THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996.]

BELINDA TAÑEDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers

and sisters, and TEOFILA CORPUZ TAÑEDO, representing her minor
daughter VERNA TAÑEDO , petitioners, vs . THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAÑEDO AND TERESITA BARERA TAÑEDO ,
respondents.

Atty. Jose T. Bartolome, for petitioners.

Joselito L. Lum, for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALE; MAY NOT BE ENTERED INTO UPON FUTURE
INHERITANCE; EXCEPT IN CASES EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW. — Pursuant to
Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law." Consequently, said contract made in 1962
conveying one hectare of his future inheritance is not valid and cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties. Hence, the "af davit of
conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962
sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same
infirmity." Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF VENDEES IN CASE OF DOUBLE SALE. —
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered
his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF EXISTENCE OF GOOD
FAITH, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. — There are indeed many con icting documents
and testimonies as well as arguments over their probative value and signi cance. Suf ce it
to say, however, that all the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of
evidence and credibility of witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent any
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for the
conclusions made by the lower courts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not
disturb their ndings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their evidence
was not believed by both the trial and the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended
to give more credence to the evidence presented by the private respondents. But this in
itself is not a reason for setting aside such ndings. We are far from convinced that both
courts gravely abused their respective authorities and judicial prerogatives.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p

Is a sale of future inheritance valid? In multiple sales of the same real property, who has
preference in ownership? What is the probative value of the lower court's nding of good
faith in registration of such sales in the registry of property? These are the main questions
raised in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set
aside and reverse the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV NO. 24987
promulgated on September 26, 1991 af rming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63, Third Judicial Region, Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No. 6328, and its Resolution
denying reconsideration thereof, promulgated on May 27, 1992. cdtai

By the Court's Resolution on October 25, 1995, this case (along with several others) was
transferred from the First to the Third Division and after due deliberation, the Court
assigned it to the undersigned ponente for the writing of this Decision.
The Facts
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor
of his eldest brother, Ricardo Tañedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private
respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, "one
hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona,
Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the
said property being his "future inheritance" from his parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his
father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Af davit of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980 (Exh.
3) to "re-af rm respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962." On January 13,
1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
covering his "undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . ." (Exh.
4). He acknowledged therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In
February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children,
petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 (Exh. E). On June 7,
1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in their favor in the Registry
of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certi cate of Title No.
166451 (Exh. 5).
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 led a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds
of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited
by Lazaro from his father. cdasia

Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated
December 29, 1980 (Exh. E), conveying to his ten children his allotted portion under the
extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the land in
litigation (Lot 191).
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and
signed by Matias dated December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever
inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaro's) children (Exh.
A); (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed by Lazaro in the presence of
two witnesses, wherein he con rmed that he would voluntarily abide by the wishes of his
father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaro's) children all the property he would inherit from the
latter (Exh. B); and (3) a letter dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter Carmela,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 stating that his share in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was
intended for his children, petitioners herein (Exh. C).
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of
Sale" dated March 12, 1981 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners
for the reason that it was "simulated or ctitious — without any consideration whatsoever".
cdtai

Shortly after the case a quo was led, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G) which
virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale (Exh. 6) and
the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private respondents. However, Lazaro testi ed that he
sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced him to execute a deed
of sale in favor of his children after giving him ve pesos (P5.00) to buy a "drink" (TSN
September 18, 1985, pp. 204-205).
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to
adduce a preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of
Appeals af rmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January
13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said
respondents.
The Issues
Petitioners raised the following "errors" in the respondent Court, which they also now
allege in the instant Petition: cdt

"I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962
(Exhibit 7, Answer) is merely voidable or annullable and not void ab initio
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the New Civil Code involving as it does
a 'future inheritance'.

"II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants-appellees acted in good faith in
registering the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 (Exhibit 9) with the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac and therefore ownership of the land in question passed on to
defendants-appellees.
"III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and
documentary evidence of plaintiffs-appellants which clearly established by
preponderance of evidence that they are indeed the legitimate and lawful owners
of the property in question.

"IV. The decision is contrary to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions
drawn from the established facts are illogical and off-tangent." cdtai

From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:

1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?

2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the
Registry of Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same
buyers valid?
3. May this Court review the ndings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the
buyers acted in good faith in registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b)
in "failing to consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the conclusions of the
respondent Court "illogical and off-tangent"? cdta

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 The Court's Ruling
At the outset, let it be clear that the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court in this
petition for review on certiorari are only those allegedly committed by the respondent
Court of Appeals and not directly those of the trial court, which is not a party here. The
"assignment of errors" in the petition quoted above are therefore totally misplaced, and for
that reason, the petition should be dismissed. But in order to give the parties substantial
justice we have decided to delve into the issues as above re-stated. The errors attributed
by petitioners to the latter (trial) court will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to
the appellate court's assailed Decision and Resolution.
The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the
assailed Decision conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated
future inheritance is null and void." 3

But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the
Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law." cdasia

Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
Hence, the "af davit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to
validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court,
"suffers from the same in rmity." Even private respondents in their memorandum 4
concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of
sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided
inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered
on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners
covering the same property. These two documents were executed after the death of
Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate
was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words, these
dispositions, though con icting, were no longer infected with the in rmities of the 1962
sale. cdtai

Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was only one-half hectare out
of Lot No. 191, citing as authority the trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is
on review in these proceedings by this Court is the Court of Appeals' decision — which
correctly identi ed the subject matter of the January 13, 1981 sale to be the entire
undivided 1/12 share of Lazaro in Lot No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of
on December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration
of the sale in favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of
multiple sales, as follows: cdt

"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have rst taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was rst in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith."aisadc

The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law,
ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it rst in the registry of
property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the
one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed
fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at
all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered
his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property. 5
As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless
contended that it was done in bad faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled: cdta

"Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that

defendants-appellees acted in bad faith when they registered the Deed of Sale in
their favor as appellee Ricardo already knew of the execution of the deed of sale
in favor of the plaintiffs; appellants cite the testimony of plaintiff Belinda Tañedo
to the effect that defendant Ricardo Tañedo called her up on January 4 or 5, 1981
to tell her that he was already the owner of the land in question 'but the contract
of sale between our father and us were (sic) already consummated' (pp. 9-10, tsn,
January 6, 1984). This testimony is obviously self-serving, and because it was a
telephone conversation, the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 was not
shown; Belinda merely told her uncle that there was already a document showing
that plaintiffs are the owners (p. 80). Ricardo Tañedo controverted this and
testified that he learned for the first time of the deed of sale executed by Lazaro in
favor of his children 'about a month or sometime in February 1981' (p. 111, tsn,
Nov. 28, 1984). . . ." 6

The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's ndings, refused to overturn the latter's
assessment of the testimonial evidence, as follows:
"We are not prepared to set aside the nding of the lower court upholding Ricardo
Tañedo's testimony, as it involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the
trial judge, who presided at the hearing, was in a better position to resolve." (Court
of Appeals' Decision, p. 6.)cdt

In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by petitioners, both in their
basic petition and in their memorandum, as follows:
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact that respondent
Ricardo "by fraud and deceit and with foreknowledge" that the property in
question had already been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro execute the deed of
January 13, 1981;

2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of the purchase
price of P10,000.00 was paid at the time of the execution of the deed of sale,
contrary to the written acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith; aisadc

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 3. There is allegedly suf cient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of
the sale in favor of petitioners "was tainted with fraud or deceit."
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private respondents "took
undue advantage over the weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of
Lazaro Tañedo. . ." and that respondent Ricardo Tañedo "exercised moral
ascendancy over his younger brother he being the eldest brother and who reached
fourth year college of law and at one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while
his younger brother only attained first year high school . . .";

5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners' evidence,

especially Lazaro Tañedo's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating
that Ricardo Tañedo deceived the former in executing the deed of sale in favor of
private respondents. cdtai

To be sure, there are indeed many con icting documents and testimonies as well as
arguments over their probative value and signi cance. Suf ce it to say, however, that all
the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence and credibility of
witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the
lower courts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not disturb their ndings. At
most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their evidence was not believed by both
the trial and the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended to give more credence to
the evidence presented by private respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting
aside such ndings. We are far from convinced that both courts gravely abused their
respective authorities and judicial prerogatives.
As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock
Construction and Development Corp. 7 :
"The Court has consistently held that the factual ndings of the trial court, as well
as the Court of Appeals, are nal and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. Among the exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts
found by the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a nding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when the inference
made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; when the ndings went beyond the issues of the case
and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. After
a careful study of the case at bench, we nd none of the above grounds present
to justify the re-evaluation of the findings of fact made by the courts below."
cdtai

In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company,
Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. 8 is equally applicable to the present case:
"We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. .
. . (I)t is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, particularly
where, such as here, the ndings of both the trial court and the appellate court on
the matter coincide." (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No Costs.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 SO ORDERED. cdtai

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 58-64.

2. Thirteenth Division, composed of J. Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes ponente, and JJ. Arturo B.
Buena, Chairman, and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., member.
3. CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 62. cdasia

4. At pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 145-146.

5. Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 213 (March 13, 1989).
6. Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 63. cdtai

7. G.R. No. 112130, March 31, 1995; J. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, ponente.

8. G.R. No. 102253, June 2, 1995; J. Jose C. Vitug, ponente.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com