Republic of the Philippines 1.
Section 34 which provides:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177508 August 7, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction2 filed by petitioner Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)3 and enjoining respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate
on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23 January
2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA
9369. Two newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on
26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus took effect on 10 February 2007.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for
prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. 4 Petitioner
also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to
petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to
comply with the provisions of the Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments. At
the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save for the
prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as unconstitutional.
The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 26. Official Watchers. - Every registered political party or coalition of political parties, and
every candidate shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing
center: Provided That, candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or
Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only one
watcher.
"The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall determine
in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per
diem of four hundred pesos (400.00).
"There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six accredited major political
parties excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who shall be designated by the
Commission upon nomination of the said parties. These political parties shall be determined by
the Commission upon notice and hearing on the basis of the following circumstances:
"(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now composed
them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in past election;
"(b) The number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before
the date of election;
"(c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their
organized/chapters;
"(d) The ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the
position of President; and
"(e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and
strengths."
2. Section 37 which provides:
SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice
President: The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. – Congress
and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificate
of canvass for president and vice president and senators, respectively, as accomplished and
transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of
canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of
canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate
of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice president or senator,
as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and their corresponding votes in
words and in figures; (3) there exits no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of
canvass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by
precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and (4)
there exist no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificates of
canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts
covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election returns or
certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
"When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province, city of
district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of the Commission, as
the case may be, shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal
delivery, the election returns form polling places that were not included in the certificate of canvass
and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within
two (2) days from receipt of notice.
"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in
the board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the
municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of
canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of the respective
proceedings."
4. Section 43 which provides:
SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."

"When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by The Issues
city/municipality or by precinct bears erasures or alteration which may cast doubt as to the veracity
of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result of the election, upon requested of Petitioner raises the following issues:
the presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party, Congress or the
Commission en banc, as the case may be shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual 1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution;
number of votes cast for president, vice president or senator, count the votes as they appear in
the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI 5 and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article
VII6 of the Constitution;
"In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the
procedure on pre-proclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Section
17,18,19 and 20. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution;7 and

"Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of canvass Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution. 8
or statement of votes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of
votes bearing a simulated certification or a simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense The Court’s Ruling
shall be penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881."
The petition has no merit.
3. Section 38 which provides:
is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional.9 The presumption is that the
SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows: legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare
a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice President, Senator, and not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail.10
Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for president, vice
president, senator, and member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be
be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation declared unconstitutional.
of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided for in
Section 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but
contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner
also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to
its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than
a technical construction.11 The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 12 The title of a
law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text
are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.13 Moreover, a title which declares a
statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the
amendatory act need not be further stated.14
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act
Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11,
1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related
Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.’" Clearly, the subject matter of
RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), 15 Republic Act
No. 7166 (RA 7166),16 and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369
assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881,
specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively;
and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions
are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among
others.
Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). According to
petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National
Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-
proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner
concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc
undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the
adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any
discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC
adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now
entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.1avvphi1
OSG argues that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases involving national
elective posts. According to the OSG,
only Section 15 of RA 716617 expressly disallows pre-proclamation cases involving national
elective posts but this provision was subsequently amended by Section 38 of RA 9369.
In Pimentel III v. COMELEC,18 we already discussed the implications of the amendments
introduced by Sections 37 and 38 to Sections 15 and 30 19 of RA 7166, respectively and we
declared:
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the
authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for
President, Vice-President, and Senators. The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a pre-
proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said provision which adopts and
applies to such a case the same procedure provided under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Republic
Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation controversies.
In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of
canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the
prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or
proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369.20
In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other,
are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice
President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only
be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have
been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en
banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of
the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.
Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and
the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting
arms of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute
election offenses.21
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to "investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." This was an important innovation
introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not in the 193522 or
197323 Constitutions.24 The phrase "[w]here appropriate" leaves to the legislature the power to
determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or
concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.
The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP 881,
which provides:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this
Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission
fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied)
This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history of election laws shows that prior to
BP 881, no such "exclusive power" was ever bestowed on the COMELEC.25
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to
conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the
COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified
and explained.26 The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 34 - Prosecution of Election Offenses
Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. - The Commission
shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses to
the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the
intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to
investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the
Constitution. They did not.
In People v. Basilla,27 we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals
and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice,
the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the
course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible.28 In COMELEC v. Español,29 we also
stated that enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELEC did not
have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such
cases.30 The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an
indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.31 Thus, given the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress
passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not violate the Constitution.
Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the
dominant majority and dominant minority parties at ₱on election day. Petitioner argues that this
violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the
contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract
using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only
applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore,
no obligation will be impaired.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it
will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary
contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll
watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its
police power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair
and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a
reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a
copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling
precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in
application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties.32 There is impairment if a subsequent law changes
the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed
upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.33
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or
demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the
14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their
respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in properly counted. Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help
their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369. ensure that the elections are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the per
diem of the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties promotes the general
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause.34 The welfare of the community and is a valid exercise of police power.
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
community.
SO ORDERED.
Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 140535 specifies the rights and duties of poll watchers:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
The watchers shall have the right to stay in the space reserved for them inside the polling place. Associate Justice
They shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of the proceedings of the board; to
take notes of what they may see or hear, to take photographs of the proceedings and incidents, if
any, during the counting of votes, as well as the election returns, tally board and ballot boxes; to
file a protest against any irregularity or violation of law which they believe may have been
committed by the board or by any of its members or by any person; to obtain from the board a
certificate as to the filing of such protest and/or of the resolution thereon; to read the ballots after
they shall have been read by the chairman, as well as the election returns after they shall have
been completed and signed by the members of the board without touching them, but they shall not
speak to any member of the board, or to any voter, or among themselves, in such a manner as
would disturb the proceedings of the board; and to be furnished, upon request, with a certificate of
votes for the candidates, duly signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and all the members of
the board of election inspectors.

Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a precinct shall, if
available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct. 36 The
dominant majority and minority parties shall also be given a copy of the certificates of
canvass37 and election returns38 through their respective poll watchers. Clearly, poll watchers play
an important role in the elections.

Moreover, while the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions as they may deem convenient, such stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.39

In Beltran v. Secretary of Health,40 we said:

Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to
the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity.41 (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be constitutional
because the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the
general welfare of the people. We agree with the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is
invested with public interest. In fact, even petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only guard the
votes of their respective candidates or political parties but also ensure that all the votes are
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 162777. August 31, 2004]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its
Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA, in her capacity
as Acting Director IV, National Capital Judicial Region, Commission on Elections,
and the SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
In this petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
Francisco I. Chavez stands as a taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to enjoin the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6,
2004. The assailed provision is, as follows:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls
and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on
print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3
days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print
media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So
to use his name and image for 96 North, a clothing company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement
Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and another corporation
involved in the amusement and video games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were
entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively. Pursuant to these
agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North
Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the plastic products of Konka
International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other two showed petitioner endorsing
the clothes of 96 North. One more billboard was set up along Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner
promoting the game and amusement parlors of G-Box.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI,
REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained
Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply
with the said provision by the COMELECs Law Department. He replied, on January 29, 2004, by
requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed
provision. He sent another letter dated February 23, 2004, this time asking the COMELEC that he
be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are
mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature
campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC answered petitioners request by issuing another letter, dated February 27,
2004, wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them
from public view pending the approval of his request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from
enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this Court to declare the assailed provision
unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an
invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair
Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police
power? Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all
announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the
electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election
propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the
powers of the COMELEC, he concludes.
This Court takes a contrary view. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or
safety, and the general welfare of the people.[1] To determine the validity of a police measure, two
questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to
prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or
poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for
the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v. COMELEC, [2] wherein the
petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which
prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaigning or other political
purposes, except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as
practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the
undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. This Court ruled therein that this
objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by
extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by
the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty line.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product
endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus
Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities
included under this definition are:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for
or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against
candidate.[3] (underscoring ours)
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain
products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to
these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards
featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers
when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject
billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to
advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending
their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an
individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his
name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a
circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:
Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period. x x x [4]
Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly authorized
to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Neither is Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 a gross violation of the non-impairment
clause. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted
by the Government.[5] Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the
public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and
again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of
the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime
to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare.Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which
a
is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.[6]
Furthermore, this Court notes that the very contracts entered into by petitioner provide that
the endorsers photograph and image shall be utilized in whatever form, mode and manner in
keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law;[7] and in whatever form, mode
and manner not contrary to law and norms of decency,[8] and in whatever form, mode and manner
in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law.[9]
Petitioner also claims that Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 is in the nature of an ex post
facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally
liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said
advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose name
or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the
Omnibus Election Code.[10] A close scrutiny of this rationale, however, demonstrates its lack of
persuasiveness.Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a
penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are
favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed
provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or
paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a
person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public
office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda
materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely
does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and
image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense,
as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda
materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for
public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post
facto law in this case.
 Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to
him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims,
therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election
propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is
not tenable.The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit
billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature
campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing
popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account
of their resources and popularity.[11] Moreover, by regulating the use of such election propaganda
materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law. Under Sections 3 and 13 of the
Fair Elections Act, all election propaganda are subject to the supervision and regulation by the
COMELEC:
SECTION 3. Lawful Election Propaganda. -- Election propaganda, whether on television, cable
television radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby allowed for all registered political
parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party list
elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to
the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties observance of truth in
advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
For the purpose of this Act, lawful election propaganda shall include:
3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the
size of which does not exceed eight and one half inches in width and fourteen
inches in length;
3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular
political party or candidate for public office;
3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters whether framed or posted, with an area not
exceeding two(2) feet by three (3) feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion
of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally,
streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size, shall be
allowed: Provided, That said streamers may be displayed five (5) days before the
date of the meeting or rally and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours
after said meeting or rally;
3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media: Provided, That the advertisements
shall follow the requirements set forth in Section 4 of this Act; and
3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code
or this Act.
xxx
SECTION 13. Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules; Election Offenses. - The
COMELEC shall promulgate and furnish all political parties and candidates and the mass media
entities the rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act, consistent with the criteria
established in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and Section 86 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority of this Section shall
take effect on the seventh day after their publication in at least two (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation. Prior to effectivity of said rules and regulations, no political advertisement or
propaganda for or against any candidate or political party shall be published or broadcast through
mass media.
Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to implement this Act
shall be an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of
the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid
because of overbreadth.
A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.[12]
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only
disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and advertisements after he
has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period. Said materials and
advertisements must also show his name and image.
There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and
advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable
limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature
campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates.
The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520 is declared valid and constitutional. The prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to the
ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of the
youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of the
fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity,
committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to
knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically evil
act" of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an
ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational
justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the horrible experience
and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant, as such
facts are ably supported by evidence on record: 1*
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on
November 20, 1953. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under
construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No.
4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. But he stayed and
slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the
unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street.
She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the
compound yard, catching maya birds together with other children. While they
were playing, appellant was always around washing his clothes. Inside the
compound yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September
6, 1995, pp.17; 20-22).
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a
drinking spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already
drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his
friends (TSN, September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting
the compound, saw Ma.Victoria on that same day three to four times catching
birds inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The
unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's store (TSN, September
18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his
in-law's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on
the trip of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the
house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met appellant along
Dian Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria
standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995,
pp. 3-7; 14-17).
Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store
to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it.
She notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair
was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked
why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to
the compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing.
She last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow
hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue
rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the
following day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a
passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant
alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter
disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, l995; pp. 14-
17).
That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma.
Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the
victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was
retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without
underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following
findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of the left eye, lateral
aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0
x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area,
left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular
area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect,
middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm,
forearms, left, posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect,
0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right
anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm.
knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 X 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot,
left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural
petechial hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury,
Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock
position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots.
(TSN, August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126).
Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were
informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing.
According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the
apartment since whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the
same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-
11-27).
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of
appellant was working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City.
They proceeded to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that
appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his present
whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other hand, informed them that
appellant could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City
(TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the
house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty
white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by
Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside
another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of appellant. Also
found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an
underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as appellant's belongings. These items were brought to the
police station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8;
August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to
the office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano
retrieved the victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp.
3-8; 14-17).
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay
Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police
Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant
executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped
and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's
mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing
the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August
14,1995, pp. 13-21).
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information which
reads:2
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA
CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA
CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the
occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle
said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim
died.
Contrary to law.3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting
appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a
total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
states:
 WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further sum of
P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
(RPC), as amended,5 appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony
summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a
drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellant's employer.
After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by Isip to
clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 o'clock noon. Then he
had lunch and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his
friends to see a movie. He also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5-5).
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted
to rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed
one case of red horse beer. Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched
him at Gregorio Rivera's house. They went to Zaldy's house and bought a bottle
of gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 o'clock p.m. After consuming the bottle
of gin, they went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was
already 9 o'clock in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and
Zaldy met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left
(TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and
proceeded to Isip's apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to
sleep at the second floor of Isip's unfinished house. Around 10 o'clock p.m.,
Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the
room where appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him
a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they
would kill him. He, however, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and
Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead body downstairs. He obliged and
helped dump the body into the septic tank. Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned
him that should they ever see him again, they would kill him. At 4 o'clock the
following morning, he left the compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later
to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan,
Batangas. The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in
Manila. There, appellant heard the police officer's plan to salvage him if he would
not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he
executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty.
Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession
(TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the review
thereof since "there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe . . . than the termination
of a human life." 7 For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored. In
order therefore, that appellant's guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the
records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant's proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence8 and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, 9 conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.10 Facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence
which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon
the court.11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which upon
thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST — Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner
of the unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic tank where
the body of Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is
located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on June 25, 1995,
accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the compound
of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying
rice noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the accused's hair was disarranged, drunk
and walking in sigsagging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and
seems to be thinking deeply. That the accused did not reply to her queries why
he looked worried but went inside the compound.
SECOND — Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C. Suni, categorically testified that
on June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-
laws house, he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-
law's residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the unfinished big house
of Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of
the unfinished big house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same
evening.
THIRD — Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house
where victim's body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry
Mahinay is her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June
25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to leave. That
after finishing some work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it
is customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same
day or sometimes in the next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not
return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH — Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver
plying the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Dian St., Gen. T.
de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as
one of the passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at
2:00 early morning and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.
FIFTH — Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big
house of Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the
incident. This is a clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the said
premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic)
fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused.
The absence of any evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the
witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado,
58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA 276,. 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October
30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH — Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after
having been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty.
Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement
admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry
Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have
been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper
authorities of any maltreatment on his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398
May 29, 1984;150 SCRA 311). He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor
when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced,
coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with
details know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys
Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed
and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all
throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the
accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and
vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the
physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the
cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury
Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he
pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost
consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos
tinulak ko siya, tapos tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na,
nakatulog siya tapos ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement.
There were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim
that he was mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture,
maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been
motivated to concoct facts narrated in said affidavit; the
confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely
or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v.
Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People
v. Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH — Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was notable
to enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and
he proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said
while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of the victim and
dumped it inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to
have sex with the dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist
them in dumping the dead body of the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn
pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry
 Mahinay is staying in the apartment and not in the unfinished house. That he
slept in the said unfinished house only that night of June 25, 1995 because the
apartment where he was staying was already closed. The Court is at a loss how
would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the
unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the
room at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay
was sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to
be disposed/dump later in the septic tank located in the ground floor. Boyet and
Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by
themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where
accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the
dead body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except it's
conformity to aver knowledge observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous.
(People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT — If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have
apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who
interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of
crime as a matter of preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against
prejudicing himself. A person's silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent
will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5
July 21, 1978).
NINTH — The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his
consciousness of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after the
incident and did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995. 12
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:13
1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme
caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious: and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane,
the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed the
penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the
police or military authorities.
 3.) When the rape is committed in full view of Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of
the husband, parent, any of the children or the victim?
other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity. A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00
o'clock and 8:00 o'clock position and that the edges were
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child congested.
below seven (7) years old.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
5.) When the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by
Syndrome (AIDS) disease. a penetration of an organ.

6.) When committed by any member of the Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male
Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine organ?
National Police or any law enforcement
agency
A: Adult male organ, sir.
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?
rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation. 14
A: I am very sure of that.20
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity,15 although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re- Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that he
classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by force
and without consent. 16 (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and the S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung
victim may even be a malaking bahay na ginagawa, tapos dumating yung batang
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa kamay
immaterial18 not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, 19 but the absence of a tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa.
free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore lie, Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.
provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she
was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but 16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
also the other element that the perpetrator's evil acts with the offended party was done through
force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this
case. S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop
this investigator's table. Subject evidence were part of
evidences recovered at the crime scene).
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately proven. This
is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem examination on the
child's body: 17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?

Q: And after that what other parts or the victim did you S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang
examine? ginagawa ko.

A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim. 18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng
lasing?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN. S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.

19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape 28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong
yung batang babae?. itulak sa terrace?

S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas. S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.

20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari? 29. T: Saan makikita yung poso negra na sinasabi mo?

S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
matandaan kung anong petsa, basta araw ng Linggo.
30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari? poso-negra?

S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M. S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.

22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape 31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
mo?
S: Natatakot po ako.
S: Hindi ko po alam.
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng
batang babae na iyong ni rape at pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa
CHAN? Matatandaan mo ha ito? mga pulis.

S: Oho. 33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa

poso-negra?
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na
S: Naka-isa po. siya sa poso-negra.

25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng 34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka
"NAKARAOS", maaari bang ipaliwanag mo ito? kasama?

S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod. S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.

26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte na katawan ng batang 35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA.
babae yung iyong ari? VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o patay na?

S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae. S: Buhay pa po.

27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa 36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
ang sumunod mong ginawa?
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.21
In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim's vagina; rather the
slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the
sexual intercourse. 22 The mere touching by the male's organ or instrument of sex of the labia of
the pudendum of the woman's private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed employed
upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant's own account, he pushed the victim
causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he
ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the
time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not given
free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession, which he, however,
claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied
by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him
his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the
assisting lawyer:
Q — Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
A — We went to the station, police investigation together with
Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told by Police Officer
Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the
crime of, I think, rape with homicide.
Q — And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela
PNP who were the other person present?
A — Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other
investigator inside the investigation room and the parents of the
child who was allegedly raped.
Q — And when you reached the investigation room do you
notice whether the accused already there?
A — The accused was already there.
Q — Was he alone?
A — He was alone, sir.
Q — So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold
Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what did they tell you, if
any?
A — They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry
Mahinay would like to confess of the crime charged, sir.
Q — By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A — Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney's Office.
Q — Was he also present at the start of the question and
answer period to the accused?
A — No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
Q — But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question
and answer period start?
A — If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the
afternoon, sir.
Q — And when this question and answer period started, what
was the first thing that you did as assisting lawyer to the
accused?
A — First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the
constitution.
Q — What are those right?
A — That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right
of a counsel of his own choice and that if he has no counsel a
lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right to
refuse to answer any question that would incriminate him.
Q — Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of
accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall whether this constitutional
right enumerated by you were reduced in writing?
A — Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by
Police Officer Alabastro.
Q — I show to you this constitutional right which you said were
reduced into writing, will you be able to recognize the same?
A — Yes, sir. A — Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.

Q — Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that Q — What was the reply?
is the same document you mentioned?
A — He said "Opo".
A — Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.
Q — Did you ask him of his educational attainment?
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
A — It was the Police Officer who asked him.
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as
our Exhibit A. proper. Q — In your presence?

Q — Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional A — In my presence, sir.
right of the accused whether you asked him to sign to
acknowledge or to conform?
Q — And when he said or when he replied "Opo" so the
question started?
A — I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer
Alabastro.
A — Yes, sir.
Q — But you were present?
Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of
rights, were you present also when he signed this waiver?
A — I was then present when he signed.
A — Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q — There is a signature in this constitutional right after the
enumeration, before and after there are two (2) signatures, will
Q — Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
you please recognize the two (2) signatures?

A — I had also explained to him, sir.

A — These were the same signatures signed in my presence,
sir.
Q — In Filipino?
Q — The signature of whom?
A — In Tagalog, sir.
A — The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
Q — And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino
ATTY. PRINCIPE: over the typewritten name Larry Mahinay, "Nagsasalaysay",
whose signature is that?
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures
A — This is also signed in my presence.
identified by my compañero be encircled and marked as Exhibit
A-1 and A-2.
Q — Why are you sure that this is his signature?
Q — After you said that you apprised the accused of his
constitutional right explaining to him in Filipino, in local dialect, A — He signed in my presence, sir.
what was the respond of the accused?
 Q — And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first
one is when Larry Mahinay subscribed and sworn to, there is a
signature here, do you recognize this signature?
A — This is my signature, sir.
Q — And immediately after your first signature is a Certification
that you have personally examined the accused Larry Mahinay
and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial
Confession, do you recognize the signature?
A — This is also my signature, sir.23 (emphasis supplied).
Appellant's defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and forced
him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New
Jersey, 24
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself - such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
have no test or the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs
to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule
that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial
court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence
of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts.25 In this case, the trial court's findings, conclusions and evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect, 26 the same being
supported by substantial evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have
affected the outcome of this case27 or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the
court below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses for
the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists. 28 Neither was
any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 "when by reason or on occasion of the
rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." This special complex crime is treated
by law in the same degree as qualified rape - that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) "attendant
circumstances" enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is
death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty
cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper
penalty in accordance with Article 53 of the RPC However, if any of those circumstances proven
but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15,
the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Article 63 of the RPC in mentioning
aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if
any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it may be treated as a
qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death - subject to the usual proof of such
circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
"rape with homicide", the court has no option but to apply the same "regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime" 29 in
accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended. 30 This case of rape with homicide carries
with it penalty of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the
RPC, as amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed
under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years
of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme
Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death
penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
(emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried to
alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he
committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime. 31 Again, the record
rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20 years of
age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).32 In
addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code 33 in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof. 34 Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
damages. 35 The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of
the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is "recognized that the victim's injury is inherently
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages". 36 Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the award of
moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 37
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by one or
more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code 38 after proof that the
offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory damages. 39 Under the
circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an
accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people
lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or
investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation 40 in accordance with the Constitution,
jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial
investigation must be informed in a language known to and
understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to
and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and
that anystatement he makes may be used as evidence against
him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all
times and have the presence of an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford
the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a
lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he
must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form
shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or
after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he
has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient
means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate
family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him
or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be
visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international
non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the
officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of
said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer,
he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the
presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to
speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may
indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that
he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the
same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased
if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver
of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his
rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence,
as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court — although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray 42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
is unconstitutional — nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law
is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil
indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral
damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Martinez, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE. PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his own extrajudicial
confession which he claims is inadmissible, accused Marlo Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to
evidence instead of presenting evidence in his behalf. The trial court however denied his
demurrer, admitted his extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty of robbery with homicide.
Now before us, he maintains that his extrajudicial confession was extracted without the assistance
of counsel, thus constitutionally flawed.
As submitted by the prosecution, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ
Furnitures located along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of
its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture
shop through the window grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays
was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded the two (2) maids of the owners into the
bathroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood
Furniture, along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their
bedroom. Sensing however that something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door
to peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around her neck while another poked a balisong at her
nape. She was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered to open the drawers where she kept
money. A third man ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back, stuffed
her mouth with a towel, and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth
P30,000.00.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the
bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the
two (2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho,
dashed out of the bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary,
the two (2) maids untied her hands and took out the towel from her mouth. They then rushed to
the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of furniture which
were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told
operatives of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, while
with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his
co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop.
Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police investigators who also learned that
the trio who were all from Samar failed to report for work the day after the incident, and that
Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his
sister's child.
Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and
Jenelyn Valle went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his
companions. From the records of the parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar
Mabini stood as godfather in the baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez.
Immediately they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and
his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning to
leave.
After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses,
accused Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under arrest.
According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However after
regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted his guilt and
pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the
child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was
further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that
shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He
divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his participation as a lookout for
which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture shop since he would be
recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside. Compil said that his
cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all met in
Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit,
where they shared the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for
Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.
From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house
of Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others including
Compil, went to his house past midnight on 23 October 1987 and divided among themselves the
money and jewelry which, as he picked up from their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz,
Manila. They drank beer until past four o'clock the next morning.
On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO
lawyer Melencio Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil and
brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the
WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators
of the crime as Jose Jacale, Baltazar Mabini, Amancio Alvos, Rogelio Pakit, a certain "Erning" and
one "Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and
Baltazar Mabini who were the masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to
work for MJ Furnitures where he was the foreman.
Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in Manila,
Parañaque and Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.
On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil.
Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the
prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing
evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49,1 denied the demurrer, found the
accused guilty of robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his
constitutional rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police officers
started interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the
Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and
declare statements that can be used against him in any proceeding."2 And, the belated arrival of
counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not
cure the constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory
statements from him the day before, which extracted statements formed part of his alleged
confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of (his) oral . . . and . . . written
extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of other witnesses"3 which are replete with
"serious and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions."4
In People v. Rous,5 the Third Division of this Court held that an extrajudicial confession may be
admitted in evidence even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provided that it was read
and fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was signed. However we adopt our view
in Gamboa v. Cruz 6 where the Court En Banc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the
start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage,
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense." We maintained this rule in the fairly recent cases
of People v. Macam 7 and People v. Bandula 8 where we further reiterated the procedure —
. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf . . . Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be in admissible in evidence.
In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an
interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought
to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila,
the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to
the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he was
not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract
incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when
the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process
of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the
suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus 9 we said that
admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to
the accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the
records, the latter's constitutional rights and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial
confession.
While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details
which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence
uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit
constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We give credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Linda Hermoso, Pablo Pakit and
Jenelyn Valle. We believe that Linda Hermoso saw the accused and Mabini in the vicinity of MJ
Furnitures just before the commission of the crime. While Hermoso may have contradicted herself
on some minor incidents, she was straightforward on this specific instance —
FISCAL FORMOSO (re-direct):
Q. You said that you saw Marlo and Puti (Baltazar Mabini)
together with Jessie when you were inside the jeep, is it not?
WITNESS HERMOSO:
A. Yes, sir.
 Q. Was this before you went to sleep?
A. Yes, sir. 10
Time and again it has been said that minor inconsistencies do not impair the credibility of
witnesses, more so with witness Hermoso who only reached Grade Two and who as the trial court
noted had difficulty understanding the questions being propounded to her. In fine, in the absence
of evidence to show any reason why prosecution witnesses should falsely testify, it is fair to
conclude that no improper motive exists and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
We have repeatedly ruled that the guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial
evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proved; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11 And there can be a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 12
behalf, the Court is left with no other recourse but to consider only the evidence of the prosecution
which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy 15 which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and after the
commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest. 16 Thus circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. 17 And where conspiracy
exists, the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the same degree of liability as the
others. 18
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it
finds accused-appellant MARLO COMPIL y LITABAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide. Consequently, he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law.
Accused-appellant is also directed to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Manuel Jay in the
amount of P50,000.00, plus P35,000.00 as actual damages. He is further directed to return to
Mary Jay the jewelry worth P30,000.00, and if he can no longer return the jewelry, to pay its value.

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the Costs against accused-appellant.
following circumstances: First, accused Marlo Compil and Baltazar Mabini who are both from
Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of the SO ORDERED.
shop. Second, on the night of the incident, they were seen in front of MJ Furnitures. Third, they
were seen going to the rear of the furniture store. Fourth, robbers forcibly entered MJ Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. Fifth, some two (2) hours after the
commission of the crime, at around two o'clock the following morning, they were in a house in
Kapunan, J., is on leave.
Bangkal, Makati, dividing between themselves and their five (5) other companions the money and
jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth, they all failed to show up for work the following day.
Seventh, accuses Compil turned ashen, was trembling and speechless when apprehended in
Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime committed in Manila. Certainly these circumstances as gleaned
from the factual findings of the trial court form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime. 13 Hence
even disregarding accused-appellant's oral and written confessions, as we do, still the prosecution
was able to show that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with homicide.

While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a
warrant, accused-appellant is now estopped from questioning this defect after failing to move for
the quashing of the information before the trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his arrest
was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. 14

The argument of accused-appellant that the trial court should have convicted the arresting police
officers of arbitrary detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained persons, is misplaced. Suffice
it to say that the law enforcers who arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in the case
at bench.

Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of accused-appellant that granting that he had
participated in the commission of the crime, he should be considered only as an accomplice.
Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO, JAIME OCHOA, all of
the National Power Corporation, and RAUL GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas, Alias George
Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo (At large), Accused. JAIME OCHOA, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for
the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr.,
Ernesto Gamus,1 Jaime Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for
the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and
penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in an
amended Information,2 docketed as Criminal Case No. 19558, which alleges –
That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a
public accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR),
Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of the Loan
Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst,
respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George
Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange trader, said public
officers taking advantage of their official positions, with grave abuse of authority and committing
the offense in relation to their office, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with their private co-accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause
to be falsified the NPC’s application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
NPC Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-
121204-4, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment Instructions (PI)
when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez,
thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning, and
with the use of the said falsified commercial documents, accused succeeded in diverting,
collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation, which
they thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power Corporation in the aforementioned
sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge, while Gutierrez has
remained at large.
On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated –
1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the NPC;
2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information was (sic) the
Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED);
3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time mentioned
in the information;
4. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds;
5. That accused Ochoa’s position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him to take custody or
control of public funds;
6. That the application forms for cashier’s check or Manager’s check are not accountable forms of
the NAPOCOR.3
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of Commercial Document and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount
malversed which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused Ochoa shall also suffer
the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs against the accused.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED
of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Document. However,
because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY LIABLE for the damages suffered by the
NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa. The Hold Departure Order against the
accused embodied in this Court’s Resolution dated April 18, 2002 is recalled.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George
Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo with last known address at 1348 A. Mabini Street, Ermita, Manila
or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in –
1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information;
2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;
3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.6
The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are not disputed by the
parties:
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation ("NPC") became embroiled in a controversy
involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which were originally on deposit with
the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch ("PNB") but were subsequently used to purchase two
(2) managers’/cashier’s checks (the first check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00 while the
second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with its loan obligations to the Asian
Development Bank ("ADB"). As NPC’s debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to
follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this case,
United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local bank was supposed to
remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore bank (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais,
New York) was then supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this
case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account of the
ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in three [3] "Payment
Instructions") included a "value date" (which was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of which would
trigger the above-mentioned procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation
in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted Japanese Yen
1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB
T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on said value date the amount of
US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already issued
two (2) manager’s/cashier’s checks ("Manager’s check" for brevity) for such purpose, did not make
the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it
had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered
explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of
P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed. 7
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the two PNB Manager’s
checks by falsifying a commercial document called an "Application for Cashier’s Check" (ACC) by
inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after the name of the
payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering
that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Manager’s check to
be charged to NPC’s savings account did not contain any account number. Through the insertion,
the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in
favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George Añonuevo @ Mara Añonuevo, who is still at
large.
In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed any of the acts
alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that he deposited the checks
subsequently issued or that he received the proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with any of his
co-accused. He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the
transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel and
the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed the
sworn statement while confined at the Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would
not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional
rights when he executed the affidavit.
To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
a.] The offender is a public officer;
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment
or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.8
Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the information without
violating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him.
He points out that the information alleges willful and intentional commission of the acts complained
of while the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice.
Appellant’s contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence by allowing another
to commit such misappropriation.9To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence10 and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that
deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to
prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through
deceit or negligence,the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even
when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence
may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the
offense.11 Explicitly stated –
Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in
order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper.12
The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of
deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of first impression.
In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al.,13 we ruled that an accused charged with willful or intentional
falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, … but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in
our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the
greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant
was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of
Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in
question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate
means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do.
In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to
be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between
the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.
....
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence
is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant
himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification
has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with
imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.
In People v. Consigna, et al.,14 we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also applies to the felony of
malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful malversation, in an information
containing allegations similar to the present case, can be validly convicted of the same offense of
malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the
offense.
Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn
statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken and the
NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn statement was taken
without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that –
Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
The "investigation" under the above-quoted provision refers to a "custodial" investigation where a
suspect has already been taken into police custody15 and the investigating officers begin to ask
questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. 16 More specifically
–
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question
which tend to elicit incriminating statements.17
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
person as a suspect.18 Such a situation contemplated has been more precisely described thus
where –
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at
best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and
every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study has
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating
and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence....19
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-
appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture.20 Thus we held in
one case21 that admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine
Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional
provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual, 22 or to a
verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation, 23or even to a
mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity.24
Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused unburdening his
guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the provision
although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to take extreme caution in further admitting similar
confessions because we recognized the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. 25
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime,26 nor to a person undergoing an
audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.27
Thus, the flaw in appellant’s argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis-à-vis the
foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during
the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team28and before he was taken into custody. As
such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as
yet, no specific suspect.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at the time
at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police
authorities.29 Appellant can hardly claim that, under the prevailing circumstances at the time,
whatever degree of compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable
where impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and incriminating
declarations against his interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing so, he cannot
feign that he was intimidated in such a way as to bring his statements within the ambit of the
exclusionary constitutional provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn
statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the
constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is
based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPC’s administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the
NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.
Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran30 in insisting that the constitutional safeguard should have
been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested or under detention at the time. He also
invites our attention to the pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas 31 that "the right to counsel is
available if a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet in custody but he
is a suspect."
The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional protection covers
not only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the ruling with the statement that what is
being eschewed is the evil of "extorting" a confession from the mouth of the person being
interrogated. As defined, "extortion" is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a
person by illegal use of fear, whether by force, threats or any undue exercise of power. 32 In the
context of obtaining an admission, "extorting" means "compelling or coercing a confession or
information by any means serving to overcome his power of resistance, or making the confession
or admission involuntary."33 In this case, we find nothing on record to support appellant’s claim
that his statements were extorted from him.
Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations on what was later to
become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead to the conclusion that the rights are
available when the person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is a suspect even if
he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas34 qualified this statement by
saying that "[J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, hasconsistently held, following
Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only when the person isalready in
custody."35
Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were admissible in
evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. He contends that
although his statement was supposedly gathered from the transcript of stenographic notes of the
conversation between him and Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually
prepared the sworn statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.
The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as witness Atty.
Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him the prepared statement and
to verify from him the truth of its contents.36 Atty. Melencio testified that he asked appellant to go
over the document before affixing his signature thereto.37 He also inquired whether or not
appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when the statement was
taken.38 Appellant denied that he was coerced or intimidated,39 affirmed the contents of the
document as a true reflection of his statements,40 and signed the same.41 It need not be
overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized document which has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted only by clear and convincing evidence.
Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon
such public document with respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity
of the signatures thereon, stand.42
In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that at the time he signed
the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore not physically and mentally fit to
assess the significance of his signature. This pretext however collides with the testimony of his
own witness, Dr. Teresita Sadava, who stated that appellant was confined for three days and,
who, when queried whether "ischemic heart disease" had any emotional or psychological effect,
gave the inconclusive reply that it "may or may not." Moreover, as aptly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the alleged falsity of the
affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is supposedly astute in business matters as he then
occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of the NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to
execute another affidavit retracting the same after his recovery from illness. Verily, evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself
– such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances.43
Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the transcript of stenographic
notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially. The record, however, shows that the
prosecution presented the team leader of the NBI investigators who conducted the investigation,
although his testimony was dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and due
execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth of its contents. If at all,
the admission of the report’s existence is an acknowledgment that it is neither spurious nor
counterfeit.
All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant to prop up his
cause, his appeal must fall.

WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR — CAR, Represented by his
Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A.
Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL
Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF
Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO,
Private Respondent, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform —
Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from
that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's
death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning
such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, 1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through
falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at
least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop
receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a
single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed
the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and
preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of
gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during
the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash
advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government
"by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting
entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials' under code 8-70-600 of
accounting rules."
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued with oppression and
harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to
retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued
Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued.
The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with
City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They
were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to
submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his
counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to
defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondent's
complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were
filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by
private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno
Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private
respondent's execution of an affidavit of desistance. 5
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted,
however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the five
service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made
in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City,
and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to
him by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to
determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that
the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of
the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his
companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their
service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a
vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop
issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the
owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25,
1990. 6 With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for
one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error
committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or
accountability.
To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring
unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification 7 of
DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances
on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that
private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due
to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required applications
for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval
of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second application for leave of
absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office or upon her return
to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of
absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and
dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to
November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned
the amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination,
Lumiqued asserted that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs that would
not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was
not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992,
to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed
the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that he
suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State
Prosecutor apparently because
the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992, 9 State
Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the
Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date was
upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that
respondent advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and inability
to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The records
likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of
respondent's condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein
noted that as early as June 23, 1992, respondent was already being assisted by
counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the
sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with
the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination
of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as
November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July
31, 1992, 10finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this
committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish
the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the
reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established by
the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15)
and the certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the
respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" show that the actual
average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase
price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects
an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of
the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more
than 10 times the value of what he actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline
receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the
scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has,
nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the
respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the
payment of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this
was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also admitted
having signed the receipts.
Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money
by falsifying receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a
criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash
advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing
rules. His cash advances totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly
documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers covering
the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the
 Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete
evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's act
in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December
1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two
weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The recommendation
of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or
almost six months after the respondent's order relieving the complainant was
issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint
she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a
head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the
respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to
have the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain
Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from
office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the
same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that the
filing of the affidavit of desistance 11 would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the matter
considering that what was at stake was not only "the violation of complainant's (herein private
respondent's) personal rights" but also "the competence and fitness of the respondent (Lumiqued)
to remain in public office." He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call for "a punitive
action against the respondent on the initiative of the DAR."
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the findings of the
Committee" with the DOJ. 12 Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to the
investigating committee. 13 In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating
committee informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee "had no more authority to act on
the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has already been forwarded to
the Office of the President" and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when
they transmitted their report to the
DOJ. 14 Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the
investigating committee could no longer act on his motion for reconsideration. He added that the
motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on
Secretary Drilon's recommendation. 15
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No.
52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline
receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.
Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the
auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is
untenable. The receipts in question were signed by respondent for the purpose of
attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business for
which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by
the DAR-CAR as respondent would want us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of
incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.
In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the benefits accorded to him
by law and existing rules and regulations." This petition was basically premised on the affidavit
dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who
confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner
Lumiqued's being an "honest man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight) turned
over to him were "altered." 18
Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31,
1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that
he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. 19 On May 19,
1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28,
1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then
Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary
Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from
the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994." 22
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel
during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver
was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have
suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel
of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de
oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at
bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice
Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing
laws, a Committee to conduct the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint for oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being
notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director, Department of Agrarian
Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created . . . 24
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued
administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation 25 conducted against Lumiqued
appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system, 26 conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions as may be
provided by law," 27 prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. 28 In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired
below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No.
2260 29 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on
Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 30 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of
the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so
opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts
that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on
the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation stating that a respondent in
an administrative complaint must be "informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his
choice," 32 is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought
before the Civil Service Commission. 33 Secondly, said resolution, which is dated January 25,
1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, 34 much later than the July 1992 hearings of the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding
Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus, at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly
appraised of his option to secure the services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued.
Director Lumiqued is present. The complainant is present, Janet
Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with a
copy of the counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have a
counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him, he
told me, Sir, that he has already set a hearing, morning and
afternoon today.
RSP EXEVEA:
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel?
You are willing to proceed with the hearing even without your
counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident. . .
CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
That is my concern. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
In the course of private respondent's damaging testimony, the investigating committee once again
reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
 Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with
this even without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to
proceed with the assistance of counsel but you said that you
can take care of yourself so we have no other alternative but to
proceed. 36 (Emphasis supplied).
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the
supplemental affidavit you are going to present to us. Do you
have any request from the panel of investigators, Director
Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to
assist me and was the one who prepared my counter-affidavit is
already engaged for a hearing and according to him he is
engaged for the whole month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why don't you engage the services of another counsel. The
charges against you are quite serious. We are not saying you
are guilty already. We are just apprehensive that you will go
through this investigation without a counsel. We would like you
to be protected legally in the course of this investigation. Why
don't you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty
here in Baguio . . .
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to
finish the investigation, Director Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without
counsel, we will proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we
asked for and Director Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses,
please bring them but reduce their testimonies in affidavit form
so that we can expedite with the proceedings. 37
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of counsel.
Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being
represented by a counsel. The last time he was asked to invite
his lawyer in this investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer
to represent him in this investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me
that he had set a case also at 9:30 in the other court and he told
me if there is a possibility of having this case postponed
anytime next week, probably Wednesday so we will have good
time (sic) of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this
to the panel. The charges in this case are quite serious and he
should be given a chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
 And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been
furnished him only now and this has several documents
attached to it so I think we could grant him one last
postponement considering that he has already asked for an
extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart
ailment. 38
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital.
Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of his confinement.
Consequently because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had
already submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This
did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government,
graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baños) with the degree of Bachelor of
Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent
training seminars both here and abroad. 39 Hence, he could have defended himself if need be,
without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he
entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, "That is my concern," one
could detect that it had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or
skepticism implicit in the question, "You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?"
despite his having positively asserted earlier, "Yes, I am confident." He was obviously convinced
that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that he could avail himself
of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of his ability to defend himself, the
investigating committee could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him
drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
law. In Nera v.Auditor General, 40 the Court said:
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
lawyers; while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is
not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his
side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much
more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual
hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 43Moreover,
this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 44 Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent
filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee. 45
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 46 In the early
case of Cornejo v.Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal 47 the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This jurisprudential
pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on
accountability of public officers, as follows:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is
deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully
be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the
countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 48 In this case, it has been clearly shown that
Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct
upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were
founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the
doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is
only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 50
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's recommendation of
dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of
discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity. Strong
evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption, 51 which petitioners have not successfully
disputed in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the
same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave
credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government
service." The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the "payment of retirement benefits and
other benefits," plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued's dismissal until his demise, must,
therefore, fail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XXIX, respondent.
Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order, to annul and set
aside the order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in
Criminal Case No. 47622, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y
Gonzales, Accused," and to restrain the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of the
aforementioned case.
Petitioner alleges that:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a
warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2,
Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others.
The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the
Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay
on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to
sit down in front of her.
On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the
prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open
court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner
filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in
the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.
On 23 October 1980, the respondent court issued the following order (assailed in the petition at
bar) denying the Motion to Acquit:
For resolution is a motion to acquit the accused based on the grounds that the
constitutional rights of the said accused, to counsel and to due process, have
been violated. After considering the allegations and arguments in support of the
said motion in relation to the evidence presented, the Court finds the said motion
to be without merit and, therefore, denies the same.
The hearing of this case for the purpose of presenting the evidence for the
accused is hereby set on November 28, 1980, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Hence, the instant petition.
On 3 March 1981, the Court issued a temporary restraining order "effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by the court".1
Petitioner contends that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion, in issuing the assailed order. He insists that said order, in denying his Motion To
Acquit, is null and void for being violative of his rights to counsel and to due process. 2
We find no merit in the contentions of petitioner.
To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned
order dated 23 October 1980.
It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both
civil law and common law traditions. 3To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave,
as when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law. 4 This
is not the situation in the case at bar. The respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as
well as the prosecution's evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.
The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a democratic
society, like ours, every person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
On the right to counsel, Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
 silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12 (1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-
cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in
several cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his
behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. 5
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was
not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
The Solicitor General states:
When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had
not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part
of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was
held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused
may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United
States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course
of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a
criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not
have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation
between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the
police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He
was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far
from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be
used against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being
investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant
while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to
counsel had not accrued. 6
Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, petitioner would have no
cause for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel and due process. In Kirby vs. Illinois, 7 the
facts of the case and the votes of the Justices therein are summarized as fellows:
After arresting the petitioner and a companion and bringing them to a police
station, police officers learned that certain items found in their possession had
been stolen in a recent robbery. The robbery victim was brought to the police
station and immediately Identified the petitioner and his companion as the
robbers. No attorney was present when the Identification was made, and neither
the petitioner nor his companion had asked for legal assistance or had been
advised of any right to the presence of counsel. Several weeks later, the
petitioner and his companion were indicted for the robbery. At trial in an Illinois
state court, the robbery victim testified that he had seen the petitioner and his
companion at the police station, and he pointed them out in the courtroom and
Identified them as the robbers. The petitioner and his companion were convicted,
and the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the petitioner's conviction,
holding that the constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of evidence derived
from out-of-court Identification procedures conducted in the absence of counsel
did not apply to pre-indictment Identifications (121 III App 2d 323, 257 NEE 2d
589).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an
opinion, affirmed. In an opinion by STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of
the court and expressing the view of four members of the court, it was held that
the constitutional right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal proceedings
were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court Identifications
in the absence of counsel did not apply to Identification testimony based upon a
police station show-up which took place before the accused had been indicted or
otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.
BURGER, Ch. J., concurring, joined in the plurality opinion and expressed his
agreement that the right to counsel did not attach until criminal charges were
formally made against an accused.
POWELL, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusionary rule
should not be extended.
 BRENNAN J., joined by DOUGHLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented on the
grounds that although Supreme Court decisions establishing the exclusionary
rule happened to involve post-indictment Identifications, the rationale behind the
rule was equally applicable to the present case.
WHITE, J., dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions establishing
the exclusionary rule governed the present case. 8
Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing his view and that of three other members 9 of the Court, said:
In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's
landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158, 53 S Ct 55, 84
ALR 527, it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. See Powell v. Alabama,
supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019, 146 ALR
357; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 7 L Ed 2d 114, 82 S Ct 157; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 792, 93 ALR 2d 733; White v.
Maryland, 373 US 59, 10 L Ed 2d 193, 83 S Ct 1050; Messiah v. United States,
377 US 201, 12 L Ed 246, 84 S Ct 1199; United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 18
L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926; Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263, 18 L Ed 2d 1178,
87 S Ct 1951; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1, 26 L Ed 2d 387, 90 S Ct. 1999.
This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to
counsel only at the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right
attaches at the time of arraignment and the Court has recently held that it exists
also at the time of a preliminary hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. But the
point is that, while members of the court have differed as to existence of the right
to counsel in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have
involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment. (Emphasis supplied). 10
As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and beyond the
guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. For while, under the latter, the right to counsel "attaches only at or after the time that
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him (the accused)," under the 1973 and
1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a
respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the accused have
begun.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under
police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police
investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel
during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at
the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives
the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this
substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense;
only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had
rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The
case at bar is far from this situation.
In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order denying a
Motion To Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon arraignment, the
defendant shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or
do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn
or overruled, he should immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on
the merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the movant (in the motion to quash), he can appeal
the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections (earlier raised in his motion to quash)
which would then be subject to review by the appellate court.
An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is interlocutory and
not a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal
from the judgment, after trial. As stated in Collins vs. Wolfe,12 and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco,13 the
accused, after the denial of his motion to quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case
in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and, upon
such appeal, present the questions which he sought to be decided by the appellate court in a
petition for certiorari.
In Acharon vs. Purisima, 14 the procedure was well defined, thus:
Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases
filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his
remedy was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice
on his part to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if,
after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed
as authorized by law and precedents. Instead, he took the usual step of filing a
writ of certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is
unwarranted it being contrary to the usual course of law. 15
Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his rights to counsel
and to due process is a question which he could raise, as a defense or objection, upon the trial on
the merits, and, if that defense or objection should fail, he could still raise the same on appeal.
On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he
pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash,
except where the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. 16

Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to
have waived objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.

Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds
provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information.
Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 3 March
1981 is LIFTED. The instant case is remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings to
afford the petitioner-accused the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.

This decision is immediately executory. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127493 December 8, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ORLANDO LABTAN y DAQUIHON (At Large), alias BEBOT, HENRY FELICIANO y LAGURA
and JONELTO LABTAN (At Large), accused, HENRY FELICIANO y LAGURA, accused-
appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Henry Feliciano appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 25 1 convicting him of highway robbery and robbery with homicide on the
basis of a sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial.
On April 23, 1993, an information 2 was filed against Henry Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto
Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about April 16, 1993, at about 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, at
Buntong, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, and with grave abuse
of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by
means of violence, take, rob and carry away P30.00/cash money to the damage
and prejudice of the offended party (Florentino Bolasito); that on the occasion of
the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them (accused) to steal, take
and carry away the P30.00 money, the herein accused, in pursuance of their
conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their number and strength and
with intent to kill, accused Orlando Labtan y Daquihon, alias Bebot Labtan and
Jonelto Labtan, treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
Florentino Bolasito thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries: "Shock due
to multiple stab wounds heart", with the use of a (sic) knives/bladed weapon
which accused are conveniently provided, which directly caused the death of the
said Florentino Bolasito.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 299 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, another information 3 dated May 20, 1993 was filed against Henry Feliciano and
Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery committed as follows:
That on March 28, 1993, at more or less 10:30 o'clock in the evening while inside
a motor vehicle in the national highway at Barangay Agusan up to the road at
Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above- named with intent to gain and against the will
of the owners, by means of violence against and intimidation of persons, or force
upon things with the use of knives which they were conveniently provided with,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and criminally take, rob and carry
away money or cash amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters
owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko Diver wristwatch
owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all amounting to P10,800,00, against their will, to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in the total sum of
P10,800.00 Philippine Currency.
Contrary to and in violation of PD 532.
Only accused Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was
detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together.
The prosecution's case was mainly anchored on the three-page sworn statement executed by
Feliciano, originally in Visayan language, before the Cagayan de Oro City Police station, viz: 4
Preliminary: You Henry Feliciano y Lagura, I would like to inform you that you are
here in [the] Theft and Robbery Section of Cagayan de Oro City Police Station to
be investigated regarding an incident wherein a certain driver whose name is
Florentino Bolasito, a resident of Abellanoso St., of this City (sic). Said driver was
killed on April 13, 1993, whose body was found at Tipolohan, Camaman-an of
this City since you knew everything about it.
I would like to inform you that according to our law you have the following rights:
1. You have the right to remain silent, and not to answer incriminating questions
which will be used as evidence against you.
2. You have the right to choose an attorney to defend you in this investigation.
3. That if you can't (sic) get a lawyer, I can give you a counsel de oficio to defend
you.
Certification
This is to establish the fact that I myself voluntarily executed this certification and
hereby affix my signature hereunder on the _________________ day [of] April,
[1993 in the] City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
Sgd. Henry Feliciano y Lagura
(Affiant)
Assisted by his lawyer:
Sgd. Pepito A. Chavez
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1993
PTR No. 10843256 1/8/93
Q: Before we (will) proceed [with] this investigation, did you
understand all those rights I narrated to you?
A: Yes, sir [,] I understand everything.
Q: Will you get a lawyer of your own to defend you in this
investigation?
A: No, sir. I can't (sic) pay the services of lawyer.
Q: Since you will not get your own lawyer, will you agree that I'll
(sic) give you Atty. Pepito Chavez as your counsel de oficio in
this investigation?
A: Yes, sir. I agree that Atty. Pepito Chavez will be my lawyer
for the ascertainment of the truth.
Q: What is your highest educational attainment?
A: Grade 4 only at Baongca, Bukidnon.
Q: In other words, you know how to read Visaya?
A: I know[,] sir how to read Visaya including English but I can't
(sic) understand deep English.
Q: Tell me your name, age, occupation, residence and other
personal circumstances?
A: I, Henry Feliciano, 25 years old, married and a resident of
Kolambog, Lapasan of this city and I am [a] jeepney driver of
this city.
Q: Up to this time, are you still driving?
A: No more, sir.
Q: What is then your work at this time?
A: I go [to] work [with] my friends like Orlando
Labtan alias Bebot Labtan who are residents of Kolambog,
Lapasan of this City.
Q: From what time did you go along with this [sic] persons?
A: Since the month of February, 1993.
Q: From the time you go (sic) with them, what have you done, if
any?
A: On March 1993, I participated in a hold-up of a certain driver
Mr. Roman Mercado 5 of Tablan who owned a jeep I use[d] to
drive (before) and we got a car stereo including the jeep. Then,
we brought the jeep to Buntong, Camaman-an and the driver,
however, we freed the driver later.
Q: What else?
A: On March 1993 we hold-up (sic) a collector of my brother
whose name is Carmen Tan y Feliciano 6 and we were able to
get cash of P2,080.00; [a]nd, there was also [a] certain jeep,
owned by Mr. Mangano that we carnapped and brought (it) to
Aglayan, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
Q: With the latest incident, what have you done?
A: Last April 16, 1993, we held-up a certain driver of [a] "PU
Minica" whose name is Florentino Bolasito of Abellanosa St.
Q: Will you tell us how the driver was killed and who killed
them?
A: On April 16, 1993, at 2:30 in the afternoon, I, Bebot Labtan
and Jonelto Labtan [were] hang[ing] around outside Ororama
Superstore at J.R. Borja St., of this City, and the three of us
went to a place where most of PU Minica cars were parked. We
were able to board one PU Minica driven by an old man.
Q: As you boarded the PU Minica where did you go?
A: We ordered the driver to take us to Buntong, Camaman-an of
this City. When we arrive[d] thereat, Jonelto told us that he will
visit his girlfriend while Bebot Labtan alighted, we remained
inside the vehicle. As [the] driver demanded for the fare,
however, we have no money to pay. Suddenly, I saw Bebot
Labtan and Jonelto Labtan took a knife and stabbed the driver.
Q: After stabbing the driver, he died, and so Jonelto Labtan
drove the PU towards Tipolohon and we leave (sic) behind the
body of the driver, instead of me getting out from the car (sic),
Jonelto did not stop the car (sic), so we proceeded towards
Aluba Subd. and we left the PU Minica there.
A: After you left the PU Minica at Aluba, where did you go?
Q: I went home at Balolong of this City, and I do not [know]
where my companions proceeded.
Q: Who then stabbed the driver?
A: The one who stabbed [the driver] [,] sir[,] was Jonelto Labtan
and Bebot Labtan.
Q: Did (sic) you able to get some money from the driver?
A: Jonelto Labtan was able to get P30.00, and we brought (sic)
a (sic) coconut wine at Kolambog, Lapasan.
Q: With respect to this (sic) two (2) knives which were taken
from you and Bebot Labtan, what can you say about this (sic)
knives?
A: These two (2) knives, sir, the sharp knife with a knife case is
owned by Bebot Labtan, this double blade is owned by Jonelto
Labtan.
Q: Are these [the] knives which were used by Bebot Labtan and
Jonelto Labtan in stabbing the PU Minica driver if you know?
A: Yes, sir. Bebot Labtan used this knife with a knife case, but
this knife which is double bladed was not used, the other
kitchen knife like a fan knife which was left inside the PU was
used by Jonelto in stabbing.
Q: When (was then) were you arrested by the police authorities
of the Theft and Robbery Section?
A: On April 20, 1993, while we, I and Bebot Labtan were at
Tambo, Macasandig of this City waiting for the truck of Mr.
Aberrastori to ride to bring us to Valencia, Bukidnon, we were
apprehended by the policemen near the store of Mrs. Carmen
Tan. It was then that time where Bebot Labtan was shot at his
feet and the two knives were confiscated.
Q: I have no other questions, do you have anything to say.
A: No more. sir.
This is to certify that I have read the foregoing statements consisting of three (3)
pages of which I have initiated and signed in the presence of Atty. Pepito
Chavez, Attorney de Officio, and I state that it is true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief.
Sgd. Henry Feliciano y Lagura
(Affiant). 7
In addition, the prosecution presented the testimony of Ismael Ebon that on March 28, 1993, at
10:30 p.m., he was driving along Bugo Highway, when two (2) men boarded his jeepney. He
identified the men as Henry Feliciano and Orlando Labtan. Suddenly, Bebot Labtan pointed a
double bladed knife on the right side of his neck. Feliciano then took the steering wheel and
proceeded to Bolonsori. When they were near the house of a certain Policeman Lapis, Feliciano
stopped the jeep. The two then divested him of his watch, P700.00 cash, car stereo, two (2)
tweeters and one (1) booster. They threatened to kill him should he report to the police. However,
when the two left, he proceeded to the Puerto Police Station and reported the hold-up. He then
went to the garage and told Roman Mercado, the owner of the jeepney, that he was robbed. That
night, the two of them reported the robbery to the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. Ebon also
stated that he knew Feliciano because the latter previously worked as driver of Roman Mercado. 8
When the defense presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano testified for his behalf. His
defense consisted of an alibi and a repudiation of his sworn statement. He told the court that on
March 28, 1993, when Ismael Ebon was held-up, he was in Maasin, Baungon, Bukidnon, his
birthplace. He did not deny Ebon's claim that they were acquainted for he used to work as driver of
Roman Mercado. However, when his driver's license expired on January 20, 1993, he went home
to Bukidnon. On April 20, 1993, he went back to Cagayan de Oro City and stayed at the residence
of his sister, Carmen Tan, who lives in Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. At 4:00 p.m. of the
same day, Carmen asked him to buy snacks at a nearby store. While buying the snacks, he heard
a shot and when he looked around, he saw a man lying on the ground. Two men in civilian clothes
poked their guns at him. One of them asked him whether he was a companion of the man lying on
the ground. He said no. The two men brought him to the police station. The man lying on the
ground was brought to the hospital. At the police station, the two men asked him to confess
whether he was a companion of the person who was shot. He said no. They asked him whether
he was one of those who robbed Ismael Ebon. Again, he said no. He was questioned for about an
hour during which he was hit "at the right and left breast, at the right and left ribs, and at the left
side of [his] face." Afterwards, he was locked up in jail. In the morning of the following day, he was
investigated and mauled for two hours. Again, he was asked whether Orlando Labtan was his
companion. He insisted that he was not Labtan's companion for he does not even know him. After
the investigation, a policeman approached him and brought a piece of paper for him to sign. He
asked whether it was possible for him to read the contents. The policeman answered, "No need,
just sign so that we can finish it." They then started to maul him. He was forced to sign the paper.
At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 22, 1993, he was brought to the office of Atty.
Pepito Chavez. He was told to sit down while Atty. Chavez signed the papers. He did not know
what was happening. Atty. Chavez did not even talk to him before signing the document. He was
then brought back to jail. 9
Finding the sworn statement executed by Feliciano credible, the trial court convicted him and
imposed the following penalties: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds accused Henry
Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation in the
crime of robbery with homicide and hereby sentences the accused to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay
the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses and to
pay the cost.
This court hereby finds also the accused Henry Feliciano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of highway robbery committed on March 28, 1993
and sentences the accused to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as the minimum term to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term and to
indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value of
the P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the
sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and to
pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the trial
court:
I begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 S Ct 2568 [1973]). It is
ON THE CHARGE OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE COURT A
QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, THE TAINTED EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED EXECUTED IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.
II
ON THE CHARGE OF HIGHWAY ROBBERY, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
BELIEVING THE COMPLAINANT DRIVER WHO, IT TURNED OUT, FROM THE
POLICE BLOTTER, SAID THAT THE PERPETRATORS WERE INITIALLY
UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS THEN LATER IDENTIFIED ACCUSED FELICIANO
WHOM HE KNEW VERY WELL AS A FELLOW DRIVER.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
AND HIGHWAY ROBBERY.
The appeal is meritorious.
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of persons under custodial
investigation are provided as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible against him.
In People v. Macam 12, the rational for the guarantee, was explained in this wise —
Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of
counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the accused "was confronted with both the
intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as the
result of the changes in the patterns of police investigation, today's accused
confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system well before his trial
therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of
 prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial
proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the
trial itself to a mere formality."
Thus, in People v. Gamboa 13, we stated that:
[T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage,
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from
the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
The moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent
or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1
Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993
regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the
fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel.
On cross-examination:
Atty. Carlo Mejia
Q: What [time] did you report to your office on April 22, 1993?
SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez
A: I reported at eight o'clock in the morning.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q: What time was Henry Feliciano brought to your office on
April 22, 1993? What time did you start to investigate Henry
Feliciano on April 22, 1993?
A: In the morning, at 8:00 o'clock, when I reported for work.
Q: You already investigated the accused in this case at 8:00
o'clock in the morning on April 22, 1993?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Of course, when you investigated the accused in the
morning, he had no counsel yet?
A: I just interviewed him.
Q: We will just use the word interview. Was he assisted by
counsel when you interviewed him in the morning?
A: None.
Q: What was the subject matter of the interview in the morning
of April 22, 1993 to the accused Henry Feliciano? (sic)
A: About the PU driver that was killed.
Q: Of course, he related to you everything that transpired
regarding that alleged death of a PU driver?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So that in the morning of April 22, 1993 you already had an
idea, more or less, who committed or who killed the PU driver
by the family name Bolasito, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All that time in the morning of April 22, 1993 the accused
was not assisted by a legal counsel.
A: Not yet.
Q: What time did you decide to bring the accused to the office of
Atty. Chavez on April 22, 1993?
A: About 10:00 o'clock in the morning of April 22, 1993.
Q: Are you trying to impress us that in the morning of April 22,
1993 you also brought the accused Henry Feliciano to the office
of Atty. Chavez?
 A: At 8:00 in the morning, I just interviewed him and at 10:00
o'clock in the morning I brought him to the office of Atty.
Chavez.
Q: Are you trying to impress [upon] us that you brought accused
Henry Feliciano to the office of Atty. Chavez at 10:00 o'clock in
the morning and in the afternoon also you brought him to the
office of Atty. Chavez?
A: No more. In the afternoon Atty. Chavez was the one who
came to our office because that was what we agreed in the
morning. 14
At that point, accused-appellant had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel.
In Navallo v.Sandiganbayan 15, we said that a person is deemed under custodial investigation
where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began
to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
When SPO1 Cuarez investigated accused-appellant Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in
the killing of jeepney driver Bolasito as shown by the joint affidavit of SPO4 Johny Salcedo and
SPO1 Florencio Bagaipo who were the ones who arrested Feliciano. In their affidavit dated April
21, 1993, the two police officers stated:
in the investigation conducted to (sic) Henry Feliciano, he admitted and
confessed to us for (sic) his involvement of (sic) the death of the PU
driver together with his companion Bebot Labtan, and the same was
identified by many victims of robbery hold-up in this City. And also during
the investigation, Henry Feliciano admitted to us regarding their
confiscated bladed knife as the very weapon used in the stabbing of the
PU minica driver.
The prosecution tried to establish that Atty. Pepito Chavez provided effective and independent
counselling to accused-appellant Feliciano which cured the initial lack of counsel. However, this is
belied by the very testimony of Atty. Chavez showing he performed his duty in a lackadaisical
fashion:
Assistant City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Caballero, Jr.
Q: Atty. Chavez, you stated that you are a practicing lawyer in
Cagayan de Oro City as well as in Misamis Oriental?
Atty. Pepito Chavez
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you remember having assisted in the investigation of one
Henry Feliciano on April 22, 1993 at about 3:30 in the afternoon
when the said Henry Feliciano was (sic) investigated whose
written statement was taken by SPO1 Cuarez in the presence of
Cabigon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was this statement taken?
A: At the office of the Theft and Robbery Section at Operation
Kahusay ug Kalinaw.
Q: How did you happen to assist Henry Feliciano in the taking of
his written statement?
A: Because SPO3 Cuarez approached me in my office and
requested me to assist Henry Feliciano in the taking of his
testimony.
Q: What time was that when SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez came to
your office and requested you to assist Henry Feliciano?
A: If I can remember right, Police Officer Cuarez came to my
office about three o'clock in the afternoon.
Q: Where is your office in Cagayan de Oro City?
A: Located at Pabayo-Gomez.
Q: What did you do after Alfonso Cuarez came to your office
and requested you to assist in the taking of the written
statement or sworn statement of Henry Feliciano?
A: I told him I will follow later because at that time when he
came to my office I was working on some paper works.
Q: When you said him, you were referring to Alfonso Cuarez?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after you told him you will follow later?
A: At about 3:25, if I remember right, I was able to come to
Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw particularly the office of the
Theft and Robbery Section.
Q: When you arrived at the Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw, who
were there?
A: Police Officer Cabigon and Cuarez.
Q: Who else were there? What about Henry Feliciano?
A: Yes, I have also seen Henry Feliciano.
Q: If you see again Henry Feliciano, will you be able to identify
him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Look around if he is present in the courtroom?
A: (Witness pointing to a person with a green t-shirt and when
asked his name he answered Henry Feliciano.)
Q: What did you do after you arrived at the office of the Theft
and Robbery Section and saw Henry Feliciano, Cabigon and
Cuarez?
A: I started my investigation or confrontation with Henry
Feliciano informing him, appraising him of his constitutional right
to counsel, that he has a right to remain silent and appraise him
if it is his desire that I be his lawyer because I told him if he has
no desire that I will be his lawyer, then he can look for another.
Q: What else did you inform him or asked him aside from what
you testified already?
A: I told him did you come to confess or testify because of fact
that the police offered you some consideration or money where
you promised of release.
Q: And what was the reaction of the said Henry Feliciano?
A: As far as I can remember, Henry Feliciano told me that he is
forced to testify only to tell the truth.
Q: While you were conferring with Henry Feliciano, where was
Eleuterio Cabigon and Alfonso Cuarez?
A: Alfonso Cuarez was there listening to us.
Q: How far away from you?
A: About one armslength (sic).
Q: What about Eleuterio Cabigon?
A: About three meters near.
Q: Did Alfonso Cuarez participate in your discussions or
conference with Henry Feliciano?
A: Yes. He sometimes clarified some answers propounded by
Henry Feliciano in the course of the investigation.
Q: For example, what answer?
A: As far as I can remember, the question was reduced into
writing.
Q: Before that, I am referring to the point where you had a
conference with Henry Feliciano before the start of the
investigation; where was Alfonso Cuarez?
A: He was listening to us.
Q: Was there a participation of Alfonso Cuarez during your
discussion?
A: Yes, he was the one typing the questions asked by me and
the answers propounded by Henry Feliciano.
Q: And these questions were the ones you testified a while ago.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After that, what happened after you asked these questions
and you got the answer from him? What did Alfonso Cuarez do
to him?
A: Alfonso Cuarez told him that is it really his desire . . . we are
giving you Atty. Chavez as your counsel. Are you willing? And
he said yes.
Q: What was the answer of Henry Feliciano?
A: He answered in the affirmative.
Q: Exactly, how did he answer?
A: Yes, I am very much willing.
Q: After that, when did the investigation start?
A: About 3:30 in the afternoon.
Q: After Henry Feliciano, as you said, answered in the
affirmative, what happened then?
A: Before I started the formal investigation to [sic] him, I
reiterated that question about his desire to take me as his
counsel, and he again answered in the affirmative.
Q: After that, for the second time, what happened?
A: Then I started his investigation.
Q: Were you the one who investigated him?
A: At first, it was Alfonso Cuarez. Sometimes, I interrupted in
the investigation.
Q: How did Alfonso Cuarez start the investigation?
A: In the appraisal of Henry Feliciano of his constitutional rights.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: As far as I can remember, he proceeded with the incident
where Henry Feliciano was involved in a series of robberies.
Q: While these questions were being asked of Henry Feliciano,
where were you?
A: I was there.
Q: How many meters away from Henry Feliciano?
A: About one arm's length, I sat behind him.
Q: While these questions were asked of Henry Feliciano, as you
testified a series of robberies were committed, what did you do?
What was your reaction?
A: At first, I interrupted with the answer of Henry Feliciano
thinking that it was not the truth or it might be that the testimony
will be counted against him in the court. So, I whispered to him
if it is the truth, and he insisted it is the truth.
Q: When you whispered to him, you are referring to Henry
Feliciano?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Atty. Chavez, after the termination of the investigation which
was taken by SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez in your presence of SPO4
Eleuterio Cabigon on one Henry Feliciano, what happened after
that?
A: I examined the question and answer taken, then I read it to
Henry Feliciano, appraised him, translated to him, clarified to
him after he testified.
Q: What was the reaction of Henry Feliciano?
A: He willingly listened to my explanation and clarification about
what he confessed.
Q: And after listening to your explanation, what happened?
A: I required him to sign. Before finally requiring to sign, if you
will change your mind about what you confessed, you still have
the right to.
Q: What did Henry Feliciano say?
A: It is the truth; and after being clarified, he willingly signed the
confession.
 Q: After Henry Feliciano signed the same written statement of
(sic) him, what did you do?
A: After that, Alfonso Cuarez, Henry Feliciano and me (sic) went
to my office to have that notarized, so that when I came to the
Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw for the taking of the confession
of Henry Feliciano, I was not bringing with me my bill and other
paraphernalias (sic).
Q: When Henry Feliciano signed the written statement, where
were you, Cabigon and Alfonso Cuarez?
A: The same location at that time when Henry Feliciano was
taken his confession (sic). 16
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer
beside the accused. In People v. Bacamante 17, the term "effective and vigilant counsel" was
explained thus:
necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able
to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the
first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation
fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent,
to counsel and to be presumed innocent.
In People v. dela Cruz 18, an effective counsel was characterized as:
one who can be made to act in protection of his [accused's] rights, and not by
merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a
law degree.
Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that
stage of custodial interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the
affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's
version of the manner in which he conducted the interrogation yields no evidence
or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant his rights under the
Constitution. Indeed, from our earliest jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to the
accused the right to an effective counsel, one who can be made to act in
protection of his rights, and not by merely going through the motions of providing
him with anyone who possesses a law degree.
Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not
explain to accused-appellant the consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be
used against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.
We also find that Atty. Chavez's independence as counsel is suspect — he is regularly engaged
by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the
services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services:
On cross-examination:
Atty. Carlo Mejia
Q: Mr. Alfonso Cuarez, how long have you known Atty.
Chavez?
A: I know him for a long time ago (sic).
Q: How many times have you utilized Atty. Chavez to assist
prisoners under the custody of the Cagayan de Oro Police
Department?
A: As far as I can remember, three times already.
Q: Is Atty. Chavez being paid by your office to assist detained
prisoners?
A: Sometimes we pay him P400.00 but if we have none, he will
assist for free.
Q: So Atty. Chavez is paid by the Cagayan de Oro Police
Station?
A: It is not the Cagayan de Oro Police who paid but it is only my
initiative to give him.
Q: It is only on your own personal initiative to pay Atty. Chavez?
A: Yes.
Q: And, of course, Atty. Chavez, if you have the money, also
accepts the money you pay to him?
A: Yes, sir.
In People v. Deniega 19, expounding on the constitutional requirement that the lawyer provided be
"competent and independent", we stated that:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent
in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the
fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the
voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions
guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices
given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far
as possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be
competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely
be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's
right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel "contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation (if the latter could not afford one) "should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed
independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic."
In People v. Sahagun 20, we stated that the constitutional requirement that a lawyer should be
independent was not complied with when a lawyer who just happened to be following-up a case at
the NBI was asked to counsel the accused:
[T]he counselling given by Atty. Dizon to Villareal was not sufficiently protective
of Villareal's rights as an accused as contemplated by the Constitution. To start
with, Atty. Dizon is not really known to Villareal. He was requested to act as
counsel because he happened to be at the NBI following-up a client's case.
Given that circumstance, it cannot be expected that Atty. Dizon would give an
advice to Villareal that would offend the agent conducting the investigation. Thus,
it appears that Atty. Dizon did no more than recite to Villareal his constitutional
rights. He made no independent effort to determine whether Villareal's
confessions were free and voluntary. . . .. He did not inquire from Villareal how he
was treated in the last 24-hours. He did not seek any of Villareal's relatives or
friends to find out if he has any defense which Villareal was not free to disclose
due to his confinement.
Atty. Dizon's lack of vigilance as a counsel is likewise underscored by the fact
that he himself testified that Villareal gave his confession under the impression
that he was only a witness and not an accused in the case. This revelation
should have jolted Atty. Dizon and should have driven him to exert extra efforts to
find out whether Villareal was tricked in making his confession. Again, he did not
take an extra effort.
In People v. Januario 21, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants was their
own extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and
with the assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI. We held that —
(s)uch counsel cannot in any wise be considered "independent" because he
cannot be expected to work against the interest of a police agency he was
hoping to join, as a few months later he in fact was admitted into its work force.
For this violation of their constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants
deserve acquittal. After the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient
and credible evidence remains in the Court's records to overturn another
constitutional right: the right to be presumed innocent of any crime until the
contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he
wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for
counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are
simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant
Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether
he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be
interpreted as waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
We also find the fact that Atty. Chavez notarized the sworn statement seriously compromised his
independence. By doing so, he vouched for the regularity of the circumstances surrounding the
taking of the sworn statement by the police. He cannot serve as counsel of the accused and the
police at the same time. There was a serious conflict of interest on his part. 22
In People v. de Jesus 23, we stated that an independent counsel cannot be a special counsel,
public is private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused.
We have examined the three-page sworn statement allegedly executed by Feliciano and we failed
to see any badge of spontaneity and credibility to it. It shows signs of what we call stereotype
advice to which we have already called the attention of police officers. In People v. Jarra 24, we
said:
[T]he stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions
which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of "legal form" or mode.
Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the
answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of
 voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of
a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Since April 27, 1992 when Republic Act No. 7438 25 was enacted, the constitutional rights of
persons under custodial investigation have been further operationalized:
Sec. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or Under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers.
(a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an
offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of
his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such
person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked
if the person arrested does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and
adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided
by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or
detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and
of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouses, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession
shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in
writing and signed by the person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise such
waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be
allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of
his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or by any
international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the
President. The person's immediate family shall include his or her spouse, fiance
or fiancee, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
Consequently, it is disappointing to see how up to now some police officers still sidestep the
constitutional mandate, the consequence of which is all too familiar — the inadmissibility of the
statement, confession, or admission taken. 26
In People v. dela Cruz 27, we stated that "a confession made in an atmosphere characterized by
deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled would be rendered
valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by non-compliance with the procedural and
substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further
implemented and ramified by statutory law."
On the charge of robbery with homicide, the only evidence presented by the prosecution was the
sworn statement which we have found inadmissible. Thus, we are forced to absolve accused-
appellant of this charge. With respect to the charge of highway robbery, the prosecution presented
the testimony of Ismael Ebon. However, Ebon failed to identify Feliciano as the perpetrator when
he reported to the police immediately after the incident:
CASE NO. 2143 dated 0030 H 29 March 93. Ismael Ibon y Petalcorin, 27 m (sic),
of Reyes Bugo, CDO, driver of PUJ Bugo Liner bearing Plate No. KBJ-748, and
Christopher Impoc y Amba, 16, s (sic), of Zone 4, Tablon, this City, jointly came
to this OKK-CIS and reported that they were allegedly victimized by two
unidentified robbers who was (sic) armed with a (sic) knives and taken from the
possession of the above driver his cash money P700.00 and took our stereo
Pioneer Brand with Booster and twitter. The incident was (sic) occurred at
Agusan, this City, and the suspect was desembarked (sic) at Camaman-an, this
City at 10:30 p.m., this date. 28
Ismael Ebon and accused-appellant Feliciano are acquainted. There is no reason for Ebon to
withhold the identity of the perpetrator except for the fact that he was not certain of
it. 29 Consequently, there is no evidence pointing to Feliciano as one of those who held-up Ebon.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the trial court is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Henry
Feliciano is ACQUITTED on both charges of robbery with homicide and highway robbery due to
lack of evidence to sustain a conviction. The Director of the New Bilibid Prisons (NBP) is directed
to inform this Court compliance with the Decision within ten (10) days from its receipt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, appellee,
vs.
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial
confession. This appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is a
lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant with
Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed
with a bladed instrument (tres cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy, by
stabbing her with said bladed instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon her physical injuries causing:
"CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC.
TO STAB WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK (POSTERIOR ASPECT)"
as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge,2 and trial thereafter ensued.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from
appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin @ Hapon,
together with Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were drinking "Red
Horse" beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at around 1:00 in the
morning,
saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega
proper. A few minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard
Jaquelyn3 Tatoy, her goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two flashlights and they proceeded
upstairs to Jaquelyn’s house. The first to go up was a certain Moises, followed by the brothers
Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel and Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge
and the "walling" of the main door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and only the light in
the kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in the sala, which
he claims belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and
sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic container. Jaquelyn was brought to
the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs,
which Rico also identified to be appellant’s.4 A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres
cantos for safekeeping which were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section,
Ramos Police Station. The person who turned over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not
identified.5
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores and
Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of the information given by
Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to
appellant. Together with Rico, they went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was
temporarily staying, and found him sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts.
The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the
house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt
he was wearing and he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. It was Edgar Magdasal
who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his
tanods to take appellant to the police station.6
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario
Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his
constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty.
Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter
told him that he will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the
afternoon, he conferred with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2
Monilar and told him that appellant was ready to give his statement. 7 Appellant’s extrajudicial
confession, which was taken down completely in the Cebuano dialect,8 reads:
Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa atong batakang
balaod (Constitution) aduna kay katungod nga pahibaloon sa imong mga katungod, sama
sa imong katungod sa pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay katungod sa
pagdamgop/pagpilig sa abogado o manlalaban aron motabang kanimo niining maong
imbestighasyon nga may kalabutan sa kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy niadtong mga alas
2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin kongkulang niadtong petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra 1996,
didto sa Brgy Lorega proper, Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong ugaling dili ka maka-abot
pagbayad o pagpangitago abogado aron motabang kanimo karon, ako isip
negrepresenttar sa Estado mohatag akong abogado kanimo. Nasabtan ba kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?
Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong Batakang Balaod, anfg
tanan nga imong isulti karon dinhi, mahimong magamit ebedensya pabor o batok kanimo
sa bisan asaing husgado sa atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.
Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao nimong mga katungod
ug anadam ka ba nga moperma karon dinhi timailhan sa imong tina-aw nga nga
pagsabut? ingon man andam ka ba sa pagsulti sa matuod walay lain kon kili ang matuod
lamang gayud?
Tubag: O
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty Parawan ang among
Brgy Captain nga maoy akong giisip nga abogado nga akong pinili nga maoy motabang
kanako karon. Aron sa pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika petsa 16 sa bulan sa
Disyembre 1996.
...
Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar Tomaquin kon dili ang
matuod lamang gayud? Ingon man andam ka ba nga modawat sa resulta o linugdangan
niini?
Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.
Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga circumstacia o
rmay kalambigitan sa imong pagkatawo, sa imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-
anan ug uban pa?
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo sa akong mama
sanglit dili man kasado and akong mama ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa,
Cabagui ug and akon angga Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug
kasamtangan nga nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega proper duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako
lumad nga taga Bo. Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin didto ano nakatungha sa grade six.
Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?
Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-inom si
Rico Magdasal didito sa Brgy Lorega Proper ug taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio
Itom Tuta ug dayon nakong saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega nianang
pagka mga alas 2:20 sa maong petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa akong
tuyo sa pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.
Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka man
punta deretso.
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.
Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?
Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline Tatoy nga
naghidga sa ilang may terrace ug nidagan siya padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha
akong siyang ginsunod, gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa akong tres kantps
nga hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas
nga Jaqueline Tatoy).
Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?
Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon diin to siya
maigo. Basta manadaghan to nako siya dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.
Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo pahimudsi and iyang
pagkapbabye o wala ka bay plano sa pag rape kaniya niadtong higayona?
Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo sa pag rape niya. Ang
ako ra gyud nga tuyo mao ra gyud and pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay nisiyagit man
siyang nakaila man kayo siya nako, nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa ako untang pagkawat
sa ilang TV, hinungdan nga ako siyang gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan.
Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit
ug imong gidunggab?
Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may kusina.
Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?
Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong nagtan-awan sa ilang
TV.
Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat?
Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan agi sa pultahan nga
akong gisikaran dayon kanaog subay sa hagdan didto nabiyaan nako ang akong sapatos.
Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?
Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson Magdasal sa maong
Brgy.
Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?
Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, didtoy mga Brgy
Tanods sa balay ni Wilson Magdasal diin ila akong gipangutaan tali sa maong hitabo og
igo lan ako nitudlo sa akong white Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan ug tubig sa
planggana sa tumong nga makuha ang mansa sa dugo nga pinisik sa akong
paggdunggab patay ni Jaqueline Tatoy.
Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong slaveless white shirt
nimo?
Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang TV nila ni Jaqueline ug
sa iyang pagsiyagit ako siyang gidunggab-dunggab patay. (Elizar Yomaquin postivo nga
nitudlo ug niangkon sa maong whitel sleve less shirt)
Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto so hagdan sa balay
nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy human siya nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang hagdan human sa
hitabo ug gain sa akong pagdagan akong napatiran kadtong ilang container.
Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay aduna ka pa bay
ikasul ti o bakwion ba hinoon sa mao nimong gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa duha ka
pahina lakip niining maong pahina?
Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.
Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay tawo nga nagpugos,
naghulga, nagsaad ug gnate o nag hadlok ba hinoon kon dili sa imong kaugalingon nga
kabubut-on lamang.
Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini akong permaahn ning
petsa 16 sa Diusyembre 1996, Siyudad Sugbo, Pilipinas.9
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal and
three other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who committed the crime and
not him. Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing the television set from the Tatoy’s
residence. When Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as
Rico had stabbed her on the back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns
the tres cantos, as well as the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoy’s house. Afraid of what happened,
appellant went home to Wilson Magdasal’s house and slept there. He was awakened the next
morning by barangay tanod Julius Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and poked a gun
at him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the presence
of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latter’s house. He was
made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family while he is single. 10
Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked him
to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him
with his expenses.11
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for brevity) rendered its decision
on October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Elizar Tomaquin is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify the heirs of Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The
accused is, however, credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided he
will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal.
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BASED ON HIS UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION;
2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE FULL CREDENCE
AND FULL FAITH ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;13
Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano dialect.
Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
 translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than
the official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by
the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both
original and translation sent to this court.14 In this case, there is no official translation of appellant’s
extrajudicial confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the
rule, then appellant’s extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted by the trial court as
evidence for the prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the parties
and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable
of Cebuano in which the document was written,15 such extrajudicial confession was appropriately
considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan, is admissible in evidence
against him. There is no need at this point to secure an official translation of the confession to
English.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an empty
rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer.16
As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of Barangay
Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local Government Code, a barangay captain performs the
following duties and functions:
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall
exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code
and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code,
the punong barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;
...
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the
city or municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their
duties and functions; . . .17
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances
in his barangayand ensure peace and order at all times.
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be
deemed as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of
appellant.
In People vs. Culala,18 the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an
independent counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance
and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the
people, including the maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he
can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests.
Thus, the Court held that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the
accused during custodial investigations.19
This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman,20 and People vs. Velarde,21 where we further ruled that a
municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.
Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a
peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing
competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction,
Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter
executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an
independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense
without any intervening conflict of interest.22
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel.
An "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present
and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: "Because of this confession you will be
vs. Velarde:23 imprisoned."

. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would execute that affidavit of
the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, confession he would surely be imprisoned?
and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.24 A No I even continue that "why did he do that?"

Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person Q And what did he answer?
under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be
A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.
antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.25

Q And so what transpired next?

The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly described as effective
and vigilant. As testified by Atty. Parawan, hereinbelow quoted verbatim, this was what transpired
when he went to the Ramos police station to assist appellant during the investigation: A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then policeman Monilar went
inside the room and we had that investigation.
Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at around 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of December 16, 1996? Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?

A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused and had a A It was made in a question and answer form.
conversation with the accused.
Q And in what language were the questions framed?
Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.
A In the vernacular, vesaya.
A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?
Q What did you do during the question and answer form of investigation?
Q And may we know what did he answer?
A I just observed them.
A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.
Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was over?
Q When you said "Cap" what did he mean by that word "Cap."
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my Barangay.
A Being a Barangay Captain.
...
Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of choice. What did you do next if
any? Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an Attorney did you
immediately inquire what had happened before you arrived like; Did you start the
A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the implication of your investigation? did you inquire from that from Mr. Monilar?
admission, you will be imprisoned.
A He was already preparing this top portion here.
Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his confession that could be
… because of that confession. What was his reaction? INTERPRETER:
 Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the signature to that
portion above the names typewritten thereon.
...
Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most portion to that
portion immediately right before the typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty.
Fortunato Parawan you were not around. Correct?
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with Monilar.26
Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the morning of December 16,
1996. When appellant intimated that he was willing to confess and requested the presence of Atty.
Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and informed him of appellant’s decision. Atty.
Parawan arrived at the Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon.27 By the time Atty.
Parawan arrived, the investigation had already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked and
elicited information from appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan merely "observed" during the entire
investigation and failed to advise or explain to appellant the questions being propounded by SPO2
Monilar. He did not even bother to ask appellant if the extrajudicial confession he was about to
execute was being voluntarily given.
Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own
testimony that he already suspected appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was
brought to his house by the barangay tanods, viz.:
Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting tanods was where was
he arrested and how was he arrested and what is the reason why he was arrested.
Correct?
A Yes.
...
Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the Barangay Tanods could
explain to you the circumstances of his arrest you already started to ask questions like;
Why did you have blood in your pants. Where is your t-shirt you wore. Where did you get
that information since you were not in the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?
A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds. So when I saw
blood stains with all probability it might come from the victim. It was conclusion something
like when I saw that t-shirt stained with blood.
Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion of mine (sic) that
Elizar Tomaquin one of your constituents in the Barangay was already on your conclusion
in mine (sic) the killer of Jacquilyn Tatoy before your tanods turned it over to the police for
investigation. Is that what you are telling Atty. Parawan?
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring him to the Homicide.28
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellant’s
rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that
appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having
committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawan’s qualification as a competent and
independent counsel because he was his choice.
As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, "(A)ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right … to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such
investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning, but the word "preferably" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by
a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense.29 What is imperative is that the counsel should be competent
and independent. That appellant chose Atty. Parawan does not estop appellant from complaining
about the latter’s failure to safeguard his rights.
It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of Brgy.
Lorega where appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his
rights. The latter, however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not finish
Grade 1 and does not know how to read and write.30As between him and Atty.
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellant’s predicament, Atty.
Parawan should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding to
appellant’s choice. But it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellant’s counsel
and instead, he even let appellant go through the investigation and execute the extrajudicial
confession knowing fully well that he was biased as regards appellant’s innocence. Quoted
verbatim, Atty. Parawan testified thus:
Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a graduate of Batchelor (sic)
of Law compared to your constituent who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low intelligence. The
question is this: It did not occur to your mine (sic) to inhibit yourself despite the request by
telling the accused as barangay Captain there could be a conflict of interest and bias that
I would not be in (sic) effective counsel or assistance to you. Did it not occur toy our mine
(sic) or not?
A It did not occur to my nime (sic).
...
Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you assist a suspect in the
police station and the circumstances he was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could
give is would be to tell the accused to remain silent. Would you agree?
 ...
A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time.31
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of
an independent and competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs.
Deniega,32 stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the
exacting standards of the Constitution:
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the
sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the
sole basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality
and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these
agencies to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to
bring about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are punished. Our courts, in the
process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in
bringing about this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered
by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the
Constitution. If the standards are not met, the Constitution provides the
corresponding remedy by providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny
confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article III, Section 12(1) . . . hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Without appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case now teeters precariously on
circumstantial evidence, namely:
(1) Rico Magdasal’s testimony that:
(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16,
1996;
(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyn’s residence belongs
to appellant; and
(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the
night of the crime, which blood-stained shirt was found among the soiled clothes
in Wilson Magdasal’s house;
(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza’s testimony that the blood stains on
appellant’s sando shirt and the tres cantos was of human origin.33
These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively and convincingly that it
was appellant who killed Jaquelyn.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.34 As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.35
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.
For one, appellant’s act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning does not establish
appellant’s whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. There is nothing in the testimony of
Rico Magdasal and the other prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to
Jaquelyn’s house after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all,
what was proved is that appellant was found by the barangay tanodssleeping at home in the
afternoon of the same day.
Added to that is the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody of these valuable pieces
of evidence.
Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes and tres cantos were
given to a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned over to a Policeman Tariao of the
Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however, did not identify the person who turned over the objects to
the police.36 There was no showing who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not
presented to identify if these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyn’s
house and turned over to the police. Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as to
confirm if those articles were the same evidence turned over to him and later presented in court.
Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable for the prosecution to allege and prove every single fact
of the case. But in this case, the pieces of evidence are crucial to the prosecution’s case. Also, the
fact that a civilian obtained and received the evidence, the possibility that the integrity of these
articles could have been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted that during his
direct examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of shoes presented in court
was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It turned out that the marking he made on
the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell in the canal located in front of the
police station and they had to clean and wash the shoes!37 Such sloppy handling renders the chain
of custody of those pieces of evidence dubious, and damaging to the prosecution’s case.
And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found in the
scene of the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some point in time.
But it does not prove when particularly he was there, his authorship of the crime or his motive for
being
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres cantos.
being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of
the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial.38 Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof of
the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although appellant’s defense is
The prosecution’s evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellant’s guilt is mainly the weak, conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the
testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is uncorroborated. The rule is that the weakness of the defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence is not strong enough to justify a
testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony positively finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.46 Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.39 Moreover, the doctrine of
long standing that the testimony of a lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and
an accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. 40 Rico’s lone
testimony is not sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant
unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of his
In addition, appellant vehemently denied Rico’s allegations. According to appellant, it was Rico release, or the ground for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice of herein
who actually owns the pair of shoes and tres cantos; that it was he who bid appellant to go to the decision.
Tatoys’ residence and lift their TV set; and that it was Rico who stabbed Jaquelyn. Considering
appellant’s denial and his different version of the incident, it became incumbent upon the
Costs de oficio.
prosecution to rebut appellant's allegations with further evidence to corroborate the statement of
Rico. It must be noted that there were other persons present during their drinking spree, namely,
Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo. These persons could have been presented as SO ORDERED.
witnesses to back up Rico’s claim but the prosecution did not do so. Rico testified that appellant
owned the tres cantos found by the stairs; but Rico also stated he only "heard" that the tres Puno, Chairman, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
cantos was found by the stairs.41 Who found the tres cantosthat was supposed to have been used
to stab Jaquelyn? The neighbor who allegedly found it by the stairs was not presented in court to
identify if the tres cantos presented by the prosecution was the alleged weapon in the stabbing of
Jaquelyn. Such failure of the prosecution to corroborate the material points of Rico’s testimony
weakened their case.

The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the white sando shirt that
appellant was allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later
found bloodstained among the soiled clothes.

First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he was wearing, he told
them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. According to barangay tanod Armando Zabate, it
was Edgar Magdasal who found the shirt, "somewhat wet and bloody," among the soiled
clothes.42 Edgar Magdasal, however, was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt,
the state the shirt was in when he found it, and how he knew that it was the shirt worn by
appellant.

Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the bloodstains on
appellant’s sando shirt, as well as the tres cantos, were human blood.43 Mendoza, however, did
not conduct further tests to ascertain the type of blood found on these pieces of evidence nor did
he match it with the victim’s blood type,44 hence, it does not connect the bloodstains to the herein
victim. In People vs. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the maong pants allegedly belonging to
appellant and found positive of type O blood has no probative value since the blood type of
appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison.45
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 98252 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ELISEO SARITA @ TOTO,
EDUARDO SARINOS and SANTIAGO CID, accused.
RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN and EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when our nation was reeling
from ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and outright violations of our people's rights to life,
liberty and property. Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of human
liberty and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial investigations from ignorant,
overzealous and/or incompetent peace officers. The Constitution so dearly values freedom and
voluntariness that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense not only the services of counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a)
"competent" but also (b) "independent" and (c) "preferably of his own choice" as well.
In the case before us, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants was their own
extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and with the
assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI. Such counsel cannot in any wise be
considered "independent" because he cannot be expected to work against the interest of a police
agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later he in fact was admitted into its work force. For
this violation of their constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After
the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible evidence remains in the
Court's records to overturn another constitutional right: the right to be presumed innocent of any
crime until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in
Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case No. TG-l392-89, viz.:
WHEREFORE, and premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused:
(1) RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN
- and -
(2) EFREN CANAPE Y BAYOT
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 14 last
sentence of R.A. No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law and as
charged against them in the Information and pursuant to the said law, this Court
hereby imposes upon the said accused, the supreme penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua or life imprisonment.
Further, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, but separately, the heirs of
their victims, namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of:
(a) P50,000.00 for moral damages
(b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) P25,000.00 for actual damages
and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
There being no evidence to warrant a finding of conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING Accused SANTIAGO CID of
the crime charged. Being a detention prisoner, the City Warden of Tagaytay City
is hereby ordered to immediately release said person from his prison cell, unless
he is therein detained for any other cause.
SO ORDERED.
The Antecedents
On November 7, 1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr.,
was filed against accused-appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and their co-accused
Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of
Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law)2 allegedly commited as follows:
That on or about September 4, 1987, at Barangay Bulihan, Municipality of Silang,
Province of Cavite, the above-named accused, together with Eliseo Sarita @
Toto and Eduardo Sarinos who (sic) still at-large, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of force,
violence and intimidation; did, then and there, willfully (sic), unlawfully and
feloniously, after stabbing to death the driver Gernonimo (sic) Malibago and
conductor Andrew Patriarca, take, steal and carry away and carnap, one Isuzu
passenger type jeepney, with plate No. DFB- 550, owned by Doris and Victor
Wolf, to their damage and prejudice in the total amount of P124,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Arraigned on February 7, 1989, appellants Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty.4On May 30, 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of
not guilty.5 Sarita and Sarinos remained at large. At the trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Myrna Temporas, NBI Agent Arlis S. Vela, Vicente Dilanco Pons, Andrew
Patriarca, Sr., Juliana Malibago, Atty. Magno Toribio, and Atty. Carlos Saunar, documentary and
other evidence tending to prove the following:
From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on March 27, 1988, the
team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where
presumably they were killed. Because appellants volunteered that their companions were their
neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmarinas, Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided
to take down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team traveled with appellants
to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 28, 1988.

Sometime in March 1988, Santiago Cid went to the house of prosecution witness Vicente Dilanco At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements of appellants one at a
Pens, a farmer engaged in the buy and sell business, in Camarines Sur. Cid, Pens' cousin, asked time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just around somewhere," to assist appellants
Pens if he wanted to buy a jeepney. Pons replied that he had no money but that he could help him during the investigation Agent Arlis Vela took the: statement of appellant Januario while
find a buyer for the jeepney for the price of P50,000.00. With Amador Alayan, one of the drivers of Supervising Agent Toribio took that of Canape. The first portion of the statement, Exhibit C, taken
his son who was around, Pons offered to look for a buyer of the jeepney provided that Cid would from appellant Januario reads:
entrust the vehicle to them. Cid agreed to the proposal. At that time, Pens did not know who
owned the jeepney, but he eventually offered it for sale to Myrna Temporas who agreed to the SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NA IBINIGAY NI RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN SA
purchase price of P65,000.00. However, Temporas paid Pens only the amount of P48,500.00.6 HARAP NI NBI AGENT ARLIS E. VELA NGAYONG IKA-28 NG MARSO 1988
SA NBI, NCR, MANILA.
Myrna Temporas had a slightly different story. According to her, Pons said that the jeepney was
owned by his niece, Doris Wolf. Pons, purportedly acting upon the instructions of Doris Wolf, TANONG Mr. RENE JANUARIO ipina-aalam
borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the jeepney as a collateral. namin sa iyo na ikaw ay aming inuusig sa
The amount was given to Pens in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a check payable to Doris salang pagnakaw ng isang jeepney at
Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a pagkapatay sa driver at conductor nito. Gusto
signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back portion and a second endorsement by Pons who naming malaman mo na ikaw ay hindi maaring
subsequently deposited it in his account. pilitin na magbigay ng salaysay at kong (sic)
sakaling magbibigay ka ng salaysay, ano
On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of attorney from Doris Wolf. mang sasabihin mo rito ay pueding (sic)
Pens promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pens failed to pay the indebtedness. So, gamitin laban sa iyo sa ano mang caso.
Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount Nauunawaan mo ba ito?
borrowed but Pons always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay.7
SAGOT Naiintiendihan (sic) ko.
Inasmuch as Pons also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a
complaint against him for estafa before the NBI.8 Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the T Kailangan mo ba ang tulong ng abogado sa
relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the jeepney and ipagtatanong na ito?
informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and conductor (deceased Andrew
Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers.9
S Magsalaysay (sic) lang ako nag-may
abogado ako.
Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation, an NBI team led by
Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of the jeepney and the killing of
T May abogado ka ba sa ngayon?
Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a group of four (4) persons named Rene Januario,
Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Tote, and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also
discovered that the jeepney was disposed of through Cid. 10 S Mayroon no si Atty. CARLOS SAUNAR ay
nandito para tulongan (sic) ako.
Appellants Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in Camarines Sur. The NBI then
invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered T Nanunumpa ka na magsasabi ng
in an auto shop with its engine partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the jeepney katotohanan, buong katotohanan at wala ng
had been found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila. iba kungdi katotohanan lamang sa
nagtatanong na ito?
 S Opo.
T Sabihin mo ang iyong pangalan at iba-ibang
bagay tungkol sa iyong pagkatao?
S RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, 26 taong
gulang, binata, isang (sic) buy and sell
hanapbuhay at naninirahan sa Puro Batya,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
xxx xxx xxx 11
According to appellant Januario, two weeks before September 1987, he was already in the house
of appellant Canape in Bgy. Palapala, Dasmarinas, Cavite to procure chicken and "kalawit" for his
business. He also went there because his new friends named Toto Sarita and Digo Samera (sic),
as well as appellant Canape, wanted him to look for a buyer of a jeep. Appellant Januario asked
for a photograph of the jeep to assist him in making a canvass of buyers in Bicol but he was told
that he would have it later at night because they were then having drinks in the house of Toto.
After that drinking spree, the group agreed to fetch appellants Januario and Canape at 4:00
o'clock the following morning. It was Digo Samera who fetched appellants before they went to the
house of Tote Sarita. Together, they went to GMA town in Cavite. It was around 5:00 o'clock in the
morning when they hailed a jeep from the "looban." There after, the following allegedly transpired:
T Ano na ang nangyari noong kayo ay
sumakay sa jeep?
S Ako ang naunang sumakay pagtigil noong
jeep. Bago maka-alis ang jeep nagsalita si
TOTO SARITA na nasa baba pa kasama sina
EFREN CANAPE at DIGO na 'HINTAY ka
muna may naiwanan pa ako. Sumakay si Digo
sa tapat ng conductor na nasa loob ng jeep
samantalang si TOTO ay pumuesto sa
bandang kanan sa unahan ng jeep at si
EFREN ay sa bandang kaliwa rin ng jeep tapat
ng driver at sabay si EFREN at TOTO na
sumakay sa unahan ng jeep at mabilis na
tinulak ni EFREN ang driver patungo kay
TOTO na siyang tumutok, (sic) sa driver ng
isang sandata balisong 29. Habang
nangyayari iyon ay tinutukan naman ni DIGO
na nasa loob ng jeep ang conductor na
pinasubsub ang ulo habang tinutukan ng 29.
Ang sabi sa akin ni DIGO ay "REN igapos mo
ito" at inabutan niya ako ng isang panyong
panali. Sa aking kabiglaanan ako ay
napasunod at tinali ko iyong conductor.
T Ano na ang sumunod na nangyari matapos
matalian mo ang conductor?
S Napansin ko na lang na maneho na ni
TOTO Sarita ang jeep na kanyang pinasibad
habang ang driver ay nakatali na rin at ako
naman ay sinabihan ni DIGO na hawakan
iyong conductor sa balikat habang tinutukan
no patalim ni DIGO. Ang conductor ay
nagsasalita na siya ay nasasaktan dahil
nakatusok na ang patalim sa kanyang leeg o
batok.
T Ano ang nangyari matapos na matutukan
ang conductor at driver at habang
nagmamaneho Si TOTO?
S Mula sa lugar na iyon pagkaraan ng ilang
minuto ay biglang iniliko sa isang-maliit na
lupang kalsada na napapaligiran ng tubo at
talahib at doon ay hininto ang sasakyan:
T Ano na ang sumonod (sic) na nangyari sa
lugar na iyon matapos na maihinto ang jeep?
S Unang bumaba po ay si TOTO na hawak
ang driver pababa at itinulak ang driver sa may
tobohan (sic). Si EFREN ay sumonod (sic)
hanggang sa may gilid ng karsada' habang si
TOTO ay tuloy sa tobohan (sic) na dala ang
driver. Si DIGO naman ay tinulak ang
conductor hawak-hawak sa buhok at ang sabi
naman sa akin ay hawakan ko ang balikat.
Kinuha sa akin ang conductor ni DIGO at
dinala sa may tubuhan (sic) at akin na lang
narinig na ang pag-ungol no conductor dahil
malapit lang iyon sa sasakyan.
T Nakikita mo ba sila DIGO at ang conductor
habang siya ay umuungol?
S Hindi ko na po nakita kasi nasa tubohan na.
 T Sila TOTO at ang driver nasaan sila habang
naririnig mong umuungol ang conductor?
S Pumasok po sa tubohan hindi ko na sila
makita.
T Ano na ang nangyari matapos na dalhin ni
TOTO ang driver at ni DIGO naman ang
conductor sa tobohan (sic)?
S Mga ilang minuto lang po ay bumalik na sila
sa sasakyan at kami sumakay na at si TOTO
ang nagmaneho ng sasakyan at tuloy-tuloy na
kami sa Bikol, sa Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
T Noong kayo ay umalis sa tubohan na iyon,
nasaan na noon ang driver at ang conductor?
S Wala na no.
T May napansin ka ba kina DIGO at TOTO
noong sila ay sumakay sa jeep galing sa
tubuhan (sic)?
S Humihingal sila po na parang pagod at
napansin ko na may dugo ang kamay ni DIGO
at ang damit at pantalon naman ni TOTO ay
may tilamsik (sic) ng dugo.
xxx xxx xxx 12
Appellant Januario described the driver as more than fifty years old, Of medium build, and with
gray hair and a fine nose. Upon reaching Libmanan, they went directly to Santiago Cid with whom
appellant Januario had earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep. Appellant Januario did nor
know to whom the jeep was sold but he knew that Cid approached Vicente Pens. The latter gave
appellant Januario P1,000 cash and rice and eggs worth around P600. A second jeep was
brought by Tote and Digo to
Roger Abajero. Cid brought both appellants to the house of Roger. Later, the jeep was impounded
at the NBI Naga City office.
Appellant Januario signed and thumbmarked his statement which was sworn before NBI Executive
Director Salvador R. Ranin. It was also Signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar "as counsel."
Appellant Canape's sworn statement, Exhibit I, was taken by Atty. Magno V. Toribio, a supervising
NBI Agent. Quoted in full, the statement reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI (BINIGAY NI EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT KAY
AGENTS MAGNO V. TORIBIO AND TOMAS C. ENRILE MGA AHENTE NG NBI
DITO SA NCR, NBI, MANILA, NGAYONG IKA 27 NG MARSO 1988.
1. TANONG Ginoong EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ikaw ay
aming iniimbistigahan ngayon tungkol sa pagnanakaw ing isang
Izuzu (sic) type jitney sa Silang, Cavite sa pagkamatay ng
conductor nito noong buwan ng Septembyre (sic) 1988. Bago
ka namin tanungin aming ipinaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas. Una, ikaw ay may
karapatan na huwag magbigay ng salaysay sa imbistigasyon na
ito, at manahimik. Ano mang sabihin mo dito ay puweding
gamitin laban sa iyo sa asunto Kriminal o civil. Ikalawa ikaw ay
may karapatan na kumuha ng iyong abogado upang tulungan
ka saimbistigasyon na ito. At kung gusto mo pero wala kang
pambayad sa sirbesyon (sic) nito, ikaw ay bibigyan ng NBI ng
libre. Matapos mong malaman ang iyong mga karapatan, ikaw
ba ay nakahandang magbigay ng kusang loob na salaysay?
ANSWER Opo, sir.
T Kung ganoon sabihin mo ang iyong buong pangalan, tirahan
at iba pang mga bagay-bagay na pweding pagkakakilalanan sa
sa iyong pagkatao?
S Ako is EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, 31 anyos and idad (sic),
kasal kay AIDA ROLDAN, isang mag-sasaka (sic) nakatapos ng
ika-limang baitang sa elementarya, at at sa kasalukuyan ay
naninirahan sa Bgy. Sibuho, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
T Ikaw ba ay may nalalaman sa pagkanakaw ng isang
Malaguena type type Jeepney sa Bulihan, Silang, Cavite noong
buwan ng Septyembre 1988?
S Opo, sir.
T Kung ganoon sabihin mo sa mga imbistigador na ito kung
paano ang buong pangyayari?
S Kasi nung (sic) minsan ako ay mapasyal sa Bgy. Crossing,
sakop ng Dasmarinas, Cavite noong mga buwan ng Agosto
1987 kami ay nagkita ng aking aking Kaibigan na si 'TOTO'
SARETA at ang kanyang kasama na si DIGO (complete name
unknown) at ako ay kanyang sinabihan na humanap ng buyer
ng isang jeep. Kaya, ng (sic) ako ay umuwi na ng Libaman,
Camarines Sur ako ay humanap (sic) ng taong interesado na
bumili ng nasabing Jeep, katulung si RENE JANUARIO na taga
bayan ng Libmanan. Ang aming nakitang interesado sa jeep ay S Hindi ko po alam kung magkano ang iksaktong halaga, pero
si SANTIAGO CID. Kaya ang aming ginawa ni RENE ay ang presyo sa amin ni SANTIAGO ay P25,000.00.
bumalik sa Bgy. Crossing, Dasmarinas, Cavite para ipaalam
kina TOTO SARETA na kami ay nakakuha na ng buyer. Ng T Nang dalhin ha ninyo ang jeep kay SANTIAGO ay agad
gabing yaon na kami ay dumating kami ay niyaya nina TOTO ninyong dinala at pinagbili rin kay VICENTE PONS?
na mag inuman at habang kami ay nag-iinuman sinabi ni TOTO
na may makukuha na kami na jeep. Mga bandang alas kuwatro
S Opo, ng araw din na iyon.
ng madaling araw, kami ay niyaya na nlna TOTO na kunin na
ang jeep. Kami ay lumakad na papuntang Bulihan Silang,
Cavite, Pagdatlng namin doon, kami ay naghintay ng mga ilang T Magkano ha ang paunang bayad kung mayroon man, na
minuto. Ng (sic) dumaan ang isang Jeep na wala pang (sic) ibinigay ni VICENTE PONS sa inyo?
pasahero, ito ay pinara ni DIGO at kami ay sumakay. Mga ilang
minuto naman lumipas habang ang diyep (sic) ay tumatakbo A Ang alam ko ho ay P4,000.00 ang ibinigay ni VICENTE
papuntang Alabang ay naglabas ng patalim sin TOTO at DIGO PONS kay SANTIAGO dahil siya ang kausap nito.
at tinutukan ang driver at ang kundoktor. Tapos kami ni RENE
ay sinabihan (sic) din nila na maglabas ng patalim at tutukan din T Magkano naman ang halagang naparte mo?
ang driver at ang kundoktor (sic). Pagdating namin sa Bgy.
Maguyam, sakop din ng Silang sapilitang (sic) ibinaba nina
TOTO, DIGO at RENE ang driver at ang kundoktor (sic) at S Ako ho ay binigyan ni SANTIAGO ng P1,000.00?
dinala sa loob ng tubuhan. Ako ay naiwan sa loob ng jeep. Hindi
naman natagalan ay lumabas na ang tatlo galing sa loob ng T Ito bang pag-pabili ninyo ng jeep kay VICENTE PONS ay may
tubuhan, hindi na kasama ang driver at and kundoktor (sic). kasulatan?
Tapos, narining ko kay TOTO na ayos na daw'. Ang sunod
naming ginawa ay pinatakbo na namin ang jeep papuntang S Wala po.
Libmanan. Pagdating namin sa Libmanan dumerretso (sic). kay
SANTIAGO CID at ibinigay na namin sa kanya jeep. Ang sabi
T Kailan pa ang mga sumunod na bayad na ibinigay sa inyo ni
naman ni SANTIAGO ay dadalhin niya ang jeep kay VICENTE
VICENTE PONS?
PONS na taga Libmanan din.

S Hindi ko na ho masyadong matandaan ang iksaktong oras na

T Alam mo ba ang nangyari sa driver at konduktor (sic) ng Jeep
na inagaw niyo?
S Ang pag-kaalam ko ho sa sabi ni TOTO na 'ayos na' ang ibig
sabihin ay patay na sila.
T Sino naman ang VICENTE PONS na ito?
kanyang pagbayad at kung magkano basta ang pag-kaalam ko
ay mga tatlong beses lang siyang naghulog at iyon ay kanyang
ibinibigay kay SANTIAGO. Si SANTIAGO naman ang siyang
nag-bibigay (sic) sa amin.
T Ito bang si SANTIAGO CID at si VICENTE PONS ay alam
kung saan at paano ninyo nakuha ang jeep?

S sabi sa amin ni SANTIAGO si VICENTE PONS ay ang S Opo, sir

kanyang nakuhang buyer ng jeep.
T Nasaan na ngayon sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO?
T Sa pagkaalam mo ba ay talagang binili ni VICENTE PONS
and Jeep?
S Sa Dasmarinas, Cavite ho.

S Opo, sir.
T Hindi na ba sila napupuntang Libmanan?

T Magkano naman ang pagkabili ni VICENTE PONS?

S Bihira na ho sir. Pumupunta lang ho sila kung kukuha ng pera
 T Sa pagkaalam mo, mayroon pa ba silang ibang Jeep na
dinala sa Libmanan?
S Mayroon pa ho akong nalaman kay SANTIAGO CID, na may
isa pang jeep na dinala daw sina TOTO at DIGO sa kanya at
kanya namang ibenenta kay Mr. ROGELIO ABAJERO, na taga
Libmanan din.
T Ano pa ang ibang alam mo tungkul (sic) dito sa pangalawa
jeep, na ibenenta (sic) nila kay Mr. ABAJERO?
S Wala na ho sir.
T Iyung tungkol sa unang jeep na ibenenta kay Mr. VICENTE
PONS, alam mo ba kung nasaan na iyon ngayon?
S Hindi ko rin po alam kung saan dinala ni Mr. PONS.
T Ito bang sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO ay matagal mo ang
kakilala?
S Matagal no ho sir, dahil sa ako ay ipinanganak din sa
Dasmarinas, Cavite at doon din lumaki. Sila ho ay aking mga
kababayan at matalik kung mga kaibigan.
T Nung ikaw ba ay sabihan nina TOTO na humanap ng buyer
ng jeep alam mo ba na ang jeep na iyon ay nanakawin lamang?
S Opo, sir.
T Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong sa iyo, ikaw
ba ay mayroon pa ibig sabihin?
S Wala na po, KATAPUSAN NG SALAYSAY.
(Signed and thumbmarked)
EFREN B. CANAPE
Nagsalaysay
SINGED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Illegible signature) (Illegible signature)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 27th day of March 1988 at
NBI National Capital Region, Manila. I likewise certify that I have carefully
examined the herein affiant and that I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed
his statement and understood the same.
(Signed)
Atty. ARLIS E. VELA
(By Authority of Rep. Act 157)13
14
After the investigation, appellants went with the NBI agents in searching for their companions."
Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney
and its driver to the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang
and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after September 4, 1987, the body of 23 year-old Andrew Patriarca,
Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head was severed from his body. 15 The
body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, 16 was
recovered after the harvest of sugarcane in the plantation 17 in Maguyam. 18 Malibago's widow
identified the body from its clothing. 19
On September 12, 1989, the prosecution formally offered its evidence, 20 which the court duly
admitted 21 For its part, the defense, through counsel, manifested its intention to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, because the defense had not yet presented accused Cid, the court on
November 21, 1989, ordered the cancellation of his bail bond and gave his surety thirty days
within which to show cause why judgment against the bond should not be rendered. The defense
counsel, Atty. Jose Claro, was likewise required to explain why he should not be held in contempt
of court for his failure to file a demurrer to evidence. 22
For failure of the defense counsel to appear at the scheduled hearing dates and to file the
promised demurrer to evidence, the court on December 22, 1989, issued an order stating that the
"accused may no longer at this time be allowed to present their Demurrer to Evidence." It
scheduled dates for the presentation of defense evidence and appointed Atty. Oscar Zaldivar as
counsel de oficio for the defendants. 23
Nevertheless, on December 26, 1989, counsel for the defense Claro mailed a "demurrer to
evidence or motion to dismiss on (sic) insufficiency of
evidence." 24 On January 10, 1990, the trial court denied the motion finding that the demurrer did
not "contain any reason compelling enough to recall the previous order," disallowing the filing of
said pleading. 25
On February 8, 1990, upon the manifestation of Atty. Claro that appellants would no longer
present evidence, the trial court issued an order considering the case terminated as far as
appellants were concerned. However, it granted a "reservation" to present evidence as regards
Cid. The trial court further directed Atty. Claro to present Cid before the court on March 9, 1990. It
ordered the filing of memoranda "as the case of accused Januario and Canope (sic) is now
considered closed." It set the "partial promulgation of judgment" on March 9, 1990 "insofar as the
two (2) accused are concerned." 26
On March 1, 1990, appellants' counsel filed their memorandum. 27
On March 9, 1990, the trial court did not make a "partial promulgation of judgment." Instead, it
ordered the "continuation of proceedings for purposes of rebuttal evidence." 28
On the same day, the defense presented Santiago Cid as a witness. He testified that a certain
Raul Repe, Tote Sarita and Digo Sarreal approached him about the sale of the jeepney. He
referred them to Vicente Pens who he thought would buy the vehicle. He knew appellants were "i"
from Libmanan but did not see them during the transaction for the sale of the jeepney. 29
On March 27, 1990, the Court denied defense counsel Claro's motion to cancel the hearing
scheduled for that day. Noting the presence of Atty. Carlos Saunar, a prosecution witness whose
attendance during Scheduled trial dates had been delayed, and citing the "imperatives of justice,"
the trial court issued an order directing that the testimony of said witness should be heard that
day. 30 In the absence of the counsel of record for the defense; the trial court reiterated the
appointment of Atty. Oscar Zaldivar as counsel de oficio.
Atty. Saunar testified that he joined the NBI sometime in May or June 1988. In March 1988, while
still in private practice, he was at the NBI head office handling a client case when Arty. Vela, an
NBI agent, approached him. The latter and Arty. Toribio introduced him to appellants and Cid.
Vela and Toribio told him that the three had verbally confessed to participation in a crime and that
they needed his assistance as they were about to execute their sworn statements. 31 Saunar
agreed to assist the three suspects and allegedly explained to them the consequences of their
confession. He also supposedly told them individually, and in Tagalog, their constitutional rights,
like their rights to be silent and to counsel and that whatever they would say could be used against
them. 32
Saunar identified his signature in the sworn statement of appellant Januario. However, he could
no longer recall which of the three accused ,appellant Canape although he admitted that the
latter's face was "familiar." 33 He was certain, however, that he participated in the taking of
appellant Canape's sworn statement on March 28, 1988. He admitted that his signature does not
appear on appellant Canape's sworn statement but he could "only surmise" that he did not sign
the same sworn statement because either it was not presented to him immediately after the
statement was taken or that it had been misplaced. 34
After receiving Saunar's testimony, the trial court asked the prosecution whether it was presented
as rebuttal testimony. Answering in the positive, the prosecutor reminded the court that when
Saunar could not be presented as a witness, he had made a reservation to call him as "additional
evidence for the prosecution and/or rebuttal" testimony. Clarifying this, the court said that as
against Cid, the testimony was a principal one but a rebuttal as far as the appellants were
concerned. 35
On May 11, 1990, the defense manifested that it was closing its case. The prosecution having
waived its right to present "any rebuttal evidence," the trial court issued an order requiring the filing
of the parties' respective memoranda. 36 On June 27, 1990, the trial court rendered the herein
questioned Decision. 37
The Issues
In their separate briefs filed by their respective counsel (Atty. Jose C. Claro for Januario and Any.
Florendo C. Medina for Canape), appellants ascribe basically two errors against the trial court:
(1) The trial procedure, particularly the presentation and admission Of the testimony of Arty.
Carlos Saunar, was irregular and prejudicial to the appellants; and
(2) The extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having been
extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel.
Insisting that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, appellant Januario contends
that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his sworn statement before the NBI and the
testimony of Arty. Saunar as rebuttal or additional witness after the prosecution had rested its
case, he (appellant Januario) had filed his memorandum, and the decision had been scheduled for
promulgation. 38
For his part, appellant Canape also claims that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. He questions the trial court's having given "weight and sufficiency" to his extra-judicial
confession. 39
Appellant Januario contends that the trial court erred in allowing the presentation of Saunar as a
witness after the prosecution had closed its case and offered its documentary evidence. Saunar
could not in any guise be considered as a rebuttal witness simply because there was no defense
evidence to rebut.
The Court's Ruling
The First Issue: Order of Trial
The pertinent provisions of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court state:
Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge, and in the proper
case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if
any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in the furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the cases shall be deemed submitted unless
the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
 (e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial procedure as outlined in this rule is ordinarily followed to insure the orderly conduct of
litigations to attain the magisterial objective of the Rules of Court to protect the parties' substantive
rights. 40 However, strict observance of the Rules depend upon the circumstances obtaining in
each case at the discretion of the trial judge. Thus, as early as 1917, this Court explained:
. . . . The orderly course of proceedings requires, however, that the prosecution
shall go forward and should present all of its proof in the first instance; but it is
competent for the judge, according to the nature of the case, to allow a party who
has closed his case to introduce further evidence in rebuttal. This rule, however,
depends upon the particular circumstances of each particular case, and falls
within the sound discretion of the judge, to be exercised or not as he may think
proper. 41
Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has rested his case or even after the
defense has moved for dismissal, to present in-voluntarily omitted evidence. 42 The primary
consideration is whether the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case. Thus
The claim that the lower court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorney to introduce new
evidence is devoid of any merit, for while the prosecution had rested, the trial was not yet
terminated and the cause was still under the control and jurisdiction Of the court and the latter, in
the exercise of its discretion, may receive additional evidence. Sec. 3(9), Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court clearly provides that, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant either of the parties
the right and opportunity to adduce new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question. 43
Saunar's testimony was admitted in evidence before the trial court rendered its Decision.
Undoubtedly then, the court a quo retained its jurisdiction even though the prosecution had rested
its case. As to appellants, Saunar was an additional prosecution witness, not a rebuttal witness,
because the defense waived presentation of evidence after the prosecution had rested its
case. 44 Saunar was, therefore, a rebuttal witness with respect to accused Cid. 45
The Second Issue: Appellants' Right to Counsel
Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of appellants is, however, not a
guarantee that appellants' respective confessions had been taken in accordance with Article 111,
Section 12(1) of the Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice." Elucidating on this particular constitutional
requirement, this Court has taught:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic
laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant
to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions
guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a
competent and independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in
the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he Is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed
of the right to remain silent and to counsel 'contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter
could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police,
whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic. 46
We find that Saunar was not the choice of appellant Januario as his custodial investigation
counsel. Thus, NBI Agent Arlis Vela testified:
Q Now, considering that they were then under your custody,
and under investigation, were they represented by counsel
during the time that you took their statements?
A Yes, sir. They were.
Q Do you recall who was that counsel who represented them?
A Atty. Carlos Saunar, sir.
Q Was he the counsel of their own choice, or was the counsel
furnished by your office?
A Because they were not represented by counsel of their own
choice, we got the service of Atty. Carlos Saunar who helped
them. 47
xxx xxx xxx
Q And Atty. Saunar is connected with the NBI?
 A At that time, he was at the NBI Office. He was just A Before, during, and after the taking of the statement.
somewhere around.
Q Now, may we know from you why Atty. Saunar was present
Q And it was the NBI who requested Saunar to assist Mr. Rene there?
Januario in the investigation?
A He was present the because be was then applying for the
A We requested him, because he was just around, position of NBI agent.
sir. 48 (Emphasis supplied.)
FISCAL VELAZCO:
As regards Saunar's assistance as counsel for appellant Canape, investigating NBI Agent Magno
Toribio testified as follows: Was he the only lawyer who was present there?

Q Now, with regards to your advice that he has a right to A I remember, Atty. Claro, sometimes is there, representing
counsel, and to seek assistance of a counsel of his own choice another client. 49
if he does not have one, and to remain silent, and if he does not
have a lawyer, you will furnish One, for him, now what was his
xxx xxx xxx
answer?

Q Now, Atty. Saunar is employed with the NBI office, am I right?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.
According to him, he does not need a lawyer, but despite that
refusal to have a lawyer. . .
Q When was he employed at the NBI office? Tell us the exact
date?
COURT:

COURT:
That is not refusal. That is manifestation that he does not need
a lawyer. He did not refuse. He raid, he does not need a lawyer.
If you can.
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Although, he does not need a lawyer, we provided him a lawyer
by the name of Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was present during the Maybe in September.
investigation, and who advised him of the consequences of the
statements that he will give, and he did not refuse. ATTY CLARO:

FISCAL VELAZCO: 19?

Now, how did you know that Atty. Saunar gave him advice gave A 1988.
accused Canape advice?
Q But he was always frequent in the NBI office because he was
A Because we were present. to be employed, is that what you mean?

Q Now, when did Atty. Saunar give that advice to accused A He was applying.
Canape, was it before, during, or after the taking of this
statement? Q And from where is he?
 A I think he is from Bicol.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, how many times have you requested Atty. Saunar to
assist a person under your investigation in the NBI office, other
than this? A I cannot remember anymore.
Q You always ask him to assist if there is no lawyer available, or
the person to be investigated has no lawyer?
A If he is around. 50 (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us for the moment grant arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question.
Under the circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the
independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in
the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was
actually employed by the NBI a few months after. As regards appellant Januario, Saunar might
have really been around to properly apprise appellant of his constitutional right as reflected in the
written sworn statement itself.
However, the same cannot be said about appellant Canape. Clearly, he was not properly informed
of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking
him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if
he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with
the constitutional mandate. 51 In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional
rights and posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by
any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain and to con- template an effective communication that results in an understanding of what
is conveyed. 52 Appellant Canape's sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on
paper, fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the aforequoted testimony of
NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that appellant Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI
agents should have exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.
Moreover, there is enough reason to doubt whether appellant Canape was in fact and in truth
assisted by counsel. Atty. Saunar affirmed on the witness stand that he assisted appellants on
March 28, 1988. 53 However, the sworn statement itself reveals that it was taken on March 27,
1988. No satisfactory explanation was made by the prosecution on this discrepancy. All that Agent
Vela stated was that they conducted an oral investigation in Naga City on March 27, 1988 and that
investigation at the NBI Manila head office was made in the afternoon of March 28, 1988. 54
The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of appellants' constitutional rights is shown not
only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article m of the Constitution. They have likewise
forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that
an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel;
otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. 55
An admission which, under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is an "act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact" is different from a confession which, in turn, is defined in
Section 33 of the same Rule as the "declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
Offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein." Both may be given in evidence
against the person admitting or confessing. In People vs. Lorenzo, 56 the Court explained that in a
confession there is an acknowledgment of guilt while in an admission the statements of fact by the
accused do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which the accused is charged.
Appellants verbally intimated facts relevant to the commission of the crime to the NBI agents in
Naga City. This is shown by the testimony of NBI Agent Vela that, based on the facts gathered
from interviews of people in that city, they "invited" and questioned appellants, thus:
Q Now, tell us, what was your purpose in inviting these two (2)
people?
A That was in connection with the vehicle I mentioned earlier, in
connection with the carnapping incident mentioned earlier.
Q You invited them in connection with the carnapping because
you want to, know from them actually what they know about the
carnapping, am I correct?
A Precisely, that is right. 57
Apparently attempting to avoid the questions on whether appellants admitted complicity in the
crime, Agent Toribio testified:
ATTY. CLARO:
When you were conducting an investigation, and you saw me at
the NBI building, Naga City, you were' referring to the
investigation of Mr. Canape, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that investigation you were conducting was reduced to
writing, and that is now Exhibit "G", am I right?
A That is not.
Q But you investigated Mr. Canape in Naga City at the NBI Yes, sir.
building, am I right, tell the Court?
Q And Mr. Vela at that time, was also conducting an
A At that time, we were taking the statement of the woman, the investigation to (sic) a certain Rene Januario in Naga City, is
complainant, in the estafa case, and the; other witnesses. that right?

COURT: A. No. We took the statement in Manila.

You mean, at the time you investigated that estafa complaint, COURT:
that was the time when you also investigated Canape, is that
what you mean? You took the statement in Manila. How about in Naga, that is
the question of counsel?
FISCAL VELAZCO:
A Naga, no statement yet.
No, your Honor.
ATTY. CLARO:
COURT:
Mr. Toribio, because you were with Mr. Vela, Mr. Vela did not
But there is a question of counsel. You better clarify that. conduct any investigation to (sic) Mr. Januario, one of the
accused in this case, in Naga City? Tell the Court?
WITNESS:
A Not yet at that time, because it was useless. The crime was
He was asking me if I had already taken the statement of committed in Silang, Cavite. They will have to be brought to
Canape. Manila for the appropriate Judge or Fiscal.

COURT: COURT:

That is it, sir, Naga City. That is the question. So, you are claiming that you did not conduct any investigation
of Canape?
WITNESS:
A We conducted an investigation. When we took the statement
of the other witnesses, complainant and witnesses.
Not yet. We were only asking him.
COURT:
ATTY. CLARO:
Does that satisfy you?
By him, whom are you referring to:
ATTY. CLARO:
A The complainants and the witnesses, sir.
No.
Q All right. You were with Atty. Vela when you conducted an
investigation to (sic) Mr. Canape, am I right? In Naga City?
COURT;
WITNESS:
Please clarify the question.
 WITNESS:
It is true that we were sometimes talking with those people, but
not investigating them yet. 58 (Emphasis supplied.)
Note should also be taken of the fact that according to Atty. Saunar, when he acceded to be the
custodial investigation counsel of appellants, the latter had already confessed. Thus:
COURT:
There is one thing that he would like to add, 'that I talked to the
accused one by one,' you want to add something?
A And I confirmed with them whether they are confessing to
their crime, and they said yes. In fact, from what I: observed,
they have already confessed to the NBI agents.
COURT:
All of them confessed?
A Yes, your Honor, because they also told me what happened .
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, when they informed you that they intend to confess, now,
did you explain to them, to the accused or to the persons under
investigation the consequences of confessing?
A Yes, that is basic. I informed them of their rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and whatever they will confess there will
be used against them during the trial of this case.
Q How about that ultimate consequence of admission?
A Yes. I told them that if they confess, they will have to go to
prison.
Q And what were their answers?
A Actually, they have already confessed to their crime before I
talked to them.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
Your Honor, the witness has just answered during the
preliminary question of the Fiscal that at the time his assistance
was sought by the NBI, the accused had in fact already
confessed.
COURT:
I am now asking him, have you said that?
A They have already confessed.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
We can review the transcript of stenographic notes.
COURT:
What do you mean by that?
A They were still confessing at that time, your Honor.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
I just want to manifest into the record that they have already
confessed; that the witness has just repeated the word .
COURT:
But there is an explanation by him. Put that on record, all of
them.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, did you verify whether that confession was only verbal or
in writing?
A That was only verbal that is why there is a need for the sworn
statement to be taken. That was the time that I was telling them
that they can be put to jail. 59 (Emphasis supplied)
It is therefore clear that prior to the execution of the sworn statements at the NBI head office,
appellants had already made verbal admissions of complicity in the crime. Verbal admissions,
however, should also be made with the assistance of counsel. Thus:
The verbal admissions allegedly made by both appellants of their participation in
the crime, at the time of their arrest and even before their formal investigation,
are inadmissible, both as violative of their constitutional rights and as hearsay
evidence. These oral admissions, assuming they were in fact made, constitute
uncounselled extrajudicial confessions within the meaning of Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution. 60
That appellants indeed admitted participation in the commission of the crime in Naga City is shown
by the fact that the NBI agents brought them to Manila to facilitate apprehension of the other
culprits who could be either in Cavite or Manila. Because their uncounselled oral admissions in
Naga City resulted in the execution of their written confessions in Manila, the latter had become as
constitutionally infirm as the former. In People vs. Alicando, 61 this Court explained the
ramifications of an irregularly counselled confession or admission:
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We
have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rules known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once
theprimary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect
result of the same illegal act. The fruit of the poisonous tree is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but is equally inadmissible. The rule
is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence sub- sequently obtained.
Appellants might have indeed committed the crime in concert with Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo
Sarinos. However, what could have been their valuable admissions and confessions as far as the
prosecution was concerned were sullied and rendered inadmissible by the irregular manner by
which the law enforcement agents extracted such admissions and confessions from appellants
Without such statements, the remaining prosecution evidence — consisting mostly of hearsay
testimony and investigation reports — is sorely inadequate to prove appellants' participation in the
crime.
Notably, these law enforcers did not only defy the mandate of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights but,
after making "inquiries" from appellants about the crime, they likewise illegally detained appellants
as shown by the admission of one of the NBI agents that appellants were deprived of their liberty
while in their custody. 62 Appellants were even made to travel for ten (10) hours 63 from Naga City
to Manila just so their formal confessions could be executed in the latter city. According to NBI
Agent Vela, they "actually arrested" the appellants when the court issued the warrant for their
arrest. 64 The records show however that the NBI turned appellants over to the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo in Cavite only on March 30, 1989. On the same day, the same court
turned them back to the NBI for "detention during pendency of the case. 65
Epilogue
The Court understands the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies in apprehending
violators of the law especially those involving syndicates. It sympathizes with the public clamor for
the bringing of criminals before the altar of justice. However, quick solution of crimes and the
consequent apprehension of malefactors are not the end-all and be- all of law enforcement.
Enforcers of the law must follow the procedure mandated by the Constitution and the law.
Otherwise, their efforts would be meaningless. And their expenses in trying to solve crimes would
constitute needless expenditures of taxpayers' money.
This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government.
The admonition given by this Court to government officers, particularly those involved in law
enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case of People vs. Cuizon, 66 where NBI
agents mishandled a drug bust operation and in so doing violated the constitutional guarantees
against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures, is again called for and thus reiterated
in the case at bench, to wit:
. . . In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to
expect Ordinary people to be law abiding if we do not insist on the full protection
of their rights. Some lawmen, Prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over
an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged
evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were Obtained.
This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement.
Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and
the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages
the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to Preserve the peace and
security of Society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care
anti within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end
never justifies the means. 67
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 in
Tagaytay City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Rene Januario and Efren
Canape are ACQUITTED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director General, Philippine
National Police and the Director, National Bureau of investigation " order that Eliseo Sarita and
Eduardo Sarinos, who are still at large, may be apprehended and this time properly investigated
and prosecuted
The accused-appellants are hereby ORDERED RELEASED immediately unless they are being
detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED,
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145176 March 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS (at
large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES
y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, accused,
ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y
CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation.
The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extra-
judicial confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 92-112322. Appellants Ulysses Garcia y Tupas,
Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, as well as their
co-accused -- Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin Jr. y Granados -- were convicted
therein of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados,
Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola
y Salisi, are hereby convicted of the crime of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are ordered to pay the Central Bank of the Philippines,
now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, actual damages in the sum of P194,190.00 with interest thereon
at the legal rate from the date of the filing of this action, November 9, 1992, until fully paid."2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992,3 appellants and their co-accused were charged as
follows:
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured currency notes due for shredding in the
total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines as represented by
Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of
P194,190.00 Philippine currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia
y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said offense with
grave abuse of confidence they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers, Driver,
Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party and as such they had free access
to the property stolen."4
Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9, 1992.
Appellants, however, obtained two Release Orders from RTC Vice Executive Judge Corona Ibay-
Somera on November 9 and 10, 1992, upon their filing of a cash bond to secure their appearance
whenever required by the trial court.5
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels,
pleaded not guilty.6 On September 30, 1998, the trial court declared that Datuin Jr. and Peralta
were at large, because they had failed to appear in court despite notice.7
After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the appealed
Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the facts as
follows:
"About 10:00 o’clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank
of the Philippines (CBP) [now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and
Robbery Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for
Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito
de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
"Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC,
punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of
Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department
during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the
latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were
later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the
investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured
notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were
no longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were
stolen from the BSP by the above-named accused.
 "On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in
front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting for a passenger
bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation.
"On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave
three separate statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He
also identified the other named accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the
participation of each and everyone of them.
"On the basis of Garcia’s sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for
questioning at the police station and were subsequently charged with qualified theft
together with Garcia."8 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the Central Bank from
1978 to 1994.
"On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who had identified
himself as a police officer arrested accused-appellant Garcia while waiting for a
passenger bus in front of the Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City. He was arrested
without any warrant for his arrest. The police officer who had arrested accused-appellant
Garcia dragged the latter across the street and forced him to ride x x x a car.
"While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back,
and he was made to bend with his chest touching his knees. Somebody from behind hit
him and he heard some of the occupants of the car say that he would be salvaged if he
would not tell the truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated notes, he
told them that he does not know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and x x x up and down x x x the
stairs. While being dragged out of the car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-accused and he told
them that he does not know his co-accused x x x. Whenever he would deny knowing his
co-accused, somebody would box him on his chest. Somebody poured water on accused-
appellant Garcia’s nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit out the water that
had been poured on his nose [at first], but somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he
could not breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the torture anymore, he
decided to cooperate with the police, and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him
to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody utter, ‘may
nakikinig.‘ Suddenly his two ears were hit with open palm[s] x x x. As he was being
brought down, he felt somebody return his personal belongings to his pocket. Accused-
appellant Garcia’s personal belongings consisted of [his] driver’s license, important
papers and coin purse.
"He was forced to ride x x x the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and handcuffs were
removed when he was at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western
Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter’s name, age and
address. The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the
Philippines, interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get
accused-appellant Garcia’s wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel
supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia’s
wallet and the former insisted that they recovered the said perforated notes from
accused-appellant’s wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the statement of Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers
appearing in accused-appellant Garcia’s alleged three sworn statements dated November
4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and x x x November 6, 1992.
"At or about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, accused-appellant Garcia was brought to
the cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD. At or about 8:00 p.m., he was
brought to the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where his co-accused were also inside.
He did not identify his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders of
each of his co-accused, upon being requested, and Mr. Labita took x x x pictures while he
was doing the said act.
"Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public
Attorney’s Office on November 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw,
when SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused-appellant Garcia and told him
that Atty. Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not agree
to have Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel,
and accused-appellant Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was
not present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly signed x x x the alleged three (3) sworn
statements.
"During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court
that he did not assist accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-
appellant Garcia, and that he signed x x x the three (3) sworn statements only as a
witness thereto.
"Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4
Coronel’s warning that if he would not do so, he would again be tortured by water cure.
 "SPO[4] Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of accused appellants De Leon,
Loyola, [Flores] on the basis of the complaint of Mr. Pedro Labita, and which arrest was
effected on November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo Silva and SPO1 Redelico.
"SPO4 Coronel, in his letter dated November 6, 1992, forwarded the case to the Duty
Inquest Prosecutor assigned at the WPDC Headquarters."9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that all the accused used to work for the BSP. Garcia was a driver assigned
to the Security and Transport Department; while Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, Flores and Loyola
were laborers assigned to the Currency Retirement Division. Their main task was to haul
perforated currency notes from the currency retirement vault to the basement of the BSP building
for shredding.
On several occasions, during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated currency
notes placed in a coin sack that he, in turn, loaded in an armored escort van and delivered to
someone waiting outside the premises of the building. The trial court held that the coordinated
acts of all the accused unerringly led to the conclusion that they had conspired to pilfer the
perforated currency notes belonging to the BSP.
The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was "an
eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused." The trial court found his
allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that the
recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcia’s wallet and the flight of Peralta and
Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused.
Hence, this appeal.10
Issues
In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn Statements of Accused-
appellant Garcia and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
"2
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified theft."11
In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of errors:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three sworn statements of Accused
Ulysses Garcia (Exhibits ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’) and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
(Exhibits ‘N’ to ‘N-2’) over the objections of the accused-appellants.
"2
The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of Accused-appellants De Leon, Loyola
and Flores;
"3
The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the demurrer
to evidence;
"4
The trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence adduced by the accused-appellants,
consisting of exhibits ‘1’, ‘2’ to ‘2-B’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ and the testimony of their witness, State Auditor
Esmeralda Elli;
"5
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of qualified theft."12
Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants,
including the admissibility of Garcia’s confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency
notes; and (2) the propriety of the denial of their demurrer to evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given by
Garcia and the three perforated P100 currency notes confiscated from him upon his arrest.
Appellants, however, contend that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible.
Extrajudicial Confessions
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the
assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides thus:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited."
On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the Public
Attorney’s Office, duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions13 that Garcia was not assisted
by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the word
"SAKSI." Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted
Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn
Statement only as a witness.14
The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that
Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements
without the assistance of counsel. The lower court’s action is manifest error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress
and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law
specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the
presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is
voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise
and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-
prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused.15 The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel.16
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough.
Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. 17 The Constitution
states that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall
be inadmissible in evidence x x x." Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence
the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The
question of whether he was tortured becomes moot.
Perforated Currency Notes
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2") allegedly
confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and, hence,
inadmissible in evidence.
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the illegality of
their arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion from the evidence of
the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the trial court.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger
bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his
arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime. Neither
was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was
committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section
5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before
entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this
waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to
the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search.
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures18 of whatever nature. Without a
judicial warrant, these are allowed only under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a
search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving
motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search. 19
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly
illegal.20 Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in
evidence under the exclusionary rule.21In the present case, the perforated P100 currency notes
were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest;
hence, they are inadmissible in evidence.
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general’s argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores and
Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising objections thereto, they
entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not the
aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it.22
Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for
retirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as
the authors of the crime.
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who had similar
access to the shredding machine area and the currency retirement vault.23 Appellants were
pinpointed by Labita because of an anonymous phone call informing his superior of the people
allegedly behind the theft; and of the unexplained increase in their spending, which was
incompatible with their income. Labita, however, did not submit sufficient evidence to support his
allegation.

Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence
would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Second Issue:
Demurrer to Evidence

Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to evidence
filed by Appellants Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of the documents offered by the
prosecution and admitted in evidence by the RTC established the alleged qualified theft of
perforated notes, and not one of the pieces of evidence showed appellants’ participation in the
commission of the crime.

On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge’s determination of the sufficiency
or the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to establish a prima facie case
against the accused. Unless there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed.24

As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become apparent until
after Atty. Francisco had testified in court. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the person
of the former were held to be inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie
evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying their demurrer to evidence.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED, unless they are being detained for any other
lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to submit his report on
the release of the appellant or the reason for his continued detention within five (5) days from
notice of this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., CJ.,(Chairman) Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ concur.


EN BANC
G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO ABIÑON * alias
"NOLY", defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Southern Leyte for Robbery with Homicide. The other was sentenced to suffer only the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua on account of minority. The judgment of conviction is now before this Court
on automatic review.
The information charging appellants reads as follows:
That on the 6th day of January 1996, at about 6:30 o'clock [sic] in the evening more or
less, in [B]arangay Cagnituan, [M]unicipality of Maasin, [P]rovince of Southern Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
intent of [sic] gain, entered into [sic] the house of Paula Bandibas and Benjamin Morial
and once inside did then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
box, beat and stab the victims Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas, with the use of
sharp-pointed weapons and stones which the accused had provided themselves for the
purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victims mortal wounds which caused their
instantaneous death, after [which], said accused took, stole and carried away therefrom
Cash in the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00) Philippine Currency,
belonging to said Paula Bandibas and Benjamin Morial, to the damage and prejudice of
the victims and of social order.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution theorized that the accused committed the robbery in the early evening of January
6, 1996 so they would have money to spend for the dance later that night. To obtain the money or
to silence any witnesses, the accused killed the occupants of the house, Paula Bandibas and her
three-year old grandson Albert. In proving its theory, the prosecution offered the testimonies of
Gabriel Guilao, Benjamin Morial, SPO4 Antonio Macion and Dr. Teodulo Salas.
The crime allegedly took place at 6:00 in the evening in Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin, Southern
Leyte. Gabriel Guilao, 62, had just finished pasturing his horses and was on his way home. He
was passing through the road near the house of Benjamin Morial when he heard the voice of
Paula Bandibas pleading, "[P]lease don't kill me[.] I am going to give you money." Finding what he
heard "weird," Gabriel paused and remained at a distance of about eight (8) meters from the yard
of the house. From where he stood, Gabriel saw accused Nonelito Abiñon slap Paula Bandibas'
neck. Paula fell and was stabbed by accused Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed weapon.
Accused Leonardo Morial stood outside the house.
Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards his grandmother's
garden. Gabriel then heard the crushing sound of a stone against flesh.
The three accused stayed in the house for about ten minutes after the killing the victims.
Thereafter, they departed and headed towards the nearby houses.2
Paula Bandibas' common-law husband, Benjamin Morial, 56, was in neighboring Barangay Maria
Clara when the incident took place. He, along with the father of accused Leonardo Morial, and two
others, Heracleo Alonzo and Leo Padilla, were having drinks in his Maria Clara residence.
Benjamin left Barangay Maria Clara the next day at 2:00 in the afternoon. He arrived in Barangay
Cagnituan, 7½ kilometers away, two hours later. As was his wont, Benjamin called out Paula's
name when he was some five (5) meters from the house. This time, however, there was no
answer.
Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom. There, he found the clothes all
topsy-turvy. The box where he and Paula hid their money was turned upside down. Someone had
ransacked their house.
Benjamin moved back and saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut in her neck. He shouted for help.
Responding to his cries, Benjamin's neighbors, includingbarangay kagawads Patricio Abiñon and
Rufino Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin asked his neighbors to help search for Albert, who
was found shortly some 50 meters from the house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on the ground with
two stones near his head. Benjamin requested Patricio to send someone to report the incident to
the police.3
Upon learning of Benjamin's return to Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel Guilao also hurried to
Benjamin's house.4 He revealed to the grieving Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that
the three accused, Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon, were the perpetrators.
Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone about what he knew for fear that they would all be
killed since the Abiñons were "saturated in [their] place." Gabriel heeded Benjamin's advice.5
The police arrived at around 10:00 that evening. SPO4 Antonio Macion, along with four other
police officers, investigated the tragedy. They found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach, breast
and neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other hand, had a contusion on the right side of his head.
Beside him were two stones.6
After examining the victims' wounds, the police officers, along with Benjamin Morial, proceeded to
the bedroom. Benjamin informed the officers that P11,000.00 was missing from the moneybox.
Other than the cash, nothing else was missing.
Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to the officers his three suspects, the accused in this case.
He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody and not to
include Nonelito Abiñon, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay captain of
22 years, he knew that the Abiñons were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the
police that Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident.7
The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abiñon and invited the two
to the police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. The investigation
conducted by SPO4 Fernandez yielded an extra-judicial confession from accused Leonardo
Morial,8 who was assisted by Atty. Tobias Aguilar.
On January 8, 1996, Dr. Teodulo Salas, a rural health physician, conducted a post-mortem
examination on the bodies of the victims. Dr. Salas found an incised wound at the upper portion of
Paula Bandibas' neck, which he believed was caused by a sharp-edged weapon or instrument,
possibly a knife. Two stab wounds on the chest below and above the right nipple, both punctured
the lung. Another stab wound at the abdomen pierced the intestine. Dr. Salas concluded that the
cause of death of Paula Bandibas is severe hemorrhages secondary to the incised wound.
On the remains of Albert Bandibas, Dr. Salas found multiple angular corrogated wounds on the
head, which could have been caused by a heavy object such as a stone. Multiple stab wounds
punctured the skull. There was also an abrasion on the right side of the face, which was grossly
swollen and disfigured. The abrasion, according to Dr. Salas, might have been caused by a piece
of wood, by friction with the ground, or by some rough material that struck the child's face. The last
injury was a stab wound on the right forehead. Dr. Salas believed that the cause of death of Albert
Bandibas is the intra-cranial hemorrhages secondary to the violent injury to the head.9 The
foregoing findings and conclusions were reduced to writing in the doctor's Necropsy Reports.10
The accused, all first-degree cousins, interposed denial and alibi as their defense. They denied
being together at the time of the incident.
Accused Nonelito Abiñon, 22, claimed that he was in his house at around 6:00 in the evening of
January 6, 1996. An hour later, he went to the house of his sweetheart, Rosalie Mepico, and the
two later attended a dance at around 9:30 that evening. At the dance, they occupied a table with
Renida Mepico, Renato Montederamos and Edwin Morial. Leonardo Morial, he said, was not with
them.11
Accused Edwin Morial, 18, maintained that he was also at home on January 6, 1996. He slept
from 6:00 until 7:30 in the evening. At 9:00 p.m., he went to the dance with Renato
Montederamos. Nonelito Abiñon and Reneda Mepico were also at the dance.12
The defense pinned its bid for exculpation on the lengthy testimony of accused Leonardo Morial,
20. He narrated as follows:
At around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of January 6, 1996, he was at home washing dishes. He had supper
at approximately 7:00 and went to sleep at about 7:30 or 8:00. Unlike his fellow accused,
Leonardo did not go to the dance.13
At 4:00 in the afternoon of the next day, he was in the basketball court of their barangay watching
Nonelito and Edwin playing basketball with Jaime Morial, Renato Montederamos, Jimmy Abiñon,
Danilo Morial and Christopher Morial, among others.14 Suddenly, they heard Benjamin Morial
shout for help several times.15 Nonelito and Edwin, along with the others in the basketball court, all
rushed to Benjamin Morial's house.16 Leonardo Morial also proceeded to Benjamin's house after
bringing home his two-year old sister.17
At the house of Benjamin Morial, they found the lifeless body of Paula Bandibas on the floor
underneath the kitchen table. Her hands were on her breast, one foot crooked and the other
straight. She had wounds in her neck and breast. The corpse exuded a bad odor. Benjamin Morial
was crying. He said that whoever killed Paula shall pay.18Edwin asked Daniel Morial who the
suspects to the killing were. Daniel said he did not know. Edwin went home after about five
minutes.19
After viewing Paula Bandibas' remains, Leonardo went out of the house because of the
unpleasant smell and then headed home.20 Nonelito, on the other hand, departed as people
started looking for the body of Albert Bandibas since it was getting late. That was about 5:15 in the
afternoon.21
That night, Edwin and Leonardo slept at Nonelito's house. Nonelito had invited Edwin to sleep
over as they were going to dress a chicken,22 and Edwin had told Leonardo about it. The cousins
had the chicken for dinner. It was quite late when they finished their supper so Leonardo also
decided to spend the night at Nonelito's house.23 They slept at past 8:00 in the
evening.24 According to Nonelito, that was not the only time that the two had slept over. He said
there were previous occasions that his cousins had spent the night at their place. 25
The Abiñon household was to be roused from its slumber three hours later. At 11:00 p.m., the
police arrived to investigate the killing of the Bandibases. A police officer asked Edwin where he
was at 6:00 in the evening of January 6, 1996. Edwin replied that he was in their house sleeping.
They also asked the same question to Leonardo Morial, who answered that he was at home
taking care of his younger siblings. Nonelito, however, was not questioned. A policeman informed
Edwin and Leonardo that they would be brought to the police station for the continuation of the
investigation.26
Edwin and Leonardo went with the police officers and arrived at the station at around 3:00 dawn
the next day. The police told them to go to sleep.27
The suspects were interrogated after they awoke at past 6:00 that same morning. Edwin was
advised to tell the truth so he would not be killed. Nevertheless, he refused to admit his alleged
participation in the killings. Someone then struck his left hand with a pistol. His hand swelled. A
policeman in uniform warned him that if he did not tell the truth, he would be brought to the toilet.
Sure enough, Edwin was subsequently brought to the lavatory where he was boxed at the back
and instructed to undress. As Edwin stood naked, hands on his side, six tires were placed around
his body. A towel soaked with water was pushed into his mouth. Fortunately, the towel did not go
all the way to his throat since another policeman, a certain Leoni Egido, advised Edwin's
tormentors to stop and have pity on him. Edwin said that around seven policemen were in the
toilet with him though he could not identify any of them in court. He claimed that he did not have
his hand examined by a physician since he was afraid.28
Like Edwin, Leonardo was also asked where he was on January 6, 1996 at 6:00 in the evening.
Leonardo reiterated that he was at home. He was then brought to a separate room where his
interrogation continued.
Leonardo refused to own up to the incident so a policeman called two other policemen and
directed them to gag Leonardo. The two held Leonardo's arms while the other stuffed a shirt into
his mouth. One of them inflicted three successive painful blows on Leonardo's left side as the two
others continued to hold his hands.
Leonardo was then seated and his gag removed. The police told Leonardo to confess to the
killings. Leonardo professed that he did not witness the incident and could not tell them anything
about it. Again, they gagged his mouth and the same policeman who had hit him then boxed him
twice, this time on his right side. Thereafter, they released their hold and advised him to confess
so they would not kill him. Leonardo repeated that he did not know anything about the incident.
When a policeman attempted to box him again, Leonardo finally admitted that Nonelito Abiñon
and Edwin Morial were responsible for the death of Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation
lasted one and a half to two hours.
Asked in court to identify the uniformed policemen who beat him up, Leonardo said he could not
recall their faces. He did not look at the policemen during his interrogation and did not see their
nameplates.
Leonardo did not ask the police for a physician to examine him nor did he tell anyone about his
injuries because he did not know he was permitted to do so.
Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that they were
going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the investigation. Leonardo was told that his counsel
would be a certain Atty. Aguilar whose office was very near the police station. Leonardo
consented.
Having prepared Leonardo's statement, the police then told Leonardo to come with them to Atty.
Aguilar's office, which was about 50 meters from the police station. There, he saw Atty. Aguilar for
the first time. The lawyer read to him the document and asked him whether its contents were true.
The police had instructed Leonardo to answer "yes" if he was asked that question, and Leonardo
heeded the instructions.
Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries. Atty. Aguilar did ask
Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to execute the extra-judicial confession. Leonardo,
however, did not tell his lawyer about his injuries since a police officer had warned him that he
would be mauled again should he do so. Leonardo then signed the extra-judicial confession, after
which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing over, Leonardo was brought back to the police
station.29 Later in court, Leonardo claimed that he merely made up all the statements in the
document because he was afraid.
At around 8:30 that morning, Nonelito visited Leonardo and Edwin at the police station. A police
officer informed Nonelito that he was one of the suspects and handcuffed him.30
To belie Gabriel Guilao's eyewitness account, the defense also presented Patricio Abiñon and
Eulogio Padilla. Patricio and Eulogio purportedly saw Gabriel in Barangay Maria Clara at the
alleged time of the incident as well as the morning after.
On rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Flora Bandibas, Martin Galope and Erlito
Bandibas.
Flora and Martin were presented to disprove the testimony of the accused that Edwin Morial was
not at the dance with his co-accused. Flora claimed that she saw the three together at the dance
with Rosalia and Reneda Mepico occupying one table. Nonelito and Edwin danced joyfully, even
somewhat unusually, and caught the attention of other people. Leonardo also danced but did not
seem to enjoy himself.31
Martin, abarangay tanod, was at the dance to help preserve the peace. He maintained that he saw
all the three accused, including Leonardo Morial, at the dance.32
The defense attempted to diminish these witnesses' credibility by showing their relation to the
victim. On cross-examination, Flora admitted that she is the wife of Ireneo Bandibas, the barangay
captain, and the son of Paula Bandibas.33 Martin Galope, for his part, said that the same Ireneo
Bandibas had appointed himbarangay tanod.34
Erlito Bandibas' testimony, on the other hand, was intended to refute the testimonies of defense
witnesses Patricio Abiñon and Eulogio Padilla that Gabriel Guilao, the alleged eyewitness to the
killings, was in Maria Clara at the purported time of the incident.
On sur-rebuttal, the defense again presented Eulogio Padilla to dispute the testimony of Erlito
Bandibas.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused, namely:
LEONARDO MORIAL, NONELITO ABIÑON and EDWIN MORIAL, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as defined under Article
293 and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby
sentenced as follows:
1. Accused LEONARDO MORIAL and NONELITO ABIÑON to each suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection; and
2. Accused EDWIN MORIAL, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.
 Civilly, the three (3) accused aforenamed are held liable JOINTLY and SEVERALLY as
follows:
3. To indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity;
4. To indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity;
5. To indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of P20,546.00 as actual
damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses;
6. To pay to the heirs [the] aforementioned moral damages of P60,000.00 for each death;
and
7. To restitute or restore to private complainant Benjamin Morial the P11,000.00 amount
robbed;
8. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
Appellants' conviction rests on two vital pieces of evidence: the extra-judicial confession of
appellant Leonardo Morial and the eyewitness account of Gabriel Guilao.
The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively
deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.
A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner."36 It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect,i.e., when the police investigator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense.37
A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach upon the
commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights.38 The prosecution must prove with clear and convincing evidence that the accused was
accorded said rights before he extra-judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.39
Thus, the prosecution offered the testimonies of SPO4 Andres Fernandez and Atty. Tobias
Aguilar. SPO4 Fernandez testified that the investigation he conducted resulted in an admission by
Leonardo Morial that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. SPO4
Fernandez asked Leonardo whether he was willing to reduce his statement into writing and to sign
the same. The suspect answered positively. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right "to
remain silent and [to] have a counsel[,] [and informed him that] whatever will be his answer will be
used as evidence in Court."40
Leonardo told the investigator that he had no money to pay for the services of counsel. SPO4
Fernandez informed him that there are many lawyers in their municipality and named some of
them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus
volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4
Fernandez then contacted Atty. Aguilar.41
Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived at about 8:00 that morning of January 9, 1996. After being introduced
to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was
willing to answer the questions that may be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar
warned him that the statements that he may give might be used in evidence against him.
Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions voluntarily. According to Atty. Aguilar,
Leonardo was bent on revealing what really happened. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted
the investigation in Cebuano.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty.
Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The
investigator agreed to the lawyer's request.42
Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his
absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had been prepared, the
accused and the document containing the confession should be brought to his office for "further
examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for less than thirty minutes from the start of the
interrogation.
At about 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon, Leonardo and his policeman-escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's
office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated while he was away and
examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he was not
harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to determine whether its
contents conformed to the answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence. He
propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar asked him
whether he understood its contents and whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the
positive and signed the document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort.43
SPO4 Fernandez confirmed that Atty. Aguilar left during the investigation. On direct examination,
SPO4 Fernandez said the lawyer left the station while the investigation was still going on, saying
that he had so many things to do in his office.44 On cross-examination, SPO4 Fernandez hesitated
a little when he testified that Atty. Aguilar "might" have probably gone out in the middle of the
investigation.45 Later, he clarified that while in the process of drafting the statement, Atty. Aguilar
told him that he had to go to his office to attend to some matters.46 SPO4 Fernandez added that
while Atty. Aguilar was "in the police station during the investigation," "he (Atty. Aguilar) [would]
come and go but within the police station."47
During and despite Atty. Aguilar's absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the investigation and
propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.48
The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a
counsel assisting him from the very start thereof.49 InPeople vs. Lucero,50 where the suspect's
counsel left just when the interrogation was starting, this Court chastised both counsel and the trial
court for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the rights of the accused.
SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he
knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that he (Leonardo) and his companions
committed the crime.51 Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that
he left only after the latter had admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's
respective participation in the crime.52 For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys
the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination — indeed,
"in every phase of the investigation."53 An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession."54
Furthermore, Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 743855 requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The last paragraph of
Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted."
The right of appellant to counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of
Atty. Tobias before the termination of the custodial investigation. InPeople vs. Deniega,56 we
explained the rationale for the rule requiring counsel's continuing presence throughout the
custodial investigation:
Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial investigation. What may satisfy
constitutional requirements of voluntariness at the investigation's onset may not be
sufficient as the investigation goes on. . . . The competent or independent counsel so
engaged should be present from the beginning to end,i.e., at all stages of the interview,
counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping
the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either
continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client
undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued only until
as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he
failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions
during the lawyer's absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant
of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial investigation started.57
Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by his "coming
and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination of
the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated
when it added the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the
"vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant
behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors and which this Court
condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this vital right, which is to:
. . . curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the
"evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him." These constitutional guarantee have been made available to protect him
from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such
investigation.58
Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the investigation and to
answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, these
rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No
such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel did not cure
its constitutional defects. InPeople vs. Compil,59 this Court held:
. . . it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation
upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to
the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to
Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances,
he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all
those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing
of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already
able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has
been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial
confession. Thus inPeople v. de Jesus [213 SCRA 345 (1992)] we said thatadmissions
obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution. [Emphasis supplied.]
Moreover, appellant's policeman-escort was also present in the lawyer's office as attorney and
client discussed the voluntariness of the latter's confession. One can hardly expect the suspect, in
the face of such intimidating presence, to candidly admit that he was coerced into confessing.
As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.60
The confession is also inadmissible against appellant Leonardo Morial's co-accused, Nonelito PROS. RUIZ:
Abiñon and Edwin Morial. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.61 Q Now, how long did you stay in that pasture land?

An exception to theres inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, A Two minutes, Sir, then I went home.
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided
Q So, after pasturing your horse for two minutes, after that you went home? Now, on
that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. The exception,
your way home, do you remember what happened if any?
however, does not apply in this case since the confession was made after the alleged conspiracy
and not while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.62
A Yes, Sir.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession executed by Leonardo Morial,
the conviction of appellants is fully supported by the other pieces of evidence adduced by the Q What was that incident are you referring to?
prosecution. It is well settled that where there is independent evidence, apart from the accused's
alleged uncounseled confession, that the accused is truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a A When I went home, I passed by on the road near the house of Benjamin Morial,
conviction.63 Here, the testimony of eyewitness Gabriel Guilao certainly deserves credence. He then I heard the voice of Paula saying: "please don't kill me I am going to give you
recounted before the trial court: money."

Q Now, do you still recall Mr. Witness where you were on January 6, 1996 at more Q Now, when you said, Paula are you referring to Paula one of the victim in this
or less 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon? case?

A I can remember, sir. A Yes, Sir.

Q Where were you if you can recall? PROS. RUIZ

A I was pasturing my horse. Q Now, when you heard that voice of Paula, what did you do?

Q How many horses do you have? A I paused for a while because what I heard I found it weird.

A One mature and one young horse, the young one is not yet tied up. Q Where did you stay at that moment as what you have said that you stayed for a
while?
Q So you have two horses all in all?
A I stayed at a distance of about 8 meters from their yard.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q Were there trees in the place where you were staying at that time?
Q Do you have carabao, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
A None, Sir.
Q While staying at the distance of 8 meters away from the yard of the house of
Q Now, while you were pasturing your horse at more or less 6:00 o'clock in the Benjamin Morial, what did you observe if any?
afternoon of January 6, 1996, I withdraw that question, Your Honor.
A I saw that the old woman was slapped by Nonelito Abiñon on her neck.
COURT:
Q What else have you observed if any?
Reform.
A Then the old woman was down and when she was down, this Edwin Morial Q Now, after ten minutes, what did they do Mr. Witness?
stabbed her.
A They went out of the house.
Q Would you please tell this Honorable Court what was that weapon used in
stabbing the old woman by Edwin Morial? PROS. RUIZ:

A A small sharp pointed weapon, Sir. Q After getting out from the house, what did they do?

Q Now, have you seen Leonardo Morial in the house of Benjamin Morial? A They went home, Sir.

WITNESS: Q In what direction?

A Leonardo Morial was just outside the house of Paula Bandibas. A Towards the houses nearby.64

PROS. RUIZ: The defense has tried to discredit Guilao by harping on the latter's relationship with private
complainant, Benjamin Morial, who is the brother of Gabriel's wife,65 conveniently forgetting that
Q What was Leonardo Morial doing outside the house of Benjamin Morial? Gabriel is also related to all of the accused who are all his nephews. 66 On this score, the Court has
held that the weight of testimony of a witness is not impaired or in any way affected by his
A He was just standing thereat. relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the
witness.67 A person who was close to the victim would not callously violate his conscience by
blaming it on someone he believed innocent thereof,68 especially if the accused were his blood
Q Now, in your estimate, how long did Nonelito and Edwin were inside the house of relatives.
Benjamin Morial?
Anent the failure of Guilao to either attend to the victims or to report the matter immediately to the
WITNESS:
authorities, it should be remembered that different people react differently to an unusual event and
there is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to something so shocking or
After they have killed the old woman, two minutes . . . gruesome as murder especially if the assailant is near.69 The initial reluctance of the eyewitness to
disclose what transpired was sufficiently explained: Gabriel, who was 62 years old at the time of
ATTY. GABUCAN: the incident, was too afraid to share what he saw even to his wife,70 and while he wanted to tell
their barangay captain, the latter was in Davao at that time.71 Instead, he made up his mind to tell
The answer is not responsive, the question was how long? only Benjamin,72 the common-law husband of the victim Paula, which he promptly did upon
Benjamin's arrival at his house from Maria Clara.73 The failure of Gabriel to execute an affidavit on
what he witnessed was in fact due to the request of Benjamin who advised him not to tell anybody
PROS. RUIZ: for fear that they might all be killed,74 as the Abiñons were the most feared persons in this place.75

That is the answer of the witness. The defense, likewise, tried to show that Gabriel could not have possibly witnessed the crime
because he was in Maria Clara at that time. Patricio Abiñon, a relative of the accused Nonelito
COURT: Abiñon,76 testified that he saw Gabriel at Maria Clara at around six o'clock in the evening of 06
January 1996,77 and again at around eight o'clock in the morning the following day.78 He surmised
Continue with the answer. that Gabriel stayed in Maria Clara because it would take him about two (2) hours of hiking to travel
from Maria Clara to Cagnituan. However, it could not be discounted that Patricio was merely
making an opinion as to the travel or hiking time of Gabriel and he also admitted that he was not
WITNESS:
wearing a timepiece.79 Hence, as observed by the trial court, it was not farfetched that Gabriel was
in Maria Clara in the afternoon of 06 January 1996, hiked to Cagnituan in time to witness the
A After killing the old woman, they stayed inside the house for about ten minutes, incident and then returned to Maria Clara in the morning of 07 January 1996 to buy some fish.
Sir.
As regards the defense testimonies that Gabriel could not have possibly seen the incident from
the trail, it should be stressed here that Gabriel categorically stated that he was about eight (8)
meters from the yard of Benjamin's house when he saw Nonelito Abiñon slap Paula on the neck
after which Edwin Morial stabbed her.80 In addition, defense witnesses Patricio Abiñon and Eulogio
Padilla even contradicted each other when the former stated it would be possible to see the inside
of the house if the light was on81 while the latter stated that any person inside could not be seen
even if the light was on.82
Pending review of this case, Gabriel Guilao filed before this Court a three-page "Manifestation with
Prayer," dated 22 June 2000, which in effect, was a recantation of his testimony in the trial court.
He declared that he was "utilized" by Benjamin Morial against the three accused because the
latter had a long-standing grudge against them and was impelled by "hatred" and a "false sense of
anger." Since Benjamin could not "pinpoint" the killer of Paula and Albert Bandibas, it was decided
that the three accused be implicated to the crime "as a way of getting revenge." Gabriel's relation
to Benjamin, whose wife is the sister of Gabriel's wife Regina, accounted for Benjamin's influence
over him. In sum, Gabriel maintained that appellants Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito
Abiñon had "nothing to do with the crime charged."
The attitude of courts towards affidavits of retraction is one of distrust, if not of disapprobation,
because —
. . . affidavits of recantation can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses for
monetary consideration or through intimidation. Recanted testimony is exceedingly
unreliable for there is always the probability that it may later be repudiated. Courts thus
look with disfavor at affidavits of retractions of testimony given in open court, and are
wary or reluctant to allow a new trial based on retracted testimony. Indeed, it would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because
the witness later on changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make
a solemn trial a mockery and will place the investigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.83
Further, the defense, during the trial of this case, failed to establish any grudge or animosity
between and against the accused and Benjamin Morial, as well as against the accused and
Gabriel Guilao. In fact, when Edwin's father died, Benjamin accommodated Edwin and his mother
in his nipa house "kamalig" for more than two (2) years.84Nonelito Abiñon also testified that he
could not recall having personal differences with Benjamin.85
The accused have no other excuse other than alibi. Interestingly, they all testified that they were in
their respective homes at the time of the incident. Edwin Morial was sleeping, 86 Leonardo Morial
was cooking,87 while Nonelito Abiñon was at home, not doing anything.88 In a number of cases, the
Court has ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and it is practically worthless in the face of positive identification of the accused. 89 The
Court noted that none of the accused even presented any of their supposed home companions to
prove that they were at home when the killings took place. In addition, it was not established that it
would have been physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.90 The house of Edwin Morial was about two hundred (200) meters from the house of
Benjamin,91 the house of Leonardo Morial only about sixty (60) meters away,92 while the house of
Nonelito Abiñon was about seven hundred (700) meters from the house of Benjamin and he could
negotiate the distance in about ten (10) minutes.93Equally unnatural were the respective reactions
of the accused when the bodies of Paula and Albert were discovered. Leonardo Morial went home
after seeing the body of Paula,94 Edwin Morial looked at the body of Paula for five (5) minutes after
which he went home,95 while Nonelito Abiñon left the house of Benjamin while the others who went
there upon hearing the shouts of Benjamin were still searching for the body of Albert. 96 The
prosecution was also able to establish that the three accused were in one table during the benefit
dance which transpired on the eve of the incident,97 contrary to statements of Edwin Morial and
Nonelito Abiñon.
The trial court correctly ruled when it found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide. It was
established that all the elements of the crime were present;i.e., (1) the taking of personal property
perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property taken belongs
to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain oranimus lucrandi; and (4) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed.98
In this case, Benjamin, upon arrival at his house, found that their room was in disarray, the clothes
were scattered and the box where they kept their money was already turned upside down.99 The
amount of P11,000.00 contained in the box was already missing, 100 Paula was already
lifeless101 and Albert was nowhere to be found.102
The trial court also correctly ruled that the accused conspired to commit the crime. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony,
and decide to commit it.103 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after
the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.104 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 105 To exempt himself from
criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the unlawful plan to commit the felony.106
In this case, it was established that after the killing of Paula, the accused even stayed inside the
house for about ten (10) minutes,107 presumably to look for the hidden money. After about ten (10)
minutes, they left the house of Benjamin and went home. 108 Clearly, Paula and Albert were already
dead or dying but not one of the accused lifted a finger to show any pity or remorse. Hence, they
should all be made liable for the crime.
Dwelling was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because of the sanctity that
the law accords to the privacy of the human abode.109 The home is considered a sacred place to
its owners, and one who goes to another house to slander or hurt him, or do him wrong, more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.110 However, evident premeditation is inherent in
robbery and should not have been considered against the accused. 111 Treachery could only be
appreciated in crimes against persons,112 the same way with disregard of respect due to sex and
age which can be considered only in cases of crimes against persons and honor. 113
Nevertheless, accused Edwin Morial should still be spared the death penalty. The records would
show that he was a minor at the time of the execution of the crime. 114 InPeople vs.
Villagracia,115 the Court ruled:
 In this case, the trial court failed to consider the age of appellant Nixon Ledesma when
the crime was committed. At the time he testified on May 17, 1989, he stated that he was
only 15 years old (TSN, May 17, 1989, p. 31). No contradictory evidence was presented
by the prosecution. So, when the crime was committed on September 23, 1987, or more
than a year before he was presented as a witness, Nixon Ledesma was less than 15
years old.
InPeople vs. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754 [1990], we held that the accused has the burden of
proof that he was minor at the time of the commission of the crime. However, inPeople v.
Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 [1991], we upheld appellants' claim that he was 17 years old at the
time the crime was committed even without any proof to corroborate his testimony.
Considering that the prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence, we applied to
appellant therein the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under the second
paragraph of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Lugto appears to be an aberration from the long line of decisions antedating it. From U.S.
v. Bergantino, 3 Phil. 118 [1903] to People v. Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 [1986], we have
consistently ruled that, although the accused did not offer any evidence to support his
claim of minority, this fact will remain as such, until disproved by the prosecution (See
also U.S. v. Barbicho, 13 Phil. 616 [1909]; U.S. vs. Agadas, 36 Phil. 247 [1917]; People v.
Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 [1986]; People v. Bernalde, 139 SCRA 426 [1986]).
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death,
when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
As the aggravating circumstance of dwelling attended the commission thereof, the greater
penalty,i.e., death, shall be imposed116 upon appellants Nonelito Abiñon and Leonardo Morial.
Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with
Homicide," with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection, while Edwin Morial, on
account of his minority, is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years
and one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum; to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day ofreclusion temporal as maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced, jointly and severally,
to:
(1) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
death indemnity;
(2) indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
death indemnity;
(3) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos for each death as moral damages;
(4) indemnify Benjamin Morial in the amount of Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Six
(P20,546.00) pesos as actual damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses;
(5) restitute Benjamin Morial the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos representing
the stolen money.

However, appellant Edwin Morial, who was over 15 but under 18 years of age at the time of the Costs against accused-appellants.
commission of the crime, is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Accordingly, the penalty next lower,117i.e.,reclusion temporal, shall be imposed upon him in its In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
maximum period,118 there being one aggravating circumstance (dwelling). Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power.
Said appellant is further entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 119 Under
Section 1 thereof, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the SO ORDERED.
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be Davide, C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena,
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the Code for the offense. Thus, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
appellant Edwin Morial is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one Quisumbing, J ., out of town on O.B.
(1) day ofprision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day Gutierrez, J ., is on leave.
ofreclusion temporalas maximum.

As regards the civil liability of appellants, the award of P60,000.00 to the heirs of each victim as
moral damages is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 each, in conformity with recent jurisprudence.120

Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159659 October 12, 2006
RUBEN S. SIA and JOSEPHINE SIA, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and TERESITA LEE, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners urge this Court to
nullify and set aside the April 25, 2003 Decision,1 and the July 29, 2003 Resolution,2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 68057.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 27 with three counts3 of violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957,
otherwise known as The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree.
On October 15, 2001, the petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash alleging that (1) the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) the City Prosecutors' Office of
Naga City has no authority to file the informations.
On October 18, 2001, the trial court denied the motion holding that it had jurisdiction over the
case. It also scheduled an arraignment on October 29, 2001. On October 23, 2001, the petitioners
filed a Motion to Resolve the Other Ground Raised in the Motion to Quash, i.e., whether the city
prosecutor had the authority to file the informations. On October 24, 2001, the trial court denied
the motion stating that the city prosecutor was authorized to file the informations. Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Arraignment was then reset to November 21,
2001. Petitioners' Motion for Postponement of their arraignment was also denied. On November
21, 2001, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio for petitioner Ruben S. Sia and proceeded
with the arraignment.
Before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.4 The petitioners claimed that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged and the city prosecutor had no authority to
file the informations; that only the enforcement officers under Executive Order No. 71 5 are
authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to subdivisions. Moreover, they asserted that
petitioner Ruben S. Sia was denied his right to counsel when the trial court forced him to enter a
plea with only a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the assailed orders AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court for the following reasons: (1) the
informations stated that petitioners violated Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 by failing to register with
the Register of Deeds of Naga City, the Contracts to Sell they executed in favor of respondent
Teresita Lee over several subdivision lots she purchased; (2) the acts complained of were within
the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; and (3) the penalty provided by law for the violation, i.e.,
imprisonment of not more than ten years, is within the trial court's jurisdiction. Similarly, the
appellate court sustained the city prosecutor's authority to file the informations conformably with
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.7 Finally, it ruled that the trial court did not transgress
petitioner Ruben S. Sia's right to counsel since the preference in the choice of counsel expressed
in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution8 does not necessarily mean that such choice by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
lawyers from handling the defense.
Hence, this petition. The petitioners enumerate the grounds of their appeal, as follows:
[a] x x x the alleged act or omission complained of and charged in the questioned
Informations [do not] constitute a violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 otherwise
known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree[.]
[b] x x x the City Prosecutors have [no] power or authority to institute and prosecute the
present case for alleged violation of the provisions of P.D. 957 even without a prior
determination thereof by the Enforcement Officers of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)[.]
[c] x x x the herein petitioner Ruben Sia was deprived of his [c]onstitutional right to due
process and to counsel considering that he was assisted only by a counsel de
oficio during his arraignment despite his insistence to be assisted by their newly hired
counsel de parte[.]9
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Did the charges in the informations constitute violations of P.D.
No. 957? (2) Does the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City have authority to file the informations?
and (3) Was petitioner Ruben S. Sia deprived of his right to counsel when only a counsel de
oficio assisted him during his arraignment?
After considering the submission of the parties, we find the present petition without merit.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that P.D. No. 957 is applicable only to residential subdivision
and condominium projects and not to commercial subdivision projects as in this case, and that the
property involved had been classified commercial and industrial in City Ordinance No. 93-
04110 and Resolution No. 93-26111 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City. Furthermore,
petitioners add, the documents required to be registered with the Register of Deeds under Section
17 of P.D. No. 957, refer to lands that have been converted into a subdivision project for
residential purposes.
Respondent Lee maintains that petitioners' Development Permit (DP No. 92-0415) showed that
the project was classified as socialized housing while the Zoning Administrator's Certification
dated May 14, 1992, indicated that the project was situated in a residential zone in accordance
with the Zoning Ordinance of Naga City. Thus, petitioners' subdivision is residential. She also
asserts that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 957, the registration of the subdivision plan by the owner
of a parcel of land who caused its conversion into a subdivision is different from the subsequent
registration of the contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar instruments required by the
same provision. Hence, according to respondent, the petitioners are required to register the
Contracts to Sell in her favor.
Pertinent here is Section 2 of P.D. No. 957, that defines a subdivision project as "a tract or a
parcel of land registered under Act No. 496 which is partitioned primarily for residential purposes
into individual lots with or without improvements thereon, and offered to the public for sale, in cash
or in installment terms. It shall include all residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas,
as well as open spaces and other community and public areas in the project."
Observe that the provision does not confine the meaning of "subdivision project" to parcels of land
classified as residential, contrary to what petitioners restrictively propose. A subdivision project
also includes parcels of land classified as commercial. Indeed, the crucial requirement is that the
subdivision project is partitioned primarily for residential purposes, even if it is situated in a
commercial district.
In this case, the subdivision project was intended primarily for residential purposes. No less than
petitioners' Development Permit showed that the project was for socialized housing. Although the
location of the subdivision was classified as a commercial district, the subdivision project
continued to be for residential purposes and was not removed from the ambit of P.D. No. 957.
We have examined Sections 4 and 17 of P.D. No. 957, and found petitioners' interpretation
thereof, flawed. We quote these sections for clarity:
SEC. 4. Registration of Projects. - The registered owner of a parcel of land who wishes to
convert the same into a subdivision project shall submit his subdivision plan to the
Authority which shall act upon and approve the same, upon a finding that the plan
complies with the Subdivision Standards and Regulations enforceable at the time the plan
is submitted. The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a plan for a
condominium project except that, in addition, said Authority shall act upon and approve
the plan with respect to the building or buildings included in the condominium project in
accordance with the National Building Code (R.A. No. 6541).
The subdivision plan, as so approved, shall then be submitted to the Director of Lands for
approval in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 44 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended by R.A. No. 440): Provided, that in case of
complex subdivision plans, court approval shall no longer be required. The condominium
plan as likewise so approved, shall be submitted to the Register of Deeds of the province
or city in which the property lies and the same shall be acted upon subject to the
conditions and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 4 of the
Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726).
xxxx
SEC. 17. Registration. - All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar instruments
relative to the sale or conveyance of the subdivision lots and condominium units, whether
or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated.
Whenever a subdivision plan duly approved in accordance with Section 4 hereof, together
with the corresponding owner's duplicate certificate of title, is presented to the Register of
Deeds for registration, the Register of Deeds shall register the same in accordance with
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however, that if there
is a street, passageway or required open space delineated on a complex subdivision plan
hereafter approved and as defined in this Decree, the Register of Deeds shall annotate
on the new certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space, a
memorandum to the effect that except by way of donation in favor of a city or municipality,
no portion of any street, passageway, or open space so delineated on the plan shall be
closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without the requisite approval as
provided under Section 22 of this Decree.
Simply stated, P.D. No. 957 provides that when a registered owner of a parcel of land wishes to
convert the same into a subdivision project, he must register the subdivision plan with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (Section 4). Should he decide to sell the lots therein, he
must also register the subdivision project with the HLURB and the subdivision plan with the
Register of Deeds (Section 17, paragraph 2). Thereafter, a registration certificate is issued to the
subdivision owner and he may then apply for a License to Sell the lots in the subdivision project.
Whenever a lot is subsequently sold, the subdivision owner is required to register the contract to
sell, deed of sale and/or other similar instrument with the Register of Deeds (Section 17,
paragraph 1).
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners are required to register the Contracts to Sell in favor
of respondent Lee, and their failure to do so is a violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957.
On the second issue, does the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City have authority to file the
informations?
Section 3 of E.O. No. 71 provides that:
SEC. 3. – Without prejudice to the Board's overall monitoring, enforcement and visitorial
powers, local chief executives shall designate appropriate local officials who meet or
possess the qualifications, standards and criteria set by the HLURB as enforcement
officers who shall have full power to monitor, investigate and enforce compliance
with these provisions of national laws and standards whose implementation have
been devolved to the local government in accordance with this Order.
 Relative to the remaining provisions of the said laws, said officials shall, upon request of
local chief executive concerned, be authorized by the Board to initiate preliminary
monitoring and investigative activities, and issue initial notices to enforce compliance with
the Board's mandates, orders and decisions. In all such cases, the enforcement officer
shall endorse the records of the case, together with his actions thereon to the Board for
its final disposition and further enforcement actions.
In the exercise of his responsibilities under this Order, the said enforcement officer shall
be under the functional supervision of HLURB, which shall promulgate standard operating
procedures, policy guidelines and instructions for the guidance of said officials and call
their attention to effect such remedial measures as may be necessary. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, the enforcement officers of local government units shall only have full power to monitor,
investigate and enforce compliance with the provisions of national laws and standards whose
implementation have been devolved to the local government in accordance with E.O. No. 71.
Section 1 outlines which functions have been devolved:
(a) Approval of preliminary as well as final subdivision schemes and development plans of
all subdivisions, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes of the public
and private sectors, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957 as amended and
its implementing standards, rules and regulations concerning approval of subdivision
plans;
(b) Approval of preliminary and final subdivision schemes and development plans of all
economic and socialized housing projects as well as individual or group building and
occupancy permits covered by BP 220 and its implementing standards, rules and
regulations;
(c) Evaluation and resolution of opposition against the issuance of development permits
for any of the said projects, in accordance with the said laws and the Rules of Procedure
promulgated by HLURB incident thereto;
(d) Monitoring the nature and progress of land development of projects it has approved,
as well as housing construction in the case of house and lot packages, to ensure their
faithfulness to the approved plans and specifications thereof, and, imposition of
appropriate measures to enforce compliance therewith.
In the exercise of such responsibilities, the city or municipality concerned shall be guided
by the work program approved by the Board upon evaluation of the developers' financial,
technical and administrative capabilities;
Moreover, the city or municipality concerned may call on the Board for assistance in the
imposition of administrative sanctions and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the
institution of the criminal proceedings against violators;
(e) Assessment and collection of fees incident to the foregoing.
Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included in the
foregoing functions. Hence, it follows logically that it remained with the City Prosecutors' Office of
Naga City.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
It cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to
Dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant.12 The informations rest the cause of action on the petitioners' failure to register the
Contracts to Sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957. The penalty imposable is a fine of
not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years. 13Once
again, clearly, the offense charged is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
On the third issue, was Ruben S. Sia denied his right to counsel when the trial court forced him to
enter a plea with only a counsel de oficio?
We agree with herein respondent Lee when she said that petitioners were given ample time by the
trial court to get a counsel of their choice, but did not. Through the course of the proceedings, the
petitioners filed several motions. In its Orders dated November 21, 2001,14 the trial court noted
that although the informations were filed on August 7, 2000, the petitioners have not yet been
arraigned as of that day. The delay could no longer be countenanced.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution assuring an accused of counsel of his choice
pertains specifically to a person under investigation. Even if we were to extend the choice of a
counsel to an accused in a criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused getting a lawyer of his
preference cannot be so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer
exclusively to the predilection of the accused.15 In Amion v. Chiongson this Court stated:
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another,
is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter.16
In our view, petitioners' dilatory tactics should no longer be allowed to trump the progress of the
judicial process.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. SP No. 68057 dated April 25, 2003 and July 29, 2003, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.


FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 113684 January 25, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO GALLARDO y GANDER, ALFREDO COLUMNA y CORREA, and JESSIE MICATE
y ORTEZA, *accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
The Constitution enumerates the basic rights of a person under investigation.
Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.1
xxx xxx xxx
The case before the Court is an appeal by accused-appellants from the decision2 of the trial court
finding them guilty of murder for the treacherous killing of Edmundo Orizal and sentencing each of
them to reclusion perpetua and to pay in solidum the heirs of Edmundo Orizal in the sum of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and P150,000.00 as moral damages.
On November 7, 1991, on the basis of the sworn confessions of the accused, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan an information
charging the accused with murder, committed as follows:
That on or about July 28, 1991, in the municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Armando Gallardo y
Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa and Jessie Micate, armed with guns, confederating
and conspiring together and helping one another with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Edmundo Orizal, inflicting upon him several gunshot
wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, November 7, 1991.
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO A. PULIDO, NPS III
Provincial Prosecutor3
On December 2, 1991, all three accused entered a plea of not guilty.4 Trial ensued.
The prosecution's evidence established the following facts:
On July 28, 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of Ronnie
Balao in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In an autopsy performed by Dr. Edmundo Borja,
Tuguegarao Municipal Health Officer, the victim was found to have sustained seven (7) gunshot
wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left
arm and back.5
Investigation by the Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the murder of Edmundo
Orizal as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa, and Jessie Micate y Orteza.
The police received information that the suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan Police
Station because of other criminal charges. So elements of the Tuguegarao police went to the
Camalaniugan Police Station in August 1991 to fetch the suspects. Only Armando Gallardo and
Alfredo Columna alias Fermin were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police Station.
The two suspects Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police
Department. On August 18, 1991, they were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro
Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed
Edmundo Orizal.
During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and
during the taking of the statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was
present. She administered the oath on the jurat of the statements. Accused-appellants signed their
statements admitting the killing of Edmundo Orizal.
According to accused-appellants, they planned and executed the killing of Edmundo Orizal, as
follows:
At about 10:00 in the morning of July 26, 1991, Pat. Dennis Molina, accused-appellants Armando
Gallardo and Alfredo Columna, together with Jessie Micate and Asoy (Nelson) Hidalgo, met at the
house of Alfredo Columna in Ziminilla (Camalaniugan, Cagayan). Pat. Molina conveyed to the
group the desire of Congressman Domingo Tuzon that Edmundo Orizal be killed because the
latter was planning to ambush him and grab his land. Edmundo Orizal was a strong campaigner
and a bodyguard of retired Gen. Prospero Olivas, who was running for mayor of Camalaniugan
(against the congressman's re-electionist wife). Pat. Molina told the group that if they accepted the
job and succeeded in their mission, Congressman Tuzon would work for their acquittal in all their
criminal cases, and would give cash rewards.
The accused-appellants accepted the job and the following day, on July 27, 1991, they, together
with Jessie Micate, Asoy Hidalgo and Pat. Molina, set out to accomplish their mission. Pat. Molina
accompanied them to Dugo, Camalaniugan at Where Else Beauty Salon where Pat. Molina
showed them their weapons: a .38 cal. and .45 cal. handguns and a folded carbine, placed inside
a box.
At around 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, in the house of Dadoy Micate, Pat. Molina gave
the .38 cal. revolver to Armando Gallardo, the .45 cal. pistol to Alfredo Columna, and the folded
carbine to Jessie Micate. Then, Pat. Molina instructed the three accused to look for Edmundo
Orizal and kill him.
The three boarded a tricycle and proceeded to Edmundo Orizals' boarding house at Caritan,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Edmundo was not there. He was at that time in the house of Aping in
Lecaros Street, Centro, Tuguegarao. The three went to that place. At the place of Aping, accused
Gallardo engaged Edmundo in a conversation while all of them drank San Miguel beer. In the
course of their conversation, and probably to get the trust of Edmundo Orizal, accused Gallardo
told him that he had already killed Inyong Orteza, whom Edmundo Orizal wanted dead.
At around 5:00 p.m., the group moved over to the rest house of Ronnie Balao in Balzain,
Tuguegarao. Edmundo ordered Armando Gallardo to get his M-14 armalite rifle from Ronnie
Balao. However, Ronnie Balao did not give the firearm, but went with Armando to the rest house
to talk to Edmundo. After talking to Edmundo and Armando, Ronnie Balao went home.
Meanwhile, Edmundo Orizal, the two accused-appellants and Jessie Micate were conversing.
Edmundo was convincing accused-appellants and Jessie Micate to join him as bodyguards of
Gen. Olivas during the election campaign. At this point, Jessie Micate leveled his carbine at
Edmundo and successively fired at him. Alfredo Columna drew his .45 cal. Pistol and shot
Edmundo Orizal five times. This was followed by Armando Gallardo who shot Edmundo once with
his .38 cal. revolver. The three accused fled, and went to the house of Dadoy Micate in Caggay
(Tuguegarao, Cagayan), where Pat. Molina was waiting for them. They informed Pat. Molina that
the mission was accomplished.
Early the next morning, July 28, 1991, the three accused and Pat. Molina boarded a Manny Trans
bus and proceeded to Camalaniugan. They stopped at Dugo, Camalaniugan and proceeded to the
house of Congressman Tuzon to report the killing.
Congressman Tuzon was out of his house attending the town fiesta of Buguey (Cagayan). When
he arrived, Pat. Molina informed him that Edmundo Orizal is dead. Congressman Tuzon was very
happy and promised them that he would work for their acquittal in their pending cases and after
confirming the death of Orizal he would give them their cash rewards.6
Nelson Hidalgo, a friend of Manuel Columna, Jr., testified that on July 26, 1991 at around 4:30 in
the afternoon at the house of Manuel Columna, Jr., he was asked by the accused to join them in
their mission to kill Edmundo Orizal.
In that meeting, Nelson Hidalgo resolved to join the group, but while on his way home from the
meeting, he met his bosom friend Reynald Micate. He told the latter about their plan to kill
Edmundo Orizal. Reynald Micate advised him not to participate in the killing for it would just add to
his other criminal cases. Nelson Hidalgo heeded the advice of his bosom friend. Consequently,
realizing that because of his knowledge of the plan to kill Edmundo Orizal, he would be a target for
elimination so that the plan would not be revealed to anyone, he left Camalaniugan, and went to
Buguey, then Aparri and finally, to Manila. It was only after three months that he returned to
Camalaniugan and learned that Edmundo Orizal was killed.
On August 18, 1993, accused on their part filed with the trial court a demurrer to evidence, arguing
that the prosecution failed to establish that the signed statements of the accused were procured in
violation of Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. On September 10, 1993, the trial court
denied the demurrer and stated that the court would want to know controverting evidence that the
defense may give to intelligently decide the issues of the case.
Accused Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna testified in their defense. They gave a common
version. In the words of the trial court, here is what they alleged:
On August 18, 1991, elements of the Tuguegarao Police Station went to Camalaniugan to
fetch accused Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna who were detained at the
Camalaniugan Municipal Jail in connection with other criminal cases. These two accused
were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Station to be questioned on the killing of
Edmundo Orizal.
Arriving in Tuguegarao the same day, Investigator Isidro Marco investigated said accused
and took their statements at the Tuguegarao Police Station. The investigator, however,
did not inform them of their constitutional rights.
After the respective statements had been typewritten, investigator Marcos neither read to
nor allowed them to read the contents of their alleged statements. The investigator just
told them to sign their so-called statements. Accused Gallardo signed the confessional
statement because he was harmed by Marcos while accused Alfredo Columna said that
he signed said document because he was afraid he might be harmed.7
On November 29, 1993, the trial court rendered decision finding accused Armando
Gallardo y Gander and Alfredo Columna y Correa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery and sentencing
each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay in solidum the heirs of Edmundo Orizal
P50,000.00 as the mandatory indemnity for death and P150,000.00 as moral damages.
The court acquitted accused Jessie Micate y Ortega for lack of evidence.8
Hence, this appeal.
Accused-appellants Armando Gallardo y Gander and Alfredo Columna y Correa impute the
following errors to the trial court:
1. In admitting their extra-judicial confessions in evidence against them; and
2. In finding that their guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.9
The appeal has no merit. The extra-judicial confessions of the accused were given after they were
completely and clearly apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge
administered their oath. In his testimony, Atty. Rolando Velasco stated:
Q. After you were introduced to the two suspects what happened?
 A. I interrogated first Gallardo and I told him whether he can understand tagalog and he
said he can understand and I told him if he is willing to voluntarily give his statement to
the police and he said "yes", and I said he has the right to give his statement and if he is
going to give his statement his statement can be used against him in court and if he
wants to get the services of a lawyer of his own choice or if he wants me to assist him and
he readily accepted.
The same was done with accused Alfredo Columna.
Q. How did you represent them in the investigation?
A. I was present and I made sure that there was no force and intimidation made on the
person of these two suspects by the police and the police who asked questions in Ilokano
and the answer was in Ilocano by the suspects.
Q. In so representing them in that investigation were you requested to sign the
document?
A. I voluntarily signed, sir.10
Judge Aquino of the Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, asked Atty. Velasco several
question particularly on the point of how the accused-appellants were informed of their
Constitutional rights. He stated:
Q. When you conferred with the accused before taking of their sworn statement you
stated that you asked them whether they were forced or intimidated in making the
statement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you happen to know the status of the accused at the time their statements were
taken whether they are detention prisoners or not?
A. There was no warrant of arrest issued they were just apprehended as suspects.
Q. Please tell the court, did they complain to you about any harassment of any kind by the
police at the time of their investigation?
A. None, your honor.
Q. You said you accompanied them, you were present when the oath was administered
by Judge Pauig?
A. Yes, the following day I was also called by the police to be present when the accused
took their oath before Judge Pauig.
Q. You said you advised the accused before taking their sworn statement of their
constitutional rights in Tagalog, why do you say that they understand Tagalog?
A. Because they were answering in Tagalog, also, sir.
Q. How was their Tagalog?
A. Good Tagalog, sir.
Q. Will you please tell in Tagalog the information the constitutional right of the accused?
A. I told them "May karapatan kayong hindi magbigay ng salaysay sa pulis, may
karapatan kayong magkaroon ng abogado na sarili ninyo kung magbigay kayo."
We have held that "while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators,
the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer.11
In the case at bar, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused
themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their
lawyer. They were asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel
during the investigation. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused
during custodial investigation be previously known to them. The Constitution provides that the
counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused and protect
their Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Also, we have held that "to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions
being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.12
We are, therefore, convinced that Atty. Velasco acted properly in accordance with the dictates of
the Constitution and informed the accused of their Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the
accused and made sure that the statements given by the accused were voluntary on their part,
and that no force or intimidation was used by the investigating officers to extract a confession from
them.
Aside from Atty. Velasco, Judge Vilma Pauig also testified that when she administered the oath to
the accused-appellants, she asked them whether they understood the contents of their statements
and whether they were forced by the police investigators to make such statements. Accused-
appellants answered in the negative. From the foregoing, it can therefore be established that
accused-appellants were properly apprised of their rights and there was no violation of their Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Department of
Constitutional rights.13 Justice, Manila, for inquiry into the involvement of other persons in the crime.

Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be With costs.
admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent SO ORDERED.
counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. 14 All these
requirements were complied with.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

It would have been different if the accused were merely asked if they were waiving their
Constitutional rights without any explanation from the assisting counsel. In this case, Atty. Velasco
asked the accused if they were aware of their rights and the lawyer informed them of their rights
and asked them if they were giving their statements willingly after being informed of their rights.
This is in compliance with the constitutional guarantee of the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation.

There is no merit to the contention that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of prosecution witness Nelson Hidalgo remains
uncontroverted. The defense was unable to produce any evidence to prove that Nelson Hidalgo
was biased and not credible.

Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that "the Court will not interfere with the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses absent any indication or showing that the trial court
overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion."15

Consequently, the trial court correctly found accused-appellants Alfredo Columna y Gander and
Armando Gallardo y Correa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the treacherous murder of
Edmundo Orizal.

We are however concerned with the statements of the accused that it was Congressman Tuzon
who masterminded the killing of Edmundo Orizal. The order of inquest Judge Dominador L. Garcia
dropping Congressman Tuzon and Pat. Molina from the criminal complaint for the reason that the
confessions of the accused Gallardo and Columna were inadmissible against them under the res
inter alios acta rule do not persuade us that former Congressman Tuzon and Pat. Molina were not
liable as co-principals in the crime committed.1âwphi1.nêt

Concededly, the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Gallardo and Columna are not
admissible against Congressman Tuzon and Pat. Molina. However, the interlocking confessions of
the accused are confirmatory evidence of the possible involvement of former Congressman Tuzon
and Pat. Molina in the crime.16

Consequently, we refer the case to the Department of Justice for investigation of the involvement
of former Congressman Tuzon and Pat. Molina in the killing of Edmundo Orizal.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. However, the award of
moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133026 February 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin
alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once
shared.1âwphi1.nêt
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened Gerry
Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis and
stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned
by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded
momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown
Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at
Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he
collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical
attention. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated
the heart."1
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward
Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However,
as both accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting
the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo
and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken
into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was
fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of
the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused
Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing
Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According
to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is
Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the
boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they
separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through the testimony of
Clara Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis Aquino standing outside the Soundlab
Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when Galgarin suddenly approached them and
without any prior warning stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover
who harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized Edward and Gerry
because the street was sufficiently lighted.2
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door neighbor of Dennis,
who testified that a little past six o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Gerry Galgarin together
with a companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to
the Soundlab Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she heard a
Instinctively, she instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for cover while she anxiously
waited for her seven (7)-year old daughter Josephine who was out of the house for an errand for
her. Soon enough she heard Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying because she said
her Kuya Dennis had been shot and stabbed.3
Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry Galgarin stab
her Kuya Dennisand she could remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose.4
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of
Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife
Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until the 16th of October when
she was discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.5
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported the alibi of accused-
appellant. However, she admitted that when she registered the child's birth on 13 December 1993
or more than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the civil registrar that the child's father
was "unknown."6 His story was also confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-
workers at the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-appellant was
fetched by a neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon of 14 October with the news that
his wife was having labor pains.7
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it
was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped
confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in
Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.8
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police
officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his
confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of
hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers' assertion that it was even
accused-appellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national
television for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support his
allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by treachery9 and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages. The case against his
nephew and co-accused Edward Endino remained in the archives without prejudice to its
reinstatement as soon as he could be arrested.10
In his Appellant's Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi and admitting his
videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16 October 1991
as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the 14th of that month, is not
persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of Cornelio Tejero Jr.,11 Philippine Airlines
Load Controller of the Puerto Princesa City, that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on
their passenger manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be
relied upon inasmuch as he himself admitted that they could not be sure of their passengers' real
identities. The testimonies of accused-appellant's co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14
October 1991 did not fortify his defense either since these witnesses did not categorically state
that they saw him in Antipolo in the evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one
who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leong's identification
of accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous manner. Her confidence as
to the attacker's identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having a mole below his
nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to implicate accused-
appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her
naming of accused-appellant as her boyfriend's assailant was not done out of spite, but was
impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellant's guilt, probably with intense incriminating effect, were his
immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak 12 revealing a guilty conscience,
hence, his persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession
does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men
in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been
forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all
likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision 13 -
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed
Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that
the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept
the truth of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, 14 it is prudent that
trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond
the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would
be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system.1âwphi1.nêt
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases
such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession
was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect
and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is
admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be
vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents itself
is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery.
Doubtless, the crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while he
was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the
accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the
slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the
killing to murder.15
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant GERRY GALGARIN
alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to compensate the decedent's heirs
P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and mental anguish. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
E N B AN C c ri me o f A rs o n wi t h Mu l t i p l e Ho mi c i d e o r A rs o n r e s u l t i n g t o t h e d e a t h o f s i x (6 )
people, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of death.
P E OP LE O F T HE P H I LI P P I N E S , G. R. N o. 1 7 0 4 7 0
Appellee,
P re s e n t :
Th e F a c t s
P A N GA N I B A N , C . J . ,
P UN O,
QU I S U M B I N G,
Y NA RE S -S A N TI A G O, A s s u m m a ri ze d [ 3 ] b y t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a l s , t h e a n t e c e d e n t f a c t s a r e a s
S A ND OV A L -G U TI E RRE Z,
CA RP I O, f o l l o ws :
A US T RI A - M A R T I NE Z ,
- v e rs u s - CO R ON A ,
Fr o m t h e p e rs o n a l a c c o u n t o f Re mi g i o B e rn a r d o , t h e
CA RP I O M O RA L E S ,
B a r a n g a y Ch a i r m a n i n t h e a re a , a s w e l l a s t h e p e rs o n a l a c c o u n t
CA L L E J O , S R. ,
o f t h e p e d i c a b d ri ve r n a me d Ro l a n d o Gr u t a , i t wa s a t a ro u n d 4 : 4 5
A ZC UN A ,
a . m. o n J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 w h e n Re m i g i o B e rn a rd o a n d h i s t a n o d s
TI NG A ,
s a w t h e a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E D NA , o n e h i r e d a s a h o u s e m a i d b y
CHI C O- NA ZA R I O,
R o b e r t o S e p a ra , S r. , w i t h h e r h e a d t u rn i n g i n d i f f e re n t d i re c t i o n s ,
GA RCI A , a n d
h u r ri e d l y l e a vi n g t h e h o u s e o f h e r e mp l o y e r a t No . 1 7 2 M o d e rn a
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
S t r e e t , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a . S h e wa s s e e n t o h a v e b o a rd e d a
p e d i c a b wh i c h w a s d ri v e n b y a p e rs o n l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s Ro l a n d o
E D N A M AL N G AN y M A Y O, P ro m u l g a t e d :
G ru t a . S h e wa s h e a rd b y t h e p e d i c a b d ri v e r t o h a ve i n s t r u c t e d
Appellant.
t h a t s h e b e b ro u g h t t o Ni p a S t re e t , b u t u p o n h e r a rri v a l t h e re , s h e
S e p t e mb e r 2 6 , 2 0 0 6
c h a n g e d h e r mi n d a n d a s k e d t h a t s h e b e b r o u g h t i n s t e a d
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
t o B a l a s a n S t r e e t wh e r e s h e f i n a l l y a l i g h t e d , a f t e r p a yi n g f o r h e r
f a re .

Th i rt y mi n u t e s l a t e r , a t a ro u n d 5 : 1 5 a . m . B a r a n g a y
D E C I S I O N Ch a i r m a n B e rn a rd o s g r o u p l a t e r d i s c o ve re d t h a t a f i re g u t t e d t h e
h o u s e o f t h e e mp l o ye r o f t h e h o u s e m a i d . B a r a n g a y C h a i r ma n
B e r n a rd o a n d h i s t a n o d s re s p o n d e d t o t h e f i re u p o n h e a ri n g
C H I C O- N AZ AR I O , J . : s h o u t s f r o m t h e r e s i d e n t s a n d t h e re a f t e r , f i re m e n f r o m t h e Fi re
Di s t ri c t 1 -N CR a r ri v e d a t t h e f i r e s c e n e t o c o n t a i n t h e f i re .

W h e n B a ra n g a y Ch a i r ma n B e rn a rd o re t u r n e d t o t h e
Th e C a s e
B a r a n g a y H a l l , h e re c e i ve d a r e p o rt f ro m p e d i c a b d ri ve r Ro l a n d o
G ru t a , wh o wa s a l s o a t a n o d , t h a t s h o r t l y b e f o re t h e o c c u r re n c e
o f t h e f i re , h e s a w a wo m a n ( t h e h o u s e ma i d ) c o mi n g o u t o f t h e
Fo r r e vi e w i s t h e D e c i s i o n [ 1 ] o f t h e Co u rt o f A p p e a l s i n CA - G. R. CR HC h o u s e a t N o . 1 7 2 Mo d e rn a S t re e t , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a a n d h e
N o . 0 1 1 3 9 p ro m u l g a t e d o n 2 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , a f f i rmi n g wi t h m o d i f i c a t i o n re c e i v e d a c a l l f ro m h i s wi f e t e l l i n g h i m o f a wo m a n (t h e s a m e
h o u s e m a i d ) wh o wa s a c t i n g s t r a n g e l y a n d s u s p i c i o u s l y o n
t h e J u d g m e n t [ 2 ] o f t h e R e g i o n a l T ri a l C o u rt ( RT C) o f M a n i l a , B ra n c h 4 1 , i n B a l a s a n S t re e t . B a ra n g a y Ch a i r m a n B e rn a r d o , Ro l a n d o Gr u t a a n d
t h e o t h e r t a n o d s p ro c e e d e d t o B a l a s a n S t re e t a n d f o u n d t h e
C ri mi n a l Ca s e No. 0 1 -1 8 8 4 2 4 p ro m u l g a t e d on 13 Oc t o b e r 2003, finding wo m a n wh o w a s l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t . A f t e r
a p p e l l a n t E d n a Ma l n g a n y M a yo (E d n a ) g u i l t y b e yo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f t h e Ro l a n d o G ru t a p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e wo m a n a s t h e s a m e
p e rs o n wh o l e f t No . 1 7 2 Mo d e r n a S t re e t , B a l u t , T o n d o , Ma n i l a ,
B a r a n g a y C h a i r ma n B e rn a r d o a n d h i s t a n o d s a p p re h e n d e d h e r
a n d b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e B a ra n g a y Ha l l f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . A t t h e
B a r a n g a y H a l l , M e rc e d i t a Me n d o z a , n e i g h b o r o f Ro b e r t o S e p a ra ,
S r. a n d wh o s e h o u s e w a s a l s o b u rn e d , i d e n t i f i e d t h e wo m a n a s
a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E D N A w h o w a s t h e h o u s e ma i d o f Ro b e rt o
S e p a ra , S r . U p o n i n s p e c t i o n , a d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r wa s f o u n d
i n s i d e a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E D N A s b a g . Th e re a f t e r, a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t E D N A c o n f e s s e d t o B a ra n g a y C h a i r m a n B e rn a r d o i n t h e
p re s e n c e o f mu l t i t u d e s o f a n g r y r e s i d e n t s o u t s i d e t h e B a ra n g a y
Ha l l t h a t s h e s e t h e r e mp l o y e rs h o u s e o n f i re b e c a u s e s h e h a d
n o t b e e n p a i d h e r s a l a r y f o r a b o u t a ye a r a n d t h a t s h e wa n t e d t o
g o h o m e t o h e r p ro vi n c e b u t h e r e m p l o y e r t o l d h e r t o j u s t ri d e a
b ro o ms t i c k i n g o i n g h o m e .
A c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E D N A w a s t h e n t u r n e d o ve r t o a rs o n
i n v e s t i g a t o rs h e a d e d b y S [ F] O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n , w h o b ro u g h t h e r
t o t h e S a n L a za ro Fi r e S t a t i o n i n S t a . C ru z , Ma n i l a wh e r e s h e
wa s f u rt h e r i n ve s t i g a t e d a n d t h e n d e t a i n e d .
W h e n Me rc e d i t a M e n d o z a w e n t t o t h e S a n L a za ro Fi re
S t a t i o n t o g i v e h e r s w o rn s t a t e me n t , s h e h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o
a s k a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E D N A a t t h e l a t t e rs d e t e n t i o n c e l l w h y s h e
d i d t h e b u r n i n g o f h e r e mp l o y e rs h o u s e a n d a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t
E DNA re p l i e d t h a t s h e s e t t h e h o u s e o n f i re b e c a u s e w h e n s h e
a s k e d p e r mi s s i o n t o g o h o m e t o h e r p ro vi n c e , t h e wi f e o f h e r
e mp l o y e r R o b e rt o S e p a r a , S r. , n a m e d V i r g i n i a S e p a r a (s i c )
s h o u t e d a t h e r: S i g e u m u w i k a , p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i k a n a .
S u m a k a y k a s a w a l i s , p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i k a n a ( TS N, J a n u a r y
2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , p . 6 ) ( Go a h e a d , w h e n yo u a r ri ve yo u r c o l o r w o u l d b e
f a i r a l r e a d y . R i d e a b ro o ms t i c k , w h e n yo u a rri ve y o u r c o l o r wo u l d
b e f a i r a l re a d y. ) A n d w h e n Me rc e d i t a M e n d o z a a s k e d a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t E D N A h o w s h e b u rn e d t h e h o u s e , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t
E DNA t o l d h e r : N a g l u k o t a k o n g m a r a m i n g d i y a ry o , s i n i n d i h a n k o
ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob
n g b a h a y ( TS N , J a n u a r y 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , p . 7 . ) ( I c r u m p l e d n e ws p a p e rs ,
lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of
the table inside the house.)
Ro b e r t o S e p a ra , S r. a n d V i r g i n i a S e p a ra t o g e t h e r wi t h t h e i r f o u r
(4 ) c h i l d r e n , n a m e l y: Mi c h a e l , Da p h n e , P ri s c i l l a a n d Ro b e r t o , J r .
On 9 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 , a n I n f o r m a t i o n [ 4 ] w a s f i l e d b e f o re t h e R TC o f Ma n i l a ,
B ra n c h 4 1 , c h a rg i n g a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t wi t h t h e c ri me o f A rs o n wi t h Mu l t i p l e
Ho m i c i d e . Th e c a s e w a s d o c k e t e d a s Cri m i n a l Ca s e N o . 0 1 - 1 8 8 4 2 4 . Th e
a c c u s a t o r y p o rt i o n o f s a i d I n f o r m a t i o n p ro vi d e s :
Th a t o n o r a b o u t J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 , i n t h e Ci t y o f Ma n i l a ,
P h i l i p p i n e s , t h e s a i d a c c u s e d , wi t h i n t e n t t o c a u s e d a ma g e , d i d
t h e n a n d t h e re wi l l f u l l y, u n l a wf u l l y, f e l o n i o u s l y a n d d e l i b e ra t e l y
s e t f i re u p o n t h e t w o -s t o r e y re s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f ROB E R T O
S E P A RA a n d f a mi l y m o s t l y ma d e o f wo o d e n m a t e ri a l s l o c a t e d a t
No . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , T o n d o , t h i s c i t y, b y l i g h t i n g c ru m p l e d
n e ws p a p e r wi t h t h e u s e o f d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r i n s i d e s a i d h o u s e
k n o wi n g t h e s a m e t o b e a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e a n d s i t u a t e d i n a
t h i c k l y p o p u l a t e d p l a c e a n d a s a c o n s e q u e n c e t h e re o f a
c o n f l a g r a t i o n e n s u e d a n d t h e s a i d b u i l d i n g , t o g e t h e r wi t h s o m e
s e v e n (7 ) a d jo i n i n g re s i d e n t i a l h o u s e s , we re r a ze d b y f i re ; t h a t b y
re a s o n a n d o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e s a i d f i re , t h e f o l l o wi n g ,
n a me l y ,
1. R o b e rt o S e p a ra , S r. , 4 5 ye a rs o f a g e
2. V i r g i n i a S e p a ra y Me n d o z a , 4 0 ye a rs o f
age
3. Mi c h a e l S e p a ra , 2 4 ye a rs o f a g e
4. D a p h n e S e p a ra , 1 8 ye a rs o f a g e
5. P ri s c i l l a S e p a ra , 1 4 ye a rs o f a g e
6. R o b e rt o S e p a ra , J r. , 1 1 ye a rs o f a g e
s u s t a i n e d b u r n i n ju ri e s wh i c h w e r e t h e d i re c t c a u s e o f t h e i r d e a t h
i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r. [ 5 ]

W h e n i n t e rvi e w e d b y C a r m e l i t a V a l d e z, a r e p o rt e r o f A B S -
CB N Ne t w o rk , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E D NA wh i l e u n d e r d e t e n t i o n
When a rr a i g n e d , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t wi t h assistance of counsel de
(s i c ) wa s h e a rd b y S F O4 (s i c ) D a n i l o T a l u s a n a s h a vi n g a d m i t t e d
t h e c ri m e a n d e v e n n a r ra t e d t h e m a n n e r h o w s h e a c c o m p l i s h e d i t .
o f i c i o , p l e a d e d [ 6 ] No t G u i l t y t o t h e c ri me c h a rg e d . Th e re a f t e r, t ri a l e n s u e d . [ 7 ]
S F O4 (s i c ) D a n i l o Ta l u s a n w a s a b l e t o h e a r t h e s a me c o n f e s s i o n ,
t h i s t i m e a t h i s h o me , w h i l e w a t c h i n g t h e t e l e vi s i o n p ro g ra m T r u e
Cri m e h o s t e d b y Gu s A b e l g a s a l s o o f A B S -CB N N e t wo rk .
Th e prosecution p re s e n t e d f i ve (5 ) wi t n e s s e s , namely,
Th e f i re re s u l t e d i n [ t h e ] d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e h o u s e o f
Ro b e r t o S e p a ra , S r. a n d o t h e r a d jo i n i n g h o u s e s a n d t h e d e a t h o f S P O 4 [ 8 ] Da n i l o Ta l u s a n , R o l a n d o G ru t a , R e mi g i o B e r n a rd o , M e rc e d i t a Me n d o z a
a n d Ro d o l f o Mo vi l l a t o e s t a b l i s h i t s c h a r g e t h a t a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E d n a A : I wa s a t o u r o f f i c e , s i r.

c o m mi t t e d t h e c ri me o f a rs o n w i t h mu l t i p l e h o m i c i d e . Q: W a s t h e re a n y o t h e r o c c a s i o n wh e r e i n t h e a c c u s e d m a d e
a n o t h e r c o n f e s s i o n re l a t i v e t o t h e a d mi s s i o n o f t h e c ri m e ?

A : Ye s , s i r .
S P O 4 D a n i l o T a l u s a n , a rs o n i n v e s t i g a t o r, t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e wa s o n e o f
Q: W h e n wa s t h a t ?
t h o s e wh o re s p o n d e d t o t h e f i re t h a t o c c u r r e d o n 2 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 a n d w h i c h
A : L a s t Fri d a y, s i r . I t wa s s h o w n i n T ru e C ri m e o f Gu s A b e l g a s .
s t a r t e d a t N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a . H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e f i re
S h e wa s i n t e r vi e w e d a t t h e Ci t y J a i l a n d s h e a d mi t t e d t h a t
s h e w a s t h e o n e w h o a u t h o re d t h e c ri m e , s i r.
k i l l e d R o b e rt o S e p a ra , S r. a n d a l l t h e o t h e r m e mb e rs o f h i s f a mi l y , n a me l y h i s

w i f e , V i r g i n i a , a n d h i s c h i l d r e n , M i c h a e l , D a p h n e , P ri s c i l l a a n d Ro b e r t o , J r. ; t h e P ro s . R e b a g a y:
A n d wh e re we re yo u wh e n t h a t a d mi s s i o n t o Gu s A b e l g a s wa s
f i re a l s o d e s t r o ye d t h e i r a b o d e a s w e l l a s s i x n e i g h b o ri n g h o u s e s . H e l i k e wi s e made?

t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e t w i c e h e a rd a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t o n c e wh i l e t h e l a t t e r wa s b e i n g A : I wa s i n t h e h o u s e a n d I ju s t s a w i t o n t v, s i r.

i n t e r vi e w e d b y Ca r me l i t a V a l d e z, a re p o rt e r o f A B S -CB N, a n d t h e o t h e r t i m e Q: W h a t wa s t h a t a d mi s s i o n t h a t y o u h e a r d p e rs o n a l l y, wh e n y o u
we re p r e s e n t , wh e n t h e a c c u s e d m a d e t h e c o n f e s s i o n t o
w h e n i t wa s s h o wn o n c h a n n e l 2 o n t e l e vi s i o n d u ri n g t h e a i ri n g o f t h e t e l e vi s i o n Ca r me l i t a V a l d e z ?

p ro g r a m entitled T ru e C ri me hosted by Gus Abelgas confess to h a vi n g A: Naglukot po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at inilagay
n i y a s a i b a b a w n g m e s a y u n g m g a d i y a ry o a t s i n u n o g n i y a .
c o m mi t t e d t h e c ri me c h a rg e d , t o w i t :
x x x x

P ro s . R e b a g a y: Q: A s i d e f ro m t h a t s t a t e m e n t , wa s t h e r e a n y o t h e r s t a t e m e n t
B a s e d o n yo u r i n ve s t i g a t i o n , wa s t h e re a n y o c c a s i o n w h e n made by the accused Edna Malngan?
t h e a c c u s e d E d n a M a l n g a n a d m i t t e d t o t h e b u rn i n g o f t h e
h o u s e o f t h e S e p a ra F a mi l y? A : Ye s , s i r. K a y a p o n i y a n a g a wa y o n g a l i t p o s i y a s a k a n y a n g
a m o n a s i V i r g i n i a , h i n d i s i y a p i n a s u we l d o a t g u s t o n a p o
x x x x n i y a n g u m u wi n a (s i c ) a y a w s i y a n g p a y a g a n . Na g s a l i t a p a
p o s a k a n y a n a , S u m a k a y k a n a l a n g s a wa l i s . P a g b a l i k m o
W it n e s s : dito maputi ka na. (s i c ) Yon po ang
Y e s , s i r. sinabi ng kanyang amo.

P ro s . R e b a g a y: A t t y. M a s w e n g :
W h e n wa s t h a t ? Th a t wa s a s t a t e m e n t o f a n a l l e g e d d e a d p e rs o n , yo u r H o n o r.

A : On J a n u a r y 2 s h e w a s i n t e r vi e w e d b y t h e m e d i a , s i r. Th e o n e Co u rt :
wh o t o o k t h e c o ve ra g e w a s C a r m e l i t a V a l d e z o f Ch a n n e l 2 , Sabi ni Valdes, ha?
A B S - C B N . Th e y h a ve a f o o t a g e t h a t E d n a a d mi t t e d b e f o r e
t h e m , s i r. P ro s . R e b a g a y:
S a b i n i E d n a M a l n g a n k a y Ca rm e l i t a V a l d e z, Y o u r H o n o r.
Q: A n d w h e re w e re y o u w h e n E d n a M a l n g a n m a d e t h a t s t a t e m e n t
o r a d mi s s i o n t o C a r me l i t a V a l d e z o f A B S -CB N? Co u rt :
 Do u b l e h e a rs a y n a y o n .
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
No , Y o u r H o n o r , t h e w i t n e s s w a s p re s e n t , Yo u r Ho n o r, wh e n t h a t
c o n f e s s i o n w a s ma d e b y t h e a c c u s e d t o Ca r me l i t a
V a l d e z. [ 9 ]
Ro l a n d o G ru t a , t h e p e d i c a b d ri v e r a n d o n e o f t h e b a ra n g a y t a n o d s i n t h e
a re a , t e s t i f i e d :
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
M r. W i t n e s s , w h a t i s y o u r p r o f e s s i o n ?
A : S i d e c a r d ri ve r, s i r.
Q: O n J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 a t a r o u n d 4 : 4 5 i n t h e m o r n i n g , d o yo u
re c a l l w h e r e w e re (s i c ) yo u ?
A : I wa s a t t h e c o rn e r o f Mo d e rn a S t re e t , s i r .
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
A n d w h i l e yo u w e re a t t h e c o r n e r o f Mo d e r n a S t . , w h a t
h a p p e n e d i f a n y , M r. W i t n e s s ?
A : I s a w E d n a c o mi n g o u t f r o m t h e d o o r o f t h e h o u s e o f R o b e rt o
S e p a ra , s i r.
Q: Do yo u k n o w t h e n u m b e r o f t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a ra Fa m i l y ?
A : 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a , s i r.
x x x x
Q: A n d y o u s a i d yo u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e
S e p a ra Fa mi l y . H o w f a r i s t h a t h o u s e f r o m t h e p l a c e w h e re
yo u w e re w a i t i n g a t t h e c o rn e r o f M o d e rn a a n d P a u l i n o
Streets?
A : A b o u t t h r e e me t e rs f ro m Mo d e r n a a n d P a u l i n o S t r e e t s wh e re
m y p e d i c a b w a s p l a c e d . M y d i s t a n c e w a s a b o u t t h re e
m e t e rs , s i r .
x x x x
Q: A n d h o w d i d y o u k n o w t h a t t h e h o u s e wh e r e E d n a c a me o u t i s
t h a t o f t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa mi l y?
A : Mi s m o n g n a k i t a p o n g d a l a w a n g m a t a k o n a d o o n s i y a g a l i n g
s a b a h a y n g S e p a r a Fa m i l y .
Q: Ho w l o n g h a v e y o u k n o wn t h e S e p a ra F a mi l y , i f yo u k n o w
them?
A : A b o u t t wo y e a rs , s i r.
Q: Ho w a b o u t t h i s E d n a , t h e o n e yo u j u s t p o i n t e d (t o ) a wh i l e a g o ?
Do yo u k n o w h e r p ri o r t o J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 ?
A : Ye s , s i r . I k n e w (s i c ) h e r f o r t w o ye a rs .
Co u rt :
W h y?
W it n e s s :
Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
Ho w a b o u t t h e S e p a r a f a mi l y ? W h y d o yo u k n o w t h e m ?
A : T h e y we re t h e e mp l o ye rs o f E d n a , s i r.
Q: Yo u s a i d y o u s a w E d n a c o mi n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e
S e p a ra F a mi l y. W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u s a w E d n a
c o mi n g o u t f ro m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa mi l y?
A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
Q: A n d w h a t d i d yo u o b s e r ve f ro m E d n a wh e n yo u s a w h e r c o m i n g
o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a ra f a mi l y ?
A : N a g m a m a d a l i p o s i y a n g l u m a k a d a t p a l i n g a -l i n g a .
x x x x
Q: A f t e r s h e b o a rd e d y o u r p e d i c a b , wh a t h a p p e n e d , i f a n y ?
A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
Q: W h e re ?
A : T o Ni p a S t re e t , s i r.
Q: Di d yo u b ri n g h e r t o Ni p a S t re e t a s s h e r e q u e s t e d ?
A : Ye s , s i r .
 A : N o , s i r.
x x x x
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
Q: Yo u s a i d t h a t yo u b ro u g h t h e r t o Ni p a S t re e t . W h a t h a p p e n e d And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was
wh e n yo u g o (s i c ) t h e r e a t N i p a S t re e t , i f a n y? a p p re h e n d e d o r n o t ?

A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po. x x x x

Q: W h a t d i d s h e d o w h e n s h e a s k e d ( yo u ) t o s t o p t h e re f o r t h re e A : I w a s c a l l e d b y o u r B a ra n g a y C h a i r ma n i n o rd e r t o i d e n t i f y
mi n u t e s ? Edna, sir.

A : A f t e r t h r e e m i n u t e s s h e re q u e s t e d me t o b ri n g h e r d i r e c t l y x x x x[10]
t o B a l a s a n S t re e t , s i r .

x x x x
Re mi g i o B e rn a rd o , B a ra n g a y C h a i r ma n o f t h e a r e a w h e re t h e f i re
Q: W h a t h a p p e n e d a f t e r t h a t ?
o c c u r re d , s t a t e d :
A : W h e n we a rri ve d t h e re , s h e a l i g h t e d a n d p a y (s i c ) P 5 . 0 0 , s i r.

Q A n d t h e n w h a t t r a n s p i re d a f t e r s h e a l i g h t e d f ro m yo u r p e d i c a b ? P ro s . R e b a g a y:

W it n e s s : On J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 , d o yo u r e c a l l i f t h e r e i s a f i re t h a t
I w e n t h o m e a n d I l o o k e d f o r a n o t h e r p a s s e n g e r, s i r . o c c u r re d s o me wh e r e i n yo u r a re a o f ju ri s d i c t i o n ,
p a r t i c u l a rl y M o d e r n a S t re e t ?
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
A f t e r t h a t , w h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u we re o n yo u wa y t o y o u r A : Ye s , s i r .
h o u s e t o l o o k f o r p a s s e n g e rs ?
Q: No w, w h e re we re y o u w h e n t h i s i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d ?
A Na k i t a k o n a n g a p o n a pagdating ko sa Mo d e rn a ,
naglalagablab na apoy. A : K a s i u g a l i k o n a p o t u wi n g u m a g a n g - u m a g a p o a k o n a p u p u n t a
s a b a r a n g a y Ha l l m g a s i g u r o 6 : 0 0 o r 5 : 0 0 o c l o c k , m e
Q: F ro m w h a t p l a c e w a s t h a t f i re c o mi n g o u t ? s u m i g a w n g s u n o g n i re s p o n d e h a n n a m i n i y o n g s u n o g e h
m e d a l a k a m i n g f i re .
A : F r o m t h e h o u s e o f R o b e rt o S e p a ra F a mi l y, s i r.
Co u rt :
x x x x Y o u ju s t a n s we r t h e q u e s t i o n . W h e re we re y o u w h e n t h i s
incident happened?
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
A f t e r yo u n o t i c e d t h a t t h e r e w a s a f i re f ro m t h e h o u s e o f Ro b e rt o W it n e s s :
S e p a ra F a mi l y, w h a t d i d yo u d o i f a n y? I w a s a t t h e B a r a n g a y Ha l l , Y o u r Ho n o r.

A : S i y e m p re p o , i s a n g B a r a n g a y Ta n o d p o a k o , n a g r e s p o n d e n a P ro s . R e b a g a y:
p o k a m i s a s u n o g . B i n u k s a n n a p o n g C h a i rm a n n a m i n g A n d y o u s a i d t h a t t h e r e wa s a f i re t h a t o c c u r re d , wh a t d i d
yung tangke, binomba na po naming yung apoy ng tubig. yo u d o ?

Q: A f t e r t h a t i n c i d e n t , M r. W i t n e s s , h a v e y o u s e e n E d n a A g a i n W it n e s s :
(s i c ). I y o n n g a n a g re s p o n d e k a m i d o o n s a s u n o g e h n a k i t a k o
i y o n g s u n o g m u k h a t a l a g a n g a rs o n d a h i l n a p a k a l a k i
 kaagad, meron pong mga tipong Iyong namatay po P ro s . R e b a g a y:
c o n t ra c t o r p o i y o n e h k a y a s i g u ro n a p a k a r a m i n g k a l a t n g A n d wh a t h a p p e n e d ?
mga pintura, mga c o n t a i n e r, kaya hindi
po namin naapula kaagad iyong apoy, nasunog ultimo A : I b ro u g h t h e r t o t h e b a r a n g a y h a l l , s i r.
iyong fire tank namin sa lakas, sir.
Q: A n d w h a t h a p p e n e d a t t h e b a ra n g a y h a l l ?
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
No w , wi l l yo u p l e a s e t e l l u s w h e re t h i s f i r e o c c u r re d ? A: Inembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me lighter
siya eh. Inamin niya po sa amin na kaya niya sinunog hindi
A : A t t h e h o u s e o f t h e s i x vi c t i ms , s i r. siya pinasasahod ng more or less isang taon na eh.
Ng a y o n s a b i k o b a k i t e h g u s t o k o n g u m u wi n g p ro b i n s y a
Q: W h o s e h o u s e i s t h a t ? ang sabi sa akin ng amo ko sumakay na lang daw po ako
n g wa l i s t i n g t i n g p a ra m a k a u wi , s i r.
A : T h e h o u s e o f t h e vi c t i ms , s i r.
A t t y. He r m a n :
x x x x W e wo u l d l i k e t o o b je c t , Yo u r Ho n o r o n t h e g ro u n d t h a t
t h a t i s h e a rs a y.
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
Y o u s a i d t h a t yo u re s p o n d e d t o t h e p l a c e , w h a t t ra n s p i r e d P ro s . R e b a g a y:
a f t e r y o u re s p o n d e d t o t h e p l a c e ? Th a t i s n o t a h e a rs a y s t a t e m e n t , Y o u r H o n o r , s t ra i g h t f r o m
the mouth of the accused.
A: Iyon nga po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae
po noon sa bahay na nagmamadali habang may sunog, me A t t y. He r m a n :
i s a n g b a ra n g a y t a n o d p o a k o n g n a g s a b i m a y h u m a h a n g o s I t s n o t u n d e r t h e e x e m p t i o n u n d e r t h e Ru l e s o f Co u rt , Yo u r
na isang babae na may dalang bag papunta po roon Ho n o r . H e i s t e s t i f yi n g a c c o r d i n g t o w h a t h e h a s h e a r d .
p a l a b a s n g s a s a k y a n , s i r.
Co u rt :
Q: A n d s o w h a t h a p p e n e d ? Th a t s p a rt o f t h e n a rr a t i o n . W h e t h e r i t i s t ru e o r n o t , t h a t s
a n o t h e r m a t t e r. L e t i t r e ma i n .
A : S i y e m p re h i n d i n a m a n a k o n a g t a n o n g k u n g s i n o n g a y o n m a y
d u m a t i n g g a l i n g n a s a b a h a y n a m i n g , m a y t u m a wa g , P ro s . R e b a g a y:
tumawag po si Konsehala Alfonso na may isang babae na No w , w h o we re p re s e n t wh e n t h e a c c u s e d a r e t e l l i n g yo u
h i n d i m a p a k a l i d o o n s a C a l l e P e d ro A l f o n s o , k e k o n s e h a l this?
na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito ganoon nirespondehan
k o p o , s i r. A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid,
siyempre may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin
Q: W h e re d i d yo u r e s p o n d ? ng mga mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay
papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and
A : A t B a l a s a n , s i r , b u t i t s n o t t h e a r e a o f m y ju ri s d i c t i o n . namatay, kaya iyong mga tao k i n o k o n t ro l siya
m a d i d i s g r a s y a s i y a d a h i l p i n -p o i n t e d p o s i y a , Y o u r Ho n o r ,
x x x x iyong dami na iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa
barangay hall n a p a k a h i ra p a wa t i n . G u s t o n g -
Q: W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u r e a c h e d t h a t p l a c e ? g u s t o s i y a n g k u n i n n g m g a t a o n g -b a y a n , n a g a l i t d a h i l a n g
daming bahay hong nasunog.[11]
A: Siya po ang nahuli ko doon, sir.

Co u rt :
W it n e s s p o i n t i n g t o a c c u s e d E d n a M a l n g a n .
 Fo r h e r p a r t , M e rc e d i t a Me n d o z a , o n e o f t h e n e i g h b o rs o f t h e S e p a r a A : M y h u s b a n d , s i r.

Fa mi l y a n d w h o s e h o u s e w a s o n e o f t h o s e d e s t ro y e d b y t h e f i r e , re c o u n t e d : Q: W h a t i s t h e re l a t i o n s h i p o f yo u r h u s b a n d t o t h e l a t e V i rg i n i a
M e n d o za Ci f a r a (s i c )?
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
A : T h e y we re f i rs t c o u s i n s , s i r .
M a d a m W i t n e s s , o n J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 , d o y o u re c a l l wh e r e
we re y o u re s i d i n g t h e n ?
Q: Ho w f a r i s y o u r h o u s e f ro m t h e h o u s e o f t h e Ci f a ra (s i c )
f a mi l y?
A : Ye s , s i r .
A : Ma g k a d i k i t l a n g p o . P a d e r l a n g a n g p a g i t a n .
Q: W h e re w e r e yo u re s i d i n g a t ?
Q: Yo u s a i d t h a t E d n a M a l n g a n wa s wo rk i n g wi t h t h e Ci f a r a (s i c )
A : A t No . 1 7 0 Mo d e rn a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a , s i r.
f a mi l y. W h a t i s t h e wo r k o f E d n a M a l n g a n ?
Q: W h y d i d y o u t ra n s f e r yo u r re s i d e n c e ? A wh i l e a g o y o u t e s t i f i e d
A : N a n g a n g a m u h a n p o . Ho u s e h e l p e r , s i r .
t h a t yo u a r e n o w re s i d i n g a t 1 4 7 Mo d e r n a S t . , B a l u t ,
To n d o , Ma n i l a ?
Q: Ho w l o n g d o yo u k n o w E d n a M a l n g a n a s h o u s e h e l p e r o f t h e
Ci f a ra (s i c ) f a mi l y?
A : B e c a u s e o u r h o u s e w a s b u rn e d , s i r.
A : I c a n n o t e s t i m a t e b u t s h e s t a ye d t h e r e f o r t h re e t o f o u r ye a rs ,
Q: Mo r e o r l e s s , h o w m u c h d i d t h e l o s s i n c u r re d o n t h e b u rn i n g o f
s i r.
yo u r h o u s e (s i c )?
Q: Do y o u k n o w wh o c a u s e d t h e b u rn i n g o f t h e h o u s e o f t h e
A : Mo r e o r l e s s , P 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , s i r
Ci f a ra (s i c ) f a mi l y?
Q: Do yo u k n o w t h e a c c u s e d i n t h i s c a s e E d n a Ma l n g a n ?
W it n e s s :
E d n a Ma l n g a n , s i r.
A : Ye s , s i r .
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
Q: W h y d o y o u k n o w h e r?
W h y d o yo u k n o w t h a t i t w a s E d n a M a l n g a n w h o b u r n e d t h e h o u s e
o f t h e Ci f a r a (s i c ) f a mi l y?
A : S h e i s t h e h o u s e h e l p e r o f t h e f a mi l y w h o we re (s i c ) b u rn e d ,
s i r.
A : W h e n t h e f i r e i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d , s i r, o n J a n u a r y 3 , w e w e n t t o
S a n L a z a r o Fi re S t a t i o n a n d I s a w E d n a M a l n g a n d e t a i n e d
Q: W h a t f a mi l y?
t h e re , s i r .
A : Ci f a ra (s i c ) f a mi l y, s i r.
Q: A n d s o w h a t i s y o u r b a s i s i n p o i n t i n g t o E d n a M a l n g a n a s t h e
c u l p ri t o r t h e o n e wh o b u r n e d t h e h o u s e o f t h e Ci f a ra (s i c )
Q: W h o i n p a rt i c u l a r d o y o u k n o w a m o n g Ci f a r a (s i c ) f a mi l y?
f a mi l y?
A : T h e wo m a n , s i r.
A : I t a l k e d t o h e r w h e n we we n t t h e re a t t h a t d a y , s i r .
Q: W h a t i s t h e n a m e ?
Q: W h a t t ra n s p i re d t h e n ?
A : V i rg i n i a Me n d o za C i f a ra (s i c ), s i r.
A : I t a l k e d t o h e r a n d I t o l d h e r , E d n a , b a k i t m o n a m a n g i n a wa
yung ganun?
Q: A r e yo u re l a t e d t o V i rg i n i a M e n d o za Ci f a r a ( s i c )?
 Q: A n d w h a t w a s t h e a n s w e r o f E d n a ?
t o p r o v e h e r g u i l t b e yo n d re a s o n a b l e d o u b t ; a n d (c ) t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n i e s g i v e n
A : S h e a n s w e re d , K a s i p a g n a g p a p a a l a m a k o s a k a n y a n g u m u wi b y t h e wi t n e s s e s o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n we re h e a rs a y, t h u s , i n a d mi s s i b l e i n
n g p r o b i n s y a , n a g p a p a a l a m p o s i y a n g u m u wi n g p r o b i n s y a
a n g s i n a s a b i d a w p o s a k a n y a n i B a b y Ci f a ra (s i c ) n a , e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r .
(s i c )S i g e u m u w i k a , p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i k a n a . S u m a k a y
ka sa walis pagdating mo maput i ka na.
Th e prosecution filed i t s Co m m e n t / O p p o s i t i o n t o accused-
P ro s . R e b a g a y:
W h a t i s t h e b a s i s t h e r e t h a t s h e wa s t h e o n e wh o b u rn e d t h e a p p e l l a n t s D e m u r re r t o E v i d e n c e .
h o u s e o f t h e C i f a ra (s i c ) f a mi l y?

A : I a l s o a s k e d h e r , P a a n o m o g i n a wa y u n g s u n o g ? S h e t o l d
m e , N a g l u k o t a k o n g m a r a m i n g d i y a ry o , s i n i n d i h a n k o n g On 1 3 Oc t o b e r 2 0 0 3 , a c t i n g o n t h e D e mu r r e r t o E vi d e n c e , t h e RT C
disposable lighter at hinagis niya sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa
l o o b n g b a h a y . (s i c ) [ 1 2 ] p ro m u l g a t e d i t s J u d g m e n t [ 1 8 ] wh e re i n i t p r o c e e d e d t o re s o l v e t h e s u b j e c t c a s e

b a s e d o n t h e e vi d e n c e o f t h e p ro s e c u t i o n . Th e R T C c o n s i d e re d a c c u s e d -

appellant to h a ve waived her ri g h t to p re s e n t e vi d e n c e , h a vi n g filed

L a s t l y, t h e p ro s e c u t i o n p r e s e n t e d R o d o l f o M o vi l l a , o wn e r o f t h e h o u s e
t h e De m u rr e r t o E v i d e n c e wi t h o u t l e a v e o f c o u r t .
s i t u a t e d b e s i d e t h a t o f t h e S e p a r a f a mi l y. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s h o u s e wa s a l s o
g u t t e d b y t h e f i re t h a t k i l l e d t h e S e p a ra f a mi l y a n d t h a t h e t ri e d t o h e l p s a i d
vi c t i ms b u t t o n o a v a i l . I n f i n d i n g a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E d n a g u i l t y b e yo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f t h e

c ri me o f A rs o n wi t h Mu l t i p l e Ho mi c i d e , t h e R T C ru l e d t h a t :
[13]
Th e p ro s e c u t i o n presented other documentary e vi d e n c e and
t h e re a f t e r r e s t e d i t s c a s e . Th e f i rs t a rg u me n t o f t h e a c c u s e d t h a t s h e i s c h a r g e d wi t h
a n a c t n o t d e f i n e d a n d p e n a l i z e d b y l a w i s wi t h o u t me ri t . x x x t h e
c a p t i o n wh i c h c h a rg e s t h e a c c u s e d wi t h t h e c ri me o f A rs o n wi t h
W h e n i t c a me t i me f o r t h e d e f e n s e t o p re s e n t e x c u l p a t o r y e vi d e n c e , M u l t i p l e Ho m i c i d e i s m e r e l y d e s c ri p t i v e o f t h e c h a r g e o f A rs o n
t h a t r e s u l t e d t o Mu l t i p l e Ho m i c i d e . T h e f a c t i s t h a t t h e a c c u s e d i s
i n s t e a d o f d o i n g s o , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a Mo t i o n t o A d m i t De m u r re r t o c h a r g e d wi t h A rs o n w h i c h re s u l t e d t o M u l t i p l e Ho mi c i d e ( d e a t h o f
vi c t i ms ) a n d t h a t c h a r g e i s e mb o d i e d a n d s t a t e d i n t h e b o d y o f
E v i d e n c e [ 1 4 ] a n d t h e c o r re s p o n d i n g D e m u rr e r t o E v i d e n c e [ 1 5 ] wi t h t h e f o r m e r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . W h a t is c o n t r o l l i n g i s t h e a l l e g a t i o n i n t h e b o d y
e x p r e s s l y s t a t i n g t h a t s a i d D e m u r re r t o E v i d e n c e w a s b e i n g f i l e d x x x wi t h o u t o f t h e I n f o r ma t i o n a n d n o t t h e t i t l e o r c a p t i o n t h e r e o f . x x x .

e x p r e s s l e a v e o f c o u rt x x x . [ 1 6 ] x x x x

Th e s e c o n d a n d t h i rd a rg u me n t s wi l l b e d i s c u s s e d jo i n t l y
In h e r De m u r re r to Evidence , accused-appellant a s s e rt s that the a s t h e y a re i n t e r re l a t e d wi t h e a c h o t h e r . x x x .

p ro s e c u t i o n s e vi d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e h e r g u i l t b e yo n d r e a s o n a b l e x x x x
[17]
d o u b t f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g re a s o n s : (a ) t h a t s h e i s c h a rg e d wi t h c ri me n o t
[W ] h i l e t h e re i s n o d i r e c t e vi d e n c e t h a t p o i n t s t o t h e a c c u s e d i n
d e f i n e d a n d p e n a l i ze d b y l a w ; ( b ) t h a t c i rc u m s t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e wa s i n s u f f i c i e n t t h e a c t o f b u rn i n g t h e h o u s e o r a c t u a l l y s t a rt i n g t h e s u b je c t f i re ,
t h e f o l l o wi n g c i rc u m s t a n c e s t h a t s h o w t h a t t h e a c c u s e d
i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a u s e d o r w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s u b je c t f i r e h a v e
been duly established:
1 . t h a t i m me d i a t e l y b e f o re t h e b u rn i n g o f t h e h o u s e , t h e
a c c u s e d h u rri e d l y a n d w i t h h e a d t u rn i n g i n d i f f e re n t d i re c t i o n s
(p a l i n g a -l i n g a ) w e n t o u t o f t h e s a i d h o u s e a n d ro d e a p e d i c a b
apparently not knowing where to go x x x;
2 . t h a t i m me d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e f i r e , u p o n a re p o rt t h a t t h e re
wa s a wo m a n i n B a l a s a n S t . wh o a p p e a rs c o n f u s e d a n d
a p p re h e n s i ve (b a l i s a ) , t h e B a ra n g a y C h a i r m a n a n d h i s t a n o d s
we n t t h e re , f o u n d t h e a c c u s e d a n d a p p re h e n d e d h e r a n d b ro u g h t
her to the barangay hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay
Ch a i r m a n R e mi g i o B e r n a rd o ; a n d
3 . t h a t w h e n s h e w a s a p p r e h e n d e d a n d i n ve s t i g a t e d b y t h e
b a r a n g a y o f f i c i a l s a n d w h e n h e r b a g wa s o p e n e d , t h e s a me
c o n t a i n e d a d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r a s l i k e wi s e s h o wn b y t h e t e s t i m o n y
o f t h e B a ra n g a y C h a i r m a n .
[ T] h e t i mi n g o f h e r h u r ri e d d e p a rt u r e a n d n e r v o u s d e m e a n o r
i m m e d i a t e l y b e f o r e t h e f i re w h e n s h e l e f t t h e h o u s e a n d ro d e a
p e d i c a b a n d h e r s a m e d e me a n o r, p h ys i c a l a n d me n t a l c o n d i t i o n
wh e n f o u n d a n d a p p r e h e n d e d a t t h e s a m e p l a c e wh e r e s h e
alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her
b a g t h e r e a f t e r w h e n i n ve s t i g a t e d i n d i s p u t a b l y s h o w h e r g u i l t a s
charged.
I f t h e r e i s a n y d o u b t o f h e r g u i l t t h a t re ma i n s wi t h t h e
c i rc u ms t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r, t h e s a m e i s re m o v e d o r
o b l i t e ra t e d w i t h t h e c o n f e s s i o n s / a d mi s s i o n s o f t h e c o m mi s s i o n o f
t h e o f f e n s e a n d t h e ma n n e r t h e re o f t h a t s h e ma d e t o t h e
p ro s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s B a r a n g a y Ch a i r m a n Re mi g i o B e rn a r d o ,
M e rc e d i t a M e n d o za a n d t o t h e m e d i a , re s p e c t i ve l y.
x x x x
[ H] e r c o n f e s s i o n s / a d m i s s i o n s a r e p o s i t i v e a c k n o wl e d g m e n t o f
g u i l t o f t h e c ri me a n d a p p e a r t o h a ve b e e n vo l u n t a ri l y a n d
i n t e l l i g e n t l y g i ve n . Th e s e c o n f e s s i o n s / a d m i s s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e
o n e g i ve n t o h e r n e i g h b o r M e rc e d i t a Me n d o za a n d t h e m e d i a ,
a l b e i t u n c o u n s e l l e d a n d ma d e w h i l e s h e wa s a l r e a d y u n d e r t h e
c u s t o d y o f a u t h o ri t i e s , i t i s b e l i e ve d , a re n o t v i o l a t i ve o f h e r ri g h t
under the Constitution.
Th e d e c re t a l p a rt o f t h e R TC s J u d g m e n t re a d s :
W HE RE FOR E , t h e D e m u r re r t o E vi d e n c e i s h e re b y d e n i e d
a n d ju d g m e n t i s h e re b y re n d e re d f i n d i n g t h e a c c u s e d E D NA
MA L N GA N Y M A Y O g u i l t y b e yo n d re a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f t h e c ri m e
o f A rs o n wi t h M u l t i p l e Ho mi c i d e o r A rs o n re s u l t i n g t o t h e d e a t h o f
s i x (6 ) p e o p l e a n d s e n t e n c i n g h e r t o s u f f e r t h e ma n d a t o r y p e n a l t y
o f d e a t h , a n d o rd e ri n g h e r t o p a y t h e h e i rs o f t h e vi c t i ms Ro b e rt o
S e p a ra , S r . a n d V i r g i n i a S e p a ra a n d c h i l d re n Mi c h a e l , D a p h n e ,
P ri s c i l l a a n d Ro b e rt o , J r . , t h e a mo u n t o f Fi f t y Th o u s a n d
(P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) P e s o s f o r e a c h vi c t i m a n d t h e a m o u n t o f On e
Hu n d r e d Th o u s a n d ( P 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) P e s o s a s t e mp e ra t e d a ma g e s
f o r t h e i r b u rn e d h o u s e o r a t o t a l o f Fo u r Hu n d r e d Th o u s a n d
(P 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) P e s o s a n d t o Ro d o l f o Mo vi l l a t h e a m o u n t o f On e
Hu n d r e d [ T h o u s a n d ] (P 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) P e s o s .
Du e t o t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i mp o s e d b y t h e R TC , t h e c a s e w a s d i re c t l y
e l e va t e d to this Court for automatic re vi e w. Co n f o r m a b l y wi t h our
d e c i s i o n i n P e o p l e v . E f re n M a t e o y Ga rc i a , [ 1 9 ] h o we ve r, w e re f e rr e d t h e c a s e
a n d i t s re c o rd s t o t h e C A f o r a p p ro p ri a t e a c t i o n a n d d i s p o s i t i o n .
On 2 S e p t e mb e r 2 0 0 5 , t h e Co u rt o f A p p e a l s a f f i rme d wi t h m o d i f i c a t i o n
t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e R TC , t h e f a l l o o f wh i c h r e a d s :
W HE RE FOR E , p re mi s e s c o n s i d e re d , t h e a s s a i l e d Oc t o b e r
1 3 , 2 0 0 3 J u d g me n t o f t h e Re g i o n a l T ri a l Co u r t o f Ma n i l a , B r a n c h
4 1 , f i n d i n g a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E d n a Ma l n g a n y M a yo g u i l t y
b e yo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f A rs o n wi t h m u l t i p l e h o mi c i d e a n d
s e n t e n c i n g h e r t o s u f f e r t h e DE A TH P E NA L T Y i s h e r e b y
A F FI R M E D wi t h M O DI F I CA TI ON i n t h a t s h e i s f u rt h e r o rd e re d t o
p a y P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s m o ra l d a m a g e s a n d a n o t h e r P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s
e x e mp l a r y d a m a g e s f o r e a c h o f t h e vi c t i ms wh o p e ri s h e d i n t h e
f i re , t o b e p a i d t o t h e i r h e i rs . S h e i s o rd e re d t o p a y Ro d o l f o
M o vi l l a , o n e wh o s e h o u s e wa s a l s o b u r n e d , t h e s u m o f
P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s e x e m p l a r y d a ma g e .
P u rs u a n t t o S e c t i o n 1 3 (a ), Ru l e 1 2 4 o f t h e 2 0 0 0 Ru l e s o f
Cri mi n a l P r o c e d u r e a s a me n d e d b y A . M . No . 0 0 - 5 - 0 3 -S C d a t e d
S e p t e mb e r 2 8 , 2 0 0 4 , wh i c h b e c a m e e f f e c t i v e o n Oc t o b e r 1 5 ,
2 0 0 4 , t h e Co u r t o f A p p e a l s , a f t e r re n d e ri n g ju d g me n t , h e re b y
re f ra i n s f r o m m a k i n g a n e n t ry o f ju d g m e n t a n d f o r t h wi t h c e r t i f i e s
t h e c a s e a n d e l e va t e s t h e e n t i r e r e c o rd o f t h i s c a s e t o t h e
S u p re m e C o u rt f o r re vi e w. [ 2 0 ]
 I t i s t h e c o n t e n t i o n o f a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e e vi d e n c e p r e s e n t e d b y
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t b e yo n d re a s o n a b l e d o u b t
a s t h e p e r p e t ra t o r o f t h e c ri m e c h a rg e d . I n s u p p o rt o f said exculpatory
p ro p o s i t i o n , s h e a s s i g n s t h e f o l l o w i n g e r ro rs [ 2 1 ] :
S E C. 5 . W h e r e De a t h Re s u l t s f ro m A rs o n . I f b y re a s o n o f
o r o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e a rs o n d e a t h r e s u l t s , t h e p e n a l t y
o f re c l u s i o n p e rp e t u a t o d e a t h s h a l l b e i m p o s e d . [ E mp h a s i s
supplied.]

I.
A rt . 3 2 0 o f t h e RP C, a s a m e n d e d , wi t h re s p e c t t o d e s t ru c t i ve a rs o n , a n d t h e
THE H O N OR A B L E C OU R T E R R E D I N R UL I N G THA T T HE
CI R CU M S T A N TI A L EVIDENCE P RE S E N TE D BY THE p ro vi s i o n s o f P D No . 1 6 1 3 r e s p e c t i n g o t h e r c a s e s o f a rs o n p r o vi d e o n l y o n e
P R OS E C U TI ON I S S U FF I C I E N T T O C O NV I C T T HE A CC US E D; penalty for the commission of a rs o n , whether considered d e s t ru c t i v e or
and
o t h e r wi s e , wh e re d e a t h re s u l t s t h e re f ro m . Th e ra i s o n d 't re i s t h a t a rs o n i s i t s e l f
II.
the end and death is simply the consequence. [24]
THE H O N OR A B L E C O U R T E R R E D I N A L L O W I NG A ND GI V I N G
CRE DE N CE TO TH E HEARSAY E V I DE NCE A ND
UN CO UN S E L L E D A D M I S S I O N S A L L E GE DL Y GI V E N B Y TH E W h e t h e r t h e c ri me o f a rs o n wi l l a b s o rb t h e r e s u l t a n t d e a t h o r wi l l h a ve t o b e a
A CC US E D TO TH E W I TN E S S E S B A RA NG A Y CHA I R M A N
RE MI G I O B E R N A R D O, ME R C E D I TA ME ND O Z A A N D THE ME DI A . s e p a ra t e c ri me a l t o g e t h e r , t h e j o i n t d i s c u s s i o n [ 2 5 ] o f t h e l a t e M r. C h i e f J u s t i c e
Ra m o n C. A q u i n o a n d M m e . J u s t i c e Ca ro l i n a C. G ri o -A q u i n o , o n t h e s u b je c t o f
t h e c ri m e s o f a rs o n a n d mu rd e r/ h o mi c i d e , i s h i g h l y i n s t r u c t i ve :
T HE RE I S N O C OM P LE X CRIME O F AR S O N WITH (M U L TI P LE )
H OM I CI D E . G ro i za rd s a ys t h a t wh e n f i re i s u s e d wi t h t h e i n t e n t t o k i l l
a p a r t i c u l a r p e rs o n wh o m a y b e i n a h o u s e a n d t h a t o b je c t i v e i s
a t t a i n e d b y b u rn i n g t h e h o u s e , t h e c ri m e i s m u r d e r o n l y. W h e n
Th e I n f o rm a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e e r r o n e o u s l y c h a rg e d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t w i t h t h e P e n a l Co d e d e c l a re s t h a t k i l l i n g c o m mi t t e d b y m e a n s o f f i re i s
m u r d e r, i t i n t e n d s t h a t f i re s h o u l d b e p u rp o s e l y a d o p t e d a s a
a c o m p l e x c ri m e , i . e . , A rs o n w i t h Mu l t i p l e H o m i c i d e . P r e s e n t l y, t h e re a re t wo m e a n s t o t h a t e n d . Th e re c a n b e n o m u r d e r wi t h o u t a d e s i g n t o
(2 ) l a ws t h a t g o ve r n t h e c ri me o f a rs o n wh e re d e a t h re s u l t s t h e re f ro m A rt i c l e t a k e l i f e . [ 2 6 ] I n o t h e r wo rd s , i f t h e m a i n o b j e c t o f t h e o f f e n d e r i s t o
k i l l b y m e a n s o f f i re , t h e o f f e n s e i s mu r d e r. B u t i f t h e ma i n
3 2 0 o f t h e Re v i s e d P e n a l C o d e (R P C ), a s a m e n d e d b y Re p u b l i c A c t ( RA ) No . o b je c t i ve i s t h e b u rn i n g o f t h e b u i l d i n g , t h e re s u l t i n g h o mi c i d e
m a y b e a b s o rb e d b y t h e c ri m e o f a rs o n . [ 2 7 ]
7659,[22] and Section 5 of P re s i d e n t i a l De c re e (PD) No . 1613 [23], quoted
h e r e u n d e r, t o wi t : x x x x

I f t h e h o u s e w a s s e t o n f i re a f t e r t h e vi c t i ms t h e re i n we re k i l l e d ,
Re v i s e d P e na l C od e : f i re wo u l d n o t b e a q u a l i f yi n g c i rc u ms t a n c e . Th e a c c u s e d w o u l d
b e l i a b l e f o r t h e s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e s o f m u rd e r o r h o mi c i d e , a s t h e
A RT . 3 2 0 . D e s t ru c t i v e A rs o n . x x x x c a s e m a y b e , a n d a rs o n . [ 2 8 ]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
p e n a l i ze d u n d e r t h i s A r t i c l e , d e a t h re s u l t s , t h e ma n d a t o r y p e n a l t y
of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.] A c c o rd i n g l y, i n c a s e s wh e r e b o t h b u rn i n g a n d d e a t h o c c u r, i n o rd e r t o
P r e s i de n ti a l D e c r e e N o. 1 6 1 3 : d e t e r mi n e wh a t c ri me / c ri me s wa s / we re p e r p e t ra t e d w h e t h e r a rs o n , m u r d e r o r
a rs o n a n d h o m i c i d e / m u rd e r, i t i s d e ri g u e u r t o a s c e r t a i n t h e m a i n o b je c t i v e o f
t h e m a l e f a c t o r: ( a ) i f t h e ma i n o b je c t i v e i s t h e b u r n i n g o f t h e b u i l d i n g o r e d i f i c e ,
b u t d e a t h r e s u l t s b y re a s o n o r o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f a rs o n , t h e c ri m e i s
s i mp l y a rs o n , a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g h o mi c i d e i s a b s o rb e d ; (b ) i f , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
t h e m a i n o b j e c t i ve i s t o k i l l a p a rt i c u l a r p e rs o n wh o ma y b e i n a b u i l d i n g o r
e d i f i c e , wh e n f i re i s re s o r t e d t o a s t h e m e a n s t o a c c o mp l i s h s u c h g o a l t h e
c ri me c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r o n l y; l a s t l y , (c ) i f t h e o b je c t i v e i s , l i k e wi s e , t o k i l l a
p a r t i c u l a r p e rs o n , a n d i n f a c t t h e o f f e n d e r h a s a l re a d y d o n e s o , b u t f i r e i s
re s o rt e d t o a s a m e a n s t o c o v e r u p t h e k i l l i n g , t h e n t h e re a re t w o s e p a ra t e a n d
d i s t i n c t c ri m e s c o m m i t t e d h o m i c i d e / m u r d e r a n d a rs o n .
W h e re t h e n d o e s t h i s c a s e f a l l u n d e r?
Fr o m a re a d i n g o f t h e b o d y o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n :
Th a t o n o r a b o u t J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 , i n t h e Ci t y o f Ma n i l a ,
Philippines, the said accused, with intent to cause damage , did
t h e n a n d t h e re w i l l f u l l y, u n l a w f u l l y, f e l o n i o u s l y a n d d e l i b e ra t e l y
s e t f i r e u p o n t h e t w o -s t o r e y r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f RO B E R T O
S E P A RA a n d f a mi l y m o s t l y ma d e o f wo o d e n m a t e ri a l s l o c a t e d a t
No . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , T o n d o , t h i s c i t y , b y l i g h t i n g c ru m p l e d
n e ws p a p e r w i t h t h e u s e o f d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r i n s i d e s a i d h o u s e
k n o wi n g t h e s a m e t o b e a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e a n d s i t u a t e d i n a
t h i c k l y p o p u l a t e d p l a c e a n d a s a c o n s e q u e n c e t h e re o f a
c o n f l a g r a t i o n e n s u e d a n d t h e s a i d b u i l d i n g , t o g e t h e r wi t h s o m e
s e v e n (7 ) a d jo i n i n g re s i d e n t i a l h o u s e s , w e r e ra ze d b y f i r e ; t h a t b y
re a s o n a n d o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e s a i d f i re , t h e f o l l o wi n g ,
n a me l y ,
1. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , 4 5 ye a rs o f a g e
2. V i rg i n i a S e p a ra y M e n d o za , 4 0 ye a rs o f a g e
3. Mi c h a e l S e p a r a , 2 4 ye a rs o f a g e
4. D a p h n e S e p a ra , 1 8 ye a rs o f a g e
5. P ri s c i l l a S e p a ra , 1 4 ye a rs o f a g e
6. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , J r . , 1 1 ye a rs o f a g e
s u s t a i n e d b u r n i n ju ri e s w h i c h w e r e t h e d i r e c t c a u s e o f
t h e i r d e a t h i m m e d i a t e l y t h e re a f t e r. [ 2 9 ] [ E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ]
a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t i s b e i n g c h a rg e d wi t h t h e c ri m e o f a rs o n . I t i t i s c l e a r f ro m
t h e f o r e g o i n g t h a t h e r i n t e n t wa s m e r e l y t o d e s t ro y h e r e m p l o y e rs h o u s e
t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f f i re .
W e n o w g o t o t h e i s s u e s ra i s e d . Un d e r t h e f i rs t a s s i g n m e n t o f e rr o r , i n
a s s e r t i n g t h e i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e p ro s e c u t i o n s e vi d e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t
b e yo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a rg u e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n wa s
o n l y a b l e t o a d d u c e c i rc u ms t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e h a r d l y e n o u g h t o p r o v e h e r g u i l t
b e yo n d re a s o n a b l e d o u b t . S h e r a t i o c i n a t e s t h a t t h e f o l l o wi n g c i rc u ms t a n c e s :
1. T h a t i m me d i a t e l y b e f o r e t h e b u r n i n g o f t h e h o u s e , t h e
a c c u s e d h u r ri e d l y a n d wi t h h e a d t u rn i n g i n d i f f e re n t
d i re c t i o n s ( p a l i n g a -l i n g a ) we n t o u t o f t h e s a i d h o u s e a n d
ro d e a p e d i c a b a p p a re n t l y n o t k n o wi n g wh e re t o g o f o r s h e
f i rs t r e q u e s t e d t o b e b r o u g h t t o Ni p a S t . b u t u p o n r e a c h i n g
t h e re re q u e s t e d a g a i n t o b e b ro u g h t t o B a l a s a n S t . a s
shown by the t e s t i mo n y of prosecution wi t n e s s
Ro l a n d o Gr u t a ;
2. T h a t i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e f i r e , u p o n a r e p o rt t h a t t h e r e
wa s a w o ma n i n B a l a s a n S t . wh o a p p e a rs c o n f u s e d a n d
a p p re h e n s i ve ( b a l i s a ), t h e B a r a n g a y C h a i r m a n a n d h i s
t a n o d s w e n t t h e re , f o u n d t h e a c c u s e d a n d a p p re h e n d e d
h e r a n d b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e b a ra n g a y h a l l a s s h o w n b y t h e
t e s t i m o n y o f B a r a n g a y Ch a i r m a n Re mi g i o B e r n a rd o ; a n d
3 . Th a t wh e n s h e wa s a p p re h e n d e d a n d i n v e s t i g a t e d b y t h e
b a r a n g a y o f f i c i a l s a n d wh e n h e r b a g wa s o p e n e d , t h e
s a me c o n t a i n e d a d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r a s l i k e wi s e s h o w n b y
t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e B a ra n g a y Ch a i r m a n . [ 3 0 ]
f a l l s h o r t o f p r o vi n g t h a t s h e h a d a n y i n vo l ve m e n t i n s e t t i n g h e r e mp l o y e rs
h o u s e o n f i re , mu c h l e s s s h o w g u i l t b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , g i ve n t h a t i t i s a
f a c t t h a t h o u s e ma i d s a re t h e f i rs t p e rs o n s i n t h e h o u s e t o wa k e u p e a rl y t o
p e rf o r m r o u t i n e c h o re s f o r t h e i r e m p l o ye rs , [ 3 1 ] o n e o f wh i c h i s p re p a ri n g a n d
c o o k i n g t h e m o r n i n g m e a l f o r t h e me m b e rs o f t h e h o u s e h o l d ; a n d n e c e s s i t y
re q u i r e s her to go out e a rl y to look for open s t o re s or even nearby x x x x
[32]
m a rk e t p l a c e s t o b u y t h i n g s t h a t w i l l c o mp l e t e t h e e a rl y m e a l f o r t h e d a y . She
Q: Yo u s a i d t h a t yo u b ro u g h t h e r t o Ni p a S t re e t . W h a t h a p p e n e d
t h e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t i t w a s n o r m a l f o r h e r t o h a ve b e e n s e e n g o i n g o u t o f h e r wh e n yo u g o (s i c ) t h e r e a t Ni p a S t re e t , i f a n y?
e mp l o y e rs h o u s e i n a h u r r y a t t h a t t i m e o f t h e d a y a n d t o l o o k a t a l l d i re c t i o n s A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po .
t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e h o u s e i s s e c u re a n d t h a t t h e r e a re n o o t h e r p e rs o n s i n t h e
Q: W h a t d i d s h e d o wh e n s h e a s k e d ( yo u ) t o s t o p t h e re f o r t h re e
vi c i n i t y . [ 3 3 ] mi n u t e s ?

A : A f t e r t h r e e m i n u t e s s h e re q u e s t e d me t o b ri n g h e r d i r e c t l y
W e a re f a r f r o m p e rs u a d e d . t o B a l a s a n S t re e t , s i r .

x x x x
Tr u e , b y t h e n a t u re o f t h e i r jo b s , h o u s e ma i d s a r e r e q u i r e d t o s t a r t t h e
day e a rl y ; h o w e ve r, c o n t ra r y to said a s s e rt i o n , the actuations and the
W e q u o t e wi t h a p p ro v a l t h e p ro n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e R TC i n d i s c re d i t i n g
d e me a n o r o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t o n t h a t f a t e f u l e a rl y mo rn i n g a s o b s e r ve d
a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t s a f o re m e n t i o n e d ra t i o n a l e :
f i rs t h a n d b y Ro l a n d o G ru t a , o n e o f t h e w i t n e s s e s o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , b e l i e h e r
c l a i m o f n o r m a l c y, t o w i t :
[ O ] b vi o u s l y i t i s n e ve r n o r m a l , c o m m o n o r o r d i n a r y t o l e a v e t h e
h o u s e i n s u c h a d i s t u r b e d , n e r vo u s a n d a g i t a t e d ma n n e r,
Q: Yo u s a i d y o u s a w E d n a c o mi n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e d e me a n o r a n d c o n d i t i o n . Th e t i mi n g o f h e r h u rri e d d e p a rt u re a n d
S e p a ra F a mi l y. W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u s a w E d n a n e r v o u s d e m e a n o r i m m e d i a t e l y b e f o re t h e f i re wh e n s h e l e f t t h e
c o mi n g o u t f ro m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa mi l y? h o u s e a n d r o d e a p e d i c a b a n d h e r s a m e d e m e a n o r, p h ys i c a l a n d
m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n wh e n f o u n d a n d a p p r e h e n d e d a t t h e s a m e p l a c e
A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar . wh e re s h e a l i g h t e d f r o m t h e p e d i c a b a n d t h e d i s c o ve ry o f t h e
l i g h t e r i n h e r b a g t h e r e a f t e r wh e n i n v e s t i g a t e d i n d i s p u t a b l y s h o w
Q: A n d w h a t d i d yo u o b s e r ve f ro m E d n a wh e n yo u s a w h e r c o m i n g h e r g u i l t a s c h a rg e d . [ 3 4 ]
o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a ra f a mi l y ?

A : N a g m a m a d a l i p o s i y a n g l u m a k a d a t p a l i n g a -l i n g a .
All the wi t n e s s e s are in a c c o rd that a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t s agitated
x x x x a p p e a ra n c e w a s o u t o f t h e o rd i n a r y . Re m a rk a b l y, s h e h a s n e v e r d e n i e d t h i s

Q: A f t e r s h e b o a rd e d y o u r p e d i c a b , wh a t h a p p e n e d , i f a n y ? o b s e r va t i o n .

A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.

W e g i ve g re a t we i g h t t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e R TC a n d s o a c c o r d c re d e n c e
Q: W h e r e ?
t o t h e t e s t i m o n i e s o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s e s a s i t h a d t h e o p p o rt u n i t y t o
A : T o Ni p a S t re e t , s i r.
o b s e r ve t h e m d i r e c t l y . T h e c r e d i b i l i t y g i ve n b y t ri a l c o u rt s t o p ro s e c u t i o n
Q: Di d yo u b ri n g h e r t o N i p a S t re e t a s s h e r e q u e s t e d ?
wi t n e s s e s i s a n i mp o r t a n t a s p e c t o f e vi d e n c e w h i c h a p p e l l a t e c o u rt s c a n r e l y o n
A : Ye s , s i r .
b e c a u s e o f i t s u n i q u e o p p o rt u n i t y t o o b s e r v e t h e m, p a rt i c u l a rl y t h e i r d e me a n o r , W hi l e t h e p r o s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s e s d i d n o t s e e a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t a c t u a l l y
s t a r t i n g t h e f i re t h a t b u rn e d s e ve ra l h o u s e s a n d k i l l e d t h e S e p a ra f a mi l y, h e r
conduct, and attitude, d u ri n g the d i re c t and c ro s s -e x a mi n a t i o n by
g u i l t ma y s t i l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d t h ro u g h c i rc u ms t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e p r o vi d e d t h a t : ( 1 )
c o u n s e l s . H e r e , Re mi g i o B e rn a r d o , R o l a n d o G ru t a a n d Me rc e d i t a M e n d o za a re
t h e re i s mo re t h a n o n e c i rc u ms t a n c e ; ( 2 ) t h e f a c t s f ro m wh i c h t h e i n f e re n c e s
d i s i n t e re s t e d wi t n e s s e s a n d t h e re i s n o t a n i o t a o f e vi d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d s t o
a re d e ri v e d a re p r o ve n ; a n d , (3 ) t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a l l t h e c i rc u m s t a n c e s i s
i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y a r e s u b o rn e d w i t n e s s e s . T h e re c o rd s o f t h e R TC e v e n s h o w s u c h a s t o p ro d u c e c o n vi c t i o n b e yo n d re a s o n a b l e d o u b t . [ 3 7 ]
t h a t R e mi g i o B e rn a r d o , t h e B a ra n g a y C h a i r m a n , k e p t a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t f ro m

b e i n g ma u l e d b y t h e a n g r y c ro w d o u t s i d e o f t h e b a ra n g a y h a l l : Ci rc u m s t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e i s t h a t e vi d e n c e wh i c h p r o v e s a f a c t o r s e ri e s o f
f a c t s f ro m w h i c h t h e f a c t s i n i s s u e ma y b e e s t a b l i s h e d b y i n f e re n c e . [ 3 8 ] I t i s
P ro s . R e b a g a y: f o u n d e d o n e x p e ri e n c e a n d o b s e r v e d f a c t s a n d c o i n c i d e n c e s e s t a b l i s h i n g a
No w , w h o w e r e p re s e n t w h e n t h e a c c u s e d a re (s i c ) t e l l i n g
yo u t h i s ? c o n n e c t i o n b e t we e n t h e k n o w n a n d p ro ve n f a c t s a n d t h e f a c t s s o u g h t t o b e

A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, p ro v e d . [ 3 9 ] I n o r d e r t o b ri n g a b o u t a c o n vi c t i o n , t h e c i rc u ms t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e

siyempre may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin p re s e n t e d m u s t c o n s t i t u t e a n u n b r o k e n c h a i n , w h i c h l e a d s t o o n e f a i r a n d
ng mga mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay
papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and re a s o n a b l e c o n c l u s i o n p o i n t i n g t o t h e a c c u s e d , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e rs , a s
namatay, kaya iyong mga tao k i n o k o n t ro l siya
m a d i d i s g r a s y a s i y a d a h i l p i n -p o i n t e d p o s i y a , Y o u r Ho n o r , t h e g u i l t y p e rs o n . [ 4 0 ]
iyong dami na iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa
b a r a n g a y h a l l n a p a k a h i ra p a wa t i n . Gu s t i n g - g u s t o s i y a n g
kunin ng mga taong-bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay I n t h i s c a s e , t h e i n t e rl o c k i n g t e s t i m o n i e s o f t h e p ro s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s e s ,
hong nasunog.[35]
t a k e n t o g e t h e r, e x e m p l i f y a c a s e wh e r e c o n vi c t i o n c a n b e u p h e l d o n t h e b a s i s
o f c i rc u ms t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e . Fi rs t , p ro s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s R o l a n d o G ru t a , t h e d ri ve r
o f t h e p e d i c a b t h a t a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t r o d e o n , t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e k n e w f o r a f a c t
A c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t has not shown any compelling reason wh y the
t h a t s h e w o rk e d a s a h o u s e m a i d o f t h e vi c t i m s , a n d t h a t h e p o s i t i ve l y i d e n t i f i e d
w i t n e s s e s p re s e n t e d w o u l d o p e n l y , p u b l i c l y a n d d e l i b e ra t e l y l i e o r c o n c o c t a h e r a s t h e p e rs o n h u rri e d l y l e a vi n g t h e h o u s e o f t h e vi c t i ms o n 2 J a n u a r y
s t o r y , t o s e n d a n i n n o c e n t p e rs o n t o ja i l a l l t h e wh i l e k n o wi n g t h a t t h e re a l 2 0 0 1 a t 4 : 4 5 a . m. , a n d a c t i n g i n a n e r v o u s ma n n e r. Th a t wh i l e ri d i n g o n

m a l e f a c t o r re m a i n s a t l a rg e . S u c h p ro p o s i t i o n d e f i e s l o g i c . A n d wh e re t h e t h e p e d i c a b , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t wa s u n s u re o f h e r i n t e n d e d d e s t i n a t i o n . U p o n
re a c h i n g t h e p l a c e w h e re h e o ri g i n a l l y p i c k e d u p a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t o n l y a f e w
d e f e n s e f a i l e d t o s h o w a n y e vi l o r i mp ro p e r m o t i v e o n t h e p a r t o f t h e
mi n u t e s a f t e r d ro p p i n g h e r o f f , Ro l a n d o G r u t a s a w t h e S e p a ra s h o u s e b e i n g
p ro s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s e s , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e i r t e s t i m o n i e s a r e t r u e a n d
gutted by a b l a zi n g f i re . S e c o n d , R e mi g i o B e rn a rd o testified that he and
t h u s e n t i t l e d t o f u l l f a i t h a n d c re d e n c e . [ 3 6 ]
h i s t a n o d s , i n c l u d i n g Ro l a n d o Gr u t a , we re t h e o n e s w h o p i c k e d u p a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t E d n a a t B a l a s a n S t r e e t ( wh e r e Ro l a n d o G ru t a d ro p p e d h e r o f f ) a f t e r
re c e i vi n g a c a l l t h a t t h e re wa s a wo m a n a c t i n g s t ra n g e l y a t s a i d s t r e e t a n d wh o
a p p e a re d to h a ve nowhere to g o . Th i rd , S P O 4 Da n i l o Ta l u s a n o ve rh e a r d
a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t a d m i t t o C a r m e l i t a V a l d e z, a re p o rt e r o f C h a n n e l 2 (A B S - A rt i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 o f t h e Co n s t i t u t i o n i n p a r t p ro vi d e s :
C B N ) t h a t s a i d a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t s t a rt e d t h e f i re , p l u s t h e f a c t t h a t h e w a s
(1 ) A n y p e rs o n u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r t h e c o m mi s s i o n o f
a b l e s e e t h e t e l e c a s t o f Gu s A b e l g a s s h o w wh e re a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t , wh i l e a n o f f e n s e s h a l l h a v e t h e ri g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f h i s ri g h t t o
b e i n g i n t e r vi e we d , c o n f e s s e d t o t h e c ri me a s we l l . Th e f o r e g o i n g t e s t i m o n i e s re m a i n s i l e n t a n d t o h a ve c o mp e t e n t a n d i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n s e l
p re f e ra b l y o f h i s o w n c h o i c e . I f t h e p e rs o n c a n n o t a f f o rd t h e
ju x t a p o s e d wi t h t h e t e s t i m o n y o f M e rc e d i t a M e n d o za va l i d a t i n g t h e f a c t t h a t s e r vi c e s o f c o u n s e l , h e m u s t b e p r o vi d e d wi t h o n e . Th e s e ri g h t s
c a n n o t b e w a i ve d e x c e p t i n w ri t i n g a n d i n t h e p re s e n c e o f
a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t confessed to h a vi n g started the f i re which killed counsel.
t h e S e p a r a f a mi l y a s w e l l a s b u rn e d s e ve n h o u s e s i n c l u d i n g t h a t o f t h e vi c t i ms ,
x x x x
c o n vi n c i n g l y form an u n b ro k e n chain, which leads to the unassailable
(3 ) A n y c o n f e s s i o n o r a d mi s s i o n o b t a i n e d i n vi o l a t i o n o f
c o n c l u s i o n p i n p o i n t i n g a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t a s t h e p e rs o n b e h i n d t h e c ri me o f
t h i s S e c t i o n o r S e c t i o n 1 7 h e r e o f s h a l l b e i n a d mi s s i b l e i n
s i mp l e a rs o n . e vi d e n c e .

In her second assigned e rr o r, a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t questions the W e h a ve h e l d t h a t t h e a b o ve q u o t e d p ro vi s i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e s t a g e o f

a d mi s s i b i l i t y o f h e r u n c o u n s e l l e d e x t ra ju d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n g i ve n t o p ro s e c u t i o n c u s t o d i a l i n ve s t i g a t i o n wh e n t h e i n ve s t i g a t i o n i s n o l o n g e r a g e n e ra l i n q u i r y

w i t n e s s e s , n a m e l y R e mi g i o B e rn a r d o , M e rc e d i t a Me n d o z a , a n d t o t h e m e d i a . i n t o a n u n s o l v e d c ri m e b u t s t a rt s t o f o c u s o n a p a rt i c u l a r p e rs o n a s a

A c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t Edna contends that being uncounselled e x t ra j u d i c i a l s u s p e c t . [ 4 1 ] S a i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a ra n t e e h a s a l s o b e e n e x t e n d e d t o s i t u a t i o n s

c o n f e s s i o n , h e r a d m i s s i o n s t o h a vi n g c o m mi t t e d t h e c ri m e c h a r g e d s h o u l d h a ve i n wh i c h a n i n d i vi d u a l h a s n o t b e e n f o r ma l l y a r re s t e d b u t h a s m e re l y b e e n

b e e n e x c l u d e d i n e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r f o r b e i n g vi o l a t i ve o f A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n i n vi t e d f o r q u e s t i o n i n g . [ 4 2 ]

1 2 ( 1 ) o f t h e Co n s t i t u t i o n .
To b e a d mi s s i b l e i n e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t a n a c c u s e d , t h e e x t ra j u d i c i a l

P a r t i c u l a rl y, she takes exception to the t e s t i mo n y of prosecution c o n f e s s i o n s m a d e mu s t s a t i s f y t h e f o l l o wi n g re q u i r e me n t s :

w i t n e s s e s Re mi g i o B e r n a r d o a n d M e rc e d i t a M e n d o z a f o r b e i n g h e a rs a y a n d i n
(1 ) i t m u s t b e vo l u n t a r y;
t h e n a t u re o f a n u n c o u n s e l l e d a d m i s s i o n . (2 ) i t m u s t b e m a d e wi t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o mp e t e n t a n d
independent counsel;
(3 ) i t m u s t b e e x p re s s ; a n d
W it h t h e a b o v e vi t a l p i e c e s o f e vi d e n c e e x c l u d e d , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t i s (4 ) i t mu s t b e i n w ri t i n g . [ 4 3 ]

o f t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e re m a i n i n g p ro o f o f h e r a l l e g e d g u i l t , c o n s i s t i n g i n t h e
m a i n o f c i rc u ms t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e , i s i n a d e q u a t e t o e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t b e y o n d
re a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
W e p a rt l y d i s a g r e e .
A rg u a b l y , t h e b a ra n g a y t a n o d s , i n c l u d i n g t h e B a r a n g a y Ch a i r m a n , i n t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , m a y b e d e e m e d a s l a w e n f o rc e me n t o f f i c e r f o r p u rp o s e s o f
a p p l yi n g A rt i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 (1 ) a n d ( 3 ) , o f t h e Co n s t i t u t i o n . W h en a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t wa s b ro u g h t t o t h e b a r a n g a y h a l l i n t h e mo rn i n g o f 2 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 , e vi d e n c e o n re c o r d t o s h o w t h a t s a i d wi t n e s s wa s a c t i n g u n d e r p o l i c e a u t h o ri t y,
s h e wa s a l re a d y a s u s p e c t , a c t u a l l y t h e o n l y o n e , i n t h e f i re t h a t d e s t r o ye d s o a p p ro p ri a t e l y, a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s u n c o u n s e l l e d e x t ra ju d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n t o
s e v e r a l h o u s e s a s w e l l a s k i l l e d t h e w h o l e f a mi l y o f Ro b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. S h e s a i d wi t n e s s wa s p ro p e rl y a d mi t t e d b y t h e R TC .
w a s , t h e re f o re , a l re a d y u n d e r c u s t o d i a l i n ve s t i g a t i o n a n d t h e ri g h t s g u a r a n t e e d
b y A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 (1 ), o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d h a ve a l r e a d y b e e n A c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t l i k e wi s e a s s a i l s t h e a d mi s s i o n o f t h e t e s t i m o n y o f
o b s e r ve d or applied to h e r. A c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t s confession
S P O 4 D a n i l o T a l u s a n . Co n t e n d i n g t h a t [ w] h e n S P O 4 Da n i l o Ta l u s a n t e s t i f i e d i n
t o B a r a n g a y C h a i r ma n R e mi g i o B e rn a rd o wa s made in response to the
c o u r t , h i s s t o r y i s m o re o f e v e n t s , w h i c h a r e n o t wi t h i n h i s p e rs o n a l k n o wl e d g e
i n t e rr o g a t i o n m a d e b y t h e l a t t e r a d m i t t e d l y c o n d u c t e d wi t h o u t f i rs t i n f o r mi n g
b u t b a s e d f ro m a c c o u n t s o f wi t n e s s e s wh o d e ri ve d i n f o r m a t i o n a l l e g e d l y f ro m
a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t o f h e r ri g h t s u n d e r t h e Co n s t i t u t i o n o r d o n e i n t h e p re s e n c e
o f c o u n s e l . Fo r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e c o n f e s s i o n o f a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t , g i ve n t o t h e a c c u s e d o r s o m e o t h e r p e rs o n s x x x . I n o t h e r wo rd s , s h e o b j e c t s t o t h e

B a r a n g a y Ch a i r m a n R e mi g i o B e rn a r d o , a s we l l a s t h e l i g h t e r f o u n d b y t h e l a t t e r
i n h e r b a g a r e i n a d mi s s i b l e i n e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r a s s u c h we re o b t a i n e d i n
vi o l a t i o n o f h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ri g h t s .
B e t h a t a s i t ma y, t h e i n a d mi s s i b i l i t y o f a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t s c o n f e s s i o n
t o B a r a n g a y Ch a i r m a n R e mi g i o B e rn a r d o a n d t h e l i g h t e r a s e vi d e n c e d o n o t
automatically lead to her acqu ittal. It should well be recalled that the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a f e g u a r d s d u ri n g c u s t o d i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s d o n o t a p p l y t o t h o s e
n o t e l i c i t e d t h ro u g h q u e s t i o n i n g b y t h e p o l i c e o r t h e i r a g e n t s b u t g i ve n i n a n
o rd i n a r y ma n n e r w h e re b y t h e a c c u s e d v e r b a l l y a d mi t s t o h a vi n g c o m mi t t e d t h e
o f f e n s e a s w h a t h a p p e n e d i n t h e c a s e a t b a r wh e n a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d
t o Me rc e d i t a Me n d o z a , o n e o f t h e n e i g h b o rs o f Ro b e rt o S e p a ra , S r . , t o h a vi n g
s t a r t e d t h e f i re i n t h e S e p a r a s h o u s e . Th e t e s t i mo n y o f Me rc e d i t a Me n d o z a
re c o u n t i n g s a i d a d mi s s i o n i s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t , a d mi s s i b l e i n
e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r a n d i s n o t c o v e r e d b y t h e a f o re s a i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
g u a ra n t e e . A r t i c l e I I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , o r t h e B i l l o f Ri g h t s , s o l e l y g o v e r n s
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e i n d i vi d u a l o n o n e h a n d a n d t h e S t a t e (a n d i t s
a g e n t s ) o n t h e o t h e r ; i t d o e s n o t c o n c e rn i t s e l f wi t h t h e r e l a t i o n b e t we e n a
p ri va t e i n d i vi d u a l a n d a n o t h e r p ri v a t e i n d i vi d u a l a s b o t h a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a n d
p ro s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s M e rc e d i t a Me n d o z a u n d o u b t e d l y a r e . [ 4 4 ] H e r e , t h e r e i s n o
t e s t i m o n y f o r b e i n g me re l y h e a rs a y . W i t h t h i s i mp u t a t i o n o f i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y , w e
a g r e e wi t h w h a t t h e Co u rt o f A p p e a l s h a d t o s a y :
A l t h o u g h t h i s t e s t i m o n y o f S FO4 Da n i l o Ta l u s a n i s h e a rs a y
b e c a u s e h e wa s n o t p r e s e n t wh e n G u s A b e l g a s i n t e r vi e w e d
a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t E D NA , i t ma y n e ve rt h e l e s s b e a d mi t t e d i n
e vi d e n c e a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y re l e v a n t s t a t e m e n t t o e s t a b l i s h n o t
the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the
s t a t e m e n t wa s ma d e [ P e o p l e v. Ma l l a ri , G. R. N o . 1 0 3 5 4 7 , J u l y 2 0 ,
1 9 9 9 , 3 1 0 S CRA 6 2 1 c i t i n g P e o p l e v. C u s i , J r. , G. R. N o . L -
2 0 9 8 6 , A u g u s t 1 4 , 1 9 6 5 , 1 4 S CR A 9 4 4 . ] . I n P e o p l e v s .
V e l a s q u e z, G . R. No s . 1 3 2 6 3 5 & 1 4 3 8 7 2 -7 5 , Fe b ru a ry 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 ,
3 5 2 S C RA 4 5 5 , t h e S u p re m e Co u rt r u l e d t h a t :
Un d e r t h e d o c t ri n e o f i n d e p e n d e n t l y re l e v a n t
s t a t e m e n t s , re g a rd l e s s o f t h e i r t ru t h o r f a l s i t y, t h e
f a c t t h a t s u c h s t a t e m e n t s h a ve b e e n m a d e i s
re l e v a n t . T h e h e a rs a y ru l e d o e s n o t a p p l y, a n d t h e
s t a t e m e n t s a re a d mi s s i b l e a s e vi d e n c e . E vi d e n c e
a s t o t h e m a k i n g o f s u c h s t a t e me n t i s n o t
s e c o n d a r y b u t p ri ma r y, f o r t h e s t a t e m e n t i t s e l f ma y
c o n s t i t u t e a f a c t i n i s s u e o r b e c i rc u m s t a n t i a l l y
re l e v a n t a s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s u c h a f a c t . [ 4 5 ]
A s re g a r d s t h e c o n f e s s i o n g i ve n b y a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t t o t h e me d i a , we
n e e d n o t d i s c u s s i t f u r t h e r f o r t h e re p o rt e rs we re n e ve r p r e s e n t e d t o t e s t i f y i n
court.
 l o c a t i o n o f t h e p ro p e r t y b u rn e d , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e va l u e o f t h e d a ma g e
A s a f i n a l a t t e m p t a t e x c u l p a t i o n , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t a s s e rt s t h a t s i n c e
c a u s e d , [ 4 8 ] t o wi t :
t h e i d e n t i t i e s o f t h e b u rn e d b o d i e s w e re n e ve r c o n c l u s i ve l y e s t a b l i s h e d , s h e
c a n n o t b e re s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r d e a t h s .
S u c h a s s e r t i o n i s b e r e f t o f me ri t .
I n t h e c ri me o f a rs o n , t h e i d e n t i t i e s o f t h e vi c t i ms a re i m m a t e ri a l i n t h a t
i n t e n t t o k i l l t h e m p a r t i c u l a rl y i s n o t o n e o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e c ri m e . A s we
h a ve c l a ri f i e d e a rl i e r , t h e k i l l i n g o f a p e rs o n i s a b s o r b e d i n t h e c h a rg e o f a rs o n ,
s i mp l e o r d e s t ru c t i ve . Th e p r o s e c u t i o n n e e d o n l y p ro ve , t h a t t h e b u rn i n g wa s
intentional and that what was intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
d w e l l i n g . A g a i n , i n t h e c a s e o f P e o p l e v . S o ri a n o , [ 4 6 ] we e x p l a i n e d t h a t :
A l t h o u g h i n t e n t ma y b e a n i n g re d i e n t o f t h e c ri me
o f A rs o n , i t ma y b e i n f e r re d f ro m t h e a c t s o f t h e a c c u s e d . Th e r e
i s a p re s u m p t i o n t h a t o n e i n t e n d s t h e n a t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h i s
a c t ; a n d wh e n i t i s s h o w n t h a t o n e h a s d e l i b e ra t e l y s e t f i r e t o a
b u i l d i n g , t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i s n o t b o u n d t o p ro d u c e f u rt h e r e vi d e n c e
o f h i s w ro n g f u l i n t e n t . [ 4 7 ]
Th e u l t i ma t e q u e r y n o w i s w h i c h k i n d o f a r s o n i s a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t
guilty of?
A s p r e vi o u s l y d i s c u s s e d , t h e r e a re t w o ( 2 ) c a t e g o ri e s o f t h e c ri m e o f
a rs o n : 1 ) d e s t ru c t i v e a rs o n , u n d e r A r t . 3 2 0 o f t h e Re vi s e d P e n a l Co d e , a s
a me n d e d b y Re p u b l i c A c t N o . 7 6 5 9 ; a n d 2 ) s i m p l e a rs o n , u n d e r P re s i d e n t i a l
D e c r e e N o . 1 6 1 3 . S a i d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s b a s e d o n t h e k i n d , c h a ra c t e r a n d
A rt i c l e 3 2 0 o f Th e Re v i s e d P e n a l C o d e , a s a m e n d e d b y RA
7 6 5 9 , c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e m a l i c i o u s b u r n i n g o f s tr uc tur e s , b ot h
pu bl i c a nd p r i v a t e , h o te l s , b ui l d i n gs , e di fi c e s , tr a i ns , v e s s e l s ,
a i r c r a f t, fa c t or i e s and o th e r m i l i ta r y, go v e r nm e n t or
c o m me r c i a l e s ta bl i s hm e n t s b y a n y p e r s o n or gr o u p of
pe r s o ns . [ [ 4 9 ] ] Th e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s t yp e o f c ri me i s k n o wn
a s De s t r u c t i v e Arson, wh i c h is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is s elf-
e vi d e n t : t o e f f e c t i ve l y d i s c o u ra g e a n d d e t e r t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f
t h i s d a s t a rd l y c ri m e , t o p re ve n t t h e d e s t ru c t i o n o f p ro p e rt i e s a n d
p ro t e c t t h e l i v e s o f i n n o c e n t p e o p l e . E x p o s u re t o a b re wi n g
c o n f l a g r a t i o n l e a ve s o n l y d e s t ru c t i o n a n d d e s p a i r i n i t s wa k e ;
h e n c e , t h e S t a t e m a n d a t e s g re a t e r re t ri b u t i o n t o a u t h o rs o f
t h i s h e i n o u s c ri m e . T h e e x c e p t i o n a l l y s e ve re p u n i s h m e n t i m p o s e d
f o r t h i s c ri m e t a k e s i n t o c o n s i d e ra t i o n t h e e x t r e me d a n g e r t o
h u ma n l i ve s e x p o s e d b y t h e m a l i c i o u s b u r n i n g o f t h e s e
s t ru c t u re s ; the danger to property re s u l t i n g f ro m the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt
p re c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t i t s c o m mi s s i o n , a n d t h e d i f f i c u l t y i n
p i n p o i n t i n g t h e p e r p e t ra t o rs ; a n d , t h e g re a t e r i m p a c t o n t h e
s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c , s e c u ri t y a n d p o l i t i c a l f a b ri c o f t h e n a t i o n .
[ E mp h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
p e n a l i z e d u n d e r A rt . 3 2 0 , d e a t h s h o u l d r e s u l t , t h e ma n d a t o r y
p e n a l t y o f d e a t h s h a l l b e i mp o s e d .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , P D 1 6 1 3 w h i c h re p e a l e d A rt s . 3 2 1 t o
3 2 6 -B o f Th e R e vi s e d P e n a l Co d e r e ma i n s t h e g o ve rn i n g l a w
f o r S i m p l e A rs o n . Th i s d e c r e e c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e ma l i c i o u s b u rn i n g
o f p u b l i c a n d p ri v a t e s t ru c t u re s , re g a rd l e s s o f s i ze , n o t i n c l u d e d
i n A r t . 3 2 0 , a s a m e n d e d b y RA 7 6 5 9 , a n d c l a s s i f i e d a s o t h e r
c a s e s o f a rs o n . T h e s e i n c l u d e ho us e s , dw e l l i n gs , go v e r n me nt
bu i l di ng s , f a r ms , mi l l s , p l a nt a t i o ns , r a i l w a ys , bu s s t a t i o ns ,
a i r por ts , w ha r ve s a n d o th e r i n d us tr i a l e s ta bl i s h me nt s . [ [ 5 0 ] ]
A l t h o u g h t h e p u rp o s e o f t h e l a w o n S i mp l e A rs o n i s t o p re ve n t t h e
h i g h i n c i d e n c e o f f i re s a n d o t h e r c ri me s i n vo l vi n g d e s t ru c t i o n ,
p ro t e c t t h e n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y a n d p r e s e r ve t h e s o c i a l , e c o n o mi c
a n d p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f t h e n a t i o n , P D 1 6 1 3 t e mp e rs t h e p e n a l t y
t o b e m e t e d t o o f f e n d e rs . Th i s s e p a ra t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f S i mp l e
A rs o n r e c o g n i z e s t h e n e e d t o l e s s e n t h e s e v e ri t y o f p u n i s h m e n t
c o m me n s u ra t e t o t h e a c t o r a c t s c o m mi t t e d , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e
 particular facts and c i rc u ms t a n c e s of each case. [Emphasis
supplied.] Th e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e a t b a r i s s o m e w h a t s i mi l a r t o t h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e

o f P e o p l e v . S o ri a n o . [ 5 3 ] T h e a c c u s e d i n t h e l a t t e r c a s e c a u s e d t h e b u rn i n g o f a

To e mp h a s i ze :
Th e n a t u re o f D e s t ru c t i ve A rs o n i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d f ro m
S i m p l e A rs o n b y t h e d e g r e e o f p e r v e rs i t y o r vi c i o u s n e s s o f t h e
c ri mi n a l o f f e n d e r. Th e a c t s c o m mi t t e d u n d e r A rt . 3 2 0 o f t h e
Re vi s e d P e n a l C o d e (a s a me n d e d ) c o n s t i t u t i n g De s t ru c t i v e
A rs o n a re c h a ra c t e ri z e d a s h e i n o u s c ri me s f o r b e i n g g ri e vo u s ,
o d i o u s a n d h a t e f u l o f f e n s e s a n d wh i c h , b y r e a s o n o f t h e i r
i n h e re n t o r m a n i f e s t w i c k e d n e s s , vi c i o u s n e s s , a t ro c i t y a n d
p e r v e rs i t y a re re p u g n a n t a n d o u t r a g e o u s t o t h e c o m m o n
s t a n d a r d s a n d n o r ms o f d e c e n c y a n d m o ra l i t y i n a j u s t , c i vi l i ze d
a n d o r d e re d s o c i e t y . [ 5 1 ] O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a c t s c o m mi t t e d u n d e r
P D 1 6 1 3 c o n s t i t u t i n g S i mp l e A rs o n a re c ri m e s wi t h a l e s s e r
d e g re e o f p e r ve rs i t y a n d vi c i o u s n e s s t h a t t h e l a w p u n i s h e s wi t h a
l e s s e r p e n a l t y. I n o t h e r w o rd s , S i mp l e A rs o n c o n t e m p l a t e s c ri me s
wi t h l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l a n d n a t i o n a l
s e c u ri t y i mp l i c a t i o n s t h a n D e s t ru c t i ve A rs o n . Ho we ve r, a c t s
f a l l i n g u n d e r S i mp l e A rs o n ma y n e ve rt h e l e s s b e c o n ve rt e d i n t o
De s t ru c t i v e A rs o n d e p e n d i n g o n t h e q u a l i f yi n g c i rc u ms t a n c e s
p re s e n t . [ E mp h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ] [ 5 2 ]
p a r t i c u l a r h o u s e . Un f o r t u n a t e l y, t h e b l a z e s p re a d a n d g u t t e d d o wn f i ve (5 )
n e i g h b o ri n g h o u s e s . T h e RT C t h e re i n f o u n d t h e a c c u s e d g u i l t y o f d e s t ru c t i v e
a rs o n u n d e r p a ra g r a p h 1 [ 5 4 ] o f A r t . 3 2 0 o f t h e Re vi s e d P e n a l C o d e , a s a me n d e d
b y Re p u b l i c A c t No . 7 6 5 9 . T h i s C o u rt , t h r o u g h M r. J u s t i c e B e l l o s i l l o , h o we v e r ,
d e c l a re d t h a t :
x x x [ T] h e a p p l i c a b l e p ro vi s i o n o f l a w s h o u l d b e S e c . 3 , p a r. 2 , o f
P D 1 6 1 3 , wh i c h i mp o s e s a p e n a l t y o f r e c l u s i o n t e m p o ra l t o
re c l u s i o n p e rp e t u a f o r o t h e r c a s e s o f a rs o n a s t h e p ro p e rt i e s
b u r n e d b y a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a re s p e c i fi c a l l y de s c r i be d a s
h o u s e s , c o n t e m p l a t i n g i n h a b i t e d h o u s e s o r d we l l i n g s u n d e r t h e
a f o re s a i d l a w. T h e d e s c ri p t i o n s a s a l l e g e d i n t h e s e c o n d
A m e n d e d I n f o r m a t i o n p a rt i c u l a rl y re f e r t o t h e s t r u c t u re s a s
h o u s e s r a t h e r t h a n a s b u i l d i n g s o r e d i f i c e s . Th e a p p l i c a b l e l a w
s h o u l d t h e re f o r e b e S e c . 3 , P a r . 2 , o f P D 1 6 1 3 , a n d n o t A r t . 3 2 0 ,
p a r . 1 o f t h e P e n a l C o d e . I n c a s e o f a m b i g u i t y i n c o n s t ru c t i o n o f
p e n a l l a ws , i t i s we l l - s e t t l e d t h a t s u c h l a ws s h a l l b e c o n s t ru e d
s t ri c t l y a g a i n s t t h e g o v e r n me n t , a n d l i b e r a l l y i n f a vo r o f t h e
accused.

Th e e l e m e n t s o f a rs o n u n d e r S e c . 3 , p a r. 2 , o f P D 1 6 1 3
a re : ( a ) t h e re i s i n t e n t i o n a l b u r n i n g ; a n d (b ) wh a t i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y
P re s c i n d i n g f ro m t h e a b o ve c l a ri f i c a t i o n v i s - - v i s t h e d e s c ri p t i o n o f t h e burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these
e l e me n t s c o n c u r i n t h e c a s e a t b a r . [ 5 5 ]
c ri me a s s t a t e d i n t h e a c c u s a t o r y p o r t i o n o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , i t i s q u i t e e vi d e n t

that accused-appellant was c h a rg e d wi t h the c ri m e o f S i m pl e Ar s o n f o r

h a vi n g d e l i b e ra t e l y set fire upon t h e t w o -s to r e y r e s i d e n ti a l ho us e o f

A s s t a t e d i n t h e b o d y o f t h e I n f o r ma t i o n , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t wa s c h a r g e d
R O B E R T O S E P A R A a n d f a m i l y x x x k n o wi n g t h e s a m e t o b e a n i n h a b i t e d
wi t h h a vi n g intentionally burned t h e t w o - s t or e y r e s i d e nt i a l ho us e o f
h o u s e a n d s i t u a t e d i n a t h i c k l y p o p u l a t e d p l a c e a n d a s a c o n s e q u e n c e t h e re o f a Ro b e r t S e p a ra . S a i d c o n f l a g r a t i o n l i k e wi s e s p re a d a n d d e s t ro ye d s e ve n ( 7 )
c o n f l a g r a t i o n e n s u e d a n d t h e s a i d b u i l d i n g , t o g e t h e r wi t h s o m e s e v e n ( 7 ) a d jo i n i n g h ou s e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y, i f p ro ve d , a s i t wa s p r o v e d , a t t h e t ri a l , s h e

a d j o i n i n g re s i d e n t i a l h o u s e s , w e re r a ze d b y f i r e . [ E mp h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ] may be c o n vi c t e d , and sentenced a c c o rd i n g l y, of the c ri m e o f s i m pl e

a r s on . S u c h i s t h e c a s e n o t wi t h s t a n d i n g t h e e r ro r i n t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e
o f f e n s e i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e m a i n s e f f e c t i ve i n s o f a r a s i t s t a t e s
t h e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e c ri m e a l l e g e d t h e r e i n . [ 5 6 ] W h a t i s c o n t ro l l i n g i s n o t t h e d e l e t i o n b e i n g t h a t n o a g g ra va t i n g c i rc u ms t a n c e h a d b e e n a l l e g e d a n d p ro ve d
t i t l e o f t h e c o m p l a i n t , n o r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e o f f e n s e c h a rg e d o r t h e b y t h e p ro s e c u t i o n i n t h e c a s e a t b a r. [ 6 1 ]
p a r t i c u l a r l a w o r p a rt t h e r e o f a l l e g e d l y vi o l a t e , x x x , b u t t h e d e s c ri p t i o n o f t h e
c ri me c h a rg e d a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s t h e r e i n re c i t e d . [ 5 7 ] To s u m ma ri ze , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t s a l t e rn a t i ve p l e a t h a t s h e b e a c q u i t t e d
o f t h e c ri me m u s t b e r e j e c t e d . W i t h t h e e vi d e n c e o n r e c o rd , we f i n d n o c o g e n t
Th e re i s , t h u s , a n e e d t o mo d i f y t h e p e n a l t y i m p o s e d b y t h e R T C a s S e c . re a s o n t o d i s t u r b t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e RT C a n d t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a l s . It is
5 o f P D No . 1 6 1 3 c a t e g o ri c a l l y p ro vi d e s t h a t t h e p e n a l t y t o b e i m p o s e d f o r indubitable that accused-appellant is the author of the c ri m e of s i mp l e
s i mp l e a rs o n i s : a rs o n . A l l t h e c i rc u ms t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e p re s e n t e d b e f o r e t h e R TC , vi e we d i n i t s
e n t i re t y , i s a s c o n vi n c i n g a s d i re c t e vi d e n c e a n d , a s s u c h , n e g a t e s a c c u s e d -

S E C . 5 . W h e re D e a t h R e s u l t s f ro m A rs o n . - I f b y re a s o n o f a p p e l l a n t s i n n o c e n c e , a n d w h e n c o n s i d e re d c o n c u rr e n t l y wi t h h e r a d mi s s i o n
o r o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f a rs o n d e a t h re s u l t s , t h e p e n a l t y given t o Me rc e d i t a Me n d o za , t h e f o r m e rs g u i l t b e yo n d reasonable doubt is
o f r e c l us i o n pe r p e t ua to d e a th s h a l l b e i m p o s e d . [ E mp h a s i s
supplied.] t wi c e a s e vi d e n t . He n c e , h e r c o n vi c t i o n i s e f f e c t i ve l y ju s t i f i e d . M o r e s o , a s i t i s
p ro p i t i o u s t o n o t e t h a t i n s t a rk c o n t r a s t t o t h e f a c t u a l c i rc u ms t a n c e s p re s e n t e d
b y t h e p ro s e c u t i o n , a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t n e i t h e r m u s t e re d a d e n i a l n o r a n a l i b i
A c c o rd i n g l y, t h e r e b e i n g n o a g g ra va t i n g c i r c u ms t a n c e a l l e g e d i n t h e except for the proposition that her guilt had not been established beyond
I n f o r m a t i o n , t h e i mp o s a b l e p e n a l t y o n a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t i s r e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a . re a s o n a b l e d o u b t .

Apropos the c i vi l liabilities of a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t , c u r re n t I N V I EW W HE RE OF , t h e De c i s i o n o f t h e Co u rt o f A p p e a l s d a t e d 2

[58]
ju ri s p ru d e n c e d i c t a t e t h a t t h e c i vi l i n d e mn i t y d u e f ro m a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t S e p t e mb e r 2 0 0 5 , i n CA G. R . CR HC N o . 0 1 1 3 9 , i s h e r e b y A F FI R ME D i n s o f a r a s
[59]
i s P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 f o r t h e d e a t h o f e a c h o f t h e v i c t i ms . H o we v e r , t h e m o n e t a r y t h e c o n vi c t i o n o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E DNA M A L N GA N Y M A Y O i s c o n c e rn e d .
a w a rd s f o r m o ra l a n d e x e mp l a r y d a m a g e s g i ve n b y t h e Co u rt o f A p p e a l s , b o t h Th e s e n t e n c e t o b e i m p o s e d a n d t h e a m o u n t o f d a ma g e s t o b e a wa rd e d ,
in the amount of P50,000.00, due the h e i rs of the vi c t i ms , h a ve to h o w e ve r, a re M O DI FI E D. I n a c c o rd a n c e wi t h S e c . 5 o f P re s i d e n t i a l De c r e e No .
b e d e l e t e d f o r l a c k o f m a t e ri a l b a s i s . S i mi l a rl y, t h e Co u r t o f A p p e a l s a wa r d o f 1613, a c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t is h e re b y sentenced t o RE C L US I ON P E RP E TUA .
e x e mp l a r y d a m a g e s t o R o d o l f o Mo vi l l a i n t h e a m o u n t o f P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 f o r t h e A c c u s e d -a p p e l l a n t is h e re b y o r d e re d to pay the h e i rs of each of the
d e s t ru c t i o n o f h i s h o u s e , a l s o h a s t o b e d e l e t e d , b u t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e f o r b e i n g vi c t i ms P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s c i vi l i n d e m n i t y.
i m p r o p e r. Mo ra l d a m a g e s c a n n o t b e a w a rd b y t h i s Co u r t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p ro o f
of mental or p h ys i c a l s u f f e ri n g on the p a rt of the heirs of the
[60]
vi c t i ms . C o n c e rn i n g t h e a w a rd o f e x e m p l a r y d a m a g e s , t h e re a s o n f o r t h e S O O RDE RE D.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial court’s conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-
year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 1 the real name and the personal
circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her
identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this
decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the appellant was accused of the crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own
daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4 During the pre-trial conference, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated
in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13)
years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the
appellant.5 On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; 6 her
brother BBB;7 and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies
revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.9 AAA’s father, the appellant, was
having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place.10 Her mother decided to leave because when
appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAA’s mother.11 Her only brother BBB also went
out in the company of some neighbors.12
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;13 removed his pants, slid inside
the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;14 warned her not to shout for
help while threatening her with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed above her
head.16 He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her
vagina."17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.18 Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out
late.19 BBB decided to take AAA with him.20 While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s
house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. 21 Upon reaching their
grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, 22 after which, they
sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.23
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. 24 He invited
appellant to the police station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to
him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.26
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula,
Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 o’clock & 6 o’clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate
bloody discharges 2° to an alleged raping incident28
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against
him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children
after engaging in a heated argument,29and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.30 He went
further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime. 31 Shortly
after, AAA arrived.32She answered back when confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked her
hard on her buttocks.34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 o’clock in the afternoon. 35 Finding
nobody at home,36he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises
Boy Banting.38They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.39 He later learned that he
was under detention because AAA charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its
decision41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship
and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 It also ordered him
to indemnify AAA ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity with
exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS44 by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45 The appellate court found that
appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s notice of
appeal.47 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs,48 but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings.49
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding
him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt,50 because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the
assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; 52 and (3) AAA’s accusation was ill-
motivated.53
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan"
and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the
confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was
no valid waiver of such requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for
under Article III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the
admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the
private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may
be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of
the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several
houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed
by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-
appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the ‘interrogation’
made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of
accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag
are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.1avvphi1
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the
case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x
[of the private complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not
a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP." 60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued
on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be
organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the
Barangay level."61 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong
Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing
Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization
Representative well-known in his community.62
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of
duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not
deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence
showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified
that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her
relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought
her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key
witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie,
and their story a mere concoction."65
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could
not simply stand together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking
incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the
testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since
she was with Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought
the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was
sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut
version of AAA’s testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial
to affect the veracity of the testimonies.66 In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase
doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.67
Appellant’s contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him
is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of
a minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.68 As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family
invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but
also bring their fathers into the gallows of death.69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it
is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal
and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such
heinous crime was not in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such
height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for
which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it
takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which
would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family
including herself to a lifetime of shame.72 It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof
of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own
father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed
against a close relative.73
Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the
applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or intimidation."75 The death penalty shall be
imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent."76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the
penetration of appellant’s penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal
knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed.77 Further, when such testimony corresponds with
medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established.78
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the
accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence
substitutes for violence and intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant
with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAA’s head.80
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that
is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate."81 "Alibi and denial must be supported by
strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility."82 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must establish two elements – (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time
the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the
time of its commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the
instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were
specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference,
and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and
admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because
they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
of Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that
where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto84 and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.85 However, the award of exemplary
damages should have been increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the
death penalty upon appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines.87 We further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellant’s non-eligibility for
parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971
RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan
del Norte and Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.
Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe, Federico del Puerto and Pelaez, Jalandoni
& Jamir for petitioner.
Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la
Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the
constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail.1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus
apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail
to P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial
jail, thus rendering this case moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the
guidance of lower court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that
should be observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to
such a constitutional right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay,
Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of
Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other
laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968.
Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First
Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder2 and another for multiple murder3 against petitioner,
his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid
occurrence. Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the
lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal
incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the
trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the
time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee
even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that on
August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such
order, sent a telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and
suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was
likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained
adamant. Hence this petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances concerning
the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would
disprove any charge that he wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the
challengedorder would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this
Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the petitioner
and respondents with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty days within which to
submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period
from receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner on April
6, 1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental answer wherein
he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then
remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit,
towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next
day with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on
behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit.
For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the
present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other
Ricardo de la Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the power
of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail."4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not warranted,
still, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should
not preclude thisTribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligationof
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of theConstitution that
excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the
evidence of guilt is strong.5 Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof liberty is
honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of probability,
however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just
simply make himself scarceand thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a
guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short of
confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused" for the
subsequent trial.6 Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a
capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome
of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the
jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the
United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. 7As construed in the
latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's
presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount
reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." 8
resists thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a stateof
desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have been
more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There
would have beenno disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of
Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent
bequest in a pauper's will."12 It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment and
bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not
entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation
from this Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an
alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such
a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to doso would be to
reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order complained of absolutely
bereft of support in law, but it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is
at war with thecommand of reason.

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea
amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 to nullify the above order.
for the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200
for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as to
constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the costs.
amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case
that the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the twooffenses. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseñor v. Abano.9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail
was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to
give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and Makasiar, J., took no part.
reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the
accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases." 10 Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive
consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court
called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the
required remedy." 11

No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is
grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required
to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would
apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal
of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to
believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside
two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions
on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision
correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year
for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20)
years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash
bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order
dated February 17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said
court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal,
invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to
comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of
the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until
final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail
ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail.
The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals4, issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the
recommendation of the Solicitor General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of
Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco
Yap, Jr., a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five
Million Five Hundred Thousand (P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following
conditions, viz. :
(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the
place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to
be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court;
(2) The Commission of lmmigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to
issue a hold departure order against accused-appellant; and
(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division
Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return;
(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-
appellant's bail bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and
confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.5
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by
respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of
the provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5 million.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail
for the provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.
The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of
abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively
denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at
P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila
Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil
liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He prays that
bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for
the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of
bail he posted during the trial of the case.6
On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed to the Court of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the
severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of
the offense of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not
only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The
Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail, it
having been established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had in
fact left the country several times during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was
also shown that petitioner used different names in his business transactions and had several
abodes in different parts of the country.
As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the
Court of Appeals requires is notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way impair
petitioner's right to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence
during the pendency of the appeal.
Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
states:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under
the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than
twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and
with notice to the adverse party.7
There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor
of allowing bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for
"humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he
went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court
deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. 8 The obvious
rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an
excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano,10 this
Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over
lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same
by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same
time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that
the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In
reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on
a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of
petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from
confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath
as he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean
that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he
were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have
been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice
Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a
munificent bequest in a pauper's will." XXX11
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts
to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may
jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options
may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report
periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements. 12 In the present case,
where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the
Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure
order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in
the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure
order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his
whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be
meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive,
and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, 13 or whenever so
required by the Court14. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 15 To fix
bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil
liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
the appellate court.
At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's submission that bail in the instant case be set at
P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August
29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is
P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court
has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state
prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, "merits attention, being in a sense
an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the
enforcement of criminal laws."16 Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but
should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal
justice.17 This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an
amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an
appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.
It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital
offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years
and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused
must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. 18 In the same vein, the
Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in
fact convicted by the trial court.19 In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J.
Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of
wise discretion; thus:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should
be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and
therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking,
be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the
conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail
than before conviction.xxx20
Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by
the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty
years --the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the
Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the
foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner
bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual
basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against
petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area
and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court", claiming that the same violates his
liberty of abode and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the
Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order.21 In fact, the petition
submits that "the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee that he will
not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his residence is
already unnecessary."22
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at
the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is
merely required to inform the court in case he does so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced
from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
 RULE 114
Bail
Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required
under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain
in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of
these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due
notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial
may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final
judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the
undertaking and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last
six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail.
(2a)
Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. — No person under detention by
legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail. (3a)
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule
(a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall
be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a)
Section 6. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing
at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with
death. (6a)
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify. (8a)
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the
following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)
Section 10. Corporate surety. — Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in
accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond
subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of
directors. (10a)
Section 11. Property bond, how posted. — A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien
on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the
approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on
file with the Register of Deeds if the land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book
on the space provided therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city and municipal
assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure to do
so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and
detention. (11a)
Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. — The qualification of sureties in a
property bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of
the undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that
expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent
to the whole amount of bail demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and
above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution. (12a)
Section 13. Justification of sureties. — Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the judge
that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the
property given as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and
amount of other bails entered into by him and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court
may examine the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem
proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified. (13a)
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. — The accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written
undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall
be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the
payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever
made the deposit. (14a)
Section 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court may release a
person in custody to his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. (15a)
Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. — No bail shall be required
when the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment prescribe for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any
modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the
discretion of the court. (16a)
Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial
judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province,
city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where
the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released
on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending,
whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court
in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (17a)
Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. — In the application for bail under section 8 of this
Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to
submit his recommendation. (18a)
Section 19. Release on bail. — The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the
judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted
the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court
where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed. (19a)
Section 20. Increase or reduction of bail. — After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may,
upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be
committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period.
An accused held to answer a criminal charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the
complaint or information, may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong
showing of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof,
committed to custody. (20a)
Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. — When the presence of the accused is required by the court or
these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and
time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and
the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why
no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period,
the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of
the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)
Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bond. (22a)
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. — For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the
bondsmen may arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the
undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and
discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (23a)
Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. — No bail shall be allowed after the judgment
of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused has applies for probation, he
may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the accused is
incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a
responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has
commenced to serve sentence. (24a)
Section 25. Court supervision of detainees. — The court shall exercise supervision over all
persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of
the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and
municipal jails and their prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the
number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and health and examine the
condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults,
ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to
eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees.
In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges or
municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails in
their respective municipalities and submit a report to the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction therein.
A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court
Administrator which shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held for more
than thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the crime charged, the status of the case, the
cause for detention, and other pertinent information. (25a)
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. — An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging
the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early
as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. (n)