Selected Papers from

The XXII World Congress of Philosophy

Heidegger’s Seyn, Ereignis, and Dingen as

Viewed from an Eastern Perspective
Kwang-Sae Lee
Kent State University

Abstract: In Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes fundamental

ontology. Heidegger conceives of Being as temporality. Being (Sein) is
unconcealment which is replaced by be-ing (Seyn), that is, the disjunction
between unconcealment and concealment. In the topological phase as
in Contributions to Philosophy (CP), The Thing and Building Dwelling
Thinking be-ing yields to enowning. “B-ing holds sway as enowning”
(CP section 10). But be-ing holding sway entails that a being (Seiende)
“is”. Which means that a thing things. Enowning is Dasein’s thinking-
responding to the call of Be-ing. Hence be-ing­historical thinking (Seyns-
geschichtes Denken) which is enowned thinking. When a thing things,
world worlds (Die Welt weltet). Be-ing-historical thinking is thinking-
thinging, that is, thinking space-time or thinking gathering (Versammlung)
of elements that “belong together”. Thinging is the mirror interplay of the
fourfold. In Four Seminars, Heidegger says: “There is no longer room
for the very name of being. . . . Being is enowned through enowning.
Sein ist durch Ereignis ereignet.” But enowning means thinking thinging.

H eidegger moves away from metaphysics towards a nominalistic process philoso-

phy. Heidegger’s lifetime work is devoted to exorcizing the ghost of the monolithic
design of Platonic metaphysic As H. W. Petzet observes, “His whole life is, he
says, has been devoted to a freeing from this prison.”1 Heidegger is manifestly
following in the footsteps of Nietzsche who excoriates the Christian faith-cum-
Plato’s doctrine of truth. Heidegger has tried to free himself from the prison of the
monolithic design of Platonic realist, substantialist philosophy and move towards
a nominalistic process philosophy. An integral part of this move is his polemics

Special Supplement, Journal of Philosophical Research pp. 343–351

DOI: 10.5840/jpr201237Supplement52
344 Kwang-Sae Lee

raised against Husserl’s notion of self-consciousness as juxtaposed to object, or

more broadly, the standard subject-object distinction as drawn by typical modern
philosophers. In the early phase of his philosophical career (as in Being and Time)
Heidegger undertakes fundamental ontology. Then in the middle phase (as in
Contributions to Philosophy) and the later phase (as in “The Thing” and “Building
Dwelling Thinking”), Heidegger yields beyng to enowning as thinging. We begin
with fundamental ontology.
In fundamental ontology Heidegger begins with being (Sein) conceived as
presence (Anwesenheit) which is the “transcendental condition of the possibility of
objects” as he subsequently characterizes in Contributions to Philosophy the sense
of being in Being and Time. Being is replaced, for example, in “On the Question of
Being” by be-ing or beyng (Seyn) or being with a crossing out, the three equivalent
symbols signifying the disjunction between presence (disclosure) and absence
(withdrawal), or between presence and nothing (“what is yet unrevealed”). Talk
of beyng is an explicitly pluralistic talk with respect to the framework question
allowing for multiplicity of ways of revelation (multiplicity of the conditions of
the possibility of objects). In regard to beings, beyng conveys the “the sense of
the plenitude of all their facets,” (to borrow the expression Heidegger, inspired
by Rilke, uses in “What Are Poets For?”). Beyng signifies the Open. Just as the
lighted side and the dark side only taken together are the whole of the globe, so
what is present and what is now absent (that is, “what is yet unrevealed” and,
to make the sense of absence or nothing fully explicit, what has already been
disclosed and what has been) taken together give expression to the “sense of
the plenitude” of beyng. Fossilizing presence as eternal being, the only possible
disclosure of being, the only truth, sires metaphysics, more specifically, what is
known in postmodernist circles as the metaphysics of presence. Metaphysics comes
into being when the dark side of the globe (in the metaphorical sense) is forgot-
ten, that is to say, when open-ended alternative ways of disclosure are forgotten.
Hence the forgetfulness of being (better, the forgottenness of beyng). Ab-ground
(Ab-grund) that Heidegger introduces in Contributions to Philosophy is designed
to dispel the metaphysical notion of absolute, unique grounding, namely, Plato’s
Doctrine of Truth.
The forgetfulness of being (Seinsvergessenheit, still better, Seynsvergessen-
heit), based on the abandonment of being (Seynsverlassenheit) means the failure
of questionableness. Thus in BQP Heidegger avers: “If we try to determine the
present situation of man on earth metaphysically— . . . —thus not histographically
and not in terms of world-view—then it must be said that man is beginning to
enter the age of the total unquestionableness of all things and all contrivances.”2
The failure of questionableness means closure, determinateness, being locked up
in the prison of metaphysics, falling prey to the block universe, and the failure
of projecting-open in the perspective of beyng-historical thinking. Overcoming
metaphysics is becoming open to the open-ended multiplicity of ways of disclosure.
Scientism, which says that science is the measure of all things, as coupled with
Heidegger Viewed from an Eastern Perspective 345

its inseparable companion, Gestell (the technological mode of thinking, which

should be distinguished from technology) is the culmination of Platonic meta-
physics. Any monolithic design claiming the monopoly of truth is metaphysics.
In addition to science, religion and art, among others, are also ways of disclosure
of beyng. Even in science, theories of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. are mani-
fold ways of disclosure of beyng. Even within physics, there are alternative ways
of disclosure (e.g., Aristotelian, Newtonian, Einsteinian, etc.). In art painting is
one way, and music is another way of disclosure. Even in painting, Cezanne’s
paintings of Mont Sainte-Victoire and Van Gogh’s paintings are different ways
of disclosure of beyng . Even Van Gogh’s paintings done in different periods are
different ways of disclosure. When Heidegger contemplated Mont Sainte-Victoire
at different times, beyng was disclosed to him differently. To anticipate a bit and
to rephrase the point in unmistakably nominalistic parlance, on each occasion of
Heidegger’s contemplating Mont Sainte-Victoire, a thing thinged in a unique and
unrepeatable fashion.
In On Time and Being, Heidegger gives expression to beyng in terms of tem-
porality. He says: “The supposition appears to be fully confirmed when we note
that absence, too, manifests itself as a mode of presence. What has-been which,
by refusing the present, lets that become present which is no longer present; and
the coming toward us of what is to come which, by withholding the present, lets
that be present, which is not yet present—both made manifest the manner of an
extending opening up which gives all presencing into the open.”3 Beyng is char-
acterized as “all presencing.” “All presencing” signifies not only the present, but
also what has-been and what is-to-come. However, fully to give expression to the
plenitude of beyng, we should also consider not only what are absent in terms of
temporality (what has-been and what is-to-come) but also what are absent in terms
of spatiality. Unlike the East Asians, Heidegger (the early Heidegger in particular
of Being and Time) neglects spatiality. We post-Heideggeerian cosmopolitans who
transcend the traditional East-West duality should be mindful of spatiality as well
as temporality. Further, we should fully unfold the significance of the plenitude
of beyng with regard to aesthetic, cognitive, moral, cultural, religious, and other
relevant dimensions.
Fully to appreciate the significance of ab-ground (Ab-grund) we should unfold
the fundamental way in which Heidegger creatively transforms Plato’s notion of
chora into the manifoldness of enownings.
For Plato, chora is what is absolutely not amenable to Reason. Chora is “abso-
lutely unreal and unknowable ” But Heidegger transforms Platonic Nothing into
what is not present here and now and yet what has-been and what is to-come. Let
us expatiate on the theme. For Plato, chora is “the absolutely unreal and unknow-
able.”4 Chora “is apprehended by some sort of bastard reasoning.”5 Chora “has
some sort of existence . . . , but not real being . . . ,”6 Form and chora “must forever
remain distinct.”7 Chora “can never enter into the existence of Forms.”8 Chora is
negative reality with shadow existence which constitutes otherness to Platonic
346 Kwang-Sae Lee

Reason and the rationally structured Reality. For Plato, the Reason/Unreason
distinction is ontologically and epistemologically ultimate and immutable. The
Platonic distinction is the source of binary opposition and dualistic thinking in the
traditional Western mainstream Rationalistic thinking. Chora is alterity which de-
fies the metaphysics of presence. But what defies the logic of Platonic reason and
metaphysics only shows the limitation of Platonic logos and reprsentationalism. By
the dexterous hands of Heidegger chora is transformed into Heideggerian absence,
pointing to open-ended multiple ways of disclosure alternative to presence. What
is “absolutely unreal and unknowable” is really what is resistant to the logic of
monolithic Platonic Truth. The “bastard logic,” if creatively recast pluralistically
along the Heideggerian line of thinking, offers intimations of alternative ways of
disclosure of beyng and thinking, points to the manifoldness of enownings and
beyng-historical thinking.
Now let us move on to topology the way Heidegger does in his middle phase,
as in Contributions to Philosophy, and in the later phase, as in The Thing and
Building Dwelling Thinking. In his topological phase, be-ing yields to enowning
(Ereignis). Focus shifts from be-yng to enowning. “Be-ing holds sway as enown-
ing.”9 But when be-ing sways as enowning, “a being is.” This is what Heidegger
says: “Be-ing holds sway: a being is.”10 In the German original, the passage
reads: “Das Seyn west: das Seiende ist.”11 “Seiende” means a a particular thing
(as in thinging). So Ereignis really means thinging, that is, particular, unique, and
unrepeatable happening (event). Now the customary translation of “Ereignis” as
“event” makes sense. Here I am adumbrating the Heideggerian project of nomi-
nalistic process philosophy.
“Be-ing needs man in order to hold sway; and man belongs to be-ing so that
he can accomplish his utmost destiny. . . . The counter-resonance of needing and
belonging makes up be-ing as enowning; and the first thing that is incumbent
upon thinking is to raise the resonance of this counter-resonance to the onefold
of knowing awareness and to ground the counter-resonance in its truth. ”12 That
be-ing enowns Dasein means that be-ing historically unfolds itself in response to
which Dasein projects-open by way of thinking. Here thrown projecting-open is
en-owned projecting-open. Enowned projecting-open is inceptual thinking, that is,
the inception of beying-historical thinking (Seynsgeschichtes Denken).
Unique, unrepeatable, particular historical happening is “time-space as ab-
ground (Die Zeit-Raum als Ab-grund). “Ab-ground is the originary essential
swaying of ground. . . . Ab-ground is the staying-away of ground. . . . The manner
of non-granting the ground. . . . letting be empty—thus an outstanding manner
of enopening. ”13 Particular happening is contingent. Ab-ground is a particular
happening yielding and deferring to other unpredictable contingent particular
happenings, “as yet unrevealed.” Particular happening is not disclosure of being
as a whole. Rather be-ing is the disjunction between presence and absence, that is,
unpredictable, open-ended particular happenings. Be-ing (beyng) or being with a
crossing out “shelters untapped treasures and is the promise of a find that awaits
Heidegger Viewed from an Eastern Perspective 347

only the appropriate seeking.”14 Heidegger unfolds “time-space as ab-ground”

thus: “Space is rendering ab-ground that charms-moves unto the encircling hold.
Time is rendering ab-ground that removes unto the gathering. Charming-moving-
unto is the encircling hold of gathering that holds to abground. Removal-unto is
gathering unto the encircling hold that holds to abground.”15 “Time-space is the
charming-moving-removal-unto gathering encircling hold , . . . , whose essential
swaying becomes historical in the grounding of the “t/here [Da] through Da-sein
(its essential trajectories of sheltering truth).”16
Spatializing (space) is coming to be present, moving-into, that is, unconcealing.
Temporalizing (time) is becoming absent, that is, concealing. Be-ing is unconcealing
and concealing, disclosing and self-sheltering. Hence time-space. Or spatializing-
temporalizing. Still better, thinging-spatializing-temporalizing. For coming-to-be
present and becoming-absent is coming to be present and becoming absent of things.
And a thing things which unfolds unto the dynamical interplay of the fourfold. More
of it later. Time-space as ab-ground is contingent, finite, historical , non-teleological
“simultaneous” happening which is “unique and once only.”17
“The relation of Da-sein to be-ing belongs in the essential sway of be-ing itself.”18
Dasein should be mindful of, and should not forget, “as yet unrevealed essence . . .
of being with a crossing out” that “shelters untapped treasures and is the promise of
a find that awaits only the appropriate seeking.” Dwelling in the beingness of beings
is “the forgetting of returnship.”19 The forgetting of returnship [Rueckkehrerschaft]
is forgetting “the free-throw,” forgetting that “every projecting-open is a thrown
one, ”how everything becomes an extant, orderable, and producable possession,”
and “how be-ing itself as machination sets itself into what is precisely not its own-
most.”20 Which sires metaphysics and Plato’s doctrine of truth.
But seeking be-ing as a whole is being capable of returnship. Experiencing re-
turnship is being free from the beingness of beings, being disowned and disengaged
from monolithic, Platomic truth. De-cision, that is, Dasein’s manner of responding
to historical, specific saying of be-ing, is beyng-historical thinking. The experi-
ence of returnship is ineluctably fused with be-ing’s enowning-throw as onefold
happening. To experience returnship is to turn from familiar saying to unfamiliar
saying of be-ng. Be-ing’s “grounding-attunement . . . “must remain fundamentally
an unintended happening [Zu-fall].”21 Heidegger calls this grounding-attunement
of be-ing reservedness because be-ing’s disclosure is staying-away, self-sheltering.
Thinking is “projecting-open, i.e., the grounding enopening of the free-play of
the time-space of the truth of be-ing.”22 If be-ing enowns Dasein, then enowned
thrown Dasein that “belongs to” be-ing” enables the opening up (enopening ) of
the free-play, that is, the play freed from the constraint of the Platonic doctrine
of truth, the play of time-space not directed by any preconceived design, of time-
space. Thinging-spatializing-temporalizing (thinging-spacing-timing) is indeed a
Zu-fall. “[The leap] is the enactment of projecting-open the truth of be-ing in the
sense of shifting into the open, such that the thrower of the projecting-open experi-
ences itself as thrown—i.e., as en-owned by be-ing. The enopening in and through
348 Kwang-Sae Lee

projecting-open is such only when it occurs as the experience of thrownness and thus
of belongingness to be-ing.”23 Thinking as enopoening is existential/ performative.
In Four Seminars, Heidegger says: “there is no longer room for the very name
of being. Letting is then the pure giving, which itself refers to the it [das Es] that
gives, which is understood as Ereignis.”24 On giving Heidegger says: that in ”il y
a” or “there is/it gives” [“es gibt”], “ ” the “it” that here “gives” is being itself. . . .
The self-giving into the open, along with the open region itself. is self-giving.”25
But, as pointed out earlier, “being is enowned through enowning” [Sein ist durch
Ereignis ereignet],”26 and enowning, as already observed, is thinging. Just as being
is appropriated (enowned) by enowning, so is enowning appropriated by thinging.
Hence “self-givng” of being is “self-giving” of thinging. The “ground” of the thing
which things is thinging itself.
“Angelus gave us the occasion to show that the principle of reason generally
does not hold in the strict sense. The rose is without why, it blooms because it
blooms. . . . ”27 “The rose is without why, but not without grounds.”28 What are the
grounds? “Blooming is grounded in itself, it has its ground with and in itself. The
blooming is a pure arising on its own, a pure shining .”29 Here Heidegger lets the
Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason or the Kantian notion of the “transcen-
dental condition for the possibility of objects” wither away. Heidegger delivers a
decisive blow to foundationalism. In fine, beyng as enownig is thinging. Blooming
is groundless thinging, Zu-fall.
The jug (better, jugging, that is, the swaying of the jug) is an apt example of
thinging. “The jug’s swaying is the pure, giving gathering of the fourfold into a
single time-space, a single stay. The jug sways as a thing. But how does the thing
sway? The thing things. Thinging gathers.. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers
the fourfold’s stay, its while, into something that stays for a while: into this thing,
that thing.”30 A jug, when wine or water is poured from it, is a thing that things.
The jug as a thing gathers the fourfold, earth, sky, gods, and mortals that belong
together: they are “the same.” “The jug-character consists in the poured off gift
of the pouring out.”31 The jug is a thing that things. Thinging is gathering. “Our
language denotes what a gathering is by an ancient word. That word is: thing.”32
A jug is a thing as a a mirror-play of the fourfold. The jug jugs. The world worlds.
Jugging, thinging, is thinging-spacing-timing.
“The fouring sways (west) as the worlding of world. The mirror-play of world
is the round dance of happening (des Reigen des Ereignens). Therefore, the round
dance does not encompass the four like a hoop. The round dance is the ring that
joins while it plays as mirror. As happening (Ereignend), it lightens the four into the
radiance of their simple oneness. . . . The gathered sway (Das gesammpte Wesen)
of the mirror-play of the world, joining in this way, is the ringing. In the ringing
of the mirror-playing ring, . . . each one (of the four) retains its own nature. . . .
they (the four) join together, worlding, the world.”33 The event of the “pure gift of
pouring out”of wine is conditioned (be-dingt) by, inter alia, the brewing process
of wine which involves the work of human beings (mortals), the growing process
Heidegger Viewed from an Eastern Perspective 349

of grapes which also calls for human labor, earth (soil, for one thing), sky (the
favorable weather and climate among others), and patterns of wine cultivation
commensurate with cultural tradition (hence gods). The four “belong together”
inseparably and inviolably. The fouring (die Vierung) is the dynamical sway of
the mirror-play of the “betrothed.” The mirror-play of the fourfold, mirroring one
another, as enfolded by “the radiance of the simple oneness,” while each of the four
retaining “its own nature (je eigenes Wesen). In fine, the happening of wine being
poured out of a jug gathers the fourfold in one unifying sway.
Thinking is gathering. To expatiate on the theme, let us talk of the bridge as an
example. “The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does not
just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the
bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes them to lie across from
each other. . . . With the banks , the bridge brings to the stream the one and the
other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and banks and
landscape into one other’s neighborhood.”34 Here the bridge as a thing is the center
of gathering. The bridge enfolds the banks, the stream and the landscape. What
makes the bridge the bridge is its relating to other related elements.
A thing things, And things are locations which allow for spaces. “Only things
that are locations in this manner allow for spaces. . . . Space is in essence that for
which room has been made, . . . That for which room is made is always granted
and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a location, that is, by such a thing
as the bridge.”35 “The bridge is a location. As such a thing, it allows a space into
which earth, heaven, divinities and mortals are admitted. The space allowed by the
bridge contains many spaces variously near or far from the bridge.”36 A thing that
gathers is a location which generates a space, just as Dasein is temporality. It is
just that Heidegger should have said here that a thing is a time just as it is a space,
just as he should have said in Being and Time that Dasein is spatiality as well as
temporality. Thing is thinging-spacing. But thinging-spacing is thinging-spacing-
timing. Thinging-spacing-timing is a center of gathering.
Let us come back to the example of the bridge. The bridge is the bridge in
virtue of the way it plays the role as “a passage that crosses.” The bridge bridges;
it lets the banks emerge as banks. The bridge gathers into this particular world the
stream and the landscape as well as the banks. The bridge is a thing because of its
dynamically relating to and enfolding the banks, the stream, and the landscape. Does
it also mean that the banks also gather and enfold the bridge as well as the stream
and the landscape? Does it mean that the banks can also be a center of gathering?
Heidegger does not say that the banks let the bridge emerge as the bridge. Nor
does he say that the stream is a center of gathering just as the bridge is a center of
gathering. For him, the bridge is the only center of gathering.
On place Heidegger says: “The essence of the place consists in holding gathered,
as the present “where,” the circumstance of what is in its nexus, what pertains to it
and is “of” it, of the place . The place is the originally gathering holding of what
belongs together and is thus for the most part a manifold of places reciprocally
350 Kwang-Sae Lee

related by holding together, which we call a settlement or district [Ortschaft].”37

In the case of the bridge, it does not seem to be the case that “a manifold of places
is reciprocally related by belonging together.” Belonging together is reciprocal
relating. That is what “the same” means. Reciprocal relating clearly means the
symmetry of relating. Yet reciprocality of gathering has lost meaning and relevance
here. Here gathering is asymmetrical. Here Heidegger is manifestly uni-centric.
The bridge enjoys privileged status. By contrast, Buddhists would say that centers
are everywhere. They are genuinely and plur-centric and egalitarian. His avowal
of pluralism notwithstanding, Heidegger is still laboring in the shadow of Platonic
monolithic design. He has not quite succeeded in freeing himself completely from
the prison.

notes
1. Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, Encounter and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger 1929–1976,
trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993),
p. 176; Encounter hereafter.
2. Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,”
trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schwer (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994),
p. 13; BQP hereafter.
3. Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper &
Row Publishers, 1972), p. 17; TB hereafter.
4. Francis Macdonald Conford, Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato Translated with
a Running Commentary (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, 1956), p. 193; Timaeus
hereafter.
5. Conford, Timaeus, p. 193.
6. Ibid., 194.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 195.
9. Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), section 10, p. 22; CP hereafter.
10. Heidegger, CP, section 139, p. 183.
11. Martin Heidegger, Gesamptausgabe Band 65 Beitrage zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittotio Klostermann, 1989), 260; BP hereafter.
12. Heidegger, CP, section 133, p. 177.
13. Ibid., section 242, pp. 264–265.
14. “On the Question of Being” which is included in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed.
William MacNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 314; PM hereafter.
15. Heidegger, CP, section 242, p. 269.
16. Ibid., section 242, pp. 269–270.
Heidegger Viewed from an Eastern Perspective 351

17. Ibid., section 242, p. 269.

18. Ibid., section 135, p. 179.
19. Ibid., section 263, p. 319.
20. Ibid., section 263, pp. 318–319.
21. Ibid., section 6, pp. 16–17.
22. Ibid., section 1, p. 4.
23. Ibid., section 122, p. 169.
24. Martin Heidegger, Four Seminars, trans. Andrew Mitchell and Francois Raffoul (India-
napolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 60; Four Seminars hereafter.
25. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’” which is included in PM, p. 255.
26. Heidegger, Four Seminars, p. 60.
27. Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Riginald Lilly (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 41; PR hererafter.
28. Heidegger, PR, p. 56.
29. Ibid., p. 57.
30. This passage is in “The Thing (das Ding),” which is contained in Martin Heidegger,
Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. and intro. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row,
1971), 174; PLT hereafter. Hofstadter translates “Der Krug west als Ding” as “This jug
presences as a thing.” His rendering of “west” as “presences” is infelicitous. I translate the
German original to read: “The jug sways as a thing.” “Sways” conveys the dynamic sense
of “west” here. Similarly I have changed “das Wesen des Kruges” from “the jug’s presenc-
ing” to “the jug’s swaying.” “Presencing” is a more fitting counterrpart of “Anwesenheit.”
Jugging ( wine or water being poured from a jug) is a dynamic process. Wine or water being
poured from a jug is thinging, that is, a dynamic event. For the German original, see Martin
Heidegger, GESAMPTAUSGABE BAND 7 Vortrage und Aufsatze (Frankfurt am Main: Vit-
torio Klostermann, 2000), p. 182; AG Band 7 VA hereafter.
31. Heidegger, PLT, p. 172.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 180. Again I change Hofstadter’s rendering of “west” as “presence” to “sway,” his
rendering of “Ereignen(s)” as “appropriation” to”happening.” his rendering of “Ereignend”
as “Appropriating” to “As happening,” his rendering of ”Wesen” as “presence” to “sway.”
See AG Band 7 VA, p. 182. After “each one” I add “of the four” with brackets. After “they”
I add “the four” within brackets.
34. This passage is in “Building Dwelling Thinking” which is in PLT, p. 152.
35. Heidegger, PLT, p. 154.
36. Ibid., p. 155.
37. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloom-
ington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 117.