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Abby Egly

Mr. Phillips

English III

3 May 2018

Russia’s Involvement in Eastern Ghouta

On March 15, 2018 the civil war in Syria entered its eighth year. Since the civil war

started, more than 465,000 Syrians have been killed and more than 12 million people have been

displaced from their homes. The Syrian civil war is being fought by two groups of people, those

who support the government and those who oppose the government. The government of Syria

under President Bashar al-Assad controls the Syrian military, and while a number of countries

support Syria, Russia is by far Assad’s key supporter. The rebel groups of Syria are led by those

opposing the Syrian government, and as a result, innocent civilians are caught in the crossfire

and have paid the heaviest price. Eastern Ghouta is important to Assad because it is the last

major rebel stronghold left in Syria, and it is only 10 km from his Presidential Palace. The

civilian situation in Syria is presently critical, with civilian facilities being targeted on a daily

basis. Men, women, and children are living in a literal hell on earth, and this research paper does

not begin to scratch the surface of what is happening in eastern Ghouta. In Syria, many people

are dying from chemical and conventional weapon attacks, and without the support from Russia,

Assad’s military would be limited in their campaign to take back eastern Ghouta from the rebels.

With the help of Russia, Assad is working to systematically destroy all civilian life in

eastern Ghouta and will stop at nothing to do so even if it means committing war crimes. What

exactly is Russia’s involvement in Syria? First, under the Russian constitution, the Russian

parliament must give consent to allow the Putin to use military force. On September 29, 2015, in

a unanimous vote, the parliament voted to allow President Putin, at the request of Syrian
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President Assad, to fight terrorism in Syria using the Russian Military (“Russian Parliament”).

This means that Russia provides troops, jets, weapons and munitions to fight in Syria, but more

importantly, it also means that Assad identifies the targets for Russia to eliminate. Finally,

Russia uses their permanent United Nations “veto power” to block any resolutions that would

hinder Assad’s progress. According to Masi and Osseiran for the News Deeply website, the

United Nations Security Council held an emergency session on February 22, 2017 to request a

30-day ceasefire resolution after a week-long airstrike campaign in eastern Ghouta. The ceasefire

resolution was to allow humanitarian aid in and allow for the evacuation of the critically

wounded. Russia vetoed this resolution and in fact it was the eleventh time Russia had vetoed a

resolution on Syria. It is clear that Assad is the beneficiary of Russia’s veto power.

There is no doubt that Russia is involved in Syria’s civil war, but why would they want to

be involved in the first place? Russia’s interests in Syria fall into three categories: military,

political, and economic. From a military standpoint, Russia gets both an air base and naval base

strategically located in the Mediterranean. These are the only military bases that Russia has in

the Mediterranean, so it is important for Assad to stay in power. Another military advantage for

Russia is that Syria is a key military ally in the Middle East. By having Syria as an ally, Russia is

also able to form close ties with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. From a political standpoint, Putin’s

support is stronger at home because Russia is working with Syria, and he also gets credit for

leading the fight against ISIS in Syria. From an economic standpoint, Russia is one of the

world’s biggest producers of hi-tech weaponry, and they stand to make a lot of money by selling

weapons and jets to Syria (Chance). While Russia benefits from their relationship with Syria,

Syria also benefits because instead of focusing on weapons, which are provided by Russia. Assad

can now focus on his strategy of taking back his country from the rebels.
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Assad’s strategy of taking back Syria from the rebels follows a clear pattern of isolating

rebel held areas and destroying everything in those areas. According to Jennifer Cafarella, a

Syria expert at the Institute for the Study of War, Assad uses the strategy of “siege, starve, and

surrender” in his attempt to “recapture every square inch of Syrian territory” (qtd. in Ward). This

strategy worked in the city of Aleppo, and now Assad has set his sights on eastern Ghouta. In

2011, after anti-government protests broke out in Syria, eastern Ghouta became a stronghold for

rebel opposition fighters. Threatened by the opposition fighters in eastern Ghouta, Assad

imposed a siege on this region in 2013 (“Eastern Ghouta”). A siege on the eastern Ghouta region

means that the Syrian army surrounds the region and controls everything that goes into or comes

out of that region. According to Lizzie Porter with Al Jazeera News, “Eastern Ghouta, once

renowned for its fertile soils and rich agricultural production, has been surrounded by Syrian

government forces for four years. Once-abundant food supplies have dwindled, and medical

supplies are almost completely gone.”

With eastern Ghouta being cut off by the siege, Assad began a campaign of

systematically attacking civilian life. “Assad’s forces destroy hospitals, schools, markets, and

even mosques, so it is nearly impossible for noncombatants to eat regular meals, receive medical

attention, or pray where they want” (Ward). In late October/early November 2017, Russian and

Syrian forces attacked a school complex in the village of Hass in Idlib. The school complex

contained a kindergarten, elementary school, two middle schools, and a high school; these aerial

attacks killed dozens of people, mostly school children. (“Russia/Syria:”) Despite eyewitness and

video accounts showing Russian SU-24 jets dropping bombs on the school complex, Russia

denies participating in these attacks (“Russia/Syria:”). On December 3, 2017, Russian and Syrian

jets attacked a market and residential housing in the town of Hamoriya (Al-Khalidi). On

February 18-21, 2018, Russian and Syrian jets attacked medical facilities throughout the eastern
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Ghouta region. The Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations said that more than 20

medical facilities in East Ghouta had been damaged or destroyed (Masi and Osseiran). Doctors

Without Borders also reported that thirteen of their facilities had been completely destroyed

(“What’s Happening”). According to Mona Zeineddine, the director of communications at the

Violations Documentation Center, hospitals were being targeted differently. She also went on to

say that:

This is important to note because the Syrian regime is largely using unguided and

improvised bombs, but when it comes to hospitals and medical points, guided and

directed rockets are used. Also when a particular medical site is hit once, it is then

hit again when first responders arrive (qtd. in Masi and Osseiran).

It is a violation of international law to directly target schools and medical facilities, yet when

questioned about these violations Russia claims to be attacking military and terrorists facilities.

How can they make this claim when the only facilities being attacked are medical facilities with

precision guided rockets?

As if all the targeting of schools, markets, and hospitals were not enough, finally we

come to the gas attacks in eastern Ghouta. Most people remember the most recent attack on April

8th, but so far in 2018, six chlorine attacks have taken place in eastern Ghouta. These gas attacks

have occurred on: January 13th and 22nd, February 1st and 25th, March 7th, and the latest on

April 8th. These attacks have taken place in Douma, Harasta, and al-Shefonia (“Syrian Forces”).

In every single instance, eyewitness accounts report helicopters flying overhead and dropping a

barrel into a heavily populated area; when the barrel hits the ground, a cloud of gas spreads out

over the area. In every case, medical organizations have reported symptoms and deaths

consistent with chlorine gas and other nerve agents. On January 23, 2018, Secretary of State Rex

Tillerson was speaking about the January 22nd chlorine attack in Syria and he said “Russia
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ultimately bears responsibility for the victims in Eastern Ghouta and countless other Syrians

targeted with chemical weapons since Russia became involved in Syria” (qtd. in Irish). Russia’s

ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, at a UN meeting on February 22, 2018 called what is

happening in eastern Ghouta ‘mass psychosis’ (qtd. in “Information War”). How is it possible

that with 465,000 dead and 12 million refugees the people of Syria imagined all of this?

There is no doubt that the relationship between Putin and Assad is mutually beneficial to

both Russia and Syria. To maintain their military bases in the Mediterranean, Russia needs the

conflict in Syria to be resolved in Assad’s favor. Putin also needs the conflict in Syria so he can

maintain a favorable political standing in his own country, and he needs the sale of weapons to

Syria to bolster Russia’s economy. In return, Assad needs Russia’s veto power before the United

Nations as international pressure is mounting for an end to the Syrian civil war. Assad also needs

the high-tech weapons and equipment that Russia provides so he can stop the rebellion in eastern

Ghouta. It is a shame that innocent civilians who have lost the most, and stand to lose the most in

the future, have no say in what is happening to their country.

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Works Cited

AlJazeera. “Eastern Ghouta: What Happened and Why.” Syria News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 14

Apr. 2018. Web. 26 Apr. 2018.

Al-Khalidi, Suleiman. “Syrian, Russian Jets Bomb Residential Areas in Eastern Ghouta:...”

Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 4 Dec. 2017. Web. 1 May 2018.

Chance, Matthew. “Syria: 5 Things Russia Wants in War.” CNN, Cable News Network, 8 Feb.

2016. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

“'Information War Technique': Russia's UN Envoy Slams 'Mass Psychosis' over Syria's Eastern

Ghouta.” RT International. 22 Feb. 2018. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

Irish, John. “U.S. Takes Aim at Russia after Suspected Syrian Government Gas Attack.”Reuters,

Thomson Reuters, 23 Jan. 2018. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

Masi, Alessandria, and Hashem Osseiran. “Syrian Conflict's Deadly Week in Eastern Ghouta.”

Syria, News Deeply, 23 Feb. 2018. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

Porter, Lizzie. “Eastern Ghouta Siege: The Worst It Has Ever Been.” News | Al Jazeera, Al

Jazeera, 24 Oct. 2017. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

“Russian Parliament Unanimously Approves Use of Military in Syria to Fight ISIS.” RT

International. 30 Sep. 2015. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

“Russia/Syria: Satellite, Video Imagery Confirm School Attack.” Human Rights Watch, 8 June

2017. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

“Syrian Forces Bombard Eastern Ghouta with Chemical Weapons for the Fourth Consecutive

Time since the Beginning of 2018.” Bellingcat, 15 Mar. 2018. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

TRTWorld. “What's Happening in Eastern Ghouta?” What's Happening in Eastern Ghouta?,

TRT World, 26 Feb. 2018. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.

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Ward, Alex. “‘Siege, Starve, and Surrender’: inside the next Phase of the Syrian Civil War.”

Vox, Vox, 28 Feb. 2018. Web. 30 Apr. 2018.