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Requisites for a valid claim for refund / Creditable Withholding Tax Cases

Koppel (Phils) vs. CIR (GR No. L-10550, September 19, 1961)

In the case of Kiener Co. Ltd. v. S. David, G.R. No. L-5157, Apr. 22, 1953 (49 O.G. No. 5, 1852), this Court
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . To this end, and bearing in mind that the Legislature is presumed to have understood the language it used to have acted with
full idea of what it wanted to accomplish, it is fair and reasonable to say, without doing violence to the context of either of the two
provisions, that by the first is meant simply that the Collector of Internal Revenue shall be given an opportunity to consider his
mistake, if mistake has been committed, before he is sued but not, as the appellant contends, that pending consideration of the
claim, the period of the two years provided in the last clause shall be deemed interrupted. Nowhere and in no wise does the law
imply that the Collector of Internal Revenue must act upon the claim, or that the taxpayer shall not go to court before he is notified of
the Collector’s action. Having filed his claim and the Collector of Internal Revenue having had ample time to study it, the claimant
may, indeed should, without the statutory period of two years proceed with his suit without waiting for the Collector’s decision. We
understand the filing of the claim with the Collector of Internal Revenue to be intended primarily as a notice or warning that, unless
the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or illegally is refunded, court action will follow. Previous and timely
notice is, in other cases and for diverse salutary reasons, made a prerequisite to the prosecution of contemplated proceedings
without imposing on the party to whom the notice was sent any obligation to make any move . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The record reveals that on June 29, 1949, the petitioner paid to the respondent the deficiency tax in question. From the said date,
the two years within which to file an action in court for the recovery of the tax expired on June 29, 1951. Within the said period, the
petitioner failed to file an action for refund either in the Court of First Instance or the Board of Tax Appeals, immediately after the
creation of the Board under Executive Order No. 401-A promulgated on Jan. 5, 1951. Petitioner just waited for the decision of the
respondent Collector of Internal Revenue in its claim for refund, which was handed down on July 28, 1953, after more than four (4)
years from payment. It is clearly ruled in the Kiener case that the petitioner should not have folded his arms and wait for the
decision, knowing, that the "time for bringing an action for a refund of income tax, fixed by statute, is not extended by the delay of
the Collector of Internal Revenue in giving notice of the rejection of such claim (U.S. v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 51 S. Ct. 284)" (II
Arañas, N.I.R. Code, p. 719). There was an assessment; the petitioner paid; the petitioner asked for refund; it was denied; a motion
for reconsideration was presented and no resolution was forthcoming from the respondent Collector. Aware of the provisions of the
law, it was the duty of the petitioner to have urged the respondent for his decision and wake him up from his lethargy or file his
action within the time prescribed by law. While it is true that there was a ruling couched in general terms, by the Secretary of
Finance on the matter, which was really controversial, because the same was later revoked by another Secretary of Finance, said
pronouncement, however, was not a decision by the respondent Collector on the specific controversy relative to the refund of the
deficiency tax in question. The court should not give a premium to a litigant who sleeps on his rights. The lawyers of the petitioner
may not come now and invoke estoppel when they have been in laches themselves. The government is never estopped by error or
mistake on the part of its agents (Pineda, Et. Al. v. CFI and Coll. of Int. Rev., 52 Phil., 803). The reservation made by the Supreme
Court in the case No. L-5701 should not be interpreted as permitting the petitioner to file another case under all circumstances, but
as the facts and circumstances might warrant under the law. The ruling in the Kiener case is still a sound one, and should be, as it is
applied, as a matter of public policy, in the enforcement of tax laws.

CIR vs. Meralco, GR No. 181459 dated June 9, 2014

Section 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. − No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for
refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax,
penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.33

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the prescriptive period provided is mandatory regardless of any supervening cause that may
arise after payment. It should be pointed out further that while the prescriptive period of two (2) years commences to run from the
time that the refund is ascertained, the propriety thereof is determined by law (in this case, from the date of payment of tax), and not
upon the discovery by the taxpayer of the erroneous or excessive payment of taxes. The issuance by the BIR of the Ruling declaring
the tax-exempt status of NORD/LB, if at all, is merely confirmatory in nature. As aptly held by the CTA-First Division, there is no
basis that the subject exemption was provided and ascertained only through BIR Ruling No. DA-342-2003, since said ruling is not
the operative act from which an entitlement of refund is determined. 34 In other words, the BIR is tasked only to confirm what is
provided under the Tax Code on the matter of tax exemptions as well as the period within which to file a claim for refund.

In this regard, petitioner is misguided when it relied upon the six (6)-year prescriptive period for initiating an action on the ground of
quasi contract or solutio indebiti under Article 1145 of the New Civil Code. There is solutio indebiti where: (1) payment is made when
there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and (2) the
payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause. 35 Here, there is a binding relation between
petitioner as the taxing authority in this jurisdiction and respondent MERALCO which is bound under the law to act as a withholding
agent of NORD/LB Singapore Branch, the taxpayer. Hence, the first element of solutio indebitiis lacking. Moreover, such legal
precept is inapplicable to the present case since the Tax Code, a special law, explicitly provides for a mandatory period for claiming
a refund for taxes erroneously paid.

Tax refunds are based on the general premise that taxes have either been erroneously or excessively paid. Though the Tax Code
recognizes the right of taxpayers to request the return of such excess/erroneous payments from the government, they must do so
within a prescribed period. Further, "a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund, but also his compliance with the
procedural due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims
would result in the denial of his claim."36 In the case at bar, respondent MERALCO had ample opportunity to verify on the tax-
exempt status of NORD/LB for purposes of claiming tax refund. Even assuming that respondent MERALCO could not have
emphatically known the status of NORD/LB, its supposition of the same was already confirmed by the BIR Ruling which was issued
on October 7, 2003. Nevertheless, it only filed its claim for tax refund on July 13, 2004, or ten (10) months from the issuance of the
aforesaid Ruling. We agree with the CTA-First Division, therefore, that respondent MERALCO's claim for refund in the amount of
Two Hundred Twenty-Four Million Seven Hundred Sixty Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Five Centavos
(₱224,760,926.65) representing erroneously paid and remitted final income taxes for the period January 1999 to July 2002 should
be denied on the ground of prescription.

CIR vs. Far East Bank GR No. 173854 March 15, 2010

A taxpayer claiming for a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax must comply with the following requisites:

1) The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date of payment of the tax;

2) It must be shown on the return that the income received was declared as part of the gross income; and

3) The fact of withholding must be established by a copy of a statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid
and the amount of the tax withheld.[12]

The two-year period requirement is based on Section 229 of the NIRC of 1997 which provides that:

SECTION 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or
in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or
proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which
payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Formerly Section 230 of the old NIRC)

While the second and third requirements are found under Section 10 of Revenue Regulation No. 6-85, as amended, which reads:

Section 10. Claims for tax credit or refund. Claims for tax credit or refund of income tax deducted and withheld on
income payments shall be given due course only when it is shown on the return that the income payment received was declared
as part of the gross income and the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payer to the
payee (BIR Form No. 1743.1) showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld therefrom.

The burden is on the taxpayer to prove its entitlement to the refund.

Moreover, the fact that the petitioner failed to present any evidence or to
refute the evidence presented by respondent does not ipso facto entitle the respondent to a tax refund. It is not the duty of the government to disprove
a taxpayers claim for refund. Rather, the burden of establishing the factual basis of a claim for a refund rests on the taxpayer.[20]

And while the petitioner has the power to make an examination of the returns and to assess the correct amount of tax, his failure to exercise
such powers does not create a presumption in favor of the correctness of the returns. The taxpayer must still present substantial evidence to prove his
claim for refund. As we have said, there is no automatic grant of a tax refund.[21]

Hence, for failing to prove its entitlement to a tax refund, respondents claim must be denied. Since tax refunds partake of the nature of tax
exemptions, which are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, evidence in support of a claim must likewise be strictissimi scrutinized and duly
proven.

CIR vs. Concepcion (22 SCRA 1058)


The Court of Tax Appeals in relying on its previous decision in the La Paz y Buen Viaje Cigar & Cigarette Factory and ruling against
the defense of the finality of the assessment, after the dismissal of the appeal in CTA No. 168 in view of the failure to have it filed
within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days, must have been of the belief that this Court, in affirming its decision on March 30,
1963, without however passing on the above question, did give an indication of its probable thinking on the matter. Such is not a
correct appraisal of the situation however, for on March 30, 1963, the very same day its La Paz y Buen Viaje decision was affirmed,
the opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Lopez5 was handed down. This is an appeal by the Republic from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Baguio dismissing its complaint for collection of a deficiency income tax against defendant Lopez on the ground
that the action had prescribed. After noting that prescription as a defense did not lie, this Court, in an opinion by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, likewise stated: "Another ground for reversing the dismissal of the complaint is that the proper remedy of the taxpayer
against the assessment complained of was to appeal the ruling of the Collector to the Court of Tax Appeals. . . ." The precise
question in this litigation then, while undoubtedly one of novelty, is not without illumination supplied by radiations from past
decisions.

For subsequently, in Republic v. Lim Tian Teng Sons & Co. Inc.,6 the above doctrine was reaffirmed categorically in this
language: "Taxpayer's failure to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal in due time made the assessment in question final, executory
and demandable. And when the action was instituted on September 2, 1958 to enforce the deficiency assessment in question, it
was already barred from disputing the correctness the assessment or invoking any defense that would reopen the question of his
tax liability on the merits. Otherwise, the period of thirty days for appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals would make little sense." Once,
the matter has reached the stage of finality in view of the failure to appeal, it logically follows, in the appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, in Morales v. Collector of Internal Revenue,7 that it "could no longer be reopened through the expedient of an appeal
from the denial of petitioner's request for cancellation of the warrant of distraint and levy."

In the same way then that the expedient of an appeal from a denial of a tax request for cancellation of warrant of distraint and
levy cannot be utilized for the purpose of testing the legality of an assessment, which had become conclusive and binding on the
taxpayer, there being no appeal, the procedure set forth in Section 306 of the National Internal Revenue Code is not available to
revive the right to contest the validity of an assessment once the same had been irretrievably lost not only by the failure to appeal
but likewise by the lapse of the reglementary period within which to appeal could have been taken. Clearly then, the liability of
respondent Concepcion as an ancillary administrator of the estate of the deceased wife and of respondent Mitchell-Roberts as the
husband for the amount of P1,181.33 as estate tax and P2,616.10 as inheritance tax was beyond question. Having paid the same,
respondents are clearly devoid of any legal right to sue for recovery. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals ordering petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the above total sum of P3,797.43 cannot stand.

CIR vs. CA (234 SCRA 348)

Further, it is also worth nothing that the Court of Tax Appeals erred in denying petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration
alleging bringing to said court's attention the existence of the deficiency income and business tax assessment against Citytrust. The
fact of such deficiency assessment is intimately related to and inextricably intertwined with the right of respondent bank to claim for
a tax refund for the same year. To award such refund despite the existence of that deficiency assessment is an absurdity and a
polarity in conceptual effects. Herein private respondent cannot be entitled to refund and at the same time be liable for a tax
deficiency assessment for the same year.

The grant of a refund is founded on the assumption that the tax return is valid, that is, the facts stated therein are true and correct.
The deficiency assessment, although not yet final, created a doubt as to and constitutes a challenge against the truth and accuracy
of the facts stated in said return which, by itself and without unquestionable evidence, cannot be the basis for the grant of the
refund.

Section 82, Chapter IX of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which was the applicable law when the claim of Citytrust was
filed, provides that "(w)hen an assessment is made in case of any list, statement, or return, which in the opinion of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was false or fraudulent or contained any understatement or undervaluation, no tax collected
under such assessment shall be recovered by any suits unless it is proved that the said list, statement, or return was not false nor
fraudulent and did not contain any understatement or undervaluation; but this provision shall not apply to statements or returns
made or to be made in good faith regarding annual depreciation of oil or gas wells and mines."

Moreover, to grant the refund without determination of the proper assessment and the tax due would inevitably result in multiplicity
of proceedings or suits. If the deficiency assessment should subsequently be upheld, the Government will be forced to institute
anew a proceeding for the recovery of erroneously refunded taxes which recourse must be filed within the prescriptive period of ten
years after discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission in the false or fraudulent return involved. 23 This would necessarily require and
entail additional efforts and expenses on the part of the Government, impose a burden on and a drain of government funds, and
impede or delay the collection of much-needed revenue for governmental operations.

Thus, to avoid multiplicity of suits and unnecessary difficulties or expenses, it is both logically necessary and legally appropriate that
the issue of the deficiency tax assessment against Citytrust be resolved jointly with its claim for tax refund, to determine once and
for all in a single proceeding the true and correct amount of tax due or refundable.
In fact, as the Court of Tax Appeals itself has heretofore conceded, 24 it would be only just and fair that the taxpayer and the
Government alike be given equal opportunities to avail of remedies under the law to defeat each other's claim and to determine all
matters of dispute between them in one single case. It is important to note that in determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the refund of the amount paid, it would necessary to determine how much the Government is entitled to collect as taxes. This would
necessarily include the determination of the correct liability of the taxpayer and, certainly, a determination of this case would
constitute res judicata on both parties as to all the matters subject thereof or necessarily involved therein.

The Court cannot end this adjudication without observing that what caused the Government to lose its case in the tax court may
hopefully be ascribed merely to the ennui or ineptitude of officialdom, and not to syndicated intent or corruption. The evidential cul-
de-sac in which the Solicitor General found himself once again gives substance to the public perception and suspicion that it is
another proverbial tip in the iceberg of venality in a government bureau which is pejoratively rated over the years. What is so
distressing, aside from the financial losses to the Government, is the erosion of trust in a vital institution wherein the reputations of
so many honest and dedicated workers are besmirched by the acts or omissions of a few. Hence, the liberal view we have here
taken pro hac vice, which may give some degree of assurance that this Court will unhesitatingly react to any bane in the government
service, with a replication of such response being likewise expected by the people from the executive authorities.

PNB vs. CIR (GR No. 206019 dated March 18, 2015
The petition is impressed with merit. As PNB insists at every turn, it has presented sufficient evidence showing its entitlement to the
refund of the excess creditable taxes it erroneously withheld and paid to the BIR.
As earlier stated, the CTA predicated its denial action on the postulate that even if PNB’s withholding and remittance of taxes were
undisputed, it was not able to prove that Gotesco did not utilize the taxes thuswithheld to pay for its tax liabilities for the year 2003.

In its Decision, the First Division categorically stated, “[P]etitioner should have likewise offered as evidence the 2003 Income Tax
Return of GOTESCO to convince this Court that indeed the excess withholding tax payments were not used by GOTESCO. The
absence of such relevant evidence is fatal to petitioner’s action preventing this Court from granting its
claim.”24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, apprised on what to do, and following the First Division’s advice, PNB presented Gotesco’s 2003 ITRs as an attachment to its
MR, which was subsequently denied however. In ruling on the MR, the First Division again virtually required PNB to present
additional evidence, specifically, Gotesco’s Certificates of Creditable Taxes Withheld (BIR Form No. 2307) covering P6,014,433 tax
credits claimed for year 2003, purportedly to show non-utilization by Gotesco of the P74,400,028.49 withholding tax payments.

Although PNB was not able to submit Gotesco’s BIR Form No. 2307, the Court is persuaded and so declares that PNB submitted
evidence sufficiently showing Gotesco’s non-utilization of the taxes withheld subject of the refund.
It is clear that as of year-end 2003, Gotesco had continued to assert ownership over the Ever Ortigas Commercial Complex as
evidenced by the following: (a) it persistently challenged the validity of the foreclosure sale which was the transaction subject to the
P74,400,028.49 creditable withholding tax; and (b) its 2003 Audited Financial Statements declared said complex as one of its
properties. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that since Gotesco vehemently refused to recognize the validity of the foreclosure
sale, it stands to reason that it also refused to recognize the payment of the creditable withholding tax that was due on the sale and
most especially, claim the same as a tax credit.

Certainly, Gotesco’s relentless refusal to transfer registered ownership of the Ever Ortigas Commercial Complex to PNB constitutes
proof enough that Gotesco will not do any act inconsistent with its claim of ownership over the foreclosed asset, including claiming
the creditable tax imposed on the foreclosure sale as tax credit and utilizing such amount to offset its tax liabilities. To do such would
run roughshod over Gotesco’s firm stance that PNB’s foreclosure on the mortgage was invalid and that it remained the owner of the
subject property.

Several pieces of evidence likewise point to Gotesco’s non-utilization of the claimed creditable withholding tax.As advised by the
First Division, Gotesco presented its 2003 ITR27along with its 2003 Schedule of Prepaid Tax28 which itemized in detail the
withholding taxes claimed by Gotesco for the year 2003 amounting to P6,014,433. The aforesaid schedule shows that the creditable
withholding taxes Gotesco utilized to pay for its 2003 tax liabilities came from the rental payments of its tenants in the Ever Ortigas
Commercial Complex, not from the foreclosure sale.

Further, Gotesco’s former accountant, Ma.Analene T. Roxas,stated in her Judicial Affidavit 29 that the tax credits claimed for year
2003 did not include any portion of the amount subject to the claim for refund. First, she explained that Gotesco could not have
possibly utilized the amount claimed for refund as it was not even aware that PNB paid the six percent (6%) creditable withholding
tax since no documents came to its attention which showed such payment by PNB. As she also explained, had Gotesco claimed the
entire or even any portion of P74,400,028.49, corresponding to the six percent (6%) tax withheld by PNB, the amount appearing in
Items 27D30 and 27C31 of Gotesco’s 2003 ITR should have reflected the additional amount of P74,400,028.49.

In claims for excess and unutilized creditable withholding tax, the submission of BIR Forms 2307 is to prove the fact of withholding
of the excess creditable withholding tax being claimed for refund. This is clear in the provision of Section 58.3, RR 2-98, as
amended, and in various rulings of the Court.33 In the words of Section 2.58.3, RR 2-98, “That the fact of withholding is established
by a copy of a statement duly issued by the payor (withholding agent) to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax
withheld therefrom.”
Hence, the probative value of BIR Form 2307, which is basically a statement showing the amount paid for the subject transaction
and the amount of tax withheld therefrom, is to establish only the fact of withholding of the claimed creditable withholding tax. There
is nothing in BIR Form No. 2307 which would establish either utilization or non-utilization, as the case may be, of the creditable
withholding tax.

It must be noted that PNB had already presented the Withholding Tax Remittance Returns (BIR Form No. 1606) relevant to the
transaction. The said forms show that the amount of P74,400,028.49 was withheld and paid by PNB in the year 2003. It contains,
among other data, the name of the payor and the payee, the description of the property subject of the transaction, and the
determination of the taxable base, and the tax rate applied. These are the very same key information that would be gathered from
BIR Form No. 2307.

While perhaps it may be necessary to prove that the taxpayer did not use the claimed creditable withholding tax to pay for his/its tax
liabilities, there is no basis in law or jurisprudence to say that BIR Form No. 2307 is the only evidence that may be adduced to prove
such non-use.

In this case, PNB was able to establish, through the evidence it presented, that Gotesco did not in fact use the claimed creditable
withholding taxes to settle its tax liabilities, to reiterate: (1) Gotesco’s 2003 Audited Financial Statements, which still included the
mortgaged property in the asset account “Properties and Equipment,” proving that Gotesco did not recognize the foreclosure sale
and therefore, the payment by PNB of the creditable withholding taxes corresponding to the same; (2) Gotesco’s 2003 ITRs, which
the CTA Special First Division required to show that the excess creditable withholding tax claimed for refund was not used by
Gotesco, along with the 2003 Schedule of Prepaid Tax which itemized in detail the withholding taxes claimed by Gotesco for the
year 2003 amounting to P6,014,433.00; (3) the testimony of Gotesco’s former accountant, proving that the amount subject of PNB’s
claim for refund was not included among the creditable withholding taxes stated in Gotesco’s 2003 ITR; and(4) the Withholding Tax
Remittance Returns (BIR Form 1606) proving that the amount of P74,400,028.49 was withheld and paid by PNB in the year 2003.

CIR vs. PNB, GR No. 180290 dated September 29, 2014

The petition, however, should be denied.

The petition is but a reiteration of reasons and arguments previously set forth in petitioner’s pleadings beforethe Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc, and which the latter had already considered, weighed,and resolved before it rendered its decision and resolution
now sought to be set aside. Furthermore, the questions on whether respondent’s claim for refund of unutilized excess creditable
withholding taxes amounting to ₱23,762,347.83 were duly supported by valid certificates of creditable tax withheld at source and
whether it had sufficiently proven its claim are questions of fact.1âwphi1 These issues require a review, examination, evaluation, or
weighing of the probative value of evidence presented, especially the withholding tax certificates, which thiscourt does not have the
jurisdiction to do, barring the presence of any exceptional circumstance, as it is not a trier of facts. 16

Besides, as pointed out by respondent, petitioner did not object to the admissibility of the 622 withholding tax certificates when these
were formally offered by respondent before the tax court.17 Hence, petitioner is deemed to have admitted the validity of these
documents.18 Petitioner’s "failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on its own, disregard
such evidence."19

The certificate of creditable tax withheld at source22 is the competent proof to establish the factthat taxes are withheld. 23 It is not
necessary for the person who executed and preparedthe certificate of creditable tax withheld at source to be presented and to testify
personally to prove the authenticity of the certificates.24

In Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals,25 this court declared that a certificate iscomplete in the relevant
details that would aid the courts in the evaluation of any claim for refund of excess creditable withholding taxes:

In fine, the document which may be accepted as evidence of the third condition, that is, the fact of withholding, must emanate from
the payor itself, and not merely from the payee, and must indicate the name of the payor, the income payment basis ofthe tax
withheld, the amount of the tax withheld and the nature of the tax paid.

At the time material to this case, the requisite information regarding withholding taxes from the sale of acquired assets can be found
in BIR Form No. 1743.1. As described in Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-85, BIR Form No. 1743.1 is a written statement
issued by the payor as withholding agent showing the income or other payments made by the said withholding agent during a
quarter or year and the amount of the tax deducted and withheld therefrom. It readily identifies the payor, the income payment and
the tax withheld. It is complete in the relevant details which would aid the courts in the evaluation of any claim for refund of
creditable withholding taxes.26(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Moreover, as correctly held by the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc, the figures appearing in the withholding tax certificates can
betaken at face value since these documentswere executed under the penalties of perjury, pursuant to Section 267 of the 1997
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 267. Declaration under Penalties of Perjury. – Any declaration, return and other statements required under this Code, shall, in
lieu of an oath, contain a written statement that they are made under the penalties of perjury. Any person who willfully files a
declaration, return or statement containing information which is not true and correct as to every material matter shall, upon
conviction, be subject to the penalties prescribed for perjury under the Revised Penal Code.

Thus, upon presentation of a withholding tax certificate complete in its relevant details and with a written statement that it was made
under the penalties of perjury, the burden of evidence then shifts to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to prove that (1) the
certificate is not complete; (2) it is false; or (3) it was not issued regularly.

Petitioner's posture that respondent is required to establish actual remittance to the Bureau of Internal Revenue deserves scant
consideration. Proof of actual remittance is not a condition to claim for a refund of unutilized tax credits. Under Sections 57 and 58 of
the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, it is the payor-withholding agent, and not the payee-refund claimant such
asrespondent, who is vested with the responsibility of withholding and remitting income taxes.

This court’s ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Asian Transmission Corporation, 27 citing the Court of Tax Appeals’
explanation, is instructive:

. . . proof of actual remittance by the respondent is not needed in order to prove withholding and remittance of taxes to
petitioner.1âwphi1 Section 2.58.3 (B) of Revenue Regulation No. 2-98 clearly provides that proof of remittance is the responsibility
of the withholding agent and not of the taxpayer-refund claimant. It should beborne in mind by the petitioner that payors of
withholding taxes are by themselves constituted as withholding agents of the BIR. The taxes they withhold are held in trust for the
government. In the event that the withholding agents commit fraud against the government by not remitting the taxes so withheld,
such act should not prejudice herein respondent who has been duly withheld taxes by the withholding agents acting under
government authority. Moreover, pursuant to Section 57 and 58 ofthe NIRC of 1997, as amended, the withholding of income tax and
the remittance thereof to the BIR is the responsibility of the payor and not the payee. Therefore, respondent . . . has no control over
the remittance of the taxes withheld from its income by the withholding agent or payor who isthe agent of the petitioner. The
Certificates of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source issued by the withholding agents ofthe government are prima facieproof of actual
payment by herein respondent-payee to the government itself through said agents