People v Panis (1988)

Facts:
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and
Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license
from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment
agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four
separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor
Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because
he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the
proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more
persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in
relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first
two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the
charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in
Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code.
Held:
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and
placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide
an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or
entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more
persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the
course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal
recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a
foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream,
only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
ELIZABETH M. GAGUI VS SIMEON DEJERO and TEODORO R. PERMEJO (2013)

Facts:
On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed separate Complaints
for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of transportation expenses,
damages, and attorney fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes.

The Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a decision ordering respondents Pro Agecy Manila Inc., and
Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to pay complainants. The LA also issued a Writ of Execution. When the
writ was returned unsatisfied, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued, but was also returned
unsatisfied.

Respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc. Corporate Officers and
Directors as Judgment Debtor. It included petitioner as the Vice-president/Stockholder/Director of
PRO Agenct, Manila, Inc. The LA granted the motion.

A 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was issued, which resulted in the garnishment of petitioner bank
deposit in the amount of P85,430.48. Since, judgment remained unsatisfied, respondents sought a
3rd alias writ of execution. The motion was granted resulting in the levying of two parcels of lot
owned by petitioner located in San Fernando Pampanga.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that apart from not
being made aware that she was impleaded as one of the parties to the case, the LA decision did not
hold her liable in any form whatsoever. Executive Labor Arbiter denied the motion.

Upon appeal, NLRC denied the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC ruled that in so far as overseas migrant
workers are concerned, it is R.A. 8042 itself that describes the nature of the liability of the
corporation and its officers and directors. It is not essential that the individual officers and directors
be impleaded as party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A finding of liability on the
part of the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers or directors.

The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. The two Motions for Reconsideration were denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency Manila,
Inc. in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042?

HELD: The Petitioner may not be held jointly and severally liable.

LABOR LAW: liability of corporate officers

The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows: The liability of the
principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval.

In Sto. Tomas v. Salac, we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this provision.
We have thus maintained: the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the
liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily
liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of
that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate finding that
she was remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal dismissal of respondents.
Examination of the records would reveal that there was no finding of neglect on the part of the
petitioner in directing the affairs of the agency. In fact, respondents made no mention of any
instance when petitioner allegedly failed to manage the agency in accordance with law, thereby
contributing to their illegal dismissal.

Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.