Threat Report 2018: The Afghan Taliban’s Lethal Insurgency

Bennett Seftel
Cipher Brief Analysis | 6 May 2018
www.thecipherbrief.com/threat-report-2018-afghan-talibans-increasingly-lethal-insurgency

Violence once again grips Afghanistan, with the Taliban, the Islamic State and other terror groups carrying out deadly attacks and
kidnappings across the country. Last month, the Taliban announced the beginning of its annual “spring offensive,” and this past
weekend bombed a mosque that was being used as a voter registration center, killing 14 and injuring dozens more.

What follows is a section of The Cipher Brief’s 2018 Annual Threat Report, which breaks down the greatest threats facing the
United States and the world at this point in time. For more information on the full report, please click here.

Bottom Line: The Afghan Taliban is mounting
an increasingly lethal insurgency across
Afghanistan, as both U.S. troops and Afghan
Security Forces face near-everyday violence
throughout the country. With the Taliban
gaining momentum and reasserting control in
remote, loosely governed parts of the country,
the window for reaching a negotiated peace to
end the ongoing conflict is rapidly closing.
Background: The Afghan Taliban was formed in
September 1994 in the predominantly Pashtun areas of
southern Afghanistan under the leadership of Mullah
Mohammad Omar, along with a group of Afghan clerics
and religious students with ties to hardline mujahedeen
rebels that had fought against the Soviet Union during
its invasion of Afghanistan.
 Literally translated as “the students,” the Afgan
Taliban gained popular support in southern
Afghanistan by pledging to bring stability to a
region fraught with conflict. The group imposed
strict Sharia law in areas it controlled, carrying out
amputations and executions. Television, Western
music and dancing were prohibited, and women
were banned from attending school.
 The Afghan Taliban, along with many mujahedeen
fighters who subsequently joined the movement,
maintain longstanding ties to Pakistan dating back
to the late 1970s and 1980s when the U.S.
government turned to Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence agency (ISI) as a conduit to funnel U.S.
and Saudi weapons and money to mujahedeen
fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
Following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan in February 1989, many mujahedeen
crossed over into Pakistan where they were
educated in Islamic seminaries known as madrassas
and later joined the Afghan Taliban.
 The Soviet Union’s retreat left a power vacuum in
Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s forceful military
approach enabled the group to assume control
over the country in May 1996. Pakistan’s ISI
supported the Taliban’s rise to power as part of its
broader regional strategy to install a friendly
government in Kabul and prevent India from
extending its influence into Afghanistan.
 In October 2001, the U.S. initiated combat
operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban
government after it refused to hand over Afghan-
based Al-Qaida leaders and operatives who were
deemed responsible for orchestrating the 9/11
attacks. The U.S. military succeeded in pushing
both groups to retreat to the mountainous Afghan-
Pakistan border. On May 1, 2003, U.S. President
George W. Bush delivered his infamous “Mission
Accomplished” speech declaring, “In the battle of
Afghanistan, we destroyed the Taliban, many
terrorists, and the camps where they trained.” Yet,
the Afghan Taliban has not been listed by the U.S.
State Department as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, presumably to allow eventual peace
talks with the group.
 A key faction within the Afghan Taliban is the
Haqqani network, which was founded by Jalaluddin
Haqqani in the 1970s and emerged as one of the
most important mujahedeen resistance units
fighting against the Soviets during their invasion of
Afghanistan in the 1980s. Throughout the Afghan-
Soviet war, the Haqqani network established
strong ties with Pakistan’s intelligence services,
receiving U.S. weapons and Saudi funds that were
funneled to mujahedeen groups through the ISI.
Jalaluddin Haqqani formally joined the Taliban in
1995, serving as a military commander and cabinet
member.
 After the fall of the Taliban government in
Afghanistan in October 2001, the Haqqani network
retreated to Pakistan where it continued to direct
and conduct terrorist activity inside Afghanistan.
The U.S. State Department designated the Haqqani
network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in
September 2012. Ties between the Haqqani
network and the Afghan Taliban were further
strengthened in July 2015, when Jalaluddin’s son,
Sirajuddin Haqqani, was appointed as a deputy
leader of the Taliban. It is estimated that the
Haqqani network can draw from some 10,000
fighters to carry out its operations.

Dan Markey, Academic Director of the Global Policy
Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies:
“The Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and al-
Qaida leaders have all found opportunities for safe
haven inside Pakistan. Of the three groups, the
Haqqanis are widely perceived to have maintained the
best terms with the Pakistani state. Washington
generally views the Haqqanis as the proxy group with
which Pakistan enjoys the greatest influence and
control, which helps to explain the particular
frustration that U.S. policymakers feel at Haqqani
attacks on U.S., NATO and Afghan forces.”
Issue: Through persistent violence, the Afghan
Taliban has crippled the Afghan government’s
ability to exercise authority across the country,
paving the way for terrorist organizations and
other extremist groups to find safe haven in
ungoverned spaces. Furthermore, the Afghan
Taliban’s surge has directly impacted and
strained U.S.-Pakistan relations, with
Washington accusing Islamabad of harboring
and supporting the Afghan Taliban and the
Haqqani network.
 From the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment:
“The overall situation in Afghanistan probably will
deteriorate modestly this year in the face of
persistent political instability, sustained attacks by
the Taliban-led insurgency, unsteady Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) performance, and
chronic financial shortfalls. The ANSF probably will
maintain control of most major population centers
with coalition force support, but the intensity and
geographic scope of Taliban activities will put those
centers under continued strain.”
 A January 2018 BBC report concluded that the
Taliban threatens nearly 70 percent of Afghan
territory. According to the study, the Taliban runs
14 districts – roughly four percent of the country –
and approximately half of Afghanistan’s population
lives in areas that are susceptible to some level of
Taliban violence or influence. According to the
most recent quarterly report issued by the U.S.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Afghan government
controls only 55.8 percent of the country. Both of
these statistics represent alarming trend lines with
respect to Taliban gains.
 News reports from January 2018 cite U.S. and
Afghan officials who assess that the Taliban
maintains a force of around 60,000 fighters – a
significant increase from 2014 estimates, which
placed the group’s numbers at around 20,000.
 The Afghan government and the Trump
administration have blamed Pakistan for failing to
root out Afghan Taliban, Haqqani and Hezb-e-
Islami Gulbuddin leaders, who they believe find
safe haven on the Pakistani side of the border.
Pakistani officials deny the charges, instead accusing
Kabul of failing to crack down on militants it says
are sheltering in Afghanistan.
Dan Markey, Academic Director of the Global Policy
Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies:
“In the aftermath of 9/11, the Pakistanis chose to be
with us for multiple reasons, but mainly because they
decided that the alternatives were too costly. But as
they started to realize that our attention in Afghanistan
began to wander, most importantly to the war in Iraq,
that we weren’t actually hunting down and killing all al-
Qaida and Taliban leaders and that we were going to
leave Afghanistan a bit of a mess, then they reverted
back to an influence strategy, using many of the same
groups and individuals that they had come to know
over decades.”
Response: While the U.S. military has
maintained a consistent troop presence in
Afghanistan since 2001 and has diligently
trained, advised, supplied and assisted the
Afghan National Security Forces, policymakers
in Washington have failed to articulate a clear
strategic objective in Afghanistan throughout
the nearly 17-year conflict and peace talks with
the Afghan Taliban remain elusive. The Trump
administration has faced the same uncertainty
with its approach to Afghanistan, although it has
pressed Pakistan to rescind its support for
certain militant groups and bring the Afghan
Taliban to the negotiating table.
 In August 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump
revealed his strategy for Afghanistan, which
included a shift from a time-based approach to a
conditions-based approach for U.S. troop presence
in Afghanistan. Trump also announced that
transparency about troop numbers and military
activities was off the table, stating that “America’s
enemies must never know our plans or believe
they can wait us out.”
 The U.S. has approximately 15,000 troops
stationed in Afghanistan, while an additional 3,000
NATO forces from U.S.-allied nations were
deployed in January 2018, bringing the total
number of NATO forces in Afghanistan to around
16,000.
 As of August 2017, Afghan forces numbered an
estimated 320,000 troops. The Afghans took
primary responsibility for their security in January
2015, and the goal strength for the defense force is
 approximately 352,000 people, including roughly the Kabul government in control of the
195,000 members of the Afghan National Army populated parts of the country.
and 157,000 in the Afghan National Police.
Reaching these goals has proven challenging, Kevin Hulbert, former Chief of Station, CIA:
however, as Afghan casualties rise due to
increasingly common and deadly Taliban strikes “When it comes to Afghanistan, we are stuck in a
across the country, and the Afghan Army faces stalemate and pursuing the morally ambiguous course
more difficult recruiting prospects. of action of doing just enough not to lose, but not
really enough to win. The way forward will be
 The Trump administration is withholding more determined by clarifying our objectives and by
than $1 billion worth of security assistance from recognizing that there are alternative courses of action
Pakistan, including $900 million in Coalition more elaborate and nuanced than the simple and binary
Support Funding, due to Pakistan’s failure to crack calculation over whether to put more or less boots on
down on members of the Haqqani network and the ground. President Trump’s actions on both
the Afghan Taliban inside its territory. The Trump Afghanistan and Pakistan over the last year may have
administration has provided Pakistan with a hit list created some forward momentum in the long sought
of nearly a dozen top militants to detain as a way after goal of Taliban reconciliation and there do seem
to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate and to be some flickers of light at the end of what has been
win back security funding. Aid to Pakistan has been a very long tunnel. However, I’m not sure if that
suspended before. In July 2011, the Obama nascent light flickering is some sort of an exit and a way
administration blocked $800 million in aid to forward with the Taliban and other factions, or the
Pakistan, after the U.S. found Osama bin Laden had light of an oncoming train. The idea of “Taliban
been hiding in the country. reconciliation” is something we have unsuccessfully
sought for many years.”
 Peace talks between the Afghan government and
the Taliban have thus far failed to gain traction
since the July 2017 launch of the Kabul Process for
Peace & Security Cooperation, which aims to bring
a political settlement to the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan. In February 2018, Afghan President
Ashraf Ghani called on the Taliban to join the
peace effort, offering to grant the group political
party status with an office in Kabul, help remove
Taliban leaders from terrorist blacklists and
negotiate without preconditions. However, the
Taliban has insisted on direct negotiations with the
United States, while Washington has maintained
that any talks must first occur between the Taliban
and the Afghan government. Washington has also
asked Pakistan to use its influence to bring the
Afghan Taliban to the table.

General Michael Hayden, former Director, CIA and

NSA:
“Frankly, what I think our objective is in Afghanistan is
to make sure it doesn’t become something we can’t
live with. In other words, realism about Afghanistan
suggests this will take a long time, and the final
outcome will not be totally satisfactory.”

Looking Ahead: A decade and a half after 9/11,

the Taliban has reasserted itself as an important
player in Afghanistan, holding significant
territory and influence in the country. As the
Afghan government and security forces have
failed to stop Taliban advances, and an alienated
Pakistan may now be less willing to help bring
the Taliban to talks, the most likely outcome is
a continuing stalemate, with the U.S. and
NATO providing just enough firepower to keep