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A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a
disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors
bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and
the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their
due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3,
1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded
that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted
such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an
extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of
respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the
late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP,
through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency
further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to
the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27,
1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976,
reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2,
1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors
to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint
reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of
their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-
payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension
of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid
resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-
condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in
the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the
Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for
the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al.,
Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case
in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous conclusion reached by the
Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional
question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the
decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for
reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19,
1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to
admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected
that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he
continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of
which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since respondent could
not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in
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other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task,
there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
more than justified. THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a
different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his health
and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent
still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he
law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the
had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the
causes entrusted to him. Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not
be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered
and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly
was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the
dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect
exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can
contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting
integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that
opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to
more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising
the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a
his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as
disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding
in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the
of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to
Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19,
discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the
2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable
mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose
finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss
compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member
of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the
of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or
bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to
tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and
respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of
after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the
their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil
transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a
rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon. The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this
case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a
Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers
speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe
ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive
language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a
decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such
decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of
this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been
used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to
determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members
of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper
intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it
should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the
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Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which they formally submitted,
through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper
disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic
freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal
reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is
not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate
speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because
respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the
minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the
purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is
apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al.
(the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this
Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy
prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian
standards, including those provided for in the relevant international
conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human
rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject
of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr.
(Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they
posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for

reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque
and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES
EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact
not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of
the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the
Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s
article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an
article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on
the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV
website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted,"
appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque
claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly
acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored
with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the
alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle
responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
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The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for
reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday.
The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-
the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences
and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL
article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were
unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was
filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens
discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on
the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the
Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the
last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am
compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as
an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the
possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international
crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v.
Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism
by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative
(MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
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In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in
footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am
also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I
made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be
ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The
cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your Chief Justice
esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully
study the arguments I made in the article. Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the Vinuya v Executive Secretary
issues raised by this letter.

With respect, Your Honors:

(Sgd.) We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by
Dr. Mark Ellis20 thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope
that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court
formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Respectfully,
Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court (Sgd.)
referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. Dean and Professor of Law

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares (Emphases supplied.)
to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name.
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is
Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and reproduced here:
on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on
various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun RESTORING INTEGRITY
Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the
University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on
August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27 A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the IN THE SUPREME COURT
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering
as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief
from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their
hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had
these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the
Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation
of another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at
best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas
and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into
committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker.
It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in
any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of
the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the
production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete
perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows
that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works
and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work.
Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no
longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the
Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and the
publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this
case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original
articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory
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explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the
plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to
appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be
familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct
and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of
the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers,
Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually
misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue
that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it
obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens.
Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the
contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying
works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by
copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it
deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage
suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in
the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely
have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners
were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford
them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of
many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the
Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge
and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy
and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most
basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine
 7 of 121 | PALE | CY

Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of
other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake. legal precedents through dubious means;

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest
standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar
because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a
democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that
surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious
plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode faith and
confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this
decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to
the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of
the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse,
such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature
of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the
Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for
the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the
Court may consider appropriate;

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without (5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is the manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a
content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise
credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice,
at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential and adjudication.
step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and
practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27
system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial
July 2010.
step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of (SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
judicial and professional ethics. Dean and Professor of Law

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of (SGD.) FROILAN M.
(SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that: BACUNGAN
Dean (1989-1995)
Dean (1978-1983)
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in (SGD.) SALVADOR T.
(SGD.) MERLIN M.
breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial CARLOTA
MAGALLONA
and professional competence expected of the Supreme Dean (2005-2008) and
Dean (1995-1999)
Court; Professor of Law

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and

credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the REGULAR FACULTY
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing
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Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made
(SGD.) JAY L. known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
BATONGBACAL quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:
Professor
Assistant Professor
Glasgow, 18 August 2010
(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P.
(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D.
SALVADOR DAWAY Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
BATTAD
Associate Dean and Associate
Assistant Professor
Professor
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

(SGD.) DANTE B. Your Excellency,

(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
GATMAYTAN
Assistant Professor
Associate Professor
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the
University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my
(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s
(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes.
Assistant Professor Assistant Professor As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken
almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
LECTURERS 2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno
Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of
(SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
ALAMPAY referencing.
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS the Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most
cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite:
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a
(SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
QUIMBO notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the
CORONEL TOMBOC same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in
the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L.
(SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
JARDELEZA
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29 approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.) Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your
Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits
during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain
faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said
Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was
given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the
signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty
members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was
that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as
represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty.
Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among
the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total
number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the
same Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August
11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the
following observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he
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cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of
decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus
that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as

attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay,
Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo,
Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O.
Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua,
Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons
1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10,
2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before
the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular
administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court,
respondents filed the following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the
37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T.
Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
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(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof.
Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par.
(1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul
T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean
Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof.
Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and
Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19,
2010 a common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels
(the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance,
respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in
the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers
in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter
of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise
alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that
"none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case.
Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s
findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are
in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of
the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal
processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the
appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their
Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign
the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to
ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive
was purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement

"focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the
Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the
Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research
and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures
enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the
law and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as
academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to
vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because
these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the
Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the
basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at
the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it
appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their
belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would
not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter
of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to
downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the
Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism
allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently
take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del
Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in
accordance with the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a
discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and
jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the
correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their
Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common
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Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28,
2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona
through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise
lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana
Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho
Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and
(ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual
Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law" by
Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that
Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without
proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court
when others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the
plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public
issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on
the issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and
Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July
25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo
published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director
General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business
Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8,
2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call
for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the
Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31,
2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar
Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo
published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the
Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del
Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod
ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the
Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine
Star on August 16, 2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University
College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has
singled them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated
specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair
and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents
briefly discussed their position that in issuing their Statement, "they
should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members
of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as
citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the
exercise of free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited
United States v. Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In
the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
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In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted
that their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic
freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on
Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided
that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise
academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed
recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free
and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of
study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained
silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have
"compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would
have created a culture and generation of students, professionals, even
lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the
public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and
that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider
the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in
Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and
impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the
judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of
his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of
any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook
occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which
affects in no way the outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the
Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law,
members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in
the Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that

respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed
"violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing
prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in
assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be
rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute
and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in the
Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and
conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for
hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the full
and fair opportunity to require the production of and to
present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28,
2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.
Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the
transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in or
relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T.
Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and
Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations
in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
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Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled
her to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution.
Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect
contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good
faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one
member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep
disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what
motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited
jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is
constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools
have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be
taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and
that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion
in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the
Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the
Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall
be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of
respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be
curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public
morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a
separate Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said
Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his
signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of
conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of
academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly
attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a
clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in
principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the
same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof.

Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a
democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b)
In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in
American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any
intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or
should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that
"attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s
mind when he signed the Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who wish to
impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what
constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October
2010, some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit
plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were
of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the
perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This
uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College.
Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate
intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s own. 85 (Emphases
supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that
he "might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such
language [in the Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends
his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has
faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will
rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of
the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three
drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as
follows:
"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of
the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures
of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause
Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and
Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
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"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical
signature, but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven
(37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of
Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP
College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring
Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from
the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three
weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity
II, and which presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s
Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty
members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty-
seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed
names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual
signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their
handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain
are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents.
Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and
came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad
agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen
instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty
members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose,
the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s
signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring
Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement,
Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the
Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among
the members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the

Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it brought to their
classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences.
Still other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were
unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless
conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as
soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring
Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed
his staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner
appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own
established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he
directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the names
of those who signed the first printed draft would appear, together with
the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring
Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or
above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public
issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the
integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements
with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the
signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring
Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication
involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with
the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of
the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As
Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed
Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen
called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name
among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had
spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August
2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to
sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed
fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice
Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States the
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following week. It would later turn out that this account was not
entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative
officer, however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were
indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate
that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix
their signatures physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his
staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice
Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to
Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially
agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally
agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly
say that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign
it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s
staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the
Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was
unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the
U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice
Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24 September
2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza
declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the
call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice
Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he
declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time,
he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the
faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due
deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not

wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the
Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of
Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity
I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that
the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38
members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when
it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean
Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II.
The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted signing
pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38
members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a
dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the
same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in
all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This
purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a
‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message,
its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other
printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting
the same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law
by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has
been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act
when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent
which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the
Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation
of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor
misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the
UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be
signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any
violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the
appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice
Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope that its
points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing
Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that
the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no
dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant
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an administrative sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for
by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical
reliefs as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and
for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only
in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation
involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is
not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State
of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP
College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010.
He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that
"the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the
dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio,
Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful
enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of
education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very
teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-
assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying
on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger,
clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective
mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on
free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other
respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the
Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of
respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their
freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic
freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they
should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily
explain why he should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar
under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set
for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled
to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R.
No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts
of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been
presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of
expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the
Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally
mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying
assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions,
and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting
view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly
show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of
the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause
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Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding
the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief
that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of
that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f
public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show
Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the
portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the
said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as
fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of
decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’
freedom of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus
that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the

independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’
submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that
the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to
discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and
common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the
following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige
of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
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necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make
the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.117 (Emphases
supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor
necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential
points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in
question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is
highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good
practice can never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to
disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage
of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and
increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on
the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court
is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it
would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their
quote from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo
concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike
the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in
the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is
authority for the following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the
high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being
what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust
in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious
statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here,
the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the
Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their
position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common
Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to
the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of
what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme
Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar
of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind,
but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices
that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a
prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of
the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation
that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession."121
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It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign
jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right
to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial
authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the
courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of
fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive
discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from
that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the
Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain
at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial
acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer
than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings
which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl.
481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the
course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance,
observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of
the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been
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deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade
the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can
be easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer,
through the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded
criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held,
thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers.
This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we
stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the
court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is
even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re:
Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only
to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny
into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in
Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of
speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55
SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly
baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to
the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19
January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint
which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the
lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x
x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
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In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of
simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and
imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held
that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging
the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex
society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not
an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the
threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of
law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the
Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression
needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x. 132 (Emphases
supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that
the Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public
interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic
freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine
what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out
that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
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freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action
for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even
if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed
upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether
lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a
defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending
to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the
courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense
in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully
invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence
discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers
to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater
force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad
definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are
bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar
as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact
that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the
Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping
with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in
keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to
legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence
the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons
to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors
are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their

students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and
not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression
and academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their
submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main
ideas: (a) the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against
Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’
staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the
majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause
Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of
his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in
public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as
Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with
more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced
the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement
using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of
the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in
the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only
of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered
the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot
coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
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recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for
contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be
properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one
of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common
Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence
to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present
controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC),
with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of
the filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As
respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed
overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for
respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it
has no bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the
Statement was intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful
enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of
effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others,
callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and
respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow
respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively
plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were
deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the
sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic
irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who
would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they
still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and
scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not
do the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the
tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions
logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive
recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to
take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts
as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s
consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first
before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement
was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture
media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most
controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in
the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP
Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of
fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully
well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the
Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both
sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been
widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the
Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the
constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement
under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge
against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the
drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and
submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had
already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled
by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it
became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to
prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening
event into account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in
the respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the
print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out."
On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that
it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of
disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature
of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the
Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who
may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal
or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who
appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse,
would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot
remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal
education in our country.
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With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance,
considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been
involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give
them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned
in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence
that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded
in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his
intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but,
unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment.
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions
and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no
excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases
employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used
was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the
judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118
La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion.
This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a
recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from
taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of
said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,
notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his
Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one
among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to
the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to
sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the
Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of
discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the
October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty
brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate
intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge

that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language
of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without
having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for
undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless
insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that
this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles
but only that they recognize that they themselves may have committed some
ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at
least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause
Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s
Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar
of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority
of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he
should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine
law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals
of any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency
and fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause
why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity
II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed
copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there
were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement
(i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is
but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as
more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses
that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the
members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories
thereto."140
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To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that
the signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live
public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at
a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that
point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies
precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the
Statement’s persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and
stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent
from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of
their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on
the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is
the fact that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring
Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out,
according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of
the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate
information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among
the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed
to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of
Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or
a website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may
be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to
accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate
blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court,
of a signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the
actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed
document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of
the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation
why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of
Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the
dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks
and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with
respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care
of documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean
Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not
contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself
a display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the
course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative
officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory,
Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only
authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted
and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not
actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is
precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or
persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for
perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one
person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he
had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice
Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended
to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe
candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why
he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to
sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the
Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure some
signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad,
then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he
was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for
actual signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As
respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement
was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the
Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any
time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of
Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due
consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems
it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230
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and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative
reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the
Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be
allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case
(G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that
were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate
Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the
sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may
be punished only after charge and hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’
premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due
process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in
this case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for
indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s
purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution
this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on
disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to
the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of

investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation,
through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not
mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A
will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not
require a trial type hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements
of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v.
Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
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In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81,
Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of
Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or
resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of
any further investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on
the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public
interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the
astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those
cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents'
administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under
the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no
evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against
and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer
or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier,
Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present
matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this
Court.146(Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a
hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on
these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any
justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not
specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they
intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and
witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in

the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the
findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution
were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the
Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request
for access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the
only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the
fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or
Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart
from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent
matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause
Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement with language that the
Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further
than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news
reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this
Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of
public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the
language of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting,
printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does
not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo
could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the
knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the
same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as
early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics
case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19,
2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from
abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the
Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable
person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles,
could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit
recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should
simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to
refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the
bases for the Show Cause Resolution.
28 of 121 | PALE | CY
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their
respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time,
because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’
own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be
aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a
hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk
they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of,
and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of
merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as
lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are
bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is
certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another
under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges,
court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court
and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the
courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors,
regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his
submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia
R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin
T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista,
Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O.
Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M.
La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S.

Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas
Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law
professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11
and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due
respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive
language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court,
and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty
in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is
excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while
he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should
strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his
students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
29 of 121 | PALE | CY
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against Atty.
Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the latter's demand for and receipt of
exorbitant sums of money from her client purportedly to expedite the
proceedings of their case which was pending before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he,
along with his siblings engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and
Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs
of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The complainant
claimed that sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) from him to expedite the
proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and above the parties’
stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract.3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month
earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received
a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) from his sibling
Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which
was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court. Handwritten
receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the
complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which,
in turn shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said
amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should
not be included in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt

The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to
expedite the process before the courts. The said amount has been advanced
by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be reimbursed to her by her
siblings upon winning the case with finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura,
Manila and learned that the Court had already denied the petition on
November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case
was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could
no longer be found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for
disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and
documents9 from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued
bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana
Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit10which was attached to the complaint,
alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks11 in her favor amounting to
₱481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to
her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit 12 was
attached to the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for
₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank
for being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,14 stating that
Atty. De Taza owes her ₱29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite
repeated demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed the Court
that Atty. De Taza is planning to leave the country as she was joining her
husband in the United States of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by
the Court to file a Comment. However, the copy of the Resolution was
returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-
Moved". The Court then resolved by virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2,
2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office address at Romero De Taza
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Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned unserved with the notation
"RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the
complainant inform the Court of Atty. De Taza’s new address, which the
complainant faithfully complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s new address in
the U.S.A. The Court, in its Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the
Clerk of Court to resend a copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007
with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using the latter’s U.S.A.
address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10,
2007 with the complaint was returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s
notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20 dated September 9,
2009, held that the said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and
resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing of her
comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they
failed to appear. Thus, the parties were directed to file their respective
position papers. The complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred
that he was already residing abroad and maintained that he had already
submitted his documentary evidence at the time of the filing of his complaint.
Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any position paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be
suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s
recommendation in a Resolution24 dated January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of [P]800,000.00 to
expedite the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had
long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.25 (Emphasis supplied)

The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR
RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF
HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the
accusations against her. Numerous attempts were made to afford her an
opportunity to defend herself from the complainant’s allegations, but all these
efforts were only met with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an
unscrupulous move on her part to evade her creditors, only she would
certainly know. But as far as the Court is concerned, all means were
exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the complainant’s
charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a hindrance
for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are
investigations by the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one.
There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court held in
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the
Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al.
v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required."29 Based on the documentary evidence
submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a
propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts
which she left unpaid without any reason. The complainant even submitted a
31 of 121 | PALE | CY
document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a
closed account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other
creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an
ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a
member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not
only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude
of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order.1âwphi1 It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to
her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers,
seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should
hold in high esteem."30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were
even worse as she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the
proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in
exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by
Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty.
De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when
she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for
the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.31 In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is
baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been
made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s
oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.32

The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33 suspended the
respondent from the practice of law for two years when the latter issued
checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial
Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34 the same penalty was meted out by this Court to
the erring lawyer who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from
the practice of law for four years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer
who defrauded his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him for the purported filing
of a petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to
his client a copy of the petition with stamped receipt from the trial court when
in reality, no such petition was filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00
from the complainant to be put up as injunction bond and asked for additional
sums of money on other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was
handling the case. When the complainant verified this with the judge, the
judge denied the respondent’s allegations. The complainant later learned that
the bond was also unnecessary, as the application for a writ was already
denied by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court suspended the
respondent from the practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach."37 "The Judiciary has been besieged enough with
accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal
profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with
such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be
tolerated."38
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and
recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to
suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their
32 of 121 | PALE | CY
information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's
record in this Court. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014
ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her Attorney-
in-Fact, VICENTE A. PICHON,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the
widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in
Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned
by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges
against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On three (3) occasions, Atty.
Agleron requested and received from complainant the following amounts for
the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 -
₱3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - ₱5,250.00
or a total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no
complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.1
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and
received the amount of ₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their
agreement was that complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental
expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing,
complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On
June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to
pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of the
attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that
since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of ₱10,050.00 was
deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee
and attorney’s fee.2
In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the
filing fee and asserted that the filing fee at that time amounted only to
₱7,836.60.
In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to

him, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four (4) months.
In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1) month.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
except as to the penalty imposed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his
client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care
and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. 6 He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.7
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint
against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was
already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate
charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee
and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a
valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case
that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he accepts
this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full
payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client
and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with
complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate
charges.1âwphi1
In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for
disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from three months to two
years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.
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WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO
M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in
the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS
BRUNET, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet
(complainants) filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren
(Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of
Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva
Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed
that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that
Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00)
which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to
the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of
the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and
original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for
additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully
gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they
became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the
return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same
provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted
to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against
them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob,
Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance
fee of ₱10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for
the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of
₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be
filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did
not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the
photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust
and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the complainants
in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin
Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of
Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot
and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation
and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the
lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against
complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD
recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
2
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD,
suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical
conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
34 of 121 | PALE | CY
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of
₱7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to
perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot despite
the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of
having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in
the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G.
AGUILOS, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney
towards his client in which the former is found and declared to be lacking in
knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum
meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally
expected to perform during his professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the
amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his
not having performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that
in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent
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her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio following:
C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund
gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00;1 that she had gone to his dated 15 August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper
residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C.
her that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information furnished
acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he had him, to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the purpose.9C
annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage;2 that she Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the
amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a
started working on the case;3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. mandatory conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her
Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever counsel attended the conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter
amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed; 4 that dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer.11 Due to his non-
the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same day, but
rendered any appreciable legal services to her;5 and that his constant refusal required the complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days.
to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint She did not submit the position paper in the end.
against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating
In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's
complainant and her British fiancee sought his legal services to bring the insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation based on
petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his evaluation of her the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable
situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal separation because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
anchored on the psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant,
British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him
action for legal separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered
evidenced by his handwritten receipt;8 that for purposes of the petition for under the principle of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be
legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of her marriage made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.
contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as
for her to submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the
separation; that he later on communicated with her and her fiancee upon respondent's statement in the last part of his answer, to the effect that the
finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly respond to his demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant should be
communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal
the money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for
fees; and that in June 2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the and improper; and he opined that such offensive and improper language
prepared petition for legal separation essentially requesting him not to file the uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.01 13of the
petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the Code of Professional Responsibility.
annulment of her marriage instead.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. follows:
Martinez, but states that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted that he wrote in the last The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the
part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following:

(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of
P30,000.00 which he received for the purpose of preparing a petition for
legal separation. Undersigned believes that considering the degree of
professional services he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he
received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and
annulment of marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.
(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his
colleagues and for using offensive or improper language in his pleading,
which was filed right before the Commission on Bar Discipline, he must
also be sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid repetition of the said
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended
that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D.
Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the former received as payment for
his services because it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect
to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and improper language in his
pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP
Board of Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De
La Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent's failure to show respect to his
fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and improper words in his pleadings,
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to Return the
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of
Governors denied through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23,
2014.17
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Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the
respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b)
whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-
2014-177, but modify the recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to
return the entire amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the
requisite professional competence and skill to handle the action for the
annulment of marriage for her. He required her to pay P150,000.00 as
attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with
the complainant as his client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis
and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very
apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract
between the respondent and the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence
that there is an attorney-client relationship. The respondent agreed to accept
the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon
to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of
appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation.
That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was
it intended for the filing of the annulment case or legal separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite
confused as to what action he is going to file in court. The intention of the
British national and the complainant was to get married. At that time and
maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio
C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are intending to get married, we
can safely assume that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition
for annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage bond with her
husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be granted, that the

complainant will be free to marry the British subject. The legal separation is
but a separation of husband and wife from board and bed and the marriage
bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted,
one is not free to marry another person.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is
not well versed in the grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for
the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital
obligations developed or of their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see
par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-
SC, the grounds are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Petition-
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed
only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be, within five years from
the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than
six years, even if pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in or outside the Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
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(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the
complainant, is not one of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal
separation.
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological
incapacity is never a ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal
separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the
purpose of filing a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in
continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of advise that
respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to
distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for
annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears
that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the
law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill
to the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the
distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of
marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a
lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His
explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal
separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by
the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an
action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the
intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal
separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-
marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared
a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees
if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond
comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim
for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as

an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he
knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he
may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis
supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily
agree that every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of
his client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to
represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable
compensation for such services.19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement
between the client and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the
parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy or public order.20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's
agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the
arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned
to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis of
what he and the client agreed.21 In the absence of the written agreement, the
lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means "as
much as he deserved."22The determination of attorney's fees on the basis
of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause,
was not able to finish the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum
meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the attorney where
the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the
parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable
compensation based on the obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the
attorney does not receive more than what is reasonable, in keeping with
Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of
the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but
may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services
rendered is not only for the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the
amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the purpose of preserving the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession.25cralawred
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was
later revealed, it was way above his ability and competence to handle the
case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to
accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even
begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant
because it was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the
action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for
legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either
his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her
more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had already
received.
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received
P70,000.00 as acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the
complainant rested on his claim of having already completed the first phase of
the preparation of the petition for legal separation after having held
conferences with the complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP
Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could
retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered
some legal services to the complainant, specifically: (a) having the
complainant undergo further interviews towards establishing the ground for
legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds discussed during the
interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after
he could not understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by
her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to submit her marriage contract with her
husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of live birth of
her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all
surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for
legal separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the

respondent was too generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved
any compensation because he did not really begin to perform the
contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the
petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage.
The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and
expectedly perform during his professional engagement does not discharge
his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The
respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according
to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered to
restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of
the professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if
warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
misrepresentation of his professional competence, and he is further to be
ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client,
plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision
until full payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from
all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in
the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not,
in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has
necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the advancement of the
interest of their clients.27 However, as members of a noble profession, lawyers
are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in
this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but
that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive
language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such,
every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the
administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards
39 of 121 | PALE | CY
his clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in
the Legal Profession.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty.
Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have been
addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it
may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this Court
cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive
and improper language by asserting that the phraseology was not per
se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had sufficient cause for
maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of
paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse
the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been
respectful and proper in responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern
warning that a repetition of the offense will be severely
punished.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated
September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is
hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence
to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper
language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition
of the offense shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant
within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.
Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos as a member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the
country. SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016
ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on November 4, 2011 by Arnold
Pacao (complainant), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty.
Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
The Facts
Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault
custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged
with qualified theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos
appeared as counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty.
Limos, for a possible settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the
complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was duly
authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that
BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by
installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the
complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to
Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of
desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve
compromise agreement for filing with the court.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00
to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing
her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the
terms of their agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought
to get from the complainant the next installment amount of their purported
agreement, but the latter refused.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille
Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel
and was not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in
behalf of BHF. The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the
P200,000.00 initial payment that he gave to Atty.
Limos.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter7 to Atty. Limos to
return the P200,000.00 initial settlement payment, but the latter failed and
refused to do so.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file any
responsive pleading.9 A mandatory conference was then set on March 1 and
40 of 121 | PALE | CY
29, 2012, and April 19, 2012, but Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the
IBP-CBD ordered the parties to submit their position paper, but once again,
Atty. Limos did not bother to submit her position paper.
On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Limos.10 The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced
deceit on the complainant to the latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to
disclose the material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and
conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to
receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise
ordered to return to the complainant the full amount of P200,000.00 with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of her receipt of
the said amount to the date of her return of the full
amount.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the
case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.13 As per verification of the Court, neither party has filed a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review thereafter.
The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis
to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of law?14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is
facing an administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended
from the practice of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v.
Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received
attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but
she failed to perform her undertaking with her client; thus she was found
guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty.
Limos was held administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct
when she obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from her client and issued two
postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge
of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the Court, gave
Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her will
merit a more severe penalty.

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case
before this Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the
complainant purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client
BHF. However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not
authorize to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor
was she authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her blunder is
compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did
she return the same to the complainant, despite due demand. Furthermore,
she even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she was not
authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her
engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.
The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense.
The foregoing factual antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ
deceit and misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude
that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the
complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming
and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.
Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges
brought against her. Similar with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did
not bother to answer the complaint against her. She also failed to file her
mandatory conference brief and her verified position paper. Worse, Atty.
Limos did not even enter appearance either personally or by counsel, and she
failed to appear at the scheduled date of the mandatory conferences which
she was duly notified.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter,
to justify her actions, Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate that she still
possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. Her
seeming indifference to the complaint brought against her was made obvious
by her unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the IBP. Her
disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the
authority of the Court.
Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again
demonstrating to this Court that not only is she unfit to stay in the legal
profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates
of the Court, which has supervision over her. Atty. Limos' unwarranted
obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court which cannot be tolerated.
The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section
27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not
hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has
become a repeat offender. Considering the serious nature of the instant
41 of 121 | PALE | CY
offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior misconduct which grossly degrades
the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is
warranted.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware
that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.19 However,
Atty. Limos' recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's
warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's authority over
members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court.
Her repeated desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be
unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she remains apathetic to the
need to reform herself.
"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."20 "Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the
very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic."21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and
evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to live up to her
duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful
insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the
Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos.
Further, let other copies be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11350
[Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211]
ADEGOKE R. PLUMPTRE, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, Respondent
PER CURIAM:
This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera
for absconding with money entrusted to him and soliciting money to bribe a
judge, On May 13, 2014, complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre filed a complaint
for disbarment1 against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Complainant alleges that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent and asked
for help in his application for a work permit from the Bureau of Immigration.2
They met a few days later, and complainant paid respondent ₱10,000.00 as
professional fee. 3
They met again, and complainant gave respondent another Pl 0,000.00,
together with his passport. This was allegedly for the processing of his work
permit. 4
They met for a third time since respondent asked complainant to submit ID
photos. 5 Respondent asked complainant for another ₱10,000.00, but
complainant refused as they only agreed on the amount of ₱20,000.00.6
Respondent also asked complainant for P8,000.00, allegedly for
complainant's other case, which respondent was also working on.7 He
explained that P5,000.00 would be given to a Las Pifias judge to reverse the
motion for reconsideration against complainant, while P3,000.00 would be
used to process the motion for reconsideration. Complainant gave him the
P8,000.00.8
Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he never
received any updates on the status of his work permit and pending court
case.9 Further, whenever he called respondent to follow up on his work
permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his wife.10
Complainant would retort by saying that he would file complaints against
respondent if he did not give back the money and passport. That was the last
time complainant heard from respondent. 11
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After inquiring -and researching on respondent's whereabouts, 12 complainant
was able to track down respondent and get back his passport, which
respondent coursed through complainant's aunt. 13 However, despite the
return of complainant's passport, respondent still refused to return the
₱28,000.00 earlier endorsed to him. 14
Complainant then decided to file a complaint against respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 15
On May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued the
Order16 directing respondent to file an answer to the complaint.
Respondent failed to show up at the September 17, 2014 mandatory
conference, 17 as well as at the second mandatory conference set on October
22, 2014. 18 The parties were directed to submit their verified position papers,
after which the case was submitted for resolution. 19
On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
respondent's suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law and the
return of P28,000.00 to complainant.20
On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
adopted and approved21 the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation,
but modified it to disbar respondent from the practice of law, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A ", for Respondent's violation of Canon 1, Canon
7, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, aggravated by his failure to file Answer and to
appear in the Mandatory Conference. Thus, Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys and Ordered to Return the Twenty Eight
Thousand (₱28,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.22(Emphasis in the original)
On April 20, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the, Philippines transmitted the case
to this Court for final action under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.23
This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.
I

Respondent's repeated failure to comply with several Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines requiring him to comment on the complaint
lends credence to complainant's allegations. It manifests his tacit admission.
Hence, we resolve this case on the basis of the complaint and other
documents submitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In Macarilay v. Serina,24 this Court held that "[t]he unjustified withholding of
funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action
against the lawyer."25 By absconding with the money entrusted to him by his
client and behaving in a manner not befitting a member of the bar, respondent
violated the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession.1âwphi1 Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
....
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
....
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
....
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.1âwphi1
Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
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As his client's advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client's interests
and the degree of service expected of him in this capacity is his "entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability." 26 The
lawyer also has a fiduciary duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued
with utmost trust and confidence.27
Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and diligence.
He not only neglected the attorney-client relationship established between
them; he also acted in a reprehensible manner towards complainant, i.e.,
cussing and threatening complainant and his family with bodily harm, hiding
from complainant, and refusing without reason to return the money entrusted
to him for the processing of the work permit. Respondent's behavior
demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral soundness.
Del Mundo v Capistrano28 has reiterated the exacting standards expected of
law practitioners:
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity_ and
fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to
discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion in consideration of the surrounding
facts. 29(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber, which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the bar but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership. 30
II
When complainant refused to give respondent any more money to process
his work permit, respondent persuaded complainant to give him an additional
₱8,000.00 purportedly to ensure that a motion for reconsideration pending
before a Las Pifias judge would be decided in complainant's
favor. 31 However, after receiving ₱28,000.00 from complainant for the work
permit and ensuring the success of complainant's court case, respondent
made himself scarce and could no longer be contacted.

Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed
decided in complainant's favor, respondent's act of soliciting money to bribe a
judge served to malign the judge and the judiciary by giving the impression
that court cases are won by the party with the deepest pockets and not on the
merits. 32
"A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system."33 Further, "a lawyer shall not state
or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body."34
By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of ₱8,000.00,
respondent trampled upon the integrity of the judicial system and eroded
confidence on the judiciary. This gross disrespect of the judicial system
shows that he is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the lack of integrity in his
character. The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly
shown that he is unfit to exercise it.
III
As for the sufficiency of notice to respondent of the disbarment proceedings
against him, this Court notes that on May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines directed respondent to answer the complaint against him, but he
failed to file his answer.35 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines set two (2)
separate dates for mandatory conferences36 after respondent failed to attend
the first setting, but he failed to appear in both instances.37 All issuances from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines had the requisite registry receipts
attached to them.
Stemmerik v. Mas38 discussed the sufficiency of notice of disbarment
proceedings. This Court held that lawyers must update their records with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines by informing it of any change in office or
residential address and contact details.39 Service of notice on the office or
residential address appearing in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines records
shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for administrative proceedings
against him or her.40
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera 1s SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for three (3) years. He is ORDERED to return to
complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre the amount of ₱28,000.00 with interest at
6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid.
He is likewise DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the
amount within 10 days from payment.
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Let copies of this Resolution be entered in respondent's personal record as a
member of the bar, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING
OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application
for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted
in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro
T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from
the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed

the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution
dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not,
however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to
take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did
not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts
which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a
condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with
his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as
a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor
in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve
not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
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And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute
is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a
lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes
home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of
1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere
greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow
path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of
requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a
high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent,
and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. .
. . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be
exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and
has pursued his profession, and has established himself
therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of
every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards

fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and
only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain
in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and professional character is
one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test
of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability,
so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts
could such agents give? They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in
courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in
fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always
been to admit no person to the practice of
the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to
the public and to the proper administration
of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
46 of 121 | PALE | CY
may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar
with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse
instead of a benefit to his community — a
Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a
Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said
to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a
proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him
for want of good moral character unless it appears that he
has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the
inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which
tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of
any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would
seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm
of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real
need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a

perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell
far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate
(rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan,
certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted
such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by
seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in
all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death
like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has
expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time
of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student
and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate
written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother
(in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
47 of 121 | PALE | CY
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates,
and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying
you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented
by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on
the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made
said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights
and interests. He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by

the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea
that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on
record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not
have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul
the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of
Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
The envelope containing it, and which actually went through
the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner
above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free
Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to
Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection
Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the
rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am
terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,
rescind and voided, the "manipulated
contract" entered into between me and the
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent
was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting
of the minds between me and the swindling
sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me.
48 of 121 | PALE | CY
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail
what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same
reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also
wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996."
and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's)
mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,
Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996
— to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage .
. .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations
with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular
and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint,
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal
Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less
aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him
a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated
that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines
of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave
P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and
as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the
money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with
the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of
an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a
49 of 121 | PALE | CY
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected
of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated
into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property — subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy
from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not
do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya
prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her)
and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya
had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts .
. . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled
him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with
Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without
. . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was
merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and
employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to
the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra;
or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a
Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
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stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he
may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every
act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had
been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-
law, " because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid
or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does
not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for
the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney;
and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate
who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during
the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign
the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed
the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
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Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take
the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until
he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific
assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and
refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was
only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19
May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating
his claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political
vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings.
The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes
that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be
a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while
he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records
show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001,
before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel
for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel
to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
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On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained"
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in
the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license
to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had

no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license.5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v.
Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath
and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the
bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not
allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan
prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In
his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was
resigning "effective upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted
respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does
not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while
serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
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On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows
that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel
before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for
leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for
his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There
is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship
in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites
Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.
– Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all
the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the
bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the
Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with
certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
(through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are
the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts
and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular
standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court
mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.6
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Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the
bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to
practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing
― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and,
concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of
the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since
Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization
as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed
never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
"(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues
in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member
of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above
and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which
he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6484 June 16, 2015
ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit1 that
Adelita B. Llunar (complainant) filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort
(respondent) for gross and inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct.
Antecedents
In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bañez,
hired the respondent to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard
Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the
Bañez family but was fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and
later was transferred to Ard.
The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot,
Albay, was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at the time the respondent
55 of 121 | PALE | CY
was hired. The respondent received from the complainant the following
afuounts: (a) ₱70,000.00 as partial payment of the redemption price of the
property; (b) ₱19,000.00 to cover the filing fees; and (c) ₱6,500.00 as
attorney's fees.
Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject
property was ever filed by the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant demanded that the respondent return
to her the amount of ₱95,000.00.
The respondent refused to return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00 to the
complainant.1awp++i1 He argued that a complaint2for annulment of title
against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though not by him, but
by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only
what was left of the ₱95,000.00 after deducting therefrom the ₱50,000.00 that
he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case.
The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed
by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's
engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years late
and the property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the
complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision
in Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected was the
reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the complaint for
annulment of title in court.
In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C.
Villanueva found the respondent to have been grossly negligent in handling
the complainant's case and to have gravely abused the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating Canons 156 and
17,7 and Rules 1.01,8 16.03,918.03,10 and 18.0411 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have erred in
not informing his client that he was under indefinite suspension from the
practice of law. Due to these infractions, Commissioner Villanueva
recommended that the respondent remain suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors agreed with the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the
respondent's liability but modified the recommended penalty from indefinite
suspension to disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent to return to the
complainant the amount of ₱95,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. The
respondent moved for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that his referral of
the complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was actually with the complainant's
knowledge and consent; and that he paid Atty. Abitria ₱50,000.00 for
accepting the case. These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an
affidavit14 dated November 17, 2004, but were alleged to have been
overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP Board . of
Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the
respondent's motion for reconsideration.15
Our Ruling
We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his
client and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension,
and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable
for grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in
handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the
complainant's property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the
delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually
filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case
and wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to
recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent
violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to
him by the complainant for handling the latter's case. On three separate
occasions, the respondent received from the complainant the amounts of
₱19,000.00, ₱70,000.00, and ₱6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the
mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary civil easels
against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several
times thereafter to follow up on the easels to be filed supposedly by the
respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had been
taken.
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After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had
not filed any case in court, she demanded that the respondent return the
amount of ₱95,000.00, but her demand was left unheeded. The respondent
later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount has been
made. These facts confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR,
which mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession"16 and to "account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client."17 In addition, a lawyer's
failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property
for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by his client.18
Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the
complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was
approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states
that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected of
him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case
despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the
indefinite suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the
offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of
suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been
justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the profession's
ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules. In Nunez v. Atty.
Ricafort,19we had adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in
failing to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client
and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by
the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against him
by his client. We then suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law - a
penalty short of disbarment. Under his current liability - which is no different in
character from his previous offense - we have no other way but to proceed to
decree his disbarment. He has become completely unworthy of membership
in our honorable profession.
With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we agree with
the IBP that the respondent should return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00,
without deductions, regardless of whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as
counsel was with the complainant's knowledge and consent.

In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary
had the respondent been honest and diligent in handling the complainant's
case from the start. The complainant should not be burdened with the
expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the respondent
was hired to do, especially in this case where there was an inexcusable non-
delivery of such services.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED
to RETURN the amount of ₱95,000.00 to complainant Adelita B. Llunar,
within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal record
and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country. This Decision should likewise be posted on the
Supreme Court website for the information of the general public. SO
ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11316
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant
vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,"
Respondent
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant
Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan
(respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to
take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
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Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr.
and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having been born
on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of
them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where
complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his
graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he
obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working
thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the
operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis
with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose
from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-
11 Store in Muntinlupa.9
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at
the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1)
year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In
1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in
the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his
wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never
went back to school to earn a college degree.12
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told
complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13
Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent
passed the Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and
college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's
University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate
any adverse consequences to him.15
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and
identity when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of
Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig
City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since
he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support.17
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager,
complainant was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong
City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue,
Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that point,
was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18,
2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes

Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation
Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records
from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records
from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St.
Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's
University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by
the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft
and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and
commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other
people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real
name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's
use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July
2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law
Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or,
in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters
concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member had
also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also
received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who
narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to
sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not. 24 Further, he
learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A.
Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security. 26 He
also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which
eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant
filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the
former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.28
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and
invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no
longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case
No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the
administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had
already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes
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and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace,
malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and
criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory
conference where both parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent moved
to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both paiiies
again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an
Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers. However,
neither of the parties submitted any.37
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
(Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming
complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He observed that
respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not
present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant
presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan."41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are
siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his
parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married
to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the
photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A.
Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These,
according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed
assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and
academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither
obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.46He also recommended that respondent and the name
"Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar;
and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was
directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.47

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-
2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a)
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b)
the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and
overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the
latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's
University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar
Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are
siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his
parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself
also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from
the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to
Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on
August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the
IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant
submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University
of Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook
with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI
clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely
used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to
the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the
Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
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The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is
"Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall
be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the
Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish,
history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While
he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA
where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.56 Clearly, respondent
has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on
complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real
name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity,
and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of
Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for
Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character
is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be
a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school
records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which

eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he
had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who
would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer,
the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between
him and the court.62
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to
have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image
of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing
of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do
not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its
members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name,
identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal
cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or
making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices
and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of the country a photograph of
respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he
is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption
of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
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A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
PER CURIAM:
It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his
own lawyer has a fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a grain
of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the
proceeding at bench, at least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has
apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some
superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural
rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the
respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present,
been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts,
dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts,
including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been
verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words
of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under
the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him
competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in
numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have been
disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite
unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and
circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their
employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to
account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated
by fairly prosaic transactions with three (3) banks which came to have
calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with
his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own
terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal
Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust
Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to
secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him or
members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations,

and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for
their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with
his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused
to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not
contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and even the lawyers
who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He sued,
as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or
another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as
the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In
the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding
number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal,
administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been
continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not
outlandish complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)
The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum
of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned,
respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita
Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan
from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a
mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo,
covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective
owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from
TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust
Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980.2
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor.
Consequently, TRB caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages
given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on
September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as
the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his
intention to redeem the properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas
C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his
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outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra.
Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits
commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.
CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional
Trial Court for specific performance and damages against TRB and its local
manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint
sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties
only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need
of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned.
Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of
the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals —
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by
decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff
(Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel
defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."
Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as
G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First
Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that
the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and
applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November
23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution
dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated
April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the
remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment.
Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7,
1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment;
and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without
action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of
Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . .
shall be entertained . . . ."
2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;
CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo
initiated another civil action in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which
he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB
Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the
defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990,3 on the ground of res
judicata, the only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to
redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case
No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank)
(supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.
The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 22356.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB
consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that
act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed
complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank
officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly,
given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City
RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and
Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario
Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and
Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just
mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers,
for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank
despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On
defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC.
(Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos.
R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and
lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221)
was dismissed by that Court's 16th Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the
reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;
CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
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Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30,
1991, still another civil action for the same cause against TRB, its
manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the
HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money,
Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the
others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the
RTC (Branch 145) on the ground of litis pendentia.
The RTC ruled that —
Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the
defendants therein, namely the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja,
Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli
Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW
are the same persons or nearly all of them who are
impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-
10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero,
Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that
more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-
9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion
of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case
No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently
they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in
said case. . . .
The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those
sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases
were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and
consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to
TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order
rendered by another Judge on November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who
previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of
November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th
Division), by Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.
Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City,
Borromeo forthwith made that event the occasion for another new
action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys — Mario Ortiz,
Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This
action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for
"Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987,
again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned,
and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature
consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No.
22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the
ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek
annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and
when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."
6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the
"merit" of his cause against TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now
took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the
members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in
the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not
only the same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers
and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and
Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly
rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the
Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had
likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August
22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for —
. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods
and disregarding evidence and pertinent laws, rendering
manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions
bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support thereof,
depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and
against deprivation of property without said process,
tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently illegal,
fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB,
(which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND
ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b)
FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION,
CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27,
32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A.
3019, for which defendants must be held liable under said
laws.
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The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained
fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral
damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation
expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On
motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated
November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the case.
7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069
It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause
subject of two (2) prior actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No.
CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario
Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the
ground of res judicata — the subject matter being the same as that in Civil
Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306 11 —
and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same as that in Civil
Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with
the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation
of the Trust Receipts Law.13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order
of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His
Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case
"under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by the
defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his
motion was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he
betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to
nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did
not show that there had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action
against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14
Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928),
but by resolution dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure

of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and
19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by Resolution
dated March 23, 1994.
a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"
He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of
March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross
travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . .
(failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on
MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15
The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22,
1994, and with some patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in
his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and
Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same
issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating that
the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the
Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by the
Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated that
Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the
Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the
First Division of this Court dated. _________,
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or
signed the resolutions."
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to
Borromeo. The record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from
Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with
the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt
with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno,
dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989.18 And the same subject was
treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due
course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897.19
B. CRIMINAL CASES
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Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor
of ignorance" — to fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its
officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal
prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with
here.
1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188
On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the
Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch
Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints
(docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank
and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned
by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated
and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his (Borromeo's)
mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale
thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market
prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office
dismissed the complaints observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not
between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.
Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties;
and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury
or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the
foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised
and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of
the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded
complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his
Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and directed
against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former
Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack of
merit. These were:
a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY.
MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False
Pretenses." — This case was dismissed by Resolution dated

January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because
based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985,
sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion
of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all
rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, as shown by the
consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent
Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of
sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of
redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the
transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and
b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD
SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False Pretenses and
Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was
dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.
2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207
While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before
the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli
Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over property
registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by Socorro
B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said bank. 23 In
that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June
1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the
improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City
covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was notarized
by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.
Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of
title by TRB over the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant
fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal
and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso)
for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September
28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful
statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution, considering that
Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in
TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in
order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
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This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August
15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of
January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of
a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas,
docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against "Supreme Court
Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" — was dismissed
for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, 1990 25 which, among
other things, ruled as follows:
It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has
remedies available under the Rules of Court, particularly on
civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of
this Office to make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of
judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The
records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings
against the respondents.
In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act
states that the Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct
the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant
had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body;" and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of
the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary authority over
members of the Judiciary.
II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)
As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also
borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and
executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage
was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No.
75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7,
1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation
for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale
was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit
accommodations he had obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo
failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or
minimize the ill effects of the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same
bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from
Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but
imposed several conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate
his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of
title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be
narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB
cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings
foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only
against Lao, but also against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he
(Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal
Bank.
1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.
No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action
initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12),
docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the
122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with
Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty.
Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo
contested Lao's application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis
Militante, presiding) denying consolidation because the transaction between
the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de retro being in law
an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum
of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the
amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the
transaction (P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was
dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal
— AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals
dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third
Division) in a four-page Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated
in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a
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motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the
resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to
"Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of
the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had deliberated
and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the members."
Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of judgment,
Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the reglementary
period, the same was simply noted without action, in a Resolution dated
November 27, 1989.
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established
rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court
and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo
MARASIGAN, respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679
Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders
Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the
Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the
adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No.
CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against
"Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and
Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of
Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial
functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,
baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No.
82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R.
Ybañez, presiding). These processes were brought to the attention of this
Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in
G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By
Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the
Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to
entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court."
Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the
summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the
nature and purpose of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or
resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed
charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several
letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman,
Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered
injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases
he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by
minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13
and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable
complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases
do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in
the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they
voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions
bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not
state the facts and the law on which they were based and
were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants
that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions
and decrees them as final and executory, as were a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is
clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to
forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due
course always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he
Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the
time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or
Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only
way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and,
accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. . . .
. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any
subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or
motions decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible
error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for
some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement . . .
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(of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition
for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute
resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the Clerk
of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the
parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued
on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform
the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never
participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and
resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court
merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in
the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix
Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981,
the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or
dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the
case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among
the members of this Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to
counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this
Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of
the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do
they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to
require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued
would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions
but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions
more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which
time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases
and the formulation of decisions and orders of important
nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure,
the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing
number of cases coming to it. . . .
b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)
6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having
no relation to the UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the
predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against administrative
officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases
adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil
action for damages against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action
and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same
Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario
Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the
case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for
reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).
In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply
with the rules by submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying
the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually
dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988,
for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment.
His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated
January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second
Division) on April 27, 1989 once more remonstrating that the resolutions
received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of
fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied
to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court
denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was
denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the
result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the
Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of
facts and legal conclusions."
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Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of
June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him
on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions
of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-
blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists
merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's
action to the parties concerned.
c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042
What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet
another in an already long series, was to commence a suit against Supreme
Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk
of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him notices of
the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June
1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo
Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had
been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 — in which the
Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to
demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment — the notice
sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of February 19,
1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been signed only by the
defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had
thereupon written letters to defendants demanding an explanation for said
"patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored;
defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only
by them and not by any Justice, and without stating the factual and legal
basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently abusive acts"
had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock, embarrassment,
sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral
damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00,
and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case
transmitted to the Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June
1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against
officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28
Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court
to "rectify the injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999,
87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the record
(Resolution, July 19, 1990).

2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.
CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his
property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with
Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the
complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) and
Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen,
and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident
partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty. Antonio Regis.
Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano
R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to
foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum of
P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses
of P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per
Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed
his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R.
No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency in form and substance and for being
"largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of
judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First
Division) said:
The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner himself and Resolved to
DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having been
filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52,
Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the
averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989
and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It
should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been
twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What
petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the
merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is
advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will
69 of 121 | PALE | CY
be granted only when there is a special and important
reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for
review may be dismissed summarily on the ground that "the
appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay
or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require
consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of
fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to
comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is
further advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and has no
application to a resolution as to which said section
pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and
that the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first
Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989 does indeed
state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set out in the
Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's
arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution
denying the petition for review and consequently bringing
about a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals —
had failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to
the Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and
therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set
forth in that judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously
no point in reproducing and restating the conclusions and
reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.
Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the
Clerk of Court of the Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above
mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-
SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which
it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and
characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and
ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL
provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter
to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing
UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2)
his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a

communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily
Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the
record because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter (Section
5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated
November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution
promulgated on December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.
SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another
action to invalidate the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he
had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was Civil
Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB,
et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented
by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.
On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A.
Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and
litigation expenses (P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this
judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the
Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that
Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of
the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26,
1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . .
order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R.
No. 84999. In a Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second Division
required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents
therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On
November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his appearance for
Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by
Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4,
1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and
law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178
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Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by
Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had
lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also
impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then
Chairman, First Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then,
respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division),
and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the
case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due
course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in
and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989
— in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court
and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a
time represented Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his
withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between
him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing
pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and
declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said)
Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other
hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to
the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order
dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants
therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's
compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated November 29,
1989.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.
CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and
Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in this
Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as
the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another
person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that
his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was
rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid and
binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent
sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals,
but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment,
by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being
docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March
16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition
as well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late;
and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of
Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by
Resolution dated June 3, 1987.
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said
adverse resolutions through various motions and letters, all of which were
denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him
by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the
following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third
Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:
Dear Mr. Borromeo:
This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a
copy of the actual resolution with the signatures of all the
Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No. 77243
whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
the petition was denied for lack of merit.
In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance,
Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine
Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the
Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this
Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the
petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does
not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions
to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be
known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by
this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or
order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the
parties of the action taken on their case by quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court.
Very truly yours,
JULIETA Y. CARREON
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B. CRIMINAL CASES
Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal
Bank, and similarly without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his
adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts
to overturn the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a
complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First
Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary
of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and
Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining that the matters therein dealt with
had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts
including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987).
The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for
complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of
the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418
A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas), dated January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of
Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a
violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for
supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued Supreme Court
resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No.
82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Resolution dated
March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed his complaint for
"lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the
respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and
fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering them," and "it is
not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial
resolutions." 33
III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY
BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-
G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running
court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it
Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure
payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance
bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in
the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed
to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in
the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to
Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was
represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by
the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty.
Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both
defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of
P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than
P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of
execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo
was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in
favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.
On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by
default, but the same was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for
Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of
Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition.
Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court
on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September
17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with
finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on
December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in
light of his history of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not
signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of
72 of 121 | PALE | CY
actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter,
instituted by Borromeo.
2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267
While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo
commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers
who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the
suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process,
Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and
Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and
deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him
through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and
moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe
anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as
well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon.
Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to
introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would
be superfluous to still require defendants to present their own evidence as
there is nothing for them to controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;
CA-G.R. CV No. 39047
Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still
another suit against the same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge
Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered
the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust Judgment
and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the
Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges
Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 &
CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton,
malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him
equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had
been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights,
and embarrassment for which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and
32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding)
dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from
liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-
G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer
of SBTC, for contempt of court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993. 35 Said the
Court:
Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes,
the subject motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a stark
difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be
considered res judicata under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and
his apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on
the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the
acceptable limits of argumentation and personal advocacy.
The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the
irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds
them highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the
dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a
licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his
otherwise contumacious behavior is presently accorded the
patience and leniency it probably does not deserve.
Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the
appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar
displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt with with
commensurate severity.
IV. OTHER CASES
A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,
CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K.
Lao is pertinent. This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of
73 of 121 | PALE | CY
Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of
P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the
security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by
TCT No. 34785.36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of
P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker.
Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's
obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which a
deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of
land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then
mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of
P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson
Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had
conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him
by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where
his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said
Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February
7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration.
His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift.
On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution denying
his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show
that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned
judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the
resolutions sent to him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no
signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the resolution
therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against
Borromeo, at least as of date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18),
which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the
theory that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third
Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was
former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at
the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano
O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint
"on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the
following pertinent observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds
that this Court has indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret
or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme
Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff
against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the
highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of
plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this
humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their
propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse
the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court
would appear not only presumptuous but also
contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a
careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint clearly
shows that all material allegations thereof are directed
against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was
allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of five (5)
justices. No allegation is made directly against defendant
Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the
case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final
order or judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Division)
which according to the plaintiff himself had issued a
resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower
Court's decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment."
Perhaps, if there was such violation of the Rules of Court,
due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the
defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have
been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to
reverse, interpret or review the acts of a superior court might
be construed to a certain degree as a show of an uncommon
common sense. Lower courts are without supervising
jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the
higher courts.
Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied
"for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15,
1994.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433
74 of 121 | PALE | CY
A. Complaint Against Lawyers
of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
lawyers who had appeared for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao
— in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, these
lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato
Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment.
Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in
(1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a
genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently
depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale;
and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath to
do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged
that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his
property in favor of Lao.
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely
baseless and nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10,
1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in
Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President),
Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.
Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid
(Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia
G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The
lawyers made the following observations:
It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard
members of the Judiciary with deferential awe and respect
sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the
courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and
unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter
disregard to the authority and name of the courts.
And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that
here is a non-lawyer who uses the instruments of justice to
harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more
especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims
and caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the
constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:
The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this
Honorable Court, and other members of the Judiciary are
clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and
contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary
and subvert the public confidence on the courts. If
unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity
of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in the
country's judicial system and administration of justice.
. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the
courts and the legal profession. So many baseless
badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this
Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free
would certainly be demoralizing to members of the
profession who afforded the court with all the respect and
esteem due them.
Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading
protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila
Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the
case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in
seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi,
President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the
respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more cautious
and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints
against lawyers." 37
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
75 of 121 | PALE | CY
Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters
("open" or otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite
unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against
him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as
well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse
dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the
respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and
circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by
Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of
Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad
hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . .
(which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to
the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant,
corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star"
as regards the reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding
the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court
persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process
and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions
devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in
the Supreme Court.
He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he
had "suffered INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render
TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING
THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while
failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same letter, he
specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on
me by this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after
EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you
said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and
defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute
resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times,
sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and
does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold
and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and
captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and
Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . .
 76 of 121 | PALE | CY

'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and
and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that
stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases, despite CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic
laws (during our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned
have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most unjust Ruling UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land
in favor of a wrongful party. . . ." grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt
to fool people!" he mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and
contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by
Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center the
caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank,
surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at
nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular"
proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o
facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the
admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE
CHARTER." 38
One other "circular" reads:
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment
without first resolving the motion for reconsideration (G.R
No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the
SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-
8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune from
suit" — despite their failure to file any pleading? Were
Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and
rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No.
82273).
TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their
acts speak for themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER
AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!

SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!! IMPEACH NARVASA

— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS • ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING,
UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO "MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF
SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution
NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it
shielded CROOKS in the judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC • VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND
Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING CASE
supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679)
denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S
which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE
SCRA itself. IN DEFAULT

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and • CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS
associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN RULING,
"Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY
patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY BANK
 77 of 121 | PALE | CY

TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3 The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as
MILLION April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D.
Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning
• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal
DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL COURT Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to
ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF by the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two
PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION (2) other cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R.
No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and
Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo
• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely
SAME TIME AND PREDICTABLY to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty.
EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW
Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles
CORRUPT JUSTICES
applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned
in his circular.
• DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and
even MERE CLERKS TO BE IMMUNE The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by
FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO the Court in other cases instituted by Borromeo in this
THE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of
ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v.
AGAINST HIMSELF
Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence
of other communications made public by Borromeo
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS reiterating the arguments already passed upon by the court
OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of those
arguments.
A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter
IBP, dated June 21, 1992 Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among above named, President, and taking account of the related
others, of some members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of facts on record, the Court Resolved:
the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated
June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last quoted, 1) to REQUIRE:
above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other officers
. . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory
(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a
remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and (2)
proceeding for contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo
in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the Court "to
instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter,
impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City
Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993 Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its
annexes; and
Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993,
requiring comment by Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to him (b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL
by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows: SERVICE of said notice of resolution and a copy of the
Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its
xxx xxx xxx

annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo,
Cebu City; and
2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days
from receipt of such notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of
June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the
letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set
forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator,
the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.
SO ORDERED.
1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989
Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the
first paragraph of the resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for
perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice
relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other
communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit: the
letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon
(of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the letter to
him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due
course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No.
87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and
that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43
C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993
In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment
dated August 27, 1993 in which he alleged the following:
1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment)
violates the Constitution which requires "signatures and
concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;"
hence, "a certified copy duly signed by Justices is
respectfully requested;"
2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should
inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and
Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard
by an impartial and independent body;"
78 of 121 | PALE | CY
3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by
members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague,
unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what
particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous
and condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty. Legaspi
has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those
accused in the "libelous circular;"
4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his
rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition
the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by
the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the
accountability of public officials;" the circular merely states
the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be
commended and encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should
specify under oath which statements are false and lies;
5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared
to support them with pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and
it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and members of
the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the
justice that they are duty bound to dispense.
D. Resolution of September 30, 1993
After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest
opportunity to explain his side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court
promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of which
was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino,
Office of the Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin
Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President
Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are
both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said
Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T.
Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days from
notice hereof within which to engage the services or
otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such
further arguments in addition to or in amplification of those
set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so
minded.

SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment
of October 15, 1992
Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992,
reiterating the arguments and allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993,
and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said)
Comment," viz.:
1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state
under oath the alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the
circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a VERIFIED
COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in
contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the
precious time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless
complaint;
2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor
disrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH and the LAW",
namely:
a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures
and clear facts and laws are patent
violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of
the Constitution;
b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon.
Court's affirmation to the Appelate Court's
ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of
redemption price, since no less than this
Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that
CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in
right of redemption;
c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks
TRB and UCPB's frauds and defiance of court orders in G.R.
Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.
F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993
79 of 121 | PALE | CY
Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26,
1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his
charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the
charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and
admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the
said Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's
baseless and false charges."
VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS
A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court
Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of
Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules
and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of
justice.44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without
merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to
him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and
executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his
own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his
personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he
has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing
for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried
the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his
repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has
wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court
employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another
on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having
been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called
"minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-
same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance
and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.
1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses
The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of
the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and
Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial
and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted,
arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the

law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an
argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic
that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against
itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to
the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers
and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and
judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the
prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be
inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform their functions with
dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the
prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal
contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law
requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an
opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The
charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. .
. ." 46
His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by
members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and
sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the
circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that
Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those
accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but
superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.
Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making
the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of
freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress
of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in
accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights
invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same
causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other
persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time,
and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
B. Basic Principles Governing
the Judicial Function
The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a
restatement of the principles governing finality of judgments and of the
paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down
definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection
on the part of lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to
administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a
80 of 121 | PALE | CY
substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review
provided by law from court judgments or orders.
1. Reason for courts; Judicial
Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In
every country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of
courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments and
final orders of lower courts.
The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e.,
the presentation of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing in the first
instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and
legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed
by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.
2. Paramount Need to end
Litigation at Some Point
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation
must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been
undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or
terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be
sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment,
indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the
issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded
absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines
v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that
courts are the temples of right."
3. Judgments of Supreme Court
Not Reviewable
The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most
jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be

reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of Government.
Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision
should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much
less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings
of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise
erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the indisputable and unshakable
foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.
In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute
before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust
extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article
204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury"
to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution"
promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . — the
following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established
doctrine: 50
. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of
December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto,
"(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable
disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is
elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early
case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911])
"controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of
occasional error, judgments of courts determining
controversies submitted to them should become final at
some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice
recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control
even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of
correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion
of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which
the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to
decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to
determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA
305, 316-317)
xxx xxx xxx
81 of 121 | PALE | CY
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate
court, whether an en banc or division, speak for themselves
and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs.
Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61
Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme
Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well
settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts
as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as
claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought
refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers
and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democractic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally
applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and
decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc.
vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).
The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine
of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative
and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their
duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It
has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a
right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would
cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it
should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces
at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch
into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of
powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the
three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34
SCRA 275, 286-287).
4. Final and Executory Judgments of
Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies
available under law to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or
orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an
appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on
whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in
accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of
courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that
it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject
to review by higher tribunals — become final and executory before, or
without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in
anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 52
C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action
against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic
Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a
regrettable increase in the resort to administrative prosecution — or the
institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to
appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as
a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of
their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency,
administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court
Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of
damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and
justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.
1. Common Basis of Complaints
Against Judges
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent
Judges or Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with
the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of
discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable
injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of
82 of 121 | PALE | CY
complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the
fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of
the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or
erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability.
2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for
Correction of Judgments and Orders
The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or
not in lieu of the prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and
orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for
appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or
criminal remedies.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution
in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the question
submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that
any contrary postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing
a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and
executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust
judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an
incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its
findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a
proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after more
fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already
pointed out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his
deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or
special civil action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves
but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long established
hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No other review is
allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204
of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust
judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any
case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not
the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the
"unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper
appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either
the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court.
Respondents should likewise know that said penal article
has no application to the members of a collegiate court such
as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.
xxx xxx xxx
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and
prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme
Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the
regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to
subvert and undermine that very independence of the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For
it is a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone
who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge
would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,
and would destroy that independence without which no
judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs.
Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).
xxx xxx xxx
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and
claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and
rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of
the duty of their high office to act upon their own
83 of 121 | PALE | CY
independent consideration and judgment of the matter at
hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and
conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and
to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance
of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy
the separation of powers and undermine the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without
violating the separation of powers mandated by the
Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of
this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their
adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme
Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine
and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have
become final and executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by
higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority.
3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed
Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust
To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or
order is unjust — or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing
judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers
or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially judicial
function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of
courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other
entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation
service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has competence to
review a judicial order or decision — whether final and executory or not —
and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness
and Leads to Absurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of
unjust judgments or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which,
at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or interlocutory
orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted
by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of
corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such
proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile
and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.
Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial
hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed
and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is
appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally,
the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the
original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would
appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the
Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary
investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by
necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court
Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most
certainly an act of supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation.
Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or
Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in
question — despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels —
and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an
information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court
Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or
the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the
Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness
of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the
same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial
Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan
Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the
offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices
of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his
conviction.
84 of 121 | PALE | CY
The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be
modified, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for
supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.
5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative
Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this
impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking
account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are
that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or
order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or
inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement
or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the judgment
rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court
in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged.
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal
or dismissal in a criminal action, as to which — the same being unappealable
— it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or
even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such
charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with
malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence,
etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative
judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or
order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action
of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the;
judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the
prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the
Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust
judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order in question is
"unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally
possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.
D. Judges Must be Free from
Influence or Pressure
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they

may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound
rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not
generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good
faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he
renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that
administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme
Court.
As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges
of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for
damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when
acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction."58 Based on Section 9, Act
No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent
legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor
shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any
judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits
of his legal powers and jurisdiction."
Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing
that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which rights are
the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the
Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such
liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent
that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust
interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that
prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already
mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained,
unless there be a final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the
decision or order in issue.
E. Afterword
Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may
well be asked why it took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50)
85 of 121 | PALE | CY
grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different
rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present
administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the
unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-
evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with
him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he
suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow
seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays along his
misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the power of
contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle.
Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no effect on him.
Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as
signs of weakness and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible
audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as
flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings
against the courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the
extent of even involving the legislative and executive departments, the
Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of
personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is
time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between
reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves
notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal
with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely
impose such punitive sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the
integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.
WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of
constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and
instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious
errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their
authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10)
DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of
which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts,
judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions. IT IS
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.
LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C.
QUILATAN, respondents.
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor
J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V.
Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both
for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and
Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4,
1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the
fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed
only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well
founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court
and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the
litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a
lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed
separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and
Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal
Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law
students of the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal
Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate
appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein
respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said
86 of 121 | PALE | CY
petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on
September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers,
among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979
and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of Section
34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on
November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining
respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting
any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs.
Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz)
of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as
scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is
authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior
courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney.
However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can
be aided only by an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is
empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by
respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana
and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal
action. — Unless the offended party has waived the civil
action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately
from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of
section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is
subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no
less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of
the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in
person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the
case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the
City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through
reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in
the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or
friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The
permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as
private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow
the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the
trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation
of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under
his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can
appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the
municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the
civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the
civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said
87 of 121 | PALE | CY
complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the
civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16,
1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners
Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner
Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is
hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners
Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the
temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana,
Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They
have no business appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a
party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of the
Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases
Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a
criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an
offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability.
The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in
respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific
provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section
34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74
SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15

specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated
August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private
prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases. Orders set aside.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana,
Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They
have no business appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a
party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of the
Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases
Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a
criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an
offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability.
The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in
respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific
provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section
34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74
SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15
specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated
August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private
prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases. Orders set aside.
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De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They
have no business appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a
party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of the
Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases
Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a
criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an
offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability.
The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in
respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific
provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section
34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74
SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15
specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated
August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private
prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases.
De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concurs with the dissent of Assoc. Justice
Herrera.

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-
0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No.
00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC
a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-
1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v.
Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission
for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No.
19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over
the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that
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Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is
the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public
respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705
pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3,
2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that
the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one
that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and
that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide
that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites
Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the
appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of
a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the
RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7,
2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order
of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold
In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705
pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s
Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance
of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant
Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to
deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite
petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO
DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL
ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE
TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW
WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR
MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS
WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE
OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted
by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and
implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No.
90 of 121 | PALE | CY
730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student,
from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant
in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by
the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation
in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of
the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this
rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and
all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court
En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior
court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts,
a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of
a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any

other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in
Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists
for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial
Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and
Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or
friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The
court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to
himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not
have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the
basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a
non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As
succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
91 of 121 | PALE | CY
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very
nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this
reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended
by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in
its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant
for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for
indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor
appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage
results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an
enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule
applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor
prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that
the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as
a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public
prosecutor. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is
the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964,
and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial
Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning
a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo
entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the
Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering
the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano
Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a
notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22
November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963,
filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's
fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed
a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the
ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were
held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants
were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the
backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case,
apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates
............................................. 10%
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Quintin Muning
......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis
................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the
ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He
asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained
averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and
considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's
answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case was considered submitted for
decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467,
27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's
fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral
in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented
by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in
the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf
of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to
duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend
in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the
representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule
138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees.
— An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's
representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he
cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of
the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the
protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it
is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the
bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the
great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation
for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not
been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as
an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated;7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will
not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave
the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity
93 of 121 | PALE | CY
and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-
lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery
of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented
when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover
as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be
awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its
members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that
moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included
as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being
contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition
as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members
because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in
the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized
"for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-
being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union
may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic
Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any
person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the
financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice
of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who
are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as

"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a
serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this
matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up
in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the
persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they
awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin
Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against
respondent Muning.
A.C. No. 7325 January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F.
Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct
and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of
emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special
power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and
possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon.
Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two
sons, Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received
53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square meters.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their
respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972,
emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo
Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program,who in turn sold the parcels of land to
94 of 121 | PALE | CY
complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was
executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation
patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered
by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the
DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-
Movant," filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.5
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition6which he signed as "Counsel for the
Plaintiff Efren Babela"7. Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty.
Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority
from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren
could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because
Efren had already been dead9 for more than a year. He claimed that Atty.
Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly
bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efren’s
widow10and daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of
rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of
sale. Both also stated that they werefamiliar with Efren’s signature. They state
that the signature inthe waiver was different from his usual signature.
Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross
misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and
manufactured evidence intothe proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a
document denominated asWaiver of Rights where Efren waived all his rights
in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment
in one of the cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a
case13 for falsification of public document and use of falsified document
against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as
"additional counsel". He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised
him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware
that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.

In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed
deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not present
credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by
plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing
of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not
explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof of the
authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable for
falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to
the DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of
Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus
recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but
modified the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law. 16 Atty.
Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was denied.18
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since
no legal fees are required in administrative cases.20
We adopt the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of
a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney isrequired to authorize him to appear in court for his
client, butthe presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes
the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contemptas an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
(Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co., 21 this Court said that
while a lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a
95 of 121 | PALE | CY
court requires that he show suchauthorization, it is imperative that he show
his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the
client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not
invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, [a]
court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer
to adduce authorization from the client.22
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for
a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court.23 If an attorney appears on a client’s
behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he
purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his
assumed authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney
for a party toa case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transaction.25
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a
client, an attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or
the lawyer.26
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the
proceedings before the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his
authority to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication
that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority during the course of the
proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time
he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and
Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have
informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that he was
retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have
been substituted.27
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v.
Mendoza28 where he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan
Magalop, presumably upon the adviceof his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of
the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than

conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man
did no[t] commit. As the ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea of
guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him – presented or forthcoming.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop
could have been implicated."
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who,
through an incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was
apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof,
to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without
cause.1âwphi1 The defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate
this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the
right to submit evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s liability
under the present circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role
of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an
attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with fairness, honesty
and candor towards the courts and his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to
uphold the law and court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer
must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in
general as agents of the judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid
about his representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded
means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracol's blatant disregard of his duties as
a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his
lawyer's oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the
practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a
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warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2610 June 16, 1951
CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners,
vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE
LOPEZ, respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan dated September 22, 1947, placing one
Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to
petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same court on August 24,
1939, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to
satisfy the payment of an obligation.
The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano,
Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all
surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother
Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer
in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio
Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on therefore
said property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment
of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. When
Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo
Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the mortgage, making as
parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio
Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served only upon Eladio
Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in that services
of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the
defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial, at which both
parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision ordering Eladio
Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest thereon at the

rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934, until its full payment, plus
the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the foreclosure of the
mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within ninety (90)
days from the date the decision becomes final. The decision was rendered on
August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the judgment within the
period therein specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered the sale
at public auction of the mortgaged properties, which were sold to the plaintiff
as the highest bidder and the provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed
of the sale in his favor. The sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941.
On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipa Lopez,
who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This
motion was granted on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners did not heed
the order, they were summoned by the court to explain why they should no be
punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession,
to which they answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an
action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal
because petitioners were not properly served with summons as defendants in
the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners having been found
to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to punish
the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence
this petition for certiorari.
The issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision
rendered by the lower court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668,
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the
properties in question; and (2) to the validity of the order of the court dated
September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place
respondent Felipa Lopez in possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in
possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgagee.
As regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the
petitioners can not be sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a
collateral attack to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has
become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its
face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought
principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717).
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served
with summons in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service
was cured when the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the
complaint thru their attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in
their behalf in all stages of the case. Since an Attorney Maiquez who
appeared for the petitioners must be presumed to have been authorized by
97 of 121 | PALE | CY
them when he appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case. The
security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor
to overcome such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is
specially so when, as in the instant case, it is only after the lapse of more than
nine (9) years after the judgment has been rendered that petitioners thought
of challenging the jurisdiction of the court.
The second issue raised by the petitioners is not also taken, for the simple
reason that the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings
is not an execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the
court can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the statute
of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in the
meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). This is the correct interpretation
of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties
mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has transferred
them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their possession. In the
exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the litigation and save
multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why the court cannot
issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser in the possession of
the property.
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a
foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser,
and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The
power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in possession,
is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decrees
and thus avoid circuitous action and vexatious litigation (Rovero de
Ortega vs.Natividad, 71 Phil., 340).
It has also been held:
In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto
intervenes and the debtor continues in possession of the real
property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to
put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court)
provides that the confirmation of the sale by judicial decree operates
to divest all the parties to the action of their respective rights and
vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal provision, it is the
duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may

be placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at
the public auction sale and become his by virtue of the final decree
confirming the sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). Emphasis
supplied.
The following American authorities may also be involved in support of the
order of the lower court:
A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in action for the
foreclosure of the mortgage, and having decreed a sale of the
premises, RETAINS its jurisdiction and has authority to put the
purchaser in possession of the property, without compelling him to
resort to an action of law. (27 Cyc., 1937; 42 C. J., 271 and cases
there cited.) (Bold types and emphasis supplied).
. . . It does not appear to consist with sound principle that the court
which has exclusive authority to foreclosure the equity of redemption
of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in interest before it, and
decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be able even to
put the purchaser into possession against one of the very parties to
the suit, and who is bound by the decree. When the court has
obtained jurisdiction of a case, and has investigated and decided
upon the merits, it is not sufficient for the ends of justice merely to
declare the right without affording the remedy. If it was to be
understood that after a decree and sale mortgaged premises, the
mortgagor, or other party to the suit, or perhaps, those who have
been let into possession by the mortgagor, pendente lite, could
withhold the possession in defiance of the authority of this court, and
compel the purchaser to resort to a court of law, I apprehend that the
delay and expense and inconvenience of such a course of
proceeding would greatly impair the value and diminish the results of
sales under a decree. (See Notes to Wilson v. Polk, 51 Am. D., 151).
(Kershew v. Thompson, 4 Johns, Ch., 609).
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.
98 of 121 | PALE | CY
In re David
PABLO, M .:
In administrative case No. 35, the respondent was suspended for malpractice
in the exercise of his profession of attorney for a period of five years as of
November 9, 1949. The respondent admits this suspension in his written
report presented on 17 March 1951; however, he continued to practice the
profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November
8, 1954.
On February 28, 1950, the petitioner presented a plea (Exhibit J) in case CA
GR No. 4792-R, Tan Tek Sy v. Maliwanag, not as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy,
but with the following words: "for and on behalf of Tan Tek Sy"; on January
26, 1951 it was sent by certified mail notification of the decision in said case
(Exhibit G), confirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; On March
13, 1951, he filed a motion in said court - already returned the file - requesting
the issuance of an execution order, which motion is signed as follows: jgc:
chanrobles.com.ph
"TAN TEK SI
" By (Sgd.) FELIX P. DAVID,
"c / o Atty, Felix P. David,
" Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,
"Philippines Saw Mill & Construction,
The respondent therefore presented the brief not as lawyers in practice
usually do, but as an agent of Tan Tek Sy.
In Civil Case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, the respondent filed a brief on
September 25, 1950, requesting an order to demolish the houses of the
defendants (Exhibit TO); On October 10, 1950, he filed a motion asking that
the Manila Sheriff be authorized to pay "the amount or such other amount as
may be collected by the Sheriff from time to time" (Exhibit B); on November
13, 1950, he filed another motion (Exhibit C) requesting another demolition
order, signing the three writings, Exhibits A, B and C, as the plaintiff's
attorney; exhibits B through B-34 show that he was receiving payments of
amounts from several defendants as the plaintiff's attorney;

In defense the appellant says that he appeared as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy
from the Municipal Court of Manila in 1948; that, upon being suspended, he
had advised his client to seek another lawyer to prepare the plea that was to
be presented before the Court of Appeal; that when there were only two or
three days left and his client could not present it, he wrote and presented it at
the request of his client; that he prepared the plea with the intention that his
client sign it, but since this was in Dagupan and he could not sign it and there
was only one day left, then he signed it as follows: "Felix P. David, for and on
behalf of the appellee. " On September 25, 1950, I filed with the Court of
Appeal a memorandum in response to the appellant, signed as is the plea.
"In order - says the appellant - to show that I did not have the intention to
disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not with the knowledge
of Tan Tek Sy even identified myself as the attorney for the appellee but in
good faith, I signed for and on behalf of the appellee without designating that I
am practicing as attorney-at-law. " cralaw virtua1aw library
We do not believe that the action of the respondent is justified in presenting
the plea and his memorandum on behalf of his client being suspended in the
exercise of his profession; knowing that he was suspended, he should not
have introduced them as an agent or as a lawyer; he was under an obligation
not to continue serving his client before the Court of Appeal; he had to warn
his client that he was suspended in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer
and should advise him to use another in his place if he wanted
representation; it should not contravene the express order of this Court; I
should have known that a non-practicing lawyer can not be brought before a
court by a litigant except before a court of law. When I present your plea and
your memorandum with the following words "For and on behalf of the
Appellee" infringed Article 31 of Rule 127 which provides that "In the other
courts, a party may conduct its own litigation personally or with the help of a
lawyer, and his appearance shall be made personally or through a duly
authorized member of the Forum." An agent or a proxy or a member of the
suspended Forum can not appear for a litigant.
To explain the filing of the motions in Case No. 3655, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc.
against Tolentino, the respondent says that I act in good faith, that I present
them not to disobey the decision of this Court but to charge their fees. As an
official of the Forum, the lawyer must comply with the decision of this Court
above any other consideration. We believe that he does not act in good faith
who, putting his interest in the collection of his fees, exercises the profession
knowing that he was not allowed to exercise it. Even if he had not submitted
his motions exhibits A, B and C and issued receipts B to B-34 for amounts
collected from the defendants, the respondent could have charged his fees,
and demanded directly from his client, and claimed them in accordance with
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the article 33 Rule 127.
The appellant says that if he appeared on March 2, 1950 in case No. 7679 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Juan de la Torre against Philippine Trust
Co., it was at the request of his brother-in-law Juan de la Torre and also the I
do not charge fees for his appearance because I knew he was suspended in
the exercise of the profession. Although this appearance was not taken into
account, the respondent can not be saved by having provided the various
professional services already reported.
To practice the profession of a lawyer is to practice the acts of that
profession. The preparation and presentation of motions requesting the
execution of the sentence, the demolition of the houses of the defendants,
asking the court to order the Sheriff to deliver the amounts collected, are acts
that are part of the exercise of the legal profession; to present a plea and
memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the profession of
lawyer, because an agent can not do it; Collecting rents from the 109
defendants, issuing 35 receipts and signing them as the plaintiff's lawyer, is
practicing the profession.
The fact that he had not put his motion for an execution order in Malayan Saw
Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, who acted as a lawyer but as an agent and
employee of the Philippines Sawmill and Construction, does not alter the
nature of his services that are certainly professional lawyer services; but,
concealing that he acted as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy and pretending that he
was only an agent, his situation is aggravated: it is more guilty that, covered
with a mask, he shoots against his enemy than the one who does it bare-
faced and in sight from the public; hence the criminal law imposes more
severe punishment in the first case.
The evidence in the case file shows that the defendant Felix P. David
exercised the profession of lawyer by intentionally disregarding the decision
of this Court of September 30, 1949, Administrative Case No. 35.
Therefore, he is disqualified from practicing as a lawyer In the Philippines, the
certificate issued in their favor to exercise the profession is declared canceled
and ordered to return it to the Clerk of this Court.
Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Angelo Bautista and
Labrador, MM., Are satisfied.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged
Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of
the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant
in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as
such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would
be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.
On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the
appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion
to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time
invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City
Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by
upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not
actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI
of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered
judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no
reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action
was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and
be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.
100 of 121 | PALE | CY
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended
party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or
that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever
in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming
from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this
criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney
Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an
agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D.
Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore
reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of
defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127
(now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing
as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice
is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent

habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from
should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
appellant..
HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed on June 3, 1981 by Herminio R.
Noriega against Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison "admitted to the Bar on March 31,
1976) on the ground of malpractice through gross misrepresentation and
falsification.
Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent Sison is a regular and
permanent employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a
Hearing Officer and as such, "is mandated to observe strictly the civil service
rules and regulations, more particularly ... the prohibition of government
employees to practice their professions"; that to circumvent the prohibition
and to evade the law, respondent assumed a different name, falsified his
Identity and represented himself to be one "Atty. Manuel Sison", with offices
at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, "at the times that he will handle
private cases"; that "Manuel Sison" is not listed as a member of the Bar in the
records of the Supreme Court; that under his said assumed name,
101 of 121 | PALE | CY
respondent is representing one Juan Sacquing, the defendant in Case No.
E01978 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila,
submitting pleadings therein signed by him respondent) under his assumed
name, despite his full knowledge That "Manuel Sison" is not a member of the
Bar and that his acts in doing so are illegal and unlawful. 1 Xerox copies of
pertinent documents, pleadings, orders and notices are annexed to the
complaint to support the material allegations therein.
As requireD, respondent filed his Answer on August 20, 1981. He attached
thereto a copy of the written authorization given by Julio A. Sulit, Jr.,
Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for him
to appear as counsel of Juan Sacquing, a close family friend, in the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court JDRC of Manila, Respondent alleges that he
never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided
legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that
he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally as "Atty. Manuel
Sison" in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his appearance, he
always signed the minutes as "Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison", and in one
instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote
his name as Atty Manuel Sison"; that due to the "inept and careless work of
the clerical staff of the JDRC", notices were sent to "Atty. Manuel Sison", at
605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, where respondent's parents conduct a
printing office and establishment, which notices were honored by the
personnel of said office as respondent's family has called respondent by the
nickname "Manuel"; that respondent did not feel any necessity to correct this
error of the JDRC since he "could use his nickname 'Manuel' interchangeably
with his original true name as a formal name, and its use was not done for a
fraudulent purpose nor to misrepresent"; and, that this administrative case is
only one of the numerous baseless complaints brought by complainant
against respondent, the former being a disgruntled loser in an injunction case
in the SEC heard before respondent as Hearing Officer.
In resolving this disbarment case, We must initially emphasize the degree of
integrity and respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying
that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study.
By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of
support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the
same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the
court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely
put by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great
importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may
depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to
be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand,
it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar
should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench
should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling
power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. 2
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving
him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function
should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and
clients may rightly repose confidence in them. 3
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof.
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 4
5
This Court has also held in re Atty. Felizarda M. de Guzman that to be made
the basis of suspension or disbarment, the record must disclose as free from
doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary
powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation
thereof must be clearly demonstrated. An attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the
contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court, that he performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.
Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint
do not warrant disbarment of the respondent. There is no evidence that the
respondent has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct,
violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful disobedience of any lawful order of the
court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case
without attorney to do so. 6
There is no violation of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations for his
appearance as counsel for the defendant in the JDRC Case No. E-01978 was
with authority given by the Associate Commisioner Of SEC, Julio A. Sulit, Jr.
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This Court also holds that under the facts complained of supported by the
annexes and the answer of respondent likewise sustained by annexes
attached thereto and the reply of the complainant, the accusation that
respondent with malice and deliberate intent to evade the laws, assumed a
different name, falsified his Identity and represented himself to be one "ATTY.
MANUEL SISON" with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the
times that he will handle private cases, is not meritorious. Neither is the
charge referred to is that pending the slantiated. The only case DRC Case
No. E-01978 wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant. It
being an isolated case, the same does not constitute the practice of law, more
so since respondent did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance
because respondent and defendant therein were close family friends. Such
act of the respondent in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close
family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of
harrassment against respondent.
The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein the respondent was
dismissed from the service because being a government employee, he
appeared as counsel in a private case, cannot be applied in the case at bar
because the respondent in said Zeta case had appeared as counsel without
permission from his superiors.
Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service rules, the complainant
however states that the basis of his complaint for disbarment is not the
respondent's act of appearing as counsel but the unauthorized use of another
name. 7
A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas there is indeed a
pleading entitled "Objection/Opposition to the 2 Formal Offer of Evidence"
(Annex "C" to the Complaint for Disbarment, which is signed as "Manuel
Sisori", counsel for defendant, 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, p. 7 of the
Records), there is, however, no showing that respondent was thus motivated
with bad faith or malice, for otherwise lie would not have corrected the
spelling of his name when the court staff misspelled it in one of the minutes of
the proceeding. Moreover, We find no reason or motive for respondent to
conceal his true name when he have already given express authority by his
superior to act as counsel for Juan Sacquing in the latter's case pending
before the JDRC And while it may be True that subsequent errors were made
in sending notices to him under the name "Atty. Manuel Sison, ' the errors
were attributable to the JDRC clerical staff and not to the respondent.
At most, this Court would only counsel the respondent to be more careful and
cautious in signing his name so as to avoid unnecessary confusion as
regards his Identity.

At this point, We are constrained to examine the motives that prompted the
complainant in filing the present case. An examination of the records reveals
that the complainant was a defendant in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Case No. 1982 filed by the Integrated Livestock Dealers
Inc. and Teofisto Jiao against seven (7) respondents including the
complainant, seeking to oust the complainant and his codefendants from
acting as officers of the Integrated Livestock Dealers lnc. then pending before
respondent as Hearing Officer of the SEC, who after trial decided the case
against the herein complainant. From this antecedent fact, there is cast a
grave and serious doubt as to the true motivation of the complainant in filing
the present case, considering further that other administrative charges were
filed by the complainant against respondent herein before the SEC, JDRC
and the Fiscal's office in Manila.
We hold that complainant's repeated charges or accusations only indicate his
resentment and bitterness in losing the SEC case and not with the honest and
sincere desire and objectives "(1) to compel the attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his client;" (Strong vs. Munday 52 N.J. Eq. 833, 21 A. 611) and
"(2) to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved
him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney." (Ex parte Brounsal Cowp 829; 83 Reprint; 6 C.J., p.
581; see In re de los Angeles Adm. Case No. 225, Sept. 31, 1959, cited in
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, p. 242).
In the light of the foregoing, We find no reason or necessity to refer this
complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When
this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must
desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from
holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension from the practice of law.1
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In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I.
Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents
allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of
Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended
respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for
two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, 7 praying
that respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of
law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this court denied
complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated
ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14,
2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan
requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's
suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution10 dated January
16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the.
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the
practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional
Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law
is suspended."11
Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with
his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According
to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his
suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's
resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his]
rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as
this court does not render advisory opinions.13

On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his
letter14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued
practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc 's resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On
Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension
and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission
as a notary public."15According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a
copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the
practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a
member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court
suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a
non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional
Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."17 The Commission
on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have ordered
Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director.
Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action
on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for report and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar
Confidant found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga
had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to file their
respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where
they might appear as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law
during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to
perform his functions as Regional Director during the period of suspension,
the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly]
disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter,
modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final
and executory. "22
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Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that this court require him to submit a certification from the
Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and
the Commission .on Human Rights be required to comment on complainant
Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his
suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public
office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his suspension from the
practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his
constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory principle in law
that what is not included is deemed excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents
to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse
of the period of suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and the
Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's
allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as Regional
Director while he was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution
dated September 23, 2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public imposed on
respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to
FILE their respective motions to lift relative to their suspension and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and
SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel,
stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from the
practice of law during the entire period of their suspension and
disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from
the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been
suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of his

functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on
the allegations of complainant against them, both within ten (10) days
from receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their
respective motions to lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his
comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing his
functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as
Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which
did not require the practice of law. These managerial functions allegedly
included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional office and
its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the
[Commission on Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the
implementation of all other services and assistance programs of the
[Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional
level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and
disbursement of funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]." 34 The
Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the
legal services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of
law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's
resolution suspending him from the practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27,
2009. It argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of
the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon
him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission,
Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter" 39 while the
imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an
entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the
[Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's
resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this
court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment,
complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty.
Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights
105 of 121 | PALE | CY
stating that he was suspended from office and desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position
as Regional Director and only performed generally managerial functions,
complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order
of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-
manager,"43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano v.
Monsod44 constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the
position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer
[in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had
supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-
manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his position as Regional
Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his
position as Regional Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty.
Baliga were really in good faith, he should have followed the initial resolution
of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga
did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the
Commission on Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By
"playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and
philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has
that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan
prayed that Atty. Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty.
Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to resume his practice of law and perform
notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for issuance of a
notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission
on Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the
Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to
perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director] which
[required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga
claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which
required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended
that the Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim.
The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in abeyance the

resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission
on Human Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension. The
Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's
claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional
Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights
reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is
separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional Director.
The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of
[Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of
law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision
[this court] arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of
suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We,
therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." 57 It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered
practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by
lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or
legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the
Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into regional offices with
each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations
in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional
Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
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Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of
Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR
Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission
on Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human
rights complaints in the absence of the legal officer or investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties
and discuss "immediate courses of action and protection remedies
and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute
resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including
notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases
prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths
and affirmations are usually performed by members of the judiciary and
notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the
bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human
rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director
must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when
he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional
Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding.
The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of
Regional Director.

This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on
June 15, 2006, "effective immediately."75From the time Atty. Baliga received
the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has been without
authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the
Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated
January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty.
Baliga from assuming his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to the
investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in
the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by
the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human
Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into effect and implement the legal
implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for
which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the
Commission on Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due
process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission
on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission
gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for
reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not
supported by the record. It was also immaterial.1âwphi1 He held the position
of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority
to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that
position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from
holding his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law:
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SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R.
Magat from the practice of law for six months for practicing his profession
despite this court's previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as
Regional Director despite lack.of authority to practice law.1âwphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the
resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first resolution suspending
Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission
admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same
offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III)
No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul
his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on
Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en
Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the
Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally blameless and should not
suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned
with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government
employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority
to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as
a notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the
conditions expressly set forth by the Commission.

With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC
Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot
close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct
of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged,
and censure Atty. Baliga for having contravened the conditions of his
commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a
privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in equal
footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty.
Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission exacts commensurate
solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission grants of every official and
employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year
suspension imposed on him pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The
Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the
office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is
being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty.
Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an
erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR
(III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the
service.80 (Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April
13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as
Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere
resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human
Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can only retain
those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege
burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers
must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest
degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal
profession."84
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WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice
of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and
six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service
on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights. SO
ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016
SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO,
Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated January 16, 2010 filed by
complainants spouses Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio
(complainants) against respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales (respondent),
praying that respondent be meted the appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for
failing to pay rent and to vacate the apartment he is leasing despite demands.
The Facts
Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at 4-D
Cavite St., Barangay Paltok, SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to
respondent under a Contract of Lease2 dated April 16, 2005. However,
respondent violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when
he failed to pay monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and
to vacate the leased premises despite repeated oral and written demands.3
This prompted complainants to refer the matter to barangay conciliation,
where the parties agreed on an amicable settlement, whereby respondent
promised to pay complainants the amount of P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009
and to vacate the leased premises on July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually
reneged on his obligations under the settlement agreement, constraining
complainants to file an ejectment case4 against him before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed as
Civil Case No. 09-39689. Further, complainants filed the instant case before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed to exemplify honesty,
integrity, and respect for the laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his
obligations to complainants.

Despite notices,6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the
mandatory conference, and to file his position paper.
Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision7 dated December 8,
2009 in the ejectment case in favor of the complainants and, accordingly,
ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainants
the following amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July
2009; (b) further rental payments of P8,000.00 per month starting August 17,
2009 until the actual surrender of said premises to complainants; (c)
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and (d) cost of suit.
During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant
City Public Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation10 dated February 8, 2011, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and,
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.11 It was found that
respondent displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts,
as highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he eventually reneged
on. In this light, the IBP Investigating Commissioner concluded that
respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should be held administratively
liable.
In a Resolution13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation. Thereafter,
the Court issued a Resolution14 dated September 15, 2014 adopting and
approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of
the IBP and, accordingly, meted respondent the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
As per Registry Return Card No. 957,15 respondent received the Court's
order of suspension on October 16, 2014.16 Records are bereft of any
showing that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and, thus, the
Court's order of suspension against him became final and executory.
Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension
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On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), a Certification17 was issued by the MeTC of Quezon
City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that respondent has been appearing
before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the
present. In connection with this, the MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter18 dated
September 8, 2015 to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), inquiring about
the details of respondent's suspension from the practice of law. In view of the
foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the OBC for appropriate action.
Despite due notice from the Court,20 respondent failed to file his comment to
the aforementioned Certification issued by MeTC-Br. 38.
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation21 dated February 10, 2016, the OBC
recommended that respondent be further suspended from the practice of law
and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for a period of six
(6) months, thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year,
effective immediately.22 It found that since respondent received the order of
suspension against him on October 16, 2014 and did not move for its
reconsideration, such order attained finality after the lapse of 15 days
therefrom. As such, he should have already served his suspension. In this
relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was holding a position
.which requires him to use and apply his knowledge in legal matters and
practice of law, i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor, he should have ceased and
desisted from acting as such. However, as per the Certification dated
September 7, 2015 of the MeTC-Br. 38, respondent never complied with his
order of suspension. In view thereof, the OBC recommended to increase
respondent's suspension from the practice of law and from holding the
position of Assistant City Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6) months.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and recommendation
of the OBC and adopts the same in its entirety.
It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from the

practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes
desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to
practice law.24 The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training,
and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the
legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's
Resolution26 dated September 15, 2014 suspending respondent from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and executory
fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of the same on October 16,
2014. Thus, respondent should have already commenced serving his six (6)-
month suspension. However, respondent never heeded the suspension order
against him as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City
Prosecutor for Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification27 issued by
MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has been appearing before it as an
Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,28 otherwise known as the
"Prosecution Service Act of 2010," provides the powers and functions of
prosecutors, to wit:
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City
Prosecutor. - The provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall:
(a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be;
(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their
respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of
such investigations he/she or any of his/her assistants shall receive the
statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this
purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under
oath before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or
recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any trial court; and
(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations
of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at the province or city and therein
discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal actions, subject to
the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
110 of 121 | PALE | CY
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the
government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be
authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his
functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the
Court's order of suspension against him.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court and wilfully appearing as an attorney without
authority to do so - acts which respondent is guilty of in this case - are
grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court, in Lingan
v. Calubaquib,29Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada30 and Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-
Moya31 consistently imposed an additional six (6)-month suspension from the
practice of law to erring lawyers who practiced law despite being earlier
suspended. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it proper to
mete the same penalty to respondent in addition to the earlier six (6)-month
suspension already imposed on him, as recommended by the OBC. Thus,
respondent's total period of suspension from the practice of law - and
necessarily, from the holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor as well
- should be fixed at one (1) year.
As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a
proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the
bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession.
While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers
through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as
not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its
sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if,
through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible."
 111 of 121 | PALE | CY

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of his friends and acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to
violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is have the cases against Teresita dismissed.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of six (6)
months from his original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year from However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office
service of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service,
respectively.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the
let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the amount she gave.8 Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita;
Department of Justice, and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is however, he failed to fulfill this promise.9 Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty.
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
guidance. SO ORDERED. On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:

TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C.
ALVAREZ, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
This administrative case involves the determination of whether a lawyer
working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under
the Department of Health is authorized to privately practice law, and
consequently, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees
is reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of
San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez
(Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The parties have differing versions of the facts as summarized by the
Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Teresita's version of the facts is as follows:
Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle several cases filed
against her before the Office of the Ombudsman.1 Atty. Alvarez was then
working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health. 2 He
asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.3 However, Atty. Alvarez did not
enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any
pleadings.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office
of the Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain
fee.5 Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to
Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for Mental Health under
the Department of Health.11 He has authority to engage in private practice of
the profession.12 He represented Teresita in several cases before the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that Teresita would consult
Atty. Alvarez whenever a case was filed against her.14 Atty. Alvarez would
then advise Teresita to send him a copy of the complaint and its attachments
through courier.15 Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez would evaluate the case and call
Teresita to discuss his fees in accepting and handling the case. 16 A 50%
downpayment would be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his secretary's bank
account.17 The balance would then be paid in installments.18 The success fee
was voluntary on Teresita's part.
On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from Teresita regarding a
meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss the decision and resolution she
received from the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing her from service for
dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No.
3019, respectively.20Atty. Alvarez accepted the case and asked for
P500,000.00 as acceptance fee.21 According to Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at
the amount after considering the difficulty of the case and the workload that
would be involved, which would include appeals before the Court of Appeals
and this Court.22 However, the fee is exclusive of filing fees, appearance fees,
and other miscellaneous fees such as costs for photocopying and mailing.
Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings in connection with
Teresita's case:
(1) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the
administrative case;
(2) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the

criminal case;
(3) petition for injunction filed on October 15, 2009 before the Regional Trial
Court of Gapan City; and
(4) petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining
order filed before the Court of Appeals on November 18, 2009, and the
amended petition on November 26, 2009.24
Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to different
government officials and agencies.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered payments for the amounts
they agreed on.26 Teresita only paid the balance of the agreed acceptance fee
equivalent to P450,000.00 on February 11, 2010.27While Teresita paid
P60,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses, she did not pay the expenses for
other legal work performed and advanced by Atty. Alvarez.
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the Office of the
Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita informed Atty. Alvarez that she was no
longer interested in retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as she had hired Atty.
Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's co-counsel in the
cases against Teresita.29
On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant a
Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment of Atty. Alvarez.30 This Court
required Atty. Alvarez to file his comment on the complaint within 10 days
from notice.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation33 dated November 12, 2012, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamayor found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended Atty. Alvarez's
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.34 Atty. Alvarez was also
ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest
from the time of demand until its full payment.35 The dispositive portion of the
Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation reads:
WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing unlawful, immoral and
deceitful acts of the Canon of Professional Responsibility, [it] is recommended
that he be suspended for one (1) year in the practice of law and he be
ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to the Complainant within two
(2) months from receipt of this order with legal interest from the time of
112 of 121 | PALE | CY
demand, until fully paid, with a warning that repetition of [a] similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.36
On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating Commissioner found
that while Atty. Alvarez claimed that he was authorized by his superior to
privately practice law, the pleadings he allegedly prepared and filed did not
bear his name and signature.37 Hence, the Investigating Commissioner stated
that:
The time that Respondent spent in following up the case of Complainant in
the Office of the Ombudsman is a time lost to the government which could
have been used in the service of many taxpayers[.]38In any case, granting that
Atty. Alvarez was authorized by his superior to practice his profession, the
Investigating Commissioner stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited to handle
cases involving malversation of funds by government officials such as a
municipal treasurer.39
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the attorney's fees Atty.
Alvarez asked for were unreasonable:
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the Respondent the
amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he has
friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who can help with a fee. That
because of that guarantee, Complainant was obligated to shell out every now
and then money for the satisfaction of the allege[d] friend of the Respondent[.]
Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4th or 5th class
municipality and the amount of attorney's fees demanded by the Respondent
is very much excessive. . . . The exorbitant amount that he demanded from
complainant is too much for a lowly local government employee. What the
Respondent did is not only illegal, immoral and dishonest but also taking
advantage of a defenseless victim.
. . . .
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees, no hard and fast
rule may be set in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is
not. That must be established from the facts of each case[.]
. . . .
The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the alleged cases he
handled despite the fact that the records and evidence does not show that he
ever signed pleadings filed, the amount of P700,000.00 is reasonable, thus,
fairness and equity dictate, he has to return the excess amount of
P700,000.00 to the complainant[.]40cralawred
 113 of 121 | PALE | CY

In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-77841 dated June 21, 2013, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner:
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering
that complaint [sic] is guilty of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts, Atty.
Nicanor C. Alvarez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year with [a] Warning that repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with
more sever[ejly. Further, he is Ordered to Return the amount of P700,000.00
to complainant with legal interest from the time of demand.42 (Emphasis in the
original)
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the Resolution,43 but the Motion
was denied by the Board of Governors in Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-
28644 dated May 3, 2014. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the
resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus,
Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated June 21, 2013 is hereby
AFFIRMED.45 (Emphasis in the original)
We resolve the following issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the
Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department
of Health, is authorized to engage in the private practice of law; and
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is
reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
The Investigating Commissioner did not make a categorical declaration that
respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of his profession. The
Investigating Commissioner merely alluded to respondent's unauthorized
practice of law.
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his profession46 as shown
in the letter dated August 1, 2001 of National Center for Mental Health Chief
Bernardino A. Vicente.47 The letter reads:
TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ
Legal Officer III
This Center
Subject : Authority to engage in private practice of profession
This refers to your request for permission to engage in private practice of your
profession.
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999 of the Department of
Health, which vested in the undersigned the authority to grant permission for
the exercise of profession or engage in the practice of profession, you are
hereby authorized to teach or engage in the practice of your
profession provided it will not run in conflict with the interest of the Center and
the Philippine government as a whole. In the exigency of the service however,
or when public interest so requires, this authority may be revoked anytime.
Please be guided accordingly.
[sgd.]
BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV
Medical Center Chief II48 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context
of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do
unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle
influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term "practice of law"
includes the more traditional concept of litigation or appearance before
courts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law."cralawred

. . . .
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing
for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute."
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill."
. . . .
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law,"
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Arty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.50 (Emphasis supplied
Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:51
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession"
or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered
practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by
lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or
legal talent" is practice of law.52 (Citations omitted)
By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to complainant,
respondent practiced law.
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
114 of 121 | PALE | CY
and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986,53government officials or
employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession
unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized,
the practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official
functions of the government official or employee:
Republic Act No. 6713:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
....
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
....
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions[.]
....
Memorandum Circular No. 17:
The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted
by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of
the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which
do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private interests and

public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and
he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer or member of the board of directors",
subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems
necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed
in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.
In Abella v. Cruzabra,54 the respondent was a Deputy Register of Deeds of
General Santos City. While serving as an incumbent government employee,
the respondent "filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was
commissioned . . . without obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the
Department of Justice."55 According to the complainant, the respondent had
notarized around 3,000 documents.56 This Court found the respondent guilty
of engaging in notarial practice without written authority from the Secretary of
Justice. Thus:
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary
public, she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the
D[epartment] [of] J[ustice]. Respondent's superior, the Register of Deeds,
cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department.
And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent
failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot
feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for
commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued
in 1986.57
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the
National Center for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under
Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.58
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the
Ombudsman and against government in general, respondent put himself in a
situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned
on the requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of
the Center and the Philippine government as a whole."59
In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government,60 the petitioner
was an incumbent City Councilor or member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Bago City. He was a lawyer by profession and had continuously engaged
in the practice of law without securing authority from the Regional Director of
the Department of Local Government.61 In 1989, the petitioner acted as
counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang and filed a case for Illegal
115 of 121 | PALE | CY
Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto C.
Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago City.
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case before the
Department of Local Government for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic
Act No. 6713 and relevant Department of Local Government memorandum
circulars on unauthorized practice of profession, as well as for oppression,
misconduct, and abuse of authority.63 While the case was pending before
Department of Local Government, the petitioner was able to secure a written
authority to practice his profession from the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, "provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with his official functions."64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner practiced his profession in
conflict with his functions as City Councilor and against the interests of
government:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or
incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with
public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public
trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against
City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is
a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would
actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel
for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims
against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his
profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the
government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991
and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on
the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to
avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the
private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows
it.65
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an
employee of government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of
government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
is going against the same employer he swore to serve.

In addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring
employees and their corrupt acts. Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a
public trust."66 The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors of the
[P]eople,"67 is mandated to "investigate and prosecute . . . any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient."68ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee
represents another government employee or public officer in a case pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes
against government's mandate under the Constitution to prosecute public
officers or employees who have committed acts or omissions that appear to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.69 Furthermore, this is consistent with
the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all
times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives."
The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or
employee but to continue to uplift the People's trust in government and to
ensure excellent public service:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of that officer or employee, but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the
government. . . . These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in
our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They
should be taken as working standards by all in the public service.71
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, we find that there is
now no need to determine whether the fees he charged were reasonable.
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant
must prove his or her allegations through substantial evidence. 72 In Advincula
v. Macabata,73 this Court dismissed a complaint for disbarment due to the
lack of evidence in proving the complainant's allegations:
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per
rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar,
complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of
her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation
is not synonymous with guilt.74 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is
shown that they committed a transgression of their oath or their duties, which
reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of the bar:
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The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for
the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a
lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly
show the lawyer's unfltness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the
lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.75
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least,
made it appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in complainant's
case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the
practice of their profession.76Respondent violated the oath he took when he
proposed to gain a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to
his influence among staff in the Office where the case was pending.77
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1,
Rules 1.01, and 1.0278prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring that the case
will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or
employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon
780 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always
"uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of
his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence,
or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a
favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.82 This act of influence peddling is highly immoral
and has no place in the legal profession:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge—or a judge
evincing a willingness—to discuss, in private, a matter related to a case
pending in that judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty.
Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a
mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was

indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is
not acceptable in the legal profession.83
84
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr., we disciplined the respondent for preparing a
release order for his clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice
and the stationery of the Secretary:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain
special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is
precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified
norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that
tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing
case, lest the people's faith in the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of
justice. To that end, their clients' success is wholly subordinate. The conduct
of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant
of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is
resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
. . . .
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be within the
bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the
profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the
present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards.
Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would
not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.85
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,86 we disbarred a lawyer
who solicited bribe money from his client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the
Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of
disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he
did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a
lawyer's relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and
fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty.
Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose
of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge
and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on
the merits, but through deceitful means—a decidedly black mark against the
Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP
by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
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From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge
allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he
is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these
to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all—to all lawyers, their
clients and the general public—that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively
and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial
system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not
compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the
Bar.87 (Emphasis supplied)
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence
peddling, and in the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of
employees in the judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing its own
employee from government service when she peddled influence in the Court
of Appeals:88
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a
few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the
impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the
disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in
eradicating the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted
by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an
administrative case is meted to erring personnel.89
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was "forced to give . .
. Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of
Respondent that he ha[d] friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who c[ould]
help with a fee."90 It is because of respondent's assurances to complainant
that she sent him money over the course of several months.91 These
assurances are seen from the text messages that respondent sent
complainant:
SUBJECT:
Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa allowance lang
muna later na ang bayad pag labas ng reso at kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas
maganda kung isasabay na ang pera pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb.. Parang
dun tayo nagkamali pero ang solusyon ay sana ibalik nila ang pera . . in d
meantime hindi dapat apektado ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at
may deadline yun
DATE: 31-05-2010
TIME: 5:24 pm
 118 of 121 | PALE | CY

TYPE: Text Message

TYPE: Text Message
....
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn ...
Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero minsan hndi tlga
DATE: 21-05-2010 sumasagot yun nag ttxt lang pagkatapos kaya lang d mo pala naiintindihan
ang txt nya bisaya "istudyahun" ibig sabihn kausapin pa so nasbi na nya sa
TIME: 5:13 pm omb yung letter at istudzahan pa

TYPE: Text Message DATE: 31-03-2010

.... TIME: 8:25 am

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TYPE: Text Message

SUBJECT: ....

Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang CA Reso pnaiwan n FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Orly @ studyohn nya (txt kontal)
SUBJECT:
DATE: 15-04-2010
Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga kailangan daw nya letter
TIME: 6:07 pm habang wala pa omb reso., Txt mo lang ko panero, have a nice holidays.,
(sagot ko yan tess)
TYPE: Text Message
DATE: 03-03-2010
....
TIME: 5:03 pm
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
TYPE: Text Message
SUBJECT:
....
Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep omb si orly at dun
din siya subok kuha letter pero nasbhan na si gutierez ng dep omb for Luzon FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
sbi ko pwwde b nila gawin total alam na ni gutierez. . . Maya tawag ko sayo
update SUBJECT:

DATE: 15-04-2010 Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka overall dep omb si
orly dun nya kukunin letter
TIME: 12:44 pm
 119 of 121 | PALE | CY

DATE: 30-03-2010
DATE: 14-04-2010
TIME: 5:00 pm
TIME: 1:29 pm
TYPE: Text Message
TYPE: Text Message
....
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro pnkta s knya ang note q
at sabi rw bumalik aq aftr Holy wk. C Orly nman ay ngsabi n es2dyuhn p rw Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng kontak tess
nya. kausapin ko mbuti sa letter)

DATE: 30-03-2010 DATE: 14-04-2010

TIME: 4:52 pm TIME: 10:25 am

TYPE: Text Message TYPE: Text Message

.... ....

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

SUBJECT: SUBJECT:

Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter magkikita pa kami Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2 falo-ups q Mar 25
marnaya las 2 at kukunin nya copy letter natin kay sales at CA reso @ Mar 30. As usual, magkita tau Apr 14 @ kunin q 20th para sa falo-up Apr
15 thnx
DATE: 15-04-2010
DATE: 08-04-2010
TIME: 12:32 pm
TIME: 10:58 am
TYPE: Text Message
TYPE: Text Message
....
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami kita at malapit ako
dun maya at hindi na sa crsng. Tnx Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa client panero at ang
 120 of 121 | PALE | CY

impression nya yun na ang hningi natin... so april 15 panero an balik mo sa

MR at yung letter form omb to dof bhala ka na sa diskarte panero pag FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
nakakuha tayo nakahanda na 150k dun
SUBJECT:
DATE: 08-04-2010
Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi mong letr adrsd 2
TIME: 10:56 am DOF Sec @ synd n Orly ang letr, pktanong s rspndnt kung ok b s knya nab
yarn nya aq ng Atty's fee n 75thou upfront @ another 75thou upon receipt of
TYPE: Text Message a DOF ordr holdng n abyans implmntation of hr dsmsal due 2 Orly's letr? thnx

.... DATE: 11-03-2010

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TIME: 7:03 pm

SUBJECT: TYPE: Text Message

In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant
Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400th hindi directly delivery ng
must have confused him with her other contacts.93 Respondent found it
Reso granting d MR pro ung delivery by the Dep Omb ng letr of appeal 2 d
"mesmerizing" that complainant was able to save all those alleged text
Omb at pgpaliwang nya sa Omb. Re sa hnhngi ng rspondnt n modfcation ng
messages from two (2) years ago.94 Moreover, assuming these messages
Dcsion. Nung 1st mtng ntn Mar 24, ngin4m q sau n ngawa n i2 ng Dep Omb
were "true, still they [were] not legally admissible as they [were] covered by
pro kausapn p ng Omb c Orly. Itong huli ang nabtn p, pro yon ay dscrtion n ng
the lawyer-client privileged communication as those supposed texts '[had
Omb@ wing control d2 and Dep. Omb.
been] made for the purpose and in the course of employment, [were]
regarded as privileged and the rule of exclusion [was] strictly
DATE: 08-04-2010
enforced.'"95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
TIME: 10:55 am
In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction is always
done in secret and often only between the two parties
TYPE: Text Message
concerned."96 Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and
as shown by the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold
....
respondent guilty of influence peddling.
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
We agree with the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors. We find respondent's acts of influence
SUBJECT:
peddling, coupled with unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law. To be so bold as to
Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm mtng naming omb
peddle influence before the very institution that is tasked to prosecute
tnx.
corruption speaks much about respondent's character and his attitude
towards the courts and the bar.
DATE: 24-03-2010
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with
TIME: 10:23 am
regulators, investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the
rule of law, and debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a
TYPE: Text Message
noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's ability to have
illicit access. Rather, it should be about making an honest appraisal of the
....
client's situation as seen through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It
 121 of 121 | PALE | CY

should be about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable

law. It is foremost about attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to
temper, with its own power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be
conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly influencing people or
public officials.

It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a client that a

lawyer knows who will make a decision is an act worthy of the utmost
condemnation. If we are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its
members must live within its ethical parameters. There is never an excuse for
influence peddling.

While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors,97 this Court
has ordered restitution of amounts to complainants due to the erroneous
actions of lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to
complainant the amount of P500,000.00—the amount that respondent
allegedly gave his friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of
P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.