People v Dalag
house. When they woke up the following day Francis
Crime charged: PARRICIDE
ISSUE: WON the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and the probative weight accorded by the
trial court.
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty (mitigating circumstances
present: voluntary surrender and 1
analogous to passion and obfuscation)
2. SC: Affirmed w/modifications (MC:
voluntary surrender only)
Facts:
Armando and Leah had an argument. Leah
was admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. The
children heard their mother crying and rushed
outside the house to see what was happening. They
were horrified when they saw Armando pushing and
kicking Leah on the left side of her body even as Leah
was already lying posthaste on the ground, continued
to beat her up. They pleaded to their father to stop
maltreating their mother, but angrily told them not to
interfere and that he will later beat them up as well.
He grabbed Leah's hair and banged her head on the
wall. Leah's forehead directly hit the wall. In the
process, Armando stepped on a nail. Even as she was
being assaulted by her husband, she told him that she
will find some medicine for his wound and so she
fled. Armando ran after his wife. He herded her back
to the house. Princess Joy was awakened when she
heard her mother crying. She went outside of the
house, saw her mother being pushed by her father.
Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness.
Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and
ordered Princess Joy to get some water. She poured
water on the face of her mother but the latter did not
move. Armando then tried to revive Leah by applying
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail. Princess
Joy went back to the house to rouse Francis. When
Francis came out to the yard, he saw his mother lying
on the ground still unconscious. Armando was sitting
near Leah, while nonchalantly smoking cigarette.
Francis got a piece of carton from their store and
placed it underneath his mother's body. Francis then
suggested to his father that they bring Leah inside the
and Princess Joy noticed that their mother remained
unconscious. Despite their mother's condition, they
decided to go to school. During lunchtime, Francis
went home and saw that Leah's condition had not
improved. When the children came home in the
afternoon after their classes, Armando told them that
their mother was brought to the hospital. When
Francis visited his mother in the hospital, he saw her
lying on the bed, her face badly swollen. He saw the
lumps and bruises on the different parts of her body.
Leah never regained her consciousness and died.
Held:
Credibility of witness:
It is axiomatic in criminal
jurisprudence that when the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, an appellate court
will normally not disturb the factual findings
of the trial unless the lower court has reached
conclusions that are clearly unsupported by
evidence, or unless it has overlooked some
facts or circumstances of weight and
influence which, if considered, would affect
the result of the case.10 The rationale for this
rule is that trial courts have superior
advantages in ascertaining the truth and in
detecting falsehood as they have the
opportunity to observe at close range the
manner and demeanor of witnesses while
testifying.11
In this case, the trial court declared
that the children, Francis and Princess Joy,
the principal prosecution witnesses, testified
"in a logical, candid, and straight-forward
manner, describing in detail what they saw
and heard in a manner characteristic of
witnesses who are telling the truth."12 The
Court finds no reason to deviate from these
findings as the records fully support the same.
The children recalled the sordid events that
happened in the evening of August 15, 1996
involving their parents without any trace of
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 bias, impelled by no other motive than to
bring justice to their mother's senseless
death.
For the crime committed:
ART. 246. Parricide. — Any person
who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. (Restored by Sec. 5, RA No.
7659.)
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following
essential elements:
(1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother
or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused.
The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion
perpetua to death. The key element in parricide is the
relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the
prosecution proved all the essential elements of
parricide.
People v Rebucan
Crime charged: DOUBLE MURDER
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable for the crime of
murder
Ruling:
1. RTC: Convicted of double murder
2. CA: Modified, adjudged guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of
murder
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications: GUILTY of
two (2) counts of murder
Facts:
Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to
the incident in question. She pointed to the accused-
appellant as the "Bata Endong" (Uncle Endong) who
hacked her grandfather and brother. She stated that
Ranil was hit in the forehead, while Felipe was hit on
the face, the left shoulder and the right shoulder.
After Felipe was hacked by the accused-appellant,
the former was still able to walk outside of his house,
to the direction of the coconut tree and thereafter
fell to the ground. Carmela said that she saw that a
long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil.
She related that Felipe also owned a bolo but he was
not able to use the same when he was attacked. She
was then inside the house with Felipe and her two
younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was
sitting about four meters away when the hacking
incident occurred indoors.
On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at
the time of the incident, she was playing with a toy
camera inside the house and she was situated beside
a chicken cage, near a bench. Felipe was also there
near the bench and he was carrying Ranil in his right
arm. When asked whether the accused-appellant
came inside the house in a sudden manner, Carmela
answered in the affirmative. She insisted that Ranil
was indeed carried by Felipe when the accused-
appellant entered the house. She said that no fight or
altercation occurred between Felipe and the accused-
appellant. After Felipe was hacked, he immediately
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ran outside of the house. Carmela and Jericho then
ran to the back of the house.
Both Adoracion Lagera and Alma Tagpis
testified that someone told then that Felipe was
hacked; saw him lying in the grassy place, wounded
and motionless; and asked Carmela and Jericho who
killed Felipe. Carmela answered it was the accused.
Defense alleged that Felipe and Timboy
Lagera went to the house of the accused and sexually
abused his wife; and he harbored ill feelings towards
the said men but he was able to control the same for
the sake of his children.
Held:
There is credence to the testimony of the
minor eyewitness Carmela Tagpis that the victim,
Felipe was holding in his arms her younger brother,
Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his house, when the accused
entered, and without any warning or provocation
coming from the victim, the accused immediately
delivered several hacking blows on the victim giving
no regard to the innocent child in the arms of Lagera.
With this precarious situation, the victim who was
unarmed has no opportunity to put up his defense
against the unlawful aggression of the accused,
moreso, to retaliate. Moreover, what defense could
an innocent 1 1/2 years old Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up
against the armed and superior strength of the
accused, but to leave his fate to God.
The circumstance that the attack was sudden
and unexpected and the victims, unarmed, were
caught totally unprepared to defend themselves
qualifies the crime committed as murder.
According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another
shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed
with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among
other things, and that the situation does not fall
within the provisions of Article 246. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering
an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the
attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with
the victims having no opportunity to repel it or
defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery
is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.
The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial
court’s and the Court of Appeals’ appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
For evident premeditation to aggravate a crime,
there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the
crime itself, of the following elements:
(1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung
to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time, between
determination and execution, to allow himself
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
It is not enough that evident premeditation is
suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be
evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing
determination to commit the crime. In order to be
considered an aggravation of the offense, the
circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it
must be "evident premeditation." In the case at bar,
the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish
any of the elements of evident premeditation since
the testimonies they presented pertained to the
period of the actual commission of the crime and the
events that occurred thereafter. The prosecution
failed to adduce any evidence that tended to
establish the exact moment when the accused-
appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter
clung to his determination to carry out the plan and
that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried
out his plan.
Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
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strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When
the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the
latter. On the other hand, dwelling, minority and
intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating
circumstances in the instant case considering that the
same were not alleged and/or specified in the
information that was filed.
The Court finds that there is a paucity of
evidence to prove that the instant case falls under
any of the two classes of complex crimes. The
evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly and
indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil
were killed by a single fatal hacking blow from the
accused-appellant. The eyewitness testimony of
Carmela did not contain any detail as to this material
fact. To a greater degree, it was neither proven that
the murder of Felipe was committed as a necessary
means for committing and/or facilitating the murder
of Ranil and vice versa. As the factual milieu of the
case at bar excludes the application of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant should
be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of
murder. In the past, when two crimes have been
improperly designated as a complex crime, this Court
has affirmed the conviction of the accused for the
component crimes separately instead of the complex
crime.
People v Lagman
Crime charged: MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER
ISSUE: WON there is treachery
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of murder and less serious
physical injuries
2. CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modification: guilty of
murder and slight physical injuries
Facts:
Maniego was in front of her banana cue
store, seated alongside her mother, Sicor, inside the
sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the
accused approached her and punched her face
several times. The accused turned on Sicor, grabbed
her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks
with a small knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and
ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that
the barangay chairman was not around, Maniego
went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel
Santiago (Santiago), at the house of Santiago’s
mother. On her way there, she saw the accused stab
Santiago four (4) times from a distance of five (5) to
six (6) meters. The distance between where Maniego
was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was
about nine (9) meters. Maniego then saw the
accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife
and heading towards Juan Luna Street. Seeing that
Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago
to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but he later expired.
While Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the
accused, who was being treated after an angry crowd
mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who
was escorting the accused that it was the latter who
had stabbed and killed Santiago.
The accused claimed that on the date of the
stabbing incident, she confronted Maniego and asked
her if it was true that she had been spreading the
rumor that the accused was insane. Maniego
answered in the affirmative. Angered, the accused
slapped Maniego and left, leaving Santiago, Sicor, and
Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a lead
pipe. Since she needed medical treatment after the
attack, she was brought to Gat Andres Bonifacio
Medical Hospital by her mother and a barangay
kagawad.
Held:
The elements of murder that the prosecution
must establish are (1) that a person was killed; (2)
that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
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 In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by
him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In
the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when
appellant, without warning, stabbed him four times
successively leaving the latter no chance at all to
evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from
appellant’s onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that
appellant’s act of suddenly stabbing the victim
leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case
of treachery. x x x
We modify the conviction of accused-
appellant with regard to Criminal Case No. 02-
200107. Originally charged with frustrated murder,
accused-appellant was convicted of less serious
physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 02-200107. The
RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by
Sicor was not on a vital part of the body and she was
able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving
medical treatment. The RTC properly ruled that the
crime committed was not frustrated murder as it was
not shown that there was intent to kill.29 However,
while the RTC correctly ruled that the accused-
appellant is not guilty of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case No. 02-200107, the records do not
support a conviction for less serious physical injuries.
Art. 265 of the RPC provides, "Any person
who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not
described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10)
days or more, or shall require medical attendance for
the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor." Nothing in the records, however,
supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated for
labor for ten (10) days or more or that she required
medical attention for the same period. After the
wound on her buttocks was treated, Sicor was
released two hours after she was admitted to the
hospital. She later returned to the hospital for the
removal of the suture on her wound, according to the
RTC, "after a certain period of time."The Medico-
Legal Report on Sicor (Exhibit "H") does not indicate
how many days of medical treatment her injury
would need. Sicor, however, testified that she lost
two (2) days of work on account of the injury she
sustained. The testimony of her attending physician,
Dr. Christian Dennis Cendeno, on the other hand, was
dispensed with following a stipulation by the parties
on his testimony. The prosecution was, therefore,
unable to establish that the injury sustained by Sicor
falls under less serious physical injuries absent the
requirement that her injury required medical
attention for 10 days or incapacitated her for the
same period.
The Court can, thus, only convict accused-
appellant of slight physical injuries. Under par. 1, Art.
266 of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries
is arresto menor "when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period." There
being no modifying circumstances to be appreciated,
and in accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64, accused-
appellant should be meted a penalty of imprisonment
of arresto menor in its medium period, which has a
duration of eleven (11) to twenty (20) days under Art.
76 of the RPC.
5|Page
People vs Laog
Crime charged: MURDER and RAPE
ISSUE: WON the crime charged is correct
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of murder and rape
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications; guilty of
Rape w/ homicide under Art. 266-B
Facts:
AAA and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal,
were walking along the rice paddies on their way to
apply for work at a canteen near the National
Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly,
appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead
pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a
grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without
warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the
lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down.
When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but
appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe,
knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer
several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered
her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to
AAA. He hit her in the head several times more with
the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While she
was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled
down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and
pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of
her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After raping her, appellant also covered
her with grass. At that point, she passed out. When
she regained consciousness, it was nighttime and
raining hard. She crawled until she reached her
uncle’s farm at daybreak. When she saw him, she
waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain
Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag,
Bulacan where she stayed for more than three
weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died.
Accused claimed that at the time of the
incident, he was at his house with his children and
nephew cooking dinner.
Held:
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides only a single penalty for the
composite acts of rape and the killing committed by
reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with
the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death. x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case
was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the
killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is
liable for rape with homicide under the above
provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed
Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for
help once she is able to run away, and also to silence
her completely so she may not witness the rape of
AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire
having been satiated, appellant purposely covered
AAA’s body with grass, as he did earlier with
Jennifer’s body, so that it may not be easily noticed
or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that
the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were
enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA
survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon
enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the
constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person
killed in this case is someone other than the woman
6|Page
victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from
our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where
the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and
other offenses have been committed by reason or on
the occasion of robbery.
It is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that
two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation
of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact
that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the
felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the
robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or
on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into
one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in
its generic sense, and includes murder and slight
physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion
of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the
circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation) alleged in the
information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to
murder and the crime committed by appellant is still
rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery
is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only.
People v Pareja
Crime charged: RAPE
ISSUE: WON the crime charged is correct
Ruling:
1. RTC: Convicted of rape
2. CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision
3. SC: Modified: guilty of attempted rape
Facts:
Victim was the sister of the accused-
appellant’s common-law-wife. He tried to rape her
but when the victim’s cry got louder; he stopped and
was kicked by the victim on his thigh. He threatened
to kill her if she divulged the incident to anyone.
Held:
By definition, rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force,
threat or intimidation, or when she is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is
under 12 years of age or is demented. "Carnal
knowledge is defined as the act of a man having
sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with
a woman." Carnal knowledge of the victim by the
accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,
considering that it is the central element in the crime
of rape.
We find it clear that the appellant’s penis did not
penetrate, but merely ‘touched’ (i.e.,"naidikit"),
AAA’s private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on
cross-examination that the appellant did not
succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina.
Significantly, AAA’s Sinumpaang Salaysay also
disclosed that the appellant was holding the victim’s
hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her
vagina. This circumstance – coupled with the victim’s
declaration that she was resisting the appellant’s
attempt to insert his penis into her vagina – makes
penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable.
Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CA’s
7|Page
conclusion that the appellant’s penis penetrated, penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise,
however slightly, the victim’s female organ. the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.

Touching when applied to rape cases does not simply

mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the
external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons
pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the
labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused
to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias,
which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are
by their natural situs or location beneath the mons
pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the
penis is to attain some degree of penetration
beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest

penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum
of the female organ." Without any showing of such
penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of
lasciviousness."

As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to present

sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the
required penile penetration. AAA’s testimony did not
establish that the appellant’s penis touched the labias
or slid into her private part. Aside from AAA’s
testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a
medico-legal report, could confirm whether there
indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the
victim’s labias. In the absence of testimonial or
physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the
appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape.

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,

states that there is an attempt when the offender
commenced the commission of the crime directly by
overt acts but does not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v.
Publico, we ruled that when the "touching" of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to

8|Page
People v Padigos
Crime charged: RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
ISSUE: WON the guilt was proven beyond reasonable
doubt
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of rape (considering the
aggravating qualifying circumstance of
relationship to and minority of the victim)
and acts of lasciviousness
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications
Facts:
"AAA", six-years old, was sleeping inside their
house when her father, accused-appellant raped her.
He undressed her and removed her panty, and also
took off his pants. He inserted his penis into her
vagina and made push and pull movements. She felt
pain in her private organ. Her mother was not around
as it was only her and her father who were home.
The next day, accused-appellant made her hold his
penis. He, on the other hand, touched her genitals
and inserted his fingers into her vagina causing her to
feel pain. She related the incidents to her mother
who simply gave her father a fierce piercing stare but
did nothing. She also confided to her aunt, sister of
her mother, who brought her to a doctor for medical
examination and to the police station to report the
matter.
Held:
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code which
deals with the offense of rape provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How
Committed. – Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or
intimidation;
b. When the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d. When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be
present;
2. By any person who, under any of
the circumstances mentioned in par. 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault
by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
As cemented in jurisprudence, the elements
of rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under 12 years of age. Thus, sexual intercourse with a
girl below 12 years old, which is the subject of this
case, is considered as statutory rape in this
jurisdiction.
According to the sixth paragraph of Article
266-B, the death penalty shall be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed "when the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim."
After a careful review of the records of this
case, we are persuaded that appellant is indeed guilty
of qualified rape. In People v. Pruna, we formulated a
set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential
benchmark in appreciating age either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in order
to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions
regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s
9|Page
age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as
follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic
document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family
either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below
12 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the
victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a
categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
(Citation omitted.)
In the case at bar, the prosecution may have
been unable to present AAA’s birth certificate or
other authentic document such as a baptismal
certificate during trial, however, that failure to
present relevant evidence will not deter this Court
from upholding that qualified rape was indeed
committed by appellant because he himself
admitted, in his counter-affidavit which formed part
of the evidence for the defense and the contents of
which he later affirmed in his testimony in open
court, that AAA was below 7 years old around the
time of the rape incident. In the Court’s view, this
admission from appellant, taken with the testimony
of the victim, sufficiently proved the victim’s
minority.
Acts of Lasciviousness
Anent the charge of acts of lasciviousness, Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. – Any
person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of
either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article, shall be punished by
prision correccional.
Therefore, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is
composed of the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following
circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under
12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person
of either sex. (Citation omitted.)
10 | P a g e
 Utilizing the foregoing definition as a guide, it People v Villaflores
is beyond cavil that appellant’s act of making AAA
hold his penis and, subsequently, of touching her Crime charged: RAPE w/ HOMICIDE
vagina with his fingers can be both characterized as
constituting acts of lasciviousness. As previously ISSUE: WON RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding
discussed, the moral influence or ascendancy accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
exercised by appellant over AAA takes the place of homicide
the element of force and intimidation.
Ruling:

1. RTC: Guilty of rape w/ homicide

2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications
Facts:

- Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw

Villaflores holding Marita by the hand
(akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2,
1999, leading the child through the alley
going towards the direction of his house
about 6 houses away from the victim’s
house.
- Secondly, Marita went missing after that
and remained missing until the discovery
of her lifeless body on the following day.
- Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores’
house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999
and heard the crying and moaning
(umuungol) of a child coming from inside.
- Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999
Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his
house carrying a yellow sack that
appeared to be heavy and going towards
the abandoned house where the child’s
lifeless body was later found.
- Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita,
identified the yellow sack as the same
yellow sack that covered the head of his
daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time
he discovered her body; Manito also
mentioned that a blue sack covered her
body.
- Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed
between the abandoned house where
Marita’s body was found and Villaflores’
house, because his house had a rear exit
that enabled access to the abandoned
house without having to pass any other
11 | P a g e
 houses. This indicated Villaflores’
familiarity and access to the abandoned
house.
- Seventhly, several pieces of evidence
recovered from the abandoned house,
like the white rope around the victim’s
neck and the yellow sack, were traced to
Villaflores. The white rope was the same
rope tied to the door of his house, and
the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his
toilet.
- Eighthly, the medico-legal findings
showed that Marita had died from
asphyxiation by strangulation, which
cause of death was consistent with the
ligature marks on her neck and the
multiple injuries including abrasions,
hematomas, contusions and punctured
wounds.
- Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep
fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh
blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and
periurethral smears taken from her body
tested positive for spermatozoa.
- And, tenthly, the body of Marita was
already in the second stage of flaccidity at
the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at
8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal
findings indicated that such stage of
flaccidity confirmed that she had been
dead for more than 24 hours, or at the
latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
Held:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How
Committed. – Rape is committed
1) By a man who have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or
intimidation;
b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the
circumstance mentioned above be
present.
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
Xxx
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines
and sets forth the composite crimes of attempted
rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In both
composite crimes, the homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion of rape. As can be noted,
each of said composite crimes is punished with a
single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to
death, and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the
occasion of the rape are crucial in determining
whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex
or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape
obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to
the rape, the offense the offender originally designed
to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of
the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide and the
rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and
admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the
phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as
easy to determine. To understand what homicide
may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the
rape, a resort to the meaning the framers of the law
intended to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed, during
the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act
No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the
phrase on the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing
that occurs immediately before or after, or during the
commission itself of the attempted or consummated
12 | P a g e
rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a People v Suansing
person other than the rape victim herself for as long
as the killing is linked to the rape. Crime charged: RAPE (attended by the qualifying
circumstance that the victim has a mental disability)

ISSUE: WON the crime charged of qualified rape is

correct

Ruling:

1. RTC: Guilty of simple rape (mental

retardation was not specifically alleged in
the Amended Information, it cannot be
considered as a qualifying circumstance
that would warrant the imposition of the
death penalty.)
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications (crime of
qualified rape)

Facts:

LEGEND:

AAA: victim
EEE: the aunt/guardian
FFF: friend
GGG: accused-appellant’s sister

FFF was requested to get from appellant’s

boarding house an electric fan and a transformer.
Together with her brother and "AAA" went to the
boarding house of appellant. After giving the
requested items, appellant ordered "FFF" and her
brother to leave "AAA" behind. FFF" brought the
items to "GGG" who, upon learning that "AAA" was
still with appellant, requested "FFF" to return to
appellant’s boarding house to fetch "AAA." Upon
arriving at the boarding house, "FFF" noticed that the
door was closed. She called out to "AAA" to go home
to avoid being scolded by "EEE." "AAA" opened the
door and came out fixing her short pants. "FFF" then
asked "AAA" if anything happened. "AAA" replied
that after "FFF" and her brother left the boarding
house, appellant pulled her inside the room, removed
her shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the
floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina without
her consent. "AAA" requested "FFF" not to tell
anyone that she was raped by appellant. “EEE"
13 | P a g e
learned about the rape and confronted "AAA." "EEE"
then reported the incident to police authorities.
Held:
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 8353, states that:
Art. 226-A. Rape, When and How
Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or
intimidation;
b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d) When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
"[F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12
years of age or was demented." From these
requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is
committed the moment the offender has sexual
intercourse with a person suffering from mental
retardation. "[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is
a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of
retardation deprives the complainant of that natural
instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and
womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with
one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she
is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act
already constitutes rape[,] without requiring proof
that the accused used force and intimidation in
committing the act." Only the facts of sexual congress
between the accused and the victim and the latter’s
mental retardation need to be proved.
Both the RTC and the CA also found that
"AAA’s" mental retardation was satisfactorily
established by the prosecution. Dr. Kwong-Garcia, a
psychiatrist at the Davao Medical Center, testified
that the results of the IQ test conducted on "AAA"
revealed that she is a mental retardate with a mental
age of between 9-12 years. These findings are
contained in a Medical Certificate dated December
11, 2002. These findings were corroborated by the
Psychological Assessment Report of Castro, a
psychologist at the Davao Medical Center, whose
examination showed that the intellectual capacity of
"AAA" is between 9-12 years old. These pieces of
evidence prove beyond doubt that "AAA" is a mental
retardate. Notably, the defense did not even impugn
"AAA’s" mental retardation. On the contrary, records
show that even appellant himself conceded that
"AAA" is a mental retardate. We therefore agree with
the RTC’s ruling, as affirmed by the CA, that "AAA’" is
mentally retarded.
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of
the victim during the rape qualifies and makes it
punishable by death.
Paragraph 10, Article 266-B of the RPC, as
amended, provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x
The death penalty shall also be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the
mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime.
[Emphasis supplied]
Thus, knowledge of the offender of the mental
disability of the victim during the commission of the
crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by
death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should
be alleged in the Information since "a crime can only
14 | P a g e
be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the
indictment."
Appellant’s knowledge of the mental
disability of "AAA" at the time of the commission of
the crime of rape was properly alleged in the
Amended Information. "Knowledge of the offender of
the mental disability of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime of rape qualifies the crime
and makes it punishable by death x x x." "When rape
is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of
the victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is
increased to death." "Mental retardation is a chronic
condition present from birth or early childhood and
characterized by impaired intellectual functioning
measured by standardized tests." Intellectual or
mental disability "is a term synonymous with and is
now preferred over the older term, mental
retardation."
Thus, appellant’s knowledge of "AAA’s"
mental disability at the time of the commission of the
crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is
therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape.
People v Cial
Crime charged: RAPE (attended by the qualifying
circumstances of minority, the victim being less than
18 years old, and relationship, the accused being the
common-law husband of complainant’s mother)
ISSUE: WON the crime charged is correct
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of qualified rape
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Modified, guilty of simple rape
Facts:
Appellant, common-law-husband of AAA’s
mother, called "AAA" and told her to go to the
bedroom inside their house. Once inside, he took off
"AAA’s" shorts and panty and spread her legs. He
pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his
penis into the little girl’s vagina. "AAA" felt intense
pain but she did not try to struggle because he had a
bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust, he
threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she
reported the incident to anyone. At that time,
"AAA’s" maternal grandmother was in the house but
was unaware that "AAA" was being ravished. Unable
to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to
her mother but did not believe her. "AAA" ran away
from home and went to her maternal uncle’s house.
She disclosed her harrowing experience to her uncle.
Her uncle appeared to be angered by appellant’s
wrong doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed
appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched
her. For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA"
ran away and went to the house of her aunt. Her aunt
helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
Held:
We find however that both the trial court and
the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of
qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
attended the commission of the crime. We rule
otherwise.
15 | P a g e
 In its Formal Offer of Evidence, the appellant to be a step-father to "AAA," he must be
prosecution mentioned "AAA’s" Certificate of Live legally married to "AAA's" mother.
Birth. Also attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked
as Exhibit "B" is "AAA’s" Certificate of Live Birth Suffice it to state that qualifying
showing that "AAA" was born on October 31, 1991. circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable
However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said doubt just like the crime itself In this case, the
Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or prosecution utterly tailed to prove beyond
offered during the trial of the case. During the March reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of
28, 2006 hearing, the prosecution manifested before minority and relationship. As such, appellant should
the RTC that it will be presenting "AAA’s" Certificate only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the
of Live Birth at the next setting. In its Order dated penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.
June 27, 2006, the trial court reset the hearing of the
case to allow the prosecution to present evidence
with respect to "AAA’s" Certificate of Live Birth.
However, up until the prosecution rested its case,
nobody was presented to testify on "AAA’s"
Certificate of Live Birth.

The same is true with respect to the other

qualifying circumstance of relationship. The
prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish
"AAA’s" relationship with the appellant. Although the
Information alleged that appellant is the common-
law husband of "AAA’s" mother, "AAA’" referred to
appellant as her step-father.

The RTC interchangeably referred to

appellant as the common-law husband of "AAA’s"
mother as well as the step-father of "AAA".Moreover,
the RTC failed to cite any basis for its reference to
appellant as such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft
of any discussion as to how it reached its conclusion
that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAA’s"
mother or that "AAA" is his step-daughter.

The CA committed the same error.

Notwithstanding appellant's claim that he is married
to "AAA's" mother, it went on to declare, without any
explanation or justification, that appellant is the
common-law husband of "AAA's" mother, viz: x x x
Also. given that Marciano and AAA's mother were not
legally married, the qualifying circumstance that the
accused is the common-law husband of the victim's
mother may be properly appreciated.

The temrs "common-law husband" and "step-

father" have different legal connotations. For

16 | P a g e
People v Candellada
Crime charged: ATTEMPTED RAPE and 8 COUNTS OF
RAPE
ISSUE:
Ruling:
1. RTC: Acquitted in attempted rape; Guilty
of 8 counts of rape
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications (into
account the qualified aggravating
circumstances of minority of the victim
and her relationship with accused-
appellant)
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications
Facts:
AAA was the second of three daughters of
accused-appellant and his deceased first wife. She
lived with accused-appellant and the latter’s second
wife, while her two sisters lived with accused-
appellant’s mother. While they were still living in
Davao, accused-appellant impregnated her. When
she was already five months pregnant, accused-
appellant brought her with him to Lanao del Norte.
Accused-appellant approached Gemina, who
he came to know during a previous visit to Lanao del
Norte in 1993, and asked permission if he could stay
at Gemina’s old house with his wife, introducing AAA
to Gemina as his wife. Gemina immediately noticed
that AAA was pregnant and also commented that
AAA was so young she could already be accused-
appellant’s daughter, but accused-appellant only
laughed. Gemina and her husband allowed accused-
appellant and AAA to stay at their old house.
While they were staying at Gemina’s old
house, accused-appellant had intercourse with AAA
many times, but AAA could only remember eight
specific dates. AAA further testified that she
consistently resisted accused-appellant’s bestial acts
but he threatened to stab her with a knife. On
December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made
amorous advances on AAA; she refused so accused-
appellant became violently angry. He mauled AAA
and hit her head with a piece of wood, which
rendered her unconscious. Gemina, who saw what
happened, asked help from the Barangay Captain.
The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested
the accused-appellant.
According to Gemina, since accused-appellant
and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte, the two lived as
husband and wife. However, sometime in December
2004, a drunk accused-appellant already admitted to
Gemina’s husband that AAA was his (accused-
appellant’s) daughter.
Held:
Qualified rape is defined and punished under
the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How
Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or
intimidation;
b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d) When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be
present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – x x x.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be
imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the
17 | P a g e
 offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
For a conviction of qualified rape, the
prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman,
(3) by force and without consent; and in order to
warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the
additional elements that (4) the victim is under
eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5)
the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
The fourth and fifth elements, minority and
relationship, were admitted by accused-appellant
during the pre-trial conference.
behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court
stood in a much better position to decide the
question of credibility. Findings of the trial court on
such matters are binding and conclusive on the
appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted. No such facts or
circumstances exist in the present case.
It is noteworthy to mention that even if
accused-appellant did not use a knife or made threats
to AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of
raping AAA, for in rape committed by a close kin,
such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not
necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence or intimidation.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be

convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things,
as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend
to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that
when a woman declares that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has been committed and, where her testimony
passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the
Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own
father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag
the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of
shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give
credit to the straightforward and consistent
testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions
for rape.

In resolving rape cases, primordial

consideration is given to the credibility of the victim’s
testimony. The settled rule is that the trial court's
conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape
cases are generally accorded great weight and
respect, and at times, even finality. Having seen and
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
18 | P a g e
Pielago v People
Crime charged: ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
ISSUE: CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the
crime of rape by sexual assault despite his being
charged in the information for acts of lasciviousness
only.
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of rape by sexual assault
(taking into account the qualifying
circumstance relating to the victim’s age,
"less than seven (7) years of age")
2. CA: Affirmed
3. SC: Affirmed w/ Modifications
Facts:
AAA and her two (2)-year old brother, CCC,
were playing with Pielago whom they call as Kuya
Alvin at the porch of Boyet Ros’ (Boyet) house. After
playing, the three (3) went inside Boyet’s house to
watch television. After a while, Pielago turned off the
television and brought AAA and CCC to a bedroom.
While CCC played with a toy carabao at a corner,
Pielago made AAA lie down on bed. Pielago then took
off AAA’s short pants and inserted his right hand’s
forefinger inside her vagina and exclaimed "masiram"
(which means "delicious") as he brutely licked it and
spewed saliva in it. AAA felt pain and blood came out
of her vagina which frightened her. Unsatisfied,
Pielago made AAA lie on her chest on the same bed
then fingered her anus. After a few minutes, AAA and
CCC were called for lunch by their mother, BBB.
Pielago immediately replaced AAA’s shorts then sent
her and CCC out of the bedroom. BBB noticed the
bloodstains at the back portion of AAA’s shorts.
When BBB asked AAA what happened, AAA did not
answer immediately until she said "Kuya Alvin tugsok
buyay saka lubot ko buda dila pa." (which means
"Kuya Alvin inserted something in my vagina and my
anus and he licked me). Incensed by what AAA told
her, BBB went to a certain Manay Eden who
accompanied her to the house of Boyet where she
found Pielago still lying on bed. BBB continually hit
Pielago as she asked him what he did to AAA. Pielago,
however, denied the accusations and maintained that
he was asleep when the incident happened. At 6:00
p.m. of the same day, AAA and BBB lodged a
complaint at the Police Station where AAA was
physically examined by a medico-legal officer which
issued a report showing a superficial laceration found
at the 7 o’clock position of AAA’s anus and the
presence of erythema in the perihymenal area and
fossa navicularis caused by the insertion into the
victim’s genitals of a foreign object, possibly a small
finger or any blunt object.
Held:
It is well-settled that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. In this respect, the designation in the
Information of the specific statute violated is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. In the instant case, the designation of
the offense in the Information against Pielago was
changed from the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 to the crime
of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266-
A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353. It cannot be said, however, that his right to
be properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated. This Court is not
unaware that the Information was worded, as
follows: "x x x commit an act of lasciviousness upon
the person of AAA, a minor being four (4) years old,
by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers
to the vagina of AAA, x x x." And, as correctly
explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained
in the Information determine the crime charged
against the accused and not the designation of the
offense as given by the prosecutor which is merely an
opinion not binding to the courts. As held in Malto v.
People:
What controls is not the title of the
information or the designation of the offense
but the actual facts recited in the
information. In other words, it is the recital of
facts of the commission of the offense, not
19 | P a g e
 the nomenclature of the offense, that
determines the crime being charged in the
information. (Citations omitted)
Also, in the more recent case of People v. Rayon, Sr.,
this Court reiterated that the character of the crime is
not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by
the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in
the complaint or information.
The CA further ratiocinated that the variance
in the two crimes is not fatal to Pielago’s conviction.
Indeed, in order to obtain a conviction for rape by
sexual assault, it is essential for the prosecution to
establish the elements that constitute such crime.
Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code explicitly
provides that the gravamen of the crime of rape by
sexual assault which is the insertion of the penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or
anal orifice. In the instant case, this element is clearly
present when AAA straightforwardly testified in court
that Pielago inserted his forefinger in her vagina and
anus. Jurisprudence has it that testimonies of child-
victims are given full weight and credit, since when a
woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was indeed committed. Thus, AAA’s unrelenting
narration of what transpired, accompanied by her
categorical identification of Pielago as the malefactor,
established the case for the prosecution.
Garingarao v People
Crime charged: ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IN
RELATION TO RA 7610
ISSUE:
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications
Facts:
AAA was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa
Medical Center by her father BBB and mother CCC
due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr. George
Morante (Dr. Morante), the attending physician,
recommended that AAA be confined at the hospital
for further observation. AAA was admitted at the
hospital and confined at a private room where she
and her parents stayed for the night. The next day,
BBB left the hospital to go to Lingayen, Pangasinan to
process his daughter’s Medicare papers. CCC also left
the hospital that same morning to attend to their
store at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone in
her room.
When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told
him that she wanted to go home. Dr. Morante
advised against it but due to AAA’s insistence, he
allowed AAA to be discharged from the hospital with
instructions that she should continue her
medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at
their house, AAA cried and told her parents that
Garingarao sexually abused her. They all went back to
the hospital and reported the incident to Dr.
Morante. They inquired from the nurses’ station and
learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on
that day.
AAA testified that Garingarao, who was
wearing a white uniform, entered her room and
asked if she already took her medicines and if she
was still experiencing pains. AAA replied that her
stomach was no longer painful. Garingarao then lifted
20 | P a g e
AAA’s bra and touched her left breast. Embarrassed,
AAA asked Garingarao what he was doing. Garingarao
replied that he was just examining her. Garingarao
then left the room and returned 15 to 30 minutes
later with a stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA that he
would examine her again. Garingarao lifted AAA’s
shirt, pressed the stethoscope to her stomach and
touched her two nipples. Garingarao then lifted
AAA’s pajama and underwear and pressed the lower
part of her abdomen. Garingarao then slid his finger
inside AAA’s private part. AAA instinctively crossed
her legs and again asked Garingarao what he was
doing. She asked him to stop and informed him she
had her monthly period. Garingarao ignored AAA and
continued to insert his finger inside her private part.
Garingarao only stopped when he saw that AAA really
had her monthly period. He went inside the
bathroom of the private room, washed his hands,
applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrived at the
hospital, AAA insisted on going home. She only
narrated the incident to her parents when they got
home and they went back to the hospital to report
the incident to Dr. Morante.
Held:
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3 for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be; Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) yeas of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period, x x x
(c) x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article
III of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age.
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct
is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with the
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.
In this case, the prosecution established that
Garingarao touched AAA’s breasts and inserted his
finger into her private part for his sexual gratification.
Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by
pretending that his actions were part of the physical
examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on
what he was doing despite AAA’s objections. AAA
twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he
answered that he was just examining her.
21 | P a g e
 The Court has ruled that a child is deemed
subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the
victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct under
the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation
which subdues the free exercise of the offended
party’s free will. In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA
into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending
that he was examining her.
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true,
he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610
because the incident happened only once.
Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not
suffice to hold him liable under RA 7610. His
argument has no legal basis. The Court has already
ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse
under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA
7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not.
Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is
enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of
lasciviousness under RA 7610.
People v Dulay
Crime Charged: RAPE (a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation)
ISSUE: WON the court gravely erred in finding the
accused-appellant guilty of rape as co-principal by
indispensable cooperation
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of rape as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Modified, guilty of violating Section 5
(a), Article III R.A. 7610, as amended
Facts:
AAA’s sister introduced her to appellant as
someone nice. They went to a wake together, and
then they went to the “kubuhan” to look for some
fish. At the “kubuhan”, AAA was pulled by the
appellant in a room where “Speed” was. She saw
appellant received money from “Speed” and left
them. She was threatened and tied by “Speed” and
raped her. She saw appellant peeping in the room
and asked for help but the latter did nothing.
Thereafter, she was threatened by “Speed” not
divulge the incident or else he’ll come after her. AAA
went to San Pedro, Laguna and told her sister what
happened, and then her sister told their mother and
filed a case against “Speed” and appellant.
Held:
The Supreme Court is of another view and
does not subscribe to the findings of the trial court,
as sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principal by indispensable
cooperation in the crime of rape.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be
considered a principal by direct participation, by
inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a
principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or
unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
22 | P a g e
commission of the offense by performing another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by
appellant are indispensable in the commission of the
crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from
the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until
appellant received money from the man who
allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the
crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA
and offered the latter's services in exchange for
money and AAA could still have been raped. Even
AAA could have offered her own services in exchange
for monetary consideration and still end up being
raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect
of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be
remembered that in the Information, as well as in the
testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for
a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by
"Speed."
The Supreme Court does not find appellant to have
committed the crime of rape as a principal by
indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of
violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act, which states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse. – Children,
whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote,
facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of
a child prostitute by means of written
or oral advertisements or other
similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence
towards a child to engage him as a prostitute;
or
(5) Giving monetary consideration
goods or other pecuniary benefit to a
child with intent to engage such child
in prostitution.
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes,
facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to,
the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a
child prostitute by means of written
or oral advertisements or other
similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as a
prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence
towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration,
goods or other pecuniary benefit to a
child with intent to engage such child
in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be
exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to
or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates
sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In
other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused
primarily for profit.
23 | P a g e
Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 Bongalon v People
(a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting as a procurer of
a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It Crime charged: CHILD ABUSE (act in violation of
must be remembered that the character of the crime Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610)
is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
ISSUE: WON accused should be guilty of the crime
information nor from the specification of the
charged
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the Ruling:
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information. The sufficiency of an information is not 1. RTC: Guilty of violation of RA 7610
negated by an incomplete or defective designation of 2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
the crime in the caption or other parts of the 3. SC: Decision of CA set aside, guilty of
information but by the narration of facts and slight physical injuries
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and
Facts:
sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Prosecution

Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his

older brother, both minors, joined the evening
procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi
City. When the procession passed in front of the
petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann
Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called
him "sissy".Petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan
and called them names like "strangers" and
"animals". He struck Jayson at the back with his hand,
and slapped Jayson on the face, and went to the
brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz,
their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out
of the house to take on the petitioner. Rolando later
brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and
reported the incident. Jayson also underwent medical
treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital. The doctors who examined Jayson issued
two medical certificates attesting that Jayson
suffered contusions.

Defense

The petitioner denied having physically

abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he
only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann
Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told
him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at
them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He
denied shouting invectives at and challenging
Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando
to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.

24 | P a g e
 Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did
not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why
Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he
had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied
throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy."
She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had
pelted her with stones during the procession.
Held:
The law under which the petitioner was
charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section
10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which
relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse,
Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any
other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section
3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his
basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give
medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the
RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped
Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding
that his acts constituted child abuse within the
purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records
did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his
laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to
debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as
a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed
the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at
the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for
the personal safety of his own minor daughters who
had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and
Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked
that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child
abuse.
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five
to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner
was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and
maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries
shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the
offender has inflicted physical injuries
which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days,
or shall require medical attendance
during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto
menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment. In imposing the correct penalty,
25 | P a g e
however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article
13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the
petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby
diminishing the exercise of his will power. Passion or
obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing
only in the honest belief of the accused. It is relevant
to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the
offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and
intent. With his having acted under the belief that
Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two
minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned
Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is
prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10
days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance
that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year, the petitioner shall suffer a
straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
People v Mamantak
Crime charged: KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable of kidnapping for
ransom
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of kidnapping for ransom
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications
Facts:
Teresa went with Christopher and her elder
sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower
in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and
Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida
proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa
took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the
counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his
mother’s sight when she realized that he had
disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for
him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood
outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the
child was futile, they reported him missing to the
nearest police detachment.
Teresa went to several TV and radio stations
to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to
appeal for help and information. Despite the
publicity, however, Teresa received no word about
Christopher’s whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were
gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery.
Teresa received a call from a woman who
sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have
custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in
exchange for the boy. the same muslim-sounding
woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent
photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the
Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when
Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent
picture of Christopher. She then contacted the
mysterious woman through the cellphone number
the latter had previously given her. When the woman
instructed her to immediately board a ship for
Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised
26 | P a g e
the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct
the pay off at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte. Teresa sought the help of the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
While Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at
Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were
Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak.
Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and
asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that
they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the
name written at the back of the picture she received
in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo
to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato.
Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a
cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan.
Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin
of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox
and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak
asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but
they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave
Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the
same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that
Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked
Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their
agreement that the boy be handed over at the
carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after
several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and
embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He
no longer recognized nor understood her for he could
only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he
was, the boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as
surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and
demanded the ransom money. She answered that
her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox.
Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a
jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s
watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox
handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this
juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and
the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested
Mamantak and Taurak.
Held:
Kidnapping is defined and punished under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. – Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall
have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed
simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall
have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained
shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female
or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a private individual; not
either of the parents of the victim7 or a public
officer who has a duty under the law to
detain a person;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal and
27 | P a g e
 (4) in the commission of the offense, any of
the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days; (b) it is committed by simulating
public authority; (c) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
are made or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a public
official.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention
is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and
illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention becomes
inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes
punishable by death even if none of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.9
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only
the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for
whatever length of time. And liberty is not limited to
mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to
enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such
restraints necessary for the common welfare.
actually spent for the care and subsistence of
Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated
the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of
expenses incurred for taking care of the child.
(Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement
for "board-and-lodging.")
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for the redemption of a captured person
that will release him from captivity. No specific form
of ransom is required to consummate the felony of
kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is
intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the
victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the
ransom is immaterial.
In this case, the payment of P30,000 was demanded
as a condition for the release of Christopher to his
mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
considered it as a demand for ransom.

Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control

and custody and even brought him to Lanao del
Norte. She demanded P30,000 in exchange for his
return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak’s
actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her
acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt
that she was aiding her sister and was acting in
concert with her. These were the identical factual
findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There
is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently
supported by evidence.

The Court of Appeals considered the demand

for P30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which
necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On
the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as
too measly, compared to what must have been

28 | P a g e
People v Muit, et. al.
Crime charged: KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH
HOMICIDE AND CARNAPPING
ISSUE: WON the accused-appellants were correctly
convicted by the RTC
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of carnapping and kidnapping
for ransom, which resulted in the death of
the victim
2. CA: Affirmed
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications
Facts:
Accused appellants kidnapped the victim and
boarded the victim’s Pajero. They then started
the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-
asa Road gate. Two more persons who were waiting
at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero. Lipa City
Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission
received a radio message from the Tanauan Police
Station that a kidnapping was ongoing and the
kidnappers on board a Pajero with plate number
UDL-746 were heading towards Lipa City. Supt.
Mission immediately ordered the police posted near
the Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade. In the
meantime, two teams were organized to intercept
the Pajero. They proceeded to the barricade.
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams
arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted.
When policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver
stopped the vehicle. While two policemen
approached the Pajero, the driver and front
passenger opened their car doors and started firing at
the policemen. At this point, all the policemen
present at the scene fired back. The cross-fire lasted
for around four minutes. All the occupants of
the Pajero, except the driver and the front passenger
who managed to escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga
apprehended one of the escapees who turned out to
be Muit, the driver of the Pajero, at Barangay San
Carlos, Batangas, about 200 meters from the place of
the shootout.
Held:
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect
the same. The totality of the prosecution’s evidence
in this case established the commission of kidnapping
for ransom with homicide.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or
the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, defines
"carnapping" as the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. The crime was committed in this case when
the victim’s Pajero was forcibly taken away from him
contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the
construction site.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and
the carnapping were established by the direct
testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer
testified on how the group approached and
convinced him to let them use his house to keep the
victim they planned to kidnap. They planned the
crime in Ferraer’s house and waited for the call from
Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at
the construction site. The group received a call from
Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that the
victim was already at the construction site, and so
they went there to carry out their plan. At the
construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and
Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group
pointed their guns at the victim and his companion
and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground.
After getting the keys to the Pajero from Seraspe,
they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit
driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping
29 | P a g e
of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were
intercepted by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt.
Mission testified that the kidnappers refused to
surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in
which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was
one of the two persons who survived the shoot out,
but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr.
returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the
group did not arrive at their meeting place. Ferraer,
Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news
that the group engaged the police in a shoot out and
most of them were killed, and that Muit was arrested
by the police.
Madsali, et. al. v People
Crime charged: ABDUCTION WITH RAPE and SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION
ISSUE: WON the crime charged is correct
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of abduction with rape and
serious illegal detention
2. CA: Affirmed
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications (guilty of
special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and
kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659)
Facts:
AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching
water in a cave in Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan.
Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and
carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but
Sajiron overtook them. He held the hair of AAA and
told her, "Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with
me, I will kill you." Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue,
but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to
shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying
while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his
gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon
Dama and said, "If you will not go, I will shoot
you." Inon Dama went home and reported the
incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the
place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared
with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When
AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands
behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of
cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was
untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on. While
Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him
not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she
would submit to his desire, her life would be spared.
Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts and
30 | P a g e
inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted,
but to no avail. She felt pain and she noticed blood on
her private parts. She was sexually abused three
times on the ground, where she was made to lie
down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that
AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard
and watched them. They left the forest at around
10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day and
brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was
detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard
AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape.
Nine days after the abduction, upon
instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by
Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was
solemnized against AAA's will and without the
presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and
Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the
latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed
in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did
not try to escape, because her house was very far
from the place where she was held captive, and her
captors threatened to kill her and her family if she
would attempt to escape. During her detention,
Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to
roam within the vicinity of the house but she was
usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as
her guard. She was also guarded and threatened by
Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.
Held:
Criminal Case No. 12281
The Court does not agree with the findings of
the CA affirming the trial court's judgment finding
Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape in
Criminal Case No. 12281. An appeal in a criminal case
opens the entire case for review on any question,
including one not raised by the parties Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the
crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person
abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is against
her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd
designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal Case
No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would readily
show that the allegations therein do not charge the
accused with forcible abduction, because the taking,
as alleged, was not with lewd designs. The only act
that was alleged to have been attended with lewd
design was the act of rape. Upon further perusal of
the allegations in the information, it appears that the
crime charged was actually the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape,
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2)
he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer.
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who
are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged
AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive
against her will. The crime of serious illegal detention
consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure,
but also of detaining him or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is
enough that the victim is restrained from going
home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the
victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In
the present case, although AAA was not actually
confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she
was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of
cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her
to the forest away from her home.
31 | P a g e
 The crime of rape was also proven beyond
reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of
force and intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA
had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and
lustful assault.
The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies
as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v.
Larrañaga, the Court explained that this provision
gives rise to a special complex crime:
This amendment introduced in our
criminal statutes, the concept of 'special
complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or
homicide. It effectively eliminated the
distinction drawn by the courts between
those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by
the accused, and those where the killing of
the victim was not deliberately resorted to
but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing
was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under
Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659."
separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No.
7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and
that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. (Italics in the original)
Criminal Case No. 12309
We also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention.
All the elements of the crime of serious illegal
detention are present in the instant case: AAA, a
female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994,
after she was raped in the forest, she was brought to
and detained at the house of Egap and forced to
cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her
detention on July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to
guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape.
She did not dare to escape because the accused
threatened to kill her and her family if she attempted
to flee.

Where the law provides a single penalty for

two or more component offenses, the resulting crime
is called a special complex crime. Some of the special
complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1)
robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4)
kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape
with homicide. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that
would be necessary if they were made the subject of

32 | P a g e
People v Mirandilla, Jr.
Crime charged: KIDNAPPING WITH RAPE (CRIM. CASE
NO. 9278), FOUR COUNTS OF RAPE (CRIM. CASE NOS.
9274 TO 9277), and RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL
ASSAULT (CRIM. CASE NO. 9279)
ISSUE: WON the crime charged is correct
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of the crime charged
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications (guilty of
the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape (instead of kidnapping as the
RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one
count of rape by sexual assault)
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications (guilty of
special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape under
the last paragraph of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code)
Facts:
It was eve of the feast in Brgy. San Francisco,
Legazpi City. At the plaza, AAA was dancing with her
elder sister, BBB. AAA went out of the dancing hall to
buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way
back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his
arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knife’s point
thrust at her right side. She will come to know the
man’s name at the police station, after her escape, to
be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.
He told her not to move or ask for help.
Another man joined and went beside her, while two
others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun.
They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd,
walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft
sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy
fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel,
where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing
the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA
alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from
a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into
the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera
de Legazpi in Rawis.
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and
pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he
ordered her to remove her pants. When she defied
him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a gun,
forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and
reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and
rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He
forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs,
pushed and pulled his penis inside. "Sayang ka," she
heard him whisper at her, as she succumbed to pain
and exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning,
she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting
until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No
rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived
together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he
ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly
obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling
through her hair with his left hand and slapping her
with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her
into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the
road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining
tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm,
thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her
underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandilla’s penis
inside her vagina. A little while, a companion warned
Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away.
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown
inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth.
Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank,
grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again
inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following evening, Mirandilla and his
gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered
the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at
daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to
another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then
back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a
cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the
grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig,
where they caged her in a small house in the middle
of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times.
33 | P a g e
 One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA
succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing
cards, she rushed outside and ran, crossed a river, got
drenched, and continued running. She rested for
awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the
fields and stayed out of people’s sight for two nights.
Finally, she found a road and followed its path,
leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who
brought her to the police station. It was 11 January
2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless.
Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave
her food. When the police presented to her pictures
of suspected criminals, she recognized the man’s face
– she was certain it was him. He was Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her.
The following morning, accompanied by the
police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination.
The doctor discovered hymenal lacerations in
different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual
intercourse. Foul smelling pus also oozed from her
vagina - AAA had contracted gonorrhoea.
Held:
The Court agrees with the CA in finding
Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as
the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less, which found
that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention
for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a
gun and/or a knife.
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.
– Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or
intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of
the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice
of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape
committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal
knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat, or
intimidation. She was also able to prove each
element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-
A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla
inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through force,
threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is
provided for under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. – Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days. xxx
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, states that when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision
gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court
explained in People v. Larrañaga, this arises where
the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses.
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes
had been committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one
kidnapping with rape. This is because these
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible
offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts
with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no
matter how many times the victim was raped, like in
34 | P a g e
the present case, there is only one crime committed
– the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with
rape, as in this case, the offender should not have
taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it
would be complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the
taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was
raped several times, the crimes committed is one
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as
much as the forcible abduction was only necessary
for the first rape; and each of the other counts of
rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.
It having been established that Mirandilla’s
act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not
forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he
raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death.
However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, the penalty of death is hereby reduced to
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
People v Suyu
Crime charged: ROBBERY w/ RAPE
ISSUE: WON court erred in finding the
accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged
Ruling:
1. RTC: Guilty of robbery w/ rape
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications
Facts:
Clarissa Angeles was with her boyfriend,
William Ferrer. They were eating snacks inside a pick-
up truck parked in a vacant lot. Suddenly, a man, who
turned out to be Rommel Macarubbo, appeared in
front of the truck, pointed a gun at them and said:
"This is a holdup. If you will start the engine of the
car, I will shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who
turned out to be Willy Suyu, lifted the lock on
William's side and entered the pick-up. Willy Suyu
then took Ferrer's wallet which contained around
P150.00. A third man, who turned out to be Francis
Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry valued at around P2,
500.00 and cash amounting to P10.00. Thereafter,
Willy Suyu clubbed William and dragged him out of
the truck. Fortunately, William was able to escape
and immediately went to the police station to report
the incident. Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the lock of
the pick-up truck at Clarissa's side. Macarubbo then
opened the door. The two and Cainglet dragged the
girl to a hilly place, not far away. Macarubbo and
Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked
a fan knife at her. There, they ravished her.
Held:
The conviction thus of appellants for robbery
with rape defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. The
law provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons- Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of
35 | P a g e
 violence against or intimidation of any person People v Cabbab
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua Crime charged: DOUBLE MURDER AND ATTEMPTED
to death, when by reason or on MURDER WITH ROBBERY
occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, ISSUE: WON the crime charged is correct
or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional Ruling:
mutilation or arson.
1. RTC: Guilty of double murder with
robbery or better put, robbery with
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following double homicide and attempted murder
elements must concur: as defined in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same
(1) the taking of personal property is committed
Code or robbery with double homicide
with violence or intimidation against
defined and penalized under Art. 248 in
persons;
relation to Art. 6
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
2. CA: Affirmed w/ modifications (Guilty of
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
the special complex crime of Robbery
or animus lucrandi;
with Homicide and separate crime of
(4) the robbery is accompanied by rape
attempted murder)
3. SC: Affirmed w/ modifications (Guilty of
The intent to rob must precede the rape. In
robbery with homicide and acquitted of
robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to
the separate crime of attempted murder
rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape
against the person of PO William Belmes)
must be contemporaneous with the commission of
the robbery. We note that aside from raping the
Facts:
victim, appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in
her sexual organ. Appellant Suyu, thus, committed
Father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner
sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article 266-
Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe Abad
A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353. Also, aside
and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, went to
from Rodolfo Suyu, Cainglet raped the victim.
Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to attend a
Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible
"fiesta" celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they
felony of robbery with rape and any crimes
found out that the fiesta celebration was already
committed on the occasion or by reason of the
over, thus, they decided to go home in Villaviciosa,
robbery are merged and integrated into a single and
Abra. The group took their lunch at Sitio Turod,
indivisible felony of robbery with rape.
located in the same area of Barangay Kimmalasag,
thereafter while on their way home, they were met
by accused-appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino
Calpito and invited them to play "pepito," a local
version of the game of "russian poker."

Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan

played "pepito" with the group of accused-appellant.
Winner Agbulos played the dealer/banker in the
game while accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito
acted as players therein. Around 3:00 o’clock p.m.,

36 | P a g e
PO William Belmes told Winner Agbulos and Eddie homicide shall have been committed,
Quindasan that they should be going home after or when the robbery shall have been
three (3) more deals. About 3:30 p.m., Winner accompanied by rape or intentional
Agbulos’s group wrapped-up the game and were set mutilation or arson.
for home together with his group. Winner Agbulos
won the game. While on their way home from Sitio To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with
Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan saw accused-appellant, confluence of the following elements:
accused Segundino Calpito and a companion running
up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw (1) the taking of personal property is
Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were committed with violence or intimidation
then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire. against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a (3) the taking is characterized by intent to
canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of gain or animo lucrandi; and
accused-appellant. PO William Belmes ran towards (4) by reason of the robbery or on the
Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
behind the group, and informed the two that Winner
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by
intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur
accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three
before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial
(3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the
that death would supervene by mere accident, or
dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie
that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The three
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once
sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra
a homicide is committed by reason or on the
and returned to the scene of the crime where they
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the
found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino
Calpito who ambused them and took the money,
Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond
estimated at P12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he
reasonable doubt that appellant, having lost to
won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was brought
Winner Agbulos in the game of poker, intended to
to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following
divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting
day.
to P20,000.00. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of
his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as
Held:
his companion, Eddie Quindasan.
The crime committed by appellant was
The Court feels, however, that the two courts
correctly characterized by the appellate court as
below erred in convicting appellant of the separate
Robbery with Homicide under Article 294, paragraph
crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO
1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted
murder committed during or on the occasion of the
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or
robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of
intimidation of persons — Penalties.— Any
Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex
person guilty of robbery with the use of
crime that remains fundamentally the same
violence against any person shall suffer:
regardless of the number of homicides or injuries
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua
committed in connection with the robbery.
to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of

37 | P a g e