By Ariane Tabatabai
Reading the Nuclear Politics
In Tehran
I
ran’s domestic politics and power structure
have been a source of puzzlement and
conjecture since the country’s 1979
revolution, which toppled a U.S. ally and
brought the Islamic Republic to power. This
bewilderment intensified during the nuclear
negotiations between six world powers
collectively known as the P5+1 (China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) and Tehran.
Throughout the negotiations, many
observers speculated about the Iranian
perceptions of the emerging deal and
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
how these perceptions would shape
the future of the diplomatic process
and the agreement’s implementation.
In particular, the many statements of
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
were dissected in attempts to determine
whether Iran would accept certain
Ariane Tabatabai is a visiting assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service and is a columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Previously, she was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and an
associate at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She received her Ph.D. from the Department
of War Studies at King’s College London.
16
restrictions or stop the negotiations.1 In
spite of the time and energy devoted to
these analyses, many of Tehran’s signals
were misinterpreted throughout the
process.
Today, similar questions have arisen
with regard to Iran’s intentions and
ability to implement the comprehensive
deal reached in Vienna in July. A key
issue is whether domestic politics in Iran
will allow the government to uphold its
end of the bargain. This article provides
a partial response to that question by
analyzing the Iranian establishment’s
attitude toward the P5+1 process from
the beginning of the negotiations to the
conclusion of the comprehensive deal.
Supreme Politician
To be sure, Khamenei is the final
decision-maker in Iranian foreign
policy and domestic politics. Yet, he
is not the sole decision-maker in Iran.
Furthermore, he tries to stay above
politics. This important distinction is
often lost in the United States, where the
perception is that there are no checks
and balances in the Islamic Republic.
There are several centers of power within
the regime’s structure, all of which have
their own decision-making processes,
interests, and drivers.
Khamenei and his office are the most
opaque components of the regime,
along with the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). Khamenei’s job
description includes frequent comments
and statements on social, political, and
strategic affairs. He appears in various
forums several times a month, including
at Friday prayers, where, in addition
to leading the prayer, he often makes
comments on the most pressing issues on
Iran’s social and political agenda.
For instance, in June 2009, he used the
Friday prayer as a platform to issue an
ultimatum and authorize the crackdown
on hundreds of thousands of protesters
opposing what they denounced as the
fraudulent re-election of President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.2 This event was
a turning point for Khamenei’s decision-
making. It led to the greatest crisis in
the Islamic Republic’s history, including
a broad questioning of the legitimacy
of the office of supreme leader and of
Khamenei’s legitimacy to hold the office.
This crisis led Khamenei and his advisers
to re-evaluate their approach to elections
in the following cycle.
This reality check was part of the
impetus behind the victory of Hassan
Rouhani in the 2013 presidential
elections. Indeed, many analysts in Iran
and the West suspected that Khamenei
would facilitate another fraudulent
election, favoring his preferred candidate,
Saeed Jalili, a hard-liner who had been a
nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad.3
Yet, the election of Rouhani proved

Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images

that Khamenei was no longer willing to
ignore the wishes of the people and risk
his own position when he could take
a less dangerous path by assuaging the
populace and securing the regime.
The most important topic during
the elections was that of the nuclear
crisis and how to solve it. It was clear
that if Khamenei backed Jalili, blocking Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (bottom) speaks in the parliament
Rouhani from being elected, he would be in Tehran on July 21 below a portrait of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Zarif was defending the agreement on Tehran’s nuclear program that Iran and six
endorsing Jalili’s method of negotiating:
world powers concluded on July 14.
the all-or-nothing approach. Instead,
with Rouhani now in power, the supreme
leader was ready to play by Rouhani’s Iranian political culture and the Islamic the case when national security and, by
rules: acknowledgement of the need to Republic’s political dynamics and extension, regime survival, have been at
make concessions, such as accepting structure indicates that he was trying stake in Afghanistan, in Iraq against the
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015

limitations on the nuclear program.
Throughout the process, Khamenei
intervened to set limits on just how far
the negotiators could go and where they
could make concessions.4
Despite being interpreted by some
as definitive and strict redlines, most
of Khamenei’s interventions on the
nuclear issue were in fact fairly moderate.
Virtually every one of his statements on
the nuclear negotiations was viewed in
the United States as designed to derail
the process. Yet, a careful reading of
to position himself to stand to win
regardless of the outcome of the talks
while helping the negotiations.
Khamenei’s position on the nuclear
issue has been driven by a number of
factors. First, his mandate is to secure the
survival of the Islamic Republic. To this
end, he must identify and work toward
regime interests. Therefore, in crucial
periods, Khamenei has endorsed what
the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary
ideology opposes: working with the
United States. This has consistently been
Islamic State, and today with regard to
the nuclear issue. Hence, when national
security and revolutionary ideology have
been at odds, the regime has actually
privileged the former.
This, in turn, is due to the second
factor: that there can be no regime
without a country. Hence, the supreme
leader needs to take national interests
into consideration and pursue them. In
the past decade, economic and political
pressure, increased isolation, and the
threat of war all have put the country in

17
 a vulnerable position, which contributed
to Tehran’s decision to come to the
negotiating table.
A third factor is the personal interests
that Khamenei has at stake. He has
successfully sought to position himself
in a way that guarantees he will remain
unchallenged, regardless of the outcome
of the talks.
Despite adhering to a fairly hard line on a number
of issues, [Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali]
Khamenei has in fact been a moderating agent in
the negotiating process.
From the beginning, Khamenei
cautiously backed the negotiations and
the negotiating team, commenting that
although the United States could not
be trusted, he trusted the negotiators
to preserve national security, pursue
national interests, and maintain the
country’s dignity and accomplishments.5
This cautious endorsement is an
indication of how Khamenei had to
position himself within the domestic
political landscape. Despite adhering to
a fairly hard line on a number of issues,
Khamenei has in fact been a moderating
agent in the negotiating process.
Contrary to the widely held perception
outside Iran, the supreme leader does not
always intervene in all matters relating
to foreign policy. His vision certainly
informs the country’s strategy beyond
Iran’s borders, but on an operational
level, what Tehran does is the prerogative
of the elected government. This means
that the government, chiefly the foreign
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
ministry, typically manages the country’s
foreign policy issues, excluding those
that are handled by the IRGC, namely
Iran’s activities in Iraq, Syria, and the rest
of the Middle East.
The nuclear issue was an exception
to this rule; Khamenei was intimately
involved in the talks. He “supervised”
the process, and his redlines were
Iran’s national bottom lines. The entire
security and political establishment, as
well as much of the Iranian populace,
supported the idea that Tehran should
18
make concessions but without stopping
its enrichment program, curtailing
its ability to conduct research and
development, granting inspection rights
to its nonmilitary facilities, or providing
access to its scientists.6 Khamenei had
a direct channel to the negotiators and
frequently provided his input on what
was on the table. In rare instances, he
delivered the input publicly. That was
the case on key issues such as inspection
of military sites and interviews with
nuclear scientists.7
Misunderstanding the Corps
The IRGC, much like its commander
in chief, the supreme leader, is often
misunderstood in the United States.
Its role in the nuclear program and
negotiations has been oversimplified and
exaggerated.
The IRGC’s role in the program and
talks is determined by a number of
conflicting interests. First, although there
has been a great deal of speculation on
the IRGC’s role in the nuclear program,
there is little concrete knowledge of the
extent of this involvement. It is clear,
however, that the IRGC has played and
continues to play a role in the nuclear
program and would essentially have
custody of a nuclear arsenal if Iran
acquired one.8
Certain other aspects of the connection
between the IRGC and the Iranian nuclear
program also are clear. First, the IRGC has
played a very active role in developing the
Iranian missile program. Second, the IRGC
has managed to fill the vacuum left by
foreign companies in Iran’s economy. The
combination of the Islamic Revolution,
the Iran-Iraq war, and the nuclear crisis
led an Iran in need of redevelopment
to be isolated and under backbreaking
sanctions. With foreign companies
increasingly reluctant to do business in
Iran, the country had to find a way to
redevelop its economy and infrastructure.
The IRGC stepped in. As a result of its
ability to capitalize on the isolation and
sanctions put in place, the corps now
owns a large percentage of the national
economy, with hands in many different
fields. This means that the IRGC could
actually stand to lose from sanctions.
Indeed, with the country open for
business again, foreign companies will
create serious competition for the IRGC.
Many in the political elite have indicated
their willingness to minimize IRGC
involvement in all political and economic
spheres. So far, however, their ability
to pursue this policy has been limited,
given that the country could rely only on
the IRGC and the black market to fill the
vacuum left by foreign companies. Today,
with the economy opening up, steps can
be taken to address this. Despite standing
to lose some ground from the change
in the Iranian political and economic
ecosystem, the IRGC has generally
followed Khamenei, positioning itself
relatively moderately. IRGC commanders
also have cautiously backed the
negotiations and stated that they believe
the negotiating team has only the best
interests of the country at heart.9
In some cases, the IRGC and Khamenei
have balanced each other. For instance,
on one occasion when Khamenei
gave a resounding endorsement of the
negotiating team, the IRGC cautiously
backed it. The following time, they
reversed these roles, with a more cautious
endorsement from Khamenei and a
resounding one from the IRGC. Hence,
both the supreme leader and the IRGC
have tried to position themselves above
politics in a way that would allow them
to use the outcome of the negotiations
to consolidate their power. At the same
time, they have tried to guide the process
Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images
A man flashes the victory sign in front the Iranian national flag during a celebration in Tehran on July 14 after the nuclear deal
was announced. Under the agreement, sanctions on Iran would be lifted in return for certain restrictions on and monitoring of
the country’s nuclear program.
to obtain what they view as the optimal
result, with more gains on sanctions
relief and fewer concessions on the
nuclear program.
There has been a notable exception
to the guards’ general support for the
deal. General Mohammad-Reza Naqdi,
the head of the Basij milita, has sharply
criticized the deal. Naqdi questioned the
intentions of the world powers, saying
that the nuclear issue was an excuse
“covering an underlying truth.” He
claimed that “[the facts that] the foreign
ministers of seven countries did not move
for nine days and nights in Lausanne, or
the U.S. Secretary of State[’s] presen[ce] in
the negotiations for 20 nights and days
with a broken leg” prove that something
beyond the nuclear issue was at stake.
He further stated that the answer to
Iran’s economic problems is a “resistance
economy not a borrowed economy.”10
Unlike the more mainstream members of
the IRGC, the Basij have been generally
more critical of the negotiations and
the deal. Yet, the Basij is renowned for
its loyalty to its commander in chief,
Khamenei. Hence, while being generally
more critical, its members have not been
as vocal as an organization on the matter
as other groups and are unlikely to have
an impact on the implementation of the
deal.
Opposition From the Majlis
The Iranian parliament, the Majlis,
has posed the greatest challenge to the
talks. It has often mirrored the U.S.
Congress, in part by seeking to gain
more power over the process of reaching
and implementing a deal. The hard-line
position on the process has not been
limited to conservative legislators; it
has cut across the different traditional
political leanings. To be sure, reformists
and moderates have thrown their support
behind Rouhani’s moderate agenda, but
some have been critical of the process.
Much like opponents of the deal
in Congress, those in the Majlis have
different interests and are driven by
different views. Some profoundly distrust
the United States and fundamentally
reject engagement with the West in much
the same way that some in Congress
oppose even sitting at the table with
Tehran. Other members of the Majlis
believe that any concession is too much.
Still others were in Ahmadinejad’s camp
and want to deny Rouhani a foreign
policy victory of this magnitude, just as
many Republicans in Congress, driven
by domestic politics and their opposition
to the administration of President Barack
Obama, do not want him to have this
foreign policy victory.
In other words, the Iranian domestic
opposition to the nuclear negotiations
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
stems from a number of factors and
cannot be oversimplified and attributed
to a single factor. The opponents have
been very vocal, but are in fact a small
minority of the Iranian population. Yet,
the level of influence of these groups and
the pressure they have exerted on the
negotiators cannot be underestimated.
Although it is a small group, some
individuals within the group have
considerable influence.
Ultimately, the Majlis found itself
limited in its ability to influence the
19
 talks. Hence, its members exerted
pressure on the Rouhani government
by taking the fight outside the nuclear
realm, for instance, by impeaching
ministers. Such actions indicate that
the legislators are trying to limit the
government’s ability to maneuver and
place obstacles in its way to stop it from
implementing its agenda. In this case,
[V]irtually every aspect of Iranian public and
private life has been affected by the nuclear crisis.
these tactics were designed to weaken
and put pressure on the Rouhani
government.
Khamenei intervened a number of
times after hard-line newspapers attacked
the negotiating team. In doing so, he
decreased the pressure on the team,
facilitating its efforts conclude a deal.
This in turn reinforced the idea that
regardless of their efforts, critics of a
deal would not be able to fundamentally
shift what appears to be a national
consensus and establishment decision
to negotiate with the world powers
and to do so with the intent to reach
a deal. The Majlis managed to acquire
the ability to supervise the process by
regularly summoning Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif and passing
legislation expanding its powers to
oversee the negotiations. Yet, in spite of
the rhetoric of some of its members,11 the
Majlis did not actually attempt to derail
the negotiations altogether. A significant
announcement made by Speaker Ali
Larijani in the aftermath of the deal,
praising the negotiating team’s efforts,
encapsulated the idea that the Majlis
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
would stand behind the deal.12
As the process continues into its
implementation phase, the Majlis will
continue to weigh in. Yet, it is unlikely to
take action to stop the implementation
process unless the P5+1 is seen as failing
to live up to its end of the bargain.
Popular Support
The vast majority of Iranians support
a negotiated solution to the issue of
the nuclear program.13 This is because
virtually every aspect of Iranian public
20
and private life has been affected by the
nuclear crisis: the threats to national
security, including the looming threat
of overt military conflict; economic
hardship resulting from sanctions;
the tightening of space for political
reforms; and the inability to push for
improvement on human rights because
of the threat of war. If the vast majority
of Iranians have been following the
details of the talks, it is not because they
care about their uranium-enrichment
capacity. Instead, they see the nuclear
issue as an obstacle to the normalization
of their lives and the country’s economy
and international status.
The support for the negotiators, the
popularity of Zarif, and the nationwide
celebrations of the 2013 interim deal and
the recent comprehensive deal certainly
strengthened the negotiators’ hands
domestically. This means that while
facing harsh criticism at home from some
quarters, the negotiators could say that
they benefited from the population’s
general support for their efforts.
The conventional Western wisdom
on Iranian politics is that the people’s
views on issues do not matter. There is an
element of truth to that view because the
supreme leader, the ultimate decision-
maker, is not an elected official. He is
supposed to be above politics and a
“neutral” figure in Iranian politics. Yet,
domestic politics can and do influence
decision-making. As noted previously,
Khamenei learned in 2009 that going
against the popular will could come at
a cost for him. In 2009, that was a blow
to his legitimacy and that of the regime
more generally. In 2013, defying public
opinion could have led to a deepened
crisis of legitimacy and an increased
weakening of the very foundations of the
Islamic Republic.
The Majlis represents the people.
Nevertheless, in some cases, including
this one, members of the Majlis do not
reflect the views of their constituencies.
Ultimately, however, the members also
know that, in order to be re-elected, they
can only go so far in their opposition
to something the majority of the
population really wants.
All this is not to say that there
has not been any opposition to
the negotiations and the deal. The
Delvapassan, or “Worried,” movement,
as it has come to be known, has made
headlines throughout the process,
criticizing the negotiations and urging
the team not to make concessions
on the country’s technological and
scientific achievements. Members of the
movement were often subtly invited to
quiet down by Khamenei’s endorsements
of the process. In those statements,
Khamenei always presented Zarif’s team
as driven by national interests.
More recently, the government shut
down an ultraconservative weekly paper,
9th Dey, for criticizing the deal. At the
same time, Rouhani has described social
media, including Twitter and Facebook,
banned in Iran since 2009, as helpful
tools for young people eager to express
their support for the negotiations.14
The Way Ahead
In the coming months, a number of
domestic events will occur in parallel
with the implementation of the
comprehensive deal. First and foremost,
the Majlis elections, scheduled to take
place on February 25, will be decisive
for the Rouhani government. The Majlis
continues to want to play a role and
supervise the process. As was the case
throughout the negotiations, however,
it is unlikely to do much to disturb the
process even if it shifts more to the right
as a result of the elections. Nevertheless,
it could exert more pressure on the
government through other means, as it
did during the negotiations.
Iran is expected to voluntarily
implement an additional protocol to its
comprehensive safeguards agreement,
providing the International Atomic
Energy Agency with the authority to
monitor the country’s facilities more
closely. The Majlis, however, has yet to
ratify it, which would make its provisions
permanent and legally binding. Under
the comprehensive deal, Iran must
“seek [the protocol’s] ratification and
entry into force consistent with the
respective roles of the President and
Majlis.” Tehran voluntarily implemented
the protocol from 2003 to 2005, but
stopped implementing it when the
previous round of negotiations failed.
The ratification step will be crucial to
ensure that Iran continues to implement
the protocol after the expiration of the
various constraints imposed by the deal.
After the parliamentary elections,
the next big event in Iranian politics is
the presidential election, scheduled for
mid-2017. By then, many of the issues
directly related to the nuclear issue
should be solved. Given the eight- to
25-year provisions in the deal, however,
a number of events are worth noting.
These include the redesign of the Arak
heavy-water reactor, which involves
removing the core, destroying it or
shipping it to another country, and
replacing it with a core that would
produce less plutonium; the conversion
of the Fordow enrichment site into a
research center; and the reduction of the
country’s stockpile of 10,000 kilograms
of enriched uranium to 300 kilograms.
The Rouhani government will likely
point to the nuclear deal as the flagship
success of its first term and seek re-
election for a second four-year term,
the last for which it will be eligible. A
potential complication for the successful
implementation of the deal lies in the
much-debated health of Khamenei and
the choice of his successor. This could
translate into tremendous change in the
very foundations of the Islamic Republic.
For this reason, the upcoming years
will be vital to the long-term viability
of the deal. If the deal is implemented
without major complications and Tehran
receives what it sees as its due under
the deal without feeling vulnerable to
military attacks from other countries
in the next few years, future changes
in the country’s politics and political
structure are less likely to have a
tremendous impact on the future of the
implementation of the deal.
Thus, it is important to put the deal
in place quickly and smoothly, to the
extent possible, to make sure it is locked
in before Khamenei passes from the
scene. This will ensure that the deal is
implemented efficiently throughout the
political transition to his successor. In
principle, once the implementation of
the deal begins and the first key stages—
the redesign of the Arak reactor, the
conversion of the Fordow enrichment
facility, and the initial phases of
sanctions relief—are completed, the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and
the foreign ministry will be in charge of
the file, and the supreme leader’s office
and the Majlis will no longer be watching
it as closely.
One development that would draw
the attention of the supreme leader, the
IRGC, and the Majlis would be any covert
action against Iran’s program while the
deal is being implemented, even if such
action is undertaken by a country that
is not bound by the agreement. In the
meantime, Khamenei, the IRGC, the
Majlis, and others will continue to make
statements.
It is important not to get caught up
in their rhetoric, but to pay attention
to what Iran is actually doing. The
distinction between rhetoric and policy
is crucial in understanding Iranian
intentions and actions. In the sensitive
stages of early implementation of the
nuclear deal, reading Tehran properly
will be more important than ever.
ENDNOTES
1. Ray Takeyh, “Iran Poised to Choose Poverty
Over Nuclear Disarmament,” The Washington
Post, October 31, 2014; Julian Borger, “Did
the Supreme Leader Just Torpedo the Nuclear
Talks?” The Guardian, June 24, 2015; Thomas
Erdbrink and David Sanger, “Iran’s Supreme
Leader, Khamenei, Seems to Pull Back on
Nuclear Talks,” The New York Times, June 23,
2015.
2. “Khotbeha-ye namaz-e Jomeh-ye Tehran,”
Khamenei.ir, June 19, 2009, http://farsi.
khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=7190 (in
Persian).
3. Mark Dubowitz, “Iran Has a Presidential
Selection, Not an Election,” The Atlantic, June
14, 2013.
4. “‘Khotut-e ghermez-e mozakereh’ az
didgah-e rahbar-e enghelab dar didar-e
karshenasan-e sazman-e energy-e atomi,” Fars
News, April 14, 2014, http://www.farsnews.
com/newstext.php?nn=13930125000961 (in
Persian).
5. “Bayanat dar didar-e jamee az farmandehan
va karkonan-e niroo-ye havayi,” Khamenei.
ir, February 8, 2015, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/
speech-content?id=28896 (in Persian).
6. The refusal to allow inspection of military
sites should not to be confused with the
issue of “managed access”—opening certain,
less-sensitive sections of the facilities to
inspectors—which was open for discussion.
7. Ariane Tabatabai, “Interview: Iranian Deputy
Foreign Minister Majid Ravanchi,” The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, June 30, 2015.
8. Anthony Cordesman and Adam Seitz,
“Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Doctrine, Policy and Command,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, January
12, 2009.
9. Annie Tracy Samuel, “Revolutionary Guard
Is Cautiously Open to Nuclear Deal,” Belfer
Center Iran Matters, December 20, 2013,
http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/blog/iran’s-
revolution-guard-and-nuclear-deal; “Agar
mozakerat Enshallah be natije beresad hame
khahand did ke ma az hoghough-eman kootah
nayamadeim,” Tasnim, November 14, 2014 (in
Persian).
10. “Naqdi: Resistance Economy Is the
Way Around Problems, Not Borrowed
Economy,” Fars News, August 11, 2015,
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.
php?nn=13940520000202 (in Persian).
11. Kelsey Davenport, “Bill Allowing Vote on
Iran Deal Approved,” Arms Control Today, June
2015.
12. “Larijani: Tavafogh-e hasteyi joz-e
dastarvardha-ye melli ast,” Asr-e Iran, July 23,
2015, http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/407455/
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
(in Persian).
13. Wilfred Chan and Mitra Mobasherat,
“From Social Media to the Streets, Iranians
Erupt With Joy After Nuclear Deal,” CNN,
April 3, 2015; Saeed Kamali Dehghan,
“Iranians Celebrate Nuclear Deal: ‘This Will
Bring Hope to Our Life,’” The Guardian, April 2,
2015; “Many Iranians Celebrate Nuclear Deal
As Opening to the West,” NPR, July 14, 2015.
14. Hassan Rouhani, interview with Iranian
State Media, Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting, August 2, 2015 (in Persian).
21
Copyright of Arms Control Today is the property of Arms Control Association and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright
holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.