Lina Calilap-Asmeron, Petitioner vs.

Development Bank of The Philippines,

Pablo Cruz, Trinidad Cabantog, Eni S.P. Atienza And Emerenciana Cabantog,
Respondents. G.R. No. 157330 November 23, 2011
FACTS: On March 17, 1975, the petitioner and her brother Celedonio Calilap
constituted a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land (TCT No. T-164117 and
TCT No.T-160929) to secure the performance of their loan obligation with
respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which was later foreclosed
by and sold to the latter due to non-payment of principal obligation. The one-year
redemption period expired has as well expired.
The thrust of the petitioner’s suit is that DBP accorded to her a preferential right to
repurchase lot with TCT No. 164117. She alleged that she was misled to sign a deed
of conditional sale covering both lots believing that the said lot will be released after
paying two amortizations for the other lot but DBP rescinded the deed of conditional
sale. It sold the lot to respondent Pablo Cruz to whom petitioner filed a complaint for
the rescission of the sale and impleading respondents Emerenciana Cabantog and
Eni S.P. Atienza who bought the property from Cruz pending the suit.
DBP insisted that the petitioner’s real intention had been to repurchase the two lots
on installment basis as can be gleaned from her letters and telegrams.
The RTC and CA finds the petitioner’s complaint lacking in merit pointing out that
she had not presented testimonial or documentary evidence to support or
corroborate her claim that she had been misled into signing the deed of conditional
sale. Hence this present appeal via Rule 45.
The petitioner avers that her testimonial evidence sufficiently established the facts
behind the execution of the deed of conditional sale; that she thereby proved that
she had not fully understood the terms contained in the deed; that DBP could not
resort to rescission because her nonpayment of the amortizations was only a slight
or casual breach. DBP counters that the petitioner is raising questions of fact in her
present appeal, which is not allowed under Rule ​ 45 of the ​Rules of Court; and that it
had the right to rescind the deed of conditional sale under Article 1191 of the ​Civil
Code.
ISSUE: ​Is it valid for DBP to rescind the deed of conditional sale?
RULING:
I. Appeal under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law only

The petitioner’s submissions, that her testimonial evidence sufficiently established

the facts behind the execution of the deed of conditional sale, and that she had not
fully understood the terms contained in the deed of conditional sale, involved
questions of fact, for the consideration and resolution of them would definitely
require the appreciation of evidence. As such, her petition for review is dismissible
for raising​ factual issues. Under Rule 45​, only questions of law may be the proper
 subject of an appeal in this Court.
It is true that the Court has recognized several exceptions, in which it has
undertaken the review and re-appreciation of the evidence. Among the exceptions
have been: (​a) when the findings of the CA are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (​b) when the inference made by the CA is manifestly
​ mistaken, absurd or impossible; (​c) when there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA; (​d) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (​e) when the findings
​ of facts of the CA are conflicting; (​f) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions
​ of both the appellant and the appellee; (​g) when the findings of the
CA​ are contrary to those of the trial court; (​h) when the findings of the CA are
conclusions without citation of​ specific evidence on which they are based; (​i) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
​ are not disputed by the respondent; (​j) when the findings of fact of the CA are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (​k) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
Although the petitioner submits that the CA made findings of fact not supported by
the evidence on record, this case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions. On the contrary, the records contained clear indicia of her real
intention ​vis--vis her reacquisition of the two foreclosed properties.
​ II. Article 1332 of the ​Civil Code did not apply to the petitioner
The petitioner would have us consider that she had not given her full consent to the
deed of conditional sale on account of her lack of legal and technical knowledge. In
effect, she pleads
​ for the application of Article 1332 of the ​Civil Code1 . We cannot
accede to the petitioner’s plea.
Our impression is that the stipulations of the deed of conditional sale were simply
worded and plain enough for even one with a slight knowledge of English to easily
understand. The petitioner was not illiterate. She had appeared to the trial court to
be educated, its cogent observation of her as lettered being based on how she had
composed her correspondences to DBP. Thereby revealed was her distinctive ability
to understand ​written and ​spoken English, the language in which the terms of the
contract she​ signed had been written. Clearly, Article 1332 of the ​Civil Code does not
apply to the petitioner.
III. DBP validly exercised its right to rescind the deed of conditional sale
upon the petitioner’s default
1
​Article 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or
fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
The petitioner argues that despite the right to rescind due to nonpayment being
stipulated in the deed of conditional sale, DBP could not exercise its right because
her nonpayment of an obligation constituted only a slight or casual breach that did
not warrant rescission.
Firstly, a contract is the law between the parties. As such, the petitioner, being one
of the parties in the deed of conditional sale, could not be allowed to conveniently
renounce the stipulations that she had knowingly and freely agreed to.
Secondly, the issue of whether or not DBP validly exercised the right to rescind is a
factual one that the RTC and the CA already passed upon and determined. The
Court, which is not a trier of facts, adopts their findings, and sustains the exercise
by DBP of its right to rescind following the petitioner’s failure to pay her six monthly
amortizations, and after her being given due notice of the notarial rescission.
And, thirdly, Article 1191 of the ​Civil Code did not prohibit the parties from entering
into an agreement whereby a violation of the terms of the contract would result to its
cancellation. In ​Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the vendors right in
a contract to sell to extrajudicially cancel the contract upon failure of the vendee to
pay the installments and even to retain the sums already paid.
ACCORDINGLY​, the petition for review is ​DENIED​ for lack of merit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DARWIN RELATO y AJERO G.R. No. 173794
January 18, 2012
FACTS : ​Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited
drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the
evidence to be presented against the accused.Their observance is the key to the
successful prosecution of illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
Darwin Relato y Ajero is now charged at the RTC Bulacan of violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 after he was arrested in buy bust operation on August 29,
2002 conducted by SPO1 Masujer, PO3 Evasco, PO1 Wilfredo Lobrin and SPO2
Adolfo Villaroza. On the conduct of the the buy bust, the poseur buyer turned over
to PO3 Evasco the two transparent sachets containing crystalline substances that
Relato sold to the poseur buyer. SPO1 Masujer marked the two transparent sachets
with his own initials “EM” upon returning to the police station. The laboratory
examination at the PNP showed presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Relato denied the accusation, and claimed that he had been framed up. He alleges
that the police officers suddenly approached and handcuff him then brought him to
police station where he was searched but no shabu was found on him. He then saw
SPO1 Masujer take two sachets from his own wallet and placed them on top of a
table then he was made to point at it and a picture was then taken of him in that
pose.
RTC found him guilty which was affirmed by the CA, hence this appeal. Relato
argues that the CA should have reversed his conviction for being contrary to the
established facts, and to the pertinent law and jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper observance of the rules on preserving the
chain of custody
RULING:​ The appeal is meritorious.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the
seizure and custody of prohibited drugs (footnote the text). The provisions of Article
II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9165 also provides for such procedure. (footnote the text)
A review of the records establishes that the proper procedure was not followed. To
start with, no photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the buy-bust
team did not immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the
presence of Relato and witnesses. Thirdly, although there was testimony about the
marking of the seized items being made at the police station, the records do not
show that the marking was done in the presence of Relato or his chosen
representative. And, fourthly, no representative of the media and the Department of
Justice, or any elected official attended the taking of the physical inventory and to
sign the inventory.
“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use
in court as evidence, and the final disposition. (Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002)
While the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR provides a saving mechanism to
ensure that not every case of non-compliance, it is is expressly conditioned upon the
State rendering an explanation of the lapse or lapses in the compliance with the
procedures which however in this case tendered no explanation why the buy-bust
team had failed to mark the seized shabu immediately after the arrest.
An unavoidable consequence of the non-establishment of the chain of custody was
the serious doubt on whether the shabu presented as evidence was really the shabu
supposedly seized from Relato. It is settled that the State does not establish the
corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing
or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise
grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as
evidence in court.
WHEREFORE​, we ​REVERSE​ the decision.
PEOPLE VS. MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT G.R. No. 172606 November
23, 2011
FACTS:​ Self-defense is often readily claimed by an accused even if false.
It is time, then, to remind the Defense about the requisites of the justifying
circumstance and about the duty of the Defense to establish the requisites by
credible, clear and convincing evidence.
On June 25, 1997, the Office of Provincial Prosecutor in Antipolo City charged Jonie
Araneta y Nugas (Araneta) with murder and later was amended to include male
co-conspirator of Araneta as Melanio Nugas y Mapait (Nugas).
In the course of the presentation of evidence for the Defense, Araneta changed his
plea to enter a plea of guilty as an accomplice in homicide. He was therefore
convicted thereof.
As narrated by the prosecution, the crime happened on the evening of March 26,
1997 when the victim, Glen, his wife and two children were traveling on board their
family vehicle in Antipolo, Rizal, two men after request to hitch a ride were
accommodated by Glen to to board the vehicle at the rear. It was then that two men
suddenly brandished knives that each pointed at Glens and Nilas necks, and then
the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck which caused his death.
During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the person who had sat behind her husband
and who had stabbed her husband in the neck, and Araneta as the person who had
sat behind her and who had carried the maroon plastic bag that she had later
recovered from the backseat.
As for the defense, albeit admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that he
did so in self-defense. He claimed that the Tamaraw FX driven by Glen was a
passenger taxi, not a family vehicle; that he argued with Glen about the fare,
because Glen was overcharging; that when he was about to alight in front of
Rempson Supermarket, Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get something
from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard; that thinking that Glen was
reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand from
where he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya); and that
when asked why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for protection
because he was living in a squatters area.
RTC convicted Nugas of murder and that even granting to be true Nugas version that
Glen had pushed and punched him, his stabbing of Glen could not be a reasonable
and necessary means to repel the attack. CA affirmed the factual and legal
conclusions of the RTC, and declared that Nugas invoking of self-defense shifted the
burden to him to prove the attendance of the elements of self-defense, but he failed
to discharge such burden. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:​ Whether or not self defense is proper in this case
RULING​: The appeal has no merit.
By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing,and thereby assumes the
burden to establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing
evidence; otherwise, his conviction will follow from his admission of killing the
victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that:
(a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent
threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was
reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused
claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims
aggression.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an
attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must
not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but
must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent
to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing
his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached
for his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there.
Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he
had not been subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life.
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (a) that the means,
methods and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that such means, methods and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger
to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Verily, Nugas stabbed Glen from
behind with suddenness, thereby deliberately ensuring the execution of the killing
without any risk to himself from any defense that Glen might make.
WHEREFORE​, we ​AFFIRM​ the decision.

PAZ vs. RP
G.R. No. 157367
November 23, 2011
FACTS: ​Herein petitioner alleges thru his Petition for Cancellation of Title ostensibly
made under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, ​that he was the owner of parcels of land
which are now registered in the name ​of Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
Filinvest Development Corporation (FDC), and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI) ​as
respondents, and prays that Register of Deeds be ordered to issue a new certificate
of title in his name.
Respondents moved to dismiss the case arguing mainly that The serious and
controversial dispute spawned by the Petition for cancellation of title is litigable in
an ordinary action outside the special and limited jurisdiction of land registration
courts. The Petition is thus removed from the ambit of Sec. 108 of the Property
Registration Decree which requires, as an indispensable element for availment of the
relief thereunder, either unanimity of the parties or absence of serious controversy
or adverse claim. It authorizes only amendment and alteration of certificates of title,
not cancellation thereof. The petitioner countered that his petition for cancellation
was not an initiatory pleading that must comply with the regular rules of civil
procedure but a mere incident of a past registration proceeding.
RTC granted the Motion to dismiss and held that the petition bears all the elements
of an action for recovery. Hence, the petitioner assailed the dismissal in the CA via
petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
granting FDC and FAIs motion to dismiss but the CA dismissed the petition. Hence,
the petitioner has come to the Court for review, asserting the applicability of Section
108 of P.D. 1529, and insisting that his petition filed under Section 108 of P.D. 1529
should not be dismissed because it was exempt from the requirements of paying
docket fees, of service of summons, and of the certification against forum shopping
due to its not being an initiatory pleading.
ISSUE:​ Whether or not the petition falls under the Section 108 of PD 1529
RULING​: NO.
Based on the provision, the proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a
certificate of title under Section108 of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven instances
or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any description, whether
vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when
new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate;
(c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any
person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been
married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, which
owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within
three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title.
Thus, his petition did not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 108,
and was for that reason rightly dismissed. To reopen the decree of registration was
no longer permissible, considering that the one-year period to do so had long ago
lapsed, and the properties covered by OCT No. 684 had already been subdivided into
smaller lots whose ownership had passed to third persons.
WHEREFORE​, the ​PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI is ​DENIED​, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is ​AFFIRMED​.
People vs. BUTIONG G.R. No. 168932 October 19, 2011
FACTS: ​This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who,
although 29 years of age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to
seven-year old.
The man, Charlie Butiong, was charged of rape against his long-time neighbor, AAA
whom he invited at his home where he had carnal knowledge of her. AAA told her
sister of what happened who then brought AAA to NBI where she underwent a
medico-legal examination with results showing penetration. AAA also underwent a
series of psychological tests at the National Mental Hospital which showed that she
had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child
aged from six to seven years.
The Defense presented only one witness in the person of Dr. Natividad Dayan, whom
it offered as an expert psychologist, who concluded that the tests administered with
AAA were unreliable for determining the existence of mental retardation.
RTC convicted accused and RTC noted that nothing in Dr. Dayans testimony on the
unreliability of the tests administered on AAA would invalidate the findings of
psychologist, both of the National Center for Mental Health. The trial judge himself
based on his personal observation of AAA as a witness in court. He considered AAA
as a competent witness whose behavior and appearance manifested no possibility for
her to concoct a story of her defloration at the hands of the accused. CA affirmed the
conviction. The CA rejected Butiongs argument that rape was not established
because no semen had been taken from AAA, stressing that the fact of rape
depended not on the presence of spermatozoa but on the fact of unlawful
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ, which the State amply proved.
On appeal, accused contends that (1) State did not establish rape because there was
no evidence showing the exact date when the rape occurred, (2) that the unreliability
of the tests administered on AAA for determining the presence of mental retardation
should be appreciated in his favor, (3) that the State did not establish the elements
of rape, considering that a mental retardate qualified neither as a woman deprived of
reason nor as a woman under twelve years of age as provided under Article 266-A
par. 1(b) nor of par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 266-A of RPC includes/punshies rape of a mental
retardate
RULING:
I​. ​Exact date of rape and absence of spermatozoa
from victims genitalia are not elements of rape
We need to emphasize, however, that the date of the rape need not be precisely
proved considering that date is not an element of rape. Nor did the absence of
spermatozoa from the genitalia of AAA negate or disprove the rape. The basic
element of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse, not ejaculation. Carnal
knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman.This explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates the rape.
II. Rape was committed because AAA
was a mental retardate
Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against
the will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal
knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her consent.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A

of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental
retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or
intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental
retardation of the victim. It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental
retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra, because the provision
refers to a rape of a female deprived of reason, a phrase that refers to mental
abnormality, deficiency or retardation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELFIN CALISO
G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011
FACTS: The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of
the perpetrator of the crimeby an eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the
perpetrator was reliable and positive enough to support the conviction of appellant
Delfin Caliso (Caliso).

Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the RTC-Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA,a
mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision dated
August 19, 2002. The CA, although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to
reclusion perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a final
bid to overturn his conviction.
One eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable (Amegable), narrated that she had
been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for
mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!;[8] that the cries came from an area with
lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what was going on;
that Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended
the girls cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was
happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from
there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number 11 mark, who
dragged a girls limp body into the river, where he submerged the girl into the
knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted the limp body
andtossed it to deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river;
that in that whole time, Amegable could not have a look at his face because he
always had his back turned towards her; that she nonetheless insisted that the man
was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to having seen him
pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident;[10] that after the man fled
the crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house and told her husband what
she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly reported the incident to the
barangay chairman.
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that
on the day of the killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang. Yangyang
corroborated Calisos alibi.
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the
old-healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victims underwear had
been irregularly placed could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge; that
the examining physician also found no physical signs of rape on the body of AAA;
and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by Amegable that the man she
had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was no other than Caliso himself was
reliable. CA affirmed the convinction, it also relied on the identification by Amegable
of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of the
crime. Hence this appeal by Caliso arguing that his identity was not duly proven
that Soledad failed to see the assailants face.
ISSUE: Whether or not the identity of the accused was proven beyond reasonable
doubt
RULING:
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must
be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the
Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for
even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
Contrary to the CAs holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegables
recognition of him was reliable, the Court considers the identification not reliable
and beyond doubt as to meet the requirement of moral certainty.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does
not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will
be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy
circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has
distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde, to wit: (a) that
by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b)
that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the
victim immediately before or after the crime.
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass
by in her barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that
she was obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. In every
criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing the
identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso as
the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it
might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty
of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should
encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the
dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any
other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
Amegable identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and
uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Amegables recollection of
the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number 11 did not enhance the
reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind
apparel, but generic.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the
accused constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is
not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be
doubted.
WHEREFORE​, decision is reversed and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is
ACQUITTED​ of the crime of murder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELANIO DEL CASTILLO
y VARGAS, HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA y
DOGOS, FELIX AVENGOZA
y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLO y RAMOS, and
JOVEN DEL CASTILLO
y ABESOLA G.R. No. 169084 January 18, 2012
FACTS: This case illustrates yet again why denial and alibi are not the best defenses
when there is positive identification of the accused for their complicity in the
commission of a crime.
All the accused are related to one another either by consanguinity or by affinity.
Melanio del Castillo and Hermogenes del Castillo are brothers. Rico del Castillo and
Joven del Castillo are, respectively, Melanio’s son and nephew. Felix Avengoza is the
son-in-law of Melanio and the brother of Arnold Avengoza. Both Felix and Arnold
lived in the house of Melanio.
On March 28, 2000, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Batangas City charged all the
accused in the RTC,Batangas City with three counts of murder against against
Sabino D. Guinhawa (Sabino),Graciano A. Delgado (Graciano), and Victor B. Noriega
(Victor).
Eyewitness Froilan R. Perfinian narrated that on March 20, 2000, at about 9:00 pm
when he was walkinghome he heard someone pleading: Huwag po, huwag po! and
saw the assault by all the accused against the victims. PO3 Aguda was the
investigating officer who have seen the dead bodies and recovered a blood-stained
knife with a curved end in Melanio’s house about 20 meters from where the bodies
were found. Hermogenes surrendered at the police station and reported on Melanio's
location where PO3 Aguda has captured Melanio.
The Defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Winifreda, Hermogenes wife.
The accused admitted being in Bulihan at the time of the incident, but denied
liability. Arnold and Joven invoked self-defense and defense of strangers, while
Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico and Felix interposed denial. Winifreda corroborated the
testimonies of Arnold and Joven.
Arnold and Joven alleged that on March 21, 2001 they brought Winifreda and her
son to their house. Before they were able to reach Winifreda’s house, three (3) men
appeared. One of them held Winifreda and when he tried to help her, the other
persons attempted to draw something from their waists prompting him to hacked
one of them. He told the man to stop, but the latter refused. When the other man got
mad, he hacked him twice.

RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a

mitigating circumstance in favor of Hermogenes. CA affirmed the conviction. Hence,
the accused have come to us in a final appeal, submitting that because Arnold and
Joven had already admitted killing the victims, the rest of them should be
exculpated; that Arnold and Joven should be absolved of criminal liability because
they acted in self-defense and defense of strangers; and that conspiracy among them
was not proven.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is proper exercise of self-defense
2. Whether or not the other accused should be exculpated
by virtue of the admission of the two co-accused?
3. Whether or not there is mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
RULING:
The conviction of appellants is affirmed.
I. Arnold and Joven did not action self-defense and in defense of strangers

In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to preventor repel it; and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.20 On
the other hand,the requisites of defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful
aggression by the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it;
and (c) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.

By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in effect

admitted their parts in killing the victims. The rule consistently adhered to in this
jurisdiction is that when the accused’s defense is self-defense he thereby admits
being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to
prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.24 The rationale for
the shifting of the burden of evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be
held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. But
the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the
shoulders of the State, which carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other
words, only the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-defense is an
affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and
satisfactory proof.25 He must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength
of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution, considering that
the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view of his
admission of the killing.
Arnold and Joven did not adequately prove unlawful aggression; hence, neither
self-defense nor defense of stranger was a viable defense for them. We note that in
addition to the eyewitness account of Perfinian directly incriminating them, their
own actuations immediately after the incident confirmed their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
As the CA cogently noted,27 their flight from the neighborhood where the crimes
were committed, their concealing of the weapons used in the commission of the
crimes, their non-reporting of the crimes to the police, and their failure to surrender
themselves to the police authorities fully warranted the RTC’s rejection of their claim
of self-defense and defense of stranger. Nonetheless, even if we were to believe
Arnold and Joven’s version of the incident, the element of unlawful aggression by the
victims would still be lacking.
II. The State duly established
conspiracy and abuse of superior strength

Their individual and collective acts prior to, during and following the attack on the
victims reflected a common objective of killing the latter. Thereby, all the accused,
without exception, were co-conspirators.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.31 Conspiracy is either express or
implied. Thus, the State does not always have to prove the actual agreement to
commit the crime in order to establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that the
accused acted in concert to achieve a common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to
a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.32 Where the acts of
the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.33 Once a conspiracy is
established, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of
one is the act of all.
A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither
does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal act. In view of the foregoing, the Court rejects the pleas for
exculpation of the other accused grounded on their respective alibis considering that
Arnold and Joven’s admission of sole responsibility for the killings did not eliminate
their liability as co-conspirators.
Abuse of superior strength is present if the accused purposely uses excessive force
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there
is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter
takes advantage of superior strength. Superiority in strength may refer to the
number of aggressors and weapons used. A gross disparity of forces existed between
the accused and the victims. Not only did the six accused outnumber the three
victims but the former were armed with bolos while the latter were unarmed. The
accused clearly used their superiority in number and arms to ensure the killing of
the victims. Abuse of superiorstrength is attendant if the accused took advantage of
their superiority in number and their being armed with bolos.
Accordingly, the crimes committed were three counts of murder.
III. Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not be appreciated
in favor of Hermogenes
In order that voluntary surrender is appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the accused has not been actually arrested; (b)
the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c)
surrender is voluntary. The third requisite requires the surrender to be
spontaneous, indicating the intent of the accused to unconditionally submit himself
to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save
them the trouble and expenses necessary for his search and capture.

Although Hermogenes went to Barangay Chairman Aloria of Bulihan after the

killings, he did so to seek protection against the retaliation of the victims’ relatives,
not to admit his participation in the killing of the victims. Nonetheless, any
determination of whether or not Hermogenes was entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender was vain in light of the penalty for murder
being reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
WHEREFORE​, the Court ​AFFIRMS​ the decision.
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180219 November 23, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner was charged abd convicted at the RTC Bian, Laguna of homicide
forthe killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc.
As alleged by the prosecution witness, Jose Sevillo (Jose) on July 5, 1995 at about
7:00 oclock in the evening, he together with Eduardo Matic (Eduardo) and Ernesto
Matic (Ernesto) were infront of his house when the accused arrived and shoot
Ernesto and then Eduardo. On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and
accident. He insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo Matic (Eduardo), not victim
Ernesto Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of the
incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench,but he had parried the blow; that
he and Eduardo had then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had
grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he had thus
struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and
hit Ernesto during their struggling with eachother; that the revolver had again fired,
hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had then seized the revolver and shot Eduardo
in the head; and that he had then fled the scene when people had started swarming
around.
The CA affirmed the conviction based on the RTCs factual and legal conclusions,
and ruled that Talampas, having invoked self-defense, had in effect admitted killing
Ernesto and had thereby assumed the burden of proving the elements of self-defense
by credible, clear and convincing evidence, but had miserably failed to discharge his
burden.
ISSUE:​ Whether or not the defense of self-defense or accident are warranted
RULING:
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused in defending himself.
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim.
The established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was
Talampas who had initiated the attack only against Eduardo. Thus, Talampas was
not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim (Ernesto), thereby rendering
his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking
accident as a defense.Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,[10] the legal provision
pertinent to accident, contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of
doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the
process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the
mind of the actor an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked
his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek
refuge behind Ernesto. At that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit
Ernesto at the right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the
ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back.
Certainly, Talampas acts were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his
revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto,
did not excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. Talampas poor aim amounted to
aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him
from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability as provided in Article
4 oF the RPC.
WHEREFORE​, the Court ​AFFIRMS​ the decision.

TERESITA T. BAYONLA,​ Complainant, vs. ​ATTY. PURITA A. REYES,​ Respondent.

A.C. No. 4808 November 22, 2011
F: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment for gross dishonesty, deceit,
conversion, and breach of trust filed against Atty. Purita A. Reyes by Teresita T.
Bayonla.
Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and his uncle Alfredo had engaged
the legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation
compensation from the​ ​Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro City during
which times respondent allegedly failed to deliver the balance of Bayonla’s share.
The Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation to which the IBP Board of Governors found against Atty. Reyes. It
found that that complainant was supposed to receive the amount due her which
was ​P​123,582.66 and actually received only ​P​79,000.00; then respondent still has to
remit to complainant the amount of ​P​44,582.66. Respondent violated Rule 16.01
Canon 16 Chapter III of the Code of Professional Responsibility2. She was to render
an accounting or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant of all the collected
shares due the complainant and remit to the latter the said amount of ​P​44.582.66.
Until such time that respondent had complied with the aforementioned, she is
suspended from the practice of her legal profession.
Through her manifestation, Atty. Reyes posed some queries, as follows: (​a) whether
she could be compelled to pay the amount of ​P​44,582.66 to Bayonla even if the
latters claims had been based on perjured statements; (​b) whether the payment of
the amount would operate to dismiss the ​estafa case previously filed by Bayonla
against her for allegedly failing to deliver the balance of Bayonlas share; and (​c)
whether she could deposit the amount of ​P​44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of
Governors or the Court. She also stated that the IBP Board of Governors did not
accord to her the right to confront Bayonla during the investigation conducted by
the IBP Board of Governors.
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the final resolution of this case.
I: ​Has Atty. Reyes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility​? Does the present
administrative case against Atty. Reyes operate to dismiss the estafa case against
her previously filed by the same complainant? Was there denial of due process
against Atty. Reyes?
R:
I. Respondent was guilty of violating the canons of the ​Code of
Professional Responsibility
Canon 16 of the ​Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into her possession.
Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon
16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand, subject to the lawyer’s lien over the funds, or the lawyers
2
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
option to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the
aforestated canons. Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately account for
and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she had
converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in
her. It constituted gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law became justified pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the ​Rules of
Court3 .
II. Pendency of other cases not an obstacle to administrative proceeding
against respondent
It is indisputable that the pendency of any criminal charges between the lawyer and
her client does not negate the administrative proceedings against the lawyer. We
explained why in ​Suzuki v. Tiamson, to wit:
The settled rule is that ​criminal and civil cases are different
from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa​. In this light,
we refer to this Courts ruling in ​Berbano vs. Barcelona, citing ​In re
Almacen, where it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are ​sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court ​motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, ​in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.​
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the
determination of respondents administrative liability and our
3
Section 27. ​Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may
be disbarred or ​suspended​ from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any ​deceit​, malpractice, or ​other
gross misconduct in such office​, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. xxx
 findings herein should not in any way be treated as having any
material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties
may choose to file against each other​.​ [emphasis supplied]
​

III. No denial of due process to respondent

Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her right to due process because
the IBP Board of Governors did not permit her to personally confront the
complainant. Contrary to Atty. Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of
Governors was under no legal obligation to conduct a trial-type proceeding at which
she could have personally confronted Bayonla. As the Court said in ​Samalio v. Court
of Appeals:

Due process in an administrative context does not require

trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process
that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other
words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due
process for an administrative​ ​agency to resolve a case based solely
on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted
by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their
direct testimony.
In her formal investigation of the complaint, Commissioner Navarro allowed
both parties to submit their respective proofs on the actual amounts released
by the ATO, the amounts due to Bayonla as her share, Atty. Reyes
corresponding contingent fees, the remittances by Atty. Reyes to Bayonla, and
the receipts showing such remittances.
IV. Sanction
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand
of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has
been suspension from the practice of law for two years. This same sanction was
imposed against the erring lawyers un in ​Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, ​Mortera v.
Pagatpatan, Small v. Banares, Barcenas v. Alvero.
Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of ​P​44,582.67, which the
IBP Board of Governors found to be still unpaid, by way of restitution. In addition,
Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12% ​per annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the
date when she was formally charged with disbarment.
WHEREFORE​, the Court ​FINDS AND PRONOUNCES​ ​ATTY. PURITA A.
REYES ​guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the ​Code of
Professional Responsibility, and ​SUSPENDS​ her from the practice of law for a period
of two years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with warning that a similar
offense by her will be dealt with more severely.