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On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for
mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor was legally non-existent in the 10 May
2004 elections.
Q — Rev. Nardo B. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet for the May 2004 elections. Thomas Palileng, another candidate for Mayor
filed a petition to annul/nullify his certificate of candidacy and/or to disqualify on the Q— What is the effect if a candidate is disqualified by final judgment? Explain.
ground that Cayat has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Twenty
three days before the election, Cayat’s disqualification became final and executory.
He, however won and was proclaimed and assumed office. Palileng filed an electoral ANS: The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment
protest contending that Cayat was ineligible to run for mayor. The Vice-Mayor before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
intervened and contended that he should succeed Cayat in case he is disqualified This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The
because Palileng was only a second placer, hence, he cannot be declared as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
winner. Is the contention of the Vice-Mayor correct? Why? Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
ANS: No, because there was no second placer, hence, Palileng should be he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
proclaimed as the winner on the following grounds: or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
First, the COMELEC’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004 when pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty-three days Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is
before the election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation
Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on sentence of Section 6.
succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-
placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms
Buguias, Benguet is beyond question. Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be
Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way
rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8, 164 votes cast in Cayat’s
regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate,
resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the second to none. (Cayat v. COMELEC).
elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the
elections. (Cayat v. COMELEC, April 27, 2007).
Q— Why is the proclamation of Cayat void? Explain.
Q — It was contended that the doctrine of rejection of the second placer laid down
in Labo v. COMELEC should apply. Is the contention correct? Why? ANS: Cayat’s proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying him had
already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain
whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of his disqualification when they
ANS: No. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of casted their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes
the second placer, does not apply because in Labo there was no final judgment of
“shall not be counted”. There is no disenfranchisement of the voters. Rather, the
disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second
voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus
placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment
their votes are stray and “shall not be counted”. (Cayat. v. COMELEC).
declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not
become final before the elections. Labo and other cases applying the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition – the Q— Is the intervention of the Vice-Mayor proper? Why?
disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This
essential condition does not exist in the present case. (Cayat v. COMELEC).
Reason in Labo. ANS: No. The petition-in-intervention should be rejected because the doctrine on
the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case. The doctrine applies
In Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after only if the winning candidate’s disqualification has not yet become final and
the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. executory before the election. In this case, the disqualification was final and
In the case of Cayat he was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10

he to vacate the office of the mayor. the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Clearly. because his service from July 1. he is disqualified. Pampanga. 1999 to June 30. (Rivera III. 2001.R. 167591. there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. et al. G. it was held that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the 601. He was a “private citizen” for a time stay in the same office.R. 7160 (the Local Government Code). Section 43(b) of R. et al. Nos. For he did it as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer” because he was one. Three-term limit. Camarines Norte 2006. x x x Morales who is similarly situated.. December 10. 479 SCRA 473. May 9. there being an involuntary severance from office as a counted since his proclamation was void.R. the three-term limit rule applies to him. Before the Supreme Court. term. hence. e al. (Cayat v. ANS: No. he voluntarily Q — Mayor Marino Morales ran for a fourth term despite having served for three vacated when there was a declaration of failure of election.R. 2007). 2001 was for a full On the other hand. There is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to more than three consecutive terms. even if “as caretaker”. Explain. Ong v. duties of the mayor of San Vicente. In Ong. v. ANS: No.R..R. Lonzanida did not fully serve the contended that his second term from July 1. elected even if he served the rest of the term of the mayor. May 9. the three-term elected local officials x x x. 1999 to July 15. Alegre applies to Morales. May 6. et al. he being the vice-mayor. he never ceased as mayor. hence. he was qualified to run for a third term. here. v. as a consequence thereof. He was mayor for the continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente. (Rivera III. he alleged that while he served his second term. COMELEC.. in Adormeo v. there was no second placer. followed by an order for him 2001. G. while he assumed office. 167591 and before running for mayor in the recall elections. no local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. . such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term. 162395 and 163354. Similarly. et al. Unlike Lonzanida. 2007). because with the death of Mayor Cruz. the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. serving the full term. Capco assumed office as mayor by Q— Explain the reason for the maximum term limit. 1999 to June 30. 170577. G. 154829.A. He was not therefore. This is especially so that he But more importantly. 376 SCRA As held in Latasa v. companion case. Q — Morales cited Borja v. For another. v. The COMELEC declared him disqualified. No. the proclamation was declared void and which became final and executory on August 6.R. 2007). COMELEC. there was actually no interruption or break in the assumed office. (Rivera III. No. Morales has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1. Section 8. G. hence. There excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged was a “break” in the service of the mayor. v. his assumption of the office of the mayor upon the death of the incumbent mayor may not be ANS: The framers of the Constitution wanted to establish some safeguards against regarded as a term. Alegre. No. In answer to a petition to the term. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides that 2007). No. et al. virtue of the principle of succession. Francis Ong was elected and assumed the declaration of failure of election. et al. COMELEC. and. G. et al. in Lonzanida. 147927. The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. No. February 4. COMELEC. his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Article X of the who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating Constitution and Section 43(b) of R. Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. G. Q — Is not the case of Morales similar to the case of Lonzanida v COMELEC? COMELEC).A. 2001 may not be 1995-1998 mayoral term. (Rivera III. cancel his certificate of candidacy. hence. COMELEC. COMELEC. Is this case applicable? 1995. He did not fully serve (3) consecutive terms as Mayor of Mabalacat. January 23. As held in Ong v. Article X of the Constitution provides that the terms of the office of But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void. COMELEC to apply to him. Is the contention correct? Why? result of legal processes. ANS: No. COMELEC. In fine. 2003..executory before the election. As ruled. 2002. No. 417 SCRA 90. entire period notwithstanding the decision in the electoral protest case ousting him Francis was never unseated during the term in question. 167591 and Why? Dee v. hence. he served the full term even as there was a Instead. No. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for limit rule applies to him. proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified. G. He served as mayor up to June 30. 1999 and that his the stated reason of “failure of election”. COMELEC. May 9. the three-term limit is an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8. In Lonzanida v. the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a nullity for suspended by the Ombudsman from January 16.

BP 881. however. 436 SCRA 45). v. COMELEC.R. Tugade v. the second placer Q — Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy but withdrew the same. 211. the votes cast for him should not be counted and must be considered 171063.R. was not a valid candidate in the petition to the same local government post. No. and deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. candidate. could not be validly substituted by Luna. No. COMELEC. COMELEC. The rationale is that a full reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election documents would run counter to the . Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a candidate of his right to Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. 2007 citing Labo v. 105111. Adormeo v. et al. Effect if there is a tie. COMELEC.R. and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Sec. No. No. G. thus. hold a special public meeting at which the board of canvassers shall ANS: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified proceed to the drawing of lots of the candidates who have tied and shall proclaim as shall not be voted for.. deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due occurred. Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy. Sanchez v. COMELEC. the following two conditions must concur: candidacy of Hans Roger. COMELEC. 167591. Q — It was contended that since Morales was disqualified. G. extent of power of COMELEC. No. (Sec. 1992. v. Ong v. In effect. He was should be proclaimed as the winner. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger. (Rivera III. COMELEC. 44 of form. Alegre. without the proper proceedings. May 9. 133495. v. COMELEC. and the candidates so proclaimed 7. the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility May 9. ANS: In Labo v. the last place in the number to be elected. the 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. COMELEC. thus. 6 and elected the candidates who may favored by luck. (Secs. after recording this fact in its minutes.Q — What is the effect if the certificate of candidacy of a candidate is cancelled? same position and two or more candidates received the same number of votes for Explain. 2004. controversy? Explain.R. et al. There was. 479 SCRA 473. (Rivera III. 2007). or in cases where two or more candidates are to be elected for the election return.. his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified apply? petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.R. 167591. there was no petition to deny due court to or cancel the certificate of ANS: For the three-term limit to apply.R. July 3. 2007). G.. shall have the right to assume office in the same manner as if he had been elected Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor by plurality of votes. In this case. The board of canvassers shall forthwith make a certificate of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered stating the name of the candidate who had been favored by luck and his as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot. No. 211 SCRA of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the 297). 2007). April 24. G. (Cipriano v. No. The COMELEC may not. The rule is that.R. the Court has ruled that a second place candidate Did the COMELEC act correctly? Why? cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner. the board of canvassers. shall by resolution. ANS: To resolve the tie. G. by itself. Pre-proclamation controversy. Omnibus proclamation on the basis thereof. et al. COMELEC. 167591. Not being a contest the election. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in valid certificate of candidacy and. 158830. May 9. COMELEC. 165983. 2007). 1998. no petition to deny Hans certificate of candidacy. et al. 295 SCRA 157. considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and. 376 SCRA 90. et al. Rivera III. September 3. March 2. (Sec. G. Is the contention correct? Why? substituted by Joy Luna but the COMELEC denied due course to her certificate on the ground that Hans being under age. Whenever it shall appear ANS: It is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation cases that the Board of from the canvass that two or more candidates have received an equal and highest Canvassers is without jurisdiction to go beyond what appears on the face of the number of votes. August 10. 240. cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of COMELEC. Election Code). stray votes.. No. et al. the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be ANS: No. being under age. (Lonzanida v. there shall be drawing of lots. In the Local Government Code. without the proper As a consequence of ineligibility. could not be office. G. candidacy and declared the substitution of Luna invalid. If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his Q — What are the requirements which must concur for the three-term limit to certificate of candidacy. he could not have filed a valid certificate of candidacy. RA 6646). Q — What is the extent of the power of the COMELEC in pre-proclamation Q— What is the proper procedure to be resorted to in case of a tie? Explain. G. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or declared elected. Del Rosario. et al. (Luna v. upon five days notice to all the tied candidates. a permanent vacancy in the contested office has proceedings.R.

244. this nomenclature.R. 598 (1973)) or double (Sarmiento v. June 16. No. 2003. (Velasco v. loosely based on a rule of the same name devised by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in Nograles v. 386 Phil. the preparation and the transmission of the the ballot (Cordero v. February 8.R.. In appreciating such votes. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) which provides: ANS: There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared. 5 SCRA 438. 2007). several entries having been Moya v. 170070. COMELEC. of force majeure. the misplaced votes are nevertheless credited to the candidates for the office for which they presented themselves because the voters’ intention to so vote is clear from the face Handwritings have only one general appearance. or feature of our election laws. February 28. 166931. this rule is not (Mandac v. or (d) in the space for COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the an office immediately following that for which the candidate presented himself. marked ballots are ballots containing distinguishing marks. there is a resulting failure to elect. 69 Phil. 10 Phil.. such election results in a failure to that in preparing the ballot. or followed by the title of the contested office or where the voter wrote after the candidate’s name a directional symbol indicating the correct office for which the misplaced name was intended (Moya v. 125 Phil. 917 (1967)). et al.R. Thus. COMELEC. 2007).R. candidate for the wrong or inexistent office. HRET Case No. v. Quemado. (Perman v.. in the sense necessary to to reach the conclusion that writings are by different hands we may find numerous invalidate it. 171882. refers to an exception to the rule on appreciation Q— When is there failure of election? of misplaced votes under Section 211(19) of Batas Pambansa Blg. COMELEC. In the second instance. This is in consonance with the settled doctrine that ballots should be Q — May the COMELEC invalidate certain ballots merely on a finding that the appreciated with liberality to give effect to the voters’ will. 54 Phil. fraud or other analogous causes. 2007. COMELEC. 138). In the third instance. votes cast for a the purpose of which is to identify them. Moscardon. Fornier. 431 (2000)).e. No. 152 Phil. 199 (1939)). fraud or other analogous place for each office the name of the individual candidate for whom he desires to causes. Delos Reyes distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be placed on the ballot is that which v. 392 (1984)). the election has been entire series of names intended to be voted for the successive offices appearing in suspended. Del Fierro. The votes contested in this appeal are all misplaced votes. 756 (1949)). ((Abad v. General resemblance is not enough to warrant the conclusion that two Marked ballot. law establishes. or we or mark on the ballot which might serve to identify it thereafter. No. violence. Del Fierro. 157004. thus defeating the secrecy of the ballot which is a cardinal fraud or other analogous causes.R. et al. terrorism. However. and (3) a single misplacement of a name written (a) off-center from the designated space . (2) a single (Farin v. 84 Phil. (Mutilan v.summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. 167438. p. (b) slightly underneath the line for the without any exception. violence.R. for the purpose of defeating the secrecy of suffrage which the Neighborhood rule. Dureza.. the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of identifying said ballot. et writings have the same general appearance and pictorial effect? Explain. the third instance is Gonzales. thus: Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot. L-18027. (c) immediately above the title for the omitted in the questioned election return. Section 211(19) is meant to avoid confusion in the minds of the election officials as (b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by to the candidates actually voted for and to stave off any scheming design to identify law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure. 405 SCRA 303. 217 Phil. 347 (1958)). et al. 706 (1930)). G. 34. No ballot should be may find divergences in both. each voter must “fill his ballot by writing in the proper elect on account of force majeure. No. The mere superficial differences. February 22. Tinga. it must appear that the voter designedly place some superfluous sign likeness in class characteristics but divergences in individual characteristics. (G. 1989.” In all three instances. 496 SCRA 505 and Ferrer v. violence. 29 June 1962. election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect. 69 Phil. Ewoc. Samonte. 171248. et al. 5 SCRA 438) misplacement of names where such names were preceded G. In Lee v. July 4. 1 HRET Rep. Section (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election 211(19) also enforces Section 195 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides returns or in the custody or canvass thereof. the Excepted from Section 211(19) are ballots with (1) a general misplacement of an election has not been held. ANS: No. G.R. Q— When is a ballot considered as marked? Explain. In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are by the same hand there must not only be present class characteristics but also individual characteristics or ‘dents and scratches’ in sufficient quantity to exclude the theory of accidental coincidence. Failure of election. No. terrorism. Calangi. J). COMELEC may applied the “neighborhood rule. et al. (Amurao v. the 174010. of the ballots. it was held that if there is contested office (Sarmiento v. a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine. (Silverio v. al. i. writings are by the same hand. No. The contested office ((Villavert v. Co. Clamor. No. Quemado. April 2.” As used by the Court. but the divergence must be something more than discarded as a marked ballot unless its character as such is unmistakable. In these instances. June 1962. G. G. 199 (1939)). (Osborn’s Questioned Documents. G. Commission on Elections. questioned returns. 29 interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner. No.. ANS: In order for a ballot to be considered marked. 2007). April 3. Commission on Elections. 25 July 2006. No. the doctrine does not apply. L-18027. Hon. COMELEC. the vote of the elector. vote. terrorism. 2007). In the first instance.

The misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material misrepresentation. (Nelson T. Thus. a misrepresentation of a non-material fact. except when all the members of the 2007). which is the Kho case. No. private respondent was proclaimed the winner. In fact. 2007. requires a certain profession or occupation as a qualification. under Section 78. et al. effect. a motion to reconsider a decision.R. 168253 and 172741.. Second.. can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. Third. the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary COMELEC. exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a Certainly. in a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession or COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the occupation in the certificate of candidacy. is he disqualified? Explain. et al. and 2004-45 for failure of the protestants and protestees to pay the required cash deposits. 2004-41. a motion to misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the office sought by the reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the candidate. (Rosal v. the candidate may not be disqualified interlocutory order. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. 2004-38. Thus. Lluz. which is the Repol case. This situation is precisely to the SC? Explain. in general. 2004-37. 2004- actual election was conducted because the voters did not actually vote and the 36.Note: interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari None of the three instances is present in this case. there was a situation where the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Division Q — When is misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy material? Explain. the elections took and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case place. order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that. No. June 7. and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were consolidated. IX-A of the Constitution. v. may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable.. (Nelson T. ANS: As a rule. June 7. Banc was likewise elevated to the Court. ballots were filled up by non-registered voters.R. 172840. Neither will the Rosal case apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the . or through criminal prosecution under Section 262 for violation of Note: Section 74. he or she may be proceeded COMELEC. when actually no need to resolve the petition assailing the interlocutory orders. or a non-material The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be misrepresentation.. v. results of the elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement. 2007). In this case. for a candidate’s certificate of Furthermore. et al. 2007). not even the office of the President of the Republic of without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. G. 2004-44. 2004-42. substitute The Court also notes that the COMELEC First Division has already issued an Order voting. G. or ruling of a candidacy to be denied due course or cancelled by the COMELEC. and farcical and statistically improbable results. candidacy under Section 78. et al. aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office. The issues raised in the ANS: A misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to petition for certiorari were also raised in the main case and therefore there was a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate’s eligibility. division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc. The assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. the main case which was meanwhile decided by the COMELEC En Misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy. RTC of Oriental Mindoro. as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy cannot order without a time limit.R. against through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy COMELEC. 2004-39. the Court have this peculiar situation where the interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division is pending before the Court but the main case has Q — May an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division be the subject of certiorari already been dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. that “it is the decision. 172840. v. the fact COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. Jr. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is ANS: No. Petitioner alleges that no dated 31 May 2005 dismissing the protests and counter-protests in EPC Nos. division which issued the interlocutory order. 164496-505. or where a COMELEC Division be denied due course or canceled on such ground. nor Q — If a candidate misrepresents his profession. in accordance with Section 7. Art. No. 2004-40. No. G. Thus.R. However. a candidate commits a material misrepresentation. what the Court are trying to avoid by insisting on strict compliance of the rule that an interlocutory order cannot by itself be the subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari. resolution. order. Soriano. Petitioner contests the were already consolidated. The the Philippines. The Court has already ruled in Reyes v. April 2. the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of elevated directly to the SupremeCourt through a special civil action for certiorari. No elective office. et al. No.” The exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and Repol. The exception is in an unusual case where the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division was pending before the SC. Lluz. G. COMELEC. period. March 16. 2004-43. In other words. et al.