Analysis
Turkey After the Verdict: Back to Normal?
Summary: The decision by Turkey’s
constitutional court to warn and
sanction, but not close the Justice
and Development Party (AKP),
offers an opportunity to Turks and
Turkey’s international partners.
After almost a year of distraction
and disarray, Ankara may now be
able to focus on the most pressing
problems facing the country. Europe
and the United States may now be
able to treat Turkey as a “normal”
country again. Much will depend
on whether the court’s decision
ushers in a period of moderation or
renewed polarization, and whether
the AKP government uses its
renewed freedom of action to think
strategically about external policy.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
www.gmfus.org
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser*
WASHINGTON — The decision by
Turkey’s constitutional court to warn
and sanction, but not close the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP),
offers an opportunity to Turks and
Turkey’s international partners. After
almost a year of distraction and disar-
ray, Ankara may now be able to focus
on the most pressing problems facing
the country. Europe and the United
States may now be able to treat Turkey
as a “normal” country again. Much
will depend on whether the court’s
decision ushers in a period of
moderation or renewed polarization,
and whether the AKP government uses
its renewed freedom of action to think
strategically about external policy.
Interpreting the Decision
Admit it or not, most observers were
surprised by the verdict. Over the
past months, Turks on all sides, and
Turkey’s international interlocutors,
had prepared themselves for a party
closure and, most likely, a ban on key
AKP political figures. In the event, the
court stepped back from this “nuclear
option,” leaving the current political
constellation in place. Some will spec-
ulate that a quiet deal may have been
struck between Prime Minister Recep
*
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
Tayyip Erdoğan, top generals, and
others in the secular establishment:
AKP left in power, but with a promise
of moderation on headscarves,
education policy, and other critical
issues in the secularism debate. As
likely, and perhaps more important
for the longer term, diverse sectors
in Turkey may have judged that
the costs of a party closure were
simply too high. The economy,
already under pressure from political
risk and troubles in global markets,
would have been badly hurt. Turkey’s
EU candidacy, already troubled,
would have been dealt a further blow.
An outright suspension of accession
negotiations could not be ruled out
and, once suspended, Turkey’s
candidacy would be difficult or
impossible to restart.
Even for hard-line Kemalists eager to
see Erdoğan out of power and AKP’s
political primacy brought to an end,
it was never clear that a party closure
would bring the desired result. AKP
would likely have reorganized under a
different name, and perhaps secured
an even larger mandate in new
general elections. In the worst case,
AKP supporters and opponents might
have gone to the streets, with unfore-
Analysis
seeable consequences for internal stability. This scenario,
however unlikely, must still be regarded as one of the few
paths to a military coup of a traditional kind. Political
frictions alone would not be sufficient.
Some Lessons
So, Turkey has stepped back from the brink. Several lessons
can be drawn from this experience. First, in today’s Turkey,
public opinion counts. AKP has arguably understood this
better than any of the other forces on the political scene.
No sector, from the military to the business community,
from secular nationalists to “Islamists,” can ignore this
reality. This is a marked change from even a decade ago, and
it imposes real constraints on the military, the state, and not
least, political parties. This is a significant dimension of
Turkey’s progressive Europeanization and convergence with
transatlantic norms.
Second, the international context matters. Without
question, the Turkish discourse in recent years has been
driven by resurgent nationalism, a degree of xenophobia,
and an internal stability “lens” affecting policy toward every-
thing from the Kurdish issue to the European Union. It has
been especially pronounced in relations with the United States
(the court’s original indictment against AKP made frequent
mention of Washington’s alleged role in encouraging Turkey’s
drift toward religious politics). But despite this pervasive
climate of suspicion, the very negative international reaction
to the prospect of a party closure arguably had some role in
the outcome. Certainly, it has been a key part of the Turkish
debate. At the broadest level, Ankara has important business
to attend to in its region and in transatlantic relations.
Domestic political turmoil inevitably limits the energy left
for credible international initiatives.
Third, the frictions in Turkish society will remain and
perhaps deepen. The trends that have put AKP in power
and polarized Turkish society have been gathering for
decades, and the resulting tensions over the future of the
country will not be resolved by the court’s ruling. AKP
forms a majority government in Turkey today because its
message of cultural conservatism and populism resonates
with the electorate, it is well-funded and well-organized at
the local and national levels, and it has a charismatic leader.
The party has also presided over a prolonged period of high
2
“AKP’s rise has been as much
about class as about religion. The
current reality is not so much the
struggle of embattled secular elites
against a more religious mass of
provincial origins, but rather an
ongoing competition between
parallel elites.”
economic growth in the wake of the financial collapse of
2000-2001. The lack of an effective political opposition has
reinforced these advantages. As many observers have noted,
AKP’s rise has been as much about class as about religion.
The current reality is not so much the struggle of embattled
secular elites against a more religious mass of provincial
origins, but rather an ongoing competition between parallel
elites—secular and religious, cosmopolitan, and provincial
—in various sectors. With AKP controlling parliament and
the presidency, and increasingly prominent in the state
bureaucracy and the economy, the AKP ascendancy in
Turkish society will be hard to reverse.
The Day After–and Beyond
The verdict seems genuinely to have taken Turks by
surprise. All sides will now face some critical decisions on
the internal and external fronts. Open questions abound.
Erdoğan and AKP will now face a key test on style and
substance. A somewhat chastened party leadership may
opt for a period of consolidation and moderation, avoiding
“hot button” issues that might reopen the legal challenge.
Less likely, but quite possibly, the AKP leadership, and
Erdoğan in particular, will see the court’s decision as a
vindication and an opportunity to renew the struggle for
power across multiple issues, including the highly symbolic
ones.
Analysis

On the external front, Ankara will now have an opportunity to

reinvigorate its foreign policy beyond the dilute, all-azimuths
approach of the last few years. AKP’s new look in international
policy has emphasized engagement over priority-setting.
Relations with Russia have expanded, Ankara has become an
active player in the Black Sea, and Turkey has returned
to the Middle East through improved ties to the Gulf
monarchies, Iran, and Syria (Turkey kept up its role as
facilitator in Israeli-Syrian talks despite domestic political
distractions). Ankara plans to open new embassies in Africa
and Asia. Relations with the United States and the European
Union remain critical by almost any measure, yet ties with
European and transatlantic partners have been badly frayed
in recent years, despite a declared commitment to improve-
ment on all sides.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was a public policy scholar
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Lesser
is also president of Mediterranean Advisors, LLC, a consultancy
specializing in geopolitical risk. Previously, he served as vice president
and director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy
(the western partner of the Council on Foreign Relations) and a senior
staff member at RAND. From 1994-1995, he was a member of the
Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State,
responsible for Turkey, Southern Europe, North Africa, and the
multilateral track of the Middle East peace process.

About GMF
An AKP government, free of legal distractions and in a
less confrontational stance with the military and secular
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
forces, may be better placed to think strategically about
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
external policy. In particular, a more testing economic and
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
security environment will compel Turkey to think in terms
between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
of foreign policy priorities. All international partnerships
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
are not equal, and the key challenges on the horizon, from
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
the future of Iraq to the reform of NATO, from the Cyprus
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
dispute to EU negotiations, will require more effective and
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
less suspicious partnership with the West. To be sure, the
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
United States and Europe will also need to take Turkish
in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on the 25th anniversary of the
interests seriously (for Washington, that may be hard to do
Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance,
until a new Administration is in place). And Turkey’s own
GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In ad-
security establishment will need to be convinced. But a
dition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices
Turkey headed “back to normal” will be in a far better
in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and
position to reinvigorate the country’s Euroatlantic
Bucharest.
connections.