Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v.

City of Cebu
Case No. 4
G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965)
Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23
FACTS:
The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent
should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue
by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers
located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to
Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of
Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light
of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge
wharfage.
ISSUE:
W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government.
HELD:
The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence,
the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The
Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the
ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are
owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only
those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a Ratio legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law,
25a Verba/ accipienda sunt – a word is to be understood in the context in which it is
used
36b ex tota material – the exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts
combined
Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier
Case No. 40
G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141
FACTS:
The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of
the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only
recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted
by his office.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the
investigation of administrative complaints.
HELD:
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said
institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the
Constitution
refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in
administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges.
This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient
investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
LATIN MAXIM:
27 – of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar
28 – a thing is known by its associates
Co v. CA
Case No. 65
G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91
FACTS:
Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check
drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of
a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is criminally liable.
HELD:
No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in
accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact
doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice
of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice.
LATIN MAXIM:
1 – legis interpretatio – judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires
the force of the law
2a – contemporanea expositio – contemporary construction is strongest in law
46a – the law looks forward not backward
Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 71
G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133
FACTS:
Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City.
Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by
the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under
protest.
ISSUE:
W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged
berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D.
34.
HELD:
No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the
Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only.
Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was
amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative
intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said law
limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the private ports are
not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular
33-73 or E.O. 72.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute
25d – verba generalia – general words should be confined according to the subject
matter or persons to which they relate
30a - expressio unius – the express mention of one person, thing or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others –
De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991)
Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for
issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a
dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law.
ISSUE:
W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question.
HELD:
The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was
committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over
the
case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s
allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does
not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the
records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is
to
apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a Ratio legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law
17 – where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is
implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law
24b – a general statement is understood in its general sense
26 – where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish
43 – strictissimi juris - follow the law strictly
b2 – a patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence (unless perfectly
vague)
Feliciano v. Aquino
Case No. 105
G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957)
Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.28
FACTS:
Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four
days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings, challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was
not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age requirement
refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the existence of a
semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code, does
not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but
rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided that he had fulfilled the first
two requirements.
ISSUE:
W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal.
HELD:
The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be
disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low
degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. No
reason is shown why, after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of
other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the
election”, the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal
officers. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as
eligible or ineligible in the said section, taking part in the election is meant, not
capacity to assume office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of
Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute,
9d, - law is to be construed liberally so that its spirit and reason be preserved
11a, - interpretatio talis – when there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is adopted
11e, lex – the law always intends that which is in accordance with reason
36b ex tota materia – the exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts
combined
In re: McCulloch Dick
Case No. 129
G.R. No. L-13862 (April 15, 1918)
Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.223
FACTS:
Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, filed for a writ
of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief
of police of the city of Manila. He is being detained because the Governor-General
of the Philippines ordered his deportation. Before the Governor-General gave his
order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the
Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No. 2113 and Sec. 69 of
the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.
HELD:
Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain
deportation proceedings. “When the provisions of Act No. 2113 were enacted and
‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again
‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore
placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having the
force and the effect of a legislative command.” In the interpretation of reenacted
statutes, the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in
force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes
originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same
effect.
LATIN MAXIM:
1 – legis interpretatio – judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires
the force of the law
3a – the best interpreter of the law is usage
4 ratihabitio – legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate
9a Ratio legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law
Laxamana v. Baltazar
Case No. 144
G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952)
Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.225
FACTS:
The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. However,
the Provincial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, appointed
herein Petitioner as the mayor.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office.
HELD:
Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of the Revised
Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code, applies
to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code
applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special provision overrides a general
one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope but
merely supplements it. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the
mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the legislature is presumed to be
acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec.
2180, the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted.
LATIN MAXIM:
1 – legis interpretatio
4, ratihabitio – legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate
38b – leges legibus – every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to have a uniform system of law
50 – generalia – a general law does not nullify a specific or a special law
Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970)
Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.57
FACTS:
At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961,
which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the
decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for
the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous
daughter of the deceased, Racquel.
ISSUE:
W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.
HELD:
Yes. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if
under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or
not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not
his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still considered
dependents under the Act.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute,
7a, - absoluta sententia – when the language of the law is clear, no explanation is
required
9c, verba intentioni – words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not to the
words
12a, ea est accipienda – that interpretation is to be adopted which is free from
injustice
37 – interpretatio fienda est – a law should be interpreted with a view of upholding
rather than destroying
People of the Philippines v. Echaves
Case No. 207
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980)
Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote No.22
FACTS:
The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts
applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that
agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same
kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. The
order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bringing
the case at hand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands
HELD:
The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring
that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the
Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis
because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem
Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative is uncertain.”
LATIN MAXIM:
9a Ratio legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law,
36b ex tota materia – the exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts
combined
People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang
Case No. 211
G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87
FACTS:
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in
Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and
evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by
previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been
appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the
“peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of
“peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section
879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant
acquitted.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a Ratio legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law,
24a – generalia verba – general words should not be understood in their general sense
Case 212 – no digest
Peope v. Manantan

Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l-

14129_1962.php

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election
Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one
of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to
dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no
officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city,
municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall
aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised
Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of
peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace
from its operation.

Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election
Code?

Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein
were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54,
however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his
office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace,
and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the
peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the
present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was
qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace"
in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it
had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the
defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is
applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of
officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices
of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not
proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution
of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor
controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of
penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of
the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who
were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its
encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA
and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the
legislature for the term "justices of peace".
People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 213
G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89
FACTS:
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of
Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used
the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not
contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The
Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
LATIN MAXIM:
1 – legis interpretatio – judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires
the force of the law
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute,
7a, - absoluta sententia – when the language of the law is clear, no explanation is
required
30a - expressio unius – the express mention of one person, thing or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others,
35, - exceptio – a thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the
purview of general rule
46c – nova constitution – a new statute should affect the future not the past
People of the Philippines v. Yabut
Case No. 231
G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote No.43
FACTS:
Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed
another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he was
punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.
HELD:
No. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English
translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only
when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder is
not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the
text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head
note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute,
7a - absoluta sententia – when the language of the law is clear, no explanation is
required
Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278
G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956)
Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote No.74
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the
charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga
and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by
Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council.
The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by
the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner
of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
ISSUE:
W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos.
HELD:
No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted
by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no
jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has eliminated the
provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision
against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors.
The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the
decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee.
The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the
decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate
the proceeding.
LATIN MAXIM:
1 – legis interpretatio – judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires
the force of the law
3a, – the best interpreter of the law is usage
6b, - animus hominis – the intention of the man is the soul of what is written
7a- absoluta sententia – when the language of the law is clear, no explanation is
required
Case no. 281 no digest
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1957/nov1957/gr_l-8888_1957.html

Facts:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant
imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per
cent totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same
Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint
it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the
ground that the term "chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.

Issue:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of
exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as
amended.

Held:
No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in
mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are
of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2
does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured
consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.
On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by
substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate
prospectively, the amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar.
The appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953,
i.e. before the exemption decree which is after September 3, 1954 pursuant to
Proclamation No. 62,.
US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915)
Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95
FACTS:
Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying
anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him
were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge
of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future
prosecution.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant should be discharged.
HELD:
Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the
Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the
legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is
necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead
his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an
acquittal since it was made prior to his trial.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a Ratio legis – the reason of the law is the soul of the law,
22a, ex dolo malo – an action does not arise from fraud
b2– a patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsic evidence (unless perfectly vague)
University of the Philippines v. CA
Case No. 305
G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971)
Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.195
FACTS:
With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing
them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from
the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service
Commissioner.
ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is
final, or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission.
HELD:
The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office
of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and E.O. 94, the President
transferred
them under herein Respondent. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the President and
Board of Regents of the U.P. possess full and final authority in disciplining,
suspension,
and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the
Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service
and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a – contemporanea expositio – contemporary construction is strongest in law,
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute,
9b, - littera necat – the letter kills but the spirit gives life
20c, - jurisdictio data est – when jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essential
to its exercise are also given
38b– leges legibus – every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to have a uniform system of law
Yra v. Abano
Case No. 316
G.R. No. 30187 (November 15, 1928)
Chapter III, Page 118, Footnote No.214
FACTS:
Respondent was running for office in Bulacan, his hometown. However, he is a
registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate, one of the qualifications is that
he/she who is running should be a “duly qualified elector therein”.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan.
HELD:
Yes. He is qualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in the
Philippine Assembly, Fernando Ma. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the
Phil. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he
was not registered in his electoral district. The conclusion to which was, “qualified
elector” meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter
and need not be register. The same was the case and decision of the Executive
Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. Laurel. It is sufficient that he possess
the qualifications stated in Sec. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated in Sec.
432 of the Election Law. However, it is not least to disregard the forcible argument
advanced that when the law make use of the phrases, “qualified electors” and
“qualified voter” the law means what it says. It would be an absurdity to hold one a
qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a – contemporanea expositio – contemporary construction is strongest in law,
3a, – the best interpreter of the law is usage
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute,
11a - interpretatio talis – when there is ambiguity, the interpretation of such that will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is adopted
SUPPLEMENTARY
Employees’ Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation
Case No. 39
G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934)
FACTS:
Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the
register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so
that
the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. They
argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because
it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real rights
can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term
exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an express
covenant requiring the lease to be registered.
ISSUE:
W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be
registered.
HELD:
The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No.
496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all
interests
must be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising
from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law
was
relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the
Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail.
LATIN MAXIM:
9c verba intentioni – words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not to the
words
49 leges posterioris – later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto
Enrile v. Salazar
Case No. 40
G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that
does not exist in the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion cannot
be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof.
ISSUE:
W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine.
HELD:
The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed
on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are
absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the
information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC.
Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled
that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion, then the
principle of non-retroactivity would be violated.
LATIN MAXIM:
1 – legis interpretatio – judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires
the force of the law
46a, - lex prospicit – the law looks forward not backward
48 – favorabilia sunt amplianda – penal laws which are favourable to the accused are
given retroactive effect
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong
Case No. 62
G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984)
FACTS:
Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia
and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted and
IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in
compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of
DOLE). Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s
decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA then
appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a
motion
for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent
considering that it has become final and had been partially executed.
2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 are valid.
HELD:
A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked
after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA waived its right to appeal by
paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment
as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are both null and void since they
amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has been held that where the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the
same must be declared null and void.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c – verba legis – do not depart from the words of the statute,
17, – where anything is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is
implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law
37, – interpretatio fienda est – a law should be interpreted with a view of upholding
rather than destroying
40c – privatum incommodum – the private interests of the individual must give way
to the accomadation of the public
KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66
G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)
FACTS:
The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied.
Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the
Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023
compels
employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the
debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already
granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the
payroll collection.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA
Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the
salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well
established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the
right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases
where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in
doubtful
cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
LATIN MAXIM:
7a- absoluta sententia – when the language of the law is clear, no explanation is
required
Pascual v. Director of Lands
Case No. 100
G.R. No. L-15816 (February 29, 1964)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102 C.A.
No. 141, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground
that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the taxes
thereon since 1947, and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-interest
had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon, in violation of
the terms and conditions of the lease. The policy in the disposition and concession of
public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. Thus, in cases of
lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior
claim by settlement or by occupation, until the consent of the occupant or settler is
first had, or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. 33, C.A. No. 141). If
anyone should be given prior right of entry at all, it should be the actual occupants
who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to
them.
ISSUE:
W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner’s claim to a right of entry
was correct.
HELD:
No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by
administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserves
great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not only the
decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
but that of the Office of the President, without the record disclosing in our opinion,
that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. To the contrary, they appear to
be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner, namely, to give
priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is not.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a – contemporanea expositio – contemporary construction is strongest in law
m i k i People of the Philippines v. Hernandez
Case No. 107
G.R. Nos. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)
FACTS:
Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on
October 16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for land
taxes to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, the
municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. The
Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of
Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September,
1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violating
Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the
right to suffrage and public office.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as
Governor in Camarines Norte.
HELD:
No. Sec. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been
elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as
provided by law. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for
assuming a public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land
taxes, this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these
circumstances, we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs.
Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not
conclusive, should be followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it was not.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a – contemporanea expositio – contemporary construction is strongest in law,
32, - casus omisus – a person, object or thing being omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally
42b renunciatio – renunciation cannot be presumed
Sumulong v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 149
G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)
FACTS:
On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad
Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first
congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the
minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Eleven
days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the
Popular Front Party of Abad Santos.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere
coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the
board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by
any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall
have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.
LATIN MAXIM:
36a,
37– interpretatio fienda est – a law should be interpreted with a view of upholding
rather than destroying
D – nigrum – the black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the
red (title or the rubric of the statute printed in red)