Alia Noelle Lamaadar

“Absorption Capacity”: Unity in Diversity?

(January 8 2007)

Among the ambiguities which have befogged the question of European unity in the past, there is,
first of all, the tendency, very marked since the time of the First Crusade, to think of it only in
terms of a reaction against something else … I have called it a negative conception of European
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unity . (Geoffrey Barraclough 1963 cited in Moisio 2002: 99)
Introduction
Somberly cast in the shadow of a Constitution rejected by both France and the Netherlands in
2005, the European Union (EU) now proceeds through a self-described period of reflection.
There is a growing tendency for this reflective political discourse to suggest that the failure of the
Constitutional Treaty, intended to pave the road for future enlargements, represents the EU’s
‘Absorption Capacity’ and is representative of the institution’s ‘democratic deficit’, and the
polity’s ‘enlargement fatigue;’ thus mandating the establishment of the EU’s ‘final frontiers’
(Emerson et al. 2006:22). The use of such sensational and ambiguous phrases, by EU officials
and academics alike, is less indicative of reflective discourse as it is of reflexive discourse.
Indeed, if this period of reflection is to contribute to a more stable and prosperous continent the
realistic basis for this euro-jargon must be assessed.
As Schimmelfennig has offered, ‘a large-scale process of international socialization has begun in
the ‘new Europe’ (Schimmelfennig 2000: 109). A so-called ‘period of reflection’ must re-
evaluate the EU’s premise, purpose and limits. As to the EU’s limits, a more elaborate and
reasoned understanding of the term ‘Absorption Capacity,’ and its implications for enlargement
are required. This paper endeavors to dissect possible interpretations of the term and assess its
conceptual value. Such a critique begins with a discussion of its rhetorical uses within and
outside the EU. Adopting the most common understanding of the term, the paper then proceeds
with an examination of its economic, political and sociological implications for the EU and
future enlargement. What becomes evident from such an undertaking is the need to distinguish
the economic and political implications for enlargement as the ‘integration capacity’ while
retaining the notion of an ‘Absorption Capacity’ to describe the sociological implications. As
such, ‘Absorption Capacity’ is reconceptualised as the extent to which the EU, dominated by
Western European interests, can overcome its dualist mindset, or in Barccaclough’s words, ‘it’s
negative conception of European unity’. Thus, this capacity is improved, and the negative effects
of enlargement mitigated, by embracing diversity as a ‘new European’ value, and actively
diffusing this value to member state populations.
‘Absorption Capacity’ in context
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The ontological origins of the phrase ‘Absorption Capacity’ are grounded in development
economics where it is understood to mean, the ‘objective’ and measurable limits of a country’s
ability to make effective use of foreign capital (Vibert 2006: 2). However in the context of the
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current debate surrounding enlargement, this usage is rare . Increasingly, academics, EU officials
and states—many of whom seek closer relations with the EU—are demanding a clearer
understanding of what this concept refers to. In relation to EU-aspiring states, Landaburu (2006)
advises that they ‘should not ask a question to which one wouldn’t like the answer’ (2).
Certainly, this same sense of foreboding is found throughout the literature regarding ‘Absorption
Capacity’; this may be a consequence of the groups who wield it most frequently. As Green
MEP Joost Lagendijk has suggested, the term has become particularly useful to those who wish
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to oppose further enlargement and particularly Turkey’s accession (‘Lawmakers debate’ 2006’ ).
The notion of the EU’s ‘final frontiers’ are connected with this usage, and Absorption Capacity
may be understood as a geographical (or geopolitical) precedent for the end of EU enlargement.
Although, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Ollie Rehn, has categorically denied
this understanding of ‘Absorption Capacity’, stating: ‘it is not deemed sensible to close the door
forever by drawing a line across the map to define Europe once and for all…’ (Emerson et al.
2006: 4). Most recently, EU representatives have been quick to distinguish the term from the
‘Copenhagen criteria’ for EU accession, elaborating it in terms of EU, and not candidate,
responsibility (EP 2006: 5). In it’s most common usage within the EU, it is applied to suggest
that ‘there are empirical and “objective” limits to what current EU structures can accommodate –
and that these limits have been or are close to being reached’ (Vibert 2006: 2). However, this
definition remains vague and essentially ambivalent towards its theoretical constituents. French
president, Jacques Chirac, explains that ‘Absorption Capacity’ is composed of both a financial
and a political capacity (‘EU cements 2006) and Emerson et al. (2006) have suggested that the
idea is better appreciated when it is de-constructed, by examining its constitutive capacities: the
economic, political, and sociological constraints of enlargement.
Absorption Capacity: economic constraints of enlargement
Assessing the validity of ‘Absorption Capacity,’ in terms of the economic constraints of future
EU enlargement is best done by borrowing from ‘club theory.’ Club theory focuses on the
challenges of clubs that are growing in size and the dilution of membership benefits and
resources as the club increases in numbers (Vibert 2006: 3). Undoubtedly, many authors have
adopted a view that highlights the gains of the recent ‘Eastern enlargement’ states at the expense
of the EU-15, leading to the suggestion that ‘the Eastern enlargement represents a goodwill
gesture by the West’ (Ellison 2006). Subsequently, the Absorption Capacity can be understood
quite simply as the financial exhaustion of Western Europe in its role as a good Samaritan. But in
practice this theory is weak; many of the economic benefits of EU membership are derived from
the increased value of shared rules. Their worth actually increases as more states ascribe to them
(Vibert 2006: 3), as is demonstrated by the expansion of the Single European Market.
Other economic concerns associated with the notion of the EU’s Absorption Capacity, are the
capacity of the goods and services markets, and the labour markets, as well as the EU’s budget to
absorb new member states. Here, the use of the phrase implies an urgent sense that tactics other
than the cessation or severe deceleration of enlargement risk collapsing these markets. However,
in the case of the Single Market for goods and services, limited if any real threat is posed by
future enlargements, which may in fact have beneficial effects. Emerson et al. (2006) conclude
that, ‘member states of the European Economic Area (EEA) are already completely integrated
with the EU. Turkey is also integrated to a high degree given its customs union with the EU’
(11). The other possible EU candidates within the Balkan states represent small, weak
economies, which for the time being are more at risk, than posing a risk to the established
economic markets of current member states (ibid). The true threat to the goods and services
markets of the EU actually looms in the growing industrial economies of Asia. In this regard the
notion of an Absorption Capacity is unconstructive, as it obscures more fruitful endeavours to
strengthen Europe’s international competitiveness by utilizing the labour and resources of future
member states (ibid).
The Capacity of the EU labour market to absorb new member states is a more controversial
matter. The EU has been overwhelmed by the staggering levels of migration after the Eastern
enlargement to those member states that did not retain restrictions. Studies in 2004 suggested
that immigration in the first year after enlargement exceeded 600, 000 and 200,000 migrants to
the UK and Ireland respectively (Emerson et al. 2006:12). Yet, during this period the UK,
Ireland, and Sweden, the three member states that did not retain restrictions, ‘have all exhibited
steady or high economic growth and declining unemployment’ (ibid). By the EU’s own
admission, enlargement was predicted to bring detrimental effects to the labour market, but in
fact the adjustments have been ‘limited and manageable’ and the migrant workers ‘have made a
positive economic contribution in the Member States which have opened their labour markets’
(CEC 2005). Even for those members of the EU-15 that seemingly have the most at stake,
particularly with continued Eastern enlargements, the costs pale in comparison to the benefits.
An ideal example of this is Germany, since it has a high unemployment rate and a close
proximity to Eastern labour. While the state may ‘face adjustment costs in the short term’ along
with Austria, ‘it is predicted to have the highest overall permanent net increase in GDP from
enlargement’ (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003:50). Overall, the effects of further enlargement on
the EU’s labour markets should prove to be at worst, minimal, and at best beneficial.
This is similarly the case for the EU’s budgetary capacity to absorb new members. Previous to
2004, Moravcsik & Vachudova (2003) anticipated that the overall effect of the Eastern
enlargement would be modest. They noted that as a whole the first ten members to accede
represented less than 5 percent of the EU’s GDP, and thus could have only a limited impact
(Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003:50). Although, they were also quick to add that ‘[d]istinct
material benefits, however modest, accrue to the EU-15 (ibid). Emerson et al. (2006) have since
confirmed that the ‘likely economic gains to the ‘old’ EU from enlargement, while small (e.g.
between 0.4 to 0.5% of GDP for the 2004 enlargement) would significantly exceed the costs to
the EU budget (Emerson et al. 2006:14; Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003:50). Regarding the
Structural and Cohesion Fund (SCF), one of the EU's largest sources of budgetary spending, and
long believed to be threatened by enlargement, the Commission, has set a funding ceiling in the
case of Eastern enlargement, limiting the total amount of funds available to new members.
While the previous treatment has only touched upon some of the primary economic concerns
represented by the concept of an Absorption Capacity, it also clearly presents its insufficiency as
a conceptual tool for addressing future EU enlargement. This is not to say that these concerns are
not valid, simply that they do not support the notion of an institution nearing its capacity for
further enlargement.
Absorption Capacity: political constraints of enlargement
It is useful to return to ‘club theory’ when assessing ‘Absorption Capacity’ as it relates to
political constraints and the decision-making ability of the EU. ‘Club theory suggests that as
membership increases, so too will the difficulties in making decisions and conducting common
policies’ (Vibert 2006: 3). This logic is intuitively appealing, particularly in an institutional
setting like the EU where individual members have the ability to veto the collective action of the
club. Certainly, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the EU is struggling to maintain its
decision-making capacity. Leading up to the Eastern enlargement the EU had neither agreed
upon an institutional architecture capable of supporting a Ministerial Council of 25 members,
and protecting the viability of the Commission, ‘[n]or could an agreement about the future
volume and funding of the EU budget be reached’(Heidenreich 2004: 16). Additionally, despite
WTO requests, no reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that would have avoided
distributional conflicts between old and new members could be agreed upon (ibid).
There would appear to be some support for the idea of a political Absorption Capacity if the
institutional bodies of the EU are increasingly unable to make binding decisions. But the
question remains as to whether or not the growing number of members within the EU is
responsible for these difficulties? Moravcsik & Vachudova (2003) answer in the negative to this
question. Their research suggests that ‘the binding constraint on EU policy making is not
generally imposed by the probability of individual vetoes. Instead, it is imposed by the level of
conflict of interest among blocks of states’ (54). In this sense the Absorption Capacity of the EU
is limited, not by the number of members but, by the diversity of their interests (ibid). Without
underestimating the importance of increased membership, Vibert supports (2006) Moravcsik &
Vachudova’s findings, by concluding that all of the individual EU institutions already have rules
that will work with greater membership (3). The history of previous enlargements suggests that
far from its capacity being reached, the EU’s decision-making may actually be strengthened.
Often integrative policy initiatives have preceded waves of enlargement. Examples include, the
limiting of national veto powers and the basic principles of the Common Market, which preceded
the third enlargement, as well as the EMU which preceded the fourth enlargement, and finally
the foundation of the proposed Constitution was laid before the fifth enlargement (Heidenreich
2004: 17).
Much emphasis is placed by EU representatives on Absorption Capacity being predicated on
the failure of the Constitution, which would have, by their accounts, provided the necessary
institutional framework to maintain and support enlargement. Previous to the Commission’s
Decision to recommend the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007, President
Barroso, commented that: ‘We are not in a position to further integrate Europe without further
institutional reform. There are limits to our absorptive capacity’ (Emerson et al. 2006:14).
Whether it is through the ratification of the constitution, or through other means, the EU is
undoubtedly in need of institutional change, but this is not solely attributable to enlargement, and
certainly does not represent the Absorption Capacity, since it is needed with or without future
enlargements. As the previous sections have demonstrated institutional reforms are particularly
necessary to combat the increasing diversity of interests within the EU, although not necessarily
arising from enlargement per se. Engaging these issues involves addressing the sociological
constraints of the EU’s Absorption Capacity
Absorption Capacity: sociological constraints of enlargement
Increasingly, attempts to understand the notion of the EU’s Absorption Capacity have also
recognized the capacity of EU member state societies’ to absorb new members (‘Lawmakers
debate’ 2006). Schimmelfennig (2000) contends that the EU represents an international
socialization project that is the follow-on to the Cold War. ‘As a result of the delegitimation of
communism, the West was able to establish its liberal order as the new standard of legitimacy for
all of Europe’ (Schimmelfennig 2000: 111). Thus, enlargement policy is viewed as a way to
favour those states who are closer to the Western core, and consequently ‘more European’.
Blokker (2006) claims, that with this in mind, it is quite easy to understand why such a policy
has led to divisions within the ‘New Europe’ (13). It is no coincidence that so much attention is
being paid to the limits of enlargement and the Absorption Capacity at a time when the
‘Europeaness’ of aspiring EU members, including Turkey and the Western Balkan countries, are
being questioned. Currently ‘Europeaness’ is defined as the criteria set out at the 1993
Copenhagen European Council. ‘The concept of Europe [is] more and more clearly associated
with the values of liberal democracy, human rights and the market economy, as well as the
ability to adapt to the EU’s acquis, and the willingness to approve the Union’s long-term
political goals agreed in the Maastricht treaty’ (Moisio 2002: 96). In no uncertain terms this
understanding of Absorption Capacity, highlights the EU’s slogan of ‘United in Diversity,’ as
being based less upon diversity and more upon assimilation. The idea of enlargement as
assimilation is well-captured in a statement frequently uttered by Commission officials that,
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‘[applicant states] are joining us; we are not joining them’ (Jacoby, 1999 ).
This view is particularly problematic if, as Blokker (2006) suggests, even after accession has
occurred the stigmatisation of the ‘Internal Other’, ‘as with regard to its communist past, the
distortion of its European heritage by oriental communism, all those elements that necessitated
the enlargement ritual’ remain (17). This theory is substantiated by recent public opinion surveys
that indicate that two-thirds of the European population considers Islam to be irreconcilable with
the ‘Western’ norms of democracy and rule of law (Emerson et al. 2006:18). Interestingly, these
same surveys confirm a close relationship between attitudes toward Islam and Turkey’s EU
membership. Absorption Capacity accordingly, represents an important sociological
phenomenon and obstacle to further enlargement. The magnitude of this obstacle inflates when
the perspective of the ‘Other’ is considered. Those states which aspire to EU membership—lest
we forget that beyond the interests of the West, there is much to be gained by membership—may
undertake to achieve the criteria for enlargement, but this does not necessarily represent their
consent to assimilation. Leading up to the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU, its former
president Vaclav Havel assured his citizens that: ‘what we are surrendering is part of our
sovereignty, but not our identity. Our identity’s character and development depends only upon
ourselves’ (1993).
And so, it seems that there is a conceptual use for the term ‘Absorption Capacity’ after all.
While the term may not necessarily reflect the economic or political realities of EU enlargement
it certainly captures a sociological phenomenon, which in many ways limits the future success of
the institution (if not the continent). As this understanding of the term becomes more popular, the
EU has derogated its use, defensively substituting the term ‘Integration Capacity’ in its place (EP
2006: 5; ‘EU tightens’ 2006). Rather, this paper proposes that ‘integration capacity’ is in fact a
more appropriate term to describe the economic and political constraints of EU enlargement. The
sociological understanding of Absorption Capacity provides a valuable understanding of
obscured and deeply ingrained obstacles that the EU must address, and as such the term
‘conceals as much as it illuminates’ (Vibert 2006: 1).
Absorption Capacity: the future of EU enlargement
An understanding of the sociological challenges posed by Western ideological dominance and
it’s aversion to diversity, highlights two prescriptive tasks. The first task is predominantly the
responsibility of the EU institutions, and involves the promotion of diversity rather than
assimilation in institutional mechanisms. The second task is primarily the responsibility of the
individual member states, and involves diffusing an appreciation for diversity, and raising the
quality of domestic discourse. The first task already shows promise of success, in the limited
ways it has already been incorporated into the EU. The ability of member states to ‘opt-out’ of
policies that they find to be detrimental or objectionable, rather than assimilate to them, has
resulted in the successful adoption of several major initiatives with only a subset of EU
members: ‘EMU, social policy, foreign policy, environmental policy, and so on. The trend is
toward differentiation, flexibility and ad hoc arrangements’ (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003: 56).
This process has intrinsic positive feedback, in the sense that if a policy demonstrates success for
the ‘opt-in’ members, it will become more attractive to those states that opted-out. Incorporating
diversity, speaks directly to achieving compliance, which ultimately demonstrates greater EU
legitimacy. The legitimacy of EU policy, for example the European Constitution, is problematic
if a reasonable inclusion of differences has not been realised (Blokker 2006:23). ‘For a sufficient
degree of loyalty to the constitutional values to come about, some ‘discursive embeddedness’ of
the arguments in wider social and cultural traditions (including those of Eastern Europe) seems
necessary’ (ibid). No longer can the EU institutions take for granted assimilation based simply
upon on the naïve and exploited ideal of universal norms and values. Two years before the
Eastern enlargement Grabbe predicted that, ‘[t]he ability and willingness of member states to be
integrated into the EU’s policies will vary much more than in the current Union. Progress in
individual policy areas […]–will often be driven by coalitions of the willing and able’ (Grabbe
2002: 5). The phrase ‘coalitions of the willing,’ should not be misunderstood by the EU as a
foregone willingness to do away with norms, language, culture or religion. However, on the
whole, opinion polls show that Europe is not against the strategic and political logic behind
enlargement (Emerson et al. 2006:6).
While it is the EU’s responsibility to embrace diversity on the supranational level, it is the
responsibility of the individual member states to diffuse this value domestically. Opinion polls
also show that despite some support for the foundations of enlargement, the European public is
‘grossly misinformed about the economic, financial and social consequences of enlargement’
(ibid). Although economic impact assessments portray EU enlargement as a success story, the
polity’s perceptions are divergent (Emerson et al. 2006: 5). ‘Enlargement is unpopular with EU
voters, many of whom associate it with rising illegal immigration, international crime, and
unemployment,’ (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003: 54) despite little persuasive evidence to this
effect. Most importantly, states seem unmotivated to rectify this situation. Even the Commission
is eager to scold member states for the disservice that they are doing to both the institution and
the public: ‘success has not been communicated well. This requires a co-ordinated joint
response. Member States must bear their responsibility to explain and defend the policies they
have agreed unanimously to’ (CEC 2005). In this key respect, ‘the EU’s absorptive capacity for
further enlargement is going to be what its leaders choose it to be’ (Emerson et al. 2006:22).
Conclusions
As the EU officially clarified its position regarding ‘Absorption Capacity,’ vis-à-vis
enlargement in Parliament’s final report of 2006, it also noticeably adopted a clause enabling
Member States to withdraw from the European Union (EP 2006: 7). The EU is at an important
juncture in its history where it is being forced to intensively reflect upon its foundations, as well
as confront its own mortality. The benefits of success seem boundless, represented by peace and
prosperity throughout the continent, and the costs of failure, absolute. As Emerson has noted,
‘[t]he EU has invested hugely, in terms of finance, political energies and reputation’ in this grand
project (Emerson et al. 2006:20). The EU has much to gain from enlargement, as do the potential
candidates for membership, although ambiguous phrases like ‘Absorption Capacity,’ can be used
by states and stakeholders ‘to set new barriers to enlargement rather than confronting the
political problems enlargement raises with their domestic electorates’ (Vibert 2006: 3).
‘Absorption Capacity’ is best used to describe the essential sociological transformation that the
EU must undergo. It is a theoretical term, based on a stern reality that must be heeded. This
reality and the EU’s Absorption Capacity are best described by Vaclav Havel in his speech to the
Council of Europe a decade before Czech accession to the EU:

If various Western states cannot rid themselves of their subconscious

drive for a dominant position in their own sphere of interests, if they
do not stop trying to outwit history by reducing the idea of Europe to
a noble backdrop against which they continue to defend their own
petty concerns[…]then Europe will only with great difficulty be able
to respond to the challenge of the present and fulfill the opportunities
that lie before it. (Havel 1993)
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1 Emphasis attributable to me.

2 Of course, I am referring to the origins outside the natural sciences where the phrase has long
been understood as a property of substances in relation to liquids.
3 See Ellison 2006 for an example.
4 Also echoed in the sentiments of Vibert 2006: 2; Emerson et al. 2006:1.
5 Emphasis attributable to me