VI.

COUNTRY - TEAM APPROACH

SEC. 27. PRIORITY CONCERNS OF PHILIPPINE FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS. - The country team
approach, as enunciated under Executive Order No. 74, series of 1993, shall be the mode under which
Philippine embassies or their personnel will operate in the protection of the Filipino migrant workers as
well as in the promotion of their welfare. The protection of the Filipino migrant workers and the
promotion of their welfare, in particular, and the protection of the dignity and fundamental rights and
freedoms of the Filipino citizen abroad, in general, shall be the highest priority concerns of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Foreign Service Posts.

SEC. 28. COUNTRY-TEAM APPROACH. - Under the country-team approach, all officers,
representatives and personnel of the Philippine government posted abroad regardless of their mother
agencies shall, on a per country basis, act as one country-team with a mission under the leadership of
the ambassador. In this regard, the ambassador may recommend to the Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs the recall of officers, representatives and personnel of the Philippine government
posted abroad for acts inimical to the national interest such as, but not limited to, failure to provide
the necessary services to protect the rights of overseas Filipinos.

Upon receipt of the recommendation of the ambassador, the Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs shall, in the case of officers, representatives and personnel of other departments,
endorse such recommendation to the department secretary concerned for appropriate action. Pending
investigation by an appropriate body in the Philippines, the person recommended for recall may be
placed under preventive suspension by the ambassador.

In host countries where there are Philippine consulates, such consulates shall also constitute
part of the country-team under the leadership of the ambassador.

In the implementation of the country-team approach, visiting Philippine delegations shall be

provided full support and information.

VII. DEREGULATION AND PHASE-OUT

SEC. 29. COMPREHENSIVE DEREGULATION PLAN ON RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES. - Pursuant to a

progressive policy of deregulation whereby the migration of workers becomes strictly a matter between
the worker and his foreign employer, the DOLE within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, is
hereby mandated to formulate a five-year comprehensive deregulation plan on recruitment activities
taking into account labor market trends, economic conditions of the country and emergency
circumstances which may affect the welfare of migrant workers.

SEC. 30. GRADUAL PHASE-OUT OF REGULATORY FUNCTIONS. - Within a period of five (5) years
from the effectivity of this Act, the DOLE shall phase out the regulatory functions of the POEA pursuant
to the objectives of deregulation.

VII. PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER HIGHLY-SKILLED FILIPINOS ABROAD

SEC. 31. INCENTIVES TO PROFESSIONALS AND OTHER HIGHLY-SKILLED FILIPINOS ABROAD. -

Pursuant to the objective of encouraging professionals and other highly-skilled Filipinos abroad
especially in the field of science and technology to participate in, and contribute to national
development, the government shall provide proper and adequate incentives and programs so as to
secure their services in priority development areas of the public and private sectors.

IX. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

 SEC. 32. POEA AND OWWA BOARD; ADDITIONAL MEMBERSHIPS. - Notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, the respective Boards of the POEA and the OWWA shall, in addition to their
present composition, have three (3) members each who shall come from the women, sea-based and
land-based sectors, respectively, to be appointed by the President in the same manner as the other
members.

SEC. 33. REPORT TO CONGRESS. - In order to inform the Philippine Congress on the
implementation of the policy enunciated in Section 4 hereof, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Department of Labor and Employment shall submit to the said body a semi-annual report of Philippine
foreign posts located in countries hosting Filipino migrant workers. The report shall not be limited to
the following information:

(a) Masterlist of Filipino migrant workers, and inventory of pending cases involving them and
other Filipino nationals including those serving prison terms;

(b) Working conditions of Filipino migrant workers;

(c) Problems encountered by the migrant workers, specifically violations of their rights;

(d) Initiative/actions taken by the Philippine foreign posts to address the problems of Filipino
migrant workers;

(e) Changes in the laws and policies of host countries; and

(f) Status of negotiations on bilateral labor agreements between the Philippines and the host
country.

Any officer of the government who fails to report as stated in the preceeding section shall be
subjected to administrative penalty.

SEC. 34. REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS. - Pursuant to Section 3(2), Article VI of the

Constitution and in line with the objective of empowering overseas Filipinos to participate in the
policy-making process to address Filipino migrant concerns, two (2) sectoral representatives for
migrant workers in the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the President from the ranks of
migrant workers: Provided, that at least one (1) of the two (2) sectoral representatives shall come from
the women migrant workers sector: Provided, further, that all nominees must have at least two (2)
years experience as a migrant worker.

SEC. 35. EXEMPTION FROM TRAVEL TAX AND AIRPORT FEE. - All laws to the country
notwithstanding, the migrant worker shall be exempt from the payment of travel tax and airport fee
upon proper showing of proof of entitlement by the POEA.

SEC. 36. NON-INCREASE OF FEES; ABOLITION OF REPATRIATION BOND. - Upon approval of this
Act, all fees being charged by any government office on migrant workers shall remain at their present
levels and the repatriation bond shall be established.

SEC. 37. THE CONGRESSIONAL MIGRANT WORKERS SCHOLARSHIP FUND. - There is hereby
created a Congressional Migrant Workers Scholarship Fund which shall benefit deserving migrant
workers and/or their immediate descendants below twenty-one (21) years of age who intent to pursue
courses or training primarily in the field of science and technology. The initial seed fund of two
hundred million pesos (P200,000,000.00) shall be constituted from the following sources:
 (a) Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) from the unexpected Countrywide Development Fund
for 1995 in equal sharing by all members of Congress; and

(b) The remaining one hundred fifty million pesos (P150,000,000.00) shall be funded from the
proceeds of Lotto.

The Congressional Migrant Workers Scholarship Fund as herein created shall be administered by
the DOLE in coordination with the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). To carry out the
objectives of this section, the DOLE and the DOST shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations.

SEC. 38. APPROPRIATION AND OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDING. - The amount necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act shall be provided for in the General Appropriations Act of the year
following its enactment into law and thereafter.

SEC. 39. MIGRANT WORKERS DAY. - The day of signing by the President of this Act shall be
designated as the Migrant Workers Day and shall henceforth be commemorated as such annually.

SEC. 40. IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS. - The departments and agencies charged
with carrying out the provisions of this Act shall, within ninety (90) days after the effectivity of this
Act, formulate the necessary rules and regulations for its effective implementation.

SEC. 41. REPEATING CLAUSE. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 42. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof shall not be affected thereby.

SEC. 43. EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation
whichever comes earlier.

LABOR CODE 32 & 34

Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment
agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment
through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the
appropriate receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a
schedule of allowable fees.

-Suspension or cancellation of licenses may include award of damages to repair the injury caused to its
victims.

Article 34. Prohibited practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of
authority:

-To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than
that actually received by him as a loan or advance;

-To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or
employment;
-To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation
for the purpose of securing a license or authority under this Code.

-To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him
to another unless the transfer is designed to liberate the worker from oppressive terms and conditions
of employment;

-To influence or to attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has not
applied for employment through his agency;

-To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to
the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;

-To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor or by his duly authorized
representatives;

-To fail to file reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of foreign
exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be
required by the Secretary of Labor.

-To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from
the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the periods of expiration of the
same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor;

-To become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be
engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency; and

-To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or
financial considerations other than those authorized under this Code and its implementing rules and
regulations.

-** A supplementary contract beneficial to worker not violative of protection afforded by the State to
workers.

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT - Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers and includes referring contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
PROVIDED that any such non-licensee or non-holder of authority who in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the commission of prohibited acts whether committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority or a licensee or holder of authority

When committed by a SYNDICATE i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and confederating with one another; or (a) When committed in a LARGE SCALE i.e., if it is
committed against three (3) or more persons ☛ VENUE OF ACTIONS ON ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT: 1. RTC
of the province or city where the offense was committed; or 2. where the offended party resides at the
time of the commission of the offense → at the option of the complainant.
JURISDICTIONS

 What are the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters?

Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the following cases:

1. Unfair labor practice (ULP) cases;

2. Termination disputes (or illegal dismissal cases);

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-
employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of the Labor Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;

6. Except claims for employees compensation not included in the next succeeding paragraph,
social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-
employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim
for reinstatement;

7. Wage distortion disputes in unorganized establishments not voluntarily settled by the parties
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6627;

8. Enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non-compliance by any of the parties

pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code, as amended;

9. Money claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or

contract, involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages as provided by Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as
amended by R.A. No. 10022;

10.Contested cases under the exception clause of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended
by R.A. 7730; and

11.Other cases as may be provided by law.

  What are the two kinds of jurisdiction of the NLRC?

The National Labor Relations Commission exercises two (2) kinds of jurisdiction: (1) Original
jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

1. Original jurisdiction:

1. Injunction in ordinary labor disputes to enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened

commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a
particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may
cause grave or irreparable damage to any party;
2. Injunction in strikes or lockouts under Article 264 of the Labor Code; and
3. Certified labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, certified to it by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment for compulsory arbitration.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:

1. All cases decided by the Labor Arbiters including contempt cases; and
2. Cases decided by the DOLE Regional Directors or his duly authorized Hearing Officers
(under Article 129) involving recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits
not exceeding P5,000 and not accompanied by claim for reinstatement.

In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions, the employers and
workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled
through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after ten (10)
calendar days of conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide the
dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory
arbitration.

The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of
any increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law or wage order.
As used herein, a wage distortion shall mean a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates
results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary
rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the
distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of
differentiation.

All workers paid by result, including those who are paid on piecework, takay, pakyaw or task basis, shall
receive not less than the prescribed wage rates per eight (8) hours of work a day, or a proportion
thereof for working less than eight (8) hours.

All recognized learnership and apprenticeship agreements shall be considered automatically modified
insofar as their wage clauses are concerned to reflect the prescribed wage rates. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 6727, June 9, 1989

 What is the prescriptive period for offenses penalized under the Labor Code?

As a rule, the prescriptive period of all criminal offenses penalized under the Labor Code and the
Rules to Implement the Labor Codeis three (3) years from the time of commission thereof.
However, criminal cases arising from ULP which prescribe within one (1) year from the time the
acts complained of were committed; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. The running of the 1
year period, however, is interrupted during the pendency of the labor case.

 What is the prescriptive period for money claims?

Prescriptive period is three (3) years from accrual of cause of action.

 What is the prescriptive period for claims for allowances and other benefits?

In cases of nonpayment of allowances and other monetary benefits, if it is established that the
benefits being claimed have been withheld from the employee for a period longer than three (3)
years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond the three-year prescriptive period is barred by
prescription. The amount that can only be demanded by the aggrieved employee shall be limited
to the amount of the benefits withheld within three (3) years before the filing of the complaint.

 What is the prescriptive period for illegal dismissal?

An action for illegal dismissal prescribes in four (4) years from accrual of cause of action.

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS. - Illegal recruitment cases under this Act shall prescribe in five (5) years:
Provided, however, That illegal recruitment cases involving economic sabotage as defined herein shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT G.R. No. 187730 June 29, 2010

FACTS:

The accused-appellant Gallo, who introduced himself as a relative of MPM Agency and several others,
who were incorporators, board members and employees of MPM, were charged with syndicated illegal
recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa committed against eighteen complainants.

The present appeal concerns solely accused-appellant’s conviction for syndicated illegal recruitment in
Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297 where he was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

Gallo, along with the others originally accused, made false misrepresentations and promises in assuring
the victims that after they paid the required placement fees, they will immediately be deployed as
factory workers in Korea. Dela Caza, one of the complainants, personally gave Gallo his money to
which the latter issued an official receipt.

Two weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza found that the agency changed its name and moved to
a new address. He then decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but the
other accused talked him out of it while Gallo even denied any knowledge about the money. After two
more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants decided to take
Action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to another place.

For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he
testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker. According
to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn because she was his town mate and he could
pay only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as processing fee. Further, to facilitate the processing of his
papers, he agreed to perform some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and
passport of applicants, running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary
except for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza once or twice at the agencys office
when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never
materialized.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred holding Gallo criminally liable for illegal recruitment when was neither
an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency?

LAW:

Labor Code Article 13, par. (b) Recruitment and placement refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for

BALITAO, MARIEL RATANI C. Case Digest in Labor I (Labor Standards) under Usec. JBJ profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-licensee or nonholder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the
following act, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority: (a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance; x x x x
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of deployment,
in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group
of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. The persons
criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of
juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.

CASE HISTORY: • RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal recruitment
and estafa . • CA affirmed RTC decision. • Gallo appelled before the SC.

RULING: The lower court was correct in holding Gallo criminally liable for illegal recruitment even
when he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency.

SC ruled that evidence supports conviction of the crime of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment.

BALITAO, MARIEL RATANI C. Case Digest in Labor I (Labor Standards) under Usec. JBJ

In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042.
Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of
foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When
accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys purported power and authority to
recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in the guise of placement fees,
the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.

Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he was indeed an
employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in the illegal
recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who issued and signed the official receipt
belies his profession of innocence.
The Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the other
persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the crime of
syndicated illegal recruitment.

The nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MPM
Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking.

The appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently show reversible error in the assailed decision. CA
decision is AFFIRMED.

OPINION:

The Supreme Court was correct in holding Gallo liable for the acts he committed against the
complainant. It is so obvious that Gallo, although not an employee of the agency, was connected with
it and was aware of its illegal transactions being present when it was still MPM to its futher changing of
names and addresses.

An employee or not, his actions constitute that of illegal recruitment in large scale, especially being an
active player in convincing the complainants of their immediate deployment in Korea and personally
receiving money from them for this reason.

As always, the court remains firm in its stand to protect the rights of the Filipino workers against
opportunists who will take advantage of their desire to aspire for better life by dragging them into the
illegal recruitment pit.

People of the Philippines vs. Melissa Chua

FACTS:

Within the period of 29 July 2002 up to 20 August 2002, accused personally met the complainants
individually and on separate dates where she represented herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist
and transport the complainants as Filipino Overseas Workers, particularly Taiwan. She personally
received various amounts as placement fees in consideration for their overseas employment and
personally issued receipts to the complainants. Accused represented herself that she is an employee of
Gate International (Golden Gate) Office located in Paragon Tower, Ermita, Manila. She also assured
them that the earlier complainants would be able to pay their placement fees then the earlier that they
could leave. After the complainants completed payment of their placement fees, they were made to
sign a contract containing stipulations as to salary and conditions of work. On several occasions
thereafter, they returned to appellant’s office to follow-up on their application. After several visits,
however, they noticed that all the properties of Golden Gate in its Paragon Tower Office were already
gone. Thus, the complainants filed a complaint for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against the accused.
During trial, accused denied that she was the one who recruited the complainants and that she is merely
a cashier of Golden Gate.

ISSUE Whether or not the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment
and Four (4) Estafa
HELD:

Yes, the accused cannot escape liability by conveniently limiting her participation as a cashier of
Golden Gate. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 are unequivocal that illegal
recruitment may or may not be for profit. It is immaterial, therefore, whether appellant remitted the
placement fees to the agency’s treasurer or appropriated them. The same provision likewise provides
that the persons criminally liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories.
Just the same, therefore, appellant can be held liable as a principal by direct participation since she
personally undertook the recruitment of private complainants without a license or authority to do so.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or
falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud.

However, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the third and
fourth elements of estafa as to the case of private complainant Ursulum. While Ursulum claims that he
delivered to the accused some amounts, he failed to produce receipts to substantiate the same. Instead,
Ursulum relies only on ten text messages allegedly sent by the accused as evidence of their transaction.
Said text messages alone does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was able to
obtain an amount from Ursulum as a result of her false pretenses.

Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a clear showing
that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the offender’s false pretenses, and
suffered damage thereby. In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.32 It is
imperative, therefore, that damage as an element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) be proved
as conclusively as the offense itself. The failure of the prosecution to discharge this burden concerning
the estafa allegedly committed against Ursulum warrants the acquittal of appellant on the said charge.
Yap v. Thenamaris Ships & Intermare Maritime

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its
principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.The contract was for 12 months.On 23 August 2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and
commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus.However, he insisted that he was
entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment.He alleged that
he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.

Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed.They further alleged that Yaps contract was validly terminated due
to the sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to Thenamaris other vessels.

Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed; that respondents
acted in bad faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he was not able to board; and that petitioner was entitled to
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months (US$12,870.00), P100,000 for moral damages,
and P50,000 for exemplary damages with 10% of the same for Attys fees.

Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the award of salaries from that corresponding to nine months to
only three months (US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042.

Respondents and petitioner both filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

NLRC affirmed the finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the part of respondent. However, the NLRC reversed its earlier
Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only 3 months salary for every year of the unexpired term because there is
no full year of unexpired term which this can be applied."

Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted, respondents filed a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 before the
CA.

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the
LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The CA relied on the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.

Both parties filed their respective MRs which the CA denied. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

[1] Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of
"salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment contract for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term,whichever is less" is constitutional;

[2] Assuming that it is, whether the CA gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired
term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term" threshold.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is
unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of (OFWs) to equal protection. Moreover, the subject clause does not state any
definitive governmental purpose, hence, it also violates petitioner's right to substantive due process.

Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is the doctrine of operative fact applied when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. This case should not be included in
the exception. It was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents.

Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the
computation of the lump-sum salary. First, fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time
on appeal, pass upon this question. Second, the allowance was encapsulated in the basic salary clause.
People v Panis
142 SCRA 664 (1986)

Facts:

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City
alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor
as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising
employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to
Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was
accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b),
he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised
or offered any employment for a fee."

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to
Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize
acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations,
application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.

Held:

Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers
to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a
fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment
and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing
hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a
cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
STOLT-NIELSEN AND CHUNG GAI SHIP MNGT vs. MEDEQUILLO -=

FACTS: On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to
deploy under a second contract.

COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT STATES: On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on
behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel “Stolt Aspiration”
for a period of nine (9) months; He would be paid with a monthly basic salary and a fixed OT pay, a total of $1,212.00 per
month during the employment period; for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while the vessel was at Batangas,
he was ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation;

Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioner’s office where he was transferred employment with
another vessel (Second Contract) named MV “Stolt Pride” under the same terms and conditions of the First Contract; Despite
the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy him; He made a follow-up with the
petitioner but the same refused to comply with the Second Employment Contract.

Thereafter, he demanded for his passport, seaman’s book and other employment documents. However, he was only allowed to
claim the said documents in exchange of his signing a document; He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily
because without these documents, he could not seek employment from other agencies.

The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995.

LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION: respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners; first contract entered into by and
between the complainant and the respondents to have been novated by the execution of the second contract. In other words,
respondents cannot be held liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the second
contract.8 However, he ruled that there was no substantial evidence to grant the prayer for moral and exemplary damages.

NLRC affirmed with modification, deleting the award of OT pay. Partial MR denied.

ISSUES: (1) WON there was novation of the first contract by the second contract; (2) WON the alleged illegal dismissal under the
1st contract is barred by prescription.

HELD:

It is evident that novation took place in this particular case. The parties impliedly extinguished the first contract by agreeing to
enter into the second contract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who was unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila. The
second contract would not have been necessary if the petitioners abided by the terms and conditions of Madequillo, Jr.’s
employment under the first contract. The records also reveal that the 2nd contract extinguished the first contract by changing
its object or principal. These contracts were for overseas employment aboard different vessels.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the first contract was a “previous valid contract” since it had not yet been terminated at the
time of Medequillo, Jr.’s repatriation to Manila. The legality of his dismissal had not yet been resolved with finality.
Undoubtedly, he was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with petitioners on the second contract. As
such, the NLRC correctly ruled that petitioners could only be held liable under the second contract

Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which Medequillo Jr. may initiate money claims under the 1st
contract commenced on the date of his repatriation. xxx The start of the three (3) year prescriptive period must therefore be
reckoned on February 1992, which by Medequillo Jr.’s own admission was the date of his repatriation to Manila. It was at this
point in time that Medequillo Jr.’s cause of action already accrued under the first contract. He had until February 1995 to
pursue a case for illegal dismissal and damages arising from the 1st contract. With the filing of his Complaint-Affidavit on March
6, 1995, which was clearly beyond the prescriptive period, the cause of action under the 1st contract was already time-barred.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA

G.R. No. 121777 24 January 2001

FACTS:

Dela Piedra was charged with illegal recruitment in a large scale. In an information filed against
her, without any POEA license, she allegedly offered and promised for a fee employment in
Singapore to Modesto, Amanita and Timbol, such that Modesto had already advanced the
amount of Php2,000.00. Dela Piedra was arrested in her home after an investigation was made
by Atty. Erlina Ramos, a lawyer of the POEA, who pretended to be an applicant, which led to an
entrapment operation of the PNP-CIS for Region IX.

ISSUES:

Is Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement void for vagueness?
Whether herein appellant committed the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

RULING:

NO. Section 13(b) is not overbroad. It encompasses what appellant apparently considers as
customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral.
NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of
illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case,
only two persons, Amanita and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by the appellant.
ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, Petitioner, v. ABOITIZ
JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

Since 1986, Nelson Dulay was employed as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on contractual basis
by General Charters, Inc,, a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime. From September 3, 1999 up to July
19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitionersvessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.

At the time of his death on August 13, 2000, he was a bona fide member of the AMOSUP, GCI collective
bargaining agent. Nelson widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the
grievance procedure of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the
grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by
the widow.

On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC against GCI for death and medical
benefits and damages. Merridy Jane claimed $90,000.00 however, CGI awarded P20,000.00 to Nelson
brother. Merridy Jane is now claiming the $90,000.00 less the P20,000.00 that Nelson brother received.

Respondents asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of
employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter death. Nelson also
had no claims against petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion
of his contract with GCI.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to pay P4,621,300.00, the
equivalent of US$90,000.00 less P20,000.00, at the time of judgment. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that
the proximate cause of Nelson death was not work-related.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA
but reversed the latter ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson death.

A special civil action for certiorari was filed with the CA. The appellate court granted the petition and
referred the case to the NCMB for the appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the
applicable CBA provision.

The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves the
interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the
voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over
the case?

HELD:

Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC
to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant
or overseas Filipino workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article 217
(c) of the Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation
or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies.

It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, there is no specific
provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding
the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner,
simply speaks, in general, of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages."

On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary
arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute
(R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular.

In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with the NLRC is: which
provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned.
The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or
implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.

In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between
the parties.

Upon this Court reading of the pertinent provisions of the CBA, it is clear that the parties really intended
to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or
application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a
procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure
should be strictly observed.

It may not be amiss to point out that the CBA are in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which states that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining
agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and
262 of the Labor Code." The Court notes that the said Omnibus Rules and Regulations were promulgated
by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and
that these departments were mandated to consult with the Senate Committee on Labor and
Employment and the House of Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs.

In consultation with the counterparts of the DOLE in the respective committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving
claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the
dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute
to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law,
and are entitled to great respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.
PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 162419

July 10, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about 5 yrs. In February
3, 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent, with the duration of 9 months. The
contract was approved by POEA. Petitioner was to be deployed on board the “MSV Seaspread” which was
scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998.

A week before the date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondent’s Vice President, sent a facsimile
message to the captain of “MSV Seaspread,”, saying that it received a phone call from Santiago’s wife and some
other callers who did not reveal their identity and gave him some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time, if allowed
to depart, will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago. The captain of “MSV Seaspread replied
that it cancel plans for Santiago to return to Seaspread.

Petitioner thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, damages, and attorney’s fees against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine)
Ltd. The Labor Arbiter (LA) favored petitioner and ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not
commenced since petitioner was not deployed and that respondent violated the rules and regulations governing
overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages. On appeal by
respondent, NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because
the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the
point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and attorney’s fees should be dismissed. But the NLRC
found respondent’s decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Petitioner
filed MR but it was denied. He went to CA. CA affirmed the decision of NLRC. Petitioner’s MR was denied. Hence
this case.

ISSUE:

When does an employer- employee relationship begin in the case at bar.

RULING:

There is some merit in the petition. The parties entered into an employment contract whereby petitioner was
contracted by respondent to render services on board “MSV Seaspread” for the consideration of US$515.00 per
month for 9 months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to
Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the
employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.
However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of
the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of
execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of
the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship would have taken
place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-
employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain
rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the
reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for
damages.
Neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid
reason. Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding “MSV Seaspread”
constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably
reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.

Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that
the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims
arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the NLR) shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within 90 calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.”

Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment, his
claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.

Respondent is liable to pay petitioner only the actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of
salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the contract indicated a fixed
overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not he rendered
overtime work. Even though petitioner was prevented without valid reason from rendering regular much less
overtime service, the fact remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will perform overtime work had he been
allowed to board the vessel. The amount stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when the employee
rendered overtime work. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or
vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours
when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely
unfair and unreasonable.

The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of damages and expenses of
litigation. Respondent’s basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a
mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed.
This Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of
the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements. Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable
However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. because respondent’s action was not tainted with bad faith,
or done deliberately to defeat petitioner’s rights, as to justify the award of moral damages.

Seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor
Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is
terminated when the contract expires. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a
contractual basis.
STO. TOMAS V. SALAC

GR No. 152642

Facts:

These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995.

1. G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710

Respondents question the constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042

Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its
passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory
functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

*Sections 29 and 30 were repealed by RA 8042. Consequently, these 2 cases were dismissed for being moot and academic.

1. G.R. 167590

Issue is on the constitutionality of Sections 6 (for being vague as it fails to distinguish licensed & non-licensed recruiters), 7 (for being sweeping
in its application of penalties), and 9 (for allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in their place of residence instead of filing it
at the place where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed) of R.A. 8042.

Section 6 defines the crime of “illegal recruitment” and enumerates the acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for prohibited
acts.

For Section 6 – Illegal recruitment, as defined, is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a distinction
between licensed and non-licensed recruiters.

By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the
appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that
section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government
license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.

For Section 7 – Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State
policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom
of this kind of choice.

Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from “illegal recruitment” before the RTC of the province or city where the
offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

* There is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs
from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Rule 110 Sec. 15 (a) of the Rules of Court allows exceptions. Thus:

SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that law’s declared policy of providing a
criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.

1. G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99

(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph on the liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency)

The liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be
a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities
(MAM Realty Development Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 314 Phil. 838, 845 (1995).
ELIZABETH M. GAGUI, Petitioner, v. SIMEON DEJERO and TEODORO R. PERMEJO, Respondents.

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:

On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal,
nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of transportation expenses, damages, and attorney fees against PRO Agency
Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes.

The Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a decision ordering respondents Pro Agecy Manila Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al
Mahwes to pay complainants. The LA also issued a Writ of Execution. When the writ was returned unsatisfied, an Alias Writ of
Execution was issued, but was also returned unsatisfied.

Respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc. Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment
Debtor. It included petitioner as the Vice-president/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agenct, Manila, Inc. The LA granted the
motion.

A 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was issued, which resulted in the garnishment of petitioner bank deposit in the amount of
P85,430.48. Since, judgment remained unsatisfied, respondents sought a 3rd alias writ of execution. The motion was granted
resulting in the levying of two parcels of lot owned by petitioner located in San Fernando Pampanga.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that apart from not being made aware that she
was impleaded as one of the parties to the case, the LA decision did not hold her liable in any form whatsoever. Executive Labor
Arbiter denied the motion.

Upon appeal, NLRC denied the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC ruled that in so far as overseas migrant workers are concerned,
it is R.A. 8042 itself that describes the nature of the liability of the corporation and its officers and directors. It is not essential
that the individual officers and directors be impleaded as party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A finding of
liability on the part of the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers or directors.

The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. The two Motions for Reconsideration were denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc. in accordance with
Section 10 of R.A. 8042?

HELD: The Petitioner may not be held jointly and severally liable.

LABOR LAW: liability of corporate officers

The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows: The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval.

In Sto. Tomas v. Salac, we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this provision. We have thus maintained: the
Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic.
To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the
affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate finding that she was remiss in directing
the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal dismissal of respondents. Examination of the records would reveal that there was
no finding of neglect on the part of the petitioner in directing the affairs of the agency. In fact, respondents made no mention of
any instance when petitioner allegedly failed to manage the agency in accordance with law, thereby contributing to their illegal
dismissal.