LAMBERT S. RAMOS, petitioner, vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.
“On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue),
Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; If the master is injured by the negligence of a third
person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the
latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against
the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made; The act of crossing an avenue which is
prohibited by law constitutes negligence.—Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz.: Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary,
it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. If the master is injured by the
negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own
servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the
superior’s action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. Applying
the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law.
Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery
for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.
Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.—
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Esguerra & Blanco for petitioner. Ramon U. Ampil for respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver,
Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual
damages suffered in a vehicular collision.
The facts, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
corner Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a
Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty
Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin (“Aquilino”), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x
x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo (“Rodel”), with Plate Number
LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat (“Estela”) sustained injuries. She
was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a
speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed
the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Expedition violently rammed
against the car’s right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan
turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause
to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property. In the meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent
reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization
of Estela in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears
prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 33277, and subsequently raffled to Branch 42.
As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it was the
negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of the
accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass
through the intersection.
(Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He
asserted that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his driver, Rodel.
Weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated
1 March 2006 exculpating (Ramos) from liability, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Counterclaims of the
defendant are likewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.”
The aforesaid judgment did not sit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he (sic) appealed the
same before the RTC of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215, which rendered the assailed
Decision dated 5 September 2006, affirming the MeTC’s Decision. (C.O.L. Realty’s) Motion
for Reconsideration met the same fate as it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 5
June 2007.”1
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino was
negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per
Certification of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) dated
November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited. Thus:
“This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of
vehicles at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision,
Quezon City has (sic) not allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the
ongoing road construction at the area.”2 (Emphasis supplied)
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah
Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue.
Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions of the
barricade which were broken, thus violating the MMDA rule.3
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos’
vehicle was moving at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing
construction (the Katipunan Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into
the rear door and fender of the passenger’s side of Aquilino’s car, sending it spinning in a
180-degree turn.4 It therefore found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence
for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.
Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision,5 the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 September 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 215 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Lambert Ramos is held
solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation the
amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages. Petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation’s claim for
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant
petition, which raises the following sole issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SAME IS INSUFFICIENT.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
There is no doubt in the appellate court’s mind that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA
prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the
proximate cause of the accident. Respondent does not dispute this; in its Comment to the
instant petition, it even conceded that petitioner was guilty of mere contributory
negligence.6
Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that:
“The Certification dated 30 November 2004 of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) evidently disproved (C.O.L. Realty’s) barefaced assertion that its driver,
Aquilino, was not to be blamed for the accident—
“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of
vehicles at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision,
Quezon City has (sic) not allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the
ongoing road construction at the area.
This certification is issued upon request of the interested parties for whatever legal
purpose it may serve.”
(C.O.L. Realty) admitted that there were barricades along the intersection of Katipunan
Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to caution drivers
not to pass through the intersecting roads. This prohibition stands even if, as (C.O.L.
Realty) claimed, the “barriers were broken” at that point creating a small gap through
which any vehicle could pass. What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these
barricades and drove through it. Without doubt, his negligence is established by the
fact that he violated a traffic regulation. This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil
Code—
“Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.”
Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realty’s) negligence which resulted
in the vehicular mishap.”7
However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodel’s contributory negligence in
driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. On this score, the
appellate court made the following pronouncement:
“As a professional driver, Rodel should have known that driving his vehicle at a high speed
in a major thoroughfare which was then subject of an on-going construction was a
perilous act. He had no regard to (sic) the safety of other vehicles on the road. Because
of the impact of the collision, (Aquilino’s) sedan made a 180-degree turn as (Ramos’) Ford
Expedition careened and smashed into its rear door and fender. We cannot exculpate
Rodel from liability.
Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary
liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption
by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his
employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
Employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
(Ramos) feebly attempts to escape vicarious liability by averring that Rodel was highly
recommended when he applied for the position of family driver by the Social Service
Committee of his parish. A certain Ramon Gomez, a member of the church’s livelihood
program, testified that a background investigation would have to be made before an
applicant is recommended to the parishioners for employment. (Ramos) supposedly
tested Rodel’s driving skills before
accepting him for the job. Rodel has been his driver since 2001, and except for the mishap
in 2004, he has not been involved in any road accident.
Regrettably, (Ramos’) evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained
unsubstantiated and are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the
records which would support (Ramos’) bare allegation of Rodel’s 10-year unblemished
driving record. He failed to present convincing proof that he went to the extent of
verifying Rodel’s qualifications, safety record, and driving history.
So too, (Ramos) did not bother to refute (C.O.L. Realty’s) stance that his driver was texting
with his cellphone while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down
albeit he knew that Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was
barricaded with barriers. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the
selection of driver remains unrebutted. As the employer of Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily
liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.
Certainly, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of
employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. These, (Ramos)
failed to do.”8
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since Aquilino’s willful disregard of the MMDA
prohibition was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then respondent alone should
suffer the consequences of the accident and the damages it incurred. He argues:
“20. It becomes apparent therefore that the only time a plaintiff, the respondent herein,
can recover damages is if its negligence was only contributory, and such contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. It has been clearly established in this
case, however, that respondent’s negligence was not merely contributory, but the sole
proximate cause of the accident.x x x x
22. As culled from the foregoing, respondent was the sole proximate cause of the
accident. Respondent’s vehicle should not have been in that position since crossing the
said intersection was prohibited. Were it not for the obvious negligence of respondent’s
driver in crossing the intersection that was prohibited, the accident would not have
happened. The crossing of respondent’s vehicle in a prohibited intersection
unquestionably produced the injury, and without which the accident would not have
occurred. On the other hand, petitioner’s driver had the right to be where he was at the
time of the mishap. As correctly concluded by the RTC, the petitioner’s driver could not
be expected to slacken his speed while travelling along said intersection since nobody, in
his right mind, would do the same. Assuming, however, that petitioner’s driver was
indeed guilty of any contributory negligence, such was not the proximate cause of the
accident considering that again, if respondent’s driver did not cross the prohibited
intersection, no accident would have happened. No imputation of any lack of care on
Ilustrisimo’s could thus be concluded. It is obvious then that petitioner’s driver was not
guilty of any negligence that would make petitioner vicariously liable for damages.
23. As the sole proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s own driver,
respondent cannot claim damages from petitioner.”9
On the other hand, respondent in its Comment merely reiterated the appellate court’s
findings and pronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty of mere contributory
negligence, and insisted on his vicarious liability as Rodel’s employer under Article 2184
of the Civil Code.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz.:
“Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.”
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to
his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of
course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which
complaint is made.10
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing
Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by
law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any
recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.11
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly
what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who
resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground
to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan
Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It
was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied
in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence,
since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in
the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he
may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages
in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would
benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s
negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May
28, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13, 2008 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 dated September 5, 2006 dismissing for lack of merit
respondent’s complaint for damages is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur. also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. of the diligence of a good father of a family. That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the
Notes.—The accident victim is guilty of contributory negligence if he did not use the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions
pedestrian overpass while crossing the avenue. (Mendoza vs. Soriano, 524 SCRA 260 in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his
[2007]) own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable with his
to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. (Lapanday civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph
Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) vs. Angala, 525 SCRA 229 [2007]) of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: “Should there be no person having such
Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation, 597 SCRA 526, G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009 x x x minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property
CRESENCIO LIBI** and AMELIA YAP LIBI, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law.”
COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondents. PETITION for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
Civil Law; Damages; Liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.—In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. which supposedly holds Alex Y. Tan for petitioners.
that “(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for private respondents.
minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising REGALADO, J.:
from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,” followed by an extended quotation
ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while
damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched.
back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder. Now, we do While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through
not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents liable, but the seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony
categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately
comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the
parents for crimes or quasidelicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060
can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with with the following decretal portion:
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such “WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby
liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and
constitute a valid and substantial defense. We believe that the civil liability of parents for solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:
quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is 1. Moral damages, P30,000.00;
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides 2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, 3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed.”1
are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are
hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that “(t)he responsibility treated of in the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident
this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are
Criminal Law; Civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children.— the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, xxx the civil liability of the aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and
second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend,
Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from
January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound
inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem
streets of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death
of both minors, their parents who are the contending parties herein, posited their
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available
reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the
gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, petitioners, puzzled and likewise
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of
his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must
have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is
likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit.”2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint
of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit
for resolution the following issues in this case:
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with
established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent
court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
3. In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer
of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether
or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However,
undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing
around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however,
that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of
whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact
of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private
respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral
parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the
occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body
of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct
his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin
test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands
was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of
Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and
twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table
and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried.4
However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never
saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the
wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue.5
In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the
wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible
that Wendell Libi shot himself.6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim
and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the
gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact
fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:
“Q
Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black
residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call
clean?
A
Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q
Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that
you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that
correct?
A
If the . . . assuming that the gun used was . . . the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q
At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the
singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your
own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the
victim himself, Wen- dell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces
and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath? the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly
A the gate of the Gotiongs; and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas
As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is station.12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the
concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked
fired by the victim.”7 with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets8 found at the scene of the rooftop.13
crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a “shadow” on top of the gate of the
respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that
Bureau of Investigation,9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe
at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states: Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions:
xxx “ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
“Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with con-tusion collar widest Q
inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?
region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed WITNESS:
slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch- A
in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively It is about 8 feet.
along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and Q
12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus. And where were you looking from?
xxx WITNESS:
“Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of A
entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or From upstairs in my living room.
bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
tissue, are absent.”10 ____________
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
thus: 11 TSN, November 9, 1979, 22.
“Q 12 TSN, December 27, 1979, 56-61.
Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the 13 Ibid., id., 62-68.
wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 25
inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible
for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches? VOL. 214, SEPTEMBER 18, 1992
WITNESS: 25
A Libi vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length. Q
ATTY. SENINING: From your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right A
arm almost straight towards his head.”11 Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high.”14
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do
of defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since
an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in
adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a “shadow” of a person at relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo
the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom. Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister,
Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that
when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he
heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot.
Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the
incident.15 Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it
was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the “shadow” of a man at the gate
of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was
another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not
even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any
alleged “John Doe.” Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi
did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence—testimonial,
documentary and pictorial—the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of
Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation.
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family,
hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not
borne out by the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi,
owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each
of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in
her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son
Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the
gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain
serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good
father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold
thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around
or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were
gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their
son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting
in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug
informers,17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the
photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof,18
holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in
possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of
diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:
“x x x It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be
engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-
appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping
said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides:
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.’
“Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun
which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily
liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by
the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas vs. Cadano,
et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed
by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts
and criminal offenses.’
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children
who acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C.
and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only
covers obligations which arise from quasidelicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).
“x x x In the instant case, minor son of herein defendantsappellees, Wendell Libi somehow
got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-
spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978
when Wendell Libi ha(d) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and
dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi
was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU
agent. x x x.”
xxx
“Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the
lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because
as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing
this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to
Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock,
but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed.” (Emphases ours.)19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable
for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by
their minor son. We take this opportunity however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination
therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court
cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al.20 which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of
parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,”
followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should
assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted
passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of
the discussion hereunder.
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but
the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires
a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which
warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of
the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the
parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted
with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if
such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence
would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we
apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental
liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides
that “(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.”
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their
minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
“Art 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.—
xxx
First. In cases of subdivisions x x x 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed
by x x x a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.” (Emphases supplied.)21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is
like-
_______________
21 Par. 2 of Art. 12 refers to “a person under nine years of age,” which should more
accurately read “nine years of age or under” since Par. 3 thereof speaks of one “over nine
x x x.” See also the complementary provisions of Art. 201, P.D. No. 603 and Art. 221, E.O.
No. 209, as amended, infra, Fn 32 and 33.
wise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on
their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor
shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case
of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182
of the Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian,
the minor x x x shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where
a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an
equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
“Should there be no person having such x x x minor under his authority, legal guardianship
or control, or if such person be insolvent, said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own
property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law.”
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated
in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of
the Civil Code has, aside from the aforesaid case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number
of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. Capuno, et al.,22 Araneta vs.
Arreglado,23 Salen, et al. vs. Balce,24 Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al.,25 and Elcano,
et al, vs. Hill, et al.26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of
the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under
15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of age or over,
since these situations are not covered by
Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of
parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180
of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases
hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would
apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that
in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage
is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances
resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether the
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasidelicts of their minor
children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through
reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his
father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence
of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability
was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son
who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the
Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article
2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as
already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with
Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for
serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in
Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages
arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in
Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to “lack of intent,
coupled with mistake,” it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there
should be solidary liability for damages, since the son, “although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence,” but “is now
of age, as a matter of equity” the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability
only for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear;27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments;28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry;29
and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused
in the other classes.30
Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present
case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the
parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in
its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the
syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of “subsidiary” liability. However, such
categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact,
after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in
said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise:
“Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence
submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility
for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted,
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence
under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as
heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is of no
moment.” Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents
are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto
caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years
of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity,
upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
friend of the youthful offender.32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is
now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor offender.33
_______________
31 While R.A. No. 6809 amended Art. 234 of the Family Code to provide that majority
commences at the age of 18 years, Art. 236 thereof, as likewise amended, states that
“(n)othing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned
in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.”
32 Art. 201, P.D. No. 603.
33 Art. 221 of E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227, provides: “Parents and other
persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the act or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.”
For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply
in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a
felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding
petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications
of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the
requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, GriñoAquino, Medialdea, Romero,
Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., On leave.
Davide, Jr., J., No part. I used to be counsel of one of the parties.
Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., No part.
Petition denied; judgment affirmed.
Note.—Employer’s liability in quasi-delict is primary and solidary and the award of
temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees lies upon the
discretion of the court (Pleno vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 208). Libi vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992

VIRGINIA REAL, petitioner, vs. SISENANDO H. BELO, respondent.
Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The rule is explicit
in its mandate that the legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgment or final
orders of both lower courts must be certified correct by the Clerk of Court, unless the
petitioner could show that the Clerk of Court was officially on leave and the
Administrative Officer was officially designated as officer-in-charge.—In the present case,
petitioner’s submission of copies of the RTC Decision and Order certified as correct by the
Administrative Officer IV of the RTC is insufficient compliance with the requirements of
the rule. Petitioner failed to show that the Clerk of Court was officially on leave and the
Administrative Officer was officially designated as officer-in-charge. The rule is explicit in
its mandate that the legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts must be certified correct by the Clerk of Court.
Same; Same; There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial
compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure; When the
Court of Appeals dismisses a petition outright and the petitioner files a motion for the
reconsideration of such dismissal, appending thereto the requisite pleadings, documents
or order/resolution, this would constitute substantial compliance with the Revised Rules
of Court.—Nonetheless, a strict application of the rule in this case is not called for. This
Court has ruled against the dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities in several
cases, especially when the appellant had substantially complied with the formal
requirements. There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial
compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. When the CA
dismisses a petition outright and the petitioner files a motion for the reconsideration of
such dismissal, appending thereto the requisite pleadings, documents or
order/resolution, this would constitute substantial compliance with the Revised Rules of
Court.
Same; Same; There is no compelling need to attach the position papers of the parties
where the Decisions of the MeTC and RTC already stated their respective arguments.—
On the necessity of attaching position papers and affidavits of witnesses, Section 2 of Rule
42 of the Revised Rules of Court requires attachments if these would support the
allegations of the petition. In the present case, there was no compelling need to attach
the position papers of the parties since the Decisions of the MeTC and RTC already stated
their respective arguments. As to the affidavits, the Court notes that they were presented
by the respondent as part of the testimony of his witness Fire Investigator Pinca and
therefore would not support the allegations of the petitioner.
Same; Same; What should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose
life, honor or property on mere technicalities.—Truly, in dismissing the petition for
review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case. The
Court’s pronouncement in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 243
(1998), is worth echoing: “cases should be determined on the merits, after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be
better served.” Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to
lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities.
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Fortuitous Events; Elements; A party’s theory of
fortuitous event is unavailing where the circumstances show that the fire originated from
leaking fumes from the LPG stove and tank installed at a party’s fastfood stall and her
employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood
stalls.—Jurisprudence defines the elements of a “fortuitous event” as follows: (a) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the
obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor. Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible
for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the
cause of injury or loss. It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking
fumes from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner’s fastfood stall and her
employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood
stalls, including respondent’s fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support
petitioner’s theory of fortuitous event.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof.—Petitioner’s bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the
Court to rule in her favor. It is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are
not evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees.—Whenever an employee’s negligence causes
damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in
eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-
delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome
the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from
the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than
what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on
appeal; Exceptions.—As to the award of temperate damages, the increase in the amount
thereof by the RTC is improper. The RTC could no longer examine the amounts awarded
by the MeTC since respondent did not appeal from the Decision of the MeTC. It is well-
settled that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative
relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if
any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. While there are exceptions to this rule, such
as if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors, none apply here.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rodriguez, Delos Santos & Naidas Law Offices for petitioner.
Hernandez & Amparo Law Offices for respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated June 16, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed outright the petition for review of Virginia Real
(petitioner) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58799, and the CA Resolution2 dated November 27, 2000
which denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case:
Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of
the Philippine Women’s University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila. Sisenando
H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at
the Food Center of PWU.
Around 7:00 o’clock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at petitioner’s
Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area,
including respondent’s stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator
SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes
coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed at petitioner’s
stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded compensation
from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondent’s demand.
Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila (MeTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 152822.3
Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and
maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the selection and supervision of her
employees; that petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted
the fastfood stalls.4
In her Answer dated September 23, 1996, petitioner denied liability on the grounds that
the fire was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employees.5
After trial, the MeTC rendered its Decision6 dated April 5, 1999 in favor of the respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter:
1) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 representing temperate or moderate
damages; and
2) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
The counterclaim filed by the defendant is hereby DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.”7
The MeTC held that the investigation conducted by the appropriate authority revealed
that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the LPG stove and tank
installed at petitioner’s fastfood stall; that factual circumstances did not show any sign of
interference by any force of nature to infer that the fire occurred due to fortuitous event;
that the petitioner failed to exercise due diligence, precaution, and vigilance in the
conduct of her business, particularly, in maintaining the safety of her cooking equipment
as well as in the selection and supervision of her employees; that even if petitioner passes
the fault to her employees, Article 2180 of the Civil Code finds application; that in the
absence of supporting evidence, the amount of actual damages and unrealized profits
prayed for by respondent cannot be granted; that, nonetheless, respondent is entitled to
temperate damages since respondent sustained pecuniary loss, though its true value
cannot, from the very nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila
(RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94606, insisting that the fire was a fortuitous event.
On November 26, 1999, the RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC but increased the
amount of temperate damages awarded to the respondent from P50,000.00 to
P80,000.00.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the increase in the award
of temperate damages is unreasonable since she also incurred losses from the fire.
In its Order dated April 12, 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
holding that it cannot disregard evidence showing that the fire originated from
petitioner’s fastfood stall; that the increased amount of temperate damages awarded to
respondent is not a full compensation but only a fair approximate of what he lost due to
the negligence of petitioner’s workers.9
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
58799.10 On June 16, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for being
“procedurally flawed/deficient.”11 The CA held that the attached RTC Decision was not
certified as a true copy by the Clerk of Court; that a certified true copy of the MeTC
Decision was not attached; that material portions of the record, such as the position
papers of the parties and affidavits of witnesses, as would support the material allegations
of the petition were also not attached.12
On July 14, 2000, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,13 attaching
photocopies of the Decisions of the RTC and MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of
Court.14
On November 27, 2000, the CA issued its Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.15
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
“1. Whether the submitted certified true copy of the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court as authenticated by a court employee other than the Clerk of Court who was
not around at that time said copy was secured constitutes compliance with the Rules?
2. Whether the submission of a certified true copy of the Metropolitan Trial Court’s
judgment is still an indispensable requirement in filing a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals despite the fact that said judgment was already modified by the above
decision of the Regional Trial Court and it is the latter decision that is the proper subject
of the petition for review?
3. Whether the submission of copies of the respective position papers of the contending
parties is still an indispensable requirement in filing a petition for review before the Court
of Appeals despite the fact that the contents thereof are already quoted in the body of
the verified petition and in the subject judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court?
4. Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result of the fire
that razed not only her own food kiosk but also the adjacent foodstalls at the Food Center
premises of the Philippine Women’s University, including that of the respondent?
5. Whether the Regional Trial Court could increase the amount of damages awarded by
the Metropolitan Trial Court in favor of the respondent who has not even filed an appeal
therefrom?”16
Petitioner submits that rules of procedure should not be applied in a very harsh, inflexible
and technically unreasonable sense.
While admitting that the RTC Decision and Order were not certified by the Clerk of Court
himself, petitioner insists that they were certified as authentic copies by Administrative
Officer IV Gregorio B. Paraon of the RTC.
As to the MeTC Decision, petitioner contends that the submission of a certified true copy
thereof is not an indispensable requirement because that judgment is not the subject of
the petition for review.
In any case, petitioner submits that she had substantially complied with the requirements
of the rule when she attached with her Motion for Reconsideration the copies of the
Decisions of the RTC and MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court.
Anent the non-submission of the position papers of the parties, petitioner maintains that
the contents of said position papers were lengthily quoted verbatim in the petition and in
the attached copy of the MeTC Decision.
On the submission of affidavits of witnesses, petitioner contends that it was not necessary
because the case before the MeTC was not covered by summary proceedings.
On the merits of her petition before the CA, petitioner avers that she should not be held
liable for a fire which was a fortuitous event since the fire could not be foreseen and the
spread of the fire to the adjacent fastfood stalls was inevitable.
Lastly, she argues that the RTC cannot increase the amount of temperate damages since
the respondent did not appeal from the judgment of the MeTC.
Respondent opted not to file a Comment, manifesting that the petition contains no new
arguments which would require
120
120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Real vs. Belo
a comment since the arguments are but a rehash of those raised and decided by the lower
courts.17
The Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their
respective memoranda.18 In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted her
Memorandum.19 On the other hand, respondent filed a Manifestation stating that since
no new issues have been raised by the petitioner in her petition and in order not to be
redundant, he adopts as his memorandum the memoranda he filed in the MeTC and the
RTC.20
In his Memoranda before the MeTC and RTC, respondent emphasized the evidence he
presented to establish his cause of action against petitioner, principally the testimony of
Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel G. Pinca stating that the fire originated from the LPG stove
and tank in petitioner’s fastfood stall.
The requirements as to form and content of a petition for review of a decision of the RTC
are laid down in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
“Sec. 2. Form and contents.—The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with
the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and
shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower
courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific
material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied
upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified
correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain
copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Under Section 3 of the same Rule, failure to comply with the above requirements “shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”
However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court also provides that rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Indeed, rules of procedure should
be used to promote, not frustrate justice.21
In the present case, petitioner’s submission of copies of the RTC Decision and Order
certified as correct by the Administrative Officer IV of the RTC is insufficient compliance
with the requirements of the rule. Petitioner failed to show that the Clerk of Court was
officially on leave and the Administrative Officer was officially designated as officer-in-
charge. The rule is explicit in its mandate that the legible duplicate originals or true copies
of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts must be certified correct by the
Clerk of Court.
Nonetheless, a strict application of the rule in this case is not called for. This Court has
ruled against the dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities in several cases,
especially when the appellant had substantially complied with the formal
requirements.22 There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.23
When the CA dismisses a petition outright and the petitioner files a motion for the
reconsideration of such dismissal, appending thereto the requisite pleadings, documents
or order/resolution, this would constitute substantial compliance with the Revised Rules
of Court.24
Thus, in the present case, there was substantial compliance when petitioner attached in
her Motion for Reconsideration a photocopy of the Decision of the RTC as certified correct
by the Clerk of Court of the RTC. In like manner, there was substantial compliance when
petitioner attached, in her Motion for Reconsideration, a photocopy of the Decision of
the MeTC as certified correct by the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
On the necessity of attaching position papers and affidavits of witnesses, Section 2 of Rule
42 of the Revised Rules of Court requires attachments if these would support the
allegations of the petition.25 In the present case, there was no compelling need to attach
the position papers of the parties since the Decisions of the MeTC and RTC already stated
their respective arguments. As to the affidavits, the Court notes that they were presented
by the respondent as part of the testimony of his witness Fire Investigator Pinca and
therefore would not support the allegations of the petitioner.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the
expense of a just resolution of the case.
The Court’s pronouncement in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals26 is worth
echoing: “cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties
for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.”27
Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose
life, honor or property on mere technicalities.28
The next most logical step would then be for the Court to simply set aside the challenged
resolutions, remand the case to the CA and direct the latter to resolve on the merits of
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 58799. But, that would further delay the case. Considering
the issues raised which can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and documents filed,
and the fact that petitioner herself has asked the Court to decide her petition on the
merits, the Court deems it more practical and in the greater interest of justice not to
remand the case to the CA but, instead, to resolve the controversy once and for all.29
The Court shall now address the issue of whether the fire was a fortuitous event.
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a “fortuitous event” as follows: (a) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human will; (b) it must
be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor
must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor.30
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous
event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other
words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or
loss.31
It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG
stove and tank installed at petitioner’s fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent
the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including respondent’s
fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support petitioner’s theory of fortuitous event.
Petitioner’s bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule in her favor. It
is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof.32 In short, mere allegations are not evidence.33
The Civil Code provides:
“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees.34 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer
must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.35
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove
and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked
for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to prove
care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection and
supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that petitioner had been
negligent.36
As to the award of temperate damages, the increase in the amount thereof by the RTC is
improper. The RTC could no longer examine the amounts awarded by the MeTC since
respondent did not appeal from the Decision of the MeTC.37 It is well-settled that a party
who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the
appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if
any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.38 While there are exceptions to this rule,
such as if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors,39 none apply here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated June 16, 2000 and
November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated November 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the temperate damages awarded is reduced from P80,000.00
to P50,000.00 as awarded by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila in its
Decision dated April 5, 1999.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed resolutions reversed and set aside.
Notes.—There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events, and the loss
of records during the transfer of records from the old to the new municipal building is not
a fortuitous event. (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Roxas, Mindoro Oriental, 236 SCRA 631 [1994])
It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in
labor cases to serve the demands of substantial justice. (Havtor Management Phils., Inc.
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 372 SCRA 271 [2001]) Real vs. Belo, 513 SCRA
111, G.R. No. 146224 January 26, 2007
SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners, vs. RODRIGO APOSTOL,
FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF
KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented
by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and
THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Civil Law; Vicarious Liability; To make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at
the time the employee was performing his functions.—Article 2180 of the Civil Code
provides that a person is not only liable for one’s own quasi-delictual acts, but also for
those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their
employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be
rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all
times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
functions entrusted to him. Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs
5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was
committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; To determine the existence of an
employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test, this involves: 1) the employer’s
power of selection; 2) payment of wages or other remuneration; 3) the employer’s right
to control the method of doing the work; 4) the employer’s right of suspension or
dismissal.—In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor
Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of
the latter. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, We rely on the
four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer’s power of selection; (2) payment of wages
or other remuneration; (3) the employer’s right to control the method of doing the work;
and (4) the employer’s right of suspension or dismissal.
Same; Same; This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee
relationship exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person
or entity because control over the employee subsists.—Applying the foregoing test, the
CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer
of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a
driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during
the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several occasions, held that
an employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the
employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists. In the
case under review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer
notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Same; In Benson v. Sorrel, 627 NE 2d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 1994), the New England
Supreme Court rules that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that
the passenger has control over the vehicle—neither does it render one the employer of
the driver.—Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell,
627 NE 2d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 1994), the New England Supreme Court ruled that
mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control
over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This Court, in
Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, 209 SCRA 47 (1992), ruled in a similar vein, to wit: x x x The fact
that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned
to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security
guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or
directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for
services entered into with the security agency. x x x
Civil Law; Vicarious Liability; In the absence of an employer-employee relationship
establishing liability, the driver’s negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee
who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.—Significantly, no negligence may be
imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the
manner of the vehicle’s operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship
establishing vicarious liability, the driver’s negligence should not be attributed to a fellow
employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control
the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application
of the doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v. Lombardi, 122 Cal. App. 22, 9 P. 2d 867
(1st Dist. 1932), is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability: Plaintiff
was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and
superior employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit
per alium is not properly applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was
not as master, but only by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by Kruse, and
the further fact that as Kruse’s agent he was delegated Kruse’s authority over the driver.
x x x In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this state and
elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be
imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only to the master or principal. (Hilton v.
Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297, 269 Pac. 425]; Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1
Pac. (2d) 528]; Ellis v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 52 S. E. 228];
Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108 Pac. 588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829;
and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277, and particularly that part commencing at p.
290.) We can see no logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between
actionable negligence and contributory negligence. x x x
Same; Same; It has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by
providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for
the latter’s negligent acts.—In Swanson v. McQuown, 139 Colo. 442, 340 P. 2d. 1063
(1959), a case involving a military officer who happened to be riding in a car driven by a
subordinate later involved in an accident, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered to the
general rule that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on
a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation. The court
went on to rule that the only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of,
or direct or encourage it. In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer
nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and
Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor
Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. Parenthetically, it has been held
that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or by serving
as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter’s negligent acts. The driver’s
duty is not one that may be delegated to others.
State Immunity; The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State
engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.—As correctly held by
the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal.
Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an
agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.
This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, 195 SCRA
692 (1991), where this Court held: It has already been remarked that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eliseo P. Vencer II for petitioners.
Ernesto I. Catedral for Mayor F.Q. Miguel.
Romeo Sucaldito for Municipal (now City) of Koronadal and provincial Legal Officer.
REYES, R.T., J.:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver
assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian?
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Polomolok, Cotabato City, Branch 39, insofar as defendant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is
concerned. The CA absolved Mayor Miguel from any liability since it was not he, but the
Municipality of Koronadal, that was the employer of the negligent driver.
The Facts
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu
pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal.2 The
pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the
possession of Ernesto Simbulan.3 Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to
bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.4
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the
National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.5 The intensity of the collision
sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that
Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident.6
Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral
contusion.7 He was initially treated at the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital.8 Due to
the seriousness of his injuries, he was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in
Davao City for more intensive treatment.9 Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six
(6) days after the accident.10
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a
complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents.11 In their complaint, they
prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. They pointed out that
that proximate cause of Marvin’s death was Lozano’s negligent and reckless operation of
the vehicle. They prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvin’s death. Apostol
and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise,
Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin’s sudden sprint across the highway made it
impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it
hit Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel. As
for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the vehicle insurer, it insisted
that its liability is contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured. Since
the insured did not file a claim within the prescribed period, any cause of action against
it had prescribed.
RTC Disposition
On January 25, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Municipality of Koronadal cannot
be held liable for the damages incurred by other defendant (sic) being an agency of the
State performing a (sic) governmental functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes
Simbulan, not being the owner of the subject vehicle, he is absolved of any liability. The
complaint against defendant First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company, Inc. is hereby
ordered dismissed there being no cause of action against said insurance company.
However, defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
(sic) the following sums:
1. One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand One Hundred One and Forty Centavos
(P173,101.40) Pesos as actual dam-
48
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jayme vs. Apostol
ages with legal interest of 12% per annum computed from February 11, 1989 until fully
paid;
2. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
3. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages;
4. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorney’s fees;
5. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the death of Marvin Jayme;
6. Three Thousand (P3,000.00) as litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.”12
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the CA.
CA Disposition
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he was Lozano’s
employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latter’s negligent act. Records showed that
the Municipality of Koronadal was the driver’s true and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel
also denied that he did not exercise due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano.
The incident, although unfortunate, was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him.
On October 22, 2003, the CA granted the appeal, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as
defendant-appellant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned, and the complaint against
him is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”13
_______________
12 Id., at p. 48.
13 Id., at p. 50.
49
VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008
49
Jayme vs. Apostol
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of
Marvin Jayme. Said the appellate court:
“Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees admitted that Mayor Miguel was not the employer of
Lozano. Thus, paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the Municipality of Koronadal
was the employer of both Mayor Miguel and Lozano. Not being the employer of Lozano,
Mayor Miguel could not thus be held liable for the damages caused by the former. Mayor
Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the time of the accident.”14
(Emphasis supplied)
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a vehicle who is
jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of the vehicle.
Issues
The spouses Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and assign to the CA the
following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MAYOR FERNANDO
MIGUEL CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MARVIN JAYME WHICH
CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE SETTLED PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
HONORABLE TRIBUNAL;
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
MOREOVER, THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE
ALL BASED ON CONJECTURES AND SURMISES AND AGAINST ACCEPTED COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH URGENTLY CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S SUPERVISION.15
Our Ruling
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present
case.
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. He
was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had direct control and supervision over
Lozano during the time of the accident. According to petitioners, the element of direct
control is not negated by the fact that Lozano’s employer was the Municipality of
Koronadal. Mayor Miguel, being Lozano’s superior, still had control over the manner the
vehicle was operated.
Article 218016 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one’s own
quasi-delictual acts, but also for
_______________ The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
15 Id., at pp. 23-24. 17 Cammarota, 449, cited in Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 522.
16 Civil Code, Art. 2180 provides: 18 Marquez v. Castillo, 68 Phil. 568 (1939); Cerf v. Medel, 33 Phil. 37 (1915).
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for one’s own acts or 19 13 Phil. 202 (1909).
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. 52
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. 52
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
under their authority and live in their company. Jayme vs. Apostol
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for alleged employment relationship. The defendant is under no obligation to prove the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are negative averment. This Court said:
employed or on the occasion of their functions. “It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the action is
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon which he bases
helpers acting within his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exceptions. This rue is in
51 harmony with the provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that
each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc.”20
VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008 In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed,
51 the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To
Jayme vs. Apostol determine the existence of an employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test.
those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as This involves: (1) the employer’s power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their remuneration; (3) the employer’s right to control the method of doing the work; and (4)
employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was the employer’s right of suspension or dismissal.21
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal
rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested
times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently
functions entrusted to him.17 assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists even if
must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control
employee was performing his functions.18 over the
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent _______________
upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence. In Belen v.
Belen,19 this Court ruled that it was enough for defendant to deny an 20 Belen v. Belen, id., at p. 206.
_______________ 21 Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v. Climaco, G.R. No. 146881, February 5, 2007, 514
SCRA 164; Ecal v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 92777-78, March 13,
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business 1991, 195 SCRA 224; Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28134, June
or industry. 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 629; Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement v. Zamora, G.R. No. L-48645,
January 7, 1987, 147 SCRA 49.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when 53
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages 53
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their Jayme vs. Apostol
custody.
employee subsists.22 In the case under review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to
be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and control over
Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the
accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or
directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell,23 the New
England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the
employer of the driver. This Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,24 ruled in a similar vein, to
wit:
“x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security
guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of
the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in
the contract for services entered into with the security agency. x x x”25 (Emphasis
supplied)
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the
person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle’s operation.26 In the
absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver’s
negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an
occupant of the vehicle.27 Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Handley v. Lom-bardi28 is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability:
“Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only an
intermediate and superior employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat
superior or qui facit per alium is not properly applicable to him. His power to direct and
control the driver was not as master, but only by virtue of the fact that they were both
employed by Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse’s agent he was delegated Kruse’s
authority over the driver. x x x
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well-settled both in this state and
elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be
imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only to the master or principal. (Hilton v.
Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297, 269 Pac. 425]; Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1
Pac. (2d) 528]; Ellis v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 52 S. E. 228];
Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108 Pac. 588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829;
and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277, and particularly that part commencing at p.
290.) We can see no logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between
actionable negligence and contributory negligence. x x x”29
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.30 and again in Sichterman v.
Hollingshead Co.31
In Swanson v. McQuown,32 a case involving a military officer who happened to be riding
in a car driven by a subordinate later involved in an accident, the Colorado Supreme Court
adhered to the general rule that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his
subordinates on a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant
situation.33 The court went on to rule that the only exception is when they cooperate in
the act complained of, or direct or encourage it.34
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s
registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the
vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere
passenger at the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by
providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for
the latter’s negligent acts.35 The driver’s duty is not one that may be delegated to
others.36
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is the
Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be
sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence,
immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
v. Firme,37 where this Court held:
“It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally
not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the
right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing
this, the claimant cannot recover.”38
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct
employer. The CA observation along this line are worth restating:
“Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with
the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of
injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual
owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle
as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation x x x.”39
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents. However, justice
demands that only those liable under our laws be held accountable for Marvin’s demise.
Justice can not sway in favor of petitioners simply to assuage their pain and loss. The law
on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver’s employer, and the registered
owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent
operation of the vehicle. Jayme vs. Apostol, 572 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 163609 November 27,
2008
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.
Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.
Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.
PARAS, J.:
In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the
decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch
VIII, at San Jose City and its modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim
for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of
the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the
Court of Appeals was certified to this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was
docketed with the aforecited number. And in the resolution of April 3, this case was
consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by
respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No.
IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular
driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and
Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of
the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the
San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who,
at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for
employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and
oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National
Irrigation Administration authorities.
The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by
petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection
with the death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed
respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and
actual expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:
. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National
Irrigation Administration to pay to the heirs of the deceased
P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the
parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of
the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs. (Brief for the
petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its
Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed
said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237- R) where it filed its brief for
appellant in support of its position.
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners
filed the instant petition with this Court.
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for
damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein
petitioners.
Petitioners allege:
1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under
paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New Civil Code which provides that
the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. Should moral damages be
granted, the award should be made to each of petitioners-
spouses individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of
mental and depth of intensity of the same, which should not be less
than P50,000.00 for each of them.
2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that
respondent National Irrigation Administration acted with gross
negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the
National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver to
stop in order to give assistance to the, victims. Thus, by reason of the
gross negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled to
exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount
of which (20%) had been sufficiently established in the hearing of May
23, 1979.
4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the
findings of the lower court upon which the disallowance of moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees was based and not
for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation
Administration, contends thus:
1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal
taken by respondent National Irrigation Administration to the Court of
Appeals against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The focal issue
raised in respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the
 question as to whether or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped
the victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. It thus
becomes necessary that before petitioners' claim for moral and
exemplary damages could be resolved, there should first be a finding
of negligence on the part of respondent's employee-driver. In this
regard, the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does
not categorically contain such finding.
2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief" dated December 28, 1981 by petitioners in
the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R. No.61045) of the
respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of
Appeals, is an explicit admission of said petitioners that the herein
petition, is not proper. Inconsistent procedures are manifest because
while petitioners question the findings of fact in the Court of Appeals,
they present only the questions of law before this Court which
posture confirms their admission of the facts.
3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not
negligence caused the vehicular accident involves a question of fact
which petitioners should have brought to the Court of Appeals within
the reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court has
become final as to the petitioners and for this reason alone, the
petition should be dismissed.
4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion
and in conformity with the law.
5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and
exemplary damages by reason of the shock and subsequent illness
they suffered because of the death of their son. Respondent National
Irrigation Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable
for the damages because it is an agency of the State performing
governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of
the vehicle, not a special agent who was performing a job or act
foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for the tortious act
should. not be borne by respondent government agency but by driver
Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act.
6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent
National Irrigation Administration in exercising due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee, the matter of due diligence
is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent
but a regular driver of the vehicle.
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with the
application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.
Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even the though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious
acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961,
Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the
tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed
liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must
not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be
foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public
official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State
assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's
tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the
provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are
more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is
immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided
by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function
is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of
agents within the scope of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising
proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act
provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created
which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration,
hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized
immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal
 seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in
all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-
Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers
and objectives:
(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it
such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous operation of
the system and reimburse within a certain period not less than
twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the above objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a
mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-
governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident
resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable
for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on
the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of
supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a
crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a
government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the
posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the
damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.
It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the
impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of
impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place
almost at the edge of the cemented portion of the road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26,
Rollo]
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a
person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail
to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong as shown by the fact that
the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the radiator guard, the hood, the fender
and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis
supplied) [page 29, Rollo]
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road
within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim
was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that
driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up
suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA
group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their
not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial
reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they
were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group,
Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed
limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their
desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle
suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in
the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the
employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage,
the employer would still be liable. (Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970,
34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation
of others who may be using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for
reasons and objects in the line to be traversed constitutes negligence.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-
spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for
hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral
damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total
award.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio- Herrera (Chairperson,), J., is on leave.