Thoughts On Europe

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Hans-Åke Persson (ed.) Häften för Europastudier nr 5
Cecilia Hansson (ed.)
Thoughts on Europe
Young Scholars on Contemporary European Issues.
Six Essays
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Contents
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11/14,5 Introduction 5 76mm
1 Caught in Europe 9
Renée Jessen, Jana Pohl
2 The State of the Future 22

The Challenges of Globalization and Regionalization
Katrine Wilms Anderson, Jemie Sae Koo,
Benjamin Fisher, Stephan Petzold
3 A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality 43

Security implications of the enlargement process and idea with
a special emphasis on the case of FYROM
Arta Alibasik, Rasmus Nilsson
4 The EU-enlargement: barriers, expectations and

possibilities 64
Based on the examples of Romania and Poland
Oana Balescu, Agnieszka Winiarczyk, Marek Koska, Lukasz Glebski
5 Argentine Emigration to Spain 87

Push and Pull Factors
Eva Bokinge, Noelia Garasievich, Liliana Lopes,
Marta Romanska
6 Integrating the Öresund

– what kind of region? 109
Valgerdur Bjarnadóttir, Damian Gadzinowski
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Introduction
Introduction
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Sometimes the personal costs of no vacation during summer can be 76mm

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worth paying. Even if the energy reserves are down to zero, stimu-
lating intellectual challenges can bring back the power. This is what
happened to us during the five week long summer course in Euro-
pean Studies at the Öresund Summer University 2002. Over this
period we had the great opportunity to meet, discuss with, and give
lectures to a group of highly motivated young scholars from all over
the world.
The main purpose with the summer course in European Studies
was to combine a critical humanistic approach with perspectives
from social sciences, in order to develop a deeper understanding on
the relations between integration and fragmentation in contempo-
rary Europe on one hand, and European history on the other.
Another purpose was to stimulate the students ability to develop,
within the short period of five weeks, an interesting problem, and
further to discuss this problem in a meaningful and coherent way
in essays that intertwined a personal with an academic approach.
Most of the lectures and discussions took place at the localities of
K3, Malmö University, an exciting environment close to the har-
bour and the old shipyard of Kockums. And indeed the students
worked real hard, even if it was one of the warmest and sunniest
summers in years. At the final seminar we ventilated each and every
essay with scrutiny, while beautiful Sailing Ships majestically
passed by outside the windows of the seminar room.
One vital experience from the summer course was the impor-
tance of students from different parts of the world coming together
and creating a dialogue on urgent subjects, academic as well as exis-
tential. Another was the difference when it came to the amount of
C critical discussions, questions allowed and the focus on the writing
M process in our approach to European Studies, which contrasted
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Introduction
largely to the educational experiences some of our students had

from their home countries. This is especially important considering
the enlargement of the European Union (EU). Here the competence
in education and research that already exists at the universities in
the Öresund region, can be both useful and important in the com-
ing decades, as a bridge between the existing member states and the
newcomers. In order to promote this development, steps are being
taken at this very moment to establish a common platform for an
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interdisciplinary European programme with a humanistic orienta- 71mm
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tion, where cultural understanding and critical reflection are in 76mm
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focus. The International Programme for European Studies combines
political theory with history and culture in an attempt to create an
understanding for this continent in its change and multiplicity. The
Öresund Summer University turned out to be a successful and inter-
esting test of this concept.
Already during the summer course we talked about publishing
the students efforts in a more lasting form. And here are the results.
Six Working Papers on different important issues that concerns the
European developments, written during a short, and very intense
period that included not just writing but also a lot of lectures, and
of course a whole lot of social activities.
The first essay, written by Renée Jessen from Denmark and Jana
Pohl from Germany, discusses the burning question of the Russian
enclave Kaliningrad and its status, caught, as it will be, inside the
enlarged European Union. They use a speech analysis to discuss the
question of Otherness, connected to the attitudes concerning
Kaliningrad, Russia and the enlargement, put forward by some of
the main political leaders in the EU. In this essay the changing bor-
ders in Europe comes to the forefront, thus revealing the tendency
to treat Eastern Europe as backward, and as a tool to define Western
European identity.
The second contribution is written by Katrine Wilms Andersen
(Denmark), Jemie Sae Koo (USA), Benjamin Fisher (Denmark) and
Stephan Petzold (Germany). They discuss important theoretical
aspects on the future of the National State in an era of globalisation
and regionalization. The essay raises the question whether the
National State is becoming powerless and less important, or if con-
C temporary developments just mean new organisational practices
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Introduction
when it comes to the state. In the end they present three different
future scenarios for the National State.
The third essay tackles the European Union and the development
on the Balkans, with focus on Macedonia (FYROM). Here Arta Ali-
basik (FYROM) and Rasmus Nilsson (Denmark) discusses if the con-
cept of a united Europe only is a rhetorical figure, which neglects
existing conflicts and security problems on the very brink of
Europe. They argue in a provocative and thoughtful way for more
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awareness in the EU when it comes to solving the complexity of the 71mm
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Balkan conflicts. 76mm
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Leaving the young national state Macedonia and approaching
states more closer to enlargement, here Poland and Romania, the
fourth contribution, written by Oana Balescu (Romania), Agnieszka
Winiarczyk, Marek Koska and Lukasz Glebski (Poland), highlights
barriers, expectations and possibilities when it comes to the
enlargement process of the EU. In this essay a detailed inventory of
the pros and cons regarding Poland and Romanias adjustments to
the EU demands for membership in the union is presented.
The fifth essay uses a totally different angle on European integra-
tion. Eva Bokinge (Sweden), Noelia Garasievich (Argentina), Liliana
Lopes Sanjurjo (Brazil) and Marta Romanska (Poland) takes as their
starting point the Global Europe and international migration pro-
cesses. The essay concentrates on recent migration from Argentine
to Spain. The authors uses push and pull factors as analytical tools,
and applies them on economy, politics, culture and social relations.
The last essay provides a thorough background and introduction
to recent developments concerning the organisation and institu-
tionalisation of the Öresund trans-border region. The authors, Val-
gerdur Bjarnadóttir (Iceland) and Damian Gadzinowski (Poland)
describes the main actors within the region and gives an historical
account of its interrelating as well as its conflicting past.
These essays were written in late July to early August 2002, which
means that some tentative questions and arguments raised in the
contributions are no longer subjects to speculation, but real issues
for future scholars to develop further. For example, the second Irish
national referendum on the Nice Treaty was held in October 2002
and resulted in Irelands ratification of the treaty. Furthermore,
C Poland has recently been given the green light to start the second
M round of negotiations for a full EU membership.
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Introduction
Taken together, these essays navigate in time and space. They

describe an intriguing European journey, from individualities and
differences to generalisations and similarities, from past exper-
iences to present conflicts and opportunities.
Håkan Arvidsson, Inge Eriksson and Hans-Åke Persson
Lecturers at European Studies, Öresund Summer University, 2002.
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Caught in Europe
1 Caught in Europe
Renée Jessen, Jana Pohl
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”Yes, the Russians destiny is incontestably all-European and univer-
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sal. To become a genuine and all-round Russian means perhaps to
become a brother of all men, a universal man, if you please”
(Dostoyevsky [1876–1881] 1954: 979).
What is wrong with this statement? Well obviously, it should have

said that the Western-Europeans destiny is incontestably all Euro-
pean and universal. At least from a Western European perspective.
But besides from being one of the most prominent Russian realist
writers of novels, Fedor M. Dostoyevsky was also a writer of political
pamphlets, that argued for the a-historical universalism of Russian
civilization, and thereby made a distinction between ”Us” and the
”Other”. There are, in a sense, two Others at work in this quotation.
There is the Other as an ideal of the Slavic way for Russia, an other-
ness that is ”a projection into a better future” (STRÅTH 2000: 17). But
there is also the Other as the non-Russian, most importantly the
rest of Europe. The notion of Otherness in this respect is a way of
enacting or constructing a difference, and more importantly a norm-
ative difference. There are more ways of staging or enacting the
notion of Otherness than these. The main point is that Otherness is
a necessary demarcation and a prerequisite for enacting the collec-
tive ”Us”, which is most obvious in political discourse. We will
show several ways of enacting otherness in our speech analysis in
the second half of the essay by exemplifying it with the help of the
future EU-enclave Kaliningrad.
In 1932, the German political thinker Carl Schmitt (1888–1985)
argued for the need of a public enemy to the political unit: ”He does
not have to be morally evil, he does not have to be aesthetically
C ugly, he does not have to appear as an economic competitor, and it
M can […] even be advantageous to have business dealings with him.
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Caught in Europe
He is nevertheless the Other” (SCHMITT [1932] 1963: 14). The idea of

a European identity very much derives its meaning from a demarca-
tion from an Other, the notion of Eastern Europe being a good
example.
At the same time as Dostoyevsky praised Russian civilization, a
quite different perception of Russians was being depicted in the
West. In her novel on immigrants in the United States, My Antonia,
the author Willa Cather draws a very Western picture of Russia and
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the Russians. Russia seems to the narrator ”more remote than any 71mm
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other country […]” and ”of all the strange, uprooted people […] 76mm
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those [the Russians] were the strangest and the most aloof” (CATHER
[1918] 1994: 19). Before their emigration from wild Russia the
uncivilized, inhuman, and vicious Russians in the novel had fed a
newly married couple to the wolves. This depiction of the Russian
immigrants contributes to the very anachronistic Western image of
the East as a place of barbarians with no or a very awkward religion.
Cathers novel, which was published for the first time in 1918, still
enjoys popularity, and to some extend the same is true for the
novel’s conception of Russia.
These are just two examples of the production of an ”Us”-and-
”Other”-topos as reflected in literature. It not only promotes stere-
otypes and racism but at the same time impedes and even excludes
the recognition of the Other in its own right, as just different
instead of normatively different. In other words, could it be possi-
ble to recognize the Other as just difference, without any normative
content?
It is this kind of difference Keyman insists on, when he criticizes
the way international relations theory is derived from a Western
rationalist and universalist posture. He argues that the ”ethical
space” for the Other to represent itself is reduced, because the Us
”[…] operates as a practice of inclusion/exclusion, in which the
privileged role of the Western sovereign-self is maintained as a
rational, Cartesian, modern cogito, and what is perceived as its
Other is excluded, marginalized, and denied to be recognized as dif-
ferent” (KEYMAN 1997: 11). The Other is in this sense enacted as a
normative difference.
Normative in the sense that the identity of ”Us” builds on a
C notion of superiority, strengthened by the implicit or explicit con-
M descension of the Other as seen in Cather. The Other is in this man-
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Caught in Europe
ner a part of a hegemonic ”Us”. It has much the same function as

the differentiation made between the Occident and the Orient, as
Edward Said points out in his book Orientalism, a differentiation
that ”[…] manifests itself in the systematic objectification and dis-
cursive construction of the Orient as a subject integral to Western
hegemony. It thus served to constitute the definitional character of
the West, being its contrasting image” (cf. KEYMAN 1997: 6).
Otherness as a normative difference is then a prerequisite for
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identity. For William Connolly, difference becomes an ontological 71mm
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necessity when he says that ”Identity requires difference in order to 76mm
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be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its
own self-certainty” (CONNOLLY 1991: 64; our italics). This conver-
sion is what makes Otherness a normative difference. Following
Johansson et.al.s distinction between identity and identification,
”identification […] becomes a prerequisite for the political mobili-
zation of a group” (TÄGIL (ed.) 2001: 14). In this manner the enact-
ing of the Other as a normative difference is a (political and ideo-
logical) means of mobilizing unity, through presenting a strong
”Us”, differentiated from a weaker ”Other”, for individuals and
groups to identify with. In Europe, the consequence is that the per-
ception of Eastern Europe sticks to a notion of backwardness. The
distinction between Eastern and Western Europe can thus be seen
as a Western construction of its own collective identity through a
normative differentiation from Eastern Europe.
The divide between Western and Eastern Europe dates back to the
Enlightenment (cf. WOLFF 1994). When Kant (1724–1804) wrote his
criticisms in Königsberg, he sat in Western Europe, demarcated
from its eastern neighbors through the ideological thrust of
Enlightenment ideas.
Kantian Königsberg was part of Western Europe or more precisely,
it was part of Western civilization, as opposed to, mainly Asian, bar-
barianism and, which is the central point here, the backwardness of
Eastern Europe, which began at the Prussian-Polish border. Various
definitions and ideas of what this place between Occident and Ori-
ent was, existed in the time of Enlightenment, as Larry Wolff argues
in his book Inventing Eastern Europe. But they had in common the
C
notion of Eastern Europe being a primitive and underdeveloped
area, where the contrasts to Western Europe only strengthened the
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Caught in Europe
feeling of Western civilization’s superiority. When Count de Ségur,

appointed as envoy extraordinaire of Louis XVI to the court of Cath-
erine II, crossed the Polish border in 1784 on his way to St. Peters-
burg, he felt that he had ”left Europe entirely” and had been
”moved back ten centuries” (as quoted in WOLFF 1994: 19). Eastern
Europe was either a place that needed the guiding hand of (West-
ern) civilization, or a place that should just be ignored, as was Kants
point of view (cf. WOLFF 1994: 340). The main point is that the con-
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descension of Eastern Europe becomes an integrated part of West- 71mm
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ern European hegemonic identity, as Said argued. Western Euro- 76mm
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pean self-understanding is perceived as a rationally acting entity in
a rationally progressing culture. This is of course also a very norma-
tive self-perception, made evidently clear in Kants article ”Was ist
Aufklärung?” from 1784: ”If it is now asked, Do we presently live in
an enlightened age? the answer is, No, but we do live in an age of
enlightenment. […] we do have clear indications that the way is now
being opened for men to proceed freely in this direction and that
the obstacles to general enlightenment […] are gradually diminish-
ing” (KANT [1784] 1983: 45). Although the Enlightenment for Kant
was a universal project for liberating mankind from its ”self-
imposed immaturity”, the cosmopolitan vision was a vision of a
universalized Western Man and Western Rationality. Also the Ger-
man philosopher, historian and diplomat G.W. Leibniz (1646–
1716, through his recognition of Russias place in Europe, did this
only to subsume Russia under the European ”Us” through the uni-
versalizing thrust of Enlightenment (cf. NEUMANN 1999: 70ff.). An
”Us” that precisely consisted of ”Western sovereign-selves” that
were ”rational, Cartesian, modern cogitos” as argued by Keyman
(KEYMAN 1997: 11).
Europe as a ”normative centre” (STRÅTH 2000) in this way is what,
according to Wolff, made ”the Iron Curtain” such a strong meta-
phor, because it was built on an Enlightenment notion of Eastern
Europe. Wolff argues that the Eastern Europe was constructed in the
”free-spirited sport” of philosophical geography during the Enlight-
enment period. A sport that has put its mark on the way Eastern
Europe is conceived today, as the ”Other” of Europe, ”Europe but
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not Europe” (WOLFF 1994: 7). This viewpoint is being dramatically
challenged by the EU-enlargement. Eastern Europe moves further
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Caught in Europe
east and ”Europe” in reality and conceptually has to reconstruct its

collective identity. The notion of ”unity in diversity” is one way of
coping with the multifaceted concept of ”Europe”. But, as Stråth
points out, ”[…] even as diversity becomes a watchword, the pro-
cess towards a single market without internal frontiers and border
controls means the fortification of the perimeter wall against the
Others” (STRÅTH 2000: 21). This also means that in EUropean poli-
tical discourse the enacting of a normative difference becomes
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more problematic, but also more necessary. Europe as a concept is 71mm
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becoming (and in many ways has always been) what Rapkin calls 76mm
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an essentially contested concept: ”When the concept involved is
appraisive in that the state of affairs it describes is a value achieve-
ment, when the practice described is internally complex in that its
characterization involves reference to several dimensions, and
when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively
open, then the concept in question is an essentially contested con-
cept” (RAPKIN 1990: 3). Moreover, the EU is becoming a political
actor, and as such needs to be able to mobilize some sort of political
unity. One recent example of how this happens through the notion
of Otherness, can be seen in the case of Kaliningrad.
Denys Hays old concept of ”Europe as a collective idea” separates
the included ”US = Europeans” from all the ”Non-Europeans”.
According to the before-mentioned Enlightenment propositions
the concept of Europe connotes progress and civilization whereas
Eastern Europe evokes images of backwardness. The former East
Prussian area, which is now referred to as the Kaliningrad oblast,
was annexed by Russia after the Second World War. The East Prus-
sian capital Königsberg was renamed Kaliningrad according to the
Russian tradition of naming cities after Russian politicians. The
once flourishing Prussian granary was badly run in Soviet times and
even more so after the system’s collapse. This way the area itself
contributes to the stereotype of Russia’s backwardness as hinted for
instance in Cather’s novel. These connotations still play a major
role in today’s EU-Russia relations, one recent example being the
Editorial in the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten, July the 7th 2002,
where Kaliningrad is described as one long detour to social disaster
since the Russian take-over.
C With the EU-Enlargement in 2004 the Kaliningrad oblast faces
M the status of an enclave in the EU enclosed by the future members
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Lithuania and Poland. Several EU-programs regarding Kaliningrad,

such as the INTERREG ”Baltic Sea” program launched in September
2001, contain aspects of security, economy, environment, and mil-
itary, function as the basis for future geopolitical co-operation. But
by drawing the East/West borderline, a sense of a community, ”we-
ness”, or belonging together is consciously avoided.
Presupposing that there is no neutral language we will track this
ideological distinction in political speeches made by EU-politicians
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(see speeches below in chronological order) and by pointing out 71mm
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certain features to show how instrumentalization of language pro- 76mm
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motes EU-aims in relation with Russia.
Six speeches form our set of primary sources, where speech I and
II, dating back to last year, serve as a background. The focus with
regard to the Kaliningrad question is on the latter speeches, which
all date to May 2002 when the contentious matter of transit
between the future European enclave Kaliningrad and Russia
started to predominate the EU-Russia-relations. Russia insists on the
implementation of corridors for travelling Russian citizens. The EU
on the other hand argues against old-fashioned corridors, backed
up by the Schengen-agreement, and for travelers requiring interna-
tional passports and visas. However, the latter speeches do not dif-
fer in themselves as far as the general message is concerned.
• Speech I: Gerhard Schröder, chancellor of Germany: ”Deutsche
Russlandpolitik europäische Ostpolitik. Gegen Stereotype, für
Partnerschaft und Offenheit eine Positionsbestimmung”, setting
unknown, published in Die Zeit 15.2001.
• Speech II: Javier Solana, representative of the EU of foreign
policy and security issues: ”Enlargement of the European Union
Opportunity or Threat?” at the Utrecht town hall on 19.06.2002,
published in Die Zeit 25.2001.
• Speech III: Rt Chris Patten, CH at the European Parliament: EU-
Russia Summit and Hoff Report on Kaliningrad, Plenary Session
in Strasbourg 14.05.2002 and speech IV in the European Business
Club (EBC) at the conference Shaping Russian-European Integra-
tion in the 21st century in Moscow 28.05.2002 (Ninth EU-Russia
Summit taking place in Moscow, 29.05.2002), published on EU-
C
Website <www.europa.eu.int>.
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• Speech V: Romano Prodi, President of the European Commis-

sion: What the 21st Century holds for the EU-Russia relationship
at the European Business Club (EBC) dinner in Moscow
28.05.2002 (Ninth EU-Russia Summit taking place in Moscow,
29.05.2002), published on EU-Website <www.europa.eu.int>.
• Speech VI: Michael Barnier, European Commissioner responsi-
ble for Regional Policy and Institutional Reform, held in St.
Petersburg, 10.06.2002 at the Fourth Summit of the Baltic Sea
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States in St. Petersburg The Northern Dimension in an Enlarged 71mm
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Union, published on EU-Website <www.europa.eu.int>. 76mm
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With regard to the setting it can be assumed that the actual audi-
ence of all the speeches, e.g. the audience in the hall, consisted
mostly of supporters, but there is also the public audience, e.g.
newspaper readers, and/or internet users.
Two things have to be kept in mind: first, all speeches deal with
the EU-Russia relations in general. The Kaliningrad question is only
one aspect among others. Second, speeches are nowadays written
by speechwriters, not necessarily by the speaker. Therefore it can be
assumed that the speeches reflect the general institutions’ opinion
and not necessarily the specific speaker’s intention.
Schröders descriptive speech is a good example of ambivalence: on
the one hand, in Leibniz tradition, he beyond doubt considers Rus-
sia as a part of Europe: ”In seinem Selbstverständnis, seinen histo-
rischen Bindungen und seinen außerordentlichen wissenschaftli-
chen und künstlerischen Leistungen gehört Russland jedoch
zweifellos zu Europa”. [”With its self-image, its historical ties and its
exceptional scientific and artistic achievements, Russia without a
doubt does belong to Europe.” Transl., CH.] He stresses co-opera-
tion and at the same time talks about ”europäisches Partnerschafts-
angebot an Russland” [”a European offer of partnership with Rus-
sia”] for Russias future European development, which on the other
hand picks up the distinction. To put it in a nutshell: He regards
Russia as a part of Europe but, in reality, Russia is not yet European.
The underlying message is that only the prevalence of Western
European prescriptive, normative values such as democracy, free
C
economic market, rule of law, human rights etc. makes Russia Euro-
pean. Most of the cited values refer directly to article 6 of the Treaty
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Caught in Europe
of European Union: ”The Union is founded on the principles of lib-

erty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the
member states.” It is noteworthy that Schröder uses the term
”Europe” and not ”EU” which can be explained by the lack of dif-
ferentiation throughout the speech. But apart from the German
chancellor none of the examined EU-officials this openly calls Rus-
sia a part of Europe. The Kaliningrad question plays a minor role in
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Schröders speech. It is part of the speechs longest paragraph, which 71mm
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deals with Germany and Russian co-operation. As in all the exa- 76mm
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mined speeches, Russias responsibility is put in the foreground. ”Es
wird im Wesentlichen aber von Russland selbst abhängen, ob sich
für das Kaliningrader Gebiet ein Fenster zur Zusammenarbeit mit
der Europäischen Union öffnet.” [”But it will mainly depend on
Russia itself, if Kaliningrad shall offer a window open for a co-ope-
ration with the European Union.” Transl., CH] With the use of
”Fenster” (= window) Schröder alludes to an old metaphor for the
opening of Russia to Europe referring back to Peter the Greats
Europe-oriented policy. This way Kaliningrad becomes a metonymy
for the whole of Russia that has to open up to Europe by imple-
menting Western values. But the stress of Russia’s responsibility is
interesting in another respect: Kaliningrad’s past and the correlated
present sovereignty. The German government today keeps denying
all interest in Kaliningrad by declaring, as Schröder does, Russia
responsible for the area. However, rumors of Re-Germanization per-
sist. Despite the ethnic cleansing after WW II the oblast officially
lists some 5,000 ethnic German residents, other estimates run as
high as 20,000. But the answer to the question of responsibility for
Kaliningrad is the same on the EU-side: ”Kaliningrad is essentially a
Russian responsibility” (Patten, speech III).
Solanas speech is divided into three parts: Why enlargement?, The
opportunities of enlargement, and the challenges of enlargement,
among which the latter is longest. By not mentioning Russia and
Kaliningrad as opportunities but placing this topic in the midst of
other challenges Solana directly opposes Pattens, Prodis and Barni-
ers terminology. According to Solana one of the challenges, a word
C
which is repeated eight times in the speech, the EU-enlargement
will bring about relationships to the new neighbors among which
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Caught in Europe
the relationship to Russia, ”[…] our most significant neighbor […]”,

and the Ukraine are the only ones to be further elaborated on in
terms of security and stability issues. The importance of security
issues with regards to Russia and later on to Kaliningrad, which are
also stressed in Pattens, Prodis and Barniers speeches, ring a bell for
the informed reader; the area of Königsberg was the cradle of Prus-
sian militarism, later the beachhead of Soviet military power, in
spite of Russias denial it is probably still an area with nuclear weap-
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ons nowadays. So the phrase Russia being ”our most significant 71mm
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neighbor” acquires a completely new meaning. 76mm
11/14,5
The importance of security issues in relation to Russia is stressed
by the altering use of the pronoun we in Pattens speech. In all other
cases we replaces the EU-member states. When the focus shifts to
security, Patten underlines the need for cooperation by including
Russia into the we: ”We [Russia, EU; J.P.] need new means if we [Rus-
sia, EU; J.P.] want to find peaceful solutions to conflict. […] we [Rus-
sia, EU; J.P.] must also find ways to stop the men of violence […]”
(Patten, speech IV; italics J.P.).
As soon as he talks about Kaliningrad, Solana drops the euphe-
mistic disguise by substituting the word ”challenge” with ”prob-
lem”: ”[…] enlargement for them [Russia, Ukraine; J.P.] raises real
issues, real problems, which have to be addressed. Take two exam-
ples: the future of Kaliningrad for Russia and the impact of the
Schengen border controls on Ukraine. We [EU; J.P.] have now begun
to take these issues seriously. […] we [EU; J.P.] work with them [Rus-
sia, Ukraine; J.P.] to solve the specific problems which enlargement
will bring”. The denomination of Kaliningrad as a problem, which
is striking to the listener and reader after only perceiving chal-
lenges, fits well to Kaliningrads ”image of a trouble-spot” (JOENNIEMI
1999: 1). In theoretical political discourse analysis these shifts are
referred to as ”soundbites”, ”carefully engineered excerpts, which
the speakers hope in advance will receive attention” (BEARD 2000,
internet resource). It can therefore be concluded that the termino-
logical shift was intended to underpin the problems seriousness
already in 2001.
Pattens, Prodis and Barniers speeches set off by stating the signifi-
C
cance of these days for Russia meaning the high-level EU-Russia
meetings during April and May this year and the USA-Russia agree-
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Caught in Europe
ment on strategic arms reduction. The East/ West distinction clearly

serves as a background since all refer to those relations as Russia’s
relations with the West. Prodi points out that ”We [EU] have no
wish to see an exclusion syndrome developing on our eastern Bor-
ders. Enlargement must not draw new dividing lines across our con-
tinent” (Prodi, speech V).
However, the borderline is subconsciously drawn with all
speeches using phrases such as ”EU is willing to…, EU offers…, EU
9/12 68mm
is ready to…, EU invites Russia…” and ”Russia must…, Russia 71mm
10/13
should…” evidence the gap between ”Us” and the ”Other” and 76mm
11/14,5
express power relations. In the dichotomy of ratio vs. emotio, the
former is combined with an argumentative style of speech to exer-
cise this power factor which becomes obvious when several EU-pro-
grams with financial EU-support are mentioned in the same breath
as the Kaliningrad transit problem. To put it bluntly: The EU is will-
ing to pay for required action (establishment of consulates, cheap
visas etc.) in order to avoid the violation of the Schengen acquis. In
this sense, Solanas, Pattens, Prodis, and Barniers speeches are all
tarred with the same brush.
Barnier for instance (speech VI) mentions the INTERREG ”Baltic
Sea” program with more than 40 million Euro for the Kaliningrad
oblast, of which 11 million Euro have been especially assigned to
border-crossings. Barnier finishes his speech by reaffirming that the
EU is ”ready to commit still more resources to support these objec-
tives, if Russia is ready to cooperate with us” (Barnier, speech VI).
Patten stresses the EU’s willingness to finance: ”We have made clear
our willingness to increase financial and technical help to deal with
challenges faced by Kaliningrad” (Patten, speech III).
The political discourse rhetoric figure importance of the three
with the verb hope in the following example promotes the effec-
tiveness of what is asked in return: ”Visa-free transit corridors are
not acceptable to the candidate countries. I hope Russia will accept
this […]. We shall be looking for progress […] and improved co-
operation on border agreement. We also hope Russia will make eas-
ier the establishment of consulates in Kaliningrad […] We hope that
the special meeting of the Cooperation Committee today in Kalin-
ingrad can make further progress […]” (Patten, speech III; italics
C J.P.). The hereby conveyed message makes compromises and this
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Caught in Europe
way the solution to the transit problem becomes difficult for both
sides.
In all speeches the Enlargement is depicted in positive terms as a
historical opportunity from which both sides, the future EU and
Russia, will benefit. If Dostoevsky turns out to be right, that ”Rus-
sias destiny is incontestably all-European”, it is still an open ques-
tion to what extent ”Russia is willing to go in this direction, how
European does Russia really want to be?” (Patten, speech IV).
9/12 68mm
Although Königsberg was part of Western Europe in Kant’s times, 71mm
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none of the speakers utilizes Kaliningrads Western European herit- 76mm
11/14,5
age in order to cross the border between East and West.
”Natural divisions, the innate spontaneous tendency of the Peoples
will replace the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by bad governments.
The map of Europe will be remade. The Countries of the Peoples
will rise, defined by the voice of the free, upon the ruins of the
Countries of the kings and privileged castles. Between these Coun-
tries there will be harmony and brotherhood” (Guiseppe Mazzini
1912, as quoted in NEUMANN 1999: 29).
If Mazzinis statement is used as a prediction for the course of
European history, he was right about one thing. The map of Europe
is being remade. But he was well off the mark when he thought that
arbitrary divisions would be replaced. The Russian exclave, or EU
enclave if you like, Kaliningrad stems from arbitrary divisions,
enforced by ideology and Western hegemony’s need for an Other.
Through defining Kaliningrad as a Russian problem, and at the
same time defining possible solutions, the EU on behalf of ”Europe”
reduces the ”ethical space” that Russia can operate in. This does not
create ”harmony and brotherhood”. Perhaps Mazzini was not
thinking about Europe anno 2002, but rather some even more dis-
tant future. And some day harmony and brotherhood will prevail.
Who knows? But until then, maybe the Us could start out by trying
to recognize the Other as, not normatively different, but as just dif-
ferent.
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Caught in Europe
Bibliography
Primary sources
Barnier, Michael. Fourth Summit of the Baltic Sea States in St. Peters-
burg The Northern Dimension in an Enlarged Union, St. Peters-
burg 10.06.2002, published on EU-Website
<www.europa.eu.int>.
Jyllandsposten, Editorial, July the 7th,
9/12 68mm
10/13 Patten, Chris. EU-Russia Summit and Hoff Report on Kaliningrad, 71mm
11/14,5
Strasbourg 14.05.2002, published on EU-Website 76mm
Patten, Chris. Shaping Russian-European Integration in the 21st
century, Moscow 28.05.2002, published on EU-Website
Prodi, Romano. What the 21st Century holds for the EU-Russia
relationship, Moscow 28.05.2002, published on EU-Website
Schröder, Gerhard. ”Deutsche Russlandpolitik europäische Ostpoli-
tik. Gegen Stereotype, für Partnerschaft und Offenheit eine Posi-
tionsbestimmung.” Die Zeit 15.2001.
Solana, Javier. ”Enlargement of the European Union Opportunity
or Threat?” Die Zeit 25.2001.
Secondary sources
Beard, Adrian. The language of politics. London: Routledge, 2000.
Cather, Willa. My Antonia. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1994.
Connolly, William. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of
Political Paradox. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1991.
Van Dijk, Teun A. Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. London:
Sage Publications, 1998.
Van Dijk, Teun A. ”What is political discourse analysis?” In: Blom-
maert, Jan/ Bulcaen, Chris (eds.). Political linguistics. Amsterdam:
Benjamins, 1998: pp. 11–52.
Dostoyevsky, Fedor M. The Diary of a Writer. New York: George Bra-
ziller, 1954.
Foucault, Michel. The archaeology of knowledge & the discourse on lan-
guage. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971.
C Hay, Denys. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
M UP, 1968.
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Caught in Europe
Joenniemi, Pertti. ”Kaliningrad as a Discursive Battlefield.” Working

Papers 15.1999, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.
”Kaliningrad. Russen fordern Korridor.” Der Spiegel 20.2002.
”Kaliningrad. Das wäre eine Katastrophe. Governeur Wladimir
Jegorow über die Isolation der russischen Ostsee-Exklave und den
Konflikt mit der EU um die Errichtung von Korridoren.” Der
Spiegel 21.2002.
Conference on The Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad: European and
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regional integration 17–18 May 2000, Eigtveds Pakhus, Copenhagen. 71mm
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Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen 2000. 76mm
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Kant, Immanuel. ”What is Enlightenment.” In: Perpetual Peace and
Other Essays. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983.
Keymann, E. Fuat. Globalization, State, Identity/Difference Toward a
critical Social Theory of International Relations. New Jersey: Human-
ities Press, 1997.
Mazzini, G. The Duties of Man and Other Essays. London: Longman,
1912.
Neumann, Iver B. Uses of the Other ”The East” in European Identity
Formation. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Padgen, Anthony. ”Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent.” In:
Padgen, Anthony (ed.). The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the
European Union. Cambridge: CUP, 2002: pp. 33–54.
Rapkin, David P. (ed.). World Leadership and Hegemony, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990.
Royal, Robert. ”Who put the West into Western Civilization?” Inter-
collegiate Review Spring 1998: pp. 3–17.
Schmitt, Carl. Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vor-
wort und drei Collarien. Berlin: Duncker and Humbolt, 1963.
Stråth, Bo (ed.). Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other. Brussels:
P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2000.
Thumann, Michael. ”Schau westwärts, Putin. Russland muss
begreifen: Seine Zukunft heisst Europa.” Die Zeit 02.2001.
Thumann, Michael. ”Im Stau nach Westen. Russland und die EU
sprechen über Kaliningrad: Die marode Exklave könnte blühen,
wenn Moskau es nur wollte.” Die Zeit 21.2001.
Tägil, Sven (ed.). Europa historiens återkomst. Hedemora: Gidlunds
Bökforlag, 1992.
C Wolff, Larry. Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the
M Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: UP, 1994.
Y
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The State of the Future
2 The State of the Future

The Challenges of Globalization and
Regionalization
Katrine Wilms Anderson, Jemie Sae Koo,
9/12 Benjamin Fisher, Stephan Petzold 68mm
10/13 71mm
11/14,5 76mm
Introduction
”I believe that the nation-state is […] only in an evolutionary phase
for some earlier, for others later, that it is inevitably losing ever more
of its importance. In the future the state will rather become an admin-
istrative department in the global order and in no way the object of a
national cult”.1
There is at the moment a vivid discussion in social science on the

future of the national state. This is partly due to globalization and
the creation of international organizations. Some argue that the
complex process of globalization undermines the nation-state,
whereas others believe that the role of the state is not challenged
but rather changed. The question often raised is whether supra-
national forms of political organization will supersede the nation
state or if there is a revival of nationalism, as some authors have
argued e.g. after the Yugoslav crises in the 1990s.
In this paper, we will discuss whether the state is becoming pow-
erless and will lose its importance or if it is just a question of the
state being organized in a manner different from classical state the-
ory. We do not only consider the process of globalization, but also
that of regionalization, as they are closely linked to each other2 and
1 Vaclav Havel in an interview with the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel in

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1999, cited in Goldmann (2001): 3.
M 2 Jönsson et al (2002).
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because we think that it is both from above and below that the state
is challenged.
Alea iacta est – the dice has been thrown

9/12
Globalization 68mm
71mm
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There are various perspectives on globalization in the current on-
11/14,5 going debate regarding this issue. The often held conception of glo- 76mm
balization is David Helds who sees it as ”the stretching and deepen-

ing of social relations and institutions across space and time such
that, on the one hand, day-to-day activities are increasingly influ-
enced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on
the other, the practices and decisions of local groups or communi-
ties can have significant global reverberations.”3 This definition of
globalization is rather abstract, we have therefore chosen to work
with three dimensions within this issue: the internationalization of
problems, the internationalization of decision-making, and the
internationalization of societies. The first dimension is that some
political problems have been internationalized4. This means – as
stated by David Held that more problems on the nation-states polit-
ical agendas are determined by events taking place outside the
states borders and its control.5 Such problems deal with, for exam-
ple, the environment and international crime. These globalized
problems are sought to be solved on international arenas.
Decisions have therefore been internationalized in intensity as
well as in scope. The increase in intensity means that the decisions
made by international organizations are binding for the nation-
states. The increase in scope means that a wider range of problems
and policies are discussed on an international level. The EU is the
most radical example of the processes of internationalization of
3 Held (1995): 20.

4 Some scholars thinks that the internationalization of problems is not a new
phenomenon, but the new thing is that the decision-makers perception of the
problems have changed. For the purpose of this paper this discussion is not
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important and therefore we will leave it here.
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decision-making. The union has in some ways developed from an

inter-governmental cooperation to a supranational political institu-
tion. The reason the EU is considered a supranational political insti-
tution is, for instance, due to: 1) decisions made in the Council of
Ministers can be made with qualified majority voting and 2) the
European Commission is empowered to issue – binding directives
in various areas.
The third dimension, the internationalization of societies means
9/12 68mm
that all kinds of human relations between nation-states, particu- 71mm
10/13
larly the exchange of goods, services, and information, have inten- 76mm
11/14,5
sified.6 Sociologists emphasize that modernism and globalization
have changed the structure of society. Information technology has
made time and space insignificant.7 As a consequence, the elite are
no longer bound to territory or the nation-state and a kind of
world-culture emerges.8 Other scholars also point out that ”Ameri-
canization” or ”McDonaldization” is a contribution to the globali-
zation process.
Globalization and regionalism

Regionalism can be seen as a consequence of the globalization proc-
ess. The following three arguments present why globalization and
regionalization – instead of being counteracting forces – can rein-
force one another.
One argument is economic. Michael Porter argues that in order to
be competitive in the global market, companies need to be situated
in strong clusters. He defines a cluster as being ”a geographic con-
centration of interconnected companies and institutions in a par-
ticular field.”9 The clusters can be environments for innovation.
This is mostly due to two aspects: the first is that in the clusters
there are competitive pressures between two or more rivaling com-
6 There has been some discussion between scholars whether the level of trade/
exchange of goods in the globalized world differ from the state of the world
prior to World War I.
7 Giddens (1995 [1986]).
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8 Bauman (1998).
M 9 Porter (2000).
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panies, which result in production that can be competitive in the

global market. The second reason is that clusters are often innova-
tive, which is due to the complementary relationships between the
companies and their suppliers. The complex interaction makes it
possible to create and share resources such as technology and
know-how. It is important to stress that public institutions, i.e. gov-
ernments (local and national) and universities, play an important
role in developing these clusters. The Øresund region, described as
9/12 68mm
the Medicon Valley, is an example of such a cluster. The develop- 71mm
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ment of the region is an attempt to create an innovative cluster 76mm
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with global competitive companies, which can create economic
growth and help the nation-states prosper.
Another argument for globalization and regionalization being
intertwined stems from the internationalization of societies that
has made the range global. However, not every human being has
the capability to cope with this change. In other words, the human
reach is limited even though the range is global. For this reason,
some people turn to their region. To them the world is complex,
chaotic, and violent, whereas the region seems to be a haven that is
well known and safe. In this way the regions play an increasing role
in the identity making of the ”common” man.10 This is one reason
why globalization and especially the internationalization of socie-
ties are contributing to the ”regionalization process”.
The third argument concerns the democratic perspective. Deci-
sions in a globalized world are often made distant from the people.
When decisions are made far away from the people some politi-
cians and debaters argue that they are without democratic control.
Furthermore they argue that these decisions are sometimes even
made by bureaucrats without democratic mandate. This is due to
the internationalization of decision-making. As a reaction against
this tendency, an increasing number of people become involved in
10 Bauman (1998) argues that globalization has changed the traditional class struc-
ture. Two new classes have emerged and the dividing line is ”mobility”: 1) The
elite are those who are mobile and therefore able to use the possibilities of a glo-
balized world and the 2) The ”unfortunate” who are ascribed to where they were
born. Robert Cox (1996) makes a similar demarcation, but the dividing line is
education instead of mobility. He makes a distinction between the high-skilled
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workers who are mobile and flexible and the low or unskilled workers who are
M bound to their native soil.
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their local communities, for example in school boards. They desire

to have influence and gain control of what is near them and factors
that concern their daily lives.11
The European Union and the regions

68mm
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The History of the European Community 71mm
11/14,5 For many centuries European intellectuals thought about the inte- 76mm
gration of the European states in a federation or confederation in

order to overcome the extreme fragmentation of the continent,
which was then seen as the source of perpetual conflict and war.12
But it was only after the Second World War that the effort of inte-
gration came to realization. There are three main reasons for this
occurrence: first, the two world wars had brought tragedy and mis-
ery to Europe so that European statesmen saw the need to supersede
the old European state system in order to eliminate the source and
scourge of war from the continent. Second, the looming Cold War
and the fear of Soviet communist dominion over the whole conti-
nent supported the integration of the liberal Western part of
Europe. The United States backed these moves and assisted Western
Europe in rebuilding their economies through Marshall Aid. Third,
having severely suffered from German hubris three times in seventy
years, France and other allied powers sought to integrate (Western)
Germany and its industrial power into a European framework.
It is essential to understand the distinction between why the EC/
EU was created in the 1950s and what it is presently. The EU was
not founded because of the internationalization of problems that
many have come to believe, but for the purpose of peace and stabil-
ity in Europe. The European Union is now a part of globalization
since it is an organization that tries to cope with the international-
ization of problems through internationalization of decision-mak-
ing.
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11 Beck (1993).
M 12 Johannsen et al (2001).
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The Regional Policies of the EU

As early as the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, the European Com-
munity has laid emphasis on the regions. From the beginning of
the European Community, it has been a mission for the union to
improve underdeveloped regions up to standard with their sur-
rounding regions.13 The emphasis on the quality of life was there-
fore an essential issue for the EC. However, with the realization of
9/12 the need to compete in the global market, the European Union has 68mm
71mm
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expanded their regional program and contributed funding to more
11/14,5 developed regions in order to help them adapt to the demands of 76mm
todays economy.
For a while the European Union regarded regions primarily as
functional regions. This has changed during the 1990s where the
EU began to place more emphasis on the cultural and historical
regions. An example of this can be found in issues concerning lan-
guage policy, through which a large portion of money has been
given to maintain and develop the use of regional or minority lan-
guages.14 At the same time, the union places a huge emphasis on
the realization of the Single Market, which enables the free move-
ment of goods, people, capital and services. This develops a para-
dox: at the same time as borders are being erased by the Single Mar-
ket, new ones are created due to the emphasis of cultural regions.
One of the reasons for this emphasis on the cultural regions could
be that the union regards strong regional identities as a mean to
weaken the nation state. The creation of a European identity is
probably seen as a utopian idea. It may be easier to make ”a union
united in diversity” if the people have regional instead of national
identities, because the regions will not be as capable of solving
problems as the nation-state is, due to their lack of resources
(knowledge, administrative capacity). It will, thus, increase the
need for cooperation in the union.
13 See Keating (1998): 46ff and Bullmann (1997): 9.

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14 This argument was developed in a lecture by Jonas Frykman for Øresund Sum-
M mer Universitys interdisciplinary day, 02.08.2002.
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Democratic deficit
Many people living in the European Union do not identify with the
union. This skepticism and hesitancy has increased over the last
decade.15 This rather low identification of the Europeans with the
idea of European integration can be ascribed to three factors. First,
European and national politicians as well as media and academics
have not succeeded, if they have ever tried to, in promoting the
9/12 68mm
beneficial effects of the integration to the people. This problem has 71mm
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increased since the integration has expanded to the political, social 76mm
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and cultural areas. Therefore, people increasingly experience that
the integration influences their everyday lives; this causes insecu-
rity on peoples identity.
The second factor has to do with the fact that the people of
Europe have been marginalized in the national decision-making
process in respect of giving away sovereignty. It was only in a few
countries where referenda were held on very crucial decisions such
as the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the introduction of the single
currency in 1999. However, this problem is inherited in the very
structure of the European integration process, which gives much
power to the intergovernmental decision-making bodies and thus
to national leaders. We are here presented with a dilemma: On one
hand, most people agree that the internationalization of problems
requires that more power is given to supranational institutions;
whereas public complaint, on the other hand, has often stressed
that too much power has been given away already.
The third factor is usually referred to as the ”democratic deficit”,
which may be defined as ”the gap between the powers held by
European institutions and the ability of European citizens to influ-
ence the work and decisions of those institutions”16. This deficit
can be exemplified in the Parliaments lack of power, the Commis-
sions lack of public accountability, and the power residing in inter-
governmental decision-making bodies. A former member of the
European Commission has even said that if the EU applied for
membership in the EU, it would have to be rejected.17 Given this, it
15 John McCormick (1999): 150.

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16 McCormick (1999): 152.
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is no surprise that there is a ”psychological barrier”18 between the

European Union and its citizens. In order to overcome the demo-
cratic deficit, politicians and people alike have been focusing on
reforming EU institutions for a long time. This debate is connected
with the future outlook of the EU and the ”finalité européenne”, or
the final purpose of the integration process. This discussion has
been highlighted in the wake of the unions Eastern enlargement.
There can be no doubt that the institutions that were made for a
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union of six states cannot work efficiently in a Union of 25 or 30 71mm
10/13
states. In this context, European and national politicians have lay 76mm
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out and elaborated different ideas on how to reform the European
Union.19
However, most proposals are limited in the sense that they only
focus on the European institutions without acknowledging that
there also exists a political crisis in the nation state.20 One may say
that the nation-state is also suffering from a democratic deficit.
David Held argues that the state is going through a double crisis,
one of rationality and one of legitimacy.21 The former refers to a
state no longer capable of living up to peoples needs and expecta-
tions. This is largely due to the process of globalization or what we
called internationalization of problems. In other words, the state is
unable to fulfill its traditional functions. The crisis of legitimacy
refers to the states inability to receive enough loyalty from its citi-
zens; for example: less people take part in elections, less people are
involved in political parties, and so forth. At some point, it seems as
if the nation-state is eroded by peoples insecurity; they no longer
trust in the conventional rules of political conduct. In this respect,
one may also speak of a crisis of democracy.
One way of decreasing the EUs democratic deficit and the more
general legitimacy crisis of politics is to decentralize the political
system, which can be seen as a ”new system of European govern-
ance”. The basic idea behind this concept, as employed by the Euro-
pean Commission, is that political decisions should be conducted
18 McCormick (1999): 152.

19 The most famous proposals were those made by Joschka Fischer, Gerhard
Schröder, Jacques Delors, Jacques Chirac
20 This can also be seen when looking at academic discourse on the EUs demo-
C
cratic deficit; see the contributions to Anderson and Eliassen (eds) (1996).
M 21 Held (1995).
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where it is most appropriate and where it is closest to the people.

This idea was confirmed in the Treaty for the European Union in
1992 and was called the subsidiary principle, which was introduced
to make the people closer to the union. The regions are considered
to be able to fulfill that function.
To ensure efficiency in the political process the ”White Paper on
Governance” issued by the European Commission suggests a
”stronger involvement of regional and local authorities in the Un-
9/12
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71mm
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by the EU has so far given far more weight on the European and 76mm
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national levels than the regional. As this brought about an
estrangement between the political elite and the citizens, a radical
decentralization is regarded as the ultimate cure for the demo-
cratic deficit. According to the president of the European Commis-
sion, Romano Prodi, ”the leaders of regional, urban and local
communities […] have a special responsibility in that they are
accountable for their actions to a parliament and for them Europe
is an everyday reality. On the one hand, they are in the best position
to promote grassroots democracy. On the other, they are directly
involved in applying a whole series of Community rules and pro-
grams.”23
The State undermined?

In this chapter, we will analyze how regionalism and globalization
may undermine the authority of the state. In order to do so, we
have operationalized the ”state” into three different models of the
state, the territorial state, the nation-state as Staatsnation and the
nation-state as Kulturnation. These concepts portray three different
dimensions of the modern state, which we will present and embark
22 European Commission (2001): 12.

23 Romano Prodi in a speech to the Committee of the Regions in Brussels, 20 Sep-
tember 2001
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<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/governance/docs/index_en.htm#speech, as
M of 3 August 2002>
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on in more detail to clarify in what ways the individual concepts

are undermined.
The territorial state developed at the turn of the late Middle Ages
to the early modern period. Its primary role was to provide security
for the people living within a given territory. According to the
founder of modern state theory, Thomas Hobbes, people gather
together and sign a social contract in order to overcome the state of
nature, in which there is no security. By this contract they transfer
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their individual autonomy to the sovereign to gain security and sta- 71mm
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bility in return. In Max Webers words, the state has the monopoly 76mm
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of violence. Throughout the early modern period, the state gained
more responsibilities and became the sole source of political legiti-
macy and sovereignty.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most European
states turned into nationstates. In the process of nation building,
the state received unity by a common identity. In other words, it
was given a meaning through national identity. There are two ways
through which the nation was built, which were given a distinct
classification: Staatsnation and Kulturnation24. They are differentiated
by how national identity was created.
National identity in the Staatsnation derives from state institu-
tions and republican values. Its citizens identify the nation as
embodied in the constitution, parliament and a national anthem or
a slogan such as ”liberté, égalité, fraternité”. These institutions are
the source of the nation-states legitimacy. Usually, a national iden-
tity centered on the state and its institutions could only develop in
countries where there was already a state before the nationbuilding
started. Examples of this model are France and the United States,
where national identities were founded on a history of a Grand (or
not so grand) revolution.
The Kulturnation, in contrast, came into being where national
sentiments could not cling onto an existing state and its institu-
tions. Instead, national identity was here built upon a common cul-
ture, a shared heritage and a common historical legacy; language
played a very important role in the creation of distinct national
identities. This was the case with those people that were, at the time
C
24 This distinction is an ideal model. The ideal model vulgarizes reality into a
M model to make analysis easier and clearer (Weber, 1982).
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of the ”Spring of Nations”,25 either living in several states, as in Ger-

many, or under some sort of imperial rule, as in more or less all Cen-
tral and East European states. Once a national identity had devel-
oped, these states were called ”nations without states”.
It must be said, however, that both concepts of Staats- and Kultur-
nation are not separate or mutually exclusive any longer, if they
have ever been so. Today, elements of both are found in every
nation-state. French obsession with the purity of their language
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may well serve as an example as well as the Germans pride of their 71mm
10/13
constitution and other institutions. Thus, we have three layers of 76mm
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stateness, so to speak, which can be more exactly analyzed when it
comes to the weakening of the state than the concept of the state as
a whole.
Form of social Central analytical variables weakened by

organization and elements
Territorial state sovereignty multi-national corporations,
international institutions
Nation state republican values democratic deficit, estrange-
Staatsnation state institutions ment between people and elite
Nation state culture migration
Kulturnation history cosmopolitan culture
tradition Americanization
The territorial state

The states sovereignty has been challenged by several develop-
ments. One of the first signs of a possible threat to state sovereignty
was the existence of nuclear weapons. As John Herz argued in the
early 1950s, the existence of nuclear weapons and their potential of
massive destruction made the territorial boundaries blur, as the
nuclear threat in contrast to conventional arms did not stop at state
borders.26 Both superpowers acquired mutually assured destruction
capability by the late 1950s, which meant that, in case one of the
superpowers had initiated a nuclear attack, the opposing super-
25 This term was used to depict the political situation during the months following
C
the February Revolution in France 1848.
M 26 Herz (1962).
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power would have enough nuclear weapons for a counter-strike

that would result in unbearable losses to the aggressor. As a conse-
quence of this, war as a means to achieve political goals was no
longer possible.
Another factor weakening state sovereignty is the evolution of
global norms and values.27 In the United Nations system there has
recently been a shift from non-intervention to protection of human
rights. Both these norms are stipulated in the UN Charter. For a
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long time they were not seen as bearing potential conflict because 71mm
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the human rights-principle was seen as less important, than the 76mm
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sovereignty-principle. It was only in the last ten years that there has
been increasing tension between the two principles, because pro-
tection of human rights may well require interference of the inter-
national society in the internal affairs of sovereign states.28 The
humanitarian interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Somalia and East Timor can all be seen as examples hereof.
The focus on human rights has also an impact on the Western
states. The Amnesty International reports on the conditions of
human rights in all states, and these reports influence states poli-
cies. Political pressure from other countries and international
organization means that the Western states – as the rest of the
worlds states no longer can decide on internal affairs solely on their
own.
The last ten years have also displayed the privatization of vio-
lence, which means that the state no longer has the monopoly of
violence. This is seen on the international arena, where there has
been a decrease of interstate wars and a dramatic increase of intra-
state or civil wars since 1945.29 Although this development has
mainly affected non-Western states, it has also shown repercussions
in Europe. For instance, the separatist movements in the Basque
Country, Corsica and Northern Ireland are using terrorism to
achieve their goals.
27 The idea of universal human rights has been discussed quite often and it has
been said that it is more like the spread of Western norms and values to the
other parts of the world. This debate on whether there are universal values is
not of relevance here, as it is rather obvious that they have an impact on world
politics. For a discussion of human rights in world politics see Brown (1997).
C
28 Jackson and Sørensen (1999): 263.
M 29 Gantzel (2000); SIPRI-Yearbook (2000).
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The privatization of violence in the western world is even more

articulate when it comes to the fact that people no longer rely on
the state as provider of their security. The increasing number of pri-
vate security guards and the gated communities can be seen as evi-
dence of this trend.30
9/12 The nation-state as Staatsnation 68mm
10/13 71mm
The Staatsnation is being threatened by regionalization, globaliza- 76mm

11/14,5
tion and the individualization of society.
Since the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s Western society
has become increasingly more dominated by the individuals in
society. This process was largely engendered in the political and
social movements of the 1960s, in which a particular section of the
people demanded more rights for the individual and less domina-
tion of a sometimes authoritarian and traditional society. In the fol-
lowing years a number of emancipation movements emerged, e.g.
the Afro-Americans civil right movements in the United States and
women throughout the Western hemisphere. Whereas the conven-
tional way of life was embedded in a family or a village community,
individuality freed from whatsoever kind of command was becom-
ing one of the basic principles of Western society. The individual
became the basic element of society and it is therefore no longer the
communal values people hold on to; instead they strive towards
their personal well-being and individual progress.
This notion has however been challenged, at least in the philo-
sophical arena. Much of political theory in the 1980s was domi-
nated by the debate between liberals and communitarians. They
were arguing on whether society is based on strong individuals
coming together and constituting a society or whether it is based
on a strong community, which was regarded as necessary by com-
munitarians, to give sense to its members in the first place as society
marks the framework of their lives.
Even though there were different opinions on the process of indi-
vidualization, it had and still has a quite fundamental influence on
politics of the nation-state. As citizens do not perceive the well-
C
M 30 Baumann (1998).
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being of the community or society as the ultimate goal any longer,

they somehow withdraw from society and from the reach of poli-
tics, at least to a certain extent. Due to individualization political
participation has changed. Instead of being members of political
parties and participation in elections, people get increasingly
involved in non-governmental organizations. This trend creates a
legitimacy crisis for the political system.31 The politicians are aware
of this and try solving the problem by ”listening” to the people.
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They seem to be obsessed with opinion polls and adjust their poli- 71mm
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cies to the respective results. However, this seems not to solve the 76mm
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problem of legitimacy. People distrust the political elite even more
today and do not believe in their capacities. This is yet more puz-
zling when taking into account by which means politicians try to
”sell” their policies to the people; Tony Blairs (in)famous arsenal of
spin doctors is just one example.
It is not only the individualization that creates problems of legit-
imacy. The states inability to fulfill its traditional functions due to
internationalization of problems and decision-making also under-
mines its raison dêtre. Why do people need a state, if it is no longer
capable of solving the problems and of caring for their most imme-
diate needs? What are the reasons for having national parliaments,
national governments and all political administration, if these state
institutions are unable to understand and control the forces of glo-
balization?
National politicians do not only try to gain popular support by
using spin-doctors, they also try to create political participation by
decentralizing decisions and the welfare services to the regional or
local levels. The idea underlying the decentralization effort is that
people will participate if they think the policies will affect their per-
sonal well-being. The way politics affect the individual becomes
more evident, when the decisions are made in the local or regional
area. Moreover national politicians think and hope that political
participation in the local or regional politics will create an aware-
ness and interest in politics in general. If decentralization really has
such an effect on people, this will create the legitimacy that can
secure the future existence of the Staatsnation. However if partici-
pation in local polities does not affect participation in national pol-
C
M 31 This argument is the central thesis in Beck (1993).

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itics but becomes a goal in itself instead, then the regions will
resume the role of the Staatsnation and become the new political
entity.
The nation-state as Kulturnation

The Kulturnation is in many ways threatened by globalization. This
9/12 is not only due to the flow of money, goods, services and informa- 68mm
10/13 tion across national borders, but also due to migration and Ameri- 71mm
11/14,5 canization. Migration inevitably raises the question of collective 76mm
self-identification: ”who are we?” and ”who belongs to us?”

The reason for asking these questions in the globalized world is
that the Kulturnation, which is characterized by cultural homogene-
ity, will be undermined by cultural diversity resulting from immi-
gration. Linguistic diversity and increasing importance of the Eng-
lish language are examples of how the majority of the Kulturnation
has lost its cultural hegemony. The linguistic diversity is, however,
not thought of as being the greatest threat to the Kulturnation. This
is primarily due to the fact that languages can be regarded as a neu-
tral medium of communication. Besides, most immigrants will
learn to speak the national language of their ”host society”, as this
is necessary to become an accepted citizen in the new country.
Another example of how the Kulturnation is undermined is the
emergence of religious diversity in most western societies. Religious
diversity raises the issue of whether the traditional ways of living
should be changed. Religion is not only a private matter that is
practiced in the domestic sphere because living the life, which your
faith prescribes, requires confessing it publicly.32 An example for
this may be Sunday closing laws in Christian countries so that peo-
ple have the opportunity to rest as God did on the seventh day after
he had created everything between heaven and earth.
As constructivist theories consider nations to be human commu-
nity built upon common historical myths, immigrants coming
from all over the globe do not share these collective memories, as
they are not theirs.33 They do not understand the meaning and sig-
32 Bauböck (1998): 16.

C
33 Today, it is academic common sense that ethnic and national identities are
M socially constructed. For evidence see Anderson (1991) and Smith (1993).
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nificance of particular cultural habits and rituals, which have devel-

oped in that country over a very long time.
Yet another problem occurs when one keeps in mind that the
very idea of the Kulturnation is, to a particular extent, always based
on ethnic identity. This ”myth of a common ancestry”34 is at least
partly alive in nation-states that build citizenship on the jus san-
guinis. If one envisages the Kulturnation as a historically grown
community based on ethic similarity, it is very difficult for strangers
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to be integrated into such a ”naturally” or ”genetically” homogene- 71mm
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ous nation. 76mm
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Cultural diversity as a result of immigration will, however,
become a real danger to the Kulturnation only when the immi-
grants are excluded from full participation in their respective host
society. Only when they are not offered integration into society,
will they begin to be proud of the identity of their home country in
order to distinguish them from the society in which they were not
admitted. This tendency can, for instance, be seen in many Latin
American communities in US-American cities or with the young
beurs of French North African ghettos.35
Another phenomenon that is believed to undermine the Kultur-
nation is Americanization. Americanization is often defined as a
process in which cultural models and norms are being exported
from the United States to the rest of the world. This exported model
of society is one characterized by mass consumption and mass cul-
ture. However, it is not only Coca-Cola, Hollywood movies and
Levis jeans that went to the other side of the Atlantic but also ele-
ments of the ”American dream”, the idea of a better life and of
”prosperity for all”. Americanization will undermine the Kulturna-
tion because the uniqueness of the original culture will disappear.
The distinct national cultures will no longer be distinguished from
that of others and thus the nation will disappear.
The Kulturnation is undermined by yet another process: region-
alization, which may be seen as a reaction to Americanization and
globalization. All over the world people are feeling threatened by
globalization, which causes them to look toward the regions; they
are living in as providers of a distinct identity. One example for this
C
34 Smith (1993): 29.
M 35 Castells (1997): 274.
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is European Union where new ”cultural” borders are created at the

same time as the national borders are destroyed because of the sin-
gle market and Schengen. The creation of strong regional identities
may undermine the Kulturnation and the national political regime,
because the regional identity may become the base for political
mobilization.
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10/13 71mm
11/14,5 Conclusion 76mm
The nation-state is without any doubt under pressure due to glo-

balization and regionalization. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the nation-state will be undermined and disappear as a
political entity. Predictions on the future of the nation-state depend
on whether one conceives of the interplay of regions, nation-states
and international actors as a zero-sum or a plus-sum game.37 When
a process takes place within a zero-sum game, the amount of power
available always remains constant. This implies that, if one actor
gains power, another or many others must necessarily lose. This
means that if the nation-state gives sovereignty to supranational
institutions and/or regional governments, it will inevitably lose
power. According to the logic of zero-sum games it would also lose
its importance as his share of power in the game decreases.
In contrast, the amount of power can increase in plus-sum games,
which allows all actors to gain something. Paradoxically, this sug-
gests the nation-state may gain influence by giving power away to
other institutions. In a world where democratic nation-states are no
longer capable of solving problems autonomously, the very reason
of their existence is questioned. The internationalization of deci-
sion-making has been seen as an efficient way of overcoming the
inability to solve problems. In this respect, the European integra-
tion process has become a device through which nation-states can
tackle the problems they face.
Academic and public rhetoric of the state, being weakened and
undermined by invisible global forces, rests on the underlying
assumption of a zero-sum game. It is, however, all too easy just to
C declare a zero-sum game. In this paper, we have argued that decen-
M tralizing power in the European nation-states may be an effective
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means of closing the democratic deficit. We assume that there is a

possibility for the nation-state to benefit from transferring power to
supra- and sub-national institutions. The ”new regionalism” may
induce the state to give more sovereignty to the regions, but instead
it may gain democratic legitimacy. In the end, this gain of demo-
cratic legitimacy reinforces citizens identification with state institu-
tions. In the zero-sum approach, this is regarded as an illusion
because the state loses influence and hence legitimacy as it loses
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sovereignty. 71mm
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Predicting what the nation-state will precisely be in the future is 76mm
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an unfeasible and hopeless task. The state has been an extraordinar-
ily successful concept in the modern era. Nevertheless, globaliza-
tion and regionalization have brought the state into a crisis: the
state is challenged and we are quite confident that it will have to
undergo tremendous changes within the next decades. There is a
hesitance and ambiguity to what the state might be like in the
future and what role it will play. Therefore, instead of trying to con-
vince the reader of how the state will precisely look like, we want to
explore some alternatives to which the state may be heading.
One vision may be that the state will become an administrative
authority deprived of any identity-delivering functions. Arguments
and public debate over political issues will more or less disappear,
because the governments role will be regulatory and administra-
tive. The power resides within regional, international, and suprana-
tional institutions. The state will become a arbitrator or mediator
between the different levels of government. Moreover, the states
function will be to build clusters that attract investors and compa-
nies.
In a second scenario, the nation-states have lost public support in
a far-reaching degree. The state is no longer capable to live up to the
trust that was once bestowed on it; its legitimacy has deteriorated
almost entirely. As the people realize that the political elite no
longer has the power to secure the well being of the citizens, they
decide to gain this power themselves. The European governments
decide as a counter reaction to re-strengthen the nation-state in
order to gain popular support. This reaction combines both with-
drawing the power that they early on gave to supranational institu-
C tions and place more emphasis on national identity and unity.
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Essentially, a reinforcement of nationalism is induced and in turn

history repeats itself.
A third scenario is where conglomerate corporations dominate
the world. Instead of identifying with the state, the people will
adapt to a new identity where they are no longer citizens but
employees. Corporations will monopolize the former welfare states
function: controlling pensions, salaries, health benefits, social secu-
rity and essentially the livelihoods of all who are employed within
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the corporation. Therefore, democracy disappears because the state 71mm
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and participating in elections. Those that do not belong to a corpo-
ration will be an underclass, which is characterized by anarchy. The
underclass will be deprived and left out and as time progresses; an
uprising will come into being.
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A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
3 A United Europe – Rhetoric

and Reality
Security implications of the enlargement
process and idea with a special emphasis on
9/12
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71mm
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Arta Alibasik, Rasmus Nilsson 76mm
”Conscious of the importance of this Agreement to establishing

and enhancing in Europe a system of stability based on coopera-
tion, with the Community [i.e. the EU, eds.] as one of the corner-
stones…”1
This was but one of many superlatives that in the beginning of
the 1990s officially heralded the start of ten applicant countrie’s
long journey towards integration into the EU. Such rhetoric regard-
ing enlargement has since remained an essential part of the official
vocabulary, not only in the EU itself, but also in governments both
within and outside the union.
But to what extent does reality correspond with such declara-
tions? Are we actually witnessing the sunrise of a new era in Europe,
an era of true unity driven forth by all participants understanding
of the enlargements historical necessity? Or are we instead met with
insurmountable problems, shortsighted policies, double standards
and a basic lack of strategy? Such are the questions that will be
examined.
A basic hypothesis assumes that an enlargement of the EU is at
the present time possible and even desirable. That it is possible
doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that enlargement will take
place, so one of our goals with this essay is to try and pinpoint some
C
M 1 ”European Agreement”, preamble, p. 2.

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hidden dangers which may trouble not only the enlargement proc-
ess of today, but also prove problematic in the longer run. This will
be done first by focusing on the general picture and then by nar-
rowing down to a study of the relationship between the EU and one
of the applicant countries, namely FYROM2.
Choosing FYROM for this study, a country that both literally and
figuratively is quite a distance from the EU may seem strange. With
countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, placed in the
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heart of European history and being far closer to integration into 71mm
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the EU than most other applicants3 (let alone almost all applicants 76mm
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from the Balkans), why should one choose FYROM for a case study?
Well, at least a few reasons present themselves.
The first reason has to do with geography. The fact that FYROM is
situated in the Balkans makes it especially interesting for this essay.
With its unusually prominent ethnic clashes, be they violent or
not, the entire area has hosted some of the worst disturbances in
Europe since the Second World War. If the intentions set forth in
the beginning of this introduction are ever to come true a solution
must be found in the Balkans. Since the countries here are, and
have always been, considered to be part of Europe, the expansion of
the EU here could (and in many peoples eyes should) in the long
run be this solution. Having already officially declared this to be a
goal for the future, the practical efforts of the EU in promoting this
could indicate whether or not peace in Europe is still ranked high
on the EU-agenda – a vital area of concern for this essay.
This could be the case for several countries in the former Yugosla-
via. FYROM, however, is distinguished from its former fellow repub-
lics in several ways. Most importantly, FYROM isn’t placed under
outside surveillance such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. It doesnt have a
unique relationship with the West such as Serbia and Montenegro
plus Croatia, whose strong ties to the Western world are secured not
only by historical tradition, but also by the aftermath of bloody
confrontations in the 1990s. And it doesnt have an economy as suc-
cessful as Slovenias. What it has had is recent ethnic tension and
2 This acronym stands for ”Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.

3 In this essay the terms ”applicants” and ”applicant countries” refer to all coun-
C
tries seeking membership of the EU, not only to those countries hoping for
M acceptance by the end of 2002.
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direct EU involvement therein. The fact that FYROMs relationship

with the EU isn’t very developed yet naturally impedes our evalua-
tion of this relationship. Still, as has already been stated, it is the
aim of this essay to try portraying several general trends in the
enlargement process at large and then project them onto the case of
FYROM. In this context, choosing a ”case country” which will only
in the long run have a chance of entering the EU but which is still
most definitely part of Europe may very well provide this essay with
9/12 68mm
a longer perspective and provide a special reminder of some of the 71mm
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problems being forgotten by those analysts focusing only on the 76mm
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”first wave applicants”. However important these applicant coun-
tries may be in themselves.
General security problems

The first step of any examination involving the term ”security”
must necessarily focus on the term itself and how it is to be under-
stood. To speak in very broad terms two definitions of the word
may be distinguished, namely ”hard” and ”soft” security. ”Hard”
security is, popularly speaking, old-fashioned security with a focus
on military aspects. This type of security was seen as especially
important up till and including the Cold War, since it proved to be
a useful tool in analyzing various power-balancing moves among
actors (mainly states) in international politics. Gradually, however,
scientists began to realize that more and more factors had to be
taken into consideration if one was to understand a world that was
growing ever more complex. Thus, Morgenthau’s4 classic realist pic-
ture of international affairs and of security was expanded and a
”new” kind of security entered the general debate.
This security is known as ”soft” security and is, roughly speaking,
defined only as being non-military. Inside the boundaries of such a
crude definition it is obvious that a number of sub-categories exist:
Economic, demographic, environmental, social etc.5 This ”soft”
security is gradually gaining in importance as old time territorial
4 Morgenthau, Hans; Politics among Nations; 1948.

C
5 According to several specialists in this area, the number of sub-categories (and
M sub-sub-categories) number well over a hundred.
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conflicts give way to the threats of impoverishment and mass

migration, not to mention their common companions such as eth-
nic clashes, terrorism and the like. Also among the applicant coun-
tries for the EU are problems of ”soft” security generally the most
prominent. One shouldn’t forget, though, that it is exactly among
these countries that some of the most terrifying ”hard security”-
threats seen in the last decade have shown up. An aspect, which
will only become clearer as we examine the security problems con-
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nected not only with the applicant countries as such, but also with 71mm
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future enlargement processes and their possible effect. 76mm
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If one is to look at security problems showing themselves among
the applicant countries, three conflicts especially seem prominent.
It is the discrepancy between the borders of today and those of the
past; it is the question between the right of minorities and the fear
of separatism and national disintegration; and it is the right to set-
tle ones own ”internal affairs” against the right of interference by
outside forces (here seen as forces not being applicant countries
themselves) with ”legitimate interests”. It is ”hard” and ”soft” secu-
rity in a most volatile mix.
The first conflict is the one that seemingly has the least to offer.
After all, this ”hard” security problem has been solved in the vast
majority of the countries concerned. If one for a moment is to avoid
looking at the area of deceased Yugoslavia whats strikingly is a
number of territorial settlements, which show every sign of stabil-
ity: Between Poland and the Czech Republic, Hungary and its
neighbors etc. So there is hardly much to worry about for the EU
and a large concern for the Union and for Europe as such has been
taken away. Or perhaps not quite. For when a large mosaic on the
wall of a church in the Polish border town Przemysl (near Ukraine)
shows a Poland of pre-1939, then the theme isn’t precisely mutual
understanding between the peoples. And when the Hungarian
Constitution still claims to be representing all Hungarians, no mat-
ter where they be, how much respect can one actually assume that
this Constitution has for the sovereignty of other countries, least of
all their Romanian neighbors that rule over the former Hungarian
region of Transylvania?6 Furthermore, the Balkans and its former
C
6 The Polish church was visited by one of the authors in August 2000. For the
M Hungarian example, see Plewa-Thörnquist, p. 11.
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Yugoslav republics is a matter all by itself. All in all, there still seems
to be reason for concern when it comes to this type of conflict.
As for minority rights vs. fear of separatism the problems are even
more prominent. One only has to mention Crimea, Estonia and
Latvia, plus the latent civil war of Moldova to realize that here lays
one of the greatest challenges for the region at large.7 Still, it is
important to understand that (apart from Moldova) no attempts of
separation have taken place after the Cold War, if one chooses to see
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the Yugoslavian war not as the breaking up of a state, but the break- 71mm
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ing up of the Federation that it nominally and (in the eyes of the 76mm
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authors) truly was. Not that this should dissuade the EU and the
applicant countries from trying to solve this problem, but there
seems to be no real danger for a ”Yugoslavian scenario” all over this
region. Instead we are so far looking at an example of ”soft” secu-
rity, although this could possibly change in the future.
”No danger” is not always the case in the third type of conflict,
i.e. ”internal affairs” vs. ”legitimate interests”. Especially two exam-
ples come to mind. The NATO bombings of first Bosnia-Herze-
govina and then Serbia are already (in)famous as examples of how
such a conflict may turn out. But also Cyprus has for a long time
been host to such kinds of tension ever since first Greece and then
Turkey got directly involved in the islands affairs. These events are
all within the ”hard security”-sphere. ”Soft security”, however, also
has a place here. The Austrian threat of blocking the acceptance of
the Czech Republic into the EU due to a possibly insecure nuclear
power plant at Temelin is one proof of this. Another is to be seen
later on in the essay since FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia) as a name only developed after Greek pressure against
the name of Macedonia, which was already being used for a Greek
border province just south of FYROM.8
7 The conflicts mentioned here all include problems between Russians (or Russia-
supporters, as in Moldova) and the local population. Some may therefore be
inclined to believe that this kind of conflict only exists as a result of the Soviet
heritage. In that case, however, one forgets the entire Albanian problem in the
Balkans (part of which will be touched upon later), not to mention the discrim-
ination of the Roma-people in large parts of the region (although the fear of sep-
aratist tendencies may in this case be not very strong at all). For further infor-
C
mation, see Plewa-Thörnquist, pp. 8–15.
M 8 See e.g. Nyström in Tägil (ed.), p. 500.
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Thus, we have shown the existence of three types on conflicts, con-

flicts that we later will examine in the context of FYROM. The rem-
edy for these conflicts has by many been seen to be the EU enlarge-
ment in itself, as it has been assumed that an enlarged EU would
bring peace and prosperity to its new members.9 As already stated
in the introduction, this is also the opinion of this essays authors.
Yet, we are convinced that a few more aspects on this matter have
to be taken into consideration if the entire security problem is to be
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addressed. For it seems to be a possibility, at the very least, that the 71mm
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whole project of enlargement can bring trouble to the applicant 76mm
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countries in several ways.
First of all, there is the possibility that the enlargement either
doesn’t take place at all at the end of 2002 or else comes to fruition
merely as a ”Small Bang” with only a few countries entering the
Promised Land. In both cases the risk exists that disappointed appli-
cants turn away from the EU, hopefully to create their own forms of
cooperation, but more likely to return to old ways of power balanc-
ing (at least so far as the Central, East and South East European
countries go). True enough, several of the countries developed the
so-called ”Visegrad”-cooperation in the 90s, but the basic purpose
of this organization was to help the countries involved in their
common efforts to join the EU, not to create a lasting organization
of their own.10 They simply didnt have enough economic incen-
tives to do so. So the power balancing (and, perhaps, some individ-
ual trading agreements with the EU) would be their only possibility.
But even worse than such a renewal of old times tension is the fact
that all this could come true as some sort of ”domino effect”. If
countries among the ”first wave-applicants” became disillusioned
with the entire EU-idea, then other countries following in their
wake could very likely do the same. After all, what hope could
Romania have of ever joining the EU if Slovakia or the Baltic coun-
tries were left out? Reasoning such as this could spell disaster for the
applicant countries and especially so if they started comparing EU
rhetoric with reality and found the two woefully different.
9 Friis; ”EUs Udvidelse mod Øst”, pp. 12–13 shows an example of this.
10 For more information on this subject, see Hyde-Price, Adrian; The international
C
politics of East Central Europe, Manchester University Press, 1996. Especially pp.
M 122–131.
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Still, this argument could easily be used in favor of the entire

enlargement process. After all, if as many as 10 countries11 were to
be invited into the EU in Copenhagen at the end of 2002 (the so-
called ”Big Bang”-solution) wouldn’t everything be all right? Well,
not exactly. For even such a scenario wouldn’t remove the danger of
”Fort Europa”, since a number of European countries would still be
left out for several years, if not forever. In that way a ”silver curtain”
could be created in Europe with at least two repercussions.
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The first of these has to do with the so-called Schengen-plan. This 71mm
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plan has as its target to create an area (namely the EU) where move- 76mm
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ment of people and goods can avoid being slowed down by border
controls and the like. This, of course, would also bring benefits to
the new members of the EU, but their problem is that with such a
privilege come demands. Most of the applicant countries border to
non-EU areas and is thus being compelled by the Union to reinforce
these borders if membership of the EU and the Schengen-plan is to
be carried through. This, however, implies spending a large amount
of money something which countries struggling to recover from
the economic downturn in the 90s may be hard pressed to do. At
the same time it includes breaking bonds with countries in the
region outside the enlargement process; bonds that may be almost
as important to the preservation of peace in Eastern Europe as the
enlargement. An example of this can be seen at the border between
Poland and Ukraine, where a previous prospering border trade has
much decreased in wake of the former countries border and visa
reinforcements.
Thus, a part of the East European region could be left out of the
new Europe for a long time, perhaps even for good. And in this a
third danger is hidden. Countries such as Ukraine and Russia have
so far been interested in having a close relationship with the EU
since they saw a profound opportunity for cooperation here. But
should the EU begin to focus exclusively on its own problems (e.g.
due to its need for internal reform) and not care about the wishes
and words of its eastern neighbors (or if these neighbors perceived
this to be the case) then a real risk exists that opposition against the
EU would form in these countries. A situation, which in the long
C
11 These are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hun-
M gary, Slovenia, Cyprus (in one form or another) and Malta.
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run could become troubling for the European security arena as

such.12
We have now listed some of the most prominent security dangers
connected to the applicant countries as well as to the enlargement
process as such. It is time to survey the EU-response to these prob-
lems. As for those problems stemming from the applicant countries
themselves, boundaries, and minorities and outside pressure, much
9/12
was already mentioned in the so-called Copenhagen Criteria laid 68mm
10/13 down in June 1993 at the official beginning of the enlargement 71mm
11/14,5 process. Part of these criteria have to do with respect for democracy, 76mm
the rule of law, human rights, minorities and the like and should
therefore, when implemented, be able to counter two of the afore-
mentioned problems.13 And there do exist several signs of the fact
that the EU is doing its best to implement the criteria. In Estonia
and Latvia, laws preventing the large, Russian parts of the popula-
tion from achieving citizenship (and thus basic rights, such as the
right to vote) are slowly being mended. As regards Slovakia it was in
the second half of the 1990s made clear to former Prime Minister
Vladimir Meciar, notorious for not playing by the rules and sus-
pected of kidnapping the then-presidential son in 1995, that the EU
would not accept a country led by the likes of him a fact contribut-
ing to his fall from power in 1998. The two separate governments of
Cyprus (and their patrons) have several times been told that the EU
isn’t keen to accept a divided country into its midst, something
which may further talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. And
only recently Turkey completed several laws granting their Kurdish
minority extended rights to use of the Kurdish language and abol-
ished the death penalty. All these changes, all this progress was car-
ried through mainly because of the desire these countries have for
entering the EU, and the Unions insistence that the changes be car-
ried through. So in many ways the EU-response to the problems has
been sound.
And yet again, the examples listed above can just as well be
looked at from another angle. Estonia and Latvia have indeed dis-
criminated (and are to a certain extent still discriminating) against
12 This and the previous paragraphs are based on Friis; ”EUs Udvidelse mod Øst”,
C
pp. 24–26.
M 13 See ”The European Union and the World”, p. 18.
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Russians in their countries, but this was done from a basic fear that
Russia would otherwise be able to regain hegemony over these
states as happened only 60 years ago. Turkey doesn’t fear a Kurdish
power in this way, but still sees a need to prevent separatism in its
easternmost provinces, not least to avoid a major threat to the
regions security, since firm Kurdish advance would threaten the ter-
ritorial integrity of not only Turkey, but also of Syria and Iraq, two
neighboring countries with substantial Kurdish minorities. As for
9/12
Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar was democratically elected.14 The fact 68mm
71mm
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that many are now predicting his political comeback as Prime Min- 76mm
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ister and that the EU is warning forcefully against it goes to show
that the Slovakian population once again could separate the coun-
try from the wishes of the EU and what then? This could become a
prime example of a security danger mentioned above, namely
”internal affairs” vs. ”legitimate interests”. Here the EU is the out-
side actor, pressuring the applicant countries to comply with its
demands or be kept out. To a certain extent this is also shown in the
Unions support for Greece in the discussions over Cyprus, even
though Turkey here has the advantage of being member of NATO
and thus being able to delay or even hinder NATO / EU military
cooperation if need be. But all in all it should stand out clear that
any EU-interference in the internal affairs of applicant countries
could create resentment for the Union in these countries, especially
if they aren’t soon accepted into the ”club”.
Still, one could stress that all this merely shows an EU sticking to
its basic values when doing so may trouble the application proce-
dure. Though this can be unpleasant for the applicant countries
they are still left with a solid, reliable image of the EU and of the
world that awaits them when they enter. Or are they? For even
though the Union has steadfastly upheld its principles when the
applicant countries are concerned, this has not always been the case
internally in the EU. Especially a few areas of concern present them-
selves.
14 At elections in both 1992 and 1994 his HZDS-party gained far more votes than
the other parties (37,3 and 35 %, respectively). Even when he lost his position in
C
1998, his party still came in first place with 27 % of the votes. See <www.parties-
M and-elections.de/slovakia2.html>.
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First and foremost there is again the problem of minority rights

vs. fear of separatism just as we saw it in the case of Central and
Eastern Europe. Examples are legion. Northern Ireland, the Basque
Provinces and Corsica have all experienced not only separatist
demands, but also violence and murder stemming from such. And
this in three of Europes greatest democracies, plus (in two of the
cases) some of the oldest. The fact that some politicians and others
in the West still maintain that Western Europe must guide its east-
9/12 68mm
ern counterpart towards ”more civilized standards” in this area can 71mm
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only be seen as a legacy of the enlightenments generalizations on 76mm
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this part of Europe. For not only do the problems exist all over
Europe some of the harsher governmental answers are being pre-
sented in Western Europe. One has for instance only to think of the
French constitution, which claims that all its citizens are French
and nothing else – to see that there is no room here for minority
politics whatsoever. Or what about the German laws on naturaliza-
tion of immigrants, which require eight years of residence, com-
pared with Estonias five? In Southern Europe large numbers of
North African and other immigrants work illegally in the cities and
in the countryside, often without legal and medical protection.15
Lately, the ”war on terror” hasnt exactly improved the conditions
for many immigrants of Arabic descent. Britain, for instance, being
renowned for its protection of free speech, has in reference to ter-
rorist danger detained eleven Muslim Arabs suspected of wrongdo-
ing without presenting them with a trial or charge. A new law was
to be the basis for such a practice and even though the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission has now rejected this law as
”discriminatory”, a worrying tendency has shown itself.16
Here it may, of course, be said that two definitions are being
mixed up. There is a conceptual difference between immigrants and
minorities; the most important part being that minorities are per-
manently situated in the region whereas immigrants, naturally, are
people coming from the outside. Still, we are in both cases talking
about those who are in some way ”different” from the major ethnic
group in the country they inhabit. And some of the immigrant
groups (e.g. Turks in Germany) are of a size that belittles their
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15 These paragraphs are based on Plewa-Thörnquist, pp. 28–30.
M 16 ”The Economist”, August 3rd–9th 2002, p. 30
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minority counterparts. So discrimination of these groups is taking

place and their size sometimes makes the problem one of great
security interest to the country in question, even though the groups
may not strictly be labeled ”minority”. Thus the two definitions are
in this essay placed under the same label to prove that many minor-
ity problems seen outside the EU have counterparts within.
As for the other security risks mentioned in regard to the applicant
9/12
countries (i.e. territorial conflicts and outside intervention) they are 68mm
10/13 not as such present in the EU. Other problems of ”double stand- 71mm
11/14,5 ards” do exist, however. One only has to look at the strict demands 76mm
being placed by the EU on applicant countries economic stability if

these applicants are to be let in to the Euro-cooperation. By them-
selves these are quite reasonable demands, but for the applicant
countries it may seem strange that Germany (and perhaps France)
can avoid criticism when they break rules of the Euro economic sta-
bility pact, whereas the applicant countries are to go strictly by the
book.
Having said all this, let us review some remarks on the general secu-
rity aspect in the enlargement process. It can be stated that some
security problems do exist in the applicant countries and that an
enlargement of the EU could to a certain extent solve these prob-
lems. However, it is also true that the enlargement in itself creates
some security problems, which in magnitude are not less than the
ones faced so far. Furthermore, there is ample reason to raise the
question whether the EU should involve itself at all in the affairs of
the applicant countries. Not only because the ideals behind such
action may be disputed, but also because the countries comprising
the EU don’t always adhere to these ideals themselves, at least when
it comes to their ”realpolitik”. Based on this, one may ask where the
EU is really heading, and whether there exists a strategy for the
Unions future. To put light on these questions let us delve into a
study of the relationship between the EU and one of the applicant
countries, namely FYROM.
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FYROM and the EU

This part of the essay is focused on the relationship between EU and
FYROM. But if one is to write about FYROM, at the same time one
also has to consider Macedonia. Throughout history this has been a
most versatile concept, meaning something different depending on
who was asked. Such kind of mutability is still very much present
today – and it is of utmost importance to understand the nature of
9/12 68mm
this if the area’s security concerns are to be addressed. 71mm
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The name ”Macedonia” dates back to Antiquity and to the 76mm
11/14,5
empire of Alexander the Great – a connection that is still very much
being emphasized by nations inhabiting the area. For just as well as
Macedonians steadfastly claim him as their ancestor17, this is also
done by Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians. From this question of
origin all other historical discrepancies these nations in between
can be viewed. In the 5th and 6th century Slavic tribes began arriv-
ing from the north and soon the area’s demographic composition
was ”muddled” to say the least. Different Byzantine, Serbian, Bul-
garian and Macedonian dynasties18 ruled here throughout the Mid-
dle Ages and created the background for what later should turn out
to be some of the most serious territorial strife in Europe. First, how-
ever, they had to pass through the time of Ottoman occupation
from the 14th century onwards. With a policy of ethnic tolerance
this empire for many years succeeded in preventing ethnic strife –
not to mention ethnic mobilization against Istanbul itself.
All this changed, though, as one Balkan nation after another
began to distance itself from the Turks. Greece led the way – heavily
supported by nationalist sentiments and taking advantage of his-
tory with the help of West European romanticism. Not many dec-
ades after, Bulgaria and Serbia followed. Although these entities pre-
served their formal allegiance to the Ottomans, in reality they were
acting as sovereign states. Thus, the situation was ripe with diffi-
culty for Macedonia. If one is to follow maps from those years, a
Macedonian area could conceivably cover not only present day
17 In July 1991 it was even suggested that new Macedonian coins should be
adorned with the image of Alexander the Great; see Nyström in Tägil (ed.), p.
487.
C
18 The Macedonian dynasty may furthermore have had Armenian blood in it; see
M Nyström in Tägil (ed.), p. 488.
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FYROM, but also large parts of Albania, Serbia and Montenegro,

Bulgaria and Greece19. As long as these nations were part of an
empire this problem could be kept in the background. Now, it
became impossible. The Balkan Wars can in this way be seen as a
logical consequence of disagreements on origin. So can, more rele-
vantly, some present day security problems to which Macedonia
has to position itself.
9/12
But which are these ”security problems” and what relationship do 68mm
10/13 they have to each other? To begin with, one may divide them into 71mm
11/14,5 two categories, internal and external. And yet this is, as has already 76mm
been hinted at, not as simple as it may seem. For what does ”inter-
nal” actually mean here? What is the interior of Macedonia? Is it
FYROM? Many people would say so – and point to maps and official
documents as proof of their point. Maps and documents, however,
can deceive and have done so in all of history. For they often only
tell about what the world thinks of an area – not what the area
thinks of itself. A fact, which has been clearly demonstrated in the
successor states of Yugoslavia. Even the name FYROM was only
meant to be provisional – once again showing the ambiguity and
mutability of this territorial demarcation.
On the other hand it would also be problematic to view every-
thing that has been seen as Macedonia throughout history as the
”interior”. Of course these areas are still to some extent populated
by ethnic Macedonians and thus of interest to the FYROM leader-
ship. But for the purpose of this essay we must concentrate not on
what is of interest to Macedonians, but on that over which Macedo-
nians have political control. And this, however disputed its nature
may be, is the area known as FYROM. That an ambiguity exists,
though, must at all times be kept in mind.
Having said this, let us turn back to the security problems. Natu-
rally, FYROM is beleaguered by many problems, shared with coun-
tries all over the world: Crime, including heavy smuggling of peo-
ple and narcotics, pollution, etc. problems, which were already
mentioned in the beginning of this essay as examples of ”soft”
security problems. But what is of interest here, are those conflicts
being especially prominent among applicant countries to the EU.
C
M 19 See map p. 486, Nyström in Tägil (ed.).

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Internally in FYROM, this means the minority question the rela-

tionship between Macedonians and Albanians. Whereas the Alba-
nians constitute the overall minority, this differs heavily from
region to region. Especially in the northwestern parts of the coun-
try the concentration of Albanians is very high in some municipal-
ities up to 95 % of the entire population.20 The combination of
such demographic facts and the still relatively loose foundation of
identity for many Macedonians in FYROM have in the last decade
9/12
of the 20th century put a severe strain on the relationship between 68mm
71mm
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the two population groups. For Macedonians there has lurked the 76mm
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danger of a ”hidden Albanian agenda” with the ultimate goal of cre-
ating a Greater Albania, comprising not only present-day Albania
and large parts of FYROM, but also some southern provinces in Ser-
bia such as Kosovo. The emergence in the region of armed Albanian
groups such as the UCK has only heightened such fears.21 On the
other hand, Albanians only had to observe the plight of their eth-
nic kin in Kosovo and elsewhere in recent years to fear for their
safety in this region. A safety, which has also been put into question
partly by violent clashes with the predominantly Macedonian
authorities in FYROM22 and partly by the harsh treatment bestowed
by Macedonian authorities on Albanian refugees from Kosovo. The
problems reached their climax in the beginning of 2001 as armed,
Albanian groups in response to what they claimed to be legal injus-
tice towards Albanians clashed with Macedonian military and
police forces in the north of the country, putting FYROM on the
brink of a civil war.
This conflict has been the most dangerous by far in the short life
span of FYROM. The internal problem is, however, exacerbated by
another, external one, with roots far back in history. It is the prob-
lem of borders and of identity. Of FYROM, but also of three of the
neighboring countries: Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.
20 See Brunnbauer, p. 15
21 For a description of Macedonian thoughts on their own identity and on Albani-
ans, see Brunnbauer, pp. 8–9.
22 An example of this came in 1994 as a demonstration for the opening of an Alba-
C
nian university near the town of Tetovo was forcibly dispersed, leaving one
M demonstrator dead and fifteen wounded; see Nyström, p. 502.
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We have shown how in history the area in and around FYROM

has been contested by a multitude of nations and empires. Yet this
disagreement cannot be confined to history alone. For also in the
last decade it has been as prominent as ever. Already at the declara-
tion of FYROMs independence in September 1991, the problem
came to the forefront. Whereas Bulgaria immediately accepted
FYROMs integrity and independence, Greece declared the new state
to be ”a complete fabrication”, only in 1995 accepting the new
9/12 68mm
country’s status. And Bulgaria, by the way, soon changed its view- 71mm
10/13
point only one month after its initial welcoming of FYROM the Bul- 76mm
11/14,5
garian president Zelev denounced the idea of a Macedonian nation,
an attitude, which has survived to this day. As for Serbia, this coun-
try was of course preoccupied elsewhere, but didnt look favorably
on FYROM secession. From 1988 onwards, a Serbian nationalistic
group, the Sava League, even demanded the rebuilding of Serbia’s
pre-1941 borders, with FYROM as a southern Serbian province.23 All
in all, FYROM found itself surrounded by states with at best a coolly
neutral stance towards its existence.
Lately, things have improved somewhat. Serbia clearly has
enough to do with its domestic policies, and an international mili-
tary force in Kosovo indirectly gives the neighboring FYROM some
security (even though this force couldn’t prevent armed Albanians
from crossing the border in 2001!). Bulgaria, aspiring to enter the
EU, has to respect not only FYROM’s territorial integrity, but also
the rights of Macedonians living in Bulgaria, even if these aren’t
officially seen as a minority by the government. And Greece, the
primary reason behind the use of FYROM as the name for the new
republic24, has recently in cooperation with FYROM created an oil
pipeline running from Skopje to Thessalonica.25 So even though it
would be wrong to consider these problems entirely solved, there
seems to be no immediate danger for the integrity of FYROM.
All this, however, doesnt imply that the countrys problems with
its neighbors have no influence whatsoever. Already it has been
remarked that many Macedonians feel their national identity
23 See Nyström in Tägil (ed.), p. 495 and 497.

24 ”Macedonia” already being a province in northern Greece, This country
demanded the use of the acronym FYROM for the new state; see Nyström in
C
Tägil (ed.), p. 500.
M 25 For more information, see <www.newnations.com/headlines/mk.html>
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threatened and have thus reacted harsher, than might otherwise

have been the case, to the Albanian demands. So the external con-
flict influences the internal one. It also resounds in a wider forum.
The European Union and the European states in general – still
remember not only their inability to interfere in the civil war of
Bosnia Herzegovina during first half of the 1990s, but also the mas-
sive stream of refugees following in the wake of this calamity.26 To
avoid a repetition of this scenario and to adhere to the idea of the
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EU as a ”project of peace” it seemed that the Union had to get 71mm
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involved when the internal security situation in FYROM broke 76mm
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down in the beginning of 2001, to prevent further deterioration of
this country and of the entire region. And so the EU did.
Soon after the conflict had begun, the EU (together with NATO)
started mediating between Macedonians and Albanians. The result
was the Ohrid Agreement, signed by the two parts on the 8th of
August and with some difficulty ratified by leaders of the various
Macedonian and Albanian parties five days later. The agreement
mainly called for an immediate end to hostilities, for disarming of
the irregular, Albanian forces and for extended recognition of and
rights for the Albanian minority in FYROM.27 So far so good. But
what has the EU actually done for the security of FYROM since then
and, just as importantly, what has it NOT done?
To analyze these questions we must first consider ways in which
the EU could actually lessen the security problems of FYROM. There
seems to be three main options. The first has to do with the enlarge-
ment process itself. This process has, as was mentioned in the first
half of this essay (see footnote 9), by many been seen as the only
way to help countries in Europe’s eastern half to prosper economi-
cally and thus avoid the threatening security conflicts. It is, how-
ever, very difficult to see how FYROM in the nearest future could
enter the EU. Not that it hasn’t been accepted as a candidate for
future membership. And not that it hasn’t been shown those politi-
cal and economic criteria with which it has to comply. But for the
time being it is difficult to see how a country whose PPP (Purchas-
ing Power Parity) is one third of Slovenias and one fourth of Portu-
26 For background information, see

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<www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=statistics>
M 27 See Brunnbauer, pp. 4–7
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gals (one of the poorest countries in the EU) should economically

be able to enter the Union.28 Not to mention the security problems.
So as far as this option is concerned, it is safe to say that EU cannot
use it at the moment, but only work slowly towards it.
Another option concerns the stationing of armed troops to deter
potential troublemakers from attacking each other. This method
has already been used by the West in the Balkans for some years,
namely in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with some success.
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What is important to stress, though, is that the forces being used 71mm
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have all been from NATO or from the UN. EU as such hasn’t had 76mm
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any soldiers or weapons to send even for the implementation of the
Ohrid Agreement NATO-troops were being used, replacing those
UN-troops, whose mandate had expired in 1999.29 Should outside
armed interference once again become necessary in FYROM, a
future EU military force might be able to take on this role. For now,
however, such a force still has to be created. And given the present
day situation with a ”war against terror”, the will of European coun-
tries to have their military forces bound to FYROM may be quite
small, indeed.30
The third method uses economics and re-organization. Even
though the EU may not be willing to include FYROM in the organ-
ization for many years to come, this shouldnt prevent the Union
from helping the Balkan state towards economic prosperity and
thus, perhaps, better security. According to the EU itself this is
exactly what has been done, both before and after the crisis in
2001. In an effort to create a more hospitable environment for busi-
nesses, different enterprise organizations have been supported,
roads and other types of infrastructure have been improved, a de-
centralization of the country has taken place and money have been
allocated for cultural projects. So all in all it is correct to state ”The
EU aims to bring the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia closer
to EU standards and principles, and to assist the country in the
framework of the Stabilization and Association Process.”31
28 See <www.cia.gov> (”world factbook”)

29 For more on this subject, see e.g. <www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/um-tema/
det_vestlig_balkan/233.asp> or Brunnbauer, pp. 6–7
30 For a Greek suggestion to use such a force in FYROM, see <www.alb-net.com/
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pipermail/albsa-info/2001-June/001911.html>
M 31 See <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fyrom/index.htm>
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Still, having stated this a few discrepancies begin to show them-

selves. For even though the EU has a lot of plans for FYROM to pros-
per, and even though some of these plans are presently being
implemented, many other projects haven’t yet been carried
through.32 This may seem quite reasonable. After all, the EU these
days is involved in many very demanding projects33, which take up
much of the Unions time and resources. So helping FYROM slowly
forward could be seen as quite a prudent strategy, indeed.
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Even with this in mind, however, it is somewhat difficult to 71mm
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understand why the EU has cut down on its financial aid to FYROM 76mm
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the last couple of years. After having donated 90 million Euro in
1999 (as part of the post-Kosovo campaign to help the Balkans
recover economically) this amount decreased in 2000 and 2001.
According to the European Unions own statistics, financial assist-
ance for FYROM in 2001 was only 48 million Euro less than in
1997!34 As for trade between the two entities, things don’t look
bright either. For even though the amount of trade in absolute fig-
ures increased during the 1990s, the share of the European Unions
total trade staid the same. 35 Hardly the most compelling evidence
that the well being of FYROM is of high priority for the EU.
Conclusion
So what are the conclusions what can be said about the EU engage-
ment in FYROM? Well, first and foremost one has to underline the
fact that the EU is in many ways engaged in the republic. This is by
no means self-evident many international bodies have so far pre-
ferred to stay away entirely from the Balkans, finding this area far
too complicated to deal with. In many ways this was also the pre-
ferred option of the EU until the Kosovo crisis, when the Union
finally seemed to realize the grave security situation of the Balkans.
Since then, much has been planned and some has been done by the
32 As examples can be mentioned the carrying through of a census and a so-called

audience research survey; for the source see footnote 31.
33 A good depiction of this is given in Friis; ”An ever larger Union?”, p. 5
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34 See footnote 31.
M 35 See <www.fifoost.org/EU/statistik/fyrom.php>
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EU in FYROM; perhaps the sign of a new, more active policy by the

Union in its ”near abroad”. So far, so good.
On the other hand, most of the plans still have to be imple-
mented. There seems to lack a clear-cut strategy from the side of the
Union and perhaps some willpower as well. Decreasing economic
assistance and stagnating trade between the Union and FYROM do
not bode well, even though EU-plans to reform the country on
both governmental and provincial seems to show some after-
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thought. 71mm
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And then again, maybe not. For even though each of these plans 76mm
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taken by themselves seem reasonable enough, it is when they are
viewed together that they show substantial weaknesses. The prob-
lem here, as far as we see it, has to do with lack of understanding of
a central concept, namely security. All the measures undertaken by
the EU are supposed to increase the security. OK, but whose security
are we talking about? The Macedonians? The Albanians? Or
FYROM’s in general? Probably all of them, with an emphasis on the
last. Unfortunately, this may very well prove to be impossible. For
when the security of one ethnic group is heightened, the other one
often feels threatened. Such has been the case throughout history
competing groups have a tendency to think in ”zero-sum solu-
tions”. In this, FYROM is no exception. A prime example here is de-
centralization. At first glance it may seem quite reasonable when
the international community (including the EU) convinces the
FYROM government to increase local self-rule. After all, decisions
should be taken close to the people being governed isn’t it so? But
even if one complies with this, it doesnt take much imagination to
understand how some Macedonians feel, as areas almost exclu-
sively populated by Albanians receive an increased amount of self-
rule. It is not a matter of which group is more right. What matters
here is that one or both of the sides in such a dilemma may soon
feel themselves threatened and thus start tensions all anew.
If we now take this realization and use it to look at the questions
posed in the beginning of the essay, a few deductions present them-
selves. The EU isn’t only rhetoric some real work is being done to
improve security all over Europe, including in FYROM. But some
hidden dangers are at the same time showing themselves. One side
C consists of practical problems as when the EU isn’t willing to spend
M the required time or money on projects demanding exactly this.
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But there is also another side and a potentially more threatening

one. If the EU can’t come up with clear-cut goals and strategies for
the future of Europe, then it may very well end up with not much
future at all. Double standards impress no one. Neither does the
implementation of reforms, which threaten (or seem to threaten)
the various sides in a conflict. However unintentionally this may
be.
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Afterthought the theory of

Picturesquelism
Having thus completed our essay, we would very much like to add
a line of thought, which presented itself as we examined our sub-
ject. For how would it actually be possible to create peace and secu-
rity in Europe? We have tried to pinpoint fallacies in the approach
of the EU to the area of security, but this is merely half the job. Hav-
ing criticized something, one must also propose suggestions for
improvement. Thus, we hereby present the theory of Pictur-
esquelism.
In his book about Maximilien de Robespierre and the French Rev-
olution, James Thompson once commented that the Parisian mob
always acted especially violently in the hottest part of the sum-
mer.36 In the book this subject was merely glanced at, but having
delved deeper into the topic we are now convinced that a funda-
mental, yet undiscovered truth lies hidden here. For is it not so that
doctors often recommend ”a change of air and of surroundings” for
patients suffering from one malady or another? Is it not so that
human instinct compels us towards strange coasts and valleys hid-
den behind those hills? Yes, we dare say, it most certainly is! With
this in mind, our theory easily shows itself to be valid.
For what it proposes is the following: That all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by Nature with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Landscape, Wanderlust and the pur-
suit of fresh Air. Based upon these eternal truths, we see no other
C
M 36 Thompson, J.M.; ”Robespierre and the French Revolution”, 1970.

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alternative than to propose a European Union of the Scenery, where

all people are entitled to beautiful and ever-changing surroundings.
Thus, for life, liberty and happiness and especially peace – to be pre-
served, we see no other alternative than to propose a Europe where
people are constantly moved between different natural landscapes.
These will be divided into categories as follows: Mountain and sea
(category one), plain and forest (category two), delta and lake (cat-
egory three) and the Shetland Isles (category four). People must
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constantly be in touch with no less than two of the categories at the 71mm
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same time and a trip to the Shetland Isles is obligatory every fourth 76mm
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year (so as to give people some perspective on their lives). People
travel around as mini-nations (max. 5.000 at a time) and have to
change their habitat each year on the 12th of August (in honor of
this theory plus its a nice time of year to move around). Should
someone in any way violate these guidelines, the punishment will
be four years of habitation on the Shetland Isles only equipped with
haggis and a television showing washing powder commercials from
the 1960s (that’ll teach them!).
In this way we are certain that given a few years, the entire
Europe will have been seen by all European people who, after this
life-altering experience, shall never wish to leave their houses again
and thus never intrude upon each others homes.
Long live Landscapes, long live European Picturesqueness!!!.
P.S.: People wanting to move to the Shetland Isles after this will be
shot!
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The EU-enlargement: barriers, expectations and possibilities
4 The EU-enlargement: barriers,

expectations and possibilities
Based on the examples of Romania and
Poland
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Oana Balescu, Agnieszka Winiarczyk, Marek Koska, 71mm
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Lukasz Glebski 76mm
Introduction: history of the European

Union
The idea of the European Union, which is one of the most signifi-
cant undertakings of the 20th century in Europe, derived its roots
from the far-sighted project of the so-called fathers of the European
integration such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. Their main
motivation after the Second World War was to establish conditions
for a lasting peace and welfare in Europe build on the principles of
rule of law, democracy, human rights and justice.
The declaration puts forward a number of principles1:
• Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan.
It will be built through practical achievements which will first
create real solidarity;
• The age old enmity between France and Germany must be elimi-
nated; any action taken must in the first place concern these to
countries, but it is open to any other European nations which
share the aims;
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1 Pascal Fontaine: A new idea for Europe, The Schuman declaration-1950–2000,
M second edition, Office for official publications of the European Communities.
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• Action must be taken immediately on one limited but decisive

point: Franco – German production of coal and steel must be
placed under a common High Authority;
• The fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the
standard of living and establish a European Community;
• The decision of the High Authority will be binding on the mem-
ber countries. The High Authority itself will be composed of
independent persons and have equal representation. The author-
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itys decisions will be enforceable. 71mm
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The European Union has been enlarging ever since it was created
over 50 years ago. Designed initially to serve 6 countries: Italy,
France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands it has
been expanding, first in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and Great
Britain joined in, followed by Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal
1986, and last but not least, by Sweden, Austria and Finland in
1995.
Today, the idea of a ”United Europe” faces a major challenge due
to the concept of its future enlargement.2
The enlargement of the EU today

The process of enlargement of the EU still continues as currently
the Community is negotiating accession with 10 more countries
from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Cyprus and Malta,
which have fulfilled the conditions known as the ”Copenhagen cri-
teria”3 for entering the EU. These criteria include: stability of insti-
tutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities and the existence of a func-
tioning market economy. All of these together with the capacity to
cope with competition on the common market and the ability to
2 P. Fontaine: A new idea for Europe, The Schuman declaration 1950–2000, European
Communities, Luxembourg 2000.
3 The criteria came as an outcome of the Copenhagen European Council meeting
C
of June 1993 when the EU made the decision to commit itself to an enlargement
M process to the East.
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take on the obligations of membership, such as, adherence to the

goals of political, economic and monetary union. A future member
state should also adopt the acquis communitaire of the EU and
change its laws in order to be adjustable to the EU law4.
The accession negotiations were opened on 31 March 1998 with
six countries: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland
and Slovenia. A year later in December 1999, at its summit in Hel-
sinki, the European Council decided to open negotiations with six
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further countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and 71mm
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the Slovak Republic. In March 2001, the EU agreed an accession 76mm
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partnership for Turkey, as with other candidates.
The idea, once proven to be successful, that countries which were
previously enemies nowadays share common currency and manage
their social affairs together with the economic and commercial
interests within the framework of joint institutions, currently faces
a lot of discussion and even some skeptical critique and uncer-
tainty, both on the side of the 12 candidate countries, as well as
from the 15 Member States. There are multiple hot potatoes in the
discussion, but the key questions posed are:
Q1. How well is the European Union prepared for the accession of new
countries and among other issues this essay will focus on the structural
reform of the EU presented in the Treaty of Nice of 11 December 2000
and its ratification process.
Q2. Are these countries ready to enter the EU?
Q3. At what cost will the status of member states be achieved in the
candidate countries?,
Q4. What will be the benefit of an enlargement for both the EU and the
countries applying for the accession?
If all the candidates for accession are successful, the EU will even-
tually stretch from the Arctic to Cyprus and from Ireland to Estonia.
However, the considerable diversity between candidates, economi-
cally, politically and culturally will present the Union with major
strategic problems. The economic disparities between the candidate
countries, which can be seen today, are expected to increase with
time. It can result in that the countries not in the first enlargement,
which will probably be the case of Romania, which faces difficulties
M 4 The European Union: Still enlarging, European Communities, Luxembourg 2000.

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in attracting foreign investment necessary to speed up the process

of catching up with the European Union5.
In this essay we will attempt to answer the above questions and
the issues mentioned will be discussed upon using the example of
Poland and Romania, countries that represent the so-called Luxem-
bourg and Helsinki negotiation group, respectively. It will also look
closely on the possible outcomes of the enlargement in these states
in respect of the religious influence, traditional culture and social
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behaviors in these countries. At the same time it will try to point 71mm
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out the fears of the West-European countries associated with the 76mm
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enlargement and confront them with the real status quo.
Q1. Challenges for the EU with the

accession of new countries
A. The Treaty of Nice
One of the major problems in the discussion of the future of the
European Union is the efficiency of its institutions when it will be
consisting of 25 or 27 countries. The fifteen Member States, which
have placed some of their responsibilities under the power of the
four institutions of the EU, i.e. the Council, the Parliament, the
Commission and the Court of Justice, pursuing common policies
and acting in the general interest of the inhabitants of the Euro-
pean Union, today are searching for a new shape of community
institutions. These institutions, without major functional and
structural reforms shall be enable to serve 25 or even 27 countries
after the EU enlargement. The IGC (Inter-governmental confer-
ence) conducted in December 2000 in Nice was aimed at changing
the structure of the future enlarged EU. Poland’s government
expected that their country would play an important role in the
enlargement. The IGC in Nice concluded with the preparation of a
new Treaty, dealing with these issues. The provisions were generally
in line with the Polish expectations. Poland obtained 27 votes in
C
5 Ed. R. Sakwa, A. Stevens: Contemporary Europe, Macmillan Press Ltd, New York
M 2000, p.164.
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the EU Council, just after the biggest ”4”, i.e. Germany, France,
Great Britain and Italy. It seems to be a decent resolution, taking
into account that e.g. the population of Germany is over twice as
big as Poland’s. The IGC decided also to change the qualified major-
ity mechanism in the EU Council. The system-to-be requires a triple
qualified majority: the number of votes, the number of countries
and the population of these countries. This mechanism works in
both directions. Many small countries wouldnt be able to outvote
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the largest members, because of the lack of the population majority. 71mm
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On the other hand the largest countries won’t gain a majority, 76mm
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because there are not enough of them. How it’s going to be in prac-
tice, is to be found out in the year 2005, the earliest.
One of the paradoxes of the EU enlargement is that the Treaty of
Nice, which serves as its legal basis, has to be implemented by all
member states. This process is still unfinished, since Ireland has not
yet implemented it. Ireland was the only country to decide on the
ratification in a national referendum. The Irish voters said NO
(54%) to the Nice Treaty in June 2001. In a second national referen-
dum is scheduled for October 2002. Poland expects the Irish voters
to accept the Treaty, which is fundamental for the EU Enlargement.
Brian Cowen, the Irish Foreign Minister in a statement from the
19th of July 2002 said, ”A definite NO to Nice would be deeply dam-
aging to these prospects (prosperity and economic success) in the
future (…). Nice is first and lasts, about enlargement. It is about giv-
ing other European countries many of whom were relatively
recently liberated from external domination the same opportuni-
ties that Ireland received thirty years ago”. He also believes that ”
(Ireland) will rise to the challenge of Enlargement. And Irish busi-
ness will take full advantage of the new economic and trading
potential with the wider Europe”6.
The public opinion in many member states points out and criti-
cizes the growing bureaucracy, mainly in the Commission, which is
running a risk to be even increasing after the EU enlargement. One
can also notice some organizational barriers and difficulties for the
process within the EU itself, such as the necessity to translate the
6 Remarks by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brian Cowen.government of

C
Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, Friday, July 19, 2002.
M http://www.gov.ie/iveagh/information/display.asp?
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whole of the acquis communitaire into all of the future Member

States languages and the cost involved with it. This, together with
the cost of employing several thousand of clerks and entrepreneurs
to serve the new EU officials and states, will increase the expenses.
Some skeptics of the enlargement also point out the democracy def-
icit based on the assumption that the Community institutions
already now seem detached from the Member States citizens and do
not always act to protect their interests.
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The main barriers seen in the process of enlargement, however, 71mm
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are recognized by the EU institutions, especially by the Commis- 76mm
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sion, which annually assesses the progress made by the candidates
in their countries7.
B. The free movement of goods, persons, services

and capital within the EU
Another barrier and a question highly debated nowadays is the
access of citizens of new Member States to the labour market and
free movement within the Community. Currently only a few coun-
tries, such as for instance Spain and Sweden, have agreed to allow
citizens of newly admitted countries to participate in their labour
markets. This fact is mainly due to shortages in their work force,
which prevents these countries from continuous development of
their economies. Opening of their markets to foreign employees
and liberating the labour markets seems to be a possibility to sus-
tain the growth of specific regions and countries, as well as the
whole Community. Nobody can deny that the falling birth rates in
EU countries, and therefore attracting both skilled and unskilled
workers seems to be a necessary step that will have to be taken by
these countries. Some sociologists point out that it will be easier for
the West European societies to accept the arrival of east European
nationals in their countries, as they are culturally closer than for
instance people from Africa or Asia. It seems a safe way to solve the
C
7 The results are published in Regular Report o Polands Progress Towards Acces-
M sion.
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problem of lacking labour force in certain areas when one looks at

the rising issue of racism in Western Europe.
Historically, EU Member States expressed similar fears in the early
1980s, when the entry of Spain and Portugal was being negotiated.
Transitional periods of up to seven years were introduced but not
needed. The flow of labour, which had been powerful well before
this enlargement, actually reversed: numbers of Spanish migrant
workers in France declined from ± 180.000 in 1980 to ± 117.000 in
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1986 as the Spanish economy geared up for membership and 71mm
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increased in dynamism. 76mm
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To judge from the public mood in the EU, as it is analyzed twice
a year by the Eurobarometer polls, immigration and unemploy-
ment figure at the top of the list of public priorities, along with
crime and the environment.8
Statistical data gathered by the EU Eurostat shows that at present,
only around 2% of the EU population live and work in countries
other than their own. People do not seek to migrate unless there are
compelling reasons. Frequently, in both Member States and candi-
date countries, jobs in one part of a country fail to attract people
from other parts; so how much less is the attraction then in a
wholly different linguistic and social environment? Usually the
cost of such an undertaking is too high when compared to the pos-
sible gain.
One can say that the great bulk of the unskilled, seasonal or man-
ual migrants have already set up in the EU, coming on tourist visas,
staying for some months and then returning to their place of origin
to renew the visa. There is, in the debate about immigration, a cer-
tain sense of locking the stable door after the horse has bolted. But
this is evident largely to those who make it their business. The
broader public still has visions of hordes of poor central Europeans
waiting to flood in. There are, nevertheless, some specific factors to
be taken into account on the question of membership negotiations
and immigration. Political parties, mostly of the extreme right and
extreme left continuously talk of enlargement as a means to swamp
Europe with immigrants, which will probably not be the case.
Member States citizens are presented with images of illegal immi-
C
8 Thomas Glaser : Directorate-General of Enlargement, Information and Inter
M institutional Relations, the Courier ACP-EU, July-August 2001.
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grants crossing the borders of European countries. However, the

media dont point out that these are not immigrants from the appli-
cant countries, maybe with the exception of Kurds from Turkey, but
citizens of African and Asian states.
One of the studies conducted by a German research body, has
come up with the figure of 220,000 immigrants to Germany
(335,000 if family members are included) once the enlargement has
taken place.9
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Q2. Barriers, fears and possibilities in

Poland and Romania
A. Facts about Poland and Romania
Both Poland and Romania represent different geographical regions
of Europe and are at different stages of accession negotiations with
the EU10, which will most probably result in different dates of acces-
sion. Despite the fact that they both share a similar kind of post-
communist experience, their political legacy of the Cold War era
was different; Poland had the strongest movement of popular dis-
sent and the greatest sense of its own national identity, whereas
Romania under Ceausescu was a highly autocratic regime11. These
factors today affect the political culture in Poland and Romania and
are an important reason for differences between them.
Due to the fact that Poland and Romania are at different stages of
the reform process, and that their economies are at different levels
of development with the Polish one being more advanced with
GDP per capita of 5904$ compared to Romanias 1545$12 (in the
year 2001) they require different approaches from the EU, includ-
9 Thomas Glaser: Directorate-General of Enlargement, Information and Inter

institutional Relations, the Courier ACP-EU, July–August 2001.
10 Poland entered the negotiation process in December 1997 together with Slove-
nia, Hungary, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, whereas Romania did in on
December 1999 with Slovakia, Malta, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia.
11 Ed. R.Sakwa, A.Stevens: Contemporary Europe, Macmillan Press Ltd, New York
C
2000, p.166.
M 12 <http://www.euro.pap.net.pl>
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ing for instance the amount of financial support from the EU struc-
tural funds or the social groups which this support should reach.
They also exhibit differences in advancement of the negotiations,
which can be seen in the number of chapters that are already closed
13
or perceived as problematic or controversial.
Initially, the barriers for these two countries included the neces-
sity of building a market economy system, securing the minority
rights and the strengthening of democracy and the civil society sys-
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tem. 71mm
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The last barrier is especially important as one can observe with 76mm
11/14,5
concern in the Polish and Romanian citizens declining interest in
voting, both in parliamentary and local government elections.
Recently in Poland an important change in the system of local
self-government have been introduced and now, for the first time,
will the leaders of local government structures be elected in a direct
ballot rather than appointed, as before, by the local councils after
the election. Hopefully, this will revitalize the local governments
and will put the authorities closer to those who have elected them.
It is important that people want to participate in elections and ref-
erenda since Poland, in spring 2003, will hold a referendum about
the Polish accession to the EU whose result will influence the coun-
trys future. Currently the support for the enlargement is over 50 per
cent, but it still remains a very sensitive issue in the society.14
In 2001 the budget deficit of Poland increased to nearly 10 per
cent of GDP. This news came as a surprise or even shock for most
citizens. The situation has improved under the regime of the new
government led by Leszek Miller, which has managed to contain
the deficit to slightly over 5 % of GDP, but the spending cuts have
resulted in the increasing support for the populist and anti-Euro-
pean currents. Fortunately the firm majority of the Polish political
elite, public opinion and the media denounce these currents which
are a threatening factor for the accession of Poland to the EU.
13 The number of provisionally closed chapters for Romania is 13 and for Poland
26 out of 30 (stated 31 July 2002), source: <http://www.ukie.gov.pl>, <http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/pdf/
stateofplay_july2002.pdf>
14 It is important that the referendum will be held in spring as it is sociologically
C
proven that in Poland more people tend to participate in elections or referenda
M which are held in the first half of the year.
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One can suppose that these political forces would never have
come to power if the majority of the society were more interested in
politics. A lot of people in Poland do not want to participate in the
social and political life of the country, as they feel socially excluded.
They dont feel that they have any influence over the governing of
the country, and therefore some of them believe that entering the
EU will further increase such a tendency.
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11/14,5 B. Barriers and possibilities in Poland and the EU 76mm
Polish challenges have their European context. The country is

heading for membership in the EU in order to grow faster and allow
Poland to meet the requirements of the global world and interna-
tional competition. Therefore, the conclusion of the accession
negotiations by the end of 2002 is a true challenge for the country,
as keeping the deadlines set in ”the road map” in Gothenburg
requires many domestic political decisions and improving the
economy.
One of the major obstacles for the accession of Poland is the situ-
ation of its agriculture, which is generally underdeveloped, not effi-
cient and employs too many people compared to the average rate of
agricultural employees in the EU Member States. In comparison,
only 2 farmers in Denmark produce the same value of agricultural
goods, which in Poland is created on average by 27 people.
The disadvantage of Polish farming lies also in the lack of special-
ization in the production of specific goods and the small size of the
farms, which on average are ca. 7.2 hectares whereas the EU average
is much larger, i.e.19 ha. Most of the farms produce goods, which
are consumed at home and never enter the countrys market15. That
image of a small, remote farm producing everything in small quan-
tities, and willing to obtain production subsidies is a scary one,
both to the EU farmers and the EU Commission due to the esti-
mated high costs for such an undertaking.
The described underdevelopment, however, doesnt have to be a
threat to the EU farmers when one looks at the possible market
C
15 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/countryrep/
M poland.pdf> (July 2002).
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niche the Polish farmers can fill with, for instance, organic food, a
branch where they could easily become specialized due to the
advantages of low polluted areas. Poland is on the verge to omit the
stage of high agriculture intensification, from which the EU coun-
tries are now taking a step back, and catch up with most Member
States at the stage of post-industrialism, high level of environmen-
tal protection and non-intensive agriculture. However, neither the
EU farmers, nor Polish and Romanian farmers see it this clearly.
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Their bilateral fears and prejudices are a result of a lack of sufficient 71mm
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information campaigns, especially among the Polish farmers who 76mm
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know very little about the advantages of joining the EU and are
therefore to a great extent against it, especially after they repeatedly
hear about the production limits that will be imposed on them by
the EU. They also are skeptical to the short transition periods for
buying arable land16 by foreign individuals and the lack of produc-
tion subsidies for their farms. On the other hand the EU farmers
fear that they will have to give up some of their subsidies for the
sake of new Member States and share their production limits with
them, which could result in lower annual incomes. They also fear a
flood of cheaper food on the EU market from new member states,
due to lower costs of production and labor there. These fears are
often employed by radical right wing parties in countries like
France and Denmark which sometimes use a rhetoric such as: Do
you want 40 million Polish peasants in the EU?17 Most European
economists, however, have already point out that it will not be pos-
sible to maintain the current level of subsidies without a reform of
the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which still amounts to ca. 52
percent of the EU budget.
High unemployment rates in Poland and Romania seem to be a
significant barrier in their future accession to the EU. In Poland it is
the highest in the countrys history. In 2001 the Polish GDP grew
with only 1 per cent, which together with a low inflation rate
16 Poland has asked for transitional periods in buying land for agriculture purposes
due to the fears that it will be bought by foreigners too quickly, due to its low
price as the average price of a hectare of arable land in Poland is app. Thousand
euro, whereas in the EU is much higher.
C
17 Rhetoric used by the Danish Folk Party before the previous parliamentary elec-
M tions.
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resulted in an unemployment of over 3 million people, which cov-

ered ca. 18 per cent of the total work force. However, the Polish gov-
ernment launched a special program a few months ago and is now
pursuing an economic strategy under the headline ”Entrepreneur-
ship-Growth-Jobs”. An important part of this program is aimed at
infrastructure investments, as foreign investors often remarks that
one of the things Poland needs most is an improved infrastructure.
Bearing this in mind, the government has already invited private
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companies to participate in various projects, for instance in con- 71mm
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structing a system of motorways, which in the future will link the 76mm
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EU countries with other post Soviet states.
C. Barriers and possibilities in Romania

Similarly, for Romania as for Poland, integration with the EU means
a guarantee of stability and economic growth. The EU enlargement
leads to a genuine revolution at the level of European policies.
Romania has enrolled in this irreversible process and takes part in
the modernization required by the integration in the European
Union, which entails the general evolution of the whole Romanian
society.
c.1. Cultural background of the economic change in todays

Romania
At the beginning of the 1990s, Romanias economic situation was
comparable with that of the other ex-communist countries from
Eastern Europe (Romanias GDP growth rate for 1991 was 12,9% and
for the same year, Hungary had 11,9%). After 10 years the situation
was completely different, and Romanias economic development
towards market economy, compared to Poland, was still negative.
For example, in 1999 Romanias GDP growth rate was 4% whereas
Poland that same year had a GDP growth rate of +4%. This was one
of the reasons why Romania was placed in the second group of
countries proposed for the EU enlargement (if we examine GDP per
capita for 1999, the difference is more relevant: Poland 4233$ and
Romania 1352$)18.
C
M 18 <www.phil.euv-frankfurt-o.de/>
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The difference can be shown, not only with the help of economic
indicators, but it is also be manifested by factors of social stability
and standard of life. It is true that for the first seven years after the
1989 Revolution Romania had a left wing government and a presi-
dent coming from this political wing and that this slowed down the
privatization process in those years. Even if the so-called socialist
countries had an economic system based on the principle of plan
economy and state property, concerning the last aspect there were
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from the start of the democratization process some differ- 71mm
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ences.(Poland for instance does not have to make a reform with 76mm
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respect to the property of the ground). After four years of central-
right government in Romania (1996–2000) the economic situation
in the field of privatization looks much better, but the economic
and social stability is still problematic.
The transformation process that took place also involved build-
ing new institutions that are important for the functioning of
democracy and market economy. The institutions are based on spe-
cific rules for the functioning of which, factors influencing human
behavior are of great relevance. This is because: ”only when we
understand this modifications in the behavior of the actors can we
make sense out of the existence and structure of institution and
explain the direction of the institutional change”.19 This assump-
tion is an important element in the explanation of how institutions
function. Among these factors, issues of culture and especially reli-
gion, plays a considerable role. This is why the question: is there
any relationship between the cultural and religious background in
Romania and the economic development in the past twelve years
with respect to market economy and capitalistic values?
If we take into consideration Max Weber`s theory about the Prot-
estant ethics and the spirit of capitalism, some researchers found
out that that the relationship between religion and economy, are
confirmed by empirical researchers20.
In order to define what tradition means for a working ethics, in
the case of Romania at the end of the 20th century, the reality of
communist education must also be taken into account. With
respect to communism and its idea of work, we have on the one
C
19 ibidem, s.19
M 20 ibid.19
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hand, the officials models of education and on the other hand some
common practice or some customs or mentality. It is also necessary
to consider aspects of cultural and economic history of the country.
It would not be correct to affirm that the attitude with respect to
work in todays Romania is based only upon tradition. Speaking
about rules that are adapted by the way of teaching we also deal
with such rules that refer to market economy and private property
as far as they are mediated by political culture.
9/12
The economic statistics show21 that the countries with a predom- 68mm
71mm
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inance of Orthodox-Christian population developed much slower 76mm
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toward capitalist economy. But still analyzing the respective process
we must be aware that simple determinism of a respective kind
would be a crude simplification. In order to define the causes of this
kind of economic development in the case of Romania all the cul-
tural and religious factors that were mentioned before have to be
taken into consideration.
c.2. Romanian elite between tradition and transformation

Romanias bid to join the EU is overwhelmingly sustained by its cit-
izens22 and the consensus of the Romanian political class, which
regards Romanias accession to the European structures as a funda-
mental objective of national policy23. This, the largest support for
joining the EU of all the candidate countries, can be explained by
the fact that the EU is seen as a huge chance for improving peoples
lives and the countrys economy. However, the candidate countries
attention should be shifted, for the time being, from the challenges
of entering the EU into inner problems.
If we take a historical approach, any survey of modern Romanian
history reveals a seemingly undeniable pattern of corrupt, manipu-
lative leadership combined with xenophobia and acutely caustic
anti-Semitism. This legacy is perhaps best demonstrated by the
shocking behavior of the ultra-right-wing paramilitary group, the
Iron Guard, during the Second World War, which has since been
21 ibid.19
22 Over 80% of the Romanians declare themselves in favour of countrys admission
to the EU.
C
23 <http://www.mie.ro/Viit_Europei/English/position/
M vision_of_the_governm.htm>
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overshadowed by the monstrous behavior of the Communist lead-

ership against its own citizens.
Scholars have repeatedly spoken of social and political culture in
Romania as something evident and unalterable, without bothering
to define their terms. Their belief is that the people within the soci-
ety must be taught democratic procedures because they simply lack
the experience of reciprocal, responsible government. However,
there are two divergent implications to this position, both of which
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revolve around the question as to whether the former communist 71mm
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countries lack experience due to historical change and uncontrolla- 76mm
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ble circumstance or whether democracy is inherently antithetical to
those societies nature. Simply put, the broader question is whether
a society gets the government it deserves.24
Within a historiographic or politically theoretical context this
would be acceptable, as it remains a polemical matter. However, the
question of NATO and EU accession bring these vague terms into
the broader public discourse, as foreign (Western) governments
repeatedly stress the need for the Romanian government to both
implement reforms, which would intensify austerity measures
within the country, and alter its ”social and political culture” or
build a ”civil society”.
Too often, Westerners impose their concepts of government and
civil society on those who simply have not had similar experiences.
Ten years after the fall of Communism, it should be now obvious
that the market system does not necessarily lead to democracy.
However, it is similarly erroneous to conclude that the burden of
blame for the failure of reforms or the rise of extremists groups on
either end of the political spectrum is directly determined by the
nature of a societys history. Romania always used its Roman roots
to stress its Western orientation and, more importantly, its strategic
geopolitical position as the natural bulwark against Russian expan-
sionism. Romanian politicians, past and present, have used both
these factors to present themselves as the last outpost of ”civilized”
Europe and therefore the Wests natural allied. Through this rela-
tionship Romania acquired political and financial support, which,
more often than not, served to consolidate the position of political
elite rather than benefit Romanian society as a whole.
C
M 24 Joanna Rohozinska, Central Europe Review, vol.1, no.11, 6th of September 1999.
Y
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But the question remains how one should define Romanias

”social and political culture” and whether the repetitive pattern,
evidenced by its foreign policy pursuits, is indicative of the societys
capacity, or desire, for reform. Perhaps this is best reflected in one of
the striking features of Bucharest: the plethora of small kiosks,
which take up sidewalk space at every intersection and in every
metro station. These packed kiosks, where one can buy anything
from soap to cigarettes or radios, stand in stark contrast to the ech-
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oing, cavernous buildings, which were intended to house depart- 71mm
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ment stores. The idea to catch on has obvious failed, as these build- 76mm
11/14,5
ings now stand mainly empty. Similarly, the more recent
introduced Western-style self-service stores are, in general, few and
far between and don’t appear particularly popular. Upon the ques-
tion why, the answer is that these stores simply arent trusted, even
though the goods are of fine quality and often are cheaper than in
kiosks. Is the answer then that there is a fundamental, ingrained
mistrust of anything that appears to be officially organized or sanc-
tioned? Even if one assumes this to be true, one shouldnt jump to
the conclusion that the future of Romania is necessarily bleak; it
merely indicates the magnitude of the task that faces Romanias
political leadership. There is a deep cleavage (that has arguably
existed) between those who hold power and those they represent.
This is obviously not unique to Romania, and we believe that all the
former Communists countries have to deal with the same problem.
The Bucharest political elite, whose origins predate the formation
of the Romanian State in 1878, have consistently pursued policies
and employed tactics that support their personal power with little
regard of concern for the common people they represent.
Q3: Cost of the accession in the EU for

Poland and Romania
The initial strong support of entering the EU may weaken in Roma-
C
nia over time as the example of Poland, which started the process of
M
negotiations earlier, has previously shown. One can notice a trend
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that whenever a controversial issue is brought into discussion on

the public arena the support for the enlargement diminishes. This
was the case especially after the negotiations with the EU concern-
ing the issue of foreigners buying land in Poland. There exist a com-
mon fear used by the populist right wing parties, which at present
make up 10 percent of the Polish Parliament, especially among the
farmers that Polish land can be too easily and cheaply obtained by
foreigners. One can already notice the increasing presence of for-
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eign farmers, especially of German and Danish nationality in 71mm
10/13
north-western Poland, and an increasing ownership of land by Ger- 76mm
11/14,5
man citizens in Mazury lake district, which had a long tradition of
German settlers who later had to move out of their territories after
the second world war, although officially there is no clear evidence
of this actually taking place. The fear that Polish land will be pos-
sessed by foreigners has determined the governments demand for a
very long transition period for buying land in Poland. Although
this demand has been turned down by the EU, the common expec-
tation of the majority of the society still remains unchanged.
The fear that Polish land will be taken over by foreigners can be
explained by the fact that the country continues to build its democ-
racy. It became fully independent as late as 1918, after the 123 years
of being partitioned by Prussia, Russia and the Habsburg Empire
and it is a strong unifying value for most Poles, especially those liv-
ing in the rural areas and most of whom having only a basic educa-
tion. Since the last parliamentary elections these societal groups are
strongly represented in the Polish Parliament, which is a phenome-
non that none of the political scientists were able to predict25. It
proves that some groups of the Polish society are afraid of the
integration process, which is partially a result of a lack of efficient
government information strategy. The complex terms related to the
EU enlargement used by the Polish politicians are not
comprehensible to a number of Polish citizens. Therefore, populist
parties of a so-called ”social objection” such as, Samoobrona (Self-
defense Party) led by the charismatic Andrzej Lepper, and Liga
Polskich Rodzin (The League of Polish Families) a conglomerate of
small, mainly Catholic Orthodox and nationalist groups endorsed
C
25 These euro-sceptical parties reached almost 17% of 460 seats in the Polish Par-
M liament.
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by Radio Maryja, an influential radio station among elderly and

nationalist-oriented catholic listeners rejecting the idea of Poland
joining the EU, enjoy a large social support.
The majority of these parties members and supporters are manual
laborers, peasants and people from different sectors of industry,
such as mining, shipbuilding industry, textile or motor industries,
which are nowadays facing restructuring or liquidation. These con-
temporary supporters of the Self-defense party, who under the com-
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munist regime were considered to be the elite of the system, now 71mm
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feel totally neglected and find themselves in a hard economic situ- 76mm
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ation. Some social scientists argue that these two political parties
reflect more precisely the moods, which are widely spread in the
Polish society, and are not an obstacle in the accession process.
Although the parties are strongly populist their attitude towards the
EU has changed since they entered the Parliament. Their leaders are
now mentioning the ”accession under certain conditions” rather
than following the Belarus example of trying to live in an autarky in
a globalized and still widening and deepening Europe. The condi-
tions mentioned are, among a variety of others, equal treatment of
the Polish farmers from the first day of accession, the maintenance
of ”Polish unique traditions and catholic values” and preserving the
influence over the ”degenerated and perverted” societies of the cur-
rent Member States.
The skepticism towards entering the EU is not a phenomenon in
Romania. Here, the predominant fears of ordinary citizens cur-
rently concern not the entering of the EU but the fear that the tran-
sitional period after the communist regime will never end and that they
will continue to live on austerity budgets and sacrifices. It is the political
class that is blamed for that state of matters, and it has lost societys
trust, even though at the beginning there was a strong feeling of
optimism and belief that everything would change for the better.
However, in twelve years nothing has really changed for the Roma-
nians in terms of money, food and quality of life and therefore they
are becoming more and more impatient. This is why we think that
in the future Romania will have to face the challenge of an ”iron
hand” government who will really want to do something for the
country and its people if only the promise that Romania will
C become a part of EU in 2007.
M
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In its 1997 Opinion, the Commission concluded that Romania

fulfilled the political criteria for EU membership26. Since then, the
country has made considerable progress in further consolidating
and deepening the stability of its institutions, guaranteeing democ-
racy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities. However, even though Romania continues to fulfill the
Copenhagen political criteria, the economy still needs to improve
in order to be competitive on an international scale.
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One can notice the improved efficiency of the legislature and the 71mm
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overall functioning of government. Also the reform of judicial pro- 76mm
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cedures has continued and an effective implementation of new leg-
islation on public procurement should play an important role in the
fight against corruption, which still remains a serious problem that
is largely unsolved. Other particular concerns are the lack of progress
in carrying out a strategic reform of the public administration and
the need to further guarantee the independence of judiciary.
Significant progress has been made in the field of human rights.
Reform of the childcare system is well under way; homosexuality
has been decriminalised and an important new legislation has been
passed regarding the restitution of property and the treatment of
asylum seekers and refugees. These were the officials declarations,
but the problem is that even if homosexuality has been decriminal-
ised officially, a large part of the population doesnt agree with this
phenomenon. There were a lot of debates and the churchs point of
view was that homosexuality, prostitution and abortion shouldnt
be permitted. And this is what most of the people think too, taking
also into consideration the fact that the church is one of the insti-
tutions that Romanian people trust. So, here we face a contradic-
tion in term of what the government declares and what people
really think.
The introduction of probation represents an important reform of
the penal system and several initiatives has been taken to address
trafficking of human beings. Future reforms should seek to modern-
ise the Penal Code and increase the public accountability of police
officers, as well as, ensure the proportionality of their actions.
New legislation extending the use of minority language was
approved, and a National Strategy for Improving the Condition of
C
M 26 <www.mie.ro>
Y
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Roma has been adopted. However, there still have to be affords put
on the implementation of the strategy, with the aim to effectively
combat the widespread discrimination, and to improve the living
conditions. But, the problem is that the Roma strategy has not yet
been implemented; anti-discrimination legislation has been
adopted but it is not yet operational; and the demilitarisation of the
police has just started and also, efforts to improve the actual living
conditions in childcare institutions should continue. These still
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remain some of the challenges for Romania. 71mm
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Although in recent years Romania had made progress towards 76mm
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establishing a functioning market economy it would not, in the
medium term, be able to cope with competitive pressure and mar-
ket forces within the Union. However, it has taken measures that
would allow developing its future capacity. The country also made
progress towards macroeconomic stabilization: the economic
growth has resumed and exports have increased. Structural reforms
have been re-launched, most notably in the area of privatization
and energy price adjustments. The recent privatization (in the past
four years) demonstrates a new commitment towards the establish-
ment of a functioning market economy.
However, there are still serious economic imbalances with high
inflation and a widening current account deficit, in a difficult social
environment. The fragile macroeconomic environment, the uncer-
tain legal framework and the poor administrative capacity hinder
the development of the private sector. Large parts of the enterprise
sector have yet to start restructuring or are still in the early stages of
the process. Romanias reform agenda remains considerable. The
authorities should give priority to securing macroeconomic stabil-
ity by fighting inflation (see table 1) and halting the deterioration
of the external account. The full implementation of the program
agreed with the IMF, focusing on reversing the causes of inflation,
would permit a gradual shifting of monetary and exchange rate pol-
icy towards inflation reduction. A further priority is to accompany
enterprise restructuring and privatization with the establishment of
sound legal and institutional foundations of the functioning mar-
ket economy27.
M 27 <www.mie.ro>
Y
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Evolutia ratel a inflatiel din 1990 pana in prezent

32 %
24 %
16 %
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8% 71mm
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0%
Nov 90
Nov 91
Nov 92
Nov 93
Nov 94
Nov 95
Nov 96
Nov 97
Nov 98
Nov 99
Nov 00
Nov 01
Table 4.1 The evolution of inflation monthly rate in Romania, years 1990–200128
Q4: Conclusion
Having discussed the pros and cons of the EU enlargement we
highly agree with Mr. Borowski, a speaker of the Polish Parliament
who said that the EU enlargement is a need and of benefit not only
to the forthcoming new members but equally to the present mem-
ber states. The enlargement must not be seen as a goodwill gesture
of the rich towards the poor, but as a process of making a single
political and economic organism that holds out opportunities for
economic growth, stabilization of the present and new member
states and for mutual benefits. This mutual benefit can be exempli-
fied by the fact that exports from the EU to Poland soared from USD
11 billion in 1992 to USD 31 billion in 2001. The analysts calcu-
lated that it enabled the creation of about 600 thousand jobs in the
EU. When we think of the EU exports to the other applicant coun-
tries this number would be much higher
All of the applicant countries have already benefited from the
access to pre-accession funds, such as PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD,
M 28 <http://www.kmarket.ro/b4/istoricinflatie.html>
Y
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but it is still important to make sure that the countries with less
developed economies such as Romania become net recipients of
funds already from the first year of their membership. Generally,
the prevailing perception of the public opinion in Poland and
Romania about the questions of agriculture and the exercising of
the four freedoms is that both countries have already liberated their
inner rules concerning the influx of, for instance, products and
services from the EU countries, whereas, on the EU market there
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still exist barriers that cannot be overcame by Romanian and Polish 71mm
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producers. Such status quo produces tensions and anxiety on both 76mm
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sides and has to be discussed in order to reach a conclusion, which
would be beneficial for the member states and the EU.
Common expectations in the candidate countries are that they
will be able to enter EU on the same rules as countries that have
done so in the past enlargement waves. There exists a fear that even
if the 10 or 12 countries enter the EU they will not share the same
freedoms and rights as the 15 Member States exercise today and
that there will be a center and periphery created within the EU.
Polish and Romanian societies fears associated with the accession
are partially the result of the EUs withdrawal from taking up some
controversial topics such as for instance the amount of money
which will be immediately accessible for the new member states
after their accession.
We can conclude that the European Union is already prepared for
the accession of new countries, a few of them very small states
which will not have a great impact on the overall EU performance.
The accession of bigger countries, like Poland, is more problematic
but on the other hand the EU can also gain a lot by inviting them to
be a part of it. Here we think especially about the advantage of a free
movement of labor force between countries that have a shortage of
it and those that experience unemployment among its citizens.
One must also remember the advantages of an expanded market,
which creates an opportunity for the growth of the member states
economies and creation of thousands of new jobs.
The cost of the enlargement will be mostly covered by the appli-
cant countries, which already are covering it in the form of sacri-
fices they have to make in order to adjust their infrastructure, law
C systems, etc. to the EU standards. One has to bear in mind that
M member states expenditures, which comprise the EU budget on
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average, make up ca. 1. 27 per cent of their GDPs, whereas it is

much more that has to be spent by the applicant countries in order
to adjust to the requirements of the EU29.
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29 Address by Mr. Marek Borowski, Speaker of the Polish Parliament, to the Royal
C
Institute for International Affairs in London: Poland: Political and Economic
M Challenges, 2 July 2002.
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Argentine Emigration to Spain
5 Argentine Emigration to Spain

Push and Pull Factors
Eva Bokinge, Noelia Garasievich, Liliana Lopes,
Marta Romanska
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Introduction
There is much debate and controversy over migration issues. This is
precisely the reasons why so many different administrations and
governments all around Europe are meeting and discussing solu-
tions to it, even new ways to control it, restrain it or prevent it,
devising new policies and ways to face and cope with the new world
changing scenario. Definitely, migrations are a major issue in
Europe today. Migrations scare, might even destabilize sometimes,
bring about new challenges, new opportunities and even transform
whole societies. Migrations have the power to construct as well as
to deconstruct and are reframing the global map. The topic of
migrations can be found in the mass media, in the academic setting
as well as in casual encounters. High rank politicians and officials
are currently forced to analyze it, but the common European citizen
is also undergoing his/her own private debate at home. Then there
have always existed the potential migrants and their own thinking,
planning and images. Consequently, there are different stand-
points, different perspectives, which will endlessly enrich, compli-
cate and shed light onto the debate. Argentine, a country that
prided itself of being ”el granero del mundo” (the world barn –rich-
ness and resources–) less than one century ago and deemed by
many as ”the envy of the world and an utopia that opened its arms
to generations of immigrants who flooded in with the firm hope of
a better tomorrow”1, is now deep into an economic depression and
with a population willing to flee.
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M 1 Sweeney, Ernest W (2002).

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In the present paper we will elaborate on the underlying funda-

mentals causing the present migration flow from Argentina to
Spain by presenting and describing the recent and contemporary
migration flows. The topic will be tackled from a ”push and pull”
perspective, underlining the factors which play a decisive role in
the context of migrations. We will also question in what aspects
Spain might be different from other potential receiving countries
and how Spain has changed its status from ”classical emigration
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country” to a new receiving region. We will then be inevitably con- 71mm
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fronted with the dilemma of why this new emigration flow is so sig- 76mm
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nificant for Argentine standards. We will also include the explana-
tion of other concepts such as migration, culture and citizenship in
the context of our discussion.
Consequently, this study will not describe Argentines emigration
towards other countries of origin such as America or Italy, which
constitute the second and third chosen destination after Spain.2
Obviously, this would take up a new study in itself.
Furthermore, through our primary focus of migrations, we ana-
lyse the meeting of two different continents; that is Europe and
South America. Since our group is composed of both people from
South America and Europe, we thought this subject would be fruit-
ful and personally enriching.
Push and Pull factors

To understand the recent flow of emigrants from Argentina to Spain
we must study the reasons behind these movements. On one hand
we have the push factors that are the reasons ”impelling people to
leave the areas of origin.”3 On the other hand, we have various pull
factors looming in the distant European horizon. Pull factors can be
described as those reasons ”attracting people to certain receiving
countries.”4 These factors will be used in an attempt to explain why
Argentines are getting more and more ”anxious to escape their
2 Servicio de Estadisticas del Trabajo en Argentina. Diario Clarin online (http://

www.clarin.com as of 21st July 2002).
C
3 Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark J. (1998).
M 4 Ibid. 3.
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countrys economic collapse (…) queuing up at foreign embassies in

Buenos Aires, seeking a passport or a visa. Some want to retrace in
reverse the journey made by great-grandparents from Spain or Italy
a century ago.”5
It is essential to depict each one of these push and pull factors in
more detail. The political and economic crises in the Argentines
case are closely intertwined. One cannot state in which order they
broke out. If we are to track their development we will see that they
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smoothly blend. Nevertheless, we can assert that the ensuing social 71mm
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crisis broke up as a result of the unsustainability of the general situ- 76mm
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ation.
Before we move on to the different push and pull factors, we find
it appropriate to define the concept of migration, where migration
can be defined as ”the permanent change of residence by an indi-
vidual or group.”6
Push Factors
While considering the migration movements of Argentines, one
can wonder why they choose Spain after all and not some other
countries, which offer similar or even better living standards. We
will try to unveil this in the following paragraphs.
The latest economic and financial crisis has been the frontrunner
for all the other push factors we will outline later. If we follow the
below mentioned economic events in the life of the Argentines, we
will well see that the economic factor is the main pushing force for
emigration. The following is meant to be a portray of what the situ-
ation is like at present and has been throughout the last fifteen
years in the economic and political life of Argentina. We consider
that the magnitude of the economic chaos demands for a rather
deeper description and account of events that the following lines
will further highlight.
5 The Economist (2002).

C
6 Human Migration. Encyclopaedia Britannica.
M <http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=42394>, as of 6 of August 2002).
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Economic and Political factors

The following citation serves well to depict, in just a few lines, the
type of Administrations prevailing in Argentina. ”The central issues
of Argentinas national life revolve around political power, charis-
matic leadership, economic development and effective democracy.
These four elements have determined the course of events in Argen-
tina’s struggle for social justice and economic stability since the
beginning of the 20th century”7 when inflation was already a
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10/13 chronic problem. In order to fully comprehend the latest events, it 71mm
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is mandatory to look back on the domestic developments in Argen- 76mm
tina.
The second president in line after the restitution of democracy –
Carlos Saul Menem– took office amid rampant inflationary trends
in 1989. In spite of being a Peronist, and therefore having a social
justice ideology, he introduced free market policies and a capitalist
model in the hands of his Harvard-trained finance minister
Domingo Cavallo who managed to halt inflation, stabilize the
economy and bring about 10 years of relative peace and prosperity
through the pegging of the peso to a fixed one-to-one parity with
the US dollar. This in turn entailed the selling off of national
industries, services and resources, including airlines, telephones,
railroads, subways, roads and much more-even control of the petro-
leum industry, once emblematic of national sovereignty.
Menem served two terms amid this feeling of fake prosperity,
appalling high internal corruption, irresponsible borrowing and
lavish spending by the upper class. Fernando de la Rúa, a Radical,
followed in 1999. By then the situation was worsening at every
level to deepen and had its turning point in December 2001 when
he and his whole cabinet were forced to resign following implaca-
ble massive violent protests.
The tragic events unraveling in 2001 started December 3rd when
de la Rúas administration was unable to meet the interest payments
coming due on the foreign debt. Domingo Cavallo – again finance
minister in a new administration – then decided to limit the pay-
ment of salaries, pensions, and cash bank withdrawals in a measure
then known as ”corralito”. Cavallos cash restrictions to $1,000 a
M 7 Ibid 1.
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month in order to avoid draining the banks, ”sparkled a wave of

uncertainty and anger throughout the country.”8 As a result, dis-
content mounted and demonstrations erupted. Rioters took to the
streets and looters to the supermarkets and the country became
ungovernable. De la Rúa imposed a state of siege – suspending con-
stitutional rights for 30 days and giving the government wide-
ranging power to stop riots and other violence – but civilians
nevertheless took up civil disobedience as he gave a speech ”but
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(…) failed to offer any prescription for dealing with the crisis.”9 68mm
71mm
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Consequently, it lasted less than 48 hours, which turned out to be 76mm
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the hardest repression, 29 young people died, ever ordered by an
elected Argentine government.
”The economic crisis that confiscated peoples money has pro-
found roots. It goes back to 1966, during the dictatorship of Juan
Carlos Ongania, when an accelerated process of denationalization
of Argentine industry began. In 1976, the brutal military govern-
ment began building up the foreign debt and there was an enor-
mous transfer of wealth to the most powerful economic actors. The
crisis continued to build, and has exploded in recent days, as a con-
sequence of the neo-liberal policies of the post-dictatorship govern-
ments.”10
An overvalued peso consequently undermined export trade and
ushered in trade imbalance. This together with ”an excessive
amount of foreign debt were the two proximate causes of the argen-
tine crisis.”11 Moreover, ”the privatization of all state-owned
industries (…) the concentration of the financial sector, the aban-
donment of all laws that protected workers (…) and with the grow-
ing disparities in income distribution, Argentina’s national produc-
tivity was destroyed.”12
To come to a close, three different ephemeral presidencies ensued
in a 10-day period after De la Rúa left office. The $141 billion
national debt being the largest sovereign debt default ever went
into default, the country was excluded from the world financial sys-
tem, and millions of Argentines faced economic ruin. ”Finally on
8 Peter Katel (2001).

9 Ibid. 1.
10 Gaudin, Andres (2002).
C
11 Feldstein, Martin (2002).
M 12 Ibid. 11.
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January 2 Peronist Eduardo Duhalde took office, elected by a legis-

lative assembly that granted him a precarious legitimacy upheld by
a vote which had been the result of party discipline”13. The peso
was sharply devalued.
Politically, in a country where traditionally public office is widely
perceived not as a responsibility of service but as an opportunity for
personal gain and enrichment, the public is completely at odds
with corrupt political leaders who increasingly lack credibility. ”The
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term ’ñoquis’ is applied to the legions of state bureaucrats who 71mm
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show up at their sinecure jobs only at the end of each month to col- 76mm
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lect their unearned salaries. Justice, say many, is bought at least as
often as it is impartially administered.”14 Many Argentines have
grown used to living in a corrupt environment. Others just cannot
simply cope with it. The latter find a stronger reason to emigrate
behind such widespread corruption. Emotional and personal
preferences lead differently in each individual case.
Unemployment
It is a paradox that in a land filled with rich pampas, there is a
25,1% unemployment rate in a total population of 37 million peo-
ple. Among University professionals this rate has gone up by 53,8%
this last year according to new data widespread by INDEC (National
Institute for Statistics and Surveys in Argentina). Though in theory
it is easier to get a job and keep it when holding a degree, this might
not be the case at present. Even though being highly qualified, it is
increasingly difficult to enter and remain on the job market when
companies go bankrupt and the private and public investment
areas get dismantled. Confronted with this, many decide to emi-
grate.
Rule of Law
Fourteen million Argentines – over a third of the population – live
below the poverty line. Growing gaps in the social strata are trigger-
ing crime and insecurity, discrimination and disparities, frustration
C
13 Ibid. 1.
M 14 Ibid. 10.
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and the feeling that there is no contention by any authority interest

either to bring about solutions or put an end to endless rethoric.
Some experts say that Argentina is experiencing a deep process of
decadence in the rule of Law. As Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, expert in
Political Science and International Relations at the Universidad de
San Andrés, says: ”the country is undergoing the partial slump of
the State but also experiencing a genuine break-up of the society.”15
In order to assert that the rule of Law is properly respected, it is
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necessary for the citizenship to have predictability, transparency 71mm
10/13
and legal safeguards, as Jens Vedsted-Hansesn Lawyer, University of 76mm
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Aarhus Law School says.16 At present, the population is demonstrat-
ing because of the lack of justice and legal insecurity.
Social and communal factors

For some time now, the population has lost hope of any societal
improvement. They have been left in despair, with no expectations
and their dreams shattered. According to an opinion poll on ”the
values of the Argentines” conducted by the consulting company
Graciela Romer & Asociados in Argentina, when it comes to the
way Argentines see their own society they found that an astound-
ing 67% of the 1,278 interviewed in the whole territory perceives it
as unjust, 66% as unequal and 63% asserts that they feel they live in
a society that has no future. Finally, only three out of ten sees it as
democratic. When morals are so low and expectations of any
change dwindle, there are not many prospects of future prosperity
or growth, nor the unity to make it happen. As a result, citizens see
no other way out and they are too immersed in the present crisis.
They just want to leave; many find ways to do so, most others do
not.
15 Dime cómo eres, te dire dónde vives. Diario Clarín online (http://www.clarin.com
as of 21st July 2002).
C
16 Vested-Hansen, Jens. Class lecture. European common values, the case of Austria
M and Denmark. Malmö Högskola , 9th August 2002.
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The influence and power of the media

”Specialists in migrations warn that there is a contagious effect
powered by the media.”17 If we follow this logic we might conclude
that ”the migration wave is not only being fostered by the unem-
ployment rate and the political chaos (…)”.18 According to Lelio
Mármora – Head teacher of the Master course in Migration Policies
at the Universidad de Buenos Aires – the media is an ongoing incen-
tive and they instill the notion that the only way out is Ezeiza
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10/13 (national airport). To Enrique Oteiza – specialist in demography 71mm
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and researcher at the Instituto Gino Germani – this process gradu- 76mm
ally gets internalized in the culture. When such contagious phe-

nomena exist, migration gets incorporated in the youth culture;
”the way out of the country is beginning to be considered as com-
mon and part of their daily life”.19 Queues in front of foreign
embassies, TV images and the many stories retold with them and
played over and over again on TV cameras have a close-up effect.
”They feed the collective psychosis”, says Lelio Mármora, ”they are
not determining factors but intervene nevertheless and foster that
image in the middle class.”20 We must say that we have found that
this is in no way a rational and consciously planned project to
foster people out. Rather, it is just a tool the media is using for their
own purposes.
Globalisation
Internet, global communications, international flights and the
readily available information of today’s world pave the way for
greater and easier channels to make decisions on where to emigrate,
why, when and how. Many who are willing to go and work in
another country might get employment through the web even
before leaving their country of origin. Moreover, it is likely that
there will be more frequent communication and contact between
relatives in the homeland and the new country of residence via e-
mail and thanks to the cheaper cost of international communica-
17 Dandan, Alejandra (2002).

18 Ibid. 15.
C
19 Ibid. 15.
M 20 Ibid. 15.
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tion and new technologies. Additionally, the transfer of money at

present is much simpler than it was in the last century. Distance
does not act as a deterrent anymore. New destinations, when it
comes to air travel as well as the frequency of flights, have opened
up a whole new set of options to choose from. In many ways, tech-
nology and progress has made the uprooting less painful and lonely
than it used to be for past migrants.
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Emigrants and figures
11/14,5 76mm
As a result, with a prolonged widespread crisis of this sort it is likely
that the society will further disintegrate. The counterpart – stated in
the research ”The value of the Argentines” – results in high individ-
ualism, lack of mutual trust and a fracture in the sense of belonging
to the nation expressed in the desire to emigrate. But who emi-
grates? What is the characteristic of the present emigrant? The
young middle class people see in leaving one of the few – if not the
only – way to attain their parents former living standards and social
conditions. According to Professor Lelio Mármora, the Argentines
that are leaving at present do not fit in the traditional profile of
emigrants. Unlike emigrants all over the world, who generally send
remittances to their families back home, Argentines do not or
simply cannot do so. ”They are mostly youth, middle class students
whose families are supporting from here.”21 This is explained by the
fact that when willing-to-be emigrants are so income-constrained
by poverty, they just cannot afford the move no matter all the other
fostering and facilitating factors at play.
To grasp the Argentine landscape even more it is useful to review
some recent figures and results. From 2000 to 2001, 140.000 people
emigrated. The process was further accelerated in December 2001
and especially January 2002. The wave of emigrations started in
2000. In one year the number of emigrants went from 8.110 to
87.068. In November and with the deepening of the institutional
crisis the figures began rising again. That month 3.259 Argentines
left and the following month that same figure amounted to 10.823.
With that increase, there is an overall of 62.880 emigrants all
throughout 2001. According to data issued by the Dirección
C
M 21 Ibid. 15.
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nacional de Migraciones (Migrations National Body) in Argentina

and published by the newspaper Página 12, in January this year
alone 23.198 people left the country. Moreover, they assert that the
preferred destinations are Spain (37%), USA (18%) and Italy (11%).
Though there has been a decrease in March – 5.328 emigrants – (in
part, due to new visa requirements and tougher measures by receiv-
ing countries) some experts suggest that the flow remains constant
towards Spain. In January 4.209 left for that destination. But figures
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themselves are not as important as their intrinsic meaningful value. 71mm
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The number of Argentines living abroad represents 600.000 and is 76mm
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the result of fifty years of emigrations. At present, in a little more
than two years 160.000 have left the country, which is one third of
the amount it took decades to build up abroad. If this trend contin-
ues all throughout this year as it is forecasted, the number of expa-
triates will have doubled shortly.
To sum it all up, the various factors mentioned will, in turn, affect
and exert influence on individuals in distinct ways and to different
degrees. The main force behind the decision to leave may vary
depending on individuals interests, economic and social condi-
tions. As the above mentioned data and figures in this paper dem-
onstrates, the middle class population may see emigration as a way
out more readily than others. Those individuals have such means as
savings, knowledge and even a degree or diploma to aid them in
new lands and help them adapt to new scenarios encountered
abroad. The possibility of obtaining Spanish citizenship is the
major pull factor in our opinion. This singles out Spain, when being
compared to other countries, in the eyes of emigrants. Other factors
that makes Spain different from other potential receiving countries
are the colonial ties and the use of the same language as in Argen-
tina.
Pull factors
The reasons fostering thousands to go to Spain every year are not
much different from those attracting so many other Spaniards to
emigrate in the past and most of the migration currents taking
C place throughout history, as the paper El País asserts in their dossier
M on immigration to Spain. In the case of countries such as Argentina,
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the colonial ties still represent a very powerful pull factor. Spain
went from being a classical country of emigration to a new country
of immigration. This is shown by the fact that even though Spain
now constitutes a chosen destination for immigrants, still there are
2 million Spaniards abroad, that is, more than the double of the
940.000 foreigners registered in Spain during the latest process of
regularization. At present, Argentina still has great colonies of Span-
iards with a, sometimes, much higher number than that of the vot-
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ers of many of the constituencies in Spain. 71mm
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It is worth browsing some more compelling figures from the 76mm
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Spanish side. When it comes to Spain, the Minister of the Interior
finds that the number of foreign residents went from 499.773 in
1995 to 938.783 in 2000. In 2000 the number of Argentine resi-
dents in Spain accounted for 18.639, which entailed a rise of 2.349
residents as compared to the figure of the previous year. At present,
Argentines account for the fifth nationality when it comes to immi-
gration after Morocco, China, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia.
A change in trends
”Starting in the 80s, the (Iberian) Peninsula became a recipient for
immigrants with all the social and demographic changes that it
conveyed. The entry of the country in the European Union and the
subsequent adhesion to the Schengen agreement in 1994 regulating
the free flow of people within the EU has fostered the immigration
from others in the European continent.”22
Spanish immigration laws

In a country like Argentina, whose population mainly consists of
European immigrants and descendants, it is rather easy to track
down blood relations and end up getting a visa.
In connection with the Spanish legislation concerning immigra-
tion we must also take citizenship into account. Citizenship can be
defined as the ”relationship between an individual and a state in
which an individual owes allegiance to that state and in turn is
C
M 22 Inmigración en España. El País online <http://www.elpais.es> as of 21 June 2002.

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entitled to its protection.”23. National laws concerning citizenship

differ but there are two general ways applied on how to determine
citizenship from birth. The first one, ”jus soli”, works in the way
that the child acquires citizenship in the country where the birth
takes place. The second way, ”jus sanguinis”, is more interesting in
the case of Argentina and Spain. Applying ”jus sanguinis” means
that a child, wherever born, becomes a citizen in the state where his
parents are citizens. This principle can further be supplemented by
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a nations own principles.24 68mm
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One of the decisive pull factors for Argentineans going to Spain is 76mm
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the fact that Spain plays the role of ”a mother country” by applying
the ”jus sanguinis” citizenship. In other words, the Spanish legisla-
tion allows people to acquire Spanish identity on the condition
that they have an ancestor in Spain. The Spanish passport can be
granted exclusively to the sons of a Spanish mother or father. With
the economic crises looming, many Argentineans who have Span-
ish grandparents search for relevant documents required for enter-
ing the EU. So, first the parents make the effort of getting Spanish
citizenship and only then the grandchildren can get it as well. As
soon as Argentines obtain the Spanish passport, they acquire a EU
citizenship as well. It means that they are allowed to enter, leave
and stay permanently on the Spanish territory.
Based on the data published by the Spanish paper El País online,
Spain has an overall of 18.639 residents from Argentina. In 2000
there were 2.349 regularized immigrants living in Spain. If viewed
from the perspective of the applications for residence and accord-
ing to the figures issued by the Delegación del Gobierno para la
Inmigración y Extranjeria in El País, 2.927 Argentines handed in
their applications of which 2.349 were favorably accepted – that is,
80,25% favorable resolutions.
Colonial ties
To better understand the colonial ties between the people of Argen-
tina and the country of Spain we will take a brief look at the history
23 Citizenship. Encyclopedia Britannica

C
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=84903> as of 5 of August 2002.
M 24 Ibid. 23.
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of the colonization and migration flows between these two coun-

tries. The colonization of the Rio de La Plata area started in the year
of 1516 when Spanish navigator Juan Díaz de Solís and his expedi-
tion sailed up the river and claimed the region in the name of
Spain.25 During these first years, until 1580, the majority of the
immigrants came from the Southwest regions of Spain, Andalucia
and Extremadura. These early settlers were attracted by pull factors,
which consisted of new cities and means of transportation availa-
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ble. In contrast, the emigrants during the 17th century crossed the 68mm
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Atlantic due to the present crises in Spanish society, which acted as 76mm
11/14,5
push factors. The area from which people came shifted and the
number of emigrants from the northwestern regions increased.26
The immigration to the South American colonies culminated
after their emancipation. Argentina proclaimed its independence
formally on July the 9th 1816.27 ”By the 19th century Argentina was
a vast territory with a low demographic density. The need to attract
European immigration was a permanent desire.”28 The population
increased from 800.000 in 1852 to nearly 8 million in the year of
1914. 70–80% of the immigrants came from Spain and Italy but
people also came from France, Great Britain and Germany. This
massive immigration gave the country a European character. The
immigration to Argentina in the late 19th century was more exten-
sive than to countries like USA and Australia. The reason for this is
that Argentina accepted unskilled labor.29 Brazil and Argentina
competed in the race of attracting immigrants, subsidizing their
travelling costs. Spanish immigrants ended up being the main
immigration group in Argentina. The reason for the subvention
from Argentinas point of view was the increased export of wheat.
Labor was needed. Another reason for the massive increase of immi-
gration was the development of faster means of transportation,
such as the steamboat, which made the trips cheaper and lowered
25 Argentinas general resources and History <http://www.shadow.net/^giorigio/

arbentina.html> as of 30th of June 2002).
26 Mörner, Magnus (1990).
27 Argentina in Nationalencyklopedin
<http:www.ne.se/jsp/search/article.jsp?i_artid=117497> as of 26th of June
2002).
28 A journey into the past in <http://www.surdelsur.com/somos/pob140ing.html>
C
as of 26th of June 2002).
M 29 Ibid. 27.
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the death rate during transportation. When talking about migra-

tion flows one should keep in mind that many leave their home
country with the intention of returning. This factor caused the
Argentinean authorities trouble and resulted 1911 in the decision
to double the cost for a ticket back to Europe, in an attempt to keep
the population in the country.30
The depression in the 1930s had a devastating effect on Latin
America. Immigration was no longer desired and Argentina intro-
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duced selective immigration. Many of the European immigrants 71mm
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who came during this period were political refugees. The massive 76mm
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immigration from Spain, Italy and Portugal was to some extent
renewed after the end of the Second World War. 608 000 immi-
grants came to Argentina during the years 1946–57.31 As a result of
the above mentioned migration flows from Spain to Argentina we
can understand the strong bond between these two parts of the
word.
Social networks
Having an active social network in Spain should not be forgotten as
a potential pull factor for Argentineans thinking about migrating. A
connection with a relative or some other person simplifies the
social transition between the countries. To have someone in the
new country that gives personal support in difficulties is an impor-
tant factor. Practical issues should not be forgotten, receiving help
with bureaucracy and having somewhere to stay when arriving are
important things to deal with. Finding work is also of big impor-
tance and we believe that the chances increase if the person already
has the foundation in a social network upon arrival. Having contact
with someone in Spain also gives the person a better chance to
build up realistic expectations concerning what to expect when
arriving in Spain. A possible danger for immigrants, as we see it, is
otherwise an unrealistic mental image of the country of their roots
that might be shattered upon arrival.
C
30 Ibid. 26.
M 31 Ibid. 26.
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Cultural issues
One can claim that cultural ties are a factor in attracting Argentines
to Spain. To be able to argue in favor of this we would like to start by
defining the concept of culture. The concept is complex and its def-
inition varies depending on the approach. According to the linguist
Hofstede, culture can be understood as a set of common beliefs, val-
ues, codes of behavior and ways of thinking that are shared by a
group of people.32 Language and customs are linked to the cultural
9/12 68mm
10/13 concept and will be discussed below. 71mm
11/14,5 76mm
Common language
As it is easy to imagine, the language barrier acts as a deterrent for
many when choosing their final destination. When the whole crit-
ical choice of emigrating emerges, individuals feel less strained if
they are heading towards a country where they will be able to com-
municate and where the transition will go smoothly and be the
least traumatic event in an already conflicting experience.
Similar customs
To a lesser degree, we might as well consider the fact that sharing
similar traditions and/or ways of life and customs may make the
change much less harsh. Though in the present global world this
does not constitute a decisive factor when triggering individuals to
emigrate, it might be mentally considered as an extra support factor
of contention for individuals.
We might argue that it would be a mistake to assert that Argen-
tines share the same cultural identity as the Spaniards, for there are
some other patterns of thought and behaviors that make Argen-
tines be what they are and not necessarily Spaniards descendants
only. Besides, as Johansson et al. state; ”identity-formation typically
has been demarcated by territorial parameters.” 33 If we are to ask
individuals in other Latin American countries what Argentines are
like, we will witness that they are obviously perceived in a different
manner than the Spaniards, for they might be closely related but
C
32 Hofstede, G (1991).
M 33 Tägil, Sven et al. (2001).
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still not be like them. What might thrust Argentines to Spain might
well be their feeling of identification with such a group (Spaniards)
compared to the little or none-existent identification they might
find with people from other regions in the world. It is thus evident
that Argentines are not in a position to call Spain their homeland.
There is a clear distinction, which will always make it their host
land no matter the ties they might have.
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10/13 71mm
Economic
11/14,5 76mm
As regards the Economy, the Spanish Ambassador to Argentina,
Manuel Alabart, asserts the following: ”Spain embarked in the chal-
lenge of the other, of the opening to the world, after an isolationist
period with a closed economy. This took place in the 60s with the
technocrats in the Administration, in 1975 with the assumption of
King Juan Carlos and in 1986 with the entry in the EU. Spain is the
second most open economy in the world after Canada. Ten years
ago it had high unemployment and today we have 1.3000.000 legal
immigrants.”34 Even when the Spanish economy is trying to over-
come its own domestic problems and might not be problem-free,
Argentines might readily view it as a better alternative to the
upheaval prevailing in their homeland. This does not mean Spain is
the best option but is always a better one to the realities confronted
at home. The labor market may look more flexible for those ready
to do the jobs they would not do back home.
EU membership and other Political issues

For many outside Europe – and especially outside the EU – the
union means peace and prosperity, new and better opportunities
and the embodiment of the advanced first world. It is also a world
of more equality compared to other regions in a world stricken by
lack of natural resources, corrupt administrations and different
sorts of conflicts and/or wars. The latter might not be the driving
force behind the many Argentines desiring to leave home but the
other factors may well apply to their reality. In the growing gap
C
34 España ratificó su voluntad de ayudar a la Argentina. <http://www.lanacion.com>
M as of 28th of June 2002).
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between the developed and the developing or underdeveloped

world, the European landscape seems very attractive. Human
beings struggle to find a better life and Spain – now an EU member
country – could well be the destination in this advanced world.
Increased disparities at home and deeply rooted crisis of different
kinds will only widen the gap and give the final push to those not
only willing to, but also having the means to emigrate.
Spain’s membership in EU is not an all positive thing from the
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migrating Argentines perspective, though. The reason is that when 71mm
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”EU countries removed their internal boundaries, they became 76mm
11/14,5
increasingly concerned about strengthening external boundaries”.
The base for this standpoint towards non-EU countries was set in
the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and has since then been followed
by several more ”treaties between western European countries
designed to improve control of migration.”35
Summing up, Spanish immigration laws facilitate the transfer
from Argentina to Spain for those who can take advantage of the
”jus sanguinis”. We believe this is a very important pull factor
because it puts Spain in a separate position when deciding on pos-
sible countries to emigrate to. Further on, the Spanish EU member-
ship and the image of Europe functions as attractive factors. Finally,
colonial ties and cultural issues bond these two parts of the world.
However, people are less directly affected by these factors and we
believe they only have secondary effect in comparison to other
facilitating measures and the EU membership.
Conclusion
Migration as a ubiquitous phenomenon affects people all over the
world, in all ages and all social groups. It is such a complicated and
broad issue that it is difficult to discuss it in detail embracing all the
aspects related to the subject. So many factors are at stake simulta-
neously that they make the phenomenon practically insurmoun-
table. Therefore, while studying the different factors that affect the
present emigration from Argentina to Spain – both push and pull
C
M 35 Castles, Stephen & Miller, Mark J. (1998).

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factors – we have realized that it is extremely difficult to fully grasp

all aspects of migrations today. They are all interrelated and cannot
be discussed separately. However, we made an attempt to touch
upon some possible factors influencing the process of migration
with a special focus on the case of Argentines leaving for Spain.
In this essay we mainly focus on the push and pull factors that
play a significant role in the debate about the nature of migration
from Argentina to Spain. One can ponder over the question if it is
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the push factors that are the main driving force behind Argentine 71mm
10/13
emigration or perhaps the pull factors prevail and act as a lure in a 76mm
11/14,5
country of destination. On one hand, we have lack of economic
opportunities, resulting in high unemployment, social unrest, insti-
tutional and political upheaval, failing democracy and subsequent
corruption with lowering living standards, media propaganda and a
globalization effect. On the other hand, the pull factors include
among others; economic and employment opportunities, better liv-
ing conditions and perspectives for the future, interstate facilitation
measures for immigration and naturalization, cultural ties and
informal social support networks. It is indisputable that all of the
factors mentioned above influence and direct migration to a large
extent. However, in the case of Argentina we believe that the main
driving force behind migration is a dire economic and political situ-
ation in the country, in addition with the general feeling of hope-
lessness for the future of Argentina.
In the course of our discussion, some other problematic issues
have emerged which, in our opinion, deserve attention in future
research. Some of the questions have to be left open, some of the
answers will be based only on speculations and the solutions to the
rest of the issues can be tentatively predicted for the nearest future.
One of the interesting subjects for a discussion in the context of
migration concerns the attitude of the Spanish government and
society towards Argentine immigrants. The question is if the Span-
ish society benefit economically and socially from the immigration
flow or if it constitutes a problematic issue. Do the Spanish accept
the newcomers fully or is there perhaps some hostility towards
”new people”? From what we have analyzed so far on the subject of
migration, we believe that due to the historic ties and heritage the
C Argentines are generally well accepted into the Spanish society, and
M thanks to the common cultural background they adopt to the new
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conditions without much difficulties. In addition, the migratory

policy enables Argentines to cross boundaries and acquire Spanish
citizenship. Moreover, one more asset of Argentines coming to
Spain is the fact that in majority they constitute a middle-class soci-
ety in Argentina, which means they are well educated and highly
qualified workers. Therefore, they are desired on the Spanish labour
market. On the other hand, this favorable attitude is changing grad-
ually with the increased immigration and the Spanish government
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is already cutting down on the number of people entering their 71mm
10/13
country. So, the question is left open whether the future for Argen- 76mm
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tineans in Spain will be a bright one or filled with difficulties and
the lack of all the opportunities that in fact the Argentines expect to
find.
To what extent does the immigrants blend smoothly into the
society? Are they treated as outsiders from a foreign land? Another
question to discuss is related to the extent the Spanish lifestyle, cul-
ture and identity are affected by the Argentinean culture. Does this
facilitate or hinder social integration between these two nationali-
ties?
It would be worth considering what the Argentines feel when
coming to Spain. Do they feel Spanish having a Spanish passport?
Does their identity change in the process of adapting to the Spanish
culture? If this is the case, what is this change like? In which ways
are the two groups different? So far as psychological aspects are con-
cerned, what happens to the many families torn apart by this
uprooting of their emigrating children? What does the family left
back home think and feel? How do they cope with their new status
as immigrants? What is it like to be an immigrant in Spain?
Regarding the regulatory framework, there are already signs that
the Spanish government is cutting down on immigration and mak-
ing the immigration laws stricter than they used to be. Is this to
restrict the present flow of Argentines going to Spain? Is this to
affect the present regulations applicable to Spanish descendants in
Argentina? If this is the case, what will the emigrants attitudes be
towards this move? When it comes to the EU as a whole, will the
law regulations be harsher and less welcoming towards migration
from Argentina? Right now, we can notice that there is a tendency
C to close not only the Spanish borders but the whole continent. We
M are witnessing the EU-pressure to introduce and apply stricter poli-
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cies and measures towards immigration. The Argentine Embassy in

Spain is now demanding the Spanish Administration to administer
the same kind of treatment that Spanish immigrants met when
coming to Argentina in the 19th century. Argentine Embassy
authorities are concerned about illegal Argentine residents and feel
the Spaniards should be helping not only Spaniard descendants but
also other immigrants not having European passports or legal
papers. The Argentine embassy has expressed that they consider the
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difference being made at present as based on racial reasons and con- 71mm
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demn it. They state that the Spanish Administration cannot remain 76mm
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indifferent before the Argentine situation and should help as
Argentina helped before.
Additionally, we have some other open questions as regards the
Argentines. Will this migratory trend continue? What might hap-
pen if the economic situation in Argentina improves considerably?
Is the current trend going to be reversed? Is it likely that these
Argentine emigrants will go back when the situation regularises?
What will be the attitude of the Argentine government and media
before emigration if the trend continues? Will they try to prevent or
rather facilitate it? Do they view emigration as a potential turmoil?
Will they ever consider it to be so?
Migration has always been present throughout the history of
humankind and we might even argue that the ever-changing topic
of migrations is a never-ending study. We hope we have shed some
light upon the present specific migration from Argentina to Spain
and that the questions and conclusions we have arrived at may
serve as a starting point for future research in the field of migration.
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www.clarin.com> as of 21st July 2002.
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Encyclopaedia Britannica. Human Migration <http://search.eb.com/ 71mm
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eb/article?eu=42394> as of 6th August 2002. 76mm
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Hatton, Timothy, J. & Wiliamson, Jeffrey, G (1998). The Age of Mass
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The day of reckoning, long postponed, inevitably arrived in America
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Vested-Hansen, Jens. Class lecture. European common values, the case 76mm
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of Austria and Denmark. Malmö Högskola , 9th August 2002.
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Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
6 Integrating the Öresund

– what kind of region?
Valgerdur Bjarnadóttir, Damian Gadzinowski
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10/13 71mm
11/14,5 76mm
Introduction
The last fifty years in Europe has brought an increased co-operation
between the nation states and the birth of a considerable suprana-
tional institutional level. The most advanced cooperation has devel-
oped within the European Union. The set of mutual interactions
between the European and national levels, known as a two-level
game had remained the core of cooperation and integration process
until the 1990s. Since then a third level has evolved, namely the
regional one. Regionalization as an answer to Europeization or
more broadly speaking – Globalization – has changed the tradi-
tional way of cooperation, however it must be said that it is a pro-
cess of which the outcome is unknown. Regions, generally speak-
ing, still do not enjoy enough power to be able to constitute as
much influential body (the Committee of Regions) as the European
Parliament. Nevertheless the tendency to give power down to
regions is on its way.
In this paper we aim to take a closer look upon the integration
process in the Öresund Region, which constitute an interesting
object of analysis since it is a cross border region of functional
character but with a historical background. Moreover, analyzing
the most prominent institutions and actors, we try to trace in what
kind of way the region is being integrated and what it does signify
to the main actors involved into the process.
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The Theoretical Background and the Key

Concepts
This chapter aims to clarify some basic notions, which this paper
deals with, and to provide a discussion about contemporary pro-
cesses challenging nation states within the European Union.
As Joachim Blatter (2001) stated, during the last decade there has
9/12
been a growing awareness that the European Union is not the only 68mm
10/13 challenge to the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states. 71mm
11/14,5 What then could constitute those challenges? For the purpose of 76mm
this paper it is sufficient to choose and enumerate globalization and

regionalization, with the emphasis on the latter one. The modern
societies and states are facing the tension between global and local
forces. While globalization leads to an increased dependence of the
outside world, regionalization points in another direction. It
implies that human beings and activities are, and will remain,
tightly bound to a local and regional environment (Jönsson, Tägil,
Törnqvist, 2000, p.20).
Regionalization processes can also be seen as a reaction to the
development of centralized, bureaucratic Brussels (Persson 1999,
p.212). This explains why the subsidiary principle has become so
important. The Subsidiary principle, as expressed in the Maastricht
agreement in December 1991, has been read as a confirmation of
the growing importance of the region as the most appropriate level
of European organization, more close to citizens and more compe-
tent to handle political issues than the traditional nation states
(Tägil 2001, p.11). However, the opposite opinions are also
expressed, seeing regions as an obstacle to the process of integra-
tion.
Therefore, the intensified cooperation between border regions
raise other phenomena such as ”the idea of a Europe united at the
local level” (Persson 1999, p.214–215). Undoubtedly, the connec-
tion between institution-building processes on the supranational
level (macro integration) and the process of micro-integration can
be observed in the borderlands (Blatter 2001, p.180). Hence, the
nationstate is challenged but the outcome of these processes is very
C
arguable, since it concerns a future state of order. Some proponents
of the rise of the regional state (Ohmae 1993 in Blatter 2001, p.180)
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take cross-border regions as examples for a future characterized by

the declining importance of the nationstate and the increasing
relevance of regions that are being shaped by intensive socio-
economic interdependencies (Blatter 2001, p.181). On the other
hand Östhol (2001) claims that the tough negotiations between
center and periphery may ”bring about a more firm recognition of
the significance of cross-border problems and opportunities”
(Östhol 2001, p.29). However, cross-border region building cannot
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gain legal status as one single judicial entity in two countries and 71mm
10/13
thus, achieve status under public law in one country. Therefore, 76mm
11/14,5
cross-border cooperation perforates borders, but does not replace
states (Osthol 2001, p.29). In spite of mentioned challenges, the
nation-states in a foreseeable future will remain in power to handle
the most important decisions.
It is necessary to explain what could constitute a region, a cross-
border region and what phenomena follow them. Generally,
regions can vary greatly in size, and not necessarily encompass the
state territory, fitting into its boundaries. A region can be a suprana-
tional entity, i.e. Central Europe, as well as a state. Finally, regions
can be intrastate entities that have developed a distinct identity
over time. However, intrastate regions based on a distinct identity
(culturally and historically defined) must be distinguished from
those, which are defined on the basis of economic and political cri-
teria (Johansson, Rönnquist, Tägil, p.16).
Further on, the historical region is defined on the basis of the
historical, cultural roots and traditions of the population. Therefore
a regional identity may endure long after the region has been
stripped of its political and administrative relevance (Persson 1999,
p. 213). The second type of regions we are interested in, are func-
tional regions, demarcated from the others in terms of travel, trans-
portation, contacts and other dependency relations that connect
people and structures (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, p. 139).
Cross-border regions form here an interesting concept. Both the
already mentioned types might blend into this one. Many of
Europe’s cross-border regions have been transformed into areas of
cooperation and development. This form of regionalization neu-
tralizes international borders and thus may create a more challeng-
C ing factor for the nation state (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, p.
M 147). On the other hand it must be noticed that such cross-border
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cooperation has contributed to the elimination of traditional inter-

state border conflicts (Persson 1999, p.214). Cross-border regionali-
zation differs from traditional vertical regionalization by creating
mostly horizontal links. That is why Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist
(2000, p.149) here employ the term transnational instead of inter-
national to describe the true nature of cross-border networks. This
includes actors such as firms, universities, chambers of commerce,
trade unions, political parties and cultural organizations.
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Emerging Networks
Having the Öresund Region example in mind, our interest focuses,
in this paper, on networks and center-periphery perspective. Net-
works within or between particular territories/regions are points
(actors) bound together by particular links (set of transactions). The
risk, which accompanies networks is that, they may ”become
autonomous in relation to the individual territories to which demo-
cratic control is confined” (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, p. 23).
In other words, some types of networks may not be accessible for
democratic control, transparency etc. thus, acting contrary to one
of the most important ideas which is laid as a base for regionali-
zation and subsidiary principle that is to say: increase of trans-
parency and democratic control. Naturally not all the networks
need or can be transparent while remaining harmless to democratic
rules.
This problem, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, may
concern mainly institutional networks and, to a lesser extent, social
and cultural networks while excluding entirely physical ones since
they are composed of constructions for transportation of goods,
people and information. The major problem may be linked with
institutional networks since they bind together the different sites
and entities of economic and political life (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist
2000, p. 24). Social and cultural networks may work as binding ties,
aiming in overcoming mutual stereotypes and forge mutual under-
standing. Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist (2000, p.24) say however, that
C socio-cultural networks ”involve complex structures that together
M forge a virtually impenetrable network morphology” which can
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constitute another kind of challenge to the nation-state when we

take a closer look upon major cities (Copenhagen/Malmö area)
where two new social groups emerge. First of them is a new cosmo-
politan social group with new lifestyles and consumption patterns.
It consists of high-income earners who represent a cosmopolitan
work culture. Their visions and lifestyles often clash with tradi-
tional middle-class values (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnqvist 2000, p. 158).
On the other hand, the second rootless group consists of low paid
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immigrants. For both of them the traditional nation-state is rather 71mm
10/13
an obstacle than an opportunity. 76mm
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The Centre-Periphery Dimension

Another relevant aspect of the state – region relations is the center
– periphery one. Generally speaking the center – periphery theory
has been used to express, besides the geographic distance, also the
social one as well as discrepancies in status and closeness/distance
from the decision makers in political, economic or cultural centers
(Johansson, Rönnquist, Tägil 2001, p.176).
The case of the Öresund Region in that respect is a peculiar one.
On the one hand we have Stockholm – Malmö relations, where the
latter lacks the status and prestige of the Swedish capital and may
have a feeling of being disregarded by the capital. Although Malmö
is the third biggest city in Sweden, it is rather provincial in compar-
ison with other European cities. Looking from the Malmö perspec-
tive the Swedish capital is too distant. On the other hand half an
hour from Malmö we find the Danish capital, serving as a center,
not only for Denmark, but it is the biggest city in Scandinavia.
Then, when it comes to economy, culture or transport, Copenha-
gen is growing as a center for Malmö and the southern Sweden. The
most important political decisions still must be taken in Stockholm,
however in this particular case the distance between Malmö and
Stockholm can only grow, while Copenhagen naturally becomes
closer and closer. Johansson, Rönnquist, and Tägil (2001) make an
interesting remark that the citys most evident geographic advan-
tages are that it offers two types of proximity, a territorial one and
C proximity in networks. Thanks to advanced means of transporta-
M tion and communication, people, and institutions are within reach
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and easy access (ibid, p.159). Moreover, thanks to its well-devel-

oped transportation and infrastructure, Copenhagen has become a
sort of gate for southern Sweden, and especially Scania, to Europe
and overseas.
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The Öresund Region Case 68mm
10/13 71mm
Reading declarations of both Swedish and Danish governments, 76mm

11/14,5
one may feel confused whether the name ”Öresund Region” is legit-
imized. Does the region really exist? The troublesome concept is
visible when merely reading: ”With the building of the bridge […]
water ceased to be a barrier. Zeeland and Skåne are linked […] Two
countries are brought together in one region. Öresund is born” (The
Birth of a Region 1999 in Berg, Löfgren 2000, p.7). However, the
next statement says that: ”The Öresund Region exists already, but
does not really exist yet. But the vision of a dynamic development
based on faith in the future […] that exists!” (Öresund – en region
bliver til 1999 in ibdm.). Hence, the opening of the Öresund Bridge
on the 1st of July 2000, finished only a long process of attempts to
link the Swedish and Danish Shores. This fact gave an extraordinary
opportunity to foster integration between the Swedish region
Scania and its Danish counterpart Zeeland within the Öresund
Region.
Nevertheless, we are observing the beginning of a long, uneasy
process of co-operation and integration, of which the outcome is
still uncertain. The enthusiasm that welcomed the Öresund Bridge,
has gradually been replaced by an ordinary day life. Any number of
actors from both sides of the Öresund strait express different visions
and expectations as for the future of the Öresund Region and its
patterns of co-operation.
The question about what composes the discussed region is, as
Berg and Löfgren (2000) say, the source of constant dispute, how-
ever it can be stated that it encompasses the Swedish region Scania
and the north-eastern part of the Danish island Zeeland. The
Greater Copenhagen region and the Malmö–Lund–Helsingborg
C area are perceived as the core of the Öresund Region (Berg Löfgren
M 2000, p.11).
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For a better understanding of temporary processes and attempts,

which the Öresund Region is undergoing, it is relevant to present
some of its key historical events. The history of the region does not
explain all the tendencies, however constructs a base for a further
analysis of the phenomenon.
Before the Öresund Strait started to integrate, it had for more
than three hundred years been a dividing borderline between the
two Scandinavian kingdoms. What we agreed to call the Öresund
9/12 68mm
Region here had been ruled by the Danish – Norwegian dual mon- 71mm
10/13
archy until the Pace of Roskilde was signed in 1658. Then victorious 76mm
11/14,5
Sweden, beside other lands, took over Scania. Despite the second
war over Scania, it has remained in Sweden. In order to unite newly
conquered lands, Sweden imposed a policy of ”Swedification”
(Linde-Laursen 2000, p.143). The policy targeted mainly three
social groups: the clergy, the kings officials and the nobility. It
aimed to secure the loyalty of these particular groups as well as to
create uniformity within the Kingdom. The realization of the
nation-state since the 19th century had caused what the Swedish
author Claes Krantz described as ”the immense distance across the
narrow water” (Linde-Laursen 2000, p.145–150). The Öresund bor-
der became effective in causing relatively little inter-exchange
between the Danish and Swedish coasts.
Nevertheless, it must be said that neither the policy of ”Swedifi-
cation” nor creating distinct and strongly centralized, unitary
nation-states have prevented Scania from developing an ”under-
standing of separateness” and difference from the rest of the
nation. This ”understanding of separateness” and closeness to the
rest of Europe has become a disassociating factor in the Scania –
Stockholm relations. Thus, for some Scanian actors both the bridge
and the region are means to promote an institutionalized inde-
pendence from the national center in Stockholm, as Linde-Laursen
(2000, p.153–157) put it. The institutional issue is linked to lan-
guage and culture as The Foundation for the Future of Scania (Stif-
telsen Skånsk Framtid) expressed it, when asking the Swedish gov-
ernment to ”postpone the question of the formal status of the
regional languages until such time the regions have their own
democratic political institutions” and then, to ”give the regional
C languages legal protection as well as additional and more generous
M resources” <http://www.scania.org>. So far the Swedish govern-
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ment has not recognized such demands and is unwilling to impose

any special legislation for the region – ”Lex Öresund” (Linde-
Laursen 2000, p.157) might be a consequence of linking Scania
with Zeeland in a foreseeable future. It must be said that the
”understanding of separateness” is not strong enough to be com-
pared with other European regions, i.e. Catalonia.
The Danish counterpart of the Öresund Region creates radically
different phenomena. Firstly, in Scania it is rather common that
9/12 68mm
people express their affinity with Denmark and/or Copenhagen 71mm
10/13
and the latter one is seen as an actual capital, rather than the dis- 76mm
11/14,5
tant Stockholm. This is not the case in Denmark. More than three
hundred years of separation has created number of stereotypes,
which can be a source of many different reactions but affinity.
Thus, one could find Danes saying, ”Asia begins in Malmö” (Löf-
gren 2000, p.38). That is not to say that every Dane shares this
image, however it is more common that the Swedes from Scania
associate themselves with the Greater Copenhagen region than the
other way around.
The Danish reasons to engage in the Öresund project, thus, has
been mostly economic, whereas the Swedish counterpart was also
economic but followed by those other reasons, previously men-
tioned in this paper. During the past decades Denmark has gradu-
ally changed its economic and demographic structure. From the
country founded on agriculture and family business, it has devel-
oped into an urbanized, capitalistic nation with a strong and com-
petitive economy. This perception has opened the understanding
for a bridge across the Öresund that could be an extraordinary
instrument in expanding the market for Danish products and serv-
ices eastwards (Linde-Laursen 2000, p.153). We must notice that
the Öresund Region is the most densely populated metropolitan
area in Scandinavia with approximately 3,5 million inhabitants,
two thirds living on the Danish side and one-third living on the
Swedish side. Another important factor is a network of 15 universi-
ties, 120 000 students and 10 000 researchers, a number of science
parks and an innovation oriented public sector <www.oresunds-
komiteen.dk>.
The international conditions after the end of the Cold War were
C also in favor of the project. For nearly fifty years, due to possible
M Soviet veto, it was simply impossible to realize the idea of the bridge
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across a strategic strait such as Öresund. Hence, after the collapse of

the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Swedish and Danish
governments finally agreed to build a fixed link across the Öresund
in 1991 (Tangkjår 2000, p.180).
9/12
Institutions in the Öresund Region 68mm
10/13 71mm
When thinking about the Institutions in the Öresund Region that 76mm
11/14,5
are contributing to integration we should keep in mind that per-
haps not all aspects of integration are positive.
”Some scholars have forecast that in the future, the influence of
the discursive framework of nation-states on international political
and economic processes will diminish. Instead of nation-states,
they believe networks of metropolises will appear that will lead
development. Transgressing borders, promoting advanced technol-
ogy…The networks are thought to undermine the homogenizing
effects the bureaucracies of the nation-states have had within each
political-geographic unit and at the same time erode differences,
the barriers as they are most often referred to between imagined
communities (Berg, Linde-Laursen, Löfgren 2000, 155)
The question to keep in mind is thus:
Will the nation state be able to adapt to such intimidation?
In the following sections we will try to critically examine the
integrative bodies of the Öresund region.
The Integration bodies of the Öresund Region

The Öresund Committee
The Öresund Committee (ÖC) initiates co-operation between Insti-
tutions and Interest-Organisations and administrates the EU pro-
gramme, Intereg-Öresund. It also arranges conferences and semi-
nars to spread knowledge about the region. The Öresund
Committee is a co-operation organ for regional and local politicians
on both of sides of Öresund. The purpose of the co-operation is to
C
create a region where it is simple and easy for the inhabitants to
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choose where they want to live, study and work. There should be
good environment for industrial co-operation and expansion. For
this to happen the politicians on both sides of Öresund look into
rules and regulations and try to create a working relationship
between these.
The Öresund Committee’s goal is to strengthen and promote the
region nationally and internationally as well as to create the basis
for increased growth in the region economically, culturally and
9/12 68mm
socially in order to exploit the area’s joint resources for Interna- 71mm
10/13
tional competition. The ÖC initiates and supports co-operation 76mm
11/14,5
projects. Among other things it supports cultural co-operation
projects and analyze the integration process. The aspiration is that
the Öresund Region will become one of the most integrated metro-
politan regions in Europe. In the ÖC you find 32 local and regional
politicians representing 13 member organisations – counties and
municipalities on both sides of the Öresund.
The Swedish and Danish governments have the role of observers.
They all meet four times a year. The task is to further develop a com-
mon region based on two different countries. Thus the Öresund
Committee consists of political representatives from Swedish and
Danish governments as well as representatives from regional and
local authorities in Scania and greater Copenhagen. In the view of
the ÖC a common region must be built on the preferences of its
inhabitants. The differences in regulations and legislations could
attract and stimulate investments depending on industry or trade.
The ÖC focuses on seeing these differences as possibilities and not
as barriers. It works for the creation of an environment that will
enable people to take part in the capacity on the other side and to
share experiences. Also it has the vision that the region will become
a common market, not only for investments by trade and industry,
but also for daily life: work, living and pleasure. Since the mid
1990s the Öresund Committee has been a member of the Associ-
ation of European Border Regions (AEBR), which is a forum for
political representation at the European political level as well as a
forum for the exchange of ideas and experiences.
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The European Dimension

In the view of the EU Committee of the Regions, the role of local
authorities regions have played a major part in positive develop-
ments around Europe. Budget deficits have been reduced and
unemployment has fallen. We can understand the roles of states in
EU co-operation better through looking at the financial capacity of
sub-national authorities. These authorities implement much of the
EU policy in their respective countries. The political responsibility
9/12 68mm
10/13 by sub-national authorities is generally related to financial capacity. 71mm
11/14,5
Only then can these authorities take political and administrative 76mm
responsibilities for public functions and carry out EU policy. Giving

sub-national authorities a role in the decision-making can be good
for several reasons. It would widen EU’s scope and efficiency, be
more cost efficient and increase democracy. The latter process
would happen because the decisions would be made closer to the
citizens and they would therefore be more inclined to participate.
The role of the sub-national authorities is also important because
the EU does not always have the competence to implement its pol-
icies. Sub-national authorities can deliver this, partly because they
have information about the specific conditions in which EU legisla-
tion has to be carried out and how EU initiatives have to be
adjusted to local conditions. The increased cost efficiency rises from
the fact that sub-national authorities pay for implementation of
part of the EU policy; this saves money for the taxpayers. (Commit-
tee of the Regions: 2001)
The EU Support
The EU supports the cross border cooperation in the Öresund
Region. Together with the Danish regional authority HUR and the
Swedish national authority NUTEK, the Öresund Committee is
administrating the program Interreg-Öresund. This is a EU program
aimed at furthering the integration in the Öresund Region. Between
2002 and 2006 there will be spent 60 million Euros in different
cooperation projects. Interreg-Öresund creates opportunities for
cooperation across nation borders. These projects can lie within
many different areas, for example labor market integration, educa-
C
tion, tourism, regional competence, business development,
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research development, environment, media and culture. The over-

all goal is to make the Öresund Region one of Europe’s most inte-
grated and functional border regions. This project is supposed to
give the Inhabitants of the Öresund region an opportunity to use all
of the regions resources in spite of the national borders. Through
these cooperation projects people and organizations will be able to
discover new possibilities and learn from each other’s experiences.
Obstacles and barriers will hopefully be minimized and the oppor-
9/12 68mm
tunity for new networks and institutions will be created. <www.ore- 71mm
10/13
sundskomiteen.dk> 76mm
11/14,5
Discussion about the Öresund Committee

The Öresund Committee has a broad overall goal but is sponsoring
many programs that are important in the integration process. It
also seems to have helped bolstering the economy of the region in
recent years, since one of the regions merits has become a strong
and competitive business sector characterized by high efficiency,
superior educational levels and an innovative business climate (The
Öresund Identity Network ). It is thus contributing to making the
region more functional. But one has to keep in mind that a great
deal of the money that the ÖC uses for its projects comes from the
EU. This is for example the case for the Interreg-Öresund project.
EU thus has a direct effect on certain integration projects by accept-
ing to contribute financially or not. The rest of the financing comes
from regional and national authorities, which therefore play a
major role in furthering the integration process.
Öresund Identity Network

An organization was created early in 2000 to continue the work
with branding the region (naming its qualities and providing it
with a logo). This has been carried out within a project called ”The
birth of a region”, which started in 1997. The organization’s board
of directors includes representatives for national, regional and local
governments as well as tourist organizations. Öresund Identity Net-
C work controls the region’s logo and seeks members among busi-
M nesses, organizations, authorities and institutions that associate
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themselves with the message that the Öresund region is a new cen-
tre for growth and quality of life in northern Europe. Öresund Sci-
ence region is part of this network.
Öresund Science Region

This is an alliance between IT Öresund, Medicon Valley Academy,
Öresund Environment and Öresund Food network and Öresund
9/12 68mm
University. Öresund Science Region (ØSR) gathers four strong clus- 71mm
10/13
ters, IT, biotechnology, food and environment, all with focus on 76mm
11/14,5
human needs. A greater emphasis on value instead of technique
gives the Öresund Science Region a unique potential with its com-
petitive brand ”Technology with a Human Touch”. The Foundation
for Technology Transfer in Lund and the Danish Ministry for IT and
Research made it financially possible to launch Öresund Science
Region in August 2001. They, together with The Öresund Commit-
tee for Research and Development (Öforsk), will be close partners of
ÖSR.
The overall aims and activities of Öresund Science Region are:
To establish a region of networks with special emphasis on pro-
moting cross-disciplinary research and development, stimulating
new knowledge within areas where Öresund is competitive on a
global scale. Also developing and securing an innovative environ-
ment and efficient commercialization structure global branding of
Öresund Region as a high tech region that can secure sustainable
economic growth within a high ethical and humane standard. Fur-
thermore, promoting integration across borders in the region:
between disciplines, between academia, industry and the public
sector, between Denmark and Sweden and between Öresund and
other regions in the world. It also wants to be a catalyst for creating
a worldwide inflow of students, researchers, entrepreneurs, capital
and companies into the Öresund Region. One of the functions is to
promote and initiate advanced courses, PhD and summer universi-
ties and life long learning programs within strategically important
areas. Last, but not least, one of the functions is to organize confer-
ences and symposia with a mix of small-specialized meetings, sym-
posia and big international conferences.
C Öresund Science Region will work closely together with its part-
M ners in the region: local and regional authorities, industry organiza-
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tions, agencies for marketing and branding and institutions for

research and innovation. The foremost financing agencies for the
ØSR structure are the Foundation for Technology Transfer in Lund,
the Danish Ministry for Information Technology and research, Öre-
sund University and other sponsors and companies and business
organizations and EU funds. <www.oresundnetwork.com>
9/12 68mm
10/13 Discussion about Öresund Identity Network 71mm
11/14,5 76mm
Here, as within the ÖC, the main actors are national, regional and
local authorities. The goal is to promote regional integration. In
many respects though, the parties within ÖIN seem already to treat
the ÖR as a functional integrated metropole region at least with
respect to business and industry and the goal is to become more
internationally competetitive. The funding for ÖIN comes from
foundations, Danish Ministry for IT and a host of private contribu-
tors. Thus there are both public and private founders.
The Culture Bridge Foundation 2000

The vision of creating stronger cultural links and co-operation
within the new Öresund Region led on August 1st 1997 to the for-
mation of the Swedish-Danish ”Kulturbro 2000” founded by the
Ministry of Culture in Denmark. The Kulturbro Foundation’s main
task is to put the Öresund region on the map as an area that holds
its own, strong cultural attractions. Likewise, the Foundation aims
to promote and develop the funding of cultural co-operation
between cultural institutions in the Öresund region, thereby
strengthening the regions position internationally. By creating the
framework for this biannually recurring event, Kulturbro, The
Foundation intends to successfully pursue its goals of cultural
amplification and integration. The official part of the Foundation’s
financing of Kulturbro 2000 – 50 million Danish Kroner – was
granted on March 9th 1998. The chairman and the Foundation Sec-
C retariat made the allocation of grants to the projects, and to the cul-
M tural institutions on the recommendation to the committee. The
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committee made the final decision and the final funding to ”Kul-
turbro 2000” was allocated during fall 1999. The committee of the
Cultural Bridge Foundation has the highest authority and has nine
members. The Ministry of Culture in Denmark appoints a member,
as well as the chairman. The Department of Culture in Sweden,
Copenhagen Council and Wonderful Copenhagen each appoint a
member, and Malmö Council/Region Scania and the Foundation
representatives each appoint two member Sponsors. The day to day
9/12 68mm
running of the Foundation is financed partly by public funding and 71mm
10/13
partly by support from businesses and private funding. The board 76mm
11/14,5
of representatives consists of representatives from the companies
and funding contributing to the running of the Foundation and
who have wished to join the board. <www. kulturbron.com>
As with the two former institutions, national and regional
authorities play a major role behind the culture bridge both finan-
cially and otherwise.
General discussions about Integration

bodies in Öresund
Some authors are not sure that we will end up with a fully inte-
grated region or if the role of the nation state will remain the same
or change.
”It is still to early to predict whether these creative institutional
bridge building efforts will have the effect that the Öresund will
end up also being the center of a new natural region. Many forces in
Danish and Swedish society are pushing for such a development,
and it is certain that perceptions of the border have already
changed. However it is uncertain whether this means that the roles
played by the natural nation states will diminish. During the last
century it was repeatedly predicted that the nation states would
lose their importance due to American cultural imperialism and
globalization.” (Berg,Linde-Laursen,Löfgren 2000, 162).
When looking at the integrative institutions of the Öresund
C
region one gets the impression that the creation of a functionally
effectively integrated region is already well under way. One may
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also look at the question from the perspective of the business and
industries. The chambers of commerce in Sweden may be taken to
speak for their view. They have stated that the lack of harmoniza-
tion between Danish and Swedish rules constitutes the biggest bar-
rier to the integration and future growth of the Öresund region. The
Öresund chamber of commerce has called for stronger action to
boost integration of the Öresund region. They feel that the integra-
tion process is coming to a halt and state the main obstacles that
9/12 68mm
the process is now facing. These are for example tax regulations, no 71mm
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common currency, toll fees on the Öresund Bridge and differences 76mm
11/14,5
in labor market regulations <www.oresundnetwork.com>
When looking at the three integrative institutions that we have
described, it is important to note that national, local and regional
authorities play a major role in financing all of these and may be
regarded as major driving forces behind the integration process
along with the private industries. This seems to be a paradox
because at the same time the same authorities are the biggest
obstacles to integration at least in the view of the Swedish com-
merce of chambers, as mentioned earlier.
If the power of the nation state’s central authorities will diminish
and diffusion of power to different kind of networking takes place,
then the nation state will probably change in its role in/for the
future. Its powers and its role will be different. So then we face the
task of finding out what the nations state should best focus its
resources on in the future and to redefine its role completely.
Conclusions
The uneasy integration process of the Öresund Region has begun
and actually it is in just an early phase. Tensions arise between a
number of actors and their different goals and this fact prevents
integration from going smoothly. However, this process is mature
enough not to be stopped or rewind. Since the major actor, which
could be interested in doing so, is the nation-state, it will remain
very cautious about pursuing the integration process in the Öre-
C sund Region.
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Further and deeper integration is closely linked with demands for

the ”Lex Öresund”. However, this would cause a number of demands
from other Swedish or Danish regions. In our opinion, Sweden may
become the side where the challenges and tensions would grow, due
to the reasons discussed in the paper. That is to say a growing ”net-
work gap” between the Southern Sweden and Stockholm.
As mentioned earlier some of the tensions associated with the
new networking processes such as the Öresund Integration project
9/12 68mm
described in this paper seem to be sources of tension between exist- 71mm
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ing authorities within the nation state (Ministries, regional autho- 76mm
11/14,5
rities etc) on how to do things, at what pace and what policies to
apply. These tensions have to be solved within the framework of
the nation state. With regard to the integration projects discussed
in this paper, national authorities, sub national authorities, the EU
and the private sector are all working together for integration in
networking kind of way. This networking is putting a strain on the
nation state by creating the aforementioned conflicts within the
system. Part of the challenge for the future of the nation state may
be to solve these internal conflicts.
Since the EU is a big contributor to many of the integration
projects its policies are undoubtedly having a great effect on how
things are done within the nation state. Whether this is a negative
or positive thing has to be looked at closer.
References
Berg O.P. , Löfgren O. ”Studying the Birth of a Transnational
Region” in Berg, P.O., Linde-Laursen, A., Löfgren, O. (eds). 2000.
Invoking a Transnational Metropolis. The making of the Öresund
Region. Lund: Studentlitteratur
Blatter K.J., 2001. ”Debordering the World of States: Towards a
Multi-Level System in Europe and a Multi-Polity System in North
America? Insights from Border Regions” in European Journal of
International Relations, vol. 7, nr2, p.175 – 209
Committee of the Regions. Regional and Local Government in the
C European Union. Responsibilities and resources. European Union
M (CdR-Studies E-1/2001).
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Johansson R., Rönnquist R., Tägil S., ”A crisis of the Territorial

State? Integration and Fragmentation in Europe” in Tägil S. (ed.).
2001. Europe The Return of History, Nordic Academic Press, Lund.
Jones B., Keating, M. 1995. The European Union and the Regions.
Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Jönsson, C., Tägil, S., Törnqvist, G. 2000. Organizing European Space.
Sage Publications: London
Linde Laursen A. ”Bordering Improvisations Centuries of Identity
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Politics” in Berg, P.O., Linde-Laursen, A., Löfgren, O. (eds). 2000. 71mm
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Invoking a Transnational Metropolis. The making of the Öresund 76mm
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Region. Lund: Studentlitteratur
Löfgren O. ”Moving Metaphors” in Berg, P.O., Linde-Laursen, A.,
Löfgren, O. (eds). 2000. Invoking a Transnational Metropolis. The
making of the Öresund Region. Lund: Studentlitteratur
Persson H. Å. in Tägil, S. (ed). 1999. Regions in central Europe: the leg-
acy of history. Hurst. Cop.: London.
Östhol A. ”Cross-border Co-operation in the Marketing of the Öre-
sund Region” in Eriksson, I., Persson, H.Å., (eds.). 2001. Border
Regions in Comparison. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Tangkjär Ch. ”Öresund as an Open House Strategy by Invitation” in
Berg, P.O., Linde-Laursen, A., Löfgren, O. (eds). 2000. Invoking a
Transnational Metropolis. The making of the Öresund Region. Lund:
Studentlitteratur
Tägil, S. (ed). 1999. Regions in central Europe: the legacy of history.
Hurst. Cop.: London.
Tägil, S. ”Regions in Europe – a historical perspective” in Eriksson,
I., Persson, H.Å., (eds.). 2001. Border Regions in Comparison. Lund:
Studentlitteratur.
Internet sources:
Culture Bridge 2000 <http://www.kulturbro.com>
Öresund Committee <http://www.oresundskomiteen.dk>
Öresund Region <http://www.oresund.com>
The Öresund Identity Network <http://www.oresundnetwork.com/>
”The Position of the Scanian Language in Sweden” 1996 SSF
<http://www.scania.org/>
C
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Thoughts On Europe

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Studentlitteratur 155x223-990510

Hans-Åke Persson (ed.) Häften för Europastudier nr 5

Cecilia Hansson (ed.)

Titel 17 februari 2003 13.36:19 sida 1 av 2

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

The papers and inks used in this product are environment-friendly.

Titel 30 januari 2002 09.48:14 sida 2 av 2

11/14,5 Introduction 5 76mm

2 The State of the Future 22

3 A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality 43

4 The EU-enlargement: barriers, expectations and

5 Argentine Emigration to Spain 87

6 Integrating the Öresund

bookIH.fm 17 feb 2003 13.37:44 sida 3 av 4

bookIH.fm 31 jan 2003 13.21:16 sida 4 av 4

Sometimes the personal costs of no vacation during summer can be 76mm

113781 00 Introduktion 30 Jan 2002 09.53:03 sida 5 av 8

largely to the educational experiences some of our students had

113781 00 Introduktion 30 Jan 2002 09.53:03 sida 6 av 8

113781 00 Introduktion 30 Jan 2002 09.53:03 sida 7 av 8

Taken together, these essays navigate in time and space. They

113781 00 Introduktion 30 Jan 2002 09.53:03 sida 8 av 8

What is wrong with this statement? Well obviously, it should have

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 9 av 21

He is nevertheless the Other” (SCHMITT [1932] 1963: 14). The idea of

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 10 av 21

ner a part of a hegemonic ”Us”. It has much the same function as

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 11 av 21

feeling of Western civilization’s superiority. When Count de Ségur,

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 12 av 21

east and ”Europe” in reality and conceptually has to reconstruct its

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 13 av 21

Lithuania and Poland. Several EU-programs regarding Kaliningrad,

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 14 av 21

• Speech V: Romano Prodi, President of the European Commis-

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of European Union: ”The Union is founded on the principles of lib-

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 16 av 21

the relationship to Russia, ”[…] our most significant neighbor […]”,

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 17 av 21

ment on strategic arms reduction. The East/ West distinction clearly

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 18 av 21

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 19 av 21

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Joenniemi, Pertti. ”Kaliningrad as a Discursive Battlefield.” Working

113781 01 Kap 1 13 Feb 2003 11.15:58 sida 21 av 21

The State of the Future

2 The State of the Future

There is at the moment a vivid discussion in social science on the

1 Vaclav Havel in an interview with the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel in

113781 02 Kap 2 13 Feb 2003 11.23:31 sida 22 av 42

The State of the Future

Alea iacta est – the dice has been thrown

balization is David Helds who sees it as ”the stretching and deepen-

3 Held (1995): 20.

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The State of the Future

decision-making. The union has in some ways developed from an

Globalization and regionalism

113781 02 Kap 2 13 Feb 2003 11.23:31 sida 24 av 42

The State of the Future

panies, which result in production that can be competitive in the