument of how the dominant understanding of citizenship is a conspiracy.

As you would have noted, Hindess’ primary concern is with the way migrants are treated in
host countries. His argument is that migrants are treated in a callous manner because states
are seen as the primary guarantor of human or citizenship rights, and that movement
between states are seen as an aberration. He argues that this movement between states is
today seen as an aberration because of the dominance of the idea that nations and societies
are a naturally existing fact and the state is the guarantor of the nation/society. In his words:

societies are presented as substantial and enduring collectivities, exhibiting their own
cultural patterns, possessing definite social and political structures, and in some
cases, developing a sense of national identity. (2000: 1492)

In other words, both the nation, and the state, are the first, in the sense of primary, population
groups that are invented (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983) in the process of the international
management of populations.

The converse assertion that flows from Hindess’ argument is that the movement of
populations is natural, and in fact a standard feature of human society. That social groupings
are not static entities but dynamic. A recognition of this fact, draws our attention to the fact
that it is possible to think of citizenship as more than just our status vis-à-vis a state. Rather,
citizenship is a relational activity, it is a constant process and involves the forging new
relationships in new contexts.

If Hindess is pointing to the fact that the nation, and society, are not natural, but invented, I
also want to highlight his argument that this current regime of citizenship, which is in fact
raced, is a product of the end of empires. This is to say that the anti-imperial, nationalist
movements and decolonization played a role in the production of this regime of citizenship.

Among other propositions, Hindess points to the fact that “the era that saw the consolidation
of the modern system of territorial states was also an era of unprecedented movement across
national borders and resettlement in foreign parts.” (2000: 1494)

This is an argument that finds echoes in the works of other scholars and I want to point to
two works both of which refer to the experience of South Asian groups within the British
empire. I want to especially underline the fact that I am making reference to the South Asian
experience within the space of the British empire because I am aware that experiences of
empires are not the same, indeed experience of the same empire is also mediated by race,
class, gender and other locations. Indeed, in an attempt to articulate epistemologies of the
south I believe that we need to fight the tendency to make universal claims. We need to
always locate our insights in definite contexts, while suggesting their potential to explain other
contexts.

In her article, Radhika Mongia makes a very interesting argument that I believe should be
explored further. Her argument is that “the “nation-state,” as commonly understood, does not
come into being in Europe until the rise of nationalist movements in the various empires.”
Her suggestion is that the general tendency to look at nation-states as emerging after the
treaty of Westphalia is a misrepresentation, since these states were in fact imbricated in
imperial formations. There were in fact empire states. The nation-state is born as a result of
nationalist movements within these empires.

I would like to highlight that there are two movements that we need to be aware of. One is of
the nationalist movements within metropolitan spaces, as well as in white-settler colonies.
Mongia’s argument is borne out by exploring the way in which the white-settler spaces in the
British empire (specifically Canada) sought to maintain this state and restrict the movement
of Asians into these spaces. White-settler nationalism, is also, therefore, about racism.
Radhika Singha’s text, however, also points to the way in which Indian nationalist elites, that
is native elites, were quite satisfied with the nationalizing of migration, for various reasons.

In the first case, Mongia demonstrates the way in which Canadian discomfort with receiving
Asian settlers saw them challenge the idea of an imperial subject who could move freely
anywhere within the empire. The Canadians then raise the issue of sovereignty over the
national space, that is, the right of locals to decide the fate of the territory to prevent outsiders
from entering the space. While race is not explicitly mentioned, Mongia demonstrates that it
was precisely race that they wished to exclude. Thus, the national emerges out of the empire,
and the passport emerges as a document that systematically marks race on the body of the
migrant. Once again, drawing from Santos’ text, race was not simply a matter of colour –
since the experience of the Portuguese, even in Canada – will demonstrate that whiteness
is something that is continually being produced, as various groups attempt to enter the
bracket. And while they try to do so, they are either let in, or excluded, playing out the whole
game of population groups and political society. Once again, this underlines the idea of
citizenship as a process. Of course, we would not normally associate this process of
attempting to enter an oppressor category as citizenship, since we normally associate
citizenship with emancipation. However, as much as we need to hold on to ideals of
citizenship as committed to emancipatory agendas, we need to recognize that even liberal
citizenship is all too often based on exclusion. To carry forward Hindess’ suggestion that we
should stop seeing citizenship as an unmitigated good, we should realize that the assertion
of rights of individuals in community does not always result in the good of all. To do so will
remove the positivist (and hence statist) way in which citizenship is currently understood and
studied.

Singha’s text underlines a point that even Mongia pointed to, that until the emergence of the
racialised nation-state the state did not really have a right to control the movement of
populations. What needs to be pointed out, and this is a point I will return to earlier, is that
one of the premises of empire is the ability to move freely within it.

In the second case, Singha points out that within British India, there was a differentiated
system of travelling papers. The elites were given passports, which marked their social class,
while the indentured labourer, or the coolie, and pilgrims to Mecca, were given passes. It was
only when the passport began to be used by the British empire at war to enforce loyalty that
the national elites began to get restive. However, by the mid-1920s, the elites began to invest
in the passport system for immigrant labour because in this way they could nationalize the
immigrants. That is, in a system where immigrants were already raced, the national elites
could carve out their own nation-state by laying claim to the bodies that were raced. At this
point I would like to direct your attention to an observation that Santos makes in his text that
I recommended for this class “Nationalist discourse (at least in India) frequently accepts the
intellectual premises of modernity that ground colonial domination, while defying colonial
domination itself” (p.14). In other words, where racism is a part of the discourses through
which colonial domination is legitimated, the anti-colonial activists take on the notion of nation
to fight colonialism. Unfortunately, however, while building the nation what anti-imperialist
nationalist groups (at least in India) have done is to invert the terms of the debate – thus
valorizing what the colonizers disparaged – but not actually challenging the basis of
discrimination, which was racism. Once the nation was legally recognized subsequent to
decolonization, what we have is the legitimation of a raced nation. Thus, both groups are
therefore firmly embedded in racist logic -which then comes to be incorporated into the
citizenship regime in the post-colonial order. This, of course, worked for nationalist elites,
who would benefit by being leaders of the new nation-states, and integrated into a global
order of continuing colonialism – or neo-colonialism.

In sum, the passport is the way in which the linking of citizenship and nationality, and
nationality and race are linked together, and these links are materialized. Without the need
of the passport to move between borders these linkages would remain as imagined and not
be experienced as the very concrete practices of racism that we encounter every day, and
not merely in the process of migration across borders.

I want to make a slight pause here to reflect on some of the new ideas that have appeared
thus far. What is clear is that the state did not have a right to restrict movement, and this right
emerges in the context of the long break up of empires and the emergence of the nation-
state. Both these aspects are thus a part of the process of decolonization. But if
decolonization was about liberation of the subaltern, about allowing greater mobility, we see
that this goal has not been met. Rather that decolonization has produced more restrictions
on the subaltern figure, it has created a world where capital continues to enjoy an incredible
ability to move and impact livelihoods of communities, but “most of the world” is fixed and
does not have the corresponding ability to move. Further, that these communities are
produced as hostages to national identities, identities which work for national elites, but
operate as markers of race especially for subaltern communities within the decolonized
states.

In this context, it appears that the post-colonial nation-state is not part of the emancipatory
discourse but in fact part of a restrictive apparatus, and that it may have been that the empire
offered most possibilities in terms of mobility – both social as well as geographical. Let us not
forget that a good amount of geographical movement was also to ensure social mobility.

This may appear like a bizarre claim, even reactionary, but I think that if we look at the way
in which subaltern communities utilized the discourse of empire we will see that there is
something here. In some sense, this dilemma too, is part of the conundrum of citizenship.

In 1910, South Asians in Canada had sent a petition to the Colonial government questioning
the regulations that had been imposed to effectively prevent the emigration of South Asians
to that country. Some of the rhetoric they used is interesting: in their petition they argued that
they "are not allowed to enjoy the birthright of travelling from one part of the British Empire
to the other . . .” “The petition further claimed that “as long as we are British subjects any
British territory is the land of our citizenship.”(Mongia: p. 543)

What is in evidence here is the way in which not merely the fact of empire, but the legality of
empire was harnessed by these migrants to challenge the racist barriers that were being
placed over the frame of empire.
What I am trying to suggest is that the legal frame of empire in fact need not coincide with
colonialism, and that they are two different concepts though they were without doubt
combined at one point in time. What I am trying to draw our attention to the way in which
different colonized groups – national elites, and subaltern groups, could respond differently
to the passport regime and the creation of national units. My suggestion is that the outright
dismissal and denunciation of empire effectively allows for the hegemony of the nation-state,
dismisses the complex ways in which subaltern groups attempted to find space within the
empire, and supports the fixing of groups into racial categories, with no rights of trans-border
movement.

My limited sympathy for empire is also due to the fact that the Goan claim to Portuguese,
and hence European citizenship, is itself based on imperial history and the continued
assertion of this right flies in the face of contemporary discomfort both in India, as well as in
Portugal.

I want to ground my final discussion of the Goan case by referencing what Etienne Balibar
calls “differential racism”. Balibar suggests that the dominant theme of differential racism is
not biological heredity, but “the insurmountability of cultural differences.” Thus, it operates as
racism without races. What the assertion of a Portuguese identity by Goans results in is a
confounding of the racial certainty of contemporary citizenship. By asserting Portuguese
citizenship, the Goan is asserting that a brown person can be Portuguese – which the post-
colonial Portuguese would like to restrict to metropolitan – and hence white – Portuguese. A
response of many Portuguese to the assertion of the Portuguese identity by Goans is to link
it with the claims of the Estado Novo. In a bid to halt the break-up of its empire, the Estado
Novo, that had initially submitted to hegemonic colonial terms by classing all those outside
the metropole as subjects, then returned to earlier imperial claims where all were citizens. To
these contemporary Portuguese minds, such Goan assertions seem to be renewing the
claims of the authoritarian and colonial former regime. To their minds decolonization ensured
that each national group could go its own way. What they don’t seem to realize is that given
the peculiarity of the Portuguese colonial experience decolonization was not simply a gifting
of sovereignty to formerly colonized peoples. Indeed, the argument has been made that
Portugal’s decolonization was in fact the result of a shift of its elites away from the rhetoric
“of a multi-continental nation, which included parts of Africa, to a more restricted definition of
nationhood, one that stressed Portugal’s connection to Europe and thus defined belonging
by descent” and hence the capitulation from one kind of racism to another (Reiter 2008).
They also fail to perceive that the colonized subaltern may have not necessarily been
demanding a destruction of empire, but the institution of justice within the operation of a
transcontinental space that was being run to benefit capitalist enterprise and racist assertions
of metropolitan superiority. What they also do not realize is that the agency of the colonized
subaltern is not entirely captured within the national. And that decolonization would ideally
allow for multiple ways in which individual agency can be asserted.

At the end of the day, we should understand citizenship not as rights within a state format,
but the room for manoeuvre (Gordon and Stack) for the individual to assert themselves.

Simultaneously, it undermines the Indian states attempt to race the Indian body, which relies
on being the sole signifier of the brown subcontinental body. What Goan politics is doing,
therefore, is to stress what Santos has called an inter-identity, and this I think is critical to the
task of challenging the contemporary regime of citizenship.
Before I conclude I would like to offer a summary of my argument. First, that contemporary
citizenship is marked by a number of conundrums because rather that assert the rights of
individuals of mobility what it does is to fix peoples. It fixes them into population groups, that
are catered to. It fixes people into racial types and national societies. Nationalism has
ensured that rather than fight an earlier structure, we have created a new structure which
simply continues racism. Thus, while not asking for a return to empire, we need to inquire if
the way in which colonialism was responded to, by the institution of national states was
necessarily an ideal response. Finally, I suggest that the way forward to challenge this regime
is to encourage the multiplication of inter-identities. While the Portuguese empire definitely
has a history that allowed for this inter-identity, other imperial formations also had such
spaces and these are the very spaces that we need to return to and explore as a way out of
the conundrums of contemporary citizenship.

References
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Gordon, Andrew, and Trevor Stack. 2007. “Citizenship Beyond the State: Thinking with Early
Modern Citizenship in the Contemporary World.” Citizenship Studies 11 (2): 117–33.

Hindess, Barry. 2000. “Citizenship in the International Management of Populations.”

American Behavioral Scientist 43 (9): 1486–97.

Kutty, Omar. 2012. “Civic Anxieties and Dalit Democratic Culture: Balmikis in Delhi.” In Re-
Framing Democracy and Agency in India: Interrogating Political Society, edited by Ajay
Gudavarthy, 253. London, New York, Delhi: Anthem Press.

Mongia, Radhika Viyas. 1999. “Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport.” Public
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Pearson, M. N. 1972. “Indigenous Domination in a Colonial Economy: The Goa Rendas,

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and Inter-Identity.” Luso-Brazilian Review 39 (2): 09-43.

Singha, Radhika. 2005. “‘A “Proper” Passport for the Colony: Border Crossing in British India,
c. 1882–1920.’” presented at the Yale Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series Spring 2005 -
2006, Yale, February 3. http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/papers/16passportill.pdf.

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Hobsbawm, E.J., and Terrence O. Ranger, eds. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Reiter, Bernd. 2008. “The Perils of Empire: Nationhood and Citizenship in Portugal.”
Citizenship Studies 12 (4): 397–412.