81.

People vs Del Rosario

G.R. No. 127755 I April 14, 1999

Facts:
On 13 May 1996 Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nitas Drugstore Cabanatuan City, when three
women flagged him. Parked in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point,
Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the
two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher
kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still
on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del
Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion
entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of
the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported
the incident.
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was
hired for P120.00 by a certain Boy Santos, his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would drive him
to cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. However, despite their earlier arrangement boy Santos directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. He acceded. Marquez and Bisaya
boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market. Subsequently, he was asked to
proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretest of buying
a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her
bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help Dodong Bisaya. Del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but
Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before boarding the tricycle Jun
Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting,
Dodong Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him
to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard his passengers
saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. Upon arriving at Dicarma,
the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise
he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not
report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused and be
exempt from criminal liability

Ruling:
Yes. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts
not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man
asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He
could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances
would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he
only saw for the first time that day.
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him was
real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the
moment of automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than a mere
instrument acting involuntarily an against his will. He is therefore exempt from criminal liability since by reason
of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.
 82. People vs Bandian
G. R. No. 45186 I September 30, 1936

Facts:

Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from
her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go
for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with
blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He
ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her
house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened
to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such
circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested
him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely
gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body
to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not,
the appellant answered in the affirmative.

Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno went to the
appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly
under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to
kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been
living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous
relations.

Issue:

Whether or not Bandian be exempt from criminal liability

Ruling:

Yes. The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her,
to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by
doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person
who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
 83. People vs Lua Chu

G.R. No. 34917 I September 7, 1931

Facts:

The accused Uy Se Tieng, an agent of the real owners of the Shipments of Opium, wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium. This opium had been in Hongkong for sometime,
awaiting a ship that would go directly to Cebu. The Collector of Customs of Cebu received information that the
accused was intending to land opium in the port. Juan Samson, a secret serviceman, pretended to smooth the
way for the introduction of the prohibited drug. Samson then promised the accused that he would remove all the
difficulties in the way, and for this purpose agreed to receive in exchange P6,000: P2,000 for Juan Samson,
P2,000 for Joaquin Natividad, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the
customhouse. Upon arrival of the shipment of opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng, informed Samson that
the former consulted the real owners on how to proceed with the payment of P6,000 and will come over to
Samson’s house on to inform the decision of the owners. On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary
headed by Colonel Francisco who instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buencosejo to discuss the
capture of the opium owners. Jumapao, a stenographer, through the provincial fiscal and in the presence of
Captain Buencosejo, was asked to take the down the conversation Samson would have with Uy Se Tieng. Upon
the rendezvous, Captain Buencosejo and Jumapao hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson
to witness the conversation between Samson, Uy Se Tieng, and Lua Chu. The following morning, Uy Se Tieng
and Uy Ay, a companion, presented papers to Samson. Captain Buencosejo showed up and arrested the two
Chinese. The Constabulary arrested Lua Chu and seized the 3,252 tins of opium worth P50,000. The agents of
the law had the accused prosecuted.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in excluding Juan Samson as one of the accused moreso an instigator.

Ruling:

It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was
after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered for said drug. Juan Samson neither induced
nor instigated the accused to import the opium in question, but pretended to have an understanding with the
Collector of Customs, who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their
enterprise so far as the customs house was concerned. This is not a case where an innocent person is induced
to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch a criminal. Therefore, the mere fact
that the chief of customs secret service pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium
through the customhouse, in order to better the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to
the prosecution and conviction of the accused.

Entrapment 1. The practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal
prosecutions. 2. It is a scheme or technique ensuring the apprehension of the criminals by being in the actual
crime scene. 3. The law officers shall not be guilty to the crime if he have done the following: a. He does not
induce a person to commit a crime for personal gain or is not involved in the planning of the crime. b. Does take
the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits
in mind.

Instigation This is the involvement of a law officer in the crime itself in the following manners: 1. He
induces a person to commit a crime for personal gain. 2. Doesn’t take the necessary steps to seize the instrument
of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. 3. He obtained the profits in mind
even through afterwards does take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the
offenders.
 84. People vs Doria
G.R. No. 125299 I January 22, 1999

Facts:
In 1995, members of the PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from 2 civilian
informants (CI) that one “Jun” was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents
decided to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha they
designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer. At 7:20 a.m., “Jun” appeared. PO3 Manlangit handed “Jun” the
marked bills worth P1,600.00.The exchange of money for a marijuana was completed. “Jun” asked PO3 to
wait for an hour while he will get the mariujuana from his associate. After a while, when “Jun” was about to give
the marijuana,PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun”. They frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him.
Upon inquiry, “Jun” left the money to his associate “Neneth”. The team went to the house and they noticed a box
under the dining table. Suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box.
He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana
leaves. Simultaneous with the box’s discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “Neneth.” They
arrested “Neneth and Jun”.They learned that “Jun” is Florencio Doria y Bolado while “Neneth” is Violeta Gaddao
y Catama. Both of them were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous
Drugs Actof 1972. The trial court found the existence of an “organized/syndicated crime group” and
sentenced both to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. Hence, the automatic review.

In a number of cases, the Court differentiated entrapment and instigation:

People vs Galicia - The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for
the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.
People v. Tan Tiong - the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker."

People v. Tiu Ua - Entrapment is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public
policy and illegal.

The test used in courts is a combination of objective (focused on acts of law enforcer) and subjective (focused
on predisposition of accused to commit the offense).

Issue:
the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria
Ruling:

"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false
arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common
motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister
sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the employment of
illegal means."

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should
not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. It
is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through
lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice
lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation
of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of
strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police
should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming
evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts
should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they
are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-
appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as
the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance
payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his credibility
was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's testimony was
corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the
confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police It is well-settled that except
when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to
testify falsely against the appellant, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the
entire transaction,\ the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale
was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source
of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution
proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the
marijuana.
 85. Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong

G.R. No. 181409 I February 11, 2011

Facts:

Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate
of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against
her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced
Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of
attorney (in the pretense of presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment,
transfer and disposition of the latter’s properties. In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the
case.

As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives who shall be exempt from criminal
prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law. He
further counters that the same law makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death
of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the death of his spouse Zenaida Carungcong
Sato though dissolved the marriage with the accused, did not on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and
son-law relationship between Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed from the
protective mantle of Art 332.

Issues:

1.Whether or not the death of William’s wife and Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida, extinguished the relationship by
affinity between William and Manolita.

2.Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to Manolita.

Ruling:

1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues
even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.

2.No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the
offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to
prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical
and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332 considering that the crime he
committed falls under the nature of a complex crime which is the crime estafa through falsification of public
document and does not anymore concern private relations of family members. He then can be held criminally
liable.
 86. People vs Jaurigue
G.R. No. 384 I February 21, 1946
Facts:

Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the
crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of
homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of
prision mayorto thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-
half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern
Luzon.
On September 20, 1942, at around 8o’clock in the evening, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh
Day Adventists o attend religious services. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her
father, also for the purpose of attending religious services,
Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting
and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand
on the upper part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which
she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's
right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left
side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal.
Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein
defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody
into the house, unless accompanied by him.
Then three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about the
incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said
policemen briefly of what had actually happened

Issues:

Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding in her favor additional mitigating circumstances

Ruling:

In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado
Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant
committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor.
Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric lights and there were several people inside;
under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. The means employed
by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case,
she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.

The facts that the defendant and appellant (1) immediately, voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered and
admitted having stabbed the deceased, (2) had acted in the immediate vindication of grave offense committed
against her, (3) had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand, be
considered as mitigating circumstances.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two
months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed
1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be
given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked ordered confiscated.
 87. People vs Narvaez
L-33466-67 I April 20, 1983

Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if
they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running
towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant
and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher
and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to
pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his
person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed
a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the
courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of
the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of
the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is
accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements
are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights.
Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of
chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may
not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be
respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to
the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since
he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill
since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249
RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete
defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
 88. People vs Ulep
G.R. No. 132547 I September 20, 2000

Facts:
Wapili, having a high fever and insensibly talking to himself, was acting strangely in his home (nasisiraan
na ng ulo). His brother in law was trying to calm him down but to know avail. Wapili locked himself in his room.
Later on, he went out naked and chased his brother in law (Leydan). Leydan and neighbours tried to tie him
with rope but to no avail so he got loose in the village. Leydan went to a policewoman to report the incident and
while this was happening, Wapili turned up in front of the policewoman’s house to bang her vehicle so she called
for assistance. Later on, SPO1 Ulep and 2 other police officers went to the scene where they saw Wapili armed
with a bolo and a rattan stool Ulep fired a warning shot but Wapili charged towards them so Ulep shot him. Wapili
fell to the ground. Ulep came closer then pumped another bullet to his head, literally blowing his brains out.
Accused-appellant prays for his acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was in the
course of the performance of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili
Ruling:
YES. Liable for homicide
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of RPC may be
successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.
During the first stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing
towards them, notwithstanding accused-appellant's previous warning shot and verbal admonition to the victim to
lay down his weapon or he would be shot. As a police officer, it is to be expected that accused-appellant would
stand his ground. Up to that point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim's further
advance was justified under the circumstances. After all, a police officer is not required to afford the victim the
opportunity to fight back. Neither is he expected - when hard pressed and in the heat of such an encounter at
close quarters - to pause for a long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait after each blow to determine
the effects thereof.
However, Ulep cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty during the second stage of the incident -
when he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after the latter slumped
to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. Sound discretion
and restraint dictated that Ulep, a veteran policeman, should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw
the latter fall to the ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable of
mounting an aggression against the police officers. Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary.
Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-defense. The presence of unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim
has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. In the present case, the records
show that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet wounds he sustained,
and possibly unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The aggression that was initially begun
by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any
danger to his life.
 The Court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of
a right. Under Art. 69 of RPC, "a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify
the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that the
majority of such conditions be present.
The Court likewise credited Ulep with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The police
blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that immediately after killing Wapili, accused-appellant
reported to the police headquarters and voluntarily surrendered himself.
 89. Guillermo vs People
G.R. No. 153287 I January 20, 2009

Facts:
Noel Guillermo, Arnaldo Socias, and Joemar Palma was charged for the killing of Winnie Alon, of the 3,
only Guillermo, was found guilty of Homicide with the special or privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete justification, and sentenced to 6 years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, with indemnity of P50,000. Appellant contends that self-defense should have been
appreciated.
ISSUE: WON self-defense should be appreciated.
HELD: Yes. Self-defense must be appreciated as Alon was about to attack Guillermo with a broken bottle
when Guillermo realized he had a knife. Guillermo had attacked Alon in self-defense, albeit the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to repel it was not found as he stabbed Alon 3 times. There was also a
disproportionate difference between an actual blade and a broken beer bottle. All this would lead to an
incomplete self-defense, which is a mitigating circumstance only, and not a justifying one. His sentence is
modified accordingly.
 90. People vs Ural
L-30901 I March 27, 1974

Facts:

Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had
been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo,
Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari,
Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would
be more security.

Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw
Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner,
Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped
on his prostrate body.

Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's
recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for
help. Nobody came to succor him.

Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before his departure,
Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that night.
From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck
hauling iron ore and went home.

Issue:

Whether or not par. 3 of Article 13 "that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed" be appreciated in the case

Ruling:

Yes. It is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was
only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the
detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure
medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.
 91. People vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 139542 I June 21, 2001

Facts:

On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accused-appellant were
both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving
almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and
went over to Gonzalez’s. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the
scene in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out the gun which was already
in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez’s daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the
process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trisha’s substantial body
weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noel’s
wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and nephew were wounded.

The trial found accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and
accordingly sentenced him to death.

Issues:

Whether or not the trial court failed to appreciate lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as mitigating
circumstance

Ruling:

No. The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong is devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is notable disparity between the
means employed by the accused to commit so grave a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention
of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although not deliberately
sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible
consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
 92. People vs Pagal
L-32040 I October 25, 1977

Facts:
Pedro Pagal and Jose torcelino were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. They stole the
amount of P1,281.00 and killed Gaugan, their employer, by stabbing him with an ice pick and clubbing huim with
an iron pipe.
During the arraignment, the counsel for the accused informed the court of their intention to plead,
provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the victim immediately preceded the act, and that having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce
passion and obfuscation.
The accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The accused were then allowed to present their
evidence, which were claims of maltreatment/ill-treatment by the deceased. After they rested their case. The
prosecution presented the statements of the accused and other arguments. After considering the aggravating
circumstances, accepting only the mitigating circumstance of pleading guilty, the court rendered its decision
finding both accused and other pertinent documents. After considering the aggravating circumstances, and
accepting only the mitigating circumstance of leading guilty, the court rendered its decision finding both accused
guilty and sentenced to death. The case was elevated to the SC for mandatory review on account of the death
penalty imposed.
Issue:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation be applied
Ruling:
No. The maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed against them occurred musch
earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation, in order to be mitigating circumstance must
be sufficient and immediately preceded the act.
 93. Urabano vs People
G.R. No. 182750 I January 20, 2009

Facts:

Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District having just arrived
from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other co-workers, they drunk beer
in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden
hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting, petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant
of insulting petitioner.The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking
up the fight, but only for a brief moment as they refused to be pacified and continued throwing fist blows at each
other. Urabano delivered a "lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on Tomelden’s face, which
made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions
not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him
unconscious.Upon arriving home Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his
having been rendered unconscious. He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario
to immediately bring him to the hospital.Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness, headache,
and other pains. Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital and, due to financial constraints, was thereafter
discharged despite signs negating physical condition improvement. Upon reaching their house, however,
Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen
Community Hospital. This time, things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be
semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died due to "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

Issue:

Whether or not sufficient provocation be appreciated in the case

Ruling:

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of
self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting,
or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying;the provocation must
be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the act.This third requisite
of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if
provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by
the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it
was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before the fist
fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements made by the deceased
while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
 94. People vs Benito

L-32042 I February 13, 1975

Facts:

Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to
the charge of murder for a shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on December 12, 1969. The killing
was qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank. It was mitigated by plea of
guilty. The Court in its decision of February 13, 1975 affirmed the judgment of conviction. It appreciated in
Benito's favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The penalty was reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Benito filed a motion for reconsideration. He contends that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of immediate vindication of a grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank should
not be appreciated against him.

According to the suspect, he was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission at its main office
located at P. Paredes, Sampaloc. Mla., and was assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov.
1963 continuously up to Nov. 1965 when he was suspended for "DISHONESTY".After two months, he was
reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED THEFT, MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA
and FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating
in his dismissal from the Civil Service on February 1966.

On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service at P. Paredes st. and requested the victim to
help him in his cases but the former allegedly uttered to the suspect "UMALIS KA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY
MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO".The suspect left and returned the following morning at
11:00 a.m. of Dec. 12, 1969, and when they met again, the victim allegedly remarked in the presence of many
people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW". The suspect who was humiliated and incensed,
left. On that same day, the suspect who was armed with an unlicensed Cal. 22 black revolver (w/ SN - P-5317,
Trademarked "SENTINEL", SQUIRES BINGHAM MFG. CO. INC. MLA. P.I.) loaded with nine (9) live Cal. 22
bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside the Civil Service compound at P. Paredes st. Sampaloc, Mla.
The victim showed up and drove his green Chevrolet 2 door car (w/ Plate No. L-10578 Mla. 69) along P. Paredes
st. The suspect with evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and when the latter's car was at a
full stop at the corner of Lepanto and P. Paredes sts. due to heavy traffic of motor vehicles, the suspect without
any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot the victim eight (8) times on the head and different
parts of the body at closer range which consequently caused the latter's death on the spot inside his car. The
suspect then fled while the victim was conveyed on board a red private car (w/ Plate No. L-55117) by his co-
employees to the FEU Hospital. Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced DOA.

Benito surrendered to the police the revolver used in the shooting with the eight empty shells of the bullets
which he had fired at Moncayo.

Issue:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense be applied in the case

Ruling:

The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo cannot give rise to the
mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense because it was not specifically directed at Benito. The
prosecution notes that the remark was uttered by Moncayo at eleven o'clock in the morning. According to
Benito's testimony (not consistent with his confession), he saw Moncayo three hours later or at two o'clock in
the afternoon and inquired from him about his case and Moncayo said that he had already submitted his report
and he could not do anything more about Benito's case (26 tan). As already stated, the assassination was
perpetrated at around five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day.

Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification under the
circumstances recited above for changing our prior opinion that the mitigating circumstance of "haber
ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una ofensa grave, causada al autor del delito," cannot be
appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by the ponente, Justice Esguerra, Benito "had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it."

The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the
assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to
regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed
Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted with treachery and evident premeditation
in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
 95. Bacabac vs People

G.R. No. 149372 I September 11, 2007

Facts:

Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in Purok 4, San Joaquin, Iloilo City in the
company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac
(Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).
Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions also left and on
their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups then and there figured in
a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the dance hall, noticed a
commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was hugging Edzel, and later tying Jonathan with his hands. Still later,
he saw the victim hit Edzel with a stick. He thus told the victim and his companions that Edzel is the son of
Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo[ told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot
him. Jesus thus left and proceeded to Edzels residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the
meantime, Edzel and Jonathan managed to flee.

The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of which they met Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzels father, Jose,
his mother, and two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets. Petitioner and Jose were
carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively.

Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled Jonathan
and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other
persons. Jesus blurted out, however, You are just bragging that you are brave. You are only bullying small
children. Petitioner, at that instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his armalite (as if spraying his
rifle from right to left) at the victim and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) was on the
move to strike [the victim] with a piece of wood. Eduardo fell. And so did the victim who was in a kneeling position,
and as he was raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him again.

Meanwhile, Melchor escaped.

The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was pronounced dead on
arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.

Post-mortem examination showed that the victim sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal
regions and one bullet wound in the extremities, and that he died due to maceration of the internal organs due
to bullet wounds. Eduardo sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal region, and died of hemorrhage
due to gunshot wounds.

Issue:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication absolves him of liability
Ruling:

Bacabac’s invocation of the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense fails
because for it to be credited, the act should be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree [RPC Article 13 (5)]
 The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole
(according to Edzel).By Edzel's own clarification, "he was hit at his ear, not on his head hence not a grave
offense.
 96. US vs Hicks

G.R. No. 4971 I September 23, 1909

Facts:

Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in
the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned
month of 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis
Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal
in the Army who then went to live in the said house.

On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd
Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room with Corporal
Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come out of
said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short conversation,
Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following question: "Did I not tell
you to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to
live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied:
"God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing
a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away,
said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself behind the partition, just as Hicks
drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in
the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.

Issue:

Whether or not mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation is present

Ruling:

Nomitigating circumstances is present, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged
by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are
such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
 97. US vs Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 7094 I March 29, 1912

Facts:

The convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or
lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.

Issue:

Whether or not passion and obfuscation is present

Ruling:

In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion
and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she
was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain
in the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the
passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into
consideration by the court.
 98. People vs Gelaver

G.R. no. 95357 I June 9, 1993

Facts:

Randy Mamon, who testified that he heard shouts coming from the house of Tessie Lampedario in
Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. He saw the appellant and a woman having a
heated argument. Thereafter, appellant held the neck of the victim, dragged her and with a knife on his right
hand, stabbed the latter three times on the breast. Appellant then went out of the gate and fled in the direction
of the public market of Sto Niño.

Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that he did so after catching her having carnal act with
her paramour.

Appellant testified that he was married to Victoria Pacinabao, with whom he begot four children. They lived
together at their conjugal home until July 3, l987 when she abandoned her family to live with her paramour. He
did not know the name of his wife's paramour nor the name of the owner of the house where his wife and her
paramour had lived together.

Appellant further testified that on March 24, 1988, after he was informed by his daughter that his wife and
paramour were living at a house in front of the Sto. Niño Catholic Church, appellant immediately repaired to
that place. Upon entering the house, he saw his wife lying on her back and her paramour on top of her, having
sexual intercourse.

Appellants version of the killing was that when his wife saw him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her
paramour immediately stood up, took a knife placed on top of the bedside table and attacked appellant. The
latter was able to wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts
of the appellant by hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the stab intended for the
paramour.

As to why he continued to stab his wife, appellant said that his mind had been "dimmed" or overpowered by
passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her paramour.

Issue:

Whether or not passion and obfuscation is present

Ruling:

No. Before this circumstance may be taken into consideration, it is necessary to establish the existence
of an unlawful act sufficient to produce such a condition of mind. The act producing the obfuscation must not
be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might have recovered his equanimity. The crime was committed almost a year after the victim had abandoned
the conjugal dwelling.
 99. People vs Bello

L-18792 I February 28, 1964

Facts:

(1) that on September 17, 1954, the accused Guillermo Bello, a widower who at that time was about 54
years of age, took a young peasant lady named Alicia Cervantes, about 24 years old his common-law
wife; (2) that from that day they lived together apparently in blissful harmony as man and wife without
the benefit of marriage bearing, however, no child, ...; (3) that on May 15, 1958, the accused who had
no means of substantial livelihood except that of making "kaingin" and who apparently was then in
financial straits induced Alicia Cervantes to accept an employment as entertainer in a bar and
restaurant establishment known as Maring's Place situated the corner of Aguinaldo and Bonifacio
Streets, Gumaca, Quezon (4) that Alicia Cervantes entered the service of Maring's Place on that day as
a public hostess; (5) that the accused being infatuated with his young bride used to watch her
movements in Maring's Place everyday; (6) that on May 16 he saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater in
Gumaca with a man whom the accused found later was caressing his common-law wife inside the
movie house; (7) that being in love with her he took her out from the movie and warned her to be more
discreet in her personal conduct in Gumaca; (8) that Alicia Cervantes continued to serve at Maring's
Place as a public hostess; (9) that on May 20, 1958, at 3:00 p.m. the accused went to Maring's Place to
ask for some money from Alicia; (10) that Maring, the owner of the place, and Alicia refused to give
money, Maring telling him to forget Alicia completely because he was already an old man, an invalid
besides and should stop bothering Alicia; (11) that having failed to obtain financial assistance from his
paramour, accused left the place somewhat despondent and went home passing Bonifacio Street; (12)
that on his way home he met the brothers Justo Marasigan and Luis Marasigan who greeted the
accused, Luis saying to his brother Justo the following: "So this is the man whose wife is being used by
Maring for white slave trade"; (13) that these remarks of Luis Marasigan naturally brought grief to the
accused, to drown which he sought Paty's place in Gumaca where he drank 5 glasses of tuba; (14) that
from Paty's place he went to Realistic Studio which is in front of Maring's Place and from there watched
the movements of Alicia; (15) that at about 9:00 o'clock that night he entered Maring's Place and
without much ado held Alicia from behind with his left hand in the manner of a boa strangulating its prey
and with his right hand stabbed Alicia several times with a balisong; (16) that seeing Alicia fallen on the
ground and believing her to be mortally wounded, he fled and went to the municipal building and there
surrendered himself to the police of Gumaca.

Issue:

Whether or not passion and obfuscation be considered in the case

Ruling:

Yes. It will be recalled that the lower court found that the accused had previously reproved the
deceased for allowing herself to be caressed by a stranger. Her loose conduct was forcibly driven home to the
accused by Marasigan's remark on the very day of the crime that the accused was the husband "whose wife
was being used by Maring for purposes of prostitution," a remark that so deeply wounded the appellant's
feelings that he was driven to consume a large amount of wine (tuba) before visiting Alicia (the deceased) to
plead with her to leave her work. Alicia's insulting refusal to renew her liaison with the accused, therefore, was
not motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life henceforth, but showed her determination to pursue a
lucrative profession that permitted her to distribute her favors indiscriminately. We can not see how the
accused's insistence that she live with him again, and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, can be properly
qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions. Even without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous
liaison appears morally of a higher level than gainful promiscuity.