You are on page 1of 50

PT&T vs.

NLRC
272 SCRA 596

Facts:
Estrada vs. Escritor
Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a
A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a “Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee who’s having a
Facts:
maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was to
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote
immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period.
to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that
Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods,
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a
this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The
man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who
reliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to
stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and
join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job
challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the
application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that
proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor
she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the
Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive
conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for
reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the
“disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code
discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said
against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas
discrepancy and she was reminded about the company’s policy of not
learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.
accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was
she wasn’t aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadn’t
already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with
deliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remained
Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that
unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed
they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect
from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of
dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances
Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who
before the labor arbiter but and was affirmed by the NLRC with
have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations)
modification, that de guzman must be suspended for three months.
jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the
Issue:
approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and
Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace’s illegal dismissal due
immoral conduct.
to certain company policy.
Issue:
Ruling:
Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and
Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by
immoral conduct.
discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Where’s a
company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
Ruling:
marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs
Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the
afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of
fundamental policy of the State toward marriage.
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it
The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is
does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then
that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of
that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to
the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace’s illegal dismissal
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of
and the latter shall claim for damages.
evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show
that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General
utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct
circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.
The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in
cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these
distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right
to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda


35 Phil. 252

Facts: Balogbog vs. CA


Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established
their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for Facts:
about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and
month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and
the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against
provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share
her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners
the home of her parents. denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother
The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-
support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects amakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered
that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an
accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
Issue: estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court
domicile. of Appeals affirmed.

Ruling: Issue:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid
relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the even in the absence of marriage certificate.
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a
Ruling:
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
some way should be obtainable.
This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the
this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private
wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given
destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of
by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave
argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of
marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit.
the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other Ruling:
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of
Catalina is valid. the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her
surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez


185 SCRA 425

Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her
full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Cosca vs. Palaypayon
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and 237 SCRA 249
confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of Facts:
her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative
was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio
petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As
her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. 1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who 2. Falsification of the monthly reports of cases
is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their 3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court
(Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 4. Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received
5. Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and
the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are
6. Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities
the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange
of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages
under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being even without the requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples were
preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license. As a
sisters contend otherwise. consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage
Issue: contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by
Vitaliana Vargas. the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
to appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court
Issue: but this time defendant’s counsel informed the court that chances of
Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of settling case amicably were nil.
marriage.
Issue:
Ruling: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pay plaintiff damages.
pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Ruling:
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have
that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages.
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to
judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage. pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actual
damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the
defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will
come back and the wedding will push through.

Wassmer vs. Velez


12 SCRA 648

Facts:
Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiff-
appellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married on Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy
September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note to A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due to
opposition of defendant’s mother and that he will be leaving. But on
Facts:
September 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be
Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against
returning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appear
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant
nor was he heard from again.
contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as
Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
defendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to
weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that
pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955
the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador
defendant filed a “petition for relief from orders, judgments and
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration.” Beatriz moved
respondent’s residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area.
to strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
appear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
Defendant wasn’t able to appear but instead on the following day his
separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s
on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,
petition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed
confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much
other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and required the respondent to comment on the complaint.
that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the
ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner
Issue: and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the
solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC. earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the
Ruling:
need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure
The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded
to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding
the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.
for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due
subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a
to her own fault and negligence.
summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive
death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.
Issue:
A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the
Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage
jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death;
without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
(2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore
there is an irregularity. Ruling:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme
Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner.
Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.

Arañes vs. Judge Occiano


A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Vda. De Chua vs. CA
Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Facts:
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo
death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua
Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his
the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship
and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Facts:
Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
contract and the evidences that she used were: including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the
a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in
at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple
City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for
status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19,
specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with
the consent of Cardenas.
The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage,
and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate Issue:
court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents. Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no
Issue: marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.
Ruling:
Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential
appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to
to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of
wife of the decedent. documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil
to produce. registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants,
Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the
when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due
search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no
certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio.
rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original
marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should
have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage
dubious.

Republic vs castro and CA G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994


court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage.
Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign
law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they
Garcia Vs Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.
Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian
family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In
1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent
was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since October 1995, they 174 SCRA 653
lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were Pilapil vs Ibay Somera
divided. Facts:
In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national,
respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation
marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage,
and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg
in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
Supreme Court. marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
Issue: separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.
Garcia. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
Ruling:
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26
another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987,
of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the
capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign
divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and Issue:
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and may prosper.
Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court.
Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on Ruling:
evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery
was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at
validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the
marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.


139 SCRA 139

Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in


Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had
two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the
ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Republic vs. Orbecido
Nevada in 1983. 472 SCRA 114
Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that
she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton Facts:
alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were married
right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to with two children. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred and 1st became a naturalized American citizen, 2nd obtained a valid
by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry, and 3rd contracted a
acknowledged that the couple had no “community property”. marriage with Innocent Stanley, an American.
Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article
Issue: 26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends that
Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law,
between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or
Annulment instead.
Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. Issue:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen.
Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United Ruling:
States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship
and remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be to sanction Issue:
absurdity and injustice. What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of
For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) a the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting
valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her to marriage license.
remarry.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own Ruling:
courts, the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law, The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
(3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry. from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
divorce is obtained by the alien spouse. and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within
for such would be in the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible, the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases
of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife
for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
“husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Niñal vs. Bayadog


328 SCRA 122

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito
resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Manzano vs. Sanchez
Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
Facts:
5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a
Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with
one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that Cosca vs. Palaypayon
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly 237 SCRA 249
stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he Facts:
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Same. Article 27-34; Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin,
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint
affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, almost six (6) years already.
he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to Issue:
harass him. Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriage
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court with the exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of Code is valid.
gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with Ruling:
more severely. In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when
it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months
Issues: and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and
1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the wife for almost 6 years already before they got married as they stated in
respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code. their joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
the law. Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their
marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
Ruling: parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
the following requisites must concur: This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already
and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the
no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge
The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate.
at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993
and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent
Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null
and void.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated
gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present. PRESUMPTION!!!
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have
taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
Mariategui vs. CA lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things
have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
Facts: Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. On
his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot
four children, Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his
second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Domingo vs. CA
Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children, 226 SCRA 572
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with Facts:
which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo died without a Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of
will. Upon his death, descendants from his first and second marriages Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No. 163. However, the against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married
children on Lupo’s third marriage filed with the lower court an amended at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage
complaint claiming that they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina
which were owned by their common father. dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior
marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their
The petitioners, children on first and second marriage, filed a marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that
counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial court denied the she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the
motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents, marriage and to recover them from him.
children on third marriage. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is
court committed an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in his
married and also in holding respondents are not legitimate children of their possession.
said parents. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to Issue:
equal shares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity
motion for reconsideration of said decision. of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of
bigamy.
Issue: Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession
rights over the said estate. Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
Ruling: respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their
that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason
mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was questions regarding the couple's properties.
Niñal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122

Facts:
Same. Article 35

Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father Republic vs. CA and Molina
with defendant is null and void ab initio. February 13, 1997
Ruling:
Facts:
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases
Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he
subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The
“husband and wife”.
RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
was affirmed by the CA.
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Issue:
Whether or not irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities constitute psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
got a chance to visit the U.S., where he underwent a training program
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. were of no avail.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the married life.
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically Issue:
permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of 36 of the FC.
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Ruling:
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
and their children.
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand in
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated,
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated.

Leouel Santos vs. CA


G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be
an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20,
1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
spouses’ family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
“quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should
start living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would Facts:
express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents. Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a
despite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent
departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised to return alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan.
home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel
They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987,
she gave birth to their child. Facts:
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married
M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born. On October
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his 27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage
marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the to petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The case
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. However,
After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied petitioner’s
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited established quantum evidence of respondent. Petitioner elevated the case
the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial
of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense
Issue: must present evidence.
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to
psychological incapacity. Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence
despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of
Ruling:
marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity.
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
Ruling:
marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned
incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’
his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
marriage.
caused by a psychological disorder.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no
charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to
showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included
the context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect
Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation.
from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed
any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that
height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed
not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
cases against him. The evidence presented merely establishes the
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction
Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence,
besetting their marital union.
the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.

Choa vs. Choa


and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
Antonio vs. Reyes marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
Facts: Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, however, the court is sufficiently convinced
Marie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petition
that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
established by the petitioner.
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, Facts:
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
other events or things. them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy,
psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent.
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet
they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his
was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that her
should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his
respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he
perform her essential marital obligations. wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return
and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate their
occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because
others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and differences.
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her The trial court declared their marriage void on account of
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving psychological incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the decision of the trial court.
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Issue:
Issue: Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have
Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is
incapacity as to render the marriage null and void. equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Ruling: Ruling:
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish psychological incapacity.
truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the Issue:
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husband’s Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his
senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is defense of good faith.
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to Ruling:
“procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
of merit. characterized by statutes as "void."
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private
act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
Morigo vs. People of the Philippines justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme
G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not
tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of
Facts: criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 43 SCRA 177
1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they Facts:
became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant Eufemio, married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen
to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative.
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed accident. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal
a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional separation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and
Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation.
nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in Issue:
information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation
Regional Trial Court of Bohol. before final decree abated the action.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia Ruling:
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than
but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only
to the charge. the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of Ruling:
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on
personalis moritur cum persona. concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal
action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover
civil liability arising from the offense.
Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related
to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of
in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.

Gandionco vs. Peñaranda


G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987

Facts:
Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco,
filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for
legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support
and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage Bugayong vs. Ginez
against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The
respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente Facts:
lite. Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After
incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband, before the latter
concubinage. left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila
would stay with Benjamin’s sisters.
Issue: Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed
Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in
suspended on the case of concubinage. Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sister
Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity. Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the
Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico
house of Leonila’s godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her
the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of
he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la
tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed Concepcion in North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on
in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property
timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles;
complaint. that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his
name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other
Issue: "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and
Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
condoned by the plaintiff-husband.
Issue:
Ruling: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion
Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on
the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him the decree of legal separation.
and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband
and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for Ruling:
legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can
within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code. put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less
than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention
not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of
the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal
separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in
order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

Pacete vs. Cariaga


231 SCRA 321

Facts:
Macadangdang vs. CA
108 SCRA 314

Facts:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that
due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth Potenciano vs. CA
to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. G.R. No. 139789, 139808 July 19, 2001
Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support
against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now
Facts:
petitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and
Erlinda Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable
praying for its dismissal.
from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of
The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order
Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which
However, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
both parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an
petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject,
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the
Potenciano Ilusorio.
lower court dismissed the complaint. The decision invoked positive
Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via
provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities.
certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano
Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano
Issue:
Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio appealing from
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would
the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never
bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed
refused to see her. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas
father, an opportunity to be heard.
corpus for lack of merit, and granted the petition to nullify the Court of
Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda Ilusorio.
Ruling:
SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned
Issue:
decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and
Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 of Family
clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
Code to have custody of her husband in consortium.
partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised
Ruling:
attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless
The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound to
behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her
live together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69.
own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization
However, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Only the
consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married
moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for
women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then
making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly
exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to
personal. Therefore, they deny the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking
the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil. 252

Facts:
Same. Article 68

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may claim support from her husband Ty vs. CA
outside of the conjugal domicile. G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

Ruling: Facts:
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria
wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by Villanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively. However, the
maintaining her in his own home at his option. The law provides that Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said
at his option. spouses, private respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of
However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore
permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his two daughters. Until private respondent petition that their marriage be
wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time
designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Article 68 emphasize they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the
mutual love, respect and fidelity among husband and wife. time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
Maria had not been issued.
Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is
untrue. She submitted the marriage license in court and private
respondent did not question the evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmed
their decision in favor of private respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply
with marital obligations of the respondent.

Ruling:
There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of
marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be
awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of Ruling:
their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
sense, militates against such incongruity. effective, not merely nominal or moral.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband
to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ
of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is
denied.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner


G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000

Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and
lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the
spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and 248 SCRA 300
in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Facts:
When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda Article 69; Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of
in Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On
their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for
latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with
for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. requirement for residency.
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of
condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in
City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not
custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always
petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second
Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City. Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution
finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus
to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss. Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said
Ruling: properties at public auction.
It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law. The presumption that the wife automatically Issue:
gains the husband's domicile by operation of law but never automatically Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as
loses her domicile of origin. guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony the spouses.
with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage Ruling:
different domiciles of origin. This difference could, for the sake of family The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or
unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult
actual residence. each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to
get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered
to redound to the benefit of the family.
But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for
a third person’s debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit
of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated
activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

Ayala Investments vs. CA


G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

Facts:
Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM,
respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP, executed security agreements and
making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness
to Ayala Investments. Agapay vs. Palang
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for 276 SCRA 341
sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a
writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo Facts:
caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina
sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding,
Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang,
against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales
against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not
not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial
child. partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of
When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having
marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his
by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to
at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda take care of his house and store.
as the sole vendee. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. The party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed
parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand,
land to their only child, Herminia Palang. Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then two A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument
years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of
concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the
riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten
given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint
lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila
Issue: was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land under Article 87 of the Family Code.
acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.
Issue:
Ruling: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late
The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction
was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was Ruling:
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
donation. the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the
other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and
void.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael


G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001

Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the Uy vs. CA
registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
Facts:
Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the
guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of
real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. The
petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administering 130 Phil 324
his properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the
Jardeleza’s real and personal assets, there was a need for a court- Facts:
appointed guardian to administer said properties. Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz,
Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the defendant, at Bacolod City. During their coverture they acquire seven
declaration of incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at Silay
powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell Cadastre. They are also engaged in varied business ventures.
the property. She alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally
hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard
of real property and its improvements. She prayed for authorization from Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City.
the court to sell said property. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the
RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. She also began to
convinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. However, certain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting several
Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not pieces of evidence on the defendant’s polo shirt and iron safe.
knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case. He also The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the
questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements reason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan,
thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations and Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and
hospitalization. extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife
temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. The
Issue: defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and
Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give
administration of the conjugal property. them financial support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to
draw allowances from his office and he financed the education of their
Ruling: children, two of whom were studying in Manila.
The CA, which the SC affirmed, ruled that in the condition of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in Issue:
relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because he Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to
was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due comply with his obligations.
to illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Ruling:
Revised Rules of Court. The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is
considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his
wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be
real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not
only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
desertion.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the
term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from
the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal
partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the
defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives
any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his
marital duties and rights.
Partosa-Jo vs. CA
216 SCRA 692 BA Finance Corporation vs. CA
161 SCRA 608
Facts:
Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered Facts:
fifteen children. The first woman, petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be Augusto Yulo, respondent, secured a loan from the petitioner, BA
his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter. Finance Corp., as evidenced by his signature on a promissory note in
Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of behalf of the A & L Industries. About two months prior to the loan,
conjugal property and an action for support. The complaint for support was however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had
granted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal property abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and
was never entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA but demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.
retain its affirmation on trial court’s ruling. When their motions for Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the
reconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of basis of the promissory note. They also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
judicial separation of conjugal property. attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the
The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds that debt. The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the
the petitioner and respondent were legally married and that the properties petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Private respondent
mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that Augusto had
although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy. already abandoned her and their children five months before the filing of
the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory
Issue: note was executed. She also alleged that her signature was forged in the
Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be special power of attorney procured by Augusto.
granted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment. Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if
the attached properties were her exclusive property, the same can be
Ruling: made answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part
SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent had of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo.
already rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo
demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their Issue:
conjugal relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial support Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms
to the petitioner. part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be made answerable to
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the obligation.
the respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal Ruling:
property. SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property.
Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during the
marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of
the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
In the case at bar, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to
enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent
was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because
at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family defendant-wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal
and had left their conjugal home. partnership, as well as the defendant-husband cannot be held liable. Only
the defendant-wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. The
conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant-husband cannot be
levied upon.

Johnson & Johnson Inc. vs. CA


262 SCRA 298

Facts:
Delilah Vinluan, defendant and owner of Vinluan Enterprises,
engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products incurred an
obligation to the said company. She issued checks amounting to the
payment of the obligation but the checks bounced. Johnson & Johnson,
petitioner, demands for the payment and even offered accommodations to
Spouses Laperal vs. Spouses Katigbak
pay the obligation but failed. With these, respondent filed a complaint
90 Phil 77
against defendant spouses Vinluan for collection of the principal obligation
plus interest with damages. RTC granted the complaint and ordered
defendant to pay. Facts:
However, after meticulously scrutinizing the evidence on record The plaintiffs, Roberto Laperal Jr. and his wife Purificacion M.
that there was no privity of contract between respondent and defendant- Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak, who acted as an agent in the sale on the
husband regarding the obligations incurred by the defendant-wife, they commission of jewels, and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover the total
held that defendant-husband must not be legally held liable for the said sum P113,500 plus interest and costs. The defendant Evelina moved to
obligation. Thus, they issued a writ of execution against the properties of dismiss, on the ground that the complaint failed to state sufficient facts to
the defendant-wife but the two notices of levy on execution covered also constitute a cause of action against her. The plaintiff opposed the motion
the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership. but the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence this
Defendant-husband filed a third-party claim seeking the lifting of appeal.
the levy on the conjugal properties. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. The first
to fix the value of the levied properties. Defendant-husband moved to transcribed four promissory notes for various sums and the notes are not
quash the levy on execution but as expected petitioner opposed the signed by Evelina. The only allegations that may affect her liability if any,
motion. are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her",
and that both defendants refused to pay the notes.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not defendant-husband be held liable for the debts of
Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of her
his wife which were incurred without his consent.
husband against the spouses Laperal.

Ruling: Ruling:
SC denied petition based on the respondent Court’s original The defendant Evelina is not personally liable. Ramon was not her
findings which had already become final and indisputable. The defendant- agent, and he did not contract for her. For the repayment of the sums
husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by the borrowed by him, Ramon Katigbak was personally responsible with his own
private funds, and at most the assets of the conjugal partnership. To reach they be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of action
both kinds of property it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to implead the wife upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and
Evelina Katigbak. "Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against his wife Victoria. Victoria’s will stated that her interests, rights and
the wife, and she is not a necessary party defendant.” properties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be
The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and
unless its administration has been transferred to him, which is not the Teodoro in equal shares. Modesto’s will, on the other hand, bequeathed to
case. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts his two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with
incurred by the husband. Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of
the spouses Modesto and Victoria.

Ruling:
Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession
of the lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot would
nonetheless be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him
“during the marriage by lucrative title”.
Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from
his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property.
The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of
law.

Villanueva vs. IAC


192 SCRA 21

Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of
land in Capiz. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto and
Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of
extrajudicial partition. BPI vs. Posadas
Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz 56 Phil 215
Registry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they
had no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate Facts:
children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary
Bernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. In named in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life
the loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative Raymundo Assurance Company of Canada. During the following five years the insured
Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness. paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. The deceased
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano.
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land The plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was
at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later, Consolacion appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary
Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas estate by an order, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico bought
Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from
the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the an officemate.
life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with
Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for
Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day
it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned the period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina
money to said widow. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of
principle that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed the
upon the death of the person insured. case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in
nature.
Issue: Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and
Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money.
partnership. After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wong’s. A writ of
execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all
Ruling: in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed
SC holds, (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution,
the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "not
partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as
husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; and (2) that if the Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. That he had nothing
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her
proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution
part. and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties.
That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary Issue:
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive
probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the properties of Romarico.
law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is
immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.
Ruling:
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists
in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with
money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he
obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then
the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on
this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the
determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during
coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the
purchase.

Wong vs. IAC


200 SCRA 792

Facts:
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They
had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles
Ayala Investments vs. CA Carlos vs. Abelardo
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 G.R. No. 146504 April 4, 2002

Facts: Facts:
Same. Article 121-122 Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October 1989,
respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him
Issue: and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the
Whether or not debts and obligations contracted by the husband purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct
alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. their married life independently and on their own, petitioner issued a check
in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who
Ruling: acknowledged receipt thereof. The amount was in full payment of the
The respondent directly received the money or services to be used property.
in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as to the status of
the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. Here, no the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
the contract of loan and services, the family stands to benefit from the resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making
loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the various death threats against petitioner.
husband. It is immaterial in the, his business or profession fails or does not Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.
of the family business, the law presumes and rightly so, that such Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. damages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. As
they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa
Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from
petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a
staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded
immediate payment of the full amount.

Issue:
Whether or not the amount of US$25,000.00 was a loan obtained
by private respondent and his wife from petitioner.

Ruling:
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that
the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and
lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus
benefiting the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are
jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of
US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the
corporation and not as a loan. Defendant-husband does not appear to be a
stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos
Construction, Inc. Since he is not a stockholder, he has no right to
participate in the income or profits thereof.
Mallilin vs. Castillo
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition
and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against Valdez vs. RTC
respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged that petitioner and 260 SCRA 211
respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their
respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship while their respective Facts:
marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Same. Article 147; Emphasis to the RTC’s judgment on liquidation
Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o
of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. unions of marriage.
The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and
personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. Issue:
Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the
demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but parties in the liquidation of their properties.
respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely
in her name. Ruling:
Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the property
business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs regimes are those provided for in Article 147 or 148as, the case may be.
Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the
registered with the SEC. She denied that she and petitioner lived as provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflict
husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married with Article 147 or 148.
to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and
real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the shall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and co-ownership. However, the fruits of couple’s separate property are not
registered solely in her name. included in the co-ownership.

Issue:
Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of the
properties.

Ruling:
A co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple
are not capacitated to marry each other.
the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim.
Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds were provided
by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to
shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment
creditor.

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.


G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005

Facts:
Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G. Agapay vs. Palang
Francisco were married. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president 276 SCRA 341
in a private corporation. The Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Facts:
Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house. The Same. Article 148.
Register of Deeds made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles.
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan. It Issue:
appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired by
Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of cohabitation between her and Miguel.
Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement from
MIWCC but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against him Ruling:
in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities, or the The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
value thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
against Eduardo. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not
trial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submitted capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
an indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
The sale at public auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property. marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was
Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
RTC of Parañaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
injunction or temporary restraining order. She alleged then that she was Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in
the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. Hence, the business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade
the levy on execution of the property was null and void. the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. Since
petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
Issue: of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of over the same.
Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco.

Ruling:
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with
her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is
the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that the
Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the
petitioner and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter
as vendee after her marriage to Eduardo.
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23.
At that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase
Juaniza vs. Jose
89 SCRA 306

Facts: Tumlos vs. Fernandez


Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train
of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 Facts:
which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner
its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the
married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant- said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private
that of husband and wife. respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months,
the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants
jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied. promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was
not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several
Issue: times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of the
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC) property for the construction of a new building.
is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the
relationship is incapacitated to marry. complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause
of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as
Ruling: evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She
contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants
marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an
an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as
aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said
jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that
legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees
arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
of the jeepney which figured in the collision. the annulment of his marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property in
litis.
without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of
Ruling: non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and
actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have
her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or
Mario. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices
cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.
justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that
the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership.
The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents.

Docena vs. Lapesura


G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001

Facts: Martinez vs. Martinez


Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005
land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena.
The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since Facts:
time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well
trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The as the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and
CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He
vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo,
Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners estate.
with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father,
the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila.
Writ of Demolition. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of
TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC.
Issue: RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground
Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no
that the husband and the wife always act together. allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had
been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.
Ruling: In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote
Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the
subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. It is believed that letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a
even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They
have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of alleged that they were the owners of the property. The spouses Martinez
demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise
had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile.
No amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition for
preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences. review on certiorari.

Issue: Issue:
Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege
the complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient under oath that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to
compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made. filing thereof.

Ruling: Ruling:
The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, Petition was granted. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as
it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase
should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and
hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint premature. complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

Hontiveros vs. RTC


G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Facts:
The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Manalo vs. CA
Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
Jamindan, Capiz.
Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground Facts:
that private respondents’ answer did not tender an issue or that it Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was
otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Private survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of
respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners’ legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real
claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a
resolved after trial. business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion. After an assessment of The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed
the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, pleadings is a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of
inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother,
specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof, The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of
however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this
amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. The court order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who
dismissed the case and petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the
petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing
through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. an action against the other.
Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He
Issue: explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they
Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children
for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a with her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement
compromise involving members of the same family have been made. that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief
was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent
Ruling: incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in
The petition was denied for lack of merit. petitioners may not effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge
validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary.
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of Issue:
the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear Whether or not respondent judge committed malpractice as a
enough. notary.
This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an Ruling:
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law
considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband
and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership".
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically
dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by
this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of
marriage and the family

Albano vs. Gapusan


A.M. No. 1022-MJ May 7, 1976

Facts:
Redentor Albano in a verified complaint charged Municipal Judge
Patrocinio Gapusan of Ilocos Norte with incompetence and ignorance of the
law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for tile Modequillo vs. Breva
personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of 185 SCRA 766
their conjugal partnership.
In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, Facts:
respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of
the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar, Ilocos Norte Appeals entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.”
and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It was The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of
stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment
on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased
located at Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and a parcel residential lot with a bungalow. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc.
of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. Instead of
by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise
located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 agreement with private respondent.
prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned
execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the
Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that agreement in good faith. Private respondent filed a motion for execution
the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was
defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other
Code. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs. personal properties of petitioner. These chattels were sold at public auction
for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
Issue: Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs
Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. Private respondent
Family Code. opposed the motion. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ
of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by
Ruling: petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables, the
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also
no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in ruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was
the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to Issue:
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a
not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of Family
the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Code.
Article 153 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. It does not mean that
Articles 152 and 153 FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the FC. Art. 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the FC.

Manacop vs. CA
277 SCRA 941

Facts:
Andal vs. Macaraig
89 Phil 165

Facts:
Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian
ad litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of Benitez-Badua vs. CA
the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of
Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the Facts:
parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties,
Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in upon their death the fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued.
favor of the former. Vicente’s sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) administration of Vicente’s estate. On the other hand, Marisa Benitez-
declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such Badua opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the
entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner deceased spouses and is capable of administering the estate.
of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. In RTC, both parties submit their pieces of evidence. Petitioner
Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of Marissa, prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses by
law are involved. submitting documentary evidence and that the spouses continuously
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, treated her as legitimate child. On the other hand, respondents proved by
his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to testimonial evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during their
help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak marriage because the spouse Isabel was treated by an obstetrician-
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueñas, his wife, gynecologist which prevented her to give birth. The older sister of Vicente
eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix also declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the spouses,
and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and who were unable to procreate, as she was there at the time the spouses
wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even were having this problem.
attend his funeral. Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal. Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was the biological child of the
Issue: spouses and has the right to be the sole heir.
Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of
Emiliano. Ruling:
Petitioner was not the biological child based on facts. Live of Birth
Ruling: Certificate was repudiated by Notarized of Deed of Extra-Judicial
Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen that Settlement of Estate.
Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the biological or
the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within adopted child of deceased was denied, on the ground that Articles 164,
300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation
other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is also where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of a
seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where the husband
physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife.
And here there is no such proof.
Concepcion vs. CA
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

Facts:
Ma. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion, which they Liyao vs. Liyao
begot a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo Concepcion found out that his G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
wife was still married to Mario Gopiao. Hence, he filed for annulment on
the ground of bigamy. Theresa averred that he married Mario but that was Facts:
only a sham and she never lived with him at all. RTC ruled that Theresa’s Corazon Garcia is legally married to but living separately from
marriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting thus the marriage Ramon M. Yulo for more than 10 years at the time of the institution of the
with Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was condemned illegitimate. said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up
Custody was then given to Theresa. to the time of William’s untimely demise. They lived together in the
Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage.
marriage annulled. She argued that a putative father cannot have Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. During her three day stay
visitation rights over the illegitimate child and the child’s surname be at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born
changed to the mother’s maiden name. Gerardo opposed the motion and baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and
insisted on the visitation rights and retention of the father’s surname to clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even
the child. asked his confidential secretary to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate.
He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Issue: Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be
Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce
considered legitimate. him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Ruling:
Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother may Issue:
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be
adulteress. The fact that the child was conceived and born at the time the able to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao.
spouses had lived together.
The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or Ruling:
illegitimate children, for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be SC denied the petition. A child born and conceived during a valid
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of
status for the information contained therein is merely supplied by the children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
what a parent says it is. virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
SC finds no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with
the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had
admitted or recognized his paternity.
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is
deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.

Eceta vs. Eceta


G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta
sometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a
son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the
disputed property. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente Constantino vs. Mendez
as his compulsory heirs. 209 SCRA 18
In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria
Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his Facts:
compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Amelita Constantino, petitioner and waitress at Tony’s Restaurant,
Theresa. met Ivan Mendez, respondent. On that first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita
In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he stayed. While dining, Ivan
for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that professed his love to Amelita through a promise of marriage and then they
by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co- have had a sexual intercourse. But after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed
owner of the property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is that he is a married man. However, they repeated their sexual contact in
paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. the months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in Manila,
which resulted to Amelita’s pregnancy.
Issue: Amelita pleas for help and support to Ivan but failed. She then filed
Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the for the recognition of the unborn child and payment for damages.
certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation However, Ivan rebutted by the petition of the dismissal of the complaint for
of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father lack of cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Amelita, respondent petition
Vicente Eceta. the complaint CA that RTC erred in its ruling. CA favored the respondent
and dismissed the complaint of petitioner.
Ruling:
Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Issue:
Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. Whether or not Amelita was able to prove the paternity of Ivan to
The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, her son Michael to warrant support.
was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed and
admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Ruling:
Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter. SC dismissed the petition. She was inconsistent in her response
Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her whether they did or didn’t have any sex in Manila in the 1st and 2nd week
filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. of November. At first, she said she remembered during cross-examination.
Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby Later in her response, she said she doesn’t remember.
This is relevant because the child Michael is a FULL TERM baby. He the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a
was conceived approximately sometime in the 2nd week of November. She chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are
wrote to Ivan asking for support around February stating that she was four usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
months pregnant. This means, she thinks she conceived the child on being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given
October. She wrote to Ivan’s wife where she revealed her attachment to the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she
Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. cannot do if he or she is already dead.”
Moreover, she confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend resulting
to her leaving work.

Bernabe vs. Alejo


G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts: Jison vs. CA


Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998
Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal
died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole Facts:
surviving heir. Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian Lopez Jison. At the end of 1945, however, FRANCISCO impregnated
be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the Esperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s
share of Bernabe’s estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death daughter. As a result, Monina was born in Iloilo, and since childhood, had
of the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that
Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error due to RTC’s ruling Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she
based on Article 175. obtained a Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank
examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina
Issue: prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case Francisco support and treat her as such.
against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with
putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had
paternity by the latter. ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her
whereabouts since then. Further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or
Ruling: impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses,
SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription.
The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when
He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages
due to the malicious filing of the complaint. Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the
Issue: acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya.
Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter
of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family. Ruling:
The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
Ruling: personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child
SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three
daughter of Francisco. All told, Monina's evidence hurdled "the high cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or
standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's she died during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had
illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the
continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he
and special laws". Moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her
mere preponderance of evidence. heirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.

Conde vs. Abaya


13 Phil 249

Facts: Marquino vs. IAC


Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994
Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural
children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Facts:
Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession. Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for Judicial
An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages
Roman Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed said against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on the CIF of Negros Occidental. Also
appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the impleaded as defendants, were the wife of Eutiquio Marquino and their
deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano legitimate children all surnamed Terenal-Marquino.
Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of The records show that Bibiana was born of Gregoria Romano and
said estate. allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. At that time, Eutiquio was still single.
Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete City. She always
considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on the received financial assisbailomce from them. Thus, she claimed that she
matter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural
property left by Casiano Abaya.
child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separate
Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations. affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent
could finish presenting her evidence, she died. Her heirs were ordered knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners filed a Motion to Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of
Dismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a
the heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case. dispenser of justice. Respondent, in his comment, declared that his
Respondents appealed to the respondent IAC. Eutiquio Marquino died while cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor
the case was pending appeal. immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his
first wife had already left and abandoned the family home and, since then,
Issue: and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has
Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is had no news of her being alive.
intransmissible in character.
Issue:
Ruling: Whether or not respondent commited deceitful conduct in
The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, not legitimating his three illegitimate children born out of adulterous
during the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents. relationship.
In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives.
In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. Ruling:
She was born out of wedlock of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio SC ruled that respondent commited deceitful conduct and orders
Marquino who at that time was single. Bibiana sued for compulsory his dismissal from the service. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought
recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died before she could to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three
present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate
personal nature and intransmissibility. since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between respondent and his first wife. Legitimation is limited to natural
children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran


249 SCRA 447

Facts:
Complainant Abadilla, contends that respondent had scandalously
and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the Teotico vs. Del Val
existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Respondent 13 SCRA 406
allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla
Baybayan. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of Facts:
the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina
Banzuela. Mortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of
Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which
to all parties concerned. affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat,
Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, certiorari.
filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat,
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was
the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, four months old. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in
allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca form and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. The
Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served. A copy of
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other
Teotico. places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court petition.
rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child,
disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that Jason Condat, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and
heirs by way of intestate succession. purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the
surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
Issue: petitioner.
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to
intervene in this proceeding. Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which
Ruling: granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any Ruling:
claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption
therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of
portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as his natural parents. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the
of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. same. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is light of the foregoing doctrine, SC holds that the decree of adoption issued
an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of life.
the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no
relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the
adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter
but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Republic vs. CA and Bobiles


205 SCRA 356

Facts:
Tamargo vs. CA
209 SCRA 518

Facts:
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of Javier vs. Lucero
10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries 94 Phil 634
which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's Facts:
adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Salud Arca, respondent and Alfredo Javier, defendant had their
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara marriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. At the time of their marriage,
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Jr.
the tragic incident. Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy, for he was an
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had enlisted man in the US Navy. Because of defendant’s departure,
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings respondent chose to live with defendant’s parents but left due to frictions
before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted having occurred between them. She then stayed to her native place in
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Tanza, Cavite.
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing With the events transpired, the relationship of the spouses become
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting strained and with that Alfredo Javier filed an action for divorce against
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were Salud Arca at Alabama, USA. Having received the complaint, respondent
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to averred that defendant was not a resident of Alabama but a resident of
the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption Naic, Cavite. She also professed that the cause of their separation was not
was filed. of desertion on her part but of the defendant. And that sce his departure to
Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc US Navy, he had always supported his spouse and his son through
was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not allotments by US Navy Department of US Government. Through these she
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable Issue:
parties to the action. Whether or not the defendant is still obliged to support his son
even if he reaches the age of majority.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to Ruling:
appeal, may still file the instant petition. Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of petitioner Alfredo
Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even Javier, and if financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. of the appeal his education, or the completion thereof, would be unduly
delayed. That is good reason for immediate execution.
Ruling: Support also includes the education of the person to be supported
SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given "until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or
to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to vocation even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted support was granted to Alfredo Javier Jr.
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them
with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252, 262

Facts:
Same. Article 204. Emphasis on the options of support.

Issue:
Whether or not the wife can claim for support outside of the De Asis vs. De Asis
conjugal domicile. 303 SCRA 176
Ruling:
It has been held that the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal Facts:
abode by her husband, without fault on her part, may maintain an action Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the
against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
remedy, notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who is support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that
obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed petitioner is the father of subject minor, and the former refused and/or
pension or by receiving and maintaining in his home the one having the failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated
right to the same. demands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and
that he cannot be required to provide support for him. The mother’s child
sent in a manifestation stating that because of petitioner’s judicial
declarations, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from
him. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject
to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. By
virtue of the said manifestation, the parties mutually agreed to move for
the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the trial court,
which then dismissed the case with prejudice.
Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was
brought against petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, represented by her legal guardian, herein private respondent.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in
an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari. CA dismissed the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave abuse of discretion
after the first complaint was dismissed and adjudged.

Ruling:
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor
transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the
subject of a compromise. The manifestation sent by private respondent
amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject
minor, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and custody over the children be granted.
private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature
of a compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It violated the Ruling:
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and
retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances,
personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the
children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the
parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.

Espiritu vs. CA
242 SCRA 362

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding
first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Amadora vs. CA
Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was 160 SCRA 274
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to Facts:
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking
daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school
return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun
separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio
sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of
his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining
gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court,
reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and completely absolved.
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them
but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be Issue:
approved by the Court. Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in died. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages
question (Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as non- against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano.
academic.
Issue:
Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for the
is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach death of Ylarde.
to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason:
Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the Ruling:
ones directly involved with the students. SC close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious
person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he Aquino did. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils
who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his
schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school company. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident
personally and directly instructed the apprentices. would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive
today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all
also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing these years.
discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules
and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the
fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he
wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

Ylarde vs. Aquino


163 SCRA 697

Facts:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
Pangasinan, private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. As
part of work education, private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils to Facts:
help Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered remnants of Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted
World War II. an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective
block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin
Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
hole while he went to see Banez to borrow some rope. Before leaving, Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high
private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
stone." Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan
After private respondent Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
playfully jumped into the pit. The remaining Abaga jumped on top of the student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a
concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos
Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents
unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him, pinning him to the of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James
wall in a standing position. Ylarde sustained injuries, three days later, he Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and
St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for Ruling:
damages. GRANTED. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable
for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED
Issue: NEGLIGENCE. The simple reason is that the child was still under their care
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for and custody at the time of the incident. Parental liability is a consequence
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. of PARENTAL AUTHORITY.

Ruling: APPLICABLE PROVISIONS:


GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any Art. 2176: Quasi-delict – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence – The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is
and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, persons for whom one is responsible.
but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the


person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.

Tamargo vs. CA
209 SCRA 518

Facts: Libi vs. IAC


Same. Articles 220-233. Emphasis on effects and 214 SCRA 16
suspension/termination of parental authority.
Facts:
Issue: Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong, 18 years old, and deceased Wendell
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental Libi, between 18 to 19 years old, were sweethearts for two years prior to
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that
their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. But, the girl
was yet lodged with the biological parents. hold steadfast to her decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with
her best friend. On the day of the incident, the two were found shot dead
with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl instituted this 1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City
case against the parents of the guy for damages. of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of
this petition;
Issue: 2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; she
Whether or not the parents of the Wendell Libi is still liable for the married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision
death of Julie Ann Gotiong. entered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria
vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a
Ruling: decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is
DENIED. The parents of the guy are held liable for not exercising now final;
due diligence, diligentissimi patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the 3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she
guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. The father and the naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
mother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R.
negligently left lying around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years
his mother. The said gun was missing. The parents were also unable to now;
explain the photograph of their son holding a gun. The said photograph 4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally
was dedicated to the girl. separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased
Moreover, they were remiss in their duties as parents as not being able to to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed
know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agent to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her
involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. The maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
damages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesn’t
apply since the guy is or above 18 years old already. Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden
name.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden
name of Elisea Laperal.

Ruling:
The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the
petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change
of the name of herein petitioner. It is true that in the second decision which
reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive
business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place,
these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence,
obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.

Laperal vs. Republic


G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

Facts:
Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads:

Llaneta vs. Agrava


G.R. No. L-32504 May 15, 1974

Facts:
Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to
Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In
1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations
with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's
birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived
with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised
in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her
dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years
old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon, where she
was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a
scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she
discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she
is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta,
instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason,
would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court
for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname based
on her alleged facts.

Ruling:
The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita
Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. The petitioner has established that she
has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. A
sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in
order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in
confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail
endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new
surname.

You might also like