Neoliberalismo and Free Trade

Neoliberalism and Free Trade in Latin America
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American

History
Robert Jordan
Subject: Diplomatic History, International History, Labor History
Online Publication Date: Sep 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.227
Summary and Keywords
First utilized in Latin America in response to the mid-20th-century decline of populist

economic policymaking in the region, modern neoclassical theory, or neoliberalism, can
be generally defined as a market-oriented form of economy policymaking that seeks to
decentralize state authority and redefine state administrative responsibilities through
deregulation, privatization, and the creation of common markets. Based on principles of
classical 19th-century economic liberalism, the economic and political framework of
neoliberalism advocates for a dramatically limited role for the state, which should only
act to maintain the integrity of contract law and private property as a means of
supporting the market. In the absence of state intervention, neoliberalism in Latin
America alternatively emphasized the role of multilateral organizations, such as the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and
the U.S. Agency for International Development in bringing financial stability and growth
to the region through the manipulation of interest rates, the devaluation of exchange
rates, and the establishment of free-market pricing of goods. Ultimately, the widespread
implementation of neoliberal reforms through the 1980s and 1990s ushered in a new era
of transnational economic policymaking that had long-term, mixed results for the
environmental, political, and social landscape of Latin America.
Keywords: free market, debt crisis, social unrest, macroeconomics, common market, development, trade, tariff,
investment, financial, transnational, populism, economic policy, reform, neoliberal
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date: 17 August 2017

Transitions and the Beginning of a Crisis

As early as the 1930s, Latin American economic policymaking was dominated by an
import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) model of development, characterized by heavy
state interventionism, a publically subsidized private sector, and stiff tariff barriers
designed to deter foreign competition. By 1950, the efficiency of the ISI economic model
for Latin American development came under increasing assault as nations in the region
faced growing foreign competition following the creation of the European Common
Market in 1957. To gain collective strength against the renewed economic power of
postwar Europe, seven Latin American nations—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay—signed the Treaty of Montevideo in 1960 to form the first
common market in the region, the Latin American Free Trade Association (Asociación
Latinoamericana de Integración/Associação Latino-Americana de Integração, or LAFTA).1
LAFTA’s foundational initiative, a gradual, twelve-year tariff elimination program, was the
first significant step in what would eventually become a wave of free-market reforms that
swept across Latin America. This process should not be viewed as a homogenous,
inescapable process by which populist, ISI policies were wholly replaced by
neoliberalism, but rather as a multifaceted socioeconomic transition across the uneven
political terrain of the region.
Ecuador and Colombia joined LAFTA in 1961, Venezuela in 1966, and Bolivia in 1967, but
despite LAFTA’s attempts at economic stabilization through market integration, rising
international oil prices and a slowing of the average annual growth rate from 3.5 percent
in the previous decade to 2.4 percent by the mid-1970s brought about average inflation
as high as 10 percent for the region.2 Long-term state development efforts had not yielded
sufficient economic and industrial growth, and they relied heavily on the importation of
capital goods and foreign technology. Under the ISI model, high protective tariffs,
subsidies for domestic industries, and rapid industrialization exacerbated trade deficits,
increased the national debt, and quickly increased the rate of rural-to-urban migration.
Development was hampered by widespread economic inequality, which prevented the rise
of a sufficiently large consumer class capable of supporting domestic industries and
brought about rapid growth in urban areas that increasingly struggled to provide basic
public services, such as affordable housing, electricity, potable water, sanitation, policing,
and education.3
State responses to this global economic crisis varied dramatically across Latin America.
Despite rising inflationary pressures, populist Mexican Presidents Luis Echeverría
Álvarez (1971–1976) and José López Portillo (1976–1982) borrowed heavily from
international commercial banks to sponsor significant public spending programs on
education, health care, and housing. In Venezuela, President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974–
1979) nationalized the nation’s oil industry in order to finance massive programs for
industrial and agricultural development.4 Elsewhere in the region, the creation of new
common markets continued as Venezuela became the fifth member of the Andean Pact in
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1973, alongside Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Originally formed in 1969
following the signing of the Cartagena Agreement, the common market created under the
Andean Pact sought to promote industrial development and social integration within the
subregion. The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, formed in 1978 by Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela, sought to foster
collaborative scientific development in the Amazon Basin in order to mitigate the spread
of tropical diseases, improve transportation infrastructure, and promote international
tourism.5
In several Latin American nations, this period of economic instability was characterized
by civil unrest, national strikes, and the violent dissolution of democratic governments in
favor of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, which took the form of repressive military
dictatorships. In June 1973, under pressure from urban guerillas and national strikes,
Uruguayan President Juan María Bordaberry (1973–1976) closed the national parliament
in favor of a military dictatorship that lasted until 1985. That same year, the bloody
September 11th coup against Salvador Allende (1970–1973) in Chile ushered in an era of
authoritarian military rule that lasted until 1990. The regime, under President Augusto
Pinochet (1974–2000), was characterized by sweeping free-market reforms based on
policy advice from a group of U.S.-educated economists known as the “Chicago Boys,” as
well as by the killing and disappearance of thousands of domestic political dissidents
under the auspices of U.S.-backed anti-communism efforts during the Cold War.6 As
annual inflation reached 600 percent, political violence in Argentina forced President
Isabel Perón (1974–1976) from office in 1976, leading to military control of the
government until 1983.
As investor confidence in the region continued to slip at the end of the 1970s, a dramatic
anti-inflation policy decision by the U.S. Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate
from 11.25 percent in September 1979 to a peak of 17.6 percent by April 1980, a rate
increase that brought about two major economic recessions for Latin America during
what became known as the “lost decade” of the 1980s.7 Latin American governments that
had borrowed heavily from abroad were now devastated by stagnant economic growth
rates. In 1980, the Treaty of Montevideo sought to replace LAFTA with the eleven-
member Latin American Integration Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de
Integración/Associação Latino-Americana de Integração) as a means of furthering
economic, political, and social integration in the region. Founded on principles of political
and economic pluralism, the association sought to create a true Latin American common
market and establish a model for regional integration that would ultimately be far more
meaningful than LAFTA. Duty-free concessions were granted to less-developed nations
within the organization, and mechanisms for a regional tariff preference scheme were
approved by 1984. New political and economic coalitions, such as the Latin American
Integration Association and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, which formed
within the region during this transitionary period, integrated the economies of
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democratic and authoritarian regimes through their common desires for foreign capital
and the widespread reliance on the expertise of civilian technocrats.8
Following Mexico’s declaration of a moratorium on its debt payments in 1982, the

subsequent economic reforms imposed as part of an economic stabilization plan created
by the International Monetary Fund sought to lessen the state’s involvement in the
operation of the economy and to deregulate markets. Dramatic cuts were made regarding
public spending, exchange-rate targeting, restructuring of foreign debt payments, and a
temporary freeze on many prices and wages.9 Mexico’s 1982 debt crisis and renegotiation
with its commercial creditors stands as a watershed moment for the ushering in of
significant neoliberal reforms in Latin America. As a result of this crisis, lending retracted
from international capital markets and new financial reforms were put forward by the
IMF and World Bank to serve as a model for future neoliberal reforms throughout the
region in the 1980s and 1990s. During this implementation of neoliberalism, the general
consensus in the international financial community was one that viewed state economic
intervention as inherently inferior to that of the efficiencies of the free market. Thus, the
market, not the state, should be the vehicle for the creation of jobs, industrial
development, and encouragement of innovation. Between 1982 and 1983 alone,
seventeen Latin American nations accepted new agreements with the IMF as a means of
avoiding bankruptcy.10 The structural pressure to abide by the free-market, neoliberal,
economic reforms mandated by the IMF and World Bank was dramatic, as failure to do so
could result in economic exile and further financial crisis.
When President Alan Garcia (1985–1990) of Peru refused to raise the level of debt
repayments above 10 percent of foreign exchange earnings, the nation saw its credit
rating downgraded by creditors in the United States and was declared ineligible for any
new loans from the IMF and World Bank.11 Conversely, nations that adhered to austere
neoliberal conditions as part of new lending agreements received more favorable
repayment schedules and lower interest rates. The IMF first employed this tactic in 1984,
when international financial lenders rewarded Mexico by extending its debt repayment
schedule to fourteen years following the nation’s acceptance of greater neoliberal
restructuring.12 These austerity measures, aimed at creating liquidity, ultimately
suppressed access to foreign investment and left many Latin American nations unable to
produce the economic growth needed to meet their debt obligations. The subsequent
socioeconomic crisis of the 1980s brought about by these austerity measures marked the
end of decades of populist government rule and ISI policies in favor of a free-trade,
market-oriented strategy that courted a dramatic surge in new foreign investment and
that had profound social, political, and environmental consequences for the region.
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First-Generation Neoliberal Reforms

In the aftermath of the 1982 debt crisis, subsequent lMF loans, or “structural adjustment
plans,” to borrower nations compelled them to reorient industry toward an export-based
model, deregulate domestic industries, slash spending on social programs, denationalize
state-subsidized companies, and seek the elimination of all tariff barriers. As Latin
American governments sought to reduce the state’s control over the functioning of the
market, they also sought to outsource state functions to the private sector and privately
funded foundations, as well as to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from around the
world.13 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell’s observations on this shift toward a new model of
transnational governance point out that “in the asymmetrical scale politics of
neoliberalism, local institutions and actors were being given responsibility without power,
while international institutions and actors were gaining power without responsibility.”14
The growing influence of multinational corporations and lending institutions over state
policymaking during this period of neoliberal reform stifled and silenced oppositional
voices that otherwise might have advocated for an alternative version of reform. Thus,
disputes over policy implementation were largely among multilateral lenders, the
transnational bourgeoisie, and government technocrats.15
By the mid-1980s, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela had launched their
own large-scale reform efforts, while Chile continued its program of neoliberal reforms
begun a decade earlier. Thousands of public-sector employees were cut from government
payrolls, forcing a reorganization of the labor market, which in turn increased the
number of workers forced into subsistence employment in the informal economies of
Latin America. The end of many tariff barriers devastated much of the agricultural sector
in Latin America, forcing small farmers into direct competition with heavily subsidized,
multinational agribusinesses. Many farmers declared bankruptcy and lost their lands,
leading to a further surge of foreign agricultural imports to substitute for the drop in
domestic production. Unemployment as high as 15 percent became widespread in rural
areas, leading to a mass migration into urban centers and the creation of a new
transnational workforce driven by economic hardship. The average per capita income for
the region from 1981 to 1983 fell by 8 percent, barely higher than ten, or in the case of
some nations, twenty years earlier.16 Additionally, the accumulation of foreign debt
accelerated across Latin America, rising from $20.8 billion in 1970 to $314.4 billion by
1982, causing foreign investment to flee the region and the availability of commercial
loans to all but vanish.17 The region was compelled to spend less on social services,
education, and health care and more on servicing its growing debt. Despite the
implementation of modest neoliberal reforms, the socioeconomic indicators of many Latin
American nations continued to worsen, ultimately leading to a reappraisal of
policymaking by the international financial community.
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At the close of the decade, many debtor nations were no closer to financial health than
they were prior to the implementation of neoliberal reforms. Average inflation in the
region reached a decade high of 1,206 percent in 1989, while regional debt increased
nearly 150 percent from 1981 to 1989. Currency devaluations became the norm as many
Latin America nations sought to stabilize the nominal exchange rate relative to the U.S.
dollar, the most severe case being Argentina, which endured an annual rate of nominal
depreciation of over 1,607 percent.18 By the end of the “lost decade,” the region’s
population living below the poverty line had grown by 64 million people, hunger was
killing 40,000 people per day, and the minimum wage had shrunk to under 70 percent of
its level in 1980.19 Civil unrest flared up across the region in response to austerity
measures and subsequent neoliberal reforms, particularly in Venezuela when President
Carlos Andres Perez (1989–1993) abruptly ended federal petroleum subsidies, generating
a 100 percent rise in the price of gasoline and a 30 percent rise in public transportation
costs. In February 1989, two days of protests and rioting centered on Caracas were
ultimately suppressed in one of the most brutal instances of state-sponsored oppression
in Venezuela’s history.20 The ensuing military crackdown, known as the Caracazo, left as
few as four hundred and as many as three thousand people dead or disappeared from
confrontations with the nation’s armed forces.
These worsening socioeconomic conditions and the potential for significant political
destabilization of the region prompted U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicolas Brady to propose
a series of debt-reduction agreements at the Bretton Woods Committee Conference on
Third World Debt in 1989. Once again, Mexico would serve as a model for other nations
in the region following the implementation of these new reforms under what would
become known as the Brady Plan. Designed to provide a more flexible set of options, or a
“menu approach,” to commercial creditors for the collection of debt, the Brady Plan
allowed existing loans to be exchanged for a variety of debt-reduction bonds that lowered
creditors’ exposure to as low as 65 percent of pre-Brady levels in exchange for partial
debt forgiveness for borrower nations.21 Following Mexico’s 1989 acceptance of new
lending terms under the Brady Plan, other debtor nations in the region, such as Costa
Rica (1989), Venezuela (1990), Uruguay (1991), Argentina (1992), and Brazil (1992),
agreed to debt forgiveness and restructuring under customized Brady deals with the IMF
and World Bank. As a result of debt restructuring under the Brady Plan, the average
public-sector external debt in Latin America declined from 60 percent to 40 percent of
GDP and average public-sector deficits to less than 1 percent of GDP.22
Lacking sufficient funding, shackled by hyperinflation, and facing growing social unrest,
many Latin American nations seemingly had little choice but to accept the regimen of
neoliberal reforms proposed by international financial lenders and the IMF which
centered on creating export-focused growth. Every Latin American nation with the
exception of Cuba had already incorporated neoliberal economic reforms into their
domestic policymaking by the early 1990s, but this process was by no means homogenous
across the landscape of the region.23 Early adopters of neoliberal policies in the
mid-1980s, such as Argentina, Chile, and Jamaica, outpaced Colombia and Uruguay,
which advanced reform ahead of later adopters Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
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Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Nations slower to implement significant reforms, such
as Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela, waited until the
mid-1990s to implement exchange-rate liberalizations, labor reforms, and significant
privatization efforts.
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The Decade of the Washington Consensus

Hope for relief from many of the negative aspects of austerity measures came with the
release of the 1991 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development
Programme, which advanced a “lack of political commitment” as the principal cause of
human neglect and pointed to the hindrance placed on developing markets by a lack of
access to adequate education, health care, nutrition, and family-planning services. The
report criticized the widespread withdrawal of governmental funding from the public
sector and pointed to this downturn in investment into “human priority concerns” as a
contributing factor in the shrinking of private investment and as a restriction on
economic growth.24 In the aftermath of the report, neoliberal economic policymakers
advocated for a market-friendly approach to development, which placed new emphasis on
investment in people, macroeconomic stabilization, maximization of individual nations’
competitive advantage on the global market, and the creation of financial incentives for
innovation and initiative.
These more socially sensitive economic-policy recommendations found in the 1991 UN

report were based heavily on an earlier 1989 article by John Williamson, an economist
and fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC. Generally
known as the “Washington Consensus,” Williamson’s ten economic policy instruments
recommended for implementation in Latin America eventually became part of the
collective mind-set among major U.S. think-tank agencies. His report advocated for: (i)
sustained fiscal deficits maintained at no more than 1 to 2 percent of gross national
product; (ii) an end to subsides for state-owned enterprises and increased public
investment in health, infrastructure, and education; (iii) moderate marginal tax rates and
a broad tax base; (iv) moderate but market-determined interest rates to promote
investment; (v) a competitive real exchange rate founded on an “outward-oriented”
economic model; (vi) the maintenance of moderate general tariffs at 10 to 20 percent
levels, and heavier but temporary tariffs for infant industries; (vii) the liberalization of
foreign direct investment through the use of debt-equity swaps; (viii) the privatization of
state-owned enterprises to increase competition; (ix) the deregulation of industry; and (x)
the improvement of the insecure status of property rights in Latin America.25
Several authors have pointed out that the policy recommendations found in the
Washington Consensus were not originally created by Williamson but, rather, by Latin
American policymakers, who designed the reforms in response to the real problems
taking place both within and outside the region and presented them as participants in a
1989 Institute of International Economics conference organized by Williamson himself.26
His article was intended to be read as a synthesis of perspectives and policies already
being utilized throughout Latin America, but despite Williamson’s own insistence that the
term “Washington Consensus” was not meant to imply a U.S.-based origin for this
amalgamation of economic policies, the term quickly came to stand as a highly
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ideologically charged symbol of the foreign imposition of market fundamentalism and

neoliberalism across Latin America.
As Consensus-style policies were implemented across Latin America, average tariff levels,
maximum tariffs, and non-tariff restrictions declined by more than 50 percent during the
height of neoliberal reforms from 1985 to 1995, largely offset by greater domestic
collection of value-added tax (VAT) revenues. As a region, Latin America led the world in
privatization efforts, the 669 transactions made from 1990 to 1994 amounting to more
than half of the privatization sales among newly industrialized countries during this time
period. 27 Within the private sector, the energy and financial industries were the most
affected by privatization efforts, as utility companies and banking had the most potential
for significant increases in efficiency and productivity. Mexico led the region in revenues
generated from this privatization process, as the sale of more than a thousand formerly
nationalized companies generated over $24 billion for the state by 1994, a sum that
represented over 2 percent of Mexico’s GDP. A significant amount of the funds utilized for
privatization came from foreign direct investment, as many multinational companies
sought to provide capital to newly privatized companies and invest in complementary
domestic industries.28 Foreign investment into the Latin American stock market rose from
$77 billion in 1990 to over $576 billion by 1999, representing nearly 30 percent of the
region’s GDP. In Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay, domestic
private industry was significantly consolidated by acquisitions and mergers by larger
multinational corporations, resulting in rising costs for public services.29 Following
neoliberal cuts to public spending and a decade of privatization efforts, even the poorest
members of society could be expected to pay for their own education and health care.
As a result of the implementation of significant neoliberal reforms, Latin America’s GDP

growth rate in the 1990s was double that of the lost decade of the 1980s at an average of
3.4 percent. Per capita income also saw modest gains at an average annual growth rate of
almost 2 percent throughout the decade. Aided by high global demand for copper, Chile
led the region in GDP growth during this period at an average rate of 7.2 percent,
followed by Peru at 5.4 percent, and Argentina and El Salvador at 4.9 percent.30 Positive
growth in the value added in agriculture was overshadowed by significant gains in
services and industry during the 1990s in Latin America, while exports grew dramatically
in Mexico at 14.3 percent, El Salvador at 11.7 percent, and Nicaragua at 10.3 percent.
During this period, exports from Latin America were largely based on lightly processed
commodities, low value-added manufactured goods, and raw materials from the forestry
and mining sectors.31 With the exceptions of Mexico, Brazil, and Costa Rica, no other
nations in the region maintained a manufacturing base that accounted for over 50
percent of their exports, the majority of Latin America compelled to import much of its
technology-intensive manufactured goods. The narrow spectrum of raw materials traded
by many Latin American nations, such as coffee, petroleum, aluminum, corn, timber,
bananas, soy beans, cocoa, wheat, and iron, left them particularly vulnerable to
fluctuations on the world market. By the mid-1990s, the gradual decline of global
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commodity prices had created a growing trade deficit gap of more than 53 percent
between Latin America and more industrialized nations.32
The formation of free-trade blocs continued during the height of neoliberalism in the
1990s with the creation of the Southern Cone Common Market, or MERCOSUR, in 1991.
Member nations Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia sought to
coordinate macroeconomic policymaking for the bloc through the establishment of free-
trade zones, a common external tariff, and the reduction of tariffs among intragroup
members. Proponents of neoliberalism encouraged such institutionalization of
neoliberalism and free-trade policies in Latin America as a means of improving the
region’s access to capital and technology and as a means of eliminating corruption,
removing the inefficiencies of populist governments, and the promotion of individual
entrepreneurship.33 Many neoliberal intellectuals also equated free markets with free,
democratic societies, believing that the transfer of power from the state to civil society
would create the necessary socioeconomic conditions for the maintenance of a liberal
democracy. The incorporation of Latin American nations into the global marketplace via
the signing of free-trade agreements would allow the international community to exert
greater pressure on signatory nations that attempted to infringe on rights guaranteed by
a constitutional government.34 Economic benefits would materialize for all of society once
each country was able to fully utilize its domestic resources on the free market, rectifying
the inefficiencies of previous populist policymaking. The neoliberal mind-set held that
following the implementation of reforms, empowered individuals would benefit from
consequent reductions in the costs of public services, cheaper consumer goods, and
greater social mobility, capable of fully participating in society thanks to the external
protection of democracy and the opening of the economy.
The institutionalization of neoliberal policies continued with the signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement by Canada, the United States, and Mexico in 1992,
forming the second-largest common market in the world, created with the intent of
eliminating barriers to investment and trade across the continent. Unheeded domestic
concerns inside Mexico concerning the treaty’s impact on the sovereignty of the nation
and potential economic vulnerabilities were validated following NAFTA’s implementation
in January 1994. Despite Mexico’s growing trade deficit of over $28 billion by the end of
1994, the value of the peso remained steady through the manipulation of the currency
market by the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994).35
External concerns about Mexico’s economic health were exacerbated following the neo-
Zapatista uprising in the state of Chiapas, several high-profile political assassinations
prior to national elections, and a rise in U.S. interest rates.
As Salinas’s currency manipulation policies backfired, resulting in a massive devaluation

of the peso, the subsequent financial fallout became known as the “tequila crisis” in late
1994. By the end of 1995, the peso had devalued by 200 percent and Mexico’s GDP had
shrunk by 6 percent, “the worst single-year drop since the Great Depression.”36 Mexico
steadily recovered from the crisis during the latter half of the decade, but the nation’s
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agricultural sector was hit the hardest by the combination of the peso crisis and the
lifting of tariff barriers on highly subsidized U.S. agricultural imports under the auspices
of NAFTA.
Mexico was not alone in its agricultural decline during the mid-1990s. From 1995 to
2000, global corn prices plummeted by 30 percent, coffee 43 percent, soy beans 66
percent, sugar 16 percent, and wheat 30 percent, the resulting increase in rural
unemployment intensifying the process of outmigration across Latin America.37
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Pushback and the Pink Tide

Mexico’s economic struggles in the aftermath of the 1994 tequila crisis represented the
beginning of the end for neoliberalism in Latin America, as stagnant growth and a decline
in new foreign direct investment prompted concerns through the latter half of the decade
about the sustainability of the neoliberal model in the region. Increased foreign direct
investment in the mining, logging, and petrochemical industries to satisfy the raw
materials needs of the growing economies of Eurasia had a profound environmental
impact on Latin America. Lax enforcement of environmental regulations resulted in
hazardous working conditions for laborers, widespread soil and water contamination, and
millions of acres of rainforest destroyed.38 The domination of large-scale agribusinesses
also had a profound impact on the environment in developing nations throughout Latin
America. No better example could be found than in rural Brazil, which by the beginning
of the 21st century was described as “a landscape of endless seas of soy plantations,
massive cattle ranches, and poisonous industrial farms that displace poor Brazilian
families and cut down ever-larger swaths of rainforest.”39
Decreases in agricultural subsidies as part of neoliberal reforms, coupled with the buyout
of small- and medium-sized farmers by multinational agribusinesses, compelled millions
of impoverished Latin Americans to seek new employment as part of a growing
transnational labor force. Many attempted to make the expensive and dangerous journey
to the United States, while many more sought work in the growing numbers of
maquiladora factories located within export-processing zones stretching from the U.S.–
Mexico border to as far south as Argentina.40 Through the neoliberal integration of
domestic industries into globalized production chains, the cheap labor of immigrant
workers proved to be one of Latin America’s most profitable exports. Monetary transfers,
known as remittances, from transnational laborers to their home countries formed a
growing source of revenue for the region, as the amount of funds generated by
remittances increased rapidly from $1.9 billion in 1980 to a record high of over $65
billion by 2014.41 Mexico was by far the largest recipient of remittances in the region,
receiving $23.6 billion in 2014, distantly followed by Guatemala at $5.5 billion, the
Dominican Republic at $4.5 billion, El Salvador at $4.2 billion, and Colombia at over $4
billion. Remittances to Mexico, which on average represented a third of the total for the
region, exceeded the value of all other domestic exports with the exception of petroleum.
For Guyana, Jamaica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras,
remittances during the period from 2002 to 2005 steadily averaged nearly 20 percent of
GDP.42
The formation of this new transnational labor force was accompanied by the
establishment of new transnational coalitions determined to resist or reform the
neoliberal economic model. In late 1997, debt crises in East Asia triggered an
international chain reaction of dramatic interest-rate hikes and currency devaluations,
negatively impacting several prominent economies in Latin America. This economic
Page 12 of 22


depression, which lasted from 1998 to 2002, resulted in a regional political movement
that rejected neoliberalism and embroiled many Latin American nations in widespread
social unrest and political turmoil. South America was especially affected by this
antineoliberal turn, as mismanagement of the banking system in Ecuador led to the
removal of President Abdala Bucaram (1996–1997) after having been declared mentally
unfit by the National Congress. Ecuador’s economic and political problems continued for
several years, as mass demonstrations by the indigenous Pachacutik Movement for
Plurinational Unity (Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachacutik) and extensive cuts
to the defense budget led to a coup in 2000 against President Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000),
while the unpopular implementation of neoliberal policies led to the removal of President
Lúcio Gutiérrez (2003–2005) by the National Congress in 2005.43
Argentina experienced a significant debt crisis in 2001 that mobilized thousands of

cacerolazos, a form of popular protest involving the banging together of pots and pans,
whose outrage against further austerity measures imposed by the IMF eventually brought
about the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001). During this period,
despite state intervention via increased interest rates, tax increases, and social-spending
cuts, Brazil’s currency lost 35 percent of its value by 1998, ultimately resulting in further
austerity measures and $41.5 billion in emergency bailout funds from the IMF, World
Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank.44 Bolivia also served as a prominent
example of the limits of the neoliberal model in Latin America, as the privatization of the
nation’s water system and natural gas industry led to a hike in prices and subsequent
mass demonstrations in 2000 and 2003, respectively. These “water wars” and “gas wars”
resulted in deadly clashes between protestors and police, the eventual resignation of
President Carlos Mesa (2003–2005), and a landslide election victory for indigenous
President Evo Morales in 2006.45
Morales’s election and Bolivia’s subsequent return to populist policymaking were not
anomalies during this time period, as the rising “pink tide” of leftist political leadership in
Latin America included the election of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) in Venezuela, Ricardo
Lagos (2000–2006) in Chile, Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007) in Argentina, Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva in Brazil (2003–2011), Tabaré Vásquez (2005–2010) in Uruguay, Manuel Zelaya
(2006–2009) in Honduras, and Mauricio Funes (2009–2014) in El Salvador, as well as
Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua in 2007, and Fernando Lugo of
Paraguay in 2008.46 The resulting multinational coalition among the Latin American Left
created an effective counterbalance to the United States on issues of military
intervention, trade, debt negotiations, and global terrorism, yet there was less uniformity
on the nature of state redistributive projects and populist policymaking. The diverse set
of agendas among the Latin American Left included many that did not completely break
with the market-driven, neoliberal model of development, and instead sought to create a
more evenhanded model for state intervention through income redistribution and stricter
financial regulation.
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Whether or not the Latin American Left can continue to sustain its new vision for the
region has yet to be seen, inasmuch as the failed 2008 “civic coup” against the
government of Bolivian President Morales, the 2009 coup against Honduran President
Zelaya, and the death of Venezuelan President Chávez in 2013, as well as the
impeachment proceedings against Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff,, mass protests in
Venezuela against the government of President Nicolas Maduro, and protests against
President Ortega’s government in Nicaragua—all in 2015—leave many questions for the
future of postneoliberal policymaking in the region. The Chinese-driven commodities
boom in wheat, iron ore, soybeans, cement, and aluminum experienced by Latin America
from 2003 to 2009 assisted the ability of pink-tide nations to maintain economic and
political independence from the international financial community and the United States,
but as China’s economy slowed since the economic crisis of 2008–2009, the ability of
leftist politicians to finance their populist visions has waned.47
Economically and politically, Latin America’s chances for stability and prosperity are
tempered by the damage done by decades of neoliberal reform in the region. As a result
of neoliberalism in Latin America, a reverse redistribution of wealth occurred, whereby
the poorest members of society saw their land and labor privatized and commoditized for
the financial benefit of the richest members of society, while at the same time
multinational lending institutions, such as the IMF, continued to expand their dominance
over state policymaking at the expense of liberal democracy.48 For the future, the
potential creation of even larger common markets, such as the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, designed to link the economies of every nation in the Western Hemisphere, or
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which seeks to link the economies of Chile, Mexico, and
Peru to those of East Asia, is unlikely to diminish the negative effects of economic
rivalries among Latin American nations or lessen the dominance of external, nonstate
actors in the region. The task of creating real economic and political independence for
Latin America continues, a dream still unrealized.
Discussion of the Literature

With the end of significant free-market reforms in the mid-2000s more than a decade in
the past, a deeper understanding of the consequences of neoliberalism in Latin America
can be seen across a wide array of historical scholarship on the subject. The majority of
the secondary literature on this subject matter has been created by economists, political
scientists, and even journalists, providing a wide array of perspectives due to the variety
of methodologies and disciplinary lenses of analysis. The themes of various historical
works on the subject of Latin American neoliberalism tend to track chronologically, as
scholars sought to understand the causation of, consequences of, and resistance to
neoliberalism in almost distinct phases during the end of the 20th and beginning of the
21st centuries. Causes for the advent of neoliberal reforms in the 1970s and 1980s and
the subsequent means for implementing market fundamentalism into the region
Page 14 of 22


dominated the majority of the early literature, with scholars tending to focus on the
extreme winners and losers regarding socioeconomic and political outcomes.49
Additionally, the larger economies of the region, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, and Mexico, received a significantly larger amount of attention from the
financial and academic communities when it came to the analysis of neoliberal
implementation.
More recent attention by scholars focused on the consequences of neoliberal reforms

following a sufficient “cooling” period after the reorientation of the region’s market. Once
hyperinflation and foreign debt were at manageable levels, allowing Latin America to
regain relative economic stability, a clearer snapshot of the region’s socioeconomic health
could be ascertained. The hopes for neoliberal socioeconomic empowerment of the
region’s populace could not be realized overnight, and only after more than a decade
following initial neoliberal policy implementation has significant insight into these
outcomes emerged. An extensive amount of research and publications were produced at
the turn of the century by scholarly communities like the Latin American Research
Review, the North American Congress on Latin America, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and The International Political
Economy Series edited by Timothy M. Shaw and produced by Palgrave Macmillan
Publishers.50
The Latin American Research Review sought to deliberately broaden the study of
neoliberalism through the hosting of a roundtable session on “Neoliberalism in Latin
America–Successes and Failures” at the 2003 Latin American Studies Association
Conference. Results of the roundtable provoked further publications concerning the
impact of neoliberalism on the rise of the Latin American Left, the safeguarding of liberal
democracy, and the influence of multilateral actors like the IMF on governmental
policymaking.51 Neoliberalism’s impact on the environment, the formation and function of
indigenous social movements, and the renegotiation of gender identity under
neoliberalism all form a growing body of more recent scholarship that continues to
broaden the spectrum of topics under study.52 The myriad long-term consequences of
neoliberalism in Latin America have yet to be fully explored, leaving much potential for
future investigation into the impact of financial austerity measures on the stability of
liberal democracies in the region, the new macroeconomic models of governance utilized
by the Latin American Left, and the intersection of transnational economies on the
trafficking of humans and narcotics.
Primary Sources
For locating primary sources on the history of neoliberal economic practices in Latin
America, the most diverse and consolidated bodies of data come from digital repositories
produced by international political and financial communities, rather than from
traditional, physical archives or even online databases created by specific nations. As an
example of digital databases maintained by the international lending community, the
Page 15 of 22


World Bank maintains a Latin America–specific database of interactive maps, data

visualizations, and raw data tables of “microdata” stemming from housing, agricultural,
and population surveys, all of which are available for bulk download. The Inter-
American Development Bank, as the largest financer of development projects in the
world, maintains an extensive digital database for use in the classroom and in scholarly
research. Annual socioeconomic indicator reports, scholarly publications, policy briefs,
working papers, and raw data sets dating back to the 1970s are all accessible via its
website. The International Monetary Fund maintains a digital database of regional
economic reports for the Western Hemisphere, annual reports on a wide array of
socioeconomic indicators, policy papers produced by IMF partners, and a searchable
library of publications related to the history and operation of the organization.
Political organizations such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean maintain extensive databases of publications on
socioeconomic issues in the region, including gender affairs, trade and integration,
economic development, natural resources and infrastructure, and population and
development, among many other topics. Additionally, via CEPALSTAT, REDATAM, SIGCI,
and TRADECAN, specialized information systems pertaining to statistical data gathered
across Latin America since the 1990s, governmental and educational users can gain
access to thematic maps, graphed data on the trade activity of thirty-three Latin
Americans and Caribbean countries, as well as local, regional, and national census
analyses from around the region. The site hosts videos promoting projects and policy
implementation, as well as data visualizations of macroeconomic data on a wide array of
topics, including poverty, education, labor policy, agricultural and rural development,
science and technology, internal and external migration, indigenous and Afro-Latino
descendants, womens’ political participation, energy and communication infrastructure,
and sustainable economic and social development.
The Latin American Integration Association maintains a searchable database of all

official documentation of the secretary general and all official documents related to the
Secretariat of LAFTA, as well as documentation of international organizations;
publications related to the economic integration of treaty members are available online.
The Organization of American States’ Foreign Trade Information System maintains an
extensive database of political resolutions related to the formation of free-trade
agreements between OAS member states, customs unions, and links to tariff and trade
data, as well as the most extensive database of studies on trade and gender available
online. The OAS, with the assistance of the Canadian International Development Agency
(and the Foreign Trade Information System, also created and maintains the Caribbean
Trade Reference Centre, a digital database containing the full text of every official
trade policy document signed by OAS member states.
Page 16 of 22


Further Reading
Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos, Jose María Maravall, and Adam Przeworski. Economic
Reform in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Conaghan, Catherine, and James Malloy. Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and

Neoliberalism in the Central Andes. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994.
Dangl, Benjamin. Dancing with Dynamite: Social Movements and States in Latin America.
Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2010.
Fischer, Edward R., ed. Indigenous Peoples, Civil Society, and the Neo-liberal State in
Latin America New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the
New Imperialism. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2007.
Green, Duncan. Silent Revolution: The Rise and Crisis of Market Economics in Latin
America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003.
Haggard, Stephan, and Steven Webb, eds. Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political
Liberalization and Economic Adjustment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Handelman, Howard, and Werner Baer, eds. Paying the Costs of Austerity in Latin
America. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989.
López-Maya, Margarita, ed. Lucha popular, democracia y neoliberalismo: Protesta

popular en América Latina en los años de ajuste. Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad,
1999.
Madrid, Raul. Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America
and Beyond. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Nelson, Joan, ed. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990.
Peck, Jamie. “Geography and Public Policy: Constructions of Neoliberalism” Progress in

Human Geography 28.3 (2004): 392–405.
Portes, Alejandro, and Kelly Hoffman. “Latin American Class Structures: Their
Composition and Change during the Neoliberal Era” Latin American Research Review
38.1 (2003): 41–82.
Smith, William, Carlos Acufa, and Eduardo Gamarra, eds. Democracy, Markets, and
Structural Reform in Latin America. New Brunswick, NJ: Transition, 1994.
Page 17 of 22


Teichman, Judith A.The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina,
and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
Walton, John K., and David Seddon. Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global
Adjustments. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
Walton, Michael. “Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad, or Incomplete?” Latin

American Research Review 39.3 (2004): 166–183.
Webber, Jeffrey R. “Indigenous Struggle in Latin America: The Perilous Invisibility of

Capital and Class” Latin American Politics and Society 49.3 (2007): 191–206.
Weyland, Kurt. “Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to a Debate.” Latin

American Research Review 39.3 (2004): 143–149.
Weyland, Kurt. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil,
Peru, and Venezuela. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Williamson, John, ed. The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Washington, DC: Institute
for International Economics, 1994.
Notes:
(1.) United Nations, “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal
Problems,” Lake Success, NY, 1950, and Albert O. Hirschmann, The Strategy of Economic
Development (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958).
(2.) Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Colombia University
Press, 1987), 274.
(3.) Thomas Perreault and Patricia Martin, “Geographies of Neoliberalism in Latin

America,” Environment and Planning A, 37 (2005): 195.
(4.) Suranjit Kumar Saha, “Latin America: A Socioeconomic Profile,” in Globalisation and
Sustainable Development in Latin America: Perspectives on the New Economic Order,
eds. Suranjit Kumar Saha and David Parker (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002), 84.
(5.) Ibid., p. 120.
(6.) Peter Winn, “The Pinochet Era,” in Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and
Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973–2002, ed. Peter Winn (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2004), 26.
(7.) David E. Lindsey, Athanasios Orphanides, and Robert H. Rasche, “The Reform of
October 1979: How It Happened and Why,” prepared for the Conference on Reflections
on Monetary Policy 25 Years after October 1979, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2004.
Page 18 of 22


(8.) Dietrich Reuschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist

Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 212.
(9.) Pedro Aspe Armella, El camino mexicano de la transformación económica (México,

D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993), 76.
(10.) Tom Chodor, Neoliberal Hegemony and the Pink Tide in Latin America: Breaking Up
with TINA? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 75.
(11.) Jackie Roddick, The Dance of the Millions: Latin America and the Debt Crisis
(London: Latin America Bureau, 1988), 174.
(12.) Sue Branford and Bernardo Kucinski, The Debt Squads: The U.S., the Banks and
Latin America (London: Zed Books, 1988), 119.
(13.) James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of
Neoliberal Governmentality,” American Ethnologist 29.4 (2002): 990.
(14.) Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” Antipode 34.3 (2002): 386.
(15.) Catherine M. Conaghan, James M. Malloy, and Luis A. Abugattas, “Business and the
‘Boys’: The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes,” Latin American Research
Review 25.2 (1990): 7.
(16.) Bela Balassa, The Process of Industrial Development and Alternative Development
Strategies, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1980), 33.
(17.) Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin American Since Independence
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 363.
(18.) International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,” vol. 46, no. 10,
(Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, 1992).
(19.) Rosemary Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion (Washington, DC: American
Development Bank, 1998), 221.
(20.) Margarita López Maya, “The Venezuelan ‘Caracazo’ of 1989: Popular Protest and
Institutional Weakness,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35.1 (2003): 130.
(21.) Haluk Unal, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Kwok-Wai Leung, “The Brady Plan, the 1989
Mexican Debt Reduction Agreement, and Bank Stock Returns in the United States and
Japan,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25.3 (1993): 415.
(22.) International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009), 30.
(23.) Eduardo Lora, Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and
How to Measure It, (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2001). As much
Page 19 of 22


as Cuba was shielded from the implementation of neoliberal reforms due to its economic
isolation, the nation did go through a “special period” of financial austerity following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
(24.) World Bank, Human Development Report 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991).
(25.) John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in Latin American
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics, 1990.
(26.) Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003),
53.
(27.) Lora, Structural Reforms in Latin America.
(28.) Frank Sadler, “Privatizing Public Enterprises and Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries, 1988–1993,” Foreign Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper, World
Bank, Washington, DC, 1993.
(29.) World Bank, Human Development Report 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000), 210–214.
(30.) United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2000), 202–205.
(31.) Ibid., p. 207.
(32.) International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, vol. 55, no. 10
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2001).
(33.) Paul Drake, “The Hegemony of U.S. Economic Doctrines in Latin America,” in Latin
America After Neoliberalism: Turning the Tide in the 21st Century? eds. Eric Hershberg
and Fred Rosen (New York: The New Press, 2006), 39.
(34.) Jorge I. Domínguez, “Free Politics and Free Markets in Latin America,” Journal of
Democracy 9.4 (1998): 72.
(35.) Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in

Mexico (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 4.
(36.) Alexander Dawson, First World Dreams: Mexico Since 1989 (New York: Zed Books,
2006), 68.
(37.) International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (2001).
(38.) Robert N. Gwynne and Cristóbal Kay, eds., Latin America Transformed: Globalization
and Modernity (London: Hodder Education, 2004), 120.
Page 20 of 22


(39.) Benjamin Dangl, Dancing with Dynamite: Social Movements and States in Latin
America (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2010), 134.
(40.) Devon Gerardo Peña, The Terror of the Machine: Technology, Work, Gender, and
Ecology on the U.S.–Mexico Border (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 7.
(41.) René Maldonado and Maria R. Hayem, Remittances to Latin America and the
Caribbean Set a New Record High in 2014 (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development
Bank, 2015), 7.
(42.) Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto López, eds., Remittances and Development:
Lessons from Latin America (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008), 27.
(43.) Ana Margheritis and Anthony W. Pereira, “The Neoliberal Turn in Latin America: The
Cycle of Ideas and the Search for an Alternative,” Latin American Perspectives 34.3
(2007): 26.
(44.) International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey, vol. 27, no. 22 (Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund, 1998), 374.
(45.) Havard Haarstad and Vibeke Andersson, “Backlash Reconsidered: Neoliberalism

and Popular Mobilization in Bolivia,” Latin American Politics and Society 51.4 (2009): 5.
(46.) Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds., The Resurgence of the Latin
American Left (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 1.
(47.) Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, “China and the Latin America
Commodities Boom: A Critical Assessment,” Political Economy Research Institute
Working Papers, no. 192, 2009, p. 4.
(48.) David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), 19.
(49.) For this first generation of scholarship on the causes and implementation of Latin
American neoliberal reforms, see Joan Nelson, ed. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman,
eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1992); Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose María Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic
Reform in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy, Unsettling
Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes (Pittsburgh, PA: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); John Williamson, ed., The Political Economy of Policy Reform
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994); and William Smith, Carlos
Acufa, and Eduardo Gamarra, eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin
America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transition, 1994).
Page 21 of 22


(50.) Of note in The International Political Economy Series, see Juan Antonio Morales and
Gary McMahon, eds., Economic Policy and the Transition to Democracy: The Latin
American Experience (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); Henry Veltmeyer, James
Petras, and Steve Vieux, Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin America: A
Comparative Perspective on the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); and Christopher Wylde, Latin America After Neoliberalism:
Development Regimes in Post-Crisis States (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
(51.) See Kurt Weyland, “Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to a

Debate,” Latin American Research Review 39.3 (2004): 143–149; Marcus Kurtz, Free
Market Democracy and the Chilean and Mexican Countryside (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Evelyne Huber and Fred Solt, “Successes and
Failures of Neoliberalism,” Latin American Research Review 39.3 (2004): 150–164;
William Robinson, Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization
Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Andy Baker, The Market
and the Masses in Latin America: Policy Reform and Consumption in Liberalizing
Economies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Jon Beasley-Murray,
Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2010).
(52.) See Thomas Perreault and Patricia Martin, “Geographies of Neoliberalism in Latin
America,” Environment and Planning A, 37 (2005): 191–201; Julie Cupples, “Rural
Development in El Hatillo, Nicaragua: Gender, Neoliberalism and Environmental Risk,”
The Introductory Reader in Human Geography: Contemporary Debates and Classic
Writings, eds. William Moseley, David A. Lanegran, and Kavita Pandit (Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 319–330; and Benedicte Bull and Mariel Aguilar-Stoen, eds.,
Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable
Development (New York: Routledge, 2015).
Robert Jordan
Department of History, Colorado State Univeristy
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Neoliberalismo and Free Trade

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Neoliberalismo and Free Trade

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Neoliberalism and Free Trade in Latin America

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American

Summary and Keywords

First utilized in Latin America in response to the mid-20th-century decline of populist

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date: 17 August 2017

Transitions and the Beginning of a Crisis

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Following Mexico’s declaration of a moratorium on its debt payments in 1982, the

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First-Generation Neoliberal Reforms

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date: 17 August 2017

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date: 17 August 2017

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The Decade of the Washington Consensus

These more socially sensitive economic-policy recommendations found in the 1991 UN

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ideologically charged symbol of the foreign imposition of market fundamentalism and

As a result of the implementation of significant neoliberal reforms, Latin America’s GDP

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date: 17 August 2017

As Salinas’s currency manipulation policies backfired, resulting in a massive devaluation

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date: 17 August 2017

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date: 17 August 2017

Pushback and the Pink Tide

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date: 17 August 2017

Argentina experienced a significant debt crisis in 2001 that mobilized thousands of

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date: 17 August 2017

Discussion of the Literature

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date: 17 August 2017

More recent attention by scholars focused on the consequences of neoliberal reforms

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date: 17 August 2017

World Bank maintains a Latin America–specific database of interactive maps, data

The Latin American Integration Association maintains a searchable database of all

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date: 17 August 2017

Conaghan, Catherine, and James Malloy. Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and

López-Maya, Margarita, ed. Lucha popular, democracia y neoliberalismo: Protesta

Peck, Jamie. “Geography and Public Policy: Constructions of Neoliberalism” Progress in

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date: 17 August 2017

Walton, Michael. “Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad, or Incomplete?” Latin

Webber, Jeffrey R. “Indigenous Struggle in Latin America: The Perilous Invisibility of

Weyland, Kurt. “Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to a Debate.” Latin

(3.) Thomas Perreault and Patricia Martin, “Geographies of Neoliberalism in Latin

(5.) Ibid., p. 120.

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date: 17 August 2017

(8.) Dietrich Reuschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist

(9.) Pedro Aspe Armella, El camino mexicano de la transformación económica (México,