SECOND DIVISION A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl
Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui,
was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime
in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa
City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her
office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then
on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued,
and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then
met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know
later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an
illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, [2] respondent averred that she met
Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that
Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated
that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in
Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to
live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children
gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together. [4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the
Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos
Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu,
Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a
few days after she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself
to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with
her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and
that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her
mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds. [6] By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against
complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that
Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui,
and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui,
and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S.
No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
 Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same
evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the
latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and
was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still
living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they,
admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or
later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for
want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same
was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui
lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in
Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and
for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department
of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the
date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22,
1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was
because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 [13] and 184[14] of
the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and
lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), [15] respondent averred that she did not have the
original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed
such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her
possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good
moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in
his courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent
reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant
confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent
stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of
the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of
Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of
respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They
have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security
agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent
for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice [21]to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith
and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference.
She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status,
she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty.
Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man
which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man.
Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24],
respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show
sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there
is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation
that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to
respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to
believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro
Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom
he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of
having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for
Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of
Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the
practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession
of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition
to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed
him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave
birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple,
they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not
have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding
out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in
her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she
knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible
considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that
is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he
is flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. [30] This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to
believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was EN BANC
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall
the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can
forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
[A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004]
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading,
especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such
Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from DECISION
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than
the highest degree of morality. PER CURIAM:

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will
be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the
jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral
character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this
jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent [1] to the practice of law, but an unending
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred.[2]

In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma
SO ORDERED. T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality,
abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.
Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships
with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit
affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work
abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a
violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his
answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the
complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen
(18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando,
Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be
accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented
apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for their
needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate
financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of
his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her
evidence, both oral and documentary,[6] to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and
respondent were married[7] and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a
fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on
dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20,
1980,[8] October 14, 1981[9] and August 11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was
marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought their
children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide adequate
support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant
asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to
the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that
he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and
Christian Dave,[12] all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour [13] to prove the fact that
respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of
complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer. [14]
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted
his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from
the Records of the Proceedings[15] on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her
evidence.[16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting
evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for
being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.Respondent
submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he argued
that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimonypendente lite[18] filed against him by the
complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,[19] the instant administrative case should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution
No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. [22] To be the basis of
disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree[23] or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. [24]
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to
remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good
moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to
protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added
a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[26]
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.[33] Where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.[34] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents
record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on official leave.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored EN BANC
fraternity.[27] They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.[28]
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Adm. Case No. 2474
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the Complainant,
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition Present:
appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently
established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage PUNO,
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.[29] PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
CARPIO,
which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. *AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a CORONA,
member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the *CARPIO MORALES,
community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
 TINGA, and
**CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion
ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, Promulgated:
Respondent. Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his

September 15, 2004

growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal counsel.
X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became intimate. He traveled and dined
DECISION
with them abroad.[2] He frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa

PER CURIAM: Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of Convent.

mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa in
academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither
Hongkong. It was only the next
dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of
day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything is legal. Complainant was shocked,
suspension or removal.[1]
knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to

Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.

grossly immoral conduct.

Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his

The facts are undisputed: (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent
 c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there
misrepresented himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent
succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the
and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the advice of Maria Luisas parents should first be
obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting
Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
marriage with her in Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the
Hongkong authorities that he is a bachelor. xx x.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First

Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition[3] for declaration of

nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the Decision[4] dated Respondent filed a motion to dismiss[6] on the ground of lack of cause of action. He contended that the

November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio. complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers

oath. There is no allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance of the law in serving
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint[5] for disbarment, imputing to
complainants interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants
respondent the following acts:
daughter with utmost sincerity and good faith and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral
a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant and his family and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria
man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.
Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in intelligence, education, age,
experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an overwhelming
moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about
respondents courtship and advances, considering that he is a married man with three (3) In the Resolution[7] dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
children;
for investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili conducted

b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and even the investigation.
pursued her in her travels abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business
for complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of
guilt, he made representations that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;
 Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 64538 [8] a In his Manifestation,[14] complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in prosecuting his

Resolution[9] (a) setting aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P complaint for disbarment against respondent.

declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to the CFI
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing on the ground that he needed
for proper proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
more time to locate vital documents in support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings [10] on the for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to appear or present deposition, the case will

ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment be deemed submitted for resolution.[15] Respondent again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was

proceeding. It was denied. considered submitted for resolution.[16]

Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and

Order.[11] In the Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. She

disbarment proceedings.[12] recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. Thus:

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed the
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the following acts which warrant his disbarment:

Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October 19, 1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the
a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by
following order: complainant;

Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending and as a b)
practical measure to ease the backlog of this Commission, the parties shall within ten (10)
days from notice, manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case
or supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or c)
otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and terminated.[13]
His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition
to his contracting a second marriage;
The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
 Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as
a bachelor, however, he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time
term spinster with respect to Luisa.
be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[18]
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully
well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and
penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the complaint does not
reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to tutor
Maria Luisa.
allege that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly immoral
conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, [19] however, professional
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an
SO ORDERED.
indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it
Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification[20] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married
reduced respondents penalty to only one (1) year suspension.
Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of

Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation. Marriage[21] from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with

Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on the
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards
witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend. [22]
among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional

capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section

time and a mere citizen at another.[17] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of

him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession, warranting

morality.[23] respondents disbarment.

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with a (3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27] respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their

common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary

and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court,

community.[24] Measured against this definition, respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28] respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and
misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which at

Our rulings in the following cases are relevant: all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[25] respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal (5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and spent for his law

remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions education, and thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the highest degree of

of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. For this, respondent was disbarred.

values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a

whole. As such, there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred. (6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed

cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with
(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,[26] respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
a former paramour, a married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.
complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral
 The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by

respondents closeness to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say

intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we

the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was held in In re Almacen,[33] a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is

looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal

order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even action is not determinative of an administrative case against him,[34] or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment

had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of case does not affect its course,[35] then the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate

propriety and decency. him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence ---

in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. [36]
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be

charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that

such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual they shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the lawyers

respect andfidelity.[31] How could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:

Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away. CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of

Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. [32] Naturally, she was an It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above

easy prey. responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples

of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37]
 Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the Associate Justice Associate Justice
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the country Associate Justice Associate Justice

has to take before he is allowed to practice.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1)
(On Official Leave)
year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.

(On Official Leave)

WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

ADOLF S. AZCUNA
Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies of this Decision.
(On Leave)
MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. SUPREME COURT
Chief Justice Manila
 EN BANC Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or
recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You
March 23, 1929 can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the
Duran & Lim for respondent.
following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer
and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
MALCOLM, J.: can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work
regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that as notary public even on Sundays.
previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation,
reads as follows: I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the
belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be
LUIS B. TAGORDA disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I
Attorney would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my
Notary Public residence here in Echague.
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as
required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles,
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for registration.
or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation,
and is willing to help and serve the poor.) Yours respectfully,

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month.
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of
the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the
following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics
provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom,
and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or
by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or
trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our
high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to
do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable
to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or
indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or
prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested
friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional
services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of
such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be
disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the
common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The
law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others
for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac
Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is
destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in
incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of
having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is
to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only
reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would
amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of
suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular
instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be
dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and
is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
OSTRAND, J., dissenting: SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila Annex B

EN BANC GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa
for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
R E SO L U T I O N
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of
the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning
of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy
and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly
be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need
of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of
law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice
it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic"
and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated
by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and
that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to
make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order
and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and
any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can
avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited
for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those
planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize
its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one
may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services
as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that,
in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in
question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by
non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields,
such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services
are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical
assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the
Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts
which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void
under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding
such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of
law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear
and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself
as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate
and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under
the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm
of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has
been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded
by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been
duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who
act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it
nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent
are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for
its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures
related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and
are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of
the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the
practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in
those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general
public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to
make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers
but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling
prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information
regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as
provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers
in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560
for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an
illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in
this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when
it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it
falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the
Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of
the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed
that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the
law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting
for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must
be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field
had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this
is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used
by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or customer,
as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations
to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law.
This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be
an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are
not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator
is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be
that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party
the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946,
S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his
work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of
the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states
the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law
shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on
routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a
judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may
apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized
practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what
the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining
of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist
that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly
the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale
did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of
the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having
any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the
change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted,
however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law
(Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination
of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the
subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines
explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients
of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according
to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter
to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status
and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken ,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations;
and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing
and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or
the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal
law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe
you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a
while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who
died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that
it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most
of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice
of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing,
is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal
if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect
to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of
law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of
the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom
the judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals
as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious
Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession
who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled
the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken
to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered,
we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority
in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative,
even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach,
and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an [G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
services.
Information Office, respondents.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
RESOLUTION
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.
 This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist
532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up
the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed
that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time
of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that
similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief
of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. [3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the
Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be
abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a
ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order
as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one
(1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution
was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator
and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the
Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10]Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15]The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition
rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion
and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again
advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months
later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of
Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of
an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner,
it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of
the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[21]Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical
and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of
law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of
this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER
PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION,
and JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, [1] an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the
Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was
OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, [2] Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of
Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later
reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a
student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of
name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student,
the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to
register her birth anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N.
Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and
initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to
Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for
correction of name.[3]
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless,
groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently
dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 [5] of Presidential
Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake &
Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, [6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to
respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia
R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14,
1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and
unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated
to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for
herself.[9]
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges. [10] A copy of
said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches,
Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation Unclaimed. [11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to
respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the
said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of
respondent on August 27, 1999.[12]
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her
Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent
failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again
she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her
Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted
and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as
follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a government
official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain
people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the
maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground
for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which
reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal
Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of
filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards, CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[14]However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar.[15]
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and
Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests
before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded
her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents
misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for
as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as
consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a
ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of
the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[16]Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending
applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to
the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code
of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6[17] of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they
should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office
are violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests.
Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls
short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend
to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 [20] and Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct
as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from
membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright
disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in
violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the
DISBARRED. present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent,
as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., andAzcuna, JJ., concur.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The
marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in
l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for
them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6
January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared
that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by
Republic of the Philippines instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and,
SUPREME COURT thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after
Manila Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

EN BANC The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation"
carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant
on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted
having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have
EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant, still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared
vs. public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent. "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of
Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that
PER CURIAM: she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to
take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage
is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar
exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit ofdesistance and the
conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not
sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as
his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to
Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while
he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and
considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the
marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not
to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a
full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any
court."According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper
left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been
indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was
void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties
shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said
parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not
have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the
1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that
Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various
pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the
status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good
moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a
gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule
7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him
outrightfrom taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his
pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was
void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his
marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an
exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in
connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter
No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of
which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor
General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is
only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted
which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]). practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the
however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their
signature in the marriage contract. information and guidance.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow SO ORDERED.
him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was
because it was "not in order from the beginning." Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its
very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, Footnotes
that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
1 Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant. took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before
this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his
purpose. Inso doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer
should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent,
through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an
officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr.
Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted
with the powers ofan attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).