FRANCO v. PEOPLE – MORALES, I.
there, a report was received from another police officer
DOCTRINE: A private document may be received in evidence
when it is duly proved and authenticated during trial.
FACTS:
 On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Benjamin
Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to work out at the
Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo,
Manila. After he finished working out, he placed his
Nokia 3660 cell phone worth PI8,500.00 on the altar
where gym users usually put their valuables and
proceeded to the comfort room to change his clothes.
 After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but
it was already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who
was also working out, informed him that he saw Franco
get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto
requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon
verification from the logbook, he found out that Franco
had left within the time that he was in the shower.
 The gym's caretaker, Virgilio Ramos (Ramos), testified
that he saw Franco in the gym but he was not working
out and was just going around the area. In fact, it was
just Franco's second time at the gym.
 Ramos even met him near the door and as Franco did
not log out, he was the one who indicated it in their
logbook.
 When Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was
missing and asked that nobody leaves the place, he put
an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the logbook
to indicate that he was the only one who left the gym
after the cell phone was declared lost.
 Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, a police
officer who was also working out at the gym, tried to
locate Franco within the gym's vicinity but they failed to
find him. They proceeded to the police station and while
that somebody saw Franco along Coral Street, which is
near the gym and that he was holding a cell phone.
 They went to Coral Street but he was already gone. A
vendor told them that he saw a person who was holding
a cell phone, which was then ringing and that the person
was trying to shut it off. When they went to Franco's
house, they were initially not allowed to come in but were
eventually let in by Franco's mother. They talked to
Franco who denied having taken the cell phone.
 Nakamoto then filed a complaint before the barangay
but no settlement was arrived. Hence, he filed a
complaint for theft against Franco before the City of
Prosecutor’s Office in Manila.
 RTC – convicted Franco
 CA – affirmed RTC
Franco also asserts that the logbook from which his time in and
time out at the gym was based was not identified during the trial
and was only produced after Ramos testified. Ramos testified
that when Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing
and asked that nobody leaves the place, he put an asterisk
opposite the name of Franco in the logbook to indicate that he
was the only one who left the gym after the cell phone was
declared lost.
ISSUE: WON the logbook of Ramos has been identified and
authenticated during his testimony?
HELD: NO.
Under the Rules on Evidence, documents are either public or
private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any
of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides that before
any private document is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the whose cell phone Franco took from the altar still remains
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. uncertain.

In this case, the foregoing rule was not followed. The testimony
of Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified
and authenticated during the course of Ramos' testimony. At the ROMEO SUERTE FELIPE vs PEOPLE - NITRO
time when Ramos was testifying, he merely referred to the log
Facts:
in and log out time and the name of the person at page 104 of
the logbook that appears on line 22 of the entries for November
Prosecutions Version:
3, 2004. This was photocopied and marked as Exhibit "C-1."
Meanwhile, when Nakamoto was presented as rebuttal witness,
 On 11th of July 1999 in Maricaban Pasay City, one
a page from the logbook was again marked as Exhibit "D." The
logbook or the particular page referred to by Ramos was witness (Rodolfo Alumbres) was around four-arms
neither identified nor confirmed by him as the same length from the victim (Godofredo Ariate) and the
logbook which he used to log the ins and outs of the gym accused-petitioner ( Romeo Suerte-Felipe). The two
users, or that the writing and notations on said logbook were arguing over something.
was his.
 Romeo was accompanied by two policemen who were
The facts and circumstances proven by the prosecution, taken (PO3 Madriago and PO3 Jimeno) both armed with 9mm
together, are not sufficient to justify the unequivocal conclusion
that Franco feloniously took Nakamoto's cell phone. No other calibre gun.
convincing evidence was presented by the prosecution that
would link him to the theft.  While Romeo was armed with .45 calibre gun.

The fact Franco took a cell phone from the altar does not  All of a sudden Romeo fired four shot at Godofredo.
necessarily point to the conclusion that it was Nakamoto's cell Seeing Godofredo fall down Alumbres rushed to his aid
phone that he took. In the appreciation of circumstantial and attempted to bring the latter to the hospital, but
evidence, the rule is that the circumstances must be proved, Romeo also shot him twice and hit him one in his right
and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence leg. Fearing to be shot again Alumbres, pretended to be
must exclude the possibility that some other person has
dead.
committed the offense charged. Franco, therefore, cannot be
convicted of the crime charged in this case. There is not
 Godofredo’s son (William Ariate) and Barangay
enough evidence to do so. As a rule, in order to support a
conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all the chairman ( Pio Arce) witnessed the incident.
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty. In this case, not all the facts on which the
inference of guilt is based were proved. The matter of what and
  Upon arriving at the scene of the crime Pio tried to
appease petitioner shouting “Romy, ayusin na lang natin
to”
 Romeo did not heed the request but instead also fired at
Pio. Pio used his .38 calibre revolver to defend himself
against Romeo who was more than 6 meters away from
him. Pio took cover and exchange fire with Romeo.
 Madriago and Jimeno also fired to Pio.
 Godofredo was declared dead on arrival at Pasay City
General Hospital. Another son of Godofredo (Edgardo
Ariate) identified the body of the victim.
 (Dr. Ludovino J. Lagat) autopsied the body of the victim.
It showed that the victim sustained three gunshot wound
which caused his death.
 (Armando Mancera) Photographer of the NBI, took
pictures of the body of the victim
 Ballistic Examination also showed that the slugs of
bullets were fired from a .45 calibre gun.
Petitioner Version
 Godofredo and his 6 to 7 companions, which included
Pio and William,were the unlawful agressors that night.
 Godofredo was irked when Romeo chided him for
cursing and slapping a retarded boy in the streets.
 That Godofredo and his companions attacked and
repeatedly stabbed Romeo. They also attacked
Madriago and Jimeno.
 That after Pio fired at them using .38 calibre, Romeo
drew his .45 calibre gun in self-defense and accidentally
fired it in an upward direction.
 (Danilo Villa) a street vendor testified and backed up
petitoners testimony.
RTC convicted Romeo.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Petitoner’s Defense
1. Firstly, petitioner claims that there is no clear evidence
to support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that it
was Godofredo Ariate’s body that was autopsied by Dr.
Ludovino Lagat. (The argument for our topic in re: Public
documents and prima facie evidence)
2. Secondly, petitioner claims that assuming arguendo that
the autopsied body was that of Godofredo Ariate, there
is no clear evidence that the slug in question was
recovered from a fatal wound that caused Godofredo
Ariate’s death
3. Lastly, petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that
the slug in question was recovered from a fatal wound,
 there is no clear evidence that the same slug came from
the .45 firearm of petitioner.
Issue: WON the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body is
conclusive uponthe identification of the body.
Ruling: Yes.
The document being a public record made in the performance
of a duty of officers in the Medico-Legal Office of the National
Bureau of Investigation, is governed by Rule 132, Sections 19
and 23 of the Rules of Court, that provides.
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary
public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public
records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein. All other writings
are private.
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.”
Thus, entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are
deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, i.e.,
that a body has been properly identified as that of Godofredo
Ariate. This prima facie evidence of identification cannot be
rebutted by an extremely meticulous fault-finding inquiry into the
chain of custody of the body of the victim, as such body cannot
be easily replaced or substituted by ill-minded persons. What
petitioner is asking of us is not to be sedulous anymore, but to
be paranoid and unreasonably mistrustful of the persons whom
our very rules require us to trust. Petitioner’s criticism of the
identification of the body of the victim miserably fails to inject
any reasonable doubt in our minds, not when petitioner is even
loath to say that the body autopsied was not that of Godofredo
Ariate but that of some other person.
We must stress at this point that there was no indication of any
impropriety or irregularity committed by the medico-legal officer
in this case with respect to the autopsy on the body of the late
Godofredo Ariate. Dr. Lagat’s duty was to perform the autopsy
and not to obsessively investigate the authenticity of the
signature appearing on all requests presented to him.
Thus, Dr. Lagat, as a medico-legal officer, enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.
MALAYAN INSURANCE V PHIL NAILS- OMNES
FACTS: Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation
insured against all risks its shipment of 10,053.400 metric tons
of steel billets valued at P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan
Insurance Company Inc. The shipment delivered was short by
377.168 metric tons. For this shortage, respondent claimed
insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the value of
undelivered steel billets, plus customs duties, taxes and other
charges paid by respondent.Petitioner refused to pay.
On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for sum of money with
the RTC of Pasig representing said lost and/or undelivered
cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that it failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed in the
wrong venue. The motion was denied. It thus filed a petition for
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. This was also denied.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated.
However, it was eventually dismissed by the CA, and its
dismissal became final and executory.
On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an
amended complaint which
the trial court granted. It sent petitioner summons and a copy of
the complaint on October 13, 1993 and also gave petitioner until
October 31, 1993 to file its answer.
On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner
in default. The trial court
granted and allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte
before the branch clerk of court.
Respondent presented its lone witness, Jeanne King. On
November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory
counterclaim. Upon motion by the respondent, the trial court
expunged from the records the answer for late filing.
On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by
default. While in CA , it alleged that lower court erred in
admitting documentary evidence which is irregular in nature and
not in accordance with the Rules of Court. CA affirmed RTC.
Petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate
respondents documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule
132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments
had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case,
respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned
persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel
billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS
report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received had
no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on this point could
not be taken at face value.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in giving
imprimatur to the trial courts ruling with regard to the admission
of documentary evidence submitted by respondent.
ISSUE: Should respondent authenticate the documentary
evidence it submitted at the trial?
RULING: Yes, Under the rules on evidence, documents
are either public or private. Private documents are those that do
not fall under any of the
enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Here,respondents documentary exhibits are private documents.
They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their
due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they
can be admitted in evidence. With the exception concerning the
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity.
Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the
insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel
billets. In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to
prove petitioners liability.
HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA V. CA - QUISING
FACTS:
 March 1997: petitioner International Freeport Traders,
Inc. (IFTI) ordered a shipment of Toblerone chocolates
and assorted confectioneries from Jacobs Suchard
Tobler Ltd. of Switzerland (Jacobs) through its Philippine
agent, Colombo Merchants Phils., Inc., under the
delivery term "F.O.B. Ex-Works."
 Jacobs shipped the goods through Danmar Lines of
Switzerland (Danmar) which issued to negotiable house
bills of lading1 signed by its agent, respondent Danzas
Intercontinental, Inc. (Danzas).
 Danmar contracted Orient Overseas Container Line
(OOCL) to ship the goods from Switzerland.
 OOCL issued a non-negotiable master bill of lading
stating that the freight was prepaid with Danmar as the
shipper and Danzas as the consignee and party to be
 1
The bills of lading stated that:
o the terms were "F.O.B." and "freight
payable at destination,"
o Jacobs = shipper,
o China Banking Corporation =
consignee, and
notified. The shipment was to be delivered at Angeles
City in Pampanga.
 Danmar paid OOCL the arbitrary fee of US$425.00 to
process the release of the goods and ship the same to
Clark in Angeles City which was to cover brokerage,
trucking, wharfage, arrastre, and processing expenses.
 The goods were loaded on board the OOCL vessel on
April 20, 1997 and arrived at the port of Manila on May
14, 1997.
 Upon learning from Danmar that the goods had been
shipped, Danzas immediately informed IFTI of its
arrival.
 IFTI prepared the import permit needed for the clearing
and release of the goods from the Bureau of Customs
and advised Danzas on May 20, 1997 to pick up the
document.
 Danzas got the import permit on May 26, 1997.
 At the same time, it asked IFTI to
o 1) surrender the original bills of lading to secure
the release of the goods, and
o 2) submit a bank guarantee inasmuch as the
shipment was consigned to China Banking
Corporation to assure Danzas that it will be
compensated for freight and other charges.
o IFTI = party to be notified of the
shipment.
o Clark Special Economic Zone = delivery
point
o Manila = port of discharge.
 But IFTI DID NOT provide Danzas a bank guarantee,
claiming that letters of credit already covered the
shipment.
 IFTI insisted that Danzas should already endorse the
import permit and bills of lading to OOCL since the latter
had been paid an arbitrary fee. But Danzas did not do
this.
 Because IFTI did not provide Danzas with the original
bills of lading and the bank guarantee, the latter withheld
the processing of the release of the goods.
 Danzas reiterated to IFTI that it could secure the release
of the goods only if IFTI submitted a bank guarantee, but
eventually yielded to the request and applied for a bank
guarantee which was approved on May 23, 1997.
 It claimed to have advised Danzas on even date of its
availability for pick up but Danzas secured it only on
June 6, 1997.
 Danzas told IFTI that the issuance of a promissory note
would assure the delivery of the goods to Clark.
 IFTI faxed a letter to Danzas, stating that Edwin
Mabazza of OOCL confirmed that it had been paid an
arbitrary fee. IFTI maintained, however, that it was not
in a position to decide whether Danzas was to be liable
for the charges.
 IFTI issued a promissory note and requested that the
goods be released to avoid any further charges.
 Minutes later, IFTI faxed another letter reiterating its
request that the goods be released pending payment of
whatever charges Danzas had incurred for the release
and delivery of the goods to Clark.
 IFTI promised to pay Danzas any charges within five
days upon delivery of the goods as soon as the
investigation as to which company will shoulder the
expenses is settled.
 Danzas secured the release of the goods on June 13,
1997.
 Danzas delivered the same to IFTI at Clark on June 16,
1997.
 IFTI faxed a letter to Danzas, confirming the delivery.
IFTI also said that Danzas' General Manager and
OOCL's Mabazza visited IFTI's office to settle the
charges on the goods.
 Danzas agreed to charge IFTI only the electric charges
and storage fees totaling P56,000.00 (or roughly
US$2,210.00) from the original billing of about
US$7,000.00.
 In turn, IFTI agreed to give Danzas another opportunity
to service its account and requested it to disregard IFTI's
June 10, 1997 fax letter where it said that it would no
longer employ Danzas for its future shipments for Subic
and Clark.
 On January 19, 1998, however, Danzas wrote IFTI,
demanding payment of P181,809.45 for its handling of
the shipment. IFTI ignored the demand. On March 26,
1998 Danzas filed separate complaints for sum of
money against IFTI and OOCL before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 78. The
court subsequently dismissed the complaint against
OOCL after it settled the case amicably.
 In the main, Danzas claimed that IFTI engaged its
services for P181,809.45 to process the release of the
goods from the port and deliver it to IFTI at Clark but the
latter reneged on its obligation, compelling Danzas to file
the suit.
  IFTI countered that it had no liability to Danzas since
IFTI was not privy to the hiring of Danzas. Following
normal procedure, IFTI coursed the import permit to
Danzas since it was the party that issued the house bills
of lading. IFTI added that under arbitrary shipments,
imported goods are allowed to stay free of charge in the
port for three working days and in the storage for five to
six calendar days. Storage fees, electricity charges, and
demurrage become due only after such period.
 In this case, IFTI informed Danzas on May 20, 1997 to
pick up the import permit but Danzas picked it up only
on May 26, 1997. And instead of endorsing it with the
bills of lading to OOCL, Danzas itself processed the
release of the goods. Since Danzas failed to process the
release or transshipment of the goods within the three-
day period, then it should shoulder all the charges from
May 20, 1997 to June 13, 1999.
 MeTC = in favor of Danzas
 RTC of Parañaque City = dismissed the complaint
 CA = reversed RTC.
o CA ruled that IFTI's fax letters dated June 10,
1997 showed the parties engaged in negotiation
stage. When IFTI heeded Danzas' request for a
bank guarantee, its action brought about a
perfected contract of lease of service. The bank
guarantee, procured by IFTI, contained all the
requisites of a perfected contract. The cause of
the contract was the release of the goods from
the port and its delivery at Clark; the
consideration was the compensation for the
release and delivery of the goods to IFTI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a contract of lease of service exists between IFTI
and Danzas
HELD:
Yes. There is a contract of lease.
By acceding to all the documentary requirements that Danzas
imposed on it, IFTI voluntarily accepted its services.
 The bank guarantee IFTI gave Danzas assured the
latter that it would eventually be paid all freight and
other charges arising from the release and delivery of
the goods to it.
 Another indication that IFTI recognized its contract with
Danzas is when IFTI requested Danzas to have the
goods released pending payment of whatever
expenses the latter would incur in obtaining the release
and delivery of the goods at Clark.
 It also admitted that it initially settled with Danzas'
General Manager and OOCL's Mabazza the issue
regarding the charges on the goods after Danzas
agreed to bill IFTI for the electric charges and storage
fees totaling P56,000.00. Certainly, this concession
indicated that their earlier agreement did not push
through.
 Elements of a Contract
o (1) consent of the contracting parties;
o (2) object certain which is the subject matter of
the contract; and
o (3) cause of the obligation which is established.
A
Contract is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested by
the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract.
 Stages of a Contract
o (1) preparation or negotiation;
o (2) perfection; and
o (3) consummation.
Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting
parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the
moment of agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of
the contract takes place when the parties agree upon the
essential elements of the contract.
 The last stage is the consummation of the contract
where the parties fulfill or perform the terms they
agreed on, culminating in its extinguishment.
 Here, there is no other conclusion than that the parties
entered into a contract of lease of service for the
clearing and delivery of the imported goods.
SANSON VS CA - TAYABAN
DOCTRINE:
In this case, the testimony of Sanson siblings fell short in
faithfully complying with the quantum of proof under Section 22,
Rule 132. Despite this fact, the Court noticed that all the checks
issued by Juan Bon Fing Sy came from one and the same
account and the signatures appeared to have been affixed by
one and the same hand. The claimants substantiated their
claims with pieces of evidence (checks + testimonies) and so
the burden of evidence shifted to the administratrix who failed
to controvert the aforesaid pieces of evidence and her
manifestattion that she was dispensing with the presentation of
evidence against the claims.
FACTS:
Before Juan Bon Fing Sy died on January 10, 1990, he
contracted loans to the following:
(Siblings)
(brother) Felicito Sanson: 603,000.00
(sister) Celedonia Sanson-Saquin: 360,000.00
(Mother and son)
(son) Eduardo Montinola Jr: 50,000.00
(mother) Angeles Montinola: 150,000.00
RTC Branch 28 of Iloilo appointed Melecia T. Sy, the surviving
spouse of Juan Bon Fing Sy (decedent) as the administratrix of
his estate.
During trial, Celedonia, Felicito and Jade were presented as
witnesses.
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified
that she had a transaction with the deceased which is evidenced
by six checks issued by him before his death; before the
deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the
checks from his (the deceased’s) son Jerry who told her that his
father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and
after the death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the
checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored due to the
closure of his account.
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson,
testified that she knew that the deceased issued five checks to
Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the
deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for
payment but were returned due to the closure of his account.
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo
Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles, testified that on
separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and
P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as
shown by three checks issued by the deceased, two to Angeles
and the other to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased
died or sometime in August 1989, they advised him that they
would be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he
would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased
died on January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were
dishonored as the account against which they were drawn was
closed, hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter dated
February 6, 1990 addressed to the deceased’s heirs Melicia,
James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks
have remained unsettled.
Adminitratix Melecia Sy denied knowledge of the debts and
claimed that if they ever existed that they had been paid. She
also argued that the claims against the estate are illegal and
usurious and are barred by prescription. Melecia invoked the
Deadman's Rule in an attempt to disqualify the witnesses
presented.
After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four
separate manifestations informing the trial court that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their
claims.
RTC ruled that the Dead Man's rule doesn't apply and ruled in
favor of the claimants. Administratrix was ordered to pay their
claims.
CA on appeal by the Administratrix reveresed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
WON the testimony of Jade Montinolla in favor of husband
Eduardo Montinola Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles Montinolla is
sufficient to prove the claimaints' claims.
WON the testimony of the siblings Felicito Sanson and
Celedonia Sanson-Saquin in support of each other's claim may
be disqualified.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
The administratrixs counter-argument does not lie. Relationship
to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in
determining either the credibility of the witness or subject only
to well recognized exceptions none of which is here present the
admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship
to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution
in the assessment of a witness testimony but is not necessarily
a negative element which should be taken as diminishing the
credit otherwise accorded to it.
Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the
prima facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the
administratrix who expressly manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their
claims, it has become conclusive.
The SC ruled that Jade cannot be disqualified because she is
neither an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is
being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction.
SECOND ISSUE:
While the testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully
discharged the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. x x x,
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from
a comparison with the naked eye of the deceased’s signature
appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with
that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which
checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to have
been affixed by one and the same hand.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their
evidence, substantiated their claims against the estate of the
deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the
administratrix who, however, expressly opted not to discharge
the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with
the presentation of evidence against the claims.
PEOPLE VS. PAGPAGUITAN - UMANGAY
DOCTRINE:
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and
denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular
person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in
evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in
dispute; The court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a
basis for comparison.
FACTS:
Roberto Salazar and Domingo Pagpaguitan are charged with
the crime of rape filed by EvelynNalam.
Roberto was Evelyn’s neighbor at Brgy. Bitan-agan, Butuan City
and Domingo is his gang mate.
In the evening of January 30, 1992, both of them went to see
Evelyn at her employer’s house at Montilla Blvd and told her that
they met her father who was very angry with her and swore to
come an get her, if not kill her, if she will not go home to
Bitanagan.
Although she wondered why would her father be mad as she
asked permission before she left, she nevertheless went with
them boarding a jeep for San Vicente where the two accused
left her things, then proceeded towards Bitan-agan.
The accused told her that they would seek Commander Coz’s
assistance to help pacify her father’s anger.
But instead of going to Coz’s residence, the accused brought
her to the uninhabited farmhouse of Roberto’s grandfather.
Armed with knives, they threatened to kill her if she would not
go with them up to the mountain.
Upon arrival, Roberto stayed by the door while Domingo started
embracing and kissing her. She pleaded with him but he
answered that if she could not be taken “harmlessly”, then it
would have to be by force.
She kicked Domingo but the latter boxed her until she fell on the
floor. Whereupon, Domingo removedd his pants and her
panties as she continued pleading and weeping. He raped her
then.
The next morning, they went to the house of Domingo in the
mountain where his mother was. Since his mother was not
there, Domingo raped her again in the presence of Roberto.
In the meantime, Evelyn’s relatives went looking for her. They
found her with Domingo.
A meeting was held before the brgy. Captain and purok
president between Domingo and Evelyn’s parents. Domingo
propsed marriage, but Evelyn rejected.
Evelyn and her father filed a complaint for rape. Domingo and
Roberto were arrested.
When the trial ensued, Domingo admitted having sex with her
but claimed that they had eloped and that they were actually
sweethearts.
DOMINGO’S VERSION:
Evelyn went to the accused’s place of work as her father was
angry with her because someone reported to him that she and
Domingo often met at the plaza.He told Evelyn that her father
would be angrier if he knew she came to his work place, to which
Evelyn charged that he did not love her. His pride was pricked
so he invited her to his house in Bitanagan. Roberto went with
them.
They lived together as husband and wife. Domingo told her that
she should go home and he and his parents would follow to ask
for her hand but her parents did not entertain them.
They lived together until her parents went to his house and
maltreate her in from of Domingo and his family.
Domingo left for Leyte as she was told by Evelyn that her
parents would kill him. They exchanged letters.
TRIAL COURT: Convicted both accused. Hence, this petition.
Domingo faults the judge for arrogating unto himself the task of
determining the genuineness of the handwriting at the back of
the picture of the accused and the complainant together and the
alleged letter oc complainant to him submitted by the defense.
During the trial, the judge had ordered Evelyn to write a letter
under his dictation which was later marked as exhibit.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is permissible or proper for the trial
judge to receive and examine a specimen writing, written at his
order by a party who alleged tat she was not the writer of other
documents submitted in evidence?
RULING: Yes, it is permissible.
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied
upon the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other
writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for the
purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also
recognized that a comparison of writing is a rational method of
investigation, similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have
probative value in the search for truth. Thus, where a
comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or
without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his
signature as a basis for comparison.
Once admitted, the genuineness of other offered writings
alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question
for the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this
task by experts.
 ALEJANDRA LAZARO et. al. vs. MODESTA AGUSTIN et. al.
– USON
DOCTRINE:
 Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution,
and documents acknowledged before a notary public have
in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.
 Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. An affidavit does not automatically become
a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat.
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can
be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.
 A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
FACTS:
 Plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late
Simeon Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died
intestate leaving a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of
Natividad Nstra. Sra., Municipality of Laoag.
 In the desire of the children of Simeon Santos from whom the
parcel of land originated as owner, his children, Alberto, Leoncio
and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, consented that the parcel
of land be titled in the name of Basilisa (eldest)
 An Original Certificate of Title in the name of Basilisa Santos
was obtained although it was agreed among them that it did not
and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole
and exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and as embodied in
the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa Santos.
 A residential house constructed on the lot and in the
construction of which Lazaro and Basilisa and her children
spent certain amount of money. The said residential house had
a market value of P93,920.00.
 Without the knowledge and consent of the Lazaro et. al., the title
of the lot was transferred into another title which is now in the
names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia Agustin,
Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and
Bienvenido Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa
Santos-Agustin who are herein named as defendants with
Monica Agustin now deceased represented by her children Paul
A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo as defendants;
 During the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, Alejandra
Santos-Lazaro informed the former that the transfer of the title
covering the lot in the name of Basilisa Santos into the names
of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is solely and
exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but
Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied not to worry because an
affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and
specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos,
and her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one
fourth share of the lot;
 In a move to determine if the children and the heirs of Basilisa
Santos-Agustin, would follow the line of thinking of their mother
and grandmother of Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo on the
shares of the lot and residential house erected on it, the plaintiffs
initiated a partition in the barangay court but that the children of
Basilisa Santos-Agustin and her grandchildren Paul A. Dalalo
and Noel A. Dalalo refused and opposed the partition claiming
that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the lot being that
the lot is now titled in their names, and hence there was no
settlement.
 Lazaro et. al. filed against Agustin et. al., a complaint for
partition with the MTCC of Laoag City.
MTCC: In favor of Agustin et. al. and stated that no evidentiary
value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by
Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-
ownership of the subject property with her siblings Alberto,
Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented
on the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her
affidavit were hearsay.
RTC: Affirmed but modified and held that the house erected on
the disputed lot was built and renovated by petitioners in good
faith, hence, be entitled to indemnity representing the costs of
the construction and renovation of the said house.
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE/S & RULING:
I) Whether or not Basilisa’s sworn statement is a declaration
against interest or an admission against interest? Admission
against interest.
There is a vital distinction between admissions against
interest and declarations against interest. Admissions against
interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in
privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.
Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is
neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary
evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They
are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents'
predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's
legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine
and duly executed, should be considered as an admission
against interest.
II) Whether or not the subject sworn statement can be given full
faith and credence in view of the issues raised regarding its
genuineness and due execution? NO.
Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their
favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption
is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule
on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically
become a public document just because it contains a notarial
jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can
be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.
 Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity
accorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed, a
notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a
deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its
contents. The presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The
presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case
because the regularity in the execution of the sworn statement
was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie
validity was overthrown by the highly questionable
circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as well
as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the
improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on
the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the
questioned document was supposedly executed. The trial and
appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to the
testimonies of these witnesses.
III) Whether or not the document was properly notarized? NO.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
In the instant case, the notary public should have
exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the
person executing the said sworn statement. However, the
notary public did not comply with this requirement. He simply
relied on the affirmative answers of the person appearing before
him attesting that she was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of
the sworn statement are true; and that the thumbmark
appearing on the said document was hers. However, this would
not suffice. He could have further asked the person who
appeared before him to produce any identification to prove that
she was indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that the said
person was not personally known to him, and that the
thumbmark appearing on the document sought to be notarized
was not affixed in his presence.
Pan Pacific Industrial Sales vs CA - Rose Shahanna Vargas
DELFIN vs. BILLONES - ABUEG
Emergency Recit:
The subject of this case are two parcels of land: Lot 213 and Lot
3414. These lots were originally owned by respondent’s
predecessors. Respondents filed an action for annulment,
reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession
and damages, claiming that the Spouses Delfin acquired the
lots by fraud, and that the subject Deeds are null and void.
Petitioners (Sps. Delfin) argue that respondents are already
barred by prescription to assail the validity of the Deeds.
The RTC ruled in their favor of petitioners. RTC ruled that the
deeds of sale being duly executed notarial and public
documents, they enjoy the presumption of regularity. Also, RTC
says that respondent’s claim of fraud is barred by prescription.
The CA reversed.
As for Lot No. 3414, CA ruled that the transaction between the
predecessors of petitioners and the Sps. Delfin was only an
equitable mortgage and not a sale because P300.00 was
inadequate consideration for a lot consisting of 1,565 square
meters even in 1965.
As for Lot No. 213, the CA gave credence to the death certificate
presented by the respondents. CA ruled that due execution of
the Deeds cannot prevail over the fact that two (2) of the seller
signatories therein have already died prior to the date of
execution of the Deed.
SC ruled in favor of petitioner. The Death Certificates presented
by respondents were mere certifications and not the certified
copies or duly authenticated reproductions of the purported
death certificates of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano
Degala. They are not the public documents referred to by the
Rules of Court, nor even records of public documents; thus, they
do not enjoy the presumption granted by the
Rules. Respondents were unable to overthrow the presumption
of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Said deed, as well as
the titles derived must be accorded respect and must remain
undisturbed.
Facts:
On 29 July 1960, a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 213 was
executed by:
Sellers:
 Teresa Daos, Esperanza Daradar,
 Estrella Daradar and
 Maria Daradar,
 with the marital consent of Cipriano Degala, husband of
Teresa Daos,
Buyer: Spouses Delfin.
This Deed had the signatures of Esperanza and Estrella, and
thumb marks of Teresa, Maria, and Cipriano, and was
acknowledged before a notary public.
On 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute
Deed of Sale involving Lot No. 3414 was made.
Sellers:
 Teresa Daos,
 Trinidad Degala,
 Leopoldo Degala,
 Presentacion Degala,
 Rosario Degala and
 Pedro Degala
Buyer: Spouses Delfin.
This Deed, had either the thumb marks or the signatures of the
sellers, was likewise notarized.
The spouses Delfin, the buyer of the two lots, consolidated Lots
No. 213 and No. 3414 and subdivided the resulting lot into six
(6) smaller lots. They sold some of the lots to subsequent
buyers.
Respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the former owners of
Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed an action for annulment,
reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession
and damages.
Respondents allege the following:
As to Lot 3414, they say that Teresa Daos was in dire need of
money so she mortgaged ½ of portion of Lot No. 3414 to the
spouses Delfin for P300.00. Taking advantage of her condition,
the spouses Delfin made her sign a document purporting to be
a mortgage, but which turned out to be an extrajudicial partition
with deed of absolute sale.
As to Lot 213, they allege that the Deed of Sale was fictitious
and the signatures and thumb marks were all forged because
three (3) of the signatories died before the alleged sale in 1960,
namely: Estrella Daradar died in 1934, and Esperanza Daradar
and Cipriano Degala both died in 1946. They presented
certifications on the deaths of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano
Degala by the Local Civil Registrar of Panitan, Capiz.

Petitioners counter respondents by claiming that the latter were
already barred by prescription and laches. They also argued
that they (Sps. Delfin) and the subsequent owners of the subject
properties, are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
The RTC ruled in their favor of petitioners. RTC ruled that the
deeds of sale being duly executed notarial and public
documents, they enjoy the presumption of regularity. Also, RTC
says that respondent’s claim of fraud is barred by prescription.
The CA reversed.
As to Lot 3414, it was only an equitable mortgage and not a
sale, considering the following circumstances:
(i) Teresa Daos was a very old and sickly woman;
(ii) she and her children lacked formal education to fully
comprehend the document to which they affixed their
signatures and/or thumb marks;
(iii) P300.00 was inadequate consideration for a lot
consisting of 1,565 square meters even in 1965;
(iv) respondents were allowed to remain in the subject
properties; and
(v) the questioned document was registered in the name of
the spouses Delfin 15 years after the alleged date of its
execution, when most of the alleged vendors have already
died.
As for Lot No. 213, the Deed of Absolute Sale could not have
been executed on 9 July 1960. Relying on the certifications of
death presented by respondents, the defense of due execution
cannot prevail over the fact that two (2) of the signatories
therein have already died prior to said date.
SC ruled in favor of petitioners. Respondents failed to prove that
fraud attended the sale of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414. Notarized
documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be
overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the questioned deeds are valid. – Yes.
Ruling:
Yes. They are valid, because:
1. Respondents failed to prove that fraud attended the
execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale.
2. The certifications of death shown by respondents were
mere certifications and not the certified copies or duly
authenticated reproductions of the purported death
certificates
All that respondents came out with were bare allegations. Fraud
must be proven. Respondents failed to prove that fraud
attended the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed
of Absolute Sale. Their bare and unsupported allegations are
not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity of said
agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud.
On the other hand, CA annulled the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 9 July 1960 covering Lot No. 213 because one of the
vendors therein was already dead. The Supreme Court does
not agree with the CA.
Supreme Court expounds:
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
Public documents are:
(i) the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(ii) documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(iii) public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein
How public documents may be proved:
- by the original copy, an official publication, or a certified
true copy;
- and when a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation by the officer
having legal custody of the record must state that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be.
A duly-registered death certificate is considered a public
document and the entries found therein are presumed correct,
unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive
evidence establishing otherwise. But this presumption is
disputable and is satisfactory only if uncontradicted. It may be
overcome by other evidence to the contrary.
The documents presented by respondents were mere
certifications and not the certified copies or duly authenticated
reproductions of the purported death certificates of Esperanza
Daradar and Cipriano Degala. They are not the public
documents referred to by the Rules of Court, nor even records
of public documents; thus, they do not enjoy the presumption
granted by the Rules.
ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
BACANI
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with estafa and she pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged. Petitioner was an employee of
Footlucker’s, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became a
sales representative; that as a sales representative she was
authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming
from different towns and to collect payments from them; that she
could issue and sign official receipts of Footlucker’s for the
payments, which she would then remit; that she would then
submit the receipts for the payments for tallying and
reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high,
but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she
responded that business was slow; that he summoned the
accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered
erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject
her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he
learned from a customer of petitioner’s that the customer’s
outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that
balance appeared unpaid in Footlucker’s records; and that one
night later on, petitioner and her parents went to his house to
deny having misappropriated any money of Footlucker’s and to
plead for him not to push through with a case against her,
promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that she
did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work. The only
other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, store
auditor. She declared that Go had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had
already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still
reflected outstanding balances for them; that she first
conducted her audit by going to the customers in places that
she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of
around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office;
that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written
report marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report,
petitioner had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.
During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked
the ledgers of petitioner’s various customers allegedly with
discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive. Only 49 of the ledgers were formally offered and
admitted by the RTC because the 50th ledger could no longer
be found. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection
on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and
their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons
who had made the entries were not themselves presented in
court. RTC then rendered petitioner guilty for the crime of
estafa. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in
the information?
RULING:
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution
bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s
duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in
the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for
any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution
must further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its
success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused.
The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises
EVIDENCE III. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS:
Criminal Cases
150
from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that
no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to
his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must
then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not
overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor .In other
words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is
inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in
establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the
Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan,
and various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly
issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their
payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each
customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt
numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and
receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the
various duties of petitioner as Footlucker’s sales representative.
On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony
knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must
the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footlucker’s. This be entirely rejected as proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or
means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B conversion.
to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly
issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn
statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being
the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived
the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the
veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by
petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire
proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus
unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was

unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative
value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of
Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a
witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness
bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be
called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.