OPPOSITION ANALYSIS:

REAL MADRID

- Tactical & Statistical Insights -

UEFA Champions League final
May 26th, 2018

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 STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION
A. GENERAL TACTIC REMARKS
B. RMA’s ATTACK
C. RMA’s DEFENCE
D. FITNESS & PSYCHOLOGICAL
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PRELIMINARY REMARKS
❖ The focus of the underlying analysis is represented almost exclusively by Real Madrid’s weaknesses, and
not their strengths, assumed here to be notorious (e.g. winning 3 out of the last 4 UCL editions and
having played 8 consecutive UCL semi-finals, their attacking prowess – the creation, this season, of no
less than 18.6 attempts per game in La Liga, respectively 17.3 in the Champions League, the lethal skills
of Cristiano Ronaldo, the spectacular on-the-ball play of Kroos, the technical skills and vision of Isco, the
defensive excellence of RMA’s captain Sergio Ramos, unparalleled pedigree of the club in European
competitions, etc.)
❖ As such, the document is conceived with the sole purpose of providing a few tactical and statistical
elements of analysis in order to help Liverpool FC win their 6th EC/UCL against a theoretically stronger
opponent (which also explains why it almost never addresses the squad and tactics of LFC – our
technical staff should know them better than anyone, the author obviously included).
❖ The data sources employed in the analysis: uefa.com, squawka.com, foxsports.com, marca.com, ESPN,
author’s own collection of data from previous RMA’s seasons. All graphs and derived indexes or
coefficients, as well as tactical diagrams, if not otherwise mentioned, are the product of the author’s
own creative work, using no specialized football-analysis software, only the ordinary Microsoft Office.
❖ Timeframe covered: the 2017-2018 season in, mainly, the UCL and La Liga competitions.
(Date of the underlying analysis’ finalization: May 4, 2018)
Real Madrid can and should be beaten! It is difficult, but certainly possible.
A. REAL MADRID:
GENERAL TACTICAL
REMARKS
 RMA = ball-loving team of technically-gifted, attack-minded, well-passing players.

TACTICAL VERSATILITY PLAYING FORMATION & PERSONNEL

As of April 30, Zidane has juggled with mainly 3
playing systems this season (between, but also
within games), making full use of his players’
technical and tactical attributes and the depth
of his squad, depending also on various other
factors (i.e. Isco’s form, specific strengths and
weaknesses of opponents, occasional need to
provide some defensive cover on the flanks to
the otherwise attack-minded Marcelo and
Carvajal, context – injuries, rotation, etc.):
• 4-3-3 (39% of the games - a system
however, with the exception of the first leg
against Bayern, last used as a starting
formation on Febr. 3 this year);
• 4-3-1-2 (30%);
• 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 (24%).
Regardless of the specific playing formation, if all the squad is available and the game is perceived by RMA as
important, Navas (GK, jersey number 1), Marcelo (left FB, 12), Ramos (left CB, 4), Varane (right CB, 5),
Carvajal (right FB, 2), Casemiro (DM, 14), Kroos (CM, 8), and Cristiano Ronaldo (S, 7) are all starters.
The remaining three positions on the pitch depend on the playing system and Zidane’s tactics:
• In a 4-3-1-2, Isco (CAM, 22) tops the midfield diamond (same when he is nominally a left winger, but cuts
inside) completed with Modric (10) as the right central midfielder, while Benzema acts as a hybrid
between a second striker and a false No. 10, the key being his off-the-ball movement (see slide No. 12).
• In a 4-4-2, usually employed against weaker opponents or when the usual starters are rested, left-footed
Asensio (20) plays as the left winger, right-footed Vazquez (17) on the opposite position, Benzema
always accompanies CR7 in the attack, also dropping deeper, while the most frequent pairings of CMs
are Kroos-Modric (6 games this season) and Casemiro-Kovacic (4 games, but used primarily if the first
pair is injured/rested).
• The 4-3-3 represents RMA’s hardest-to-predict
system in terms of personnel. Zidane has juggled this
season with quite a few combination of wingers. Of
these, the most dangerous would arguably be a fluid
4-3-3 / 4-3-2-1 with Isco on the left and Asensio on
the right, both cutting inside (see for instance Spain’s
6-1 thrashing of Argentine this spring), and CR as
central striker.

! Regardless of the playing system, if either one of CR7 or Marcelo is playing, Zidane never fields simultaneously
all 3 (i.e. maximum 2) of these players: Asensio, Isco, Vazquez - a combination he likely regards as too attack-
minded to the detriment of RMA’s defense (a single exception: the 2nd half of the 2nd leg against Juve, when RMA
desperately needed to score).
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B. REAL MADRID’s
ATTACK
 MAIN DIRECTION OF ATTACK
! Main direction of attack: left attacking third,
especially when playing Isco in a 4-3-1-2 (rather
4-3-2-1 with Benzema dropping deep and Isco
occupying the left half-space), but also when
employing Asensio (more attack-minded than
Vazquez on the right) as a left winger in a flat 4-
4-2/4-4-1-1.
Critical area: opposition’s right half-space (see
slide No. 10)
43% 57%
RMA directions of attack
(aggregated for 44 games of the current
season (12 in UCL, 32 in La Liga))
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CREATION OF CHANCES AND PASSING MATRIX
! With an aging first eleven and a rather inefficient over-reliance on CR7 (see below), RMA barely
counterattack anymore, their goal tally coming mainly from open play and set pieces (especially corners,
where the main dangers are 1. Ramos, 2. CR7, 3. Varane). Almost all their counterattacks involve Asensio
and/or Vazquez (see for instance 1st leg against Bayern).
Build-up: medium, from the base
Goals scored from, % (UCL + La Liga, 42 games analyzed)
Avg. pass length: 17.6m
Avg. PAcc: 90%
Avg. no. of touches per pass/shot: 1.9
Attempts per 93’: 18.3
RMA passing matrix per 93’ in this season’s UCL (first 11 games)
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 4-3-1-2 PASSING MAP 4-4-1-1

Mathematical modelling: RMA’s passing map per 93 minutes in two formations

(data: UCL 2017-2018, first 11 games monitored)*

* Data pertaining to the 2nd leg against Bayern, though collected, have been excluded from the analysis due to a number of changes made by Zidane, the statistical implications of which would misleadingly distort the
7 modelling of RMA normal and coherent passing map: Vazquez played as a right full back, Asensio played first as a left winger, then switched to the right once Bale got subbed on, Kovacic played both in a 4-2-2 and a 4-3-3.
 Most frequent pass of each player

Most frequent two passes

Most frequent three passes

Build-up: Top 3 preferred passes for each RMA player depending on formation
(data: UCL 2017-2018, first 11 games analyzed)
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 4-3-1-2 COMMENT 4-4-1-1

The passing pattern within this system is heavily asymmetric, that is The passing pattern within this system is by contrast significantly more balanced,
disbalanced in favor of RMA’s left half of their attack and as such significantly or symmetrical, on the left-right axis and as such also less predictable.
transparent and predictable: In this formation, RMA will attack both on their right and on their left, Modric
1. either via the flank (Marcelo) or through the middle (Ramos), the ball is gets considerably more ball involvement, whereas upfront Asensio and Vazquez
meant to reach Kroos, the “black box” of RMA’s passing network: 5 of are able to either embrace the touchline in order to stretch out the opposition’s
RMA’s top 10 passing lanes involve Kroos as either receiver or sender. defense line, or cut inside to shoot directly or assist CR7, who in this system also
2. Then, either directly or again via Marcelo, Kroos man will then instinctively drops deeper than in the 4-3-1-2 formation.
try to find Isco, who, in spite of apparently roaming all around in a free Furthermore, albeit usually employed against weaker opponents in La Liga, not
role, will overall tend to stay within a reasonable distance of Kroos, on only has RMA’s 4-4-1-1 module conceded on average the same number as goals
RMA’s left side of attack. as when playing the diamond, but it has scored 2.1 times more goals and not lost
3. Once Isco (extremely dangerous also as a dribbler) collects the ball, he will a single game! (see slide No. 4).
try a creative pass or an assist to CR7, who Key passing subsystem: the full-back – winger pairs, especially Marcelo-Asensio.
4. will also try to position himself within 15m of Isco, somewhere in the half Dangerous area: both our right half-space (creation & assists) and our left one
space close to the penalty area – his favorite area to either shoot or sprint (assists).
diagonally towards the goal.
Remarkably, RMA’s right half of the 4-3-1-2 formation barely participates in the
attack build-up, and even when its players get the ball, it’s rather just a decoy
meant to de-structure the opponent’s defensive module, only to quickly pass it
back to the left, towards the Isco-Marcelo-CR7 group. Modric acts like some sort
of a second, off-the ball, holding midfielder, while Carvajal rarely (read: 2-3
times per important game) moves farther than 60m of his own goal.
Key passing subsystem: the Ramos-Marcelo-Isco triangle with Kroos in its
middle. Statistically, every 5th pass of RMA is played among these 4 players.
Key axis: the Marcelo – Kroos – Isco – CR7 diagonal (see below).
Dangerous area: our right half-space.

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 CONTRIBUTIONS & CRITICAL AREAS ON THEIR ATTACK

12.5 creative passes and assists

delivered from the opposition’s right
half-space compared to only 6 from
their right, and 4 delivered from their
left flank, compared to none from the
right!

Furthermore, our right half-space is

CR7’s preferred area to shoot from
outside of the box.

Main dangers: Isco (22), Marcelo (12),

Asensio (20).

Goals scored by RMA in this season’s UCL

(all 12 games; penalties excluded)

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 PLAYERS’ INVOLVEMENT IN RMA’s ATTACKING PHASE
(data: La Liga & UCL 2017-2018, weighted average figures for 42 games analyzed)

Legend:

! Critical axis: the Marcelo-Kroos-Isco-CR7 diagonal

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 Some individual features of the most used subs or semi-starters:

Asensio Vazquez Bale

Technically skillful, creative, fast, and
physically strong, provides Zidane with a
more offensive option.
A bit more disciplined tactically and offers a
better defensive option (see him for instance
employed as a full-back against Bayern), while
equally creative on the attack. He also runs
the most of all RMA players per game.
Apparently on the verge of leaving RMA, is the squad’s
second shooter, runs much and very fast and increases the
danger of RMA at corners and crosses. He is also Navas’
preferred target when the latter is forced to kick long
balls.

Benzema Kovacic Nacho

In any of the formations, he is the least passed-to With an on-the-ball-involvement index close Used as the right FB (if Carvajal doesn’t adequately recover
RMA player (i.e. receiving less passes even than to Marcelo’s, is a much more defensive- till the final and Zidane isn’t satisfied with how Vazquez
CR7, he’s not even the third passing option of any minded central midfielder less skilled than performed against Bayern) implicates asymmetry and a
of his teammates – same for Casemiro, a pure Kroos or Modric and also less involved in severe loss of attacking power and possession as well. RMA
destroyer). This is despite him playing deeper and RMA’s build-up, and who passes short and basically has 3 centre backs, Vazquez alone on the left flank,
in direct proximity to RMA’s creative midfield, safe, mostly with Ramos and, if possible, Isco. Asensio drifts centrally, Marcelo overlaps.
where, on the defensive phase, he tries to create
numerical superiority in the middle of the park.
He is rather a “decoy”, with the key being his off-
the-ball movement, which aims at dragging
defenders out of position or at least keeping them
busy, thus creating space for CR or teammates
coming from behind (check for instance Real’s first
goal of the first leg against Juve).
On the rare occasions he receives the ball, he will
automatically try to pass it to CR7 and only if the
latter is not free, then, if possible, will he try to
either shoot or pass it to somebody else available.
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 SHOOTING & SCORING:

! Inefficiency & predictability:

• CR7 delivers more than every 4th shot of
RMA, despite ranking only 6th in terms of
accuracy (% on target) and 3rd in terms of
efficacy (shot-goal conversion rate).
• Penalties excluded, he needs 7.4 attempts
to score once (compared for instance to
3.9 for Salah).
• Moreover: 90% of his shots and 92% of his
goals are from within the penalty area!
Context: Both Kroos and Modric have
stopped trying their once usual long-range
shots.
• Comparison to LFC in the EPL:
- Salah 21.6%, 47.5%, 4.5
- Firmino 17.9%, 46.2%, 2.7
- Mane 14.9%, 41.8%, 2.9.

(data: La Liga (32 games) & UCL (12 games) 2017-2018)

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 Neutralization of RMA’s attacking force. Example:

In the 1st leg of the semifinals, Bayern, who dominated the game, correctly identified both these passing lanes and RMA’s
Top pass suppliers for CR7 in UCL:
! predominant half of the pitch when attacking, and addressed them correspondingly: high pressing (starting at 30m
away from RMA’s goal, meant to block their usual buildup from the back), a special attention to RMA’s left half space
1. Kroos (6.0)
and flank, and high density in the middle (Lewa dropping deep and a narrow and mobile 4-midfield line in front of
2. Marcelo (5.2)
Martinez), which forced RMA to play long balls and useless diagonals. The main effect of this was keeping RMA’s creative
3. Isco (5.1)
players away from the ball; all three of them received and completed more than 2 times less passes than their average
4. Bale (4.6)
figures recorded in this season’s UCL: Kroos received 41 and sent 45 in 96’, Modric 35 and 36 in 96’, and Isco 24 and 17 in
5. Asensio (4.4)
47’. Subsequently, Kroos didn’t manage a single successful pass to CR7 in 96’ (he usually delivers him 6 per 93’), Isco only
6. Benzema (4.0)
one in 47’, Asensio one in 49’, and Benzema none in 27’. The only notable provider was Marcelo (6/96’ – most of the
(before the double against Bayern)
passes however in isolated areas on the flank). As a result, CR7 remained completely isolated and had only 2 attempts
throughout 96’ (compared to his usual 7 in the competition).
Similarly, in the 2nd leg, Kroos (again, no successful pass sent to CR7!) and Modric received a mere 39, respectively 37
passes in 97’, and Kovacic 35 in 74’.

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 C. REAL MADRID’s
DEFENSE &
DISCIPLINARY ISSUES
 GENERAL REMARKS ON RMA’s DEFENSE

Gegenpressing: relatively weak and rather rare, due also to the need to conserve Cristiano’s energy, the fitness issues of Modric, etc.

Pressing: frequent, usually starting at the imaginary 2/3 line of the pitch, trying to either win the ball or force the
opposition to non-dangerous areas on the flanks. The defense line usually stays at half pitch when teammates
upfront are trying to win the ball (back).

Most common defensive shape during opposition’s positional attack: 4-4-1-1. Whereas obvious when playing a 4-
4-2, when playing a 4-3-1-2, then, depending on their position, either Isco or Benzema falls back in the center of
the midfield line, the other chases the opposition ball holder, while Kroos and Modric migrate towards the flanks.
In other matches, Zidane insists on keeping the flattened diamond shape of the midfield, sometimes unreasonably
required to quickly transition from one side from one flank to the other.
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General defensive performance: weak and exploitable. Their defenders do make mistakes and the entire defensive
module not rarely lacks coherence and compactness. This season, in La Liga plus UCL, RMA have conceded no less
than 1.1 goals per match (45 matches – 50 goals, higher even than LFC and twice as much as Barcelona and Atletico,
which is all the more remarkable considering the average quality of their competitors in La Liga compared to the EPL.
This is due to a plurality of interrelated weaknesses discussed further in this presentation.

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 Defensive performance of RMA’s players: tackles & interceptions per 93’ and % of duels won
(data: La Liga + UCL, 43 games analyzed. Average season weighted values)

Key-player: Casemiro - a pure destroyer, tremendous effort capacity,

excellent positioning, plays it short and safe, rarely commits errors.
Also shoots dangerously from distance on second-balls.

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 WEAKNESSES: 1. FLANKS (specifically their full backs and especially in their 4-3-1-2 system)

Not only do both Marcelo and Carvajal make individual mistakes such as losing duels in critical areas or misplacing key-passes, but they also get frequently
caught high upfield and not tracking back. Combined with other factors (e.g. the by default narrower shape of a 4-3-1-2 formation, the diminishing physical
performance of Modric, the imprudent tackles and/or positional mistakes of Ramos, CR7 almost never tracking back an attacking defender of the opposition, or
an occasionally too high defensive line in order to ensure compactness), this issue makes RMA considerably vulnerable to counterattacks.
Indicatively, in this season’s UCL and this year’s la Liga games, RMA have conceded
Marcelo: arguably the weakest link in RMA’s defensive mechanism significantly more goals originated from within their left half-space (14-15 creative
passes & assists plus 2 solo runs) than from their right half space (9 creative &
• makes only 2.25 interceptions plus tackles/93’ (the least of all assisting passes). It is exactly this area, inside of Marcelo – behind Kroos – in front
RMA’s starting defenders and midfielders with the exception of of Ramos, that Madrid seem to have the biggest problems with when defending !
Modric);
• registers a PAcc of just 81.8% (higher only than CR7!);
• wins only 44.5% of his duels (the least of RMA’s starting 11 except
for Benzema);
• runs a mere 9.44km/93’ in UCL (1.4km less than 2 years ago!,
currently ranking 16th among all RMA players, above only CR7!);
• tactically undisciplined, is often being caught up in the attack and
doesn’t track back when the ball is lost, thus leaving his flank
exposed and forcing Ramos and Kroos to cover for him.
• Often cuts very deep inside when chasing inverted wingers, again
leaving his flank exposed.
• Sometimes doesn’t even try blocking a cross delivered from right
in front of him (e.g. Juve’s 2nd goal of the 2nd leg, or Bayern’s first
of the 2nd leg).
• His Squawka performance score is the second worst of the core-14
RMA players (better only than Carvajal’s).
All goals conceded by RMA in this season’s UCL and this year’s La Liga
(12 + 17 games, as of May 3)
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A closer look at three of the last six goals conceded by RMA in the competition sheds further light on this vulnerability:

Example No. 1: Juventus’ first goal against RMA

Casemiro (on his knees) critically loses a ball to Costa, who immediately
cuts inside, while Khedira moves to the flank, right behind Marcelo. This
? creates a 5 vs 3 for Juventus, with two areas of numerical superiority: a 3
vs 2 on the left; a 2 vs 1 on the right, with RMA’s CB Vallejo is left to deal
alone with both Costa, who attacks the central space, and Khedira, who
attacks the flank.

Vallejo is still hesitating and RMA’s defensive line remains central and
narrow. Costa passes to the right to Khedira, making use of Marcelo
being out of position (he continued chasing Costa inside). Khedira crosses
unhindered behind RMA’s defense line to the opposite corner of the six-
yard box, where Carvajal alone cannot handle both Matuidi and Mandzu,
with the latter scoring.

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 Example No. 2: Juventus’ second goal against RMA

Build-up to Juve’s 2nd goal: a translation from the left to the

center leaving RMA’s midfield diamond behind and their defense
line useless on the left. Two Juventus players get passed
Casemiro and Kroos in the center, while two teammates attack
the right flank. Not only is Marcelo left isolated, but he is also
running with his face towards his own goal (!), instead of the
attacking opposition

Left alone in a 1vs1 situation on the flank, Marcelo doesn’t hinder

Lichtsteiner from crossing to the opposite corner of the six-yard
box, where, due to Modric and Varane’s bad positioning, Carvajal is
left alone to deal with three Juve players, of which Mandzu scores.

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 Example No. 3: Bayern’s goal against RMA (1st leg)

Marcelo (red circle) caught high up the pitch, doesn’t track back fast
enough, Bayern instantly send 3 men right behind him on the exposed
flank, RMA’s narrow midfield diamond (blue) hurries to the left, trying
to close in on BAY’s ball holder with the help of Ramos (yellow, out of
position, 60m away from own goal).

Plan fails, James manages to pass through to Kimmich and there

emerges a 3vs2 situation in favour of Bayern: Varane (alongside Carvajal)
continues to man-mark Lewandowski, while Kimmich has a free
boulevard (same as Ribery on the opposite flank, running free behind
Carvajal), sprints about 30m, shoots and scores.

( ! Indicatively, 2 of BAY’s 3 goals against RMA have been scored by their right FB)

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 In comparison to Marcelo, Carvajal also registers less than 50% duels won, a relatively
low PAcc and not reacting very well when put under pressure, as well as having problems
against skillful inverted wingers.
In contrast to the Brazilian however, Carvajal is more defensive-minded (against stronger
opponents usually stops his incursions at about 60m), less technically gifted, and also less
positionally aware (weak coordination with Modric, difficulties in engaging in RMA’s
defensive line translation to the left, etc.).
This may explain in part why this season he has replaced Ramos as RMA’s most
undisciplined player; on average, he commits 2 fouls per match and receives (at least)
one yellow card every 2 matches! (UCL + La Liga, 44 games analyzed).
Suggestively, his Squawka performance score this season is the lowest among RMA’s main
14 field players.

(Data: UCL (12 games analyzed) & La Liga (33 games), 2017-2018)

Even though a 4-4-2 formation instrumenting Asensio and Vazquez on the flanks provides some cover for the full-backs and improves much of the team’s
overall performance, it doesn’t by far solve all the flaws of RMA’s defense, since there remain other weaknesses, identified below.

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 2. OTHER DEFENSIVE WEAKNESSES

2.1. Individually:
• Ramos’ positioning errors (coupled with his occasionally imprudent tackles); he not rarely adventures far away on the pitch close to the touchline,
leaving RMA completely exposed if the ball is lost – see above Bayern’s goal or below the goals of Barcelona and Celta;
• Modric’s fitness, seemingly declining, which makes him sometimes unable to fall back fast enough once the ball is lost (see the 2nd legs against Juve
or Bayern);
• Saving his energy, CR7 runs the least of RMA’s entire squad and very rarely tracks back, which increases the team’s vulnerability to counterattacks
(see below).
• Varane, although an excellent defender, sometimes hesitates to tackle decisively and, in addition, obviously can’t always step in when Ramos makes
a positional mistake.

2.2. Collectively:
• Weak coordination among RMA’s players once the ball is lost (which makes them both not very competent in counter-pressing and vulnerable to
counter-attacks) (see captures above and below);
• Zidane’s occasional insistence to keep the midfield diamond shape when defending even when the opponent is targeting the flanks, while Kroos and
Modric aren’t always capable of getting laterally fast enough;
• Defending set pieces: in this season’s La Liga, RMA have conceded 2.6 times more goals from set pieces (corners and crossed free kicks) than the
previous season. Their mixed man-mark – zonal approach doesn’t always work properly.
• Sometimes, looking for compactness, their defensive line is placed too high up the pitch, leaving them vulnerable to counterattacks of fast
adversaries; in other cases, it stays to deep and far away from the midfield, thus leaving plenty of space to be exploited by their opponents. This
seems not so much an individual problem of certain RMA players, but rather a lack of proper communication and coordination between their lines.

Such weaknesses are exemplified below.

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 Barcelona’s 1st goal against RMA (La Liga, Dec. 23, 2017)

Collective error generating a 5 vs 4 which led to the first goal of the

match. A through-ball of Kroos towards Benzema is intercepted. A
quick transition follows via a vertical pass of Busquets, not stopped by
Kroos, which surprises RMA’s completely off-guard:
• CR7 and Benzema completely outside of the play (somewhere left
of the image), don’t track back. The distance between RMA’s
defense and attack lines is of almost 40m;
• an extremely narrow and vertically stretched midfield diamond;
• Carvajal out of position, about 15m away from Barcelona’s winger;
• Kovacic decides to run back vertically, facing his own flank, and not
attack Barcelona’s ball-holder situated 1.5-2m away from him;
• considerable distance between RMA’s centre-backs situated high
up the field;
• Marcelo cuts back inside to double Kovacic (who runs with his
back to the ball-holder). Since Ramos also runs inside, RMA
abandon entirely their left flank to two Barcelona players, of which
one will ultimately collect Rakitic’s diagonal assist and score.

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 Betis’ 2nd goal against RMA (La Liga, Febr. 18, 2018)

CR7 and Bale remain upfield, Ramos (yellow), way out of position, critically
loses a duel against Betis player A, who quickly passes it short to player B. The
ball gets to player C, who runs vertically, making Carvajal chase him, while
player D continues his sprint unmarked (Vazquez is in the center of the pitch),
only to receive the assist in RMA’s penalty area and shoot a ball then deflected
by Nacho into his own goal.

Celta’s 1st goal against RMA (La Liga, Jan. 7, 2018)

With both RMA’s full-backs (Achraf – yellow, Marcelo – orange) high up on the
pitch, Modric, pressured by Celta players, loses a critical ball. A quick vertical
pass of player A cuts through RMA’s midfield line to player B, who after a short
sprint delivers a diagonal to player C, whom Marcelo has no chance of
catching. Another sprint with the ball at feet, shoot, goal.

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 Defending set pieces. Example:
RMA 6 – 3 Girona (March 3, 2018)

Girona’s 2nd goal: Mixed man-mark defense at

corner. Three opposition players remain (Height (m): RMA-LFC comparison)
unmarked, one scores.

Girona’s 3rd goal: another corner kick

opposition player jumps unhindered, free to
head the ball into the net.

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 D. FITNESS &
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASPECTS
 Psychological elements (just some amateur thoughts)
• ? This season’s UCL journey so far: The RMA players themselves will probably be aware that in this season’s UCL, Real Madrid have been far from impressive: PSG has controlled
tactically the 1st leg, Bayern dominated both legs, Tottenham has defeated them in a fully deserved manner, while Juventus has tormented them in the quarterfinal’s second leg. In
addition, referees intervened in favor of them in some critical moments (the penalty against Juve, Bayern’s refused penalties, etc.). In this context, if, in addition, Barcelona would win
in the May 6 El Classico (a match taking place after the finalization of this analysis), then the self-confidence of Madrid’s players might not be the highest possible. True, a final is a
final, and at this level both teams’ players should be expected to be at their highest level in terms of motivation, focus, and determination.
• ? Pressure vs. composure: According to Madrid’s captain himself, UCL is RMA’s only chance to save an otherwise failed season, which might add to the pressure. Equally true, 8
consecutive UCL semifinals in a row plus the 4 UCL finals played in these last 5 years, 3 of them already won, should be reasons enough to boost their self-confidence levels to the
maximum possible. Then again, “saturated” with trophies and thus not seeking anymore public recognition, they for sure won’t be as “hungry” as LFC’s.
• ?! Tradition. Big clubs know how to handle finals. RMA are a huge club and this is recognizable even in the fact that, among Europe’s top clubs, they have the highest percentage of
European cups won - 73.7% (14 out of 19). This is considerably higher than, for instance, Barcelona (64.3%), Bayern (58.3%), or Juventus (42.9%). Fun fact: not only does Liverpool
rank second in this regard, with 72.7% of their European finals won (8/11), but the last final lost by RMA, back in 1981, was against… Liverpool ☺ (plus, remember Anfield on May 10,
2009?!)
• ! Caution with Ramos. Not only is he regarded as one of the best defenders in Europe and as a true leader capable to motivate his teammates when things seem to go south, but he
also knows (and, if needed, applies) all the dirty tricks in the manual, in order to psychologically destabilize his adversaries.
• ! If things don’t go according to plan, CR7 may anytime be expected to go back to diving.
• ! Both Marcelo and Carvajal don’t respond very well to pressure – read especially against technically skilled, fast, and mobile inverted wingers. As both are expected to make a
number of mistakes, it will depend mainly on Salah and Mane to take advantage of those almost certain errors.
• ! Judging by Liverpool’s European history and type of fanbase, our supporters in Kiev will most likely outnumber and out-noise the opposition’s, both within the stadium and
around it.

Fitness
Successfully countering RMA’s passing game and their almost certainly superior possession will require LFC’s players to massively outrun their opponent.
At least in this season’s UCL, our current first-choice 10 field players do indeed run more (106.3 km/93’) than both RMA’s 4-3-1-2 (102.7 km/93’) and their
4-4-2 (with Benz, Asensio and Vazquez, and without Isco and Casemiro – 104.4 km/93’). The current context isn’t the best one for LFC, judging by both
• our last four games at the moment of writing (West Brom, Roma x2, Stoke) in which our players showed clear signs of fatigue, especially in the last 25’
– suggestively enough, in these four games, after the 79th minute, we score none, but concede six goals;
• the figures displayed on the next slide, indicative of the effort made so far this season by our players.
Successfully addressing this situation might require a very careful physical preparation, especially of our front three players, in the 12 free full days before
the final in Kyiv. Needless to say in light of our squad depletion, injuries should be avoided at any cost in the 2 EPL games left till then (Chelsea & Brighton).
28 © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
 ❖ It is understood that Salah’s Ramadan matter has been solved
following the fatwa of Egypt’s Grand Mufti? Mane’s situation?
❑ RMA: An aging squad combined with few and pale transfers in might
explain why, with the sole exception of Isco, all the other RMA players
run less per game than 2 seasons ago. Among the newcomers, Vazquez,
Asensio, and Kovacic are meant to compensate this shortcoming and do
indeed represent Madrid’s top 3 runners, bettered among LFC players
only by our veteran Milner.
❑ Benzema seems unable to complete an entire game; in this season’s
UCL, in all the games he started, he has been replaced somewhere in
the 65-75th minute. This obviously hasn’t been always for tactical
reasons.
❑ This season, age seems to have finally caught up with Modric (32
years). Thus, compared to the 2015-2016 season (UCL + La Liga), he
currently stays two times longer on the ball, though sending less passes
per time unit, his passing accuracy has dropped below 90% (the lowest
among all RMA’s central midfielders), he creates 1.5 times less chances
per game, makes 3.9 times less interceptions and 2.8 times less tackles,
and, in UCL, runs 1.1 kms less per game. In many of RMA’s goals
analyzed here, he had visible difficulties in chasing back the opposition
on – especially – counterattacks.
❑ Though hyped by the media as some kind of phenomenon in regard to
Kms run per 93’ in this season’s UCL (12 games his fitness (considering his 33 years of age), this season CR7 actually
each) (filter: ≥ 186’ played) runs a mere 9.27 km per 93’, the least among the entire RMA squad
(Ox 11.34; Can 10.60; Matip 8.99)
except for the goalkeepers. His knees might explain both his
reluctance to shoot, at least convincingly, from outside the penalty
area and his systematic failure in converting FKs. Given his favorite Guesstimated km covered this season in
all competitions (club + national teams)
area to shoot or start sprinting, and the above-dissected mechanism of as of May 3, 2018 (filter ≥ 200km)
RMA’s passing network, he will probably target Lovren.
29 © Ionuț APAHIDEANU
 Appendix: expectable tactics’ interaction in three scenarios depending on RMA’s starting eleven

4-3-1-2 4-3-3 4-4-1-1

30 © Ionuț APAHIDEANU