Professional Documents
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The Arab region, long characterized by political activity, whether in its anti-
colonial movements, its own regional and internal conflicts, or the various wars
it has witnessed, still lags far behind other regions in the world when it comes to
the political status of its women. The Arab world is ranked by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) as the second-lowest region in the world on the
Gender Empowerment Measure, and by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) as the
lowest region in terms of percentage of women in parliaments. The political status of
Arab women is therefore a critical issue.
Space only allows for a broad presentation of the situation. This case study first
provides an overview of the Arab region and focuses on the political status of women.
A cautionary point should be made here: although there are many common socio-
economic and political factors influencing the development of the Arab countries,
each state’s response to these factors is unique and depends on the internal dynamics
within each country. Hence, when discussing Arab women, it should be remembered
that the Arab world is not a homogeneous region and there is no single archetype for
Arab women. In the second section, an overview of the key challenges that confront
women in achieving decision-making positions is presented, drawing on experiences
from three countries: Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen. The third section of the case study
describes some of the mechanisms that have been used to tackle the challenges and
promote Arab women’s participation in parliaments, and suggests others that might
be appropriate for the region.
A. Overview
The Arab region stretches from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Arabian Gulf
and Indian Ocean in the east, comprising 22 states that are currently members of the
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Case Study: The Arab States
Arab League. Although there are wide variations among these countries, their Arab
Islamic cultural heritage and common language have preserved a distinctive character
More than other regions, the Arab region is defined by a complex set of issues,
including but not limited to the Arab–Israeli conflict and its repercussions, unstable
economic conditions and trends, population-resource imbalances, undemocratic
internal governance systems and environmental stress. Civil societies across the region
are in different stages of development, but generally do not fulfil the role civil society
has in other regions.
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
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Case Study: The Arab States
Patriarchy
Patriarchy is still a major force hindering Arab women’s advancement. A combination
Religion
Islam has often been cited as the main culprit behind the slow/incremental development
of the status of women in the region. Delving into the various interpretations of
Islam and Islamic feminism is beyond the scope of this case study; suffice it to state
that Islam has not deterred women in non-Arab Islamic countries such as Indonesia,
Bangladesh and Pakistan from reaching top elected positions. It can also be added
that some Islamist political parties in the Arab world have promoted their women
members as parliamentary candidates. One can question whether Arab non-Muslim
women have had better chances than their Arab Muslim sisters, or whether they all
face similar challenges in their quest to improve their lot and advance their political
careers. It has been rightly pointed out that ‘what is at issue is not so much the
religion per se, but a broader aspect of neopatriarchy… it is not culture alone that
impacts on women’s political participation, but a whole host of other factors combine
to render the situation as it is’.8
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
1. ‘The centrality of the family, rather than the individual, as the main unit of
society. This emphasis on the family is seen as justification for equivalent, rather than
equal, rights . . ’.
2. ‘The assumption that the man is the sole breadwinner of the family’.
3. ‘A “code of modesty” under which family honour and dignity rest on the
reputation of the woman. This code imposes restrictions on interaction between men
and women.
4. ‘An unequal balance of power in the private sphere that affects women’s access
to the public sphere. This power difference is anchored in family laws.’9
Hence the paradigm presumes that the man’s responsibility for supporting and
protecting his wife and family justifies his authority over his wife’s interaction in the
public sphere and control over it. This stress on women’s primary role in the private
sphere to the detriment of their role in the public sphere has actually jeopardized their
access to full citizenship rights. Recently, it has been rightly pointed out that ‘on paper
in many states, women are declared to be citizens, but there are many social rights
and benefits that remain inaccessible to women except through the medium of the
family’.10 While women in many Arab states have acquired their full political rights
as citizens, unless they acquire their full social and economic rights, their practice of
citizenship will remain curtailed.
Recent research on Arab women’s political participation has concluded that
‘women are not active in politics because politics is not a safe and secure place’, calling
for a focus on human security to ensure that women can participate freely without
threats and coercion.11 While such a new angle for analysing Arab women’s political
participation could lead to certain improvements in women’s levels of participation,
it is rather simplistic to think that this would be enough to turn the tables and bring
women’s participation to its full measure.
Discourses
Despite certain improvements in the conditions of women in the region, a challenge
has re-emerged more recently in that attempts to empower women are viewed with
suspicion, as part of a ‘Western agenda’. In the 1990s this claim came as a response to
international conferences that highlighted women’s human rights. The establishment
of the US–Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) towards the end of 2002,
and later the announcement of the Greater Middle East Initiative submitted to the
Group of Eight industrialized countries (G8) Summit, only served to reinforce such
apprehensions. In an attempt to prove that reforms should come from within, the Arab
heads of state at their Tunis Summit (May 2004) committed themselves to ‘promote
the role of women, consolidate their rights, encourage their effective participation
in development and their role in the political, economic, social and cultural fields’.12
This was the very first reference to women in the history of Arab summits.
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Case Study: The Arab States
Women’s Movements
The patriarchal order that the Arab states share permeates civil society and is an
Electoral Practices
Closely linked to the issue of the ‘Arab freedom and democracy deficit’ raised earlier
are the electoral laws in force in Arab countries and the electoral processes that ensue.
In the case of women, the questions that arise are how gender-sensitive processes and
legislation are, and more importantly, whether they can be gender-sensitized in settings
that tend to be non-democratic or in nascent democracies. The linkage between
patriarchal societies, levels of democratization and the political status of women is
very intriguing indeed, yet, regrettably, it has not been adequately researched in the
Arab region. The electoral systems in Arab countries vary, but apart from the few
cases where quota systems have been applied they are not generally women-friendly.
Mirroring the dialectical relationship of the various factors reviewed above, Arab
women’s representation in legislatures is the lowest in the world, with the world
average standing at 16 percent while in the Arab world (excluding the Pacific region)
it is only 6.5 percent.15 In contrast to most other regions of the world, in the Arab
countries women have generally been better represented in the upper houses of
national parliaments than in the lower houses. This could be explained by the fact
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
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Case Study: The Arab States
Notes:
(1) Ranked by descending order of the percentage of women in the lower/single house in 183 countries.
(2) 444 members elected, 10 appointed by the head of state.
(3) 270 directly elected, 35 representatives of women, 26 representatives of university graduates and 29
representatives of trade unions.
* Members are elected through direct elections.
** Members are elected through indirect elections.
*** Members are appointed by the head of state.
Sources: Compiled from information available on the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) web site,
‘Women in National Parliaments’, <http://www.ipu.org>, for all countries except Iraq, Oman and
Qatar, which were compiled from information available on the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU)
web site, <http://www.arab-ipu.org/>. Information on the OPT available on the Palestinian Legislative
Council web site, <http://www.pal-plc.org>.
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
This section identifies key challenges that confront women seeking decision-making
positions, specifically in parliaments. In addition to the political environment outlined
above, this section discusses the specific obstacles faced, such as the role played by
political parties, tribalism, the women’s movement and financial constraints, which
are the key obstacles. Undeniably, mature and organized political parties have a crucial
role in the political development of a given country and in preparing candidates
to participate actively in decision making. Tribalism, often criticized for hindering
women’s advancement, appears to be co-opting any opportunities for women to its
own advantage. Similarly, the role played by women’s movements is expected to be a
key factor in promoting women’s access to decision making. Finally, financial capacity
plays a crucial role in mobilizing resources to support any candidate.
Since the number of countries in the region makes it impossible to look at each
country’s electoral process individually, three countries will be highlighted here:
Yemen, Lebanon and Jordan. It is important to note that, in addition to the regional
conflicts mentioned above and their various impacts on each Arab state, both Yemen
and Lebanon have had their own internal conflicts, which have ultimately shaped the
political, economic and social contexts in these countries. Although these cases may
not be representative of the entire region, they reflect issues that have resonance with
neighbouring countries.
During the past 15 years, Yemen and Lebanon have had three national elections
each, and Jordan has had four. The participation of women as candidates in these
elections is summarized in table 4, which shows that in Yemen and Lebanon women’s
participation remains limited but Jordan has witnessed shifts and developments over
the four elections, with a marked increase in 2003, attributed to the introduction of
six reserved seats for women.17
Yemen
Table 4 illustrates the decline in the number of women in the Yemeni Parliament, to
just 0.3 percent in 2003.18 Different factors have contributed to this situation.
Illiteracy. The illiteracy rate among Yemeni women (76.1 percent)19 is the highest
in the region, which affects not only the processes of voter registration and voting, but
also political awareness of the importance of electing women. However, the higher
educational levels of women in Lebanon and Jordan have not yielded better results
for women’s broader participation in those countries.
Mobility. This is an important factor limiting women’s opportunities to participate
in Yemeni elections. Table 4 shows that the number of women candidates standing
for elections has nearly halved since 1997. This is attributed to the stipulation
introducedin the General Election Law, No. 13 of 2001, which states that an
independent candidate has to be supported by at least 300 people from his or her
constituency.
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Case Study: The Arab States
Source: Mashhur, Huriya, 2005. ‘Political Participation by Yemeni Women’, in International IDEA
and Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), Building Democracy in Yemen: Women’s Political
Participation, Political Party Life and Democratic Elections. Stockholm: International IDEA and
ANND.
This was a difficult requirement for all candidates to fulfil, but is probably more
so for women, who cannot afford to travel far and are less well known within their
communities.20
The political parties. While political parties seem to have thrived in post-
unification Yemen, women formed only 2 percent of their membership when they
were established following unification in 1990. The major political parties do have
token representation of one or two women in their higher echelons (either on the
executive board or in the highest decision-making body of the party, which usually
constitute around 20 persons), with the exception of the Socialist Party, which had
four women in its 29-member political bureau in 2003. Reported reasons for this
vary from women themselves refraining from party work to women feeling that ‘they
are not given serious tasks except to mobilize women to vote during elections’.21
Women who stood for the 2003 elections argued that they were not given any
kind of financial or moral support for their campaigns. While traditional forces
openly resisted women’s participation, the resistance of the political parties was not so
straightforward, but indirectly they pressured women not to stand. The ruling party,
the General People’s Congress (GPC), fielded only one woman candidate, whereas
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
the Socialist Party (which was previously the ruling party in the People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and was then noted for its pro-women policies)
fielded two. Furthermore, their electoral platforms in 2003 did not commit these
parties to support women to stand for election.
Tribalism. Exacerbating these factors, Yemeni women still have to confront
the traditional forces of tribalism. Many have admitted that the regressive trend in
women’s participation has been a result of ‘tribalism, its value system and its view of
women. Even political parties, which should have effected change since they represent
modernizing influences within the state, were themselves an extension of the tribe
and of the tribal attitude that resists any advancement in the status of women’.22
Lebanon
As a result of the 2000 election, only 2.3 percent of parliamentary representatives are
women. This is explained by different factors, including the following.
The political parties. The results of the three successive parliamentary elections
do not reflect the advancement of Lebanese women in several other areas, such as
education, the economy and culture. The civil war can be blamed for stunting the
political advancement of women in various ways. Prior to the civil war, women were
quite active in the political parties, and even during the war certain parties specifically
sought women’s participation. Recently, however, the situation has regressed, and
women’s wings or sections in the 18 political parties have in some instances been
reconstituted as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). ‘Some civil society actors
feel that women’s sections of political parties have in effect been marginalized and
“pushed aside” into these NGOs, and thus it is more an indication of the lack of
incorporation of women into party politics than genuine attention to women’s
issues.’23
Men dominate the leadership of political parties, and among six major parties
women’s participation at the highest levels of decision making ranges from zero to
10 percent.24 According to personal testimonies, women face difficulties within the
political parties, they question the internal democracy of the parties, and they argue
that there is an obvious division of labour based on gender within the parties’ general
activities.25 In addition, financial constraints stifle women aspirants, and without
party and financial support electoral campaigns become prohibitively expensive.
Patronage and family ties. Although tribalism does not exist in Lebanon, the
political scene is governed by other factors that carry within them similar patriarchal
overtones, including powerful families that have dominated political life. In short,
the system governing Lebanese politics could be termed a sectarian, family-based
system. The effect on women’s political participation has been negative and is often
criticized.
Lebanese women parliamentarians have been branded as the women ‘dressed
in black’.26 The first two women to enter parliament, in 1963 and much later in
1992, ‘inherited’ their seats—the first from her father, and the second from her
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Case Study: The Arab States
assassinated husband—thus explaining the black mourning dresses they wore. The
current situation is not much improved, since the women parliamentarians have not
Jordan
The 2003 elections showed a marked increase in women’s parliamentary representation,
from zero to 5.5 percent. This was attributable to the adoption of six reserved seats
for women in the parliament, which were introduced to overcome the barriers to
women’s participation.
Tribalism. Tribalism is a major force in both Jordanian politics and society. It is
interesting to note in this respect that, of the six ‘winners’ of the reserved seats for
women, five had the support of their tribes and were fielded as ‘tribal candidates’,
while only one was a partisan candidate. In contrast to the situation in Yemen, where
tribalism is seen as debilitating to the advancement of women, the quota system seems
to have suited smaller tribes whose male candidates would not have stood a chance in
open competition with candidates of larger tribes. Some simple calculations assured
the smaller tribes that the quota system would give them much better opportunities;
hence they used it to their advantage.
The political parties. With the resumption of political liberalization in 1989 and
the passing of a new political party law, Jordan now has 32 registered political parties.
The membership of women in these parties does not exceed 8 percent, and there are
very few women in the higher echelons. An analysis of the discourse of political parties
and gender equality has revealed that their general commitment to the advancement
of women is very much of a token nature, since none of the parties appears to grasp
the nature and magnitude of such issues, and they address major challenges such as
poverty, unemployment, health and education in a totally gender-blind fashion.28
Women’s linkages. After the election of six women through reserved seats, an
emerging challenge is the relationship between women members of parliament
(MPs) and the women’s movement. It is argued that women MPs are an ‘obstacle’
in securing gender equality and are not articulating women’s interests in society.29
While this charge points to an important challenge, there are certain structural and
financial deficiencies that put women MPs at a disadvantage, including the view that
MPs’ role in Jordan is much more tilted towards being a ‘service MP’.30 This reflects
what most critics of Jordanian MPs maintain—that they do not fulfil their proper
legislative roles as they seem more preoccupied with securing special services from
government (e.g. high-level appointments or cash assistance to a poor family) for
their constituents.
Equally challenging is the question what the women’s movement is doing to ensure
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
The above examples provide a snapshot of some of the main obstacles facing women
in three Arab states. In contrast to Lebanon and Yemen, Jordan has maintained a
stable internal political environment with no internal conflicts. Nonetheless, the
three countries share similarities when we look at the role of women in public life.
Furthermore, whatever the contextual and historical differences between the political
parties in each country, it is clear that the position of political parties, being crucial to
women’s political empowerment, has fallen short of realizing that role.
It is clear that in the Yemeni case illiteracy rates pose a specific dilemma. Certainly,
while this issue may not appear as forcibly in other countries, it is clear that specific
measures to address such constraining factors are essential if the inclusion of all
members of society is to be ensured.
Electoral systems have not been touched upon in detail in this paper because of
space limitations but are discussed in detail in chapter 3.
In sum, the factors that hinder the promotion of Arab women in the public
domain are complex and intertwined. The small windows of opportunity available
vary between countries, and consequently there is no blueprint for the promotion
of women that can be applied across the Arab world, given the different contexts
and experiences of each country. However, the examples given here illustrate certain
common obstacles that are shared by women, and to a lesser extent some mechanisms
or general recommendations that could be implemented to overcome these obstacles.
The following section addresses four groups of recommendations: general strategies
that target women’s advancement (grouped into state-level and political party actions);
and specific recommendations about electoral processes, categorized into pre-election
measures and measures during elections.
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
tokenism is much more apparent in the political parties than in state institutions;
this is apparent not only in quantitative terms but also in terms of policies, where
state policies often appear to be more gender-sensitive than those of the political
parties. Hence the political parties need to identify gender issues in their platforms,
institutional set-ups and internal procedures.37
One country in this case study, Jordan, has been seriously considering giving
financial incentives to political parties that engage more women in their party
membership and leadership.38 In countries that adopt proportional representation
systems, one strategy might be to give incentives, such as public funding for election
campaigns, or providing more air time for campaigning during elections, as has
happened in Timor-Leste, to parties that place women in winnable positions on their
party list.39 Another mechanism could be the implementation of quotas for women,
with strict sanctions for enforcement.
Electoral Processes
Pre-election Measures
Patriarchal structures are entrenched within the Arab states’ social fabric. Certainly
there is an immense need to challenge the patriarchal authority in the private and
public spheres. As discussed elsewhere,40 voter education and civic education in
general seem to be rather rudimentary and sporadic in the cases reviewed. Projects to
design country-specific gender-sensitive programmes have been initiated to overcome
this.41
Certainly, women’s limited political exposure and experience have minimized
their chances as candidates. Skills training and individual consultations for women
candidates and their campaign managers on issues such as time management, targeting
voters, recruiting volunteers, communications, fund-raising, and formulating and
implementing field strategies have been used with varying success.42 Such training
programmes could be further developed based on evaluations of previous activities.
The role of the women’s movement in supporting candidates has not been as
successful as its role in bringing attention to women’s issues in general. This could
be attributed to various factors such as legislation that prohibits all NGOs from
dealing with political issues, or patriarchal structures such as tribalism or political
families, whereby women’s support for candidates is automatically geared towards
the family candidate. These factors, together with the impermeability of patriarchal
structures within the political parties themselves, also inhibit the women’s movement
in pressuring the political parties to nominate more women.
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Case Study: The Arab States
overseeing polling on election day also facilitated women’s roles as voters and increased
their turnout rates.43 Both Yemen and Jordan have separate polling stations for men
D. Conclusion
‘The women’s movement…is the detonator which will explode the neo-patriarchal
society from within. If allowed to grow and come into its own, it will become
the permanent shield against patriarchal regression, the cornerstone of future
modernity.’45
It is often the case that discussions on the political status and representation
of Arab women tend to highlight the difficulties and challenges at the expense of
presenting the more positive aspects or breakthroughs that have occurred during the
last ten to 15 years. This positive momentum is gaining strength; even over the short
time span of writing this case study, changes were taking place that promise a more
prominent role and presence for Arab women. If Arab societies are to benefit fully
from the winds of political reform that are currently sweeping the region, then women
have to become an active part of these processes by asserting their full potential as the
harbingers of a better future.
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
Notes
1
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2002. Arab Human Development
Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations. New York: UNDP, p. 2.
2
According to Freedom House ratings, the ‘partly free’ countries are Bahrain, the Comoros,
Djibouti, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and Yemen. The category of ‘not free’ includes
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (both Israeli- and Palestinian Authority-administered), Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. Freedom House, 2004.
Freedom in the World 2004: Freedom in the World Country Ratings, available at <http://
www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/>; and Freedom in
the World 2004: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, <http://www.
freedomhouse.org/research/survey2004.htm> (accessed 27 October 2004).
3
Khouri, Rami, 2004. ‘Politics and Perceptions in the Middle East after September 11’.
Social Science Research Council/Contemporary Conflicts (accessed 27 October 2004)
available at <http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/mideast/khouri/pf> (accessed 26 October 2004).
4
Gambill, Gary C., 2003a. ‘Explaining the Arab Democracy Deficit: Part I’. Middle East
Intelligence Bulletin. Vol. 5, no. 2, February/March, available at <http://www.meib.org/
articles/0302 me.htm>; and Gambill, Gary C., 2003b. ‘Explaining the Arab Democracy
Deficit: Part II’. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. Vol. 5, no. 2, February/March, available
at <http://www.meib.org/articles/0303 me1.htm> (both accessed 26 October 2004).
5
Karam, Azza, 1999. ‘Strengthening the Role of Women Parliamentarians in the Arab
Region: Challenges and Options’, available at <http://www.pogar.org/publications/
gender/karam1/karama.pdf>.
6
Ibid.
7
Sharabi, Hisham, 1988. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society. New
York: Oxford University Press.
8
Karam 1999, op. cit.
9
World Bank, 2003. Gender and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Women
in the Public Sphere. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 8–9.
10
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 2004. Progress of Arab
Women 2004. Amman: UNIFEM Arab States Regional Office, p. 126.
11
Ibid., pp. 271, 287.
12
Hamzeh, Alia, 2004. ‘Leaders Adopt Reform Plan’. Jordan Times, available at
<http://www.jordanembassyus.org/05242004001.htm> (accessed 24 October 2004).
13
Joseph, Suad, 1997. ‘The Reproduction of Political Process Among Women Activists
in Lebanon: “Shopkeepers” and Feminists’, in Dawn Chatty and Annika Rabo (eds).
Organizing Women. Oxford: Berg, pp. 51–81.
14
Brand, Laurie A., 1998. Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and
North African Experiences. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 10.
15
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2005. ‘Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of
31 January 2005’, available at <http://www.ipu.org>.
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Case Study: The Arab States
16
Linkages between legislation (covering such areas as family laws, social security, etc.)
and labour force participation are discussed in World Bank 2003, op. cit. One can draw
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Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers
Law: Deputy Says Women’s “Honour” Could Be “Jeopardized” If They Are Elected to
Parliament’. No. 7607, 15 November, p. 3.
32
See al-Bilad, 2003. [Adab Saud opens files and reveals all]. No. 524, 10 September, p. 5;
al-Arab Al-Yaum, 2003; and ad-Dustour, 2003.
33
Focus group discussion attended by the author on 4 August 2004. The discussion
was held at the Jordanian National Commission for Women to discuss means of
implementing the National Plan of Action which was adopted at the National Conference
on Political Development and Jordanian Women.
34
Brand 1998, op. cit., pp. 256–8.
35
Sixteen of the 22 Arab countries have so far acceded to or ratified CEDAW. These are:
Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. All of these countries have
made reservations on certain articles of the Convention. (UNIFEM 2004, op. cit.)
36
See Karam 1999, op. cit., and Sabbagh 2004b, op. cit.
37
Sabbagh 2004b, op. cit.
38
al-Arab al-Yawm, 2004. [Daoudieh: Parties are national institutions that will be
supported]. No. 2596, 14 July, p. 23.
39
United Nations, Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of
Women (OSAGI), 2004. UN Expert Meeting: Enhancing Women’s Participation in
Electoral Processes in Post-conflict Countries. OSAGI and Department of Political
Affairs Expert Group Meeting, New York, January, available at <http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/osagi/meetings/2004/EGMelectoral/finalreport.pdf>.
40
Sabbagh 2004a, op. cit.
41
The 2004 National Conference on Jordanian Women and Political Development
developed the National Plan of Action focusing on the importance of designing such
curricula with the participation of major stakeholders such as women’s NGOs and
political parties. The Jordanian Prime Minister, Faisal al-Fayez, endorsed this Plan of
Action at the close of the conference on 1 August 2004 and preparations are under way to
start with the design of each measure outlined in the Plan of Action. The role of women’s
NGOs will not be limited to the design of these programmes but will also include their
delivery. Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW), 2004. National Plan
of Action. ‘Political Development and Jordanian Women: Discourse and Mechanisms’.
JNCW: Amman. 3 July–1 August.
42
Sabbagh 2004a, op. cit.
43
Mashhur, 2005, op. cit.; and Colburn, Martha, 2002. Gender and Development in Yemen.
Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung.
44
Mashhur, 2005, op. cit.
45
Sharabi 1988, op. cit., p. 154.
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Further Reading
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