PROXIMATE OR LEGAL CAUSE (Cause and effect)
TWO ELEMENTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
A. CONCEPT
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
B. Proximate Cause Defined
Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent, is "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.”
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply
in this case, viz:
Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and
by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or
agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming
of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
C.
1. CAUSE IN FACT
(Teague vs. Fernandez)
FACTS: The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated
by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational
school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor
of the Gil-Armi Building. At about four o'clock in the afternoon of
October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials
located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street
lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire,
some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!'
and thereafter, a panic ensued. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi
Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students,
including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants,
were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede. The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an
action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of
Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. CA
reversed.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
Petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This
finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the
provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City
of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the
petitioner's vocational school was housed. The mere fact of
violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that
such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained.
However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to
be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the
statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.
2. FORESEEABILITY (to relieve the original tortfeasor
from liability)
(Bernal vs J.V. House)
FACTS:
During a procession, the little girl was allowed to get a short
distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front
of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and
automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so
frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that
she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in
this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the
child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her clothes
were immediately removed and, then covered with a garment,
the girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There she was
attended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez.
Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at 11:40
o'clock.
The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down
the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and
consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than
the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by
their own fault and negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether there is contributory fault and negligence on the part of
the plaintiffs.
HELD:
We are shown no good reason for the departing from the
conclusion of the trial judge to the effect that the sudden death
of the child Purification Bernal was due principally to the nervous
shock and organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns
from the hot water. "The danger from burns is proportional rather
to the extent of surface involved than to the depth of the burn".
The same authority continues. "Burns of the first degree,
covering two-thirds of the body surface, are rarely recovered
from. . . . Children seem especially susceptible to the effect of
burns."
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the
religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile
appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction
of the damages.
Having reached the conclusion that liability exists, we next turn
to discover who can recover damages for the obligation, and
against whom the action will lie. The plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal
and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the mother of
Purificacion Bernal and the former was the natural father, who
had never legally recognized his child. The daughter lived with
the mother, and presumably was supported by her. Under these
facts, recovery should be permitted the mother but not the
father.
(Astudillo vs Manila Electric Company)
FACTS:
Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when
he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric
light pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City
of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased
instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
secure from the Manila Electric Company damages in the
amount of P30,000. The answer of the company set up as
special defenses that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due
solely to his negligence and lack of care, and that the company
had employed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the injury. After trial, which included an ocular inspection
of the place where the fatality occurred, judgment was rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant shall be liable.
HELD:
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies
for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of
negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the
safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and
care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
The poles must be so erected and the wires and appliances
must be so located the persons rightfully near the place will not
be injured. Particularly must there be proper insulation of the
wires and appliances in places where there is probable
likelihood of human contact therewith.
We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila Electric
Company in the lower court to the effect that the death of Juan
Diaz Astudillo was due exclusively to his negligence. He only did
the natural thing to be expected of one not familiar with the
danger arising from touching an electric wire, and was wholly
unconscious of his peril. Had not the wire caused the death of
this young man, it would undoubtedly have been only a question
of time when someone else, like a playful boy, would have been
induced to take hold of the wire, with fatal results. The cause of
the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded
against. The negligence came from the act of the Manila Electric
Company in so placing its pole and wires as to be within
proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the
possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming
in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
As we understand the position of the Manila Electric Company
on appeal, its principal defense now is that it has fully complied
with the provisions of its franchise and of the ordinances of the
City of Manila. It is undeniable that the violation of franchise, an
ordinance, or a statute might constitute negligence. But the
converse is not necessarily true, and compliance with a
franchise, an ordinance, or a statute is not conclusive proof that
there was no negligence. The franchise, ordinance, or statute
merely states the minimum conditions. The fulfillment of these
conditions does not render unnecessary other precautions
required by ordinary care.
D. PROXIMATE CAUSE: WHEN APPLICABLE
(Calalas v. CA)
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way,
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down
to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and
driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for
violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party
complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and
absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for
quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to
Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found
Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between
Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand,
is res judicata to the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence
required in the contract of carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for
quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that
case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present
case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether
Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual,
is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the
truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not
in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the
law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from
the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that
petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated
in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only
was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga,
but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought
to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing
that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney
being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the
following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach
is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable
or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d)
the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is
not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger,
as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no
legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad
faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
E. PROXIMATE CAUSE vs. INTERVENING CAUSE
“INTERVENING CAUSE” – is an event that occurs after a
tortfeasor's initial act of negligence and causes injury/harm to a
victim. An intervening cause will generally absolve the
tortfeasor of liability for the victim's injury only if the event is
deemed a superseding cause. A superseding cause is
an unforeseeable intervening cause. By contrast,
a foreseeable intervening cause typically does not break the
chain of causality, meaning that the tortfeasor is still responsible
for the victim's injury—unless the event leads to an
unforeseeable result.
FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a
carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of
the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the
defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time
protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata
first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or
seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the
bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that
the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle
on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which
it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it
became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the
bridle. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but
the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and
after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano
jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from
which he soon died.
ISSUE: Whether the proximate cause of the accident was the
stopping of the horse by Araneta.
HELD: NO. The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote
from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the
legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and
taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the
person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and
the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident
resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence
indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was
made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According
to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the
rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth;
and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and
proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was
slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from
control, started to go away as previously stated.
(Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo)
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house
of his brother-in-law. While making the repair, a galvanized iron
roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric
wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the
edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was
electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for
damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric
Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that
the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because
although the electric wire had been installed long before the
construction of the house the electric company did not exercise
due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Manila Electric Co., is guilty of negligence.
Held: NO. Death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of
the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the
company by reason of the violation of the original permit given
by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of the “media agua”. We fail to see how the
Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
diligence.
Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its
wires from any building, only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between
the “Media agua” as illegally constructed and the electric wires
was left.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action
if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion.
(Nakpil & Sons vs. CA)
FACTS:
Private respondents – Philippine Bar Association (PBA) – a non-
profit organization formed under the corporation law decided to
put up a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the
specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while
United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was
approved by the Board of Directors and signed by the President,
Ramon Ozaeta. The building was completed in 1966.
In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which
caused the building heavy damage, which led the building to tilt
forward, leading the tenants to vacate the premises. United
Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but
United Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and
Sons, alleging defects in the plans and specifications.
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a
court appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition
of the building, but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the
demolition after the building suffered more damages in 1970 due
to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there
were deviations in the specifications and plans, as well as
defects in the construction of the building.
ISSUE: Whether an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-
which caused the failure of the building, exempts from liability,
parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence.
HELD:
No, they are not exempted from liability. There is no dispute that
the earthquake is a fortuitous event or an act of god. But, if upon
the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, here
concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation, which
results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly
requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the
violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded
from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be
in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from
active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is thereby HUMANIZED, as it were, and removed
from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
United was found to have made substantial deviations from the
plans and specifications and to have failed to observe the
requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise
the requisite degree of supervision. And the Nakpins were found
to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications
prepared by them. The deviations made by United caused
indirectly the damage sustained and that those deviations not
only added but also aggravated the damage caused by the
defects made by the Nakpins.
Thus, one who negligently creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability for the natural and probably
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an
act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to
precipitate the loss. The destruction was not purely an act of
God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity
were hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells
out the fatal difference; gross negligence and evident bad faith,
without which the damage would not have occurred.
Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor are
liable for damages should the building collapse within 15 years
from completion.
On the other hand, the general rule is that no person shall be
responsible for events which could not be foreseen or which
though foreseen, were inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code).
An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and
exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which
by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have
been expected, could have been prevented.
There is no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a
fortuitous event or an act of God.
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the
following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the
event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free
from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor.
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of
God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or
violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which
results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
(Urbano vs. IAC)
FACTS:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his
way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went
to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw
Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted
that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued,
and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again
on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980,
Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid
P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14,
1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw
and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused
by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm.
He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide
and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the
Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on
the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the
deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on
November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the
proximate cause of the latter’s death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on
the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days
after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction,
the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to
the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A
prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause."
(National Power Corporation vs. CA)
Facts:
Engineering Construction, Inc., being a successful bidder,
executed a contract in Manila with the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook
to furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and materials (not
furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed 2nd lpo-Bicti
Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and Appurtenant
Structures, and Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan,
and to complete said works within eight hundred (800) calendar
days from the date the Contractor receives the formal notice to
proceed.
The project involved two (2) major phases: the tunnel work and
the outworks at both ends of the tunnel. Plaintiff corporation
already had completed the first major phase of the work, namely,
the tunnel excavation work. Some portions of the outworks at
the Bicti site were still under construction. As soon as the plaintiff
corporation had finished the tunnel excavation work at the Bicti
site, all the equipment no longer needed there were transferred
to the Ipo site where some projects were yet to be completed.
On November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit Central Luzon,
passing through defendant's Angat Hydro-electric Project and
Dam at lpo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the
project area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to the heavy
downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising
perilously at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To
prevent an overflow of water from the dam, since the water level
had reached the danger height of 212 meters above sea level,
the defendant corporation caused the opening of the spillway
gates.
The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court that
the evidence preponderantly established the fact that due to the
negligent manner with which the spillway gates of the Angat
Dam were opened, an extraordinary large volume of water
rushed out of the gates, and hit the installations and construction
works of ECI at the lpo site with terrific impact, as a result of
which the latter's stockpile of materials and supplies, camp
facilities and permanent structures and accessories either
washed away, lost or destroyed.
ISSUE: Whether the destruction and loss of ECI’s equipment
and facilities were due to force majeure, which will exempt NPC
from liability.
HELD: YES.
NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway
gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon "Welming"
when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same
gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew
of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually struck.
And even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may
call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.
1. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.)
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails
from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the
malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was
used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two
immediately following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the
ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the
cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men
were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that
defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope.
At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged,
the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and
caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards
amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident,
to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be
given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he
continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the
car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work
after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross
a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under
the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses
swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this
way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both
the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the
gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman
swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known to the workmen.
If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger
contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been
no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this
produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining
factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event
should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the
liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not
necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the
employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the
accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil
action may proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The
responsibility of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant
of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The
doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the
employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence
of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in
Philippine jurisprudence.
2. CONCURRENT CAUSES
(SABIDO vs. CUSTODIO)
FACTS: This case involves an accident between a truck [or bus]
belonging to Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (LTB) and driven
by Mudales and a truck owned by Sabido and driven by
Lagunda. The two vehicles were going in opposite directions
when they met at a curve in the road. Custodio, a passenger
ofLTB was hanging [sabit] on the left side of the vehicle. He died
after being sideswiped by Sabido’s truck.The CFI held the
vehicle owners and the drivers solidarily liable. LTB and its driver
were liable for violating the contract of carriage; Sabido and his
driver were liable for quasi-delict.
ISSUE: Whether Sabido and his driver were guilty of negligence;
whether they should be held solidarily liable with LTB.
HELD: They are both guilty of contributory negligence. Though
LTB and its driver were guilty of negligence for allowing Custodio
to hang from the left side of the bus, Sabido and his driver were
guilty of contributory negligence because the truck was running
at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating
a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the
road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the
passenger bus coming from the opposite direction as to
sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.
Though the negligence of LTB and its driver are independent
from the negligence of Sabido and his driver, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Custodio. In
fact, the negligence of the first two would not have produced this
result without the negligence of Sabido and his driver. What is
more, Sabido’s driver’s negligence was the last, in point of time,
for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus
sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite
direction, so that, in this sense, Sabido’s truck had the last clear
chance.
Even though LTB’s liability arises from breach of contract and
Sabido’s arises from quasi-delict, they are solidarily liable
because the rule is that, where the CONCURRENT OR
SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSION of two or
more persons, although acting independently of each other,
are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for
the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.
 3. NATURAL AND PROBABLE CAUSE
(UMALI vs. BACANI)
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the
Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana
plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric
Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The
live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on
the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following
morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of
the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain
that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the
lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and
8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house
is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where
the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was
electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the
electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due
to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence
exempts petitioner from liability.
HELD: YES.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that
a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in
the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With
ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have
easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line
would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff
(parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but
does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury
caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
4. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS
(ALLIED BANKING vs. LIM SIO WAN)
5. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN A CRIMINAL CASE
(PEOPLE vs. ILIGAN)
FACTS: At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and
his companions Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home
from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On
the way they met the accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew
Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed
them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix quickly said
that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his nephew fall
,Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy
but missed. Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the three accused.
They ran for a good while and even passed the house of
Quinones, when they noticed that they were no longer being
chased the three decided to head back to Quinones house. On
the way back the three accused suddenly emerged from the
road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked Quinones Jr. on the
forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy
ran. Upon returning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already
dead with his head busted. The postmortem examination report
and the death certificate indicates that the victim died of “ shock
and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.”
ISSUE: Whether Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head is the
direct cause of the latter’s death.
HELD: NO. It is the proximate cause of Quinones, Jr.’s death.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of
Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by
the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What
is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones,
Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only
to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was
directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head. The
hacking incident happened on the national highway where
vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle
passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running
scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200
meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the
hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run
over by a vehicle. Under these circumstances, we hold that while
Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have been the
direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.
Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on
him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is,
considering the very short span of time between them, one
unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability.
6. WHAT IS PROCURING CAUSE?
PROCURING CAUSE refers to a cause which starts a series of
events and results, without break in their continuity, in the
accomplishment of a broker’s prime objective of producing a
purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to buy on the owner’s
terms.1 This is similar to the concept of proximate cause in
Torts, without which the injury would not have occurred. To be
regarded as the procuring cause of a sale, a broker’s efforts
must have been the foundation of the negotiations which
subsequently resulted in a sale.
(ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND MINERALS CORPORATION
vs. TUSCAN REALTY, INC.)
FACTS: Tuscan realty was engaged by Oriental Petroleum to
look for buyers for its condominium units in Corinthian Plaza.
Tuscan introduced gateway to oriental petroleum and a contract
to sell was executed. However gateway assigned its right under
the contract to sell in favor of Ancheta who ultimately bought the
property.
ISSUE: Whether Tuscan entitled to broker’s commission.
HELD: Yes. Because of the principle of “procuring cause”.
It was on account of Tuscan realty’s effort that Oriental
Petroleum got connected to gateway, the prospective buyer,
resulting in the latter two entering into a contract to sell involving
the two condominium units. Although gateway turned around
and sold the condominium units to Ancheta, the fact is that such
ultimate sale could not have happened without gateway’s
indispensable intervention as intermediate buyer.
F. OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
(PLDT vs. CA)
Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their
jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of
its underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning light
or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and
their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the
respondents were negligent and that it should be the
independent contractor L.R. Barte and Company which
undertook said conduit system to be the one liable.The latter
claimed to have complied with its contract and had installed
necessary barricades.
Issue: Whether the PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: No. Private Respondent´s negligence was not merely
contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence
he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and
his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT
considering that he had ¨the last clear chance¨, to avoid the
injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof.
(ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS)
FACTS: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined
the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they
rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their
way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by
James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It
was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which
resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
HELD: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under
Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that
they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having
a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However,
for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered
negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus,
negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It
must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any
efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to
show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses
Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident
was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no
evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of
Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the
school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to
3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the
road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of
Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination
of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
(CALIMUTAN vs. PEOPLE)
FACTS:
Victim Cantre crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a
certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a
grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as theculprit
responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a
previous night. Thus,upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre
suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner
Calimutan dashed towards the back of victim Cantre. Petitioner
Calimutan then picked up a stone which he threw at victim
Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back.
Victim Cantre complained of backache and also of
stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim
Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was
sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. For the last
time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly
thereafter, he died.
Victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there
was massiveaccumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due
to his lacerated spleen. Thelaceration of the spleen can be
caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.Hence, Dr.
Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was
stoned to deathby petitioner Calimutan.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for the death of Cantre.
HELD: YES.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at
his back on the left side was a treacherous one and the accused
committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The
physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone
resulted in the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the
victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and
natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate
result had not been intended.
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural
consequences of one’s illegal acts merely because one does not
intend to produce such consequences.
(CORPUZ vs. LUGUE)
FACTS: On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning,
while an Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep (KC-20), then being driven
by Jimmy Basilio, was traversing the right side of the Roman
Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, it collided with a
tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim, which was then moving from
the right shoulder of the highway. As a result of the collision, the
KC-20 was thrown towards the left lane of the highway where it
was bumped by a Mazda minibus (minibus) being driven by
herein petitioner Gonzales who was then trying to overtake the
KC-20. At that point, the KC-20 spun and bumped a Transcon
service truck parked on the left side of the highway. As a result
of the impact, the KC-20 was thrown across the highway where
it was again hit by the minibus pushing the former towards a
deep portion on the left side of the road. As a consequence of
the accident, passengers of the KC-20, including respondent
Lugue, suffered physical injuries.

To summarize, the parties involved in the vehicular accident are

as follows:

VEHICLE OWNER DRIVER

Isuzu KC-20 Ricardo Santiago Jimmy Basilio

Tanker truck Oscar Jaring Gerardo Lim

Mazda minibus Amador Corpuz Romeo Gonzales

Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from

the vehicular incident before the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch
2, against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo
Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus, respectively, and
Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the tanker
truck, respectively. Therein defendants filed a third-party
complaint against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio,
owner/operator and driver of the KC-20, respectively.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision holding jointly and
severally liable Ricardo Santiago, Jimmy Basilio, Oscar Jaring,
Gerardo Lim, Amador Corpuz, and Romeo Gonzales. The Court
of Appeals granted the appeal of Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim,
while it dismissed that of plaintiffs Santiago and Basilio.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in holding them liable

for damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial
court.

HELD: From the foregoing testimonies, as well as the

discussion of the trial court earlier quoted, it is clear that the
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Lugue
was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck. As
correctly pointed out by the lower court, proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.
LEGAL INJURY
A. CONCEPT
(Equitable Bank vs. Calderon)
FACTS:
Respondent Calderon, a businessman and a seasoned traveller
in US, Europe and Asia, applied and was issued an Equitable
International Visa card. While in Hong Kong with his reputable
friends, went to Gucci Department Store, he was informed by
the saleslady that his card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the
reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady,
but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut
it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors. Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further
indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items
that he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered
much torment and embarrassment on account of EBCs wrongful
act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the
Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the Regional Trial
Court at Makati City a complaint for damages[2] against EBC.
EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latters
credit card privileges for dollar transactions were earlier placed
under suspension on account of Calderons prior use of the same
card in excess of his credit limit, adding that Calderon failed to
settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing
his obligation to become past due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that
Calderon also failed to maintain the required minimum deposit.
ISSUE: Whether Calderon has established his claim against
EBC.
HELD:
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not
have been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the
dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material distinction
between damages and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI
Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there
must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and
the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case
of damnum absque injuria.
On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that the a
contract of adhesion is as binding as ordinary contracts, the
reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free
to reject it entirely.
Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension without notice
embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is couched in
clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself
was entered into by respondent who, by his own account, is a
reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and
abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral damages are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claim for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.
(Aznar vs. Citibank)
FACTS:
The herein petitioner, Emmanuel B. Aznar, is a prominent
businessman and entrepreneur in Cebu. He decided to treat his
wife together with their grandchildren for an Asian Tour using his
Citibank credit card. He deposited P485,000 to his account to
increase his ordinary credit limit from P150,000 to P635,000. He
bought tickets to Kuala Lumpur amounting to P235,000. When
they were in Kuala Lumpur, they decided to purchases things to
which the credit card was dishonoured for over the limit.
Eventually the agency further dishonoured the card and even
mentioned that the petitioner be a swindler. In that note, they
decided to go back Philippines and instantly filed a complaint for
damages. The lower court initially dismissed the complaint on
the ground that their was no proper authentication as to the print
out of the computer generated document presented as evidence
before the court. The petitioner filed a motion for the re-raffle of
the case, raising the contention that the judge was also a holder
of Citibank credit card. The judge later acceded with the
contention of petitioner and ordered for the company to pay
enormous amount of damages to the plaintiff. When the case
was elevated before the CA the latter denied such.
ISSUE: Whether Aznar has established his claim against
Citibank.
HELD: NO.
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that
Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in
several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia,
particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where he was
humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler
trying to use a blacklisted card.
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision,
Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that
Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the
"hot list."41
Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal
knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank and
only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card.
Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and conditions of
Citibank’s Mastercard constitute a contract of adhesion. It is
settled that contracts between cardholders and the credit card
companies are contracts of adhesion, so-called, because their
terms are prepared by only one party while the other merely
affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states that
"[Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored by any
merchant affiliate for any reason x x x". While it is true that
Citibank may have no control of all the actions of its merchant
affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect,
however, to give it blanket freedom from liability if its card is
dishonored by any merchant affiliate for any reason. Such
phrase renders the statement vague and as the said terms and
conditions constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its
provisions must be construed against the party who prepared
the contract,55 in this case Citibank.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions
which limits its liability to ₱1,000.00 or the actual damage
proven, whichever is lesser.
Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being
unconscionable as it precludes payment of a larger amount
even though damage may be clearly proven. This Court is not
precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the terms of a
contract if the attendant facts and circumstances show that they
should be ignored for being obviously too one-sided.56
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by
Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court still cannot award damages
in favor of petitioner.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law; thus there must
first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the
breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury.57
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations
of the other party. It is also required that a culpable act or
omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate
cause of the damage sustained by the claimant and that the
case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Arts. 221958 and 222059 of the Civil Code.60
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are
recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in
bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad
faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The
breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.61
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue
embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was
dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency’s
personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use
blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present petition as
he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank
breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said
suffering.
B. VIOLATION OF RIGHT OR LEGAL INJURY
(Dapar vs. Biascan)
FACTS:
Mario is an electrician who worked in Saudi Arabia as an OCW
from 1977 to 1981. In 1979, he met Zenaida Dapar who was
working as a domestic helper. The two became lovers and Mario
failed to give support to his wife and family in the Philippines.
Zenaida returned to the Philippines in 1981. When Mario also
returned, they lived together in a rented house in Valenzuela and
opened a joint account with PNB. Mario returned to Saudi Arabia
in February 1984 while Zenaida stayed behind and worked in a
garment factory. He remitted his earnings to Zenaida and the
latter deposited them in their joint savings account. These
remittances were credited in said account as well as others
coming from Zenaida’s relatives working abroad. It had a
balance of P257,225.
A contract to sell was executed between State Land Investment
Corp. and Spouses Mario and Zenaida Biascan over a parcel of
land with an area of 150 sq. m. in Novaliches for P177,189. A
Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Spouses Mario and
Zenaida Biascan as vendees and A TCT was issued by the RD
of Caloocan under their names.
Gloria Biascan filed a complaint against Zenaida for annulment
if title, reconveyance and damages in the RTC of Caloocan. She
alleged that Zenaida fraudulently misrepresented herself as
Mario’s legal wife and had no legal basis in having her name
included in the TCT and tax declaration; and that Gloria, as legal
wife, is entitled to damages because of Zenaida’s use of the
surname Biascan which is a usurpation of surname under Article
377 of the New Civil Code.
Zenaida filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that, under
Article 113 of the Civil Code and Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, a married woman cannot sue or be sued alone without
joining her husband, and that, as registered co-owner of the
subject property, the latter was an indispensable party. She also
alleged that she had no idea that Mario was a married man; that
she tried to leave him when such fact came to her knowledge;
and that Mario made repeated promises of marriage.
Zenaida had also previously instituted an action for Partition
when Mario and his family fraudulently and maliciously forced
her to vacate the house and lot of which the RTC declared her
as a co-owner of the subject lot.
Zenaida’s motion to dismiss was denied. In her counterclaim she
averred that most of the money used for the amortization and
purchase of the subject lot, as well as the construction of the
improvements thereon, was sourced from her earnings and
income and not solely from Mario Biascan. She further alleged
that Mario was, in fact, unemployed from the later part of 1985
to the early part of 1988, and that they had to secure a loan in
the total amount of P80,000 from her mother, which was used
to pay part of the amortization of the property and, which to date,
has remained unpaid.
The court ruled in Zenaida’s favor. CA reversed and set aside
the lower court’s decision. Her motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether Gloria Biascan is entitled to an award of
damages.
RULING: NO. The action filed by Gloria is barred by the decision
of RTC in the Partition case.
Anent respondent Gloria Biascan’s claim for damages for the
petitioner’s alleged usurpation of her husband’s name, we rule
that she is not entitled to an award therefor.

The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code

implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It
consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the
owner and the usurper, and exists when a person designates
himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there
is an actual use of anothers name by the defendant; (2) the use
is unauthorized; and (3) the use of anothers name is to
designate personality or identify a person. None of the foregoing
exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim
that the petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the
trial court found that respondent Mario Biascan allowed the
petitioner to use his surname.

The very first time that Zenaida Dapar’s name had the surname
Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had executed the
affidavit of undertaking in connection with his employment in
Saudi Arabia, wherein he designated as his beneficiary Zenaida
Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to by the defendant
on April 7, 1982 and which also showed that his effective date
of employment in Saudi Arabia was April 1982 and to expire on
February 1984.

Zenaida appeared to have no participation in the preparation of

said document. Moreover, when the contract to sell and the
deed of sale of the property in question were executed, Zenaida
Dapar used the surname Biascan and defendant Mario Biascan
did not object to the use of such surname. Also, in the joint bank
account with the PNB Valenzuela, the name Zenaida Dapar
Biascan is described as a joint depositor.

Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used the surname

Biascan because she was instructed by her co-defendant to do
so and she thought the latter was not married. She only became
aware of his civil status a few years later after their living
together in 1981.

The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her co-defendant

Mario Biascan was allowed by the latter and in no case could it
be considered usurpation of surname. Accordingly, co-
defendant Zenaida Dapar can no longer be held liable for
damages for the use thereof.

The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use

thereof coupled with the representation that one is the lawful
wife, or the usurpation of the wife’s status, which gives rise to an
action for damages.