Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chander Bhan
S/o Shri Chhotey Lal
R/o Village Dhul Siras
New Delhi …Petitioner
Through Mr. Anand Yadav, Advocate
Versus
1. Union of India
(through Secretary)
Ministry of Urban Development
Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi
2. Lt. Governor
NCT of Delhi
Raj Niwas, Delhi
MADAN B. LOKUR, J.
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) in
Petitioner has annexed with the writ petition a photocopy of the Official
notification was issued in respect of the land of the Petitioner, that is,
the notification was issued, inter alia, in respect of land bearing Khasra
newspaper publication, his land being Khasra No.55/5 (4-11) was not
Gazette and the newspaper publication state that a map showing the
Delhi. There is no averment made by the Petitioner that the map did not
of the Act, was not issued in respect of his land bearing Khasra No.55/5
little later.
raised only one contention, namely, that no prejudice was caused to the
of his land. The Petitioner appeared and was heard at the time of
of the land did not prejudice him and was not good enough reason to
propositions: first, that the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act were
Rameshwar Saran & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1988 All.L.J. 559.
Court that the requirement of Section 4(1) of the Act is mandatory and
prescribed in Section 4(1) of the Act are resorted to, there could be no
9. In Prem Lata Devi v. State of Bihar, 1999 (1) LACC 335 the
of Section 4(1) of the Act are mandatory. Therefore, it was held that the
LRs v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2007 (5) SCALE 122 which was a case
all prescribed modes have to be strictly resorted to. The Supreme Court
held that the principle is well settled that where any statutory provision
provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then, that thing
in the statute.
the Petitioner, we find that (i) there is no doubt that the provisions of
mandatory, and (ii) failure to comply with the mandate of Section 4(1)
deal with the theory of prejudice relied upon by learned counsel for the
Respondents.
119 of the Report but did not elaborate or elucidate the theory.
Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 626, the Supreme Court dealt with the theory of
issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that
the appellants therein did not point out how the alleged ambiguity or
the sense that they could not file effective objections to the proposed
nebulous plea. The Supreme Court further observed that even assuming
(1995) 1 SCC 133, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 8 of the Report
that since the owner of the acquired land or a person having interest in
publish the substance of the declaration in the locality would not render
the fact of the matter is that the “theory of prejudice” has been
acquisition of land. The question that arises is this: Can the theory of
prejudice save the acquisition process in the present case and is there
vagueness in the purpose of the acquisition and observed that there was
notification. This is because they had (a) filed their objections to the
proposed acquisition and (b) the appellants heard them on the objections
filed.
easily discernible in the facts of this case that no prejudice, let alone any
facts:
Gazette, there can be no doubt that the contents of the Official Gazette
accepting the fact that the Petitioner was put to adequate notice with
Collector) did not depict the correct state of affairs. If the Petitioner had
any doubt about the proposed acquisition of his land due to the
2000) and the newspaper (published later on 21st December, 2000) all
map available with the Land Acquisition Collector whether his land was
Mumbai v. Virgo Steels Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 316 it was held that a
that person.
his land. He could waive this right since it pertained to him only. He
could not (nor could the general public) waive the general right to a
public notice. This right, which is personal to the Petitioner (since the
discrepancy was in the description of his land only) was clearly waived
under Section 5A of the Act with regard to his land bearing Khasra
2001 and the second set on 30 th January, 2001. In the first set of
this regard. There was no occasion for the Petitioner to file these
objections if his land was not covered by the notification issued under
Section 4(1) of the Act. The Petitioner acted as if he knew his land was
conscious of the fact that a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of
the Act in respect of his land bearing Khasra No.55/5 (4-11) and that the
24. We have also taken note of the fact that the Petitioner has
any prejudice has been caused to him. On the contrary, the Petitioner
that similarly placed land belonging to some other persons was released
by the Respondents although it was very much required for the same
public purpose for which the land of the Petitioner was acquired. In this
regard, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on Sube Singh
noted that on the facts of the case, the decision of the State Government
maps of the area, that the only land released was that portion which fell
for use as a shamshan bhumi. It is not the case of the Petitioner that his
land falls for use as a shamshan bhumi. This being the position, we find
MADAN B. LOKUR, J