1. Kalaw v.

Relova
132 SCRA 237

FACTS:

On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceasedsister,

Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December
24, 1968.

The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her
sole heir. She opposed probate alleging that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix
as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by
his full signature.

ROSA’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and
probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration denied.

ISSUE:

W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the
Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or
not, with Rosa as sole heir.

HELD:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in
a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, … the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but
which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that
nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first
written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But
that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in
the mannerrequired by law by affixing her full signature,

The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures
or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words
themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the
erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be
determined with certitude.

2. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. LUI SHE

G.R. No. L-17587. September 12, 1967
Ponente: J. Castro

DOCTRINE:
Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is against a constitutional prohibition, the
same should be considered null and void.

FACTS:
Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then
already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years,
although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement.
On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased
premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in
Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in
her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining
Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered
that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children
on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was
discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts
she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a
change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and
inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
HELD:
No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal
an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease
to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself
in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it— rights the sum total of
which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
 2. Camaya v. Patulandong
423 SCRA 480

FACTS:

On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she
devised Lot no. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, the
testatrix herself filed the petition for the probate of her will before the CFI. Later, on
June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying her will by devising the said Lot
288-A in favor of her four children Bernardo (the executor), Simplicia, Huillerma and
Juan (all surnamed Patulandong), and her grandson Mangulabnan – to the extent of 1/5
each.

Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title of Lot
288-A, but Patulandong refused to heed the request because of the codicial which
modified the will of the testatrix. Thus, Mangulabnan filed an ‘action for partition’
against Patulandong in the RTC. The court in this partition ordered the partitioning of
the property. However, the court holds that ‘the partition is without prejudice to the
probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court.’ So, by virtue of
the decision in partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the
testatrix over Lot 288-A, and another TCT was issued in his name. Mangulabnan later
sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot no. 288-A by a Deed of Sale, and thus, a TCT was
issued under the name of the Camayas.

However, come now the decision of the probate court admitting the codicil, and
disposing that the Deed of Sale in favor of the Camayas, and the corresponding TCT
issued in their name are null and void, and that the Register of Dees was ordered to
issue instead corresponding certificates of titles to the aforesaid four children of the
testatrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan to the extent of 1/5 each pursuant to the
codicil.

The Camayas and Mangulabnan filed an MR. But the probate court denied this. The CA
affirmed the decision of the probate court. Thus, the case was brought to the SC via a
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

1.Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and
ordered the cancellation of the TCT of Camayas and the deed of sale.

2.Whether the final judgment in partition case bars the allowance of the codicil.

HELD:

1.As to the first issue, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
the deed of sale as null and void, and also as to the cancellation of the TCTs under the
name of the Camayas. It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in chargeof
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should not be included in the inventory. If there is no dispute, well and
good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so. Having been apprised of the fact that the
property in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property
of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
ownership of the property. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
the deed of sale and the titles of the Camayas as null and void, it having had the effect of
depriving them possession and ownership of the property.

2.As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in
effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed by law; and
that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal
presumption that the transfer was lawful. Petitioners’ argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not
appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was “without
prejudice [to] … the probate of the codicil.” The rights of the prevailing parties in said
case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.

The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners’ titles,
there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas’ claim that
they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer
was lawful.

The petition is granted in part. The decision of the probate court allowing the codicil is
affirmed. But, the declaration of the aforesaid Deed of Sale, and the order to reissue
corresponding certificates of titles to the four children of the testratrix, and her
grandson Mangulabnan are set aside, without prejudice to the respondent’s ventilation
of their right in an appropriate action.