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The effects of media commercialization on journalism and politics in

Greece
Stylianos Papathanassopoulosa
a
Department of Communication and Mass Media, National and Capodistrian University of Athens,
Athens, Greece
To cite this Article Papathanassopoulos, Stylianos(1999) 'The effects of media commercialization on journalism and
politics in Greece', The Communication Review, 3: 4, 379 — 402
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The Effects of Media Commercialization
on Journalism and Politics in Greece
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos
Department of Communication and Mass Media,
National and Capodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece 10562
This paper tries to describe the effects of media modernization and

Downloaded By: [University of Botswana Library] At: 09:47 16 September 2010
commercialization in journalism and politics, taking as example the

case of contemporary Greece. This paper is organized into two parts.
The first deals essentially with the effects that the new structure of
the Greek media system has imposed on professional journalism,
while the second deals with the changes that this new media environ-
ment has caused in the political world. It argues that these changes
have led to a new battle between the media owners and politicians
over who will control the public and political agenda and a new rela-
tionship between them.
KEY WORDS: Greece; journalism; politics; interplay; political communica-

tions; professionalism; autonomy.
In the age of television dominance, commercialization and interna-

tionalization of communications and the economy, it is commonly
argued that there has been a process of convergence among media
systems and practices, diminishing national and regional differences
(McQuail, 1994, pp. 28-29; McQuail, 1995, pp. 11-12). Europe may
be the best place to examine this process, since the rapid commer-
cialization of diverse European media systems has affected Euro-
pean journalism and political communication.
News reflects in its content the political structure of its society
(Hallin, 1994, pp. 114-115), and each national system still differs in
The Communication Review, Vol. 3(4), pp. 379-402 © 1999 OPA (Overseas Publishers Association) N.V.
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379
380 Stylianos Papathanassopoulos
many respects compared to others. Nevertheless, it is possible to

identify a number of common tendencies across national systems in
this new era of journalism and politics:
(a) TV news has become dominant and the press and print journal-
ism has declined;
(b) Due to the dominance of TV news, the journalist has become a
witness and narrator of news stories without real investiga-
tion;
(c) There is a clash between media and politicians over who should
control the public agenda, while journalists function as a means

of negotiation among political and economic actors;
(d) While in the past, in many cases, journalists had as their main
point of reference political institutions and procedures, today
their main point of reference is the market and the owner of the
medium that employs them;
(e) While in the past, the emphasis of TV news in Europe was on
the process of political and ideological debate, today it is on the
ordinary citizen; political institutions meanwhile are increasingly
personalized.
Moreover, in the era of media modernization, especially with the

dominance of commercial television, one witnesses a decrease in the
status of political leaders, politicians and political parties. Politicians
and political parties spend more time trying to cope with the new
media regime and at the same time the media increase their impact
in society.
To what extent these changes in media practices will reshape pol-
itics and society is something which has to be seen; mass media and
society continually interact and influence each other. There are dif-
ferent views about the main causes and effects, but as McQuail
(1994, p. 63) has noted "today, the various influences are so bound
together that neither mass communication nor modern society is
conceivable without the other, and each is a necessary, though not a
sufficient, condition for the other."
This paper tries to describe the effects of media modernization
and commercialization in journalism and politics, taking as example
the case of contemporary Greece. The Greek case is interesting for
two main reasons: on the one hand, Greece appears to be very flex-
ible and adaptable to new media developments, while, on the other
hand, the pace of these developments is still heavily influenced by
Media Commercialization in Greece 381
its troubled political history. Therefore, this paper is organized into

two parts. The first deals essentially with the effects that the new
structure of the Greek media system has imposed on professional
journalism, while the second deals with the changes that this new
media environment has caused in the political world. In conclusion,
this paper argues that these changes have led to a new battle
between the media owners and politicians over who will control the
public and political agenda, and to a new relationship between them.
THE MEDIA AND THE STATE IN GREECE
Greek mass media are characterized by an excess of supply over

demand: there are more newspapers, more TV channels, more
magazines and more radio stations than such a small market can sup-
port. By the mid 1990s there were about 160 local, regional and
national daily newspapers in Greece, as well as 800 popular and
special interest magazine titles, 150 national and local TV channels
and 1,200 radio stations for a market of 11 million inhabitants.
Another characteristic of the history of the Greek mass commun-
ications sector is that the media have been influenced by the coun-
try's troubled political history and political instability. Greek
newspapers have a long history of divisions along party lines, divi-
sions which have literally split the country during its modern polit-
ical history. The inception of the Greek press coincided with the
struggle for independence from the Turks in 1821, and its develop-
ment paralleled the growth of political life in the nascent Greek
state. The growth of the modern Greek press in the mid-19th cen-
tury paralleled the establishment of political parties; in that period
each party had its own newspaper. Regardless of the fact that the
parties and papers gradually separated, an identity of interests was
maintained (McDonald, 1983, p. 24). The press watched all the
developments of political life and played an important role in the
political scene, becoming a player with some power, stronger com-
pared to most other countries. This was because the newspapers
were not only highly partisan, but also were used by their owners as
a mean of pressure on the government of the day in order to serve
their own particular interests. In the early days of the modern Greek
state there was a well known phrase regarding the relationship
between press owners and political power: "Either you give me a
ministry or I publish a newspaper." As I noted, the size of the Greek
382 Stylianos Papathanassoponlos
market was too small to support so many newspapers. So the press

owners also used their newspapers in order to support their other
business interests such as contracts for public works, while, on the
other hand, through those other enterprises subsidizing the operat-
ing costs of their publications. The newspapers had substantial,
power since even in the days of the state broadcasting monopoly, as
we will see later, they were the key mass medium for the dissemina-
tion of political information of Panhellenic interest.
A third relevant characteristic of Greek media history is that the
state has played a decisive role in the media sector. This can be
easily seen in the case of the press, which in most countries enjoys a
liberal regime compared with broadcasting. First, the state enforces
laws which regulate the ownership status of the press. Second, in a
more indirect but more effective way, the state acts to support its
policies on ownership as well as to enforce the unwritten rules of
power politics by using a wide range of means of intervention
which are at its disposal. These means include sizable financial aid
to the press, on which individual enterprises become dependent
because they cannot cover their production costs. Finally, the elec-
tronic media have traditionally been under the total and tight con-
trol of the state.
The close relationship between the state and the media has largely
arisen from the tensions in Greek society since the Second World
War. These tensions, combined with the absence of a strong civil
society, have made the state an autonomous and dominant factor in
Greek society. Mouzelis points out that this situation is associated
with an atrophied civil society, as a result of which the state has to
take on additional politico-ideological functions (1980, pp. 261^).
The over-extended character of the state has coincided with the
underdevelopment of capitalism in Greece. This makes the Greek
system less self-regulatory than developed capitalist systems such
as in Britain or in the US. The lack of self-regulation is also notice-
able at the level of politico-ideological superstructure, because with
a weak civil society even the economically dominant classes do not
manage to form well-organized and cohesive pressure groups.
Mouzelis notes that because of the persistence of patronage politics,
even bourgeois parties and interest groups are articulated within
the state machinery in a clientelist/personalistic manner (1980, p. 263).
This has led the state to promote the interests of particular types of
capital rather than the interests of capital as a whole. The lack of
self-regulation leads to state intervention in the politico-ideological
sphere and thus the diffusion of its repressive mechanisms through-

out society. The fact that the state plays a decisive role in the forma-
tion of the Greek economy and policy illustrates the state's "relative
autonomy" from society (Mouzelis, 1987; Tsoukalas, 1981).
It is not accidental, therefore, that there has been such strict con-
trol over the broadcasting media in Greece. The general pattern of
the broadcasting media in the state monopoly era was that a change
of government was followed by a corresponding changeover in
the state media institutions' executives. In other words, all key radio
and television appointees were politically sympathetic or affiliated
to the government of the day, reflecting the tradition of political

clientelism in Greece. Responsible posts in state broadcasting have
traditionally had rapid personnel turnover. News and editorial
judgments of particular importance, meanwhile, would be in close
agreement with the government position on a whole range of pol-
icies and decisions. This attitude of the Greek state has remained
one of the most important features of the state electronic media. It is
not surprising that various recommendations by foreign experts
concerning the structure of state broadcasting were half-adopted
or neglected by most governments (Papathanassopoulos, 1990,
pp. 338-9; Papathanassopoulos, 1997a).
However, the Greek media during the last twenty years have
undergone a process of modernization. Modernization of the press
began with the fall of the Dictatorship in 1974. The development of
advertising as a major source of revenue for the press in the 1970s
worked as a catalyst transforming the newspapers' political orienta-
tions: advertising tended to neutralize political polarization, redu-
cing the "black" and "white" (or "us" and "them") approach of the
newspapers. The tradition of the small circulation partisan publica-
tion has gradually given way to a "commercial" mentality, which
has indirectly exerted considerable influence on content, leading to
increased emphasis on financial and social news as well as human
interest stories. Moreover, the arrival of new printing technologies
in the '80s (Leandros, 1992), the entry of entrepreneurs and busi-
nessmen into the media sector as well as hard competition from
television have contributed to the process of change since the 1980s
(Psychogios, 1992, pp. 11-35; Zaoussis & Stratos, 1992, pp. 171-187).
As a result, the content of the press has become less partisan, and
the traditional close association with particular parties or indi-
viduals has been superseded by a tendency to identify more with a
political camp, right, left or center. Partly this has arisen out of a
need to attract a broader spectrum of readers to increase circulation

in a time of economic difficulties, and partly it has reflected a drift
within the political community from many small parties towards
two larger, so-called "power parties" since the 1980s, the Socialist
party (PASOK) and the Conservative party (New Democracy) have
typically attracted approximately 80 per cent of the votes. However,
the political stance of the newspapers is always manifest in periods
of intense political contention, including election periods (Komni-
nou, 1990,1996).
Greek television has undergone complete commercialization
since the 1990s, adapting to a market-oriented structure with more

channels, more advertising, more program imports (mainly from
the USA), more sensationalism and more domestic productions,
which are mostly imitations of US programs adjusted for the Greek
market. The deregulation of radio frequencies was initiated in 1987,
and the deregulation of the television sector in late 1989. As in most
European countries, the deregulation of Greek broadcasting has
been associated with partisan ends and guided by haphazard reac-
tions of political alignments at a given point in time, rather than by a
coherent plan, resulting in an overcrowded broadcasting universe
(Papathanassopoulos, 1997a). In November 1989 the first private
channel (Mega Channel) entered the Greek television landscape,
and a month later a second channel (Antenna TV) did the same.
Since then, a plethora of national, local and regional TV channels
have sprung up all over the country without official license to broad-
cast. When this article went to press seven national private channels
operated in Greece, three state channels and 153 local and regional
channels. From the very first year of their existence two private general
entertainment channels, Mega Channel and Antenna TV, have dom-
inated the TV sector in terms of audience and advertising expendit-
ure. Together they achieved a 60 per cent share of TV viewership
and a 75 per cent share of TV advertising expenditure, forming a
duopoly. However, Mega and Antenna had to face competition
from newcomers in 1994—Sky TV and Star Channel. In 1998 Mega's
audience share dipped below 21 per cent and Antenna TV's below
23 per cent for the first time since their entry to the airwaves. The
emergence of private stations has been disastrous for the public
broadcaster, ERT (Hellenic Radio Television). ERT's TV channels'
viewership has declined (ET1 6.01 per cent, NET [former ET2] 3.5
per cent in 1998), which has resulted in large advertising losses. In
effect, ERT's three channels have witnessed a steady erosion of market
share since private TV was launched in late 1989, the sharpest decline
among western European state broadcasters. ERT's current cumu-
lative debt is 45 billion drachmas. Moreover, as in other countries
publishers and other business-oriented interests have impressively
entered the broadcasting landscape. Although some government
control over the state broadcasting channels is still evident, there is
no overt control of the plethora of private television channels,
which have dominated the broadcasting scene in terms of viewers'
ratings and advertising revenue.
THE EFFECTS O N NEWS
Until the end of the state broadcasting monopoly, the state channels
were regarded as "arms of the state," in effect as "mouthpieces" of
the party in office. The state broadcaster's TV news was a kind of
primitive "ideological state apparatus" since it was presenting
almost exclusively the views of the government. The anchor—in
effect the announcer—read the news bulletins without conveying
personal involvement in the stories. The state control or interference
was too obvious for the news announcer to appear as an autonom-
ous communicator, and the dominant image was that of the chan-
nel, not the personal image of the presenter, as it has come to be in
the era of TV privatization. Thus there was no permanent announ-
cer on the main TV news bulletins; announcers changed every two
days, if not every other day. The news broadcast commenced with a
dry list of the day's events, and usually the first stories were polit-
ical ones. TV news had little internal logic, and there never was a
central theme, while all reports were referential—summarizing the
actions and statements of other political actors—not interpretative
(Papathanassopoulos, 1997b). In effect, there was neither structure
nor a central theme in the news program.
Greek TV news during the state monopoly seems to confirm what
Hallin and Mancini have pointed out when comparing the TV news
programs of a commercial system (USA) and of a politicized system
(Italy) (Hallin, 1994, pp. 117-21). In contrast to a commercial TV
system in which news reports are interpretative and constructed
to convey a certain understanding of events, in a politicized TV
system, news reports appear to be referential, do not offer mean-
ing within themselves and most importantly, provide a list of inter-
pretations offered by political actors outside of journalism.
Domination of TV news by the views of the Prime Minister

reflected the prevailing pattern of the Greek political parties dur-
ing those days: a powerful ruling party and a very powerful polit-
ical leader. It reflected the over-developed character of the state
and party system relative to civil society in Greece at that time: TV
news during the state monopoly era was exclusively concerned
with the institutionalized public sphere, i.e., principally the polit-
ical parties and the party in office, and, to a lesser extent, labor
unions and state organizations (Papathanassopoulos, 1997b,
pp. 274-88).
Tight governmental control of broadcasting curtailed the credibil-

ity of the electronic media, and the attention given by the Greek
public to the state news broadcasts was limited. This gave news-
papers a comparative advantage. It would not be an exaggeration
to argue that the press in the 1970s and '80s was regarded as the key
mass medium for the dissemination of political information of Pan-
hellenic interest.
Deregulation and commercialization of the Greek media sys-
tem—especially television—has led to changes in the demand for
news. Firstly, the press has entered a state of crisis. In terms of sales,
the newspapers have shown a decline in circulation of about 40 per
cent. In terms of advertising revenue, the share of the newspapers
shrank significantly (from 18 per cent in 1990 to 10.3 per cent in
1996). Most important, in terms of readership, fewer and fewer
Greeks read a newspaper on a daily basis. In a study conducted by
the research agency MRB Hellas (1992), it was found that 69 percent
of the sample got their daily political information from television, 11
percent from radio and 17 per cent from the press (evening and
morning). In a more recent study conducted by AGB Hellas, the TV
Ratings Company, the respondents were also asked to estimate the
contribution of each medium to their information. Each respondent
distributed ten points to the media for each topic in which they were
interested. The position of television as a source of information was
dominant on all topics (current issues/news, social/political/eco-
nomic issues, culture/show business, medical/health, sports,
human relations, and professional/scientific issues). Regarding
current affairs/news, newspapers were ranked third (Table 1).
Only 69 out of 1000 Greeks read a daily newspaper (WAN, 1998);
the «bombardment» of the average citizen by a continuous flow
of information takes them away from the printed page. In effect,
everything is now covered immediately and with saturation by
Table 1 Importance of Media for Information on current Affairs/Issues, 10 Points

Distributed by Respondent Among Various Sources of Information, by Gender and Age
Total Men Women 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+
Radio 1.65 1.78 1.53 1.44 1.72 1.72 1.92 .1.61

Television 5.75 5.33 6.14 5.70 5.49 5.46 5.64 6.22
Newspapers 1.52 1.88 1.20 1.18 1.73 1.78 1.63 1.45
Magazines 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.27 0.32 0.16 0.10
Books 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.04
Social Circle 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.77 0.60 0.45 0.55 0.46
N = 5,403 individuals, 2,534 men, 2,869 women.

Source: AGB Hellas (1998).
radio and television. If people cannot find analysis in depth in TV

news, they can find it in radiocasts.
Television's rise to become the dominant medium for news and
current affairs coincides with a substantial change in its form and
content. Although Greek TV news today, especially on the private
stations, still gives preference to individual political leadership, it is
no longer based on abstract political ideas, but rather focuses atten-
tion on the contest among politicians and clashes within their
parties. TV news on the private channels no longer merely reports
official statements from the members of the cabinet. It usually goes
beyond the bounds of official discourse and statements (Papath-
anassopoulos, 1997b, pp. 282-91): the Greek TV journalist today,
especially on the private stations, is more active than in the past
through framing, interpretation and the creation of narrative, as
well as in the gathering of information. TV journalists not only inter-
pret but also act as professionals who want to stand above political
ideology by presenting themselves as representatives of the "ordin-
ary citizen." Current TV news devotes a good deal of attention to
the private citizen, in sharp contrast to the past, when it was exclus-
ively concerned the institutionalized public sphere. While in the
past, rarely did anyone appear on state TV news who did not rep-
resent an organized participant in the political process, nowadays
very frequently the Greek viewers see ordinary people speaking
about their personal problems. This was confirmed in my research
comparing the main TV news bulletins in 1985 (during the state
monopoly era) and in 1996 (private era) of television sector (Pap-
athanassopoulos, 1997b). In the news bulletins of 1996, it is common
to see ordinary people speaking about their insecurity with the
increase of criminality or even about family disputes. Unfortunatelly,
this trend seems to continue, indeed to intensify in current follow-up

research I am doing on news programmes in 1998.
Greek TV news, like commercial TV news in the US (Hallin, 1994,
pp. 118-9), now presents a thematic, unified presentation. In con-
trast to the state monopoly era, TV news of the commercial broad-
casters begins not with a list of headlines, but with a frame: in many
cases it opens with a set of contrasting images which places all the
day's major events into a summary narrative of the important news
of the day. In contrast to the past, the news anchorperson has
become a dominant figure in the TV news bulletin (Papathanas-
sopoulos, 1997b, p. 283). TV journalists, and especially anchors, have

become public figures. They have adopted the role of authorities
who present their views and interpret social and political reality,
presenting themselves simultaneously as professionals with the
right to make independent judgments and as representatives of the
people. The TV news bulletin is now identified more with the anchor-
person and less with the channel. An indication of this is the fact
that the principal anchormen of the two major private channels
(Mega and Antenna TV) have not changed since their first days in
operation.
In contrast to the state TV monopoly era, Greek viewers do not
receive the whole statements of politicians, but rather selected
"sound bites" from these statements. Moreover, the news bulletins
present more "exclusives" and more sensationalism, while the rhythm
of the news has become faster and every story has to be accompanied
by video images. The structure of a report is a narrative structure:
the reporter sets the scene, describes the stakes, and even concludes
with an interpretation of the event. Moreover, in the new TV era the
average duration of the main TV news bulletins has expanded con-
siderably, from thirty minutes to one or even two hours. Live coverage
is now also used in all important stories, while commercials inter-
rupt the bulletins toward the end (consistent with limits imposed by
the European Union's Directive Television Without Frontiers).
In the new TV era, no story can be broadcast without a visual
image. If the producers lack footage, they turn to their archives or to
related fictional programs. Needless to say, the most fundamental
task of commercial news is to generate and retain viewers' attention.
TV news executives are well aware that they are expendable if they
do not attract high ratings. This results not only in the increasing
visualization and sensationalism of TV news, but also, as our
research has shown, in a complete reshaping of the agenda of the
Table 2 A Comparison of Greek TV between 1985 and 1996,
Average Number of Items in a News Broadcast
1985 1996 1996

ETR1 Mega Channel Antena TV
Domestic 12 13 13
Social 3 3 4.5
Police/crime 0 2 1
Politics 6 5 5
Foreign Policy 2 2 2
Economy 1 1 0.5
International 9 3 3
Politics 8 0.5 1.5
Non-politics 1 2.5 1.5
Culture & arts 14 0 0
Sports 3 3 3
Total 38 19 19
news bulletins (Table 2). In this research we examined a week of the

main TV news bulletins of the state broadcaster (ERT1) in 1985 and
the main TV news bulletins of the two most successful private chan-
nels, Mega and Antenna TV, in 1996. Our aim was to compare the
agenda of TV news bulletins in the era of state monopoly and in
the era of deregulation and privatization in terms of subjects of
news and time given to these news categories. We divided TV news
content into domestic, international and cultural news as well as
sports, weather and news from the stock exchange. We divided
domestic news into social news, police/crime news, news on domestic
politics, foreign policy, and the economy. Regarding international
news we broadly divided it into two general categories: political and
non-political. In the 1996 data, we did not include the news bulletins
of the state broadcaster, because our aim was to compare the way
the dominant TV news bulletins have changed between these two
periods. We gave preference to the two private channels, since they
are the market leaders not only in the Greek television landscape gen-
erally but also specifically in news programming. TV viewership of
the news programs of the state television channels was in 1996 (and
still is) quite low compared to the private stations.
Our research on TV news has demonstrated:
(a) a considerable use of police-crime and social related news (i.e., all
stories related to the ordinary citizen apart from police crime
stories) in the main TV news bulletins, a category of news that

was non- existent in the state monopoly era;
(b) a disappearance of news on culture and the arts (we did not
consider news on fashion as culture);
(c) a decrease in the total number of items,
(d) a decrease in the total amount of international news,
(e) a considerable increase in the number of guests (mainly journal-
ists and actors and, of course, ordinary citizens) speaking on the
news of the day,
(f) the entry of weather report within the bulletin as well as sports
and news from the stock exchange none of which appeared as

regular features in 1985; and
(g) a tremendous increase of the average duration of the bulletin,
from 33 minutes in 1985 to about an hour in 1996 (Papathanas-
sopoulos, 1997b, pp. 282-8).
THE EFFECTS O N JOURNALISTS
The new structure of the media system has reshaped the Greek
journalists' political culture. In the era of the state broadcasting
monopoly, print journalists could express their views concerning
political issues, while journalists of the electronic media only referred
to the views of other political actors. It is not a coincidence that
until recently, the Union of Journalists did not accept as members
journalists who did not work in print media. But Greek newspaper
journalists did not stand above political influences either, since
their views could not be independent from their paper's political
position or line, which was in turn subordinated to partisan forces.
This lack of independence resulted in various efforts by leading
journalists to adopt values of objective or neutral journalism. Recent
efforts to promote professional culture of journalism have included
attempts to establish a media code of ethics, as well as the creation
in the early 1990s of university faculties in journalism (Tzanetakos,
1985, p. 150; Kominis, 1985, p. 25), both of which indicate a desire on
the part of journalists to become independent from political influences.
But what actually constitutes "neutrality" or "objectivity"—com-
monly seen as hallmarks of journalistic professionalism—is not too
clear in the Greek case. For Greek journalists, the concept of an auto-
nomous "fourth estate" has been taken to mean that journalism as a
profession would serve the public and national interest. Critical views,
creative questioning, respect for human values and the improve-

ment of democracy, according to this view, should accompany news
reporting. However, what exactly was meant by "neutrality" or
"objectivity" or even "pluralism" has been open to various interpre-
tations. For Greek journalists "neutrality" or "objectivity" was closely
linked to freedom of expression and responsibility or accountability
in news reporting, rather than to the separation of fact and value. To
some extent, it involved a kind of "acting in the right": it was more a
question of moral integrity in the political stances one took, than of
accurate and strictly factual reporting. So while Greek journalism
did assert a belief in neutrality or objectivity in the sense of a com-

mitment to political pluralism and fair play, in daily practice political
neutrality was abandoned according to the political position of the
medium (Konstantinidou, 1992, pp. 248-52).
With the end of the state broadcasting monopoly, Greek journ-
alism has rapidly moved from politically-affiliated, if not poli-
tically-biased, journalism to market-oriented journalism, which
requires a neutral approach to the issues of the day, in the sense
that journalists need to be seen as representatives of the public as a
whole rather than of particular political factions. Greece does not
have a tradition of objective journalism in practice, however, so it is
not a coincidence that, despite the rapid shift to a market system,
Greek journalism has had difficulty defining a consolidated and
consensually acceptable body of ethical and professional principles
which would apply to all journalists, regardless of the type of owners
that employ them. Nor is it a coincidence that the various efforts
which have been made to form a code of ethics in the profession
have not been fruitful. The most recent effort to form a code of ethics
was initiated by the Union of Journalists in 1997, but it had not been
adopted at the time this article went to press. It seems, as in Italy, that
the commercialization of Greek media, especially television, has
pushed aside the tradition political or social intervention of Greek
journalists. At the same time, Greek journalism has been directed
more by the needs of competition among TV channels than by a solid,
widely-accepted professional conscience, despite a number of calls
by journalists for professionalization.
The process of commercialization has also created a new situation
of disparity among media workers. On the other hand, there is an
elite, mainly of TV journalists, who are well paid and can maintain a
kind of independence and professional autonomy from politicians
and owners; on the other, the rest are under-paid and constantly
insecure. Although the media explosion has meant that in comparison
to the past journalists of today are well paid, most are not more
secure. In the past, while media outlets were fewer than today, a
journalist also worked in other government-sponsored positions
(such as posts in press offices of the ministries, in the state broad-
caster and the state-owned news agencies); today's journalist is
increasingly controlled by the media owner. In contrast to the past,
the journalist has less power, since the job market is increasingly
concentrated in the hands of a few media owners and players. It is
not, for example, a coincidence that there has not been a major strike
in the private media since the deregulation of the media system. The
only strikes one can still witness are those at the state broadcaster.
At present, as in Italy (Mancini, 1992), two opposing models of
Greek journalism are emerging. One is a more traditional journalism
related more to print media and the second is a more market-oriented
journalism related to electronic media. Print journalism, especially
in relation to political coverage, has always been and remains an
arena for confrontation between contrasting political and ideolo-
gical ideas. Even though it operates in a market framework and is to
some degree affected by the new culture emerging in TV news, the
Greek press, like the Italian, offers information, analysis and com-
mentary produced by a few elite groups which address other polit-
ical, cultural and economic elites in order to send messages and
initiate negotiations. In other words, print journalism facilitates
"horizontal communication": it works as a means of negotiation among
political and economic actors who operate at the same social level.
For the comments of those elites to have an impact in the wider
society they must carried on TV news, which is the main source of
information for Greek citizens. In the new media environment,
Greek TV journalists have to adopt their style of news reporting in
order to capture the attention of the ordinary citizen. Greek TV
journalism, due to the intense competition for TV ratings and
advertising, has adopted a new professional culture, close to that of
American TV news, which directs it to make news more interesting
and attractive to audiences, most of whom after all do not have
great interest in day-to-day activities of the government and politics.
This is reflected in the fact that, as noted above, TV news reporting
on policy or economic issues is devalued relative to reporting on
social and especially police-related issues. At the end of 1993, for
example, when a group of Satanists committed a number of mur-
ders, TV news programs and the majority of the newspapers devoted
most of their attention to this story, as the expense of political news

like a new financial policy by the government and assumption of
the presidency of the European Union by Greece. Commercializa-
tion and increased use of new TV technologies has also dramatically
shortened the time between news gathering and news reporting,
while the need to be ahead of the other rival channels has driven
editors to reduce even further the time spent checking and confirm-
ing information passed to the news TV studio.
One could therefore say that due to the particularities of Greek
political history, Greek journalists, working within a heavily polit-
ical environment, used to take political institutions and procedures

as their primary point of reference. With commercialization and the
growing dominance of television, journalism has become a primary
institution of the Greek public sphere, since it has rapidly become,
due to a decline of political parties (as we shall see later), more act-
ive and more autonomous from the political apparatus. This does
not mean, however, that Greek journalism has been transformed
into a single, recognizable, autonomous institution with a solid pro-
fessional culture. As in Italy (Mancini, 1992, 1993), the commer-
cialization of the Greek mass media system has taken place in the
absence of a strong, truly independent journalistic body of ethics
capable of expressing the rules and the conditions of professional
behavior on its own terms. From journalism closely related to polit-
ical power and marked by a strong moral and educational input,
Greece has suddenly leaped into commercial journalism. This rapid
transformation has taken place in the absence of a solid tradition of
professional training, and with no real thought for examining and
elaborating a solid code of ethics accepted and applied by all journal-
ists. Greek journalism offers numerous examples of how the lack of
strong, consolidated and consensually accepted principles of behav-
ior readily lead to sensationalism and dramatization in all almost
aspects of social and political life. In sum, Greek journalism once defined
by ideological and ethical influences imposed by political power, is
now limited by the influences, rules and conditions imposed by
media owners and by intense competition in the media market.
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE AGE OF TELEVISION
The recent changes in Greek media and journalism have transformed

in turn the way parties and politicians address the public through
the media. This is particularly obvious during election campaigns,

which have themselves experienced important changes. Choreo-
graphed precinct walks and nationwide tours are becoming common
campaign routines, while crowded partisan gatherings (politikes
sygentroseis), historically sacred political and media events in Greek
campaigns, are now on the wane. Major speeches given by the polit-
ical leaders in important Greek cities used to be big events. Party
workers would mobilize citizens and friends to attend them, and
they were used as a kind of poll: observers watched which leader
had the greatest attendance as an indicator of who was likely to win
the elections. As campaigns have moved their focus to television,

these political gatherings have lost their impact. Nowadays journal-
ists look at the TV ratings to see which political leader attracts more
viewers during their campaign interviews. Opinion polls, which
first emerged in the 1970s, now flood newspapers, television news-
casts and current affairs programs. Professional advertising and
political consulting, scarcely used before, have become indispens-
able to campaign strategy.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the political communication in
legislative elections since 1993 was carried out primarily through
television. In that year, crowded partisan gatherings with fierce
speeches from political leaders cheered by hundreds of thousands
of flag-waving supporters were replaced by precinct walks, tele-
vised debates, heavy commercial (mostly negative) political advert-
ising and major press/TV interviews. To what extent the growing
importance of media, especially television, has reshaped political
communication practices is at the center of debates on contempor-
ary Greek democracy.
This, however, has not arisen suddenly, nor are changes in the
media system the only relevant factors. During the last two decades,
as Nicos Mouzelis notes, there have been three important changes
in contemporary Greece (1995, pp. 24-31). One was the participation
of Greece in the European Union, and its efforts to grasp the oppor-
tunities offered by this rapid integration. This has resulted in eco-
nomic, social and political changes being imposed from outside,
rather than being directed and promoted by indigenous political
forces. Secondly, as the polls show, Greek citizens (especially the
younger generation) now express their dissatisfaction with political
parties and politicians. Thirdly, one also notes developments within
the parties and the political system itself, specifically, the loosening
of the control by the two main parties. A lack of party cohesion has
also undermined the country's present clientelistic/populist ori-

entation and policies.
Whether these changes are permanent or temporary is an open
question. But undeniably, Greek politics, compared to the past, pre-
sents several novelties to observers. After decades of political
instability, democracy has lasted for more than two decades, with
different parties peacefully taking turns in power, while military
interventions have been relegated to the past. Also, after years of
ideological polarization, the Socialists champion free market ideals
and promote the process of state and economic reform.
This period of democratic stability has, as noted above, been

accompanied by growing public dissatisfaction with politicians and
political parties. While in the past the governing party was criticized
for exercising tight control over the electronic media, in the mid-
1990s, politicians across the political spectrum accuse television of
contributing to alienation and cynicism concerning politics and
political parties. In January 1982, less than a year after the Socialist
Party PASOK came to office, party leader Andreas Papandreou
announced a rule of public behavior for his deputies. In a ten-page
document, he prescribed the rights and the responsibilities of
his party's MPs, including the rule not to make statements, send
telegrams, write for newspapers or give press interviews without
the prior consent of the party directorate (Alivizatos, 1995, p. 173).
Fourteen years later (10 September 1995) in a major press interview
Mr. Papandreou commented:
The political climate is appalling nowadays. This is due, to a large extent, to

television. Television has disorganized us. Every member of the party (not
only from PASOK), runs to the screen where he expresses his own positions
rather than the position of the party, which we are obliged as members (of
PASOK) to communicate to the public. Is it possible for a party with 170
MPs to have 170 positions on an issue? Can we solve this problem by
'expelling' (karatomiseis) party members?
Of course not in the age of television, one must say. But Papandreou
was no longer the powerful leader of the early 1980s. Neither was
PASOK the same party. In the past, Papandreou did often expel
MPs and party members from PASOK, sometimes without very
compelling reasons. In 1995, he was an ailing man, unable to fight,
while many members in his party were already thinking of the
"post-Papandreou" era.
This, however, reflects not only the rise of television and not only
the personal decline of Papandreou, but also changes in the Greek
society and polity. As Dimitris Charalambis notes, the twenty years
since the re-establishment of Democracy have exhibited rather
lucidly the problems and contradictions of Greek society and the
Greek political system. In form, as well as in substance, the most
democratic period since the founding of the Greek state has revealed
the qualitative vacuum which characterizes the construction of Greek
society (1996, p. 289). Because it comprises the only period in modern
Greek history when the quality of the political system and the forms
of social cohesion have not been influenced by historical conjunctures

able to cancel the parliamentary regime, this period, according to
Charalambis (1996, p. 290) allows a diagnosis of much deeper dys-
functions of the Greek political system. "In the last analysis," he con-
cludes, "it was the realization of democracy that brought the problem
of the content of democracy to the foreground and by implication the
fundamental elements of social cohesion" (1996, p. 290).
Indeed, since 1974 and especially since the mid 1980s, one notes a
series of dysfunctions, problems and impasses in all areas of social
communication and material production. The result has been a
speedy growth in awareness of the crisis, coupled with an inability to
understand it rationally or to confront it practically. Phenomena like
unemployment, socially marginal groups, the widening of income
inequality, and the stabilization of inequality in stratification are
some of the main worries of contemporary Greek society. Moreover,
accusations concerning scandals and corruption at high levels have
become frequent themes on the public agenda. Greek parties have
remained leader-oriented, consistent with the traditional clientelistic
political culture. This has been an obstacle to turning followers into
active citizens, since the main reason for voting was to promote the
party's interest and power. As the political leadership (due to the entry
of Greece to the European Union, the internationalization of the eco-
nomy and changes in the international political situation) was gradu-
ally obliged to follow a more managerial rather than interventionist
policy, political parties appeared that could not be differentiated from
one another, especially during periods of economic crisis. In effect,
the institutions of the public sphere seem to be weaker, since their
main preoccupation is to compete for political office rather than to
express different policies with respect to the economy.
This new political situation has led many citizens to feel that poli-
ticians were not in a position to solve either their thorny problems
or the main concerns of the country. As in the USA, then, media

power seems to be growing as party organizations are losing both
influence and respect, and the traditional institutions of the public
sphere (such as parties and trade unions) are in decline. At the same
time this has gradually led to a new relationship between the
media—particularly its owners—and politicians.
A NEW INTERPLAY BETWEEN MEDIA AND POLITICIANS?

Most Greek politicians now claim that control over the media equals
political power. With the deregulation and privatization of the
television landscape, politicians and parties, especially the major par-
ties, have turned to television to communicate with their supporters,
since the latter do not seem willing to participate in the traditional
political gatherings and activities (Demertzis & Kafetzis, 1996). In
effect, in stark contrast to the past, politicians nowadays need to adapt
themselves to the new media regime. This situation has gradually
resulted in a new "power game" between politicians and the media,
i.e., a battle over who will control the public and political agenda.
Nowadays, Greek citizens watch an endless stream of negative
stories about political scandals, rivalry, conflict and self-interest.
The media claim that in carrying out their watchdog function they
will make politicians, bureaucrats and private interests accountable
to the public (Papathanassopoulos, 1997a, p. 320). Consequently,
those in government, in particular, and politicians in general do not
enjoy the same treatment they did in the old era. In contrast to the
past, the Greek public is now provided by the media with an
unstoppable flow of information concerning politicians' ways of
making decisions, their habits and even their personal vices. A par-
ticularly dramatic example of the change is the case of Papandreou,
the most powerful political leader of the democratic period, whose
image as a strong leader and the aura that surrounded him at the
peak of his power, more or less vanished in his last days, as televi-
sion viewers saw him almost incapable of moving or speaking when
he was leaving the hospital. The slow demise of this charismatic
leader was presented on the TV screens day after day like a soap opera.
It can be argued that Greece faces what Neuman (1986) calls the
"paradox of mass politics." While more people have access to
information, more access has not increased political knowledge.
While in one sense Greeks have a plethora of information about
politics and politicians, information of a sort that would never have

appeared in an earlier period, demand has gradually weakened for
serious and detailed political discussion. An indication of this is the
sharp decline of political TV talk shows, on which politicians are
invited to discuss political and social affairs. In the 1997-98 TV season
there were only two politically-oriented TV talk shows on the major
private channels, while there were eight in 1992/93. Another indica-
tion is the sharp decline of the daily political press noted above.
One effect of this change is that Greek politicians feel they are
more vulnerable than they were in the past. The former Prime Min-
ister Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis once accused the "web of interests
of media publishers" of being the main reason that he lost power.
The chairman of the Hellenic Parliament has attacked the media
many times, especially their owners, on the grounds that they use
their channels in order to promote their business interests. Similar
statements have been made by other politicians
The realization of this vulnerability, in my opinion, has caused
politicians to seek ways, albeit silently, to re-control the electronic
media. It could be argued that it is not a coincidence that new televi-
sion licenses have not been granted for years. It has become obvious
that the awarding of the licenses could be used as a part of the
domestic "political game." During the administration of the Con-
servative government (April, 1990 to October, 1993) announcements
of license awards usually followed political disputes with the radio
stations. When Andreas Papandreou came to power after the 1993
legislative elections, his government announced that it would
re-examine the whole regulatory environment as well as the licenses.
But up to his death in 1996 no official government license was granted.
His successor, the Simitis government, announced in Spring, 1997
the allocation of frequencies for the Greek television domain.
According to its action plan, the so called "order in the airwaves"
plan, the government would award the new licenses and also would
require a re-evaluation of the existing ones, but up to the time this
article went to press, the licenses were still being withheld.
Why this policy of non-action? The reason seems simple: success-
ive governments since 1989, the year of TV deregulation, appear to
continue playing an "on and off" game with the TV owners, who
also have other interests in the Greek economy. In effect, they seem
to be saying "be. nice to me, in order to get an official license." It is
not a coincidence that the Papandreou Socialist government created
a new law (2328 in 1995), which, like most of the other broadcasting
laws, still has not been fully implemented. The fact that the 2328 law
requires the publication of thirty-five Presidential Decrees in order
to be implement reflects its political function. It is also not a coincid-
ence that most channels are facing severe financial problems and
owe taxes to the state, yet the government has not enforced the rules
as it does with the ordinary citizens. Nor is it a coincidence that
fines which are imposed by the broadcasting regulatory body the
National Broadcasting Council (NBC) have to be approved by the
minister of Press and the Media and, up to the time this article went
to press, few had been paid. Finally, it is not a coincidence that poli-
ticians threaten to introduce legislation which would control media

concentration and, in effect, media power. In August 1998, with
Presidential Decree 214, the government announced a regulation to
oversee the "transparency of media ownership," but, again, to the
time this article went to press, nothing had yet been done.
It seems that we have entered a new era of "interplay" between
media owners and politicians. In this new game each party tries to
get tactical advantages because each needs the other. Here it is
important to stress that commercial motives alone do not drive
entrepreneurs and other business interests who enter such small
media markets as those in Greece. To an extent, broadcasting is in
this way similar to the press, where most newspapers are depend-
ent on considerable yearly subsidies or bank loans or on the wealth
of their owners. The entry of shipping owners and other business
interests into the media scene is an important way in which these
interests try to influence public opinion and to exert pressure in the
political arena. For example, the main owners of Mega Channel
(Lambrakis, Tegopoulos, Bobolas & Vardinoyannis) are also the
owners of the most influential Athenian newspapers and they have
also interests in travel and culture (Lambrakis), construction (Bobo-
las), telecommunications (Tegopoulos, Lambrakis), shipping and oil
business (Vardinoyannis), while the owner of Antenna TV and radio
station, Mr. Kyriakou, is also a ship owner. It is obvious that Greek
media owners want to have the upper hand in order to put pressure
on politicians because of the huge financial interests they hold in
telecommunications, shipping, refining and other industries. This
pressure is useful when fighting for government contracts, very
important due to the structure of Greek economy, in which the state
plays a much bigger role than in Anglo-Saxon countries, and many
important decisions affecting entrepreneurs rest in the hands of
politicians. Being able to influence public opinion has become an
Table 3 Credibility of Journalists and Politicians
Whom do you trust more:
Politicians 6.3%
Journalists 39.3%
Neither of them 53.3%
No reply 1.1%
N = 983 persons in Greater Athens region, May 2-9,1995.
Source: Project Research Consulting, 1995.
important business tool for the media owners. At the same time the
polls indicate that the Greek public appears to be increasingly cyn-
ical about both politicians and media, as the data in Table 3 suggest.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is perhaps too strong to say that Greece has become a "media-

centered democracy," to use an increasingly popular phrase. But
in the age of television dominance both Greek politicians and the
media—their owners in particular—have become preoccupied with
a new "power game" over who will control the public agenda. It can
be argued that this is nothing new since both media and political
actors continue to interact in traditional ways: the former questions
while the latter assumes the mantle of responsibility and control.
In important ways, however, the nature of these roles has changed.
Journalism, for one thing, has moved from a politically-oriented
to a commercial basis. This does not mean that commercial journal-
ism is not politically active, nor that it lacks political interpretations
or colors, since journalists are influenced by the owners of the
medium for which they work, and, in effect, are the mediators
between political power and the media owners. Although journal-
ism appears to play a more active social role today in Greece, giving
the impression that it sets the agenda and represents the citizen, in
the final analysis it is influenced by the economic needs of the news
organizations in which its members are employed. The rapid
increase in the profile and status of the Greek media is related to the
fact that Greece has entered, as Charalambis notes (1996, 286) a
demystifying process, which has allowed the appearance of real
problems in the formation and functioning of the Greek political
system and demonstrated the collapse of all sorts of alibis—social
and political—available to politicians and political parties. This

in turn increases the role of the media—but not of journalists, as
professionals, since the media are used by their owners in their nego-
tiations with the state.
This situation is related to the fact, that Greece, like other South-
ern European states, entered late into "modernity" and has neither a
strong civil society nor a strong market. In Greece parliamentarism
was established in the absence of a strong civil society, and the
media were used a vehicles for negotiating with and pressuring the
government of the day, rather than representing the public dis-
course of society. The over-extended state, meanwhile, is considered

by the private interests as the place to make business (e.g., public
works), more than the market, which has remained under-
developed. It is in this context that one can understand why the
power of the media has increased so considerably, but not the
power of journalists.
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The Communication Review

The effects of media commercialization on journalism and politics in

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Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This paper tries to describe the effects of media modernization and

commercialization in journalism and politics, taking as example the

KEY WORDS: Greece; journalism; politics; interplay; political communica-

In the age of television dominance, commercialization and interna-

many respects compared to others. Nevertheless, it is possible to

control the public agenda, while journalists function as a means

Moreover, in the era of media modernization, especially with the

its troubled political history. Therefore, this paper is organized into

THE MEDIA AND THE STATE IN GREECE

Greek mass media are characterized by an excess of supply over

market was too small to support so many newspapers. So the press

sphere and thus the diffusion of its repressive mechanisms through-

to the government of the day, reflecting the tradition of political

need to attract a broader spectrum of readers to increase circulation

since the 1990s, adapting to a market-oriented structure with more

THE EFFECTS O N NEWS

Domination of TV news by the views of the Prime Minister

Tight governmental control of broadcasting curtailed the credibil-

Table 1 Importance of Media for Information on current Affairs/Issues, 10 Points

Total Men Women 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+

Radio 1.65 1.78 1.53 1.44 1.72 1.72 1.92 .1.61

N = 5,403 individuals, 2,534 men, 2,869 women.

radio and television. If people cannot find analysis in depth in TV

this trend seems to continue, indeed to intensify in current follow-up

sopoulos, 1997b, p. 283). TV journalists, and especially anchors, have

1985 1996 1996

news bulletins (Table 2). In this research we examined a week of the

stories) in the main TV news bulletins, a category of news that

and news from the stock exchange none of which appeared as

THE EFFECTS O N JOURNALISTS

creative questioning, respect for human values and the improve-

did assert a belief in neutrality or objectivity in the sense of a com-

most of their attention to this story, as the expense of political news

ical environment, used to take political institutions and procedures

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE AGE OF TELEVISION

The recent changes in Greek media and journalism have transformed

the media. This is particularly obvious during election campaigns,

the elections. As campaigns have moved their focus to television,

also undermined the country's present clientelistic/populist ori-

This period of democratic stability has, as noted above, been

The political climate is appalling nowadays. This is due, to a large extent, to

of social cohesion have not been influenced by historical conjunctures

or the main concerns of the country. As in the USA, then, media

A NEW INTERPLAY BETWEEN MEDIA AND POLITICIANS?

politics and politicians, information of a sort that would never have

ticians threaten to introduce legislation which would control media

Whom do you trust more:

It is perhaps too strong to say that Greece has become a "media-

and political—available to politicians and political parties. This

course of society. The over-extended state, meanwhile, is considered

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