C. Plain View Doctrine

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990, 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
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That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing
the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the
appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM
team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic
Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution was
summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader
of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt.
Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City.
Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana
in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a
NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided
him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani
was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to
the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt.
Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was
assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by
Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of
Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt.
Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt.
Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams
proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga,
team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the
NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's
house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he
was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said
he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the
money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents.
Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his
right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined
Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa,
another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's
wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who
was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but
could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was
and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt.
Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari
Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned
over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa
(Exhs. "C" & "D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari Musa gave his
true name — Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana
(bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the
plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari
Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of the
marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-request, dated December 14,
1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the
same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined the
marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined
gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her
examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-
3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at
the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen written with red
ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the one newspaper-wrapped
marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs.
Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his initial, the words "buy-
bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified
the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his
signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory
(Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked
"RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1"). 4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R.
Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house at Suterville,
Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman
manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being
manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep.
Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes,
got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to
enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents
searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM
agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa
said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was
living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa,
then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at Calarian,
Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent
which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in
Tagalog. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked
to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said
he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although he himself told the
NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers
were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost
consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building.
The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari
Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the
marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to
the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM
agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to them; that he
had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was
afraid that was against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had
a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.
5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana
and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of
P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary imprisonment. 6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-
bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-
versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt.
Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy
operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter. 7 He reported
the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a
conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a
certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian
Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were
Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the
operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached
the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more
marijuana. 12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back
two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see
that there were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising
his right hand. 15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest.
The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The
appellant said that he gave it to his wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation,
which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid
and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is
without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the
appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to
sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the
transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.
17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the appellant to
sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime of
selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the presence of other people apart from the buyer
and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v.
Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that
the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that
these people will not report him to the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The
appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the
appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between
marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga
allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand
as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were
certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of
the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as they are
with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes because
according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes.
(tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those cigarettes from the
distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters. 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana
to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. The relevant portion
of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads: 22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong were
boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near the road and he was met by
one person and later known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and
later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa
and went inside the house and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance
of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the
appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence,
which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt.
Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville,
Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported
a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then
organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga
led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00
marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM
agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed
in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places; 28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an
exchange of articles took place. 29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the
Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see
exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the
prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the
poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the
NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the
other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to
retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked
money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga
described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen." 32 They asked the
appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the
trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court
issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and
seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares
inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to
this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to the
necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without
a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make
a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making
an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust
operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on
the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but
found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in
a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain
view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the defendant
husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendants'
apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife
emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of
the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy
substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting
defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S.
Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of
the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana
did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. 43 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view"
doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor
to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine
is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion
in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify
the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object. 47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the
marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic
bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as
to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they
sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the
adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room
to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue
as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond,
they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents
of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain
view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag
was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer. 48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article
III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article
II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt.
Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the
guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Pelagio S. Mandi.
2 Original Record, p. 1.
3 Id., at 8.
4 RTC Decision, pp. 2-5.
5 RTC Decision, pp- 5-7.
6 Id., at 11.
7 TSN, pp. 18-19.
8 Id., at: 19.
9 Id., at 19-20.
10 Id., at 20.
11 Id., at 21.
12 Id., at 23.
13 TSN, p. 23.
14 Id., at 36.
15 Id., at 23.
16 Id., at 26.
17 People v. Jaymalin, G.R. No. 90452, October 19, 1992 citing People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 81332,
April 25, 1989, 172 SCRA 742. Contra People v. Ventura, G.R. No. 88670, November 19, 1992.
18 People v. Simbulan, G.R. No. 100754, October 13, 1992.
19 G.R. No. 76893, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 681, 689.
20 G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50.
21 G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50 at 62.
22 TSN, pp. 55-56.
23 TSN, p. 52.
24 Id., at 52-53.
25 Id., at 53.
26 TSN, p. 53.
27 Id., at 54.
28 Id., at 55.
29 Supra, note 22.
30 People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 94472, March 3, 1992; See also People v. Paco, supra, note 19.
31 TSN, p. 57.
32 Ibid.
33 Original Record, p. 26.
34 G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383.
35 Article III, Section 3(2).
36 76 Phil. 637 (1946).
37 Id., at 645.
38 Moreno v. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439, 442 (1909). See also People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 (1925).
39 People v. Paco, supra, note 19.
40 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927).
41 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067(1968).
42 374 U.S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963).
43 Id., 10 L. Ed. 2d 744.
44 Another case where the seizure of marijuana was held valid under the "plain view" doctrine is
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1982).
45 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).
46 Id., 29 L. Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).
47 See concurring opinion by Stewart, Brennan, and White, JJ., in Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557,
22 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1969). See also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 65 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1980).
48 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1981).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner
Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. 1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 2 thru the following Information: 3
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite
rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357
caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro
Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and
permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, 5 but granted his application for bail. 6 During the
arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, 7 upon
advice of counsel, 8 to make any plea. 9 Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all
stages of the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of
the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on
April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond.
The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining
petitioner's conviction 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty,
FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter
his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said
accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he
appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further
directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" 17 but the same was denied by respondent court in its
September 20, 1995 Resolution 18 copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The
next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with application for bail 19
followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental petition" 21
and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-General 22
sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July
31, 1996. 23 The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the
petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. 24 However, after his vigorous resistance and
success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of
petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete
turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. 25
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence by respondent
court, is as follows: 26
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre
Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they
took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their
ride on motorcycles (pp 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant,
Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to
remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In
the local vernacular, he said thus: "Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya." (p. 7,
ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez
heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast
(pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz,
quite sure of what had happened, remarked "oy ta na" signifying that Manarang had been right in his
observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or
shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of
both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report
the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and
called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By
the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident
taking the general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11,
ibid).
He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle
and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of
the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1193). He called the Viper through the radio once
again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a
hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SP02 Ruby Buan, upon
receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to
apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm
was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23,
1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle
(Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the
only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the
distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile
No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue
(pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2
Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur
Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident,
even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the
Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15,
1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan
bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the
Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles
coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them that there
was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers already knew about
the incident, Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in
front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging
from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license
plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15,
ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN,
February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two
police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light
and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to
stop (p. 11, ibid).
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2
Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid).
The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized
the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him
inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his
motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which
appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such
that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit "C") tucked on the left side of his
waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja
made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was
covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered
by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2
Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid). By
that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun
and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan
and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer
in the group, SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested
for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of
his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however,
arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one
arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one
hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko" (pp. 13-15,
ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle
tucked in appellant 's back right, pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant
turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine
from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the
vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle
by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit
D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a
semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and
appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the
arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado
then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32,
ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit "L") with a
single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets.
Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one
short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the
Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario
Street beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to
SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant
admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not
able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18,
TSN, January 25, 1994).
On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit "F") was issued by Captain, Senior Inspector Mario
Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4,
1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby
armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro
Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second
Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were
not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid).
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential
agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the
penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987
Constitution.
After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime
charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured
in a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought
to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting
person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once
to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring
Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the
PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of
petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. 32 We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the
aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest,
did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could
have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained
and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put
up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life.
Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration
with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not
become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has
been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to
render aid or take action. 33 The exigent circumstances of — hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle,
the public place and the raining nighttime — all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident. 35 The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere
"reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. 36
Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and
ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing
another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
37
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had
in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit
and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in
response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its
dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. 39 These
formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was
indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified
personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. 40
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea. 41 Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure
to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to
assail the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and
defects. 43
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in
evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, 44 are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 47
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 48
3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 50
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's
firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a
prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16
rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after
alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was
immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should
happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing
their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the, corpus delicti. 53
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant. 54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect. 57
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on
the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under
a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake
a protective search 58 of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's
grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental
search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61 and
(ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible evidence not
excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is
a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or
have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 63
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is
an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by
a Mission Order 64 and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander
of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. 65 The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions 66 were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in
evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed,
petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable
evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this
score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission
Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police
officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended
on October 26, 1992.
Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority to possess and
carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the charge against him for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any
proper document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and
Missions Order, he could have produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension,
at least during the preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the
prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum
Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have
produced these documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not even take
the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no allegation of a
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject
firearms.
At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James Neneng to whom a
subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but
was not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found Superintendent
Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January 13, 1994. 67
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt if
they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject
firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that
his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be
reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to
present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and agonizing
public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the
Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement units/personnels such as
PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown
without resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction will be carried out through
all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is
rendered inoperative in respect to such violation. 68
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted.
Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the
Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders
and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt. Rodialo
Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the
Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order
covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City," 72 areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior
approval "by next higher Headquarters" 73 which is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also
unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which
pertinently provides that:
No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding certification from
the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been
officially taken up in that units property book, and that report of such action has been reported to
higher AFP authority.
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present the
corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP, does
not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP
which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's counsel. 74 The implementing
rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and
unambiguous, thus:
No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside residence
unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is
receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent
must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which
specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at
the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at
higher levels of command. 75 Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise
provides as follows:
If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian
agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and are
receiving regular compensation for the service they are rendering.
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the
firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or
registered in the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:
Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if any?
A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm
pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being
asked whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the caliber
.357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the same serial number which is the
same as that licensed and/or registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is a
pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of the
accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir. 77
xxx xxx xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:

Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
PNFEO5 28 November 1992
CERT IF ICAT IO N
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder
of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL
M76C4476687.
Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per verification from
available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y, licensed/registered
to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered
License.
This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO

Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch
78
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from,
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. 79 In People vs.
Tobias, 80 we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the
foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly
proven by the prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidences 81 that an M-
16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed
to a civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to depart from the factual findings
of both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality. 83
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic)
and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on
illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. 84 He
stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and
excessive in contravention of the Constitution. 85
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply
the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. 87 And until
its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes
adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional.
The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to
reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make
the same cruel and excessive.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to
the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual." (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive", "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community" 88
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of
the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of
imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 89
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify
nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by
this Court. 91 Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not]
contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . . " 92 Appellant's grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed
penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.
That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who
That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who
approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in
line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en banc provided that the indeterminate
penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is
discernible from the following explanation by the Court:
In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In accordance with
the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon, 94 although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for
graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the
offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1,
that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not merely
imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate
sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in
degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period. 95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the
lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Investigation Report dated October 26, 19922 of SPO1 Rene Jesus T. Gregorio of the Angeles City,
Philippine National Police (PNP), (RTC Records, Vol. 1, p. 9).
2 CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS
USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITIONS OR EXPLOSIVES; AND IMPOSING
STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.
3 The Information was filed by Special Counsel Irin Zenaida S. Buan and was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 92-1083 of Branch 61 of the Angeles City R.T.C. presided by Judge David R. Rosete.
4 RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
5 The warrant of arrest dated December 8, 1992 was issued by Judge Rosete. Later, an order
recalling all warrant of arrest against petitioner was issued by Judge Maximiano Asuncion of RTC
Quezon City. (RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 34).
6 Petitioner posted a personal bail bond of P200,000.00 furnished by FGU Insurance Corporation
(RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 37).
7 Rule 116, Section 1(c) "If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea
of not guilty shall be entered for him."
8 Petitioner was assisted by his then lead counsel Dean Antonio Coronel (appearance withdrawn
April, 1993 to serve his suspension by the Supreme Court, RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 260) and Atty.
Philip Jurado. The prosecution was represented by Angeles City Prosecutor Antonio G.P. Fausto and
his Assistant, Rufino Antonio.
9 Order dated January 20, 1993, RTC Records, Vol. I, pp. 59 and 75.
10 RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 57.
11 RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 48.
12 RTC Records, vol. II, p. 828.
13 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. CR-16040. Atty. Jurado withdrew his appearance as
petitioner's counsel on October, 1994 when the appeal was pending before the CA. His signature,
however still appeared on some pleadings for petitioner (CA Rollo, p. 429). Rene A.V. Saguisag and
Associates entered their appearance as new counsel (CA Rollo, p. 58). Appellant's brief, however,
was also signed by his brother Robert A. Padilla and Gina C. Garcia (CA Rollo, p. 146).
14 The 23-page CA (Special Tenth Division) decision promulgated on July 21, 1995 was penned by
Justice Antonio P. Solano with Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and Conchita Carpio-Morales, concurring.
(Rollo, pp. 50-72).
15 CA Decision, p. 23; Rollo, p. 50.
16 Registry Return Receipt, attached to p. 343 of the CA Rollo.
17 Registry Receipt stamped August 9, 1995. See CA Rollo, pp. 403-430.
18 CA Rollo, pp. 463-464.
19 The petition was signed by the Raval Suplico and Lokin Law Office.
20 One supplemental petition was filed on October 9, 1995 signed by Padilla, Jurado and Saguisag.
The other supplemental petition was filed on October 11, 1995 and signed by the Raval Suplico and
Lokin Office.
21 Signed by Padilla, Jurado and Saguisag.
22 Solicitor-General's Comment on the application for bail.
23 Padilla vs. CA and People, (Resolution), G.R. No. 121917, July 31, 1996.
24 Rollo, pp. 258, 282.
25 Rollo, pp. 312-339.
26 Counterstatement of Facts, Appellee's Brief filed with the CA by the Solicitor-General (CA Rollo,
pp. 230-240).
27 Consisting of about 4,000 pages.
28 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

29 People v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996.
30 US v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516, 519, citing 3 Cyc., 886; Ramsey v. State, 17 S.E., 613; Dilger v.
Com., 11 S. W., 651; State v. McAfee, 12 S. E., 435; State v. Williams, 15 S.E., 554; and Hawkins v.
Lutton, 70 N. W., 483.
31 TSN, February 13, 1993, Enrique Manarang, pp. 5-11.
32 This hit and run incident was the subject of a different complaint against petitioner.
33 United States v. Gordils, 982 F2d 64, 69 (1992).
34 See People v. de Lara, 55 SCAD 190, 196, 236 SCRA 291, 297 (1994).
35 United States v. Lopez, 989 F2d 24, 26 (1993); United Stares v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-7
(1982); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-9 (1967).
36 United States v. King, 990 F2d 1552, 1557 (1993); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702
(1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980).
37 See People v. Fernandez, 57 SCAD 481 (1994); Higbee v. City of SanDiego, 911 F2d 377, 379
(1990).
38 Eighty km/hr or higher. (TSN, Ibid, p. 3).
39 Exh. "B" and its sub-markings — Picture of the vehicle driven by petitioner which showed the
dangling plate number and the damaged hood and railings.
40 See People v. Woolcock, 314 Phil. 81 (1995).
41 People v. Rivera, 315 Phil. 454; People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 737; People v. De Guia, 227
SCRA 614; People v. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104 (1993); People v. de Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 (1993);
People v. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 (1990);
42 People v. Lopez, 315 Phil. 59 citing De Asis v. Romero, 41 SCRA 235 (1971); See also People v.
Nitcha, 310 Phil. 287 (1995) citing People vs. Hubilo, 220 SCRA 389 (1993); People v. Samson, 244
SCRA 146; Sacarias v. Cruz, 141 Phil. 417 (1969), citing (US v. Grant, 18 Phil 122, 147; Doce v.
Branch II of the CFI of Quezon, 22 SCRA 1028, 1031, citing Carington v. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 and US
v. Grant, supra.
43 In Re Letter of Freddie Manuel, 54 SCAD 97, 99, 235 SCRA 5 (1994); People v. Dural, 42 SCAD
213, 223 SCRA 201 (1993); Palanca v. Querubin. 141 Phil. 432 (1969).
44 Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996. The fifth being customs
search.
45 Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
46 People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997; People v. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679 (1995);
People v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756; People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401; People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA
388; People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122; People v. Paco,
170 SCRA 681; Manipon v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267.
47 Mapp v. Warden, 531 F2d 1167; United States v. Griffin, 530 F2d 739; United States v. Hilstrom,
533 F2d 209, 429 U.S. 982, 97 S Ct 498, U.S v. Pacelli, 470 F2d 67, 415 U.S. 983, 93 S Ct 1501;
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S Ct 2022; Ker v. California, 374 U.S 443, 465, 91 S Ct
2022, 2037-38;.
48 Harris v. US, 390 US 234; People v. Evaristo 216 SCRA 431.
49 People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995); People v. Fernandez, supra, citing People v. CFI of
Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980); People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122; Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336.
50 United v. Rem, 984 F2d 806, 812 (1993); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, supra, at p. 1220; United
States v. McCoy, 977 F2d 706, 710 (1992); United States v. Rusher, 966 F2d 868, 874 (1992);
United States v. Parker, 928 F2d 365-69 (1991).
51 Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, citing People v. Exum, 382 III, 204, 47 N.E. 2d 56,
59.
52 TSN, SPO Mercado, July 1, 1993, p. 5.
53 Concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto in Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, 776 cited in People v.
Cruz, ibid, at 141 and People v. Acol, ibid.
54 People v. Evaristo, supra.
55 TSN, March 8, 1993, SPO Ruben Mercado, pp. 32-35.
56 In People v. Doro, 223 SCRA 19 the Court said that the accused therein waived his right against
the warrantless search when he voluntarily opened the package containing illegal drugs. See also
People v. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221.
57 People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1944).
58 United States v. Saffeels, 982 F2d 1199, 1206 (1992); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034-5
(1983).
59 United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F2d 1216, 1222 (1993); United States v. Franco, 981 F2d 470,
473 (1992); New York V. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-1 (1981).
60 United States v. $639,558.00 in United States Currency, 955 F2d 712, 715-16 (1992); United
States v. Holifield, 956 F2d 665, 669 (1992); United States v. Arango, 879 F2d 1501, 1505 (1989).
61 United States v. Tarazon, 989 F2d 1045, 1051 (1993).
62 Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969).
63 People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557, 566.
64 Exhibit "I" — Alleged Mission Order of Petitioner contains the following:
Department of Interior and Local Government
Headquarters Philippine National Police

Lianga, Surigao, del Sur
29 Sept. 1992
Mission Order
Number 29-9-92-B
To: PSUPT GREGORIO DUREMBES
SO ROBIN C. PADILLA
-P O S T-
I. PROCEED TO: Camp Crame, NCR, Recom 1-12-Baguio City
II. PURPOSE: To intensify Int'l coverage and to negotiate the imdte. surrender of Father Frank
Navarro (rebel priest), believed attending conference in Baguio City. (CPP/NPA)
III. DURATION: FROM: 29 Sept to 31 Oct 1992
IV. AUTHORIZE TO WEAR THE FOLLOWING UNIFORM/ATTIRE:
(x) KHAKI ( ) HBT (X) CIVILIAN
V. AUTHORIZED TO CARRY THE FOLLOWING FIREARMS:
LIC OR MR MAKE KIND CAL SER NO AMMO
LIC or MR issued Firearms & Ammos
Nothing Follows
RECOMMENDED BY: APPROVED BY:
Sgd. RODIALO A. GUMTANG
SUPT (CSP) PNP
Deputy & S-4
65 People vs. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996; People vs. Lualhati, 234 SCRA 325
(1994); People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992).
66 Exh. "C" — 357 Smith and Wesson with bullets; Exh. "D" — M-16 armalite with magazine; Exh. "K"
— M-16 magazine; Exh. "L" — Pietro Berreta; Exh. "N" — 2 long magazines; Exh. "O" — 1 short
magazine.
67 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 18-19; Rollo pp. 67-68.
68 Exhibit "1"; Exhibit "Y".
69 TSN, Supt. Gregorio Durendes, February 10, 1994, p. 11.
70 Exhibit "I" for the Defense; Exhibit "U" (Rebuttal) for the Prosecution.
71 Issued by PNP Director-General Cesar Nazareno, March 21, 1991. Its pertinent provision states as
follows:
3.a. Only Unit Commanders/Chiefs of Offices are authorized to issue Mission Orders to their
respective personnel while in the official performance of duties. Such Mos shall be valid only within
the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Unit Commander/Chief of Office concerned.
c. MOs of PNP personnel performing mission outside AOR must be approved by next higher
Headquarters.
72 Exhibit "I"
73 See Note 71, supra.
74 Ethel Ignacio, Chief of the Non-Uniform Personnel Section of the PNP, testified that petitioner's
name is not in the Plantilla of Personnel. Counsel for petitioner admitted that the latter is "not in the
plantilla." (Rollo, p. 357; CA Decision, p. 14; TSN, Ethel Ignacio, July 25, 1994, pp. 4-6).
75 April 28, 1984 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 1866 issued by the
PC-INP Chief and Director-General.
76 Sr. Inspector Jose Mario Espino, of the PNP Headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City issued the
certification dated November 28, 1992 and December 11, 1992. (Exhibits "F'' and "G"; TSN March 4,
1993, Jose Mario Espino, pp. 7, 9, 14-17).
77 TSN, Sr. Inspector Jose Mario Espino, March 4, 1993, p. 14
78 Exhibit "F". In Exhibit "G", petitioner's alias, "Robinhood C. Padilla," was checked and yielded the
same information found in Exhibit "F" quoted above.
79 Mallari vs. CA and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 110569, December 9, 1996 citing People vs.
Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996. Such and similar certifications were declared
adequate by the Court in Rosales vs. CA, 255 SCRA 123 (1996), People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82,
97 (1994).
80 G.R. No. 114185, January 30, 1997.
81 People vs. Mesal, 313 Phil. 888.
82 TSN, Jose Mario Espino, March 4, 1993, p. 20.
83 People vs. Cahindo, G.R. No. 121178, January 27, 1997; People vs. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 95939,
June 17, 1996; People vs. Angeles, 315 Phil. 23; People vs. Remoto, 314 Phil. 432.
84 Supplemental petition, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 84-86.
85 Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Constitution.
86 Article 7, Civil Code.
87 See: People v. Limaco, 88 Phil. 36; People v. Venaracion, 249 SCRA 244.
88 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647.
89 Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., 202 SCRA 405, 417.

90 Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30, 55.
91 Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648; Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr. 202 SCRA 405.
92 People v. Morato, 224 SCRA 361, 367-368.
93 255 SCRA 532 (1996).
94 234 SCRA 555.
95 People v. Jian, 255 SCRA 532, 542.
Search
lawphil

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000

vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISIO N
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about September 25,
1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture
seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs
maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured
shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed
informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung,
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.3 The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."4
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the
site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw
seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.5
PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they
were his.6 The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.7 The police took
photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.8 Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants,
weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya for analysis.9 Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon
microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication
for marijuana.10 She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions.
She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white sack
with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for
Marijuana, a prohibited drug."11
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that
the land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland
Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.12 This lot was part
of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate
of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.13
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25,
1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does
not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something."14 This unknown person then brought appellant to
the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut.15 Five armed
policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew
anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist
at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.16 Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted
owning the marijuana.17
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot
five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a
bundle of uprooted marijuana plants.18 The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On
the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers.
Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging
activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation."19 At the
police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.20
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the
nearest house being 100 meters away.21 The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the
barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was
located between his house and Carlito Pascua's.22
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's claim
that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating.23 Tipay presented a sketch he made,24
which showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the
closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez
and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua.25 Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor
accompanied him when he made the measurements.26 He further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant
was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and the
proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.27
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of
marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants punishable
under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by
lethal injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."28
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS
DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON
APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE
MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.29
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than
ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the
ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect
that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no search
made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in
an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately
spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of
the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain
view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely to make a
verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view
of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in
the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any
search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and there was
no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect,
hence, no search warrant was required."30
The Constitution31 lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion
of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and
should be excluded.32 Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.33
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1)
day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place
where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have
convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead,
they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.34 The mantle
of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the
doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.35
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was
arrested without a warrant.36 Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of
appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search
for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.37 Clearly,
their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.38 Patently,
the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus,
cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced
lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of
the State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes
his residence, his papers, and other possessions.39 The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security"40 of
the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful
intrusion are persons, not places.41 To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it
would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures,
he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the
person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be
used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible
error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove
appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must
now address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following
observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in
the absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police
verification; under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of
the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any
counsel."42
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against
him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to
have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers
was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant
theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel should have
assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants.
Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported
voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel
during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and
independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellant’s failure to impute any false motive
for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and
(3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.43 An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person
as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense.44 The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.45
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the
location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation
was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.46
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we
just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking
him..."47 In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect.
At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."48 As a suspect, two
armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other
armed policemen.49 All had been dispatched to arrest him.50 From these circumstances, we may infer that
appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest.
Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the
marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.51 The
records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly
made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even
before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay.52 Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.53
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author
thereof.54 The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,55 it must
likewise be credible and competent.56 Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.57 Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to
be introduced at trial."58
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense
charged.1âwphi1 These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of
ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented
to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have
admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said
evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been
conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the
police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the
warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said
marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees
against illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the police during
investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession was made
without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession
cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a
criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of ownership
of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved..."59 To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on
its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused.60 Absent the required
degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.61 In this case, the seized marijuana plants
linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."62 Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled
investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against him."63 Without these proffered
but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum
of evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his favor stands.
Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring
his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is
what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."64
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1 Records, pp. 54-58.
2 Id. at 1.
3 TSN, November 19, 1996, p. 3.
4 Exhibit "1", Exhibit "C", Supra Note 1, at 3. See also TSN, November 20, 1996, p. 3.
5 TSN, November 20, 1996, pp. 5-6.
6 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 3. See also Supra Note 5, at 6.
7 TSN, November 21, 1996, p. 3. See also Exhibit "D", Supra Note 1, at 4.
8 Exhibits "I," "I-1," Supra Note 1, at 24-A-24-B. See also TSN, November 28, 1996, pp. 10-11.
9 TSN, November 28, 1996, pp. 5-6.
10 Ibid.
11 Exhibit "A," Supra Note 1 at 16.
12 Exhibits "J," "J-1" to "J-3," Supra Note 1, at 41.
13 Supra.
14 TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 2-3.
15 Id. at 6.
16 Id. at 4.
17 Id. at 5.
18 Supra Note 15.
19 Supra Note 14, at 7.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 10.
22 Id. at 11.
23 TSN, January 28, 1997, p. 2.
24 Exhibit "J" (should be Exhibit "K"), Supra Note 1, at 49.
26 Id. at 8.
27 Ibid.
29 Rollo, pp. 31-32.
30 Supra Note 28.
31 Art. III, Sec. 2 states: "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
32 People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293, 314 (1995) citing Nardone v. US, 308 US 388, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L.
Ed. 307 (1939).
33 Art. III, Sec. 3(2) provides: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
34 These instances include:
(a) A search as an incident to a lawful arrest, provided that the search is made contemporaneous to
the arrest and within a permissible area of search. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 12.;
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 59 (1992); People v. Catan, 205 SCRA 235 (1992); Posadas v. Court of
Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 (1990); and People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990).
(b) Searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws. See Hizon v.
Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517 (1996); Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975). C.f. People v.
Ammumudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
(c) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders. See Mustang Lumber v. Court of
Appeals, 257 SCRA 450 (1996); People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995); People v. Lo Hoi Wing,
193 SCRA 122 (1991); Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990), 178 SCRA 211 (1989); People v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980), and Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968).
(d) Inspection of buildings and other premises to enforce fire safety, sanitary, and other building
regulations.
(e) Where the prohibited articles or contraband are in "plain view" See People v. Musa, supra; Chia v.
Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 735 (1989)
35 People v. Bolasa, G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999, p. 5, citing People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626,
637-638 (1998).
36 TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 2-3.
37 People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993) citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 29 L. Ed 2d
564 (1971).
38 TSN, November 19, 1996, p. 4.
39 Villanueva v. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345, 349 (1972).
40 Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230, 235 (1937); Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 41 (1937).
41 Terry v. Ohio, 20 L. Ed.889, 899 (1968) citing Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 351, 19 L. Ed 2d 576,
582, 88 S. Ct 507 (1967).
43 Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).
44 Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642, 648 (1988); People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216, 231 (1989) uses "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
45 Gamboa v. Cruz, supra, 651.
46 People v. De Jesus, 213 SCRA 345, 351 (1992).
47 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 5.
48 People v. Logronio, 214 SCRA 519, 528 (1992) citing People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2, 9, (1980).
50 Supra Note 4.
51 People v. Tan, 286 SCRA 207, 214 (1998); People v. Jerez, 285 SCRA 393, 399 (1998); People v. Calvo,
Jr., 269 SCRA 676, 682 (1997); People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199, 211 (1997).
52 People v. Cabintoy, 247 SCRA 442, 449 (1995) citing People v. Dacoycoy, 208 SCRA 583 (1992);
People v. Rodriguez, 205 SCRA 791 (1992); and People v. Gonzales, 189 SCRA 343 (1990).
53 People v. Cabintoy, supra, 450, citing People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 (1992); People v. Repe, 175
SCRA 422 (1989).
54 People v. Chavez, 278 SCRA 230, 242 (1997) citing People v. Bello, 237 SCRA 347, 352 (1994).
55 People v. Vasquez, 280 SCRA 160, 178 (1997) citing People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA 473 (1997).
56 People v. Berroya, 283 SCRA 111, 121 (1997).
57 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th Ed. 1991) 284.
58 Id. at 47.
59 Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).
60 People v. Acuno, G.R. No. 130964, September 3, 1999.
61 People v. Elloreg, et al., G.R. No. 126998, September 14, 1999, pp. 30-31, citing People v. Fider, 223
SCRA 117 (1993).
62 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 3 (2).
63 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 12 (3).
64 People v. Bolasa and Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999, p. 7.
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Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
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Arizona v. Hicks
No. 86-1027
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Argued December 8, 1986 Question:
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480 U.S. 321
Syllabus
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A bullet fired through the floor of respondent's apartment injured a man on the floor
below. Police entered the apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for About Legal Answers
weapons, and there seized three weapons and discovered a stocking-cap mask. While
there, one of the policemen noticed two sets of expensive stereo components and,
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suspecting that they were stolen, read and recorded their serial numbers -- moving
some of them, including a turntable, to do so -- and phoned in the numbers to
headquarters. Upon learning that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he Follow justiacom
seized it immediately. Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery, but the
state trial court granted his motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized, and Fan Justia
the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying upon a statement in Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U. S. 385, that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the Justia
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exigencies which justify its initiation," the Court of Appeals held that the policeman's
obtaining the serial numbers violated the Fourth Amendment because it was unrelated
138,407 people like Justia.
to the shooting, the exigent circumstance that justified the initial entry and search.
Both state courts rejected the contention that the policeman's actions were justified
under the "plain view" doctrine.
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Held:
1. The policeman's actions come within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The
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mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a "seizure," since it did not
meaningfully interfere with respondent's possessory interest in either the numbers or Legal Issue or Lawyer Name
the stereo equipment. However, the moving of the equipment was a "search" separate Newark, NJ Search
and apart from the search that was the lawful objective of entering the apartment. The
fact that the search uncovered nothing of great personal value to respondent is Lawyers
near Newark, New Jersey
irrelevant. Pp. 480 U. S. 324-325.
Alan Such
2. The "plain view" doctrine does not render the search "reasonable" under the Fourth Bankruptcy, Foreclosure Defense, Real Estate La
PARSIPPANY, NJ
Amendment. Pp. 480 U. S. 325-329.
Vincent DiMaiolo Jr.
(a) The policeman's action directed to the stereo equipment was not ipso facto Bankruptcy, Business Law, Foreclosure Defense
Parsippany, NJ
unreasonable simply because it was unrelated to the justification for entering the
Dolores DeAlmeida
apartment. That lack of relationship always exists when the "plain view" doctrine applies. Dolores DeAlmeida
Bankruptcy, Foreclosure Defense, Real Estate La
In saying that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies Parsippany, NJ
which justify its initiation," Mincey was simply addressing the scope of the primary Kristen Klics
Elder Law, Foreclosure Defense, Real Estate Law
Page 480 U. S. 322 PARSIPPANY, NJ
Philip A. Kahn
search itself, and was not overruling the "plain view" doctrine by implication. Pp. 480 U.
Business Law, C ollections, Foreclosure Defense,
S. 325-326. PARSIPPANY, NJ
(b) However, the search was invalid because, as the State concedes, the policeman had See More Lawyers
only a "reasonable suspicion" -- i.e., less than probable cause to believe -- that the
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stereo equipment was stolen. Probable cause is required to invoke the "plain view" Get a free full directory profile listing
doctrine as it applies to seizures. It would be illogical to hold that an object is seizable
on lesser grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been
needed to obtain a warrant for it if it had been known to be on the premises. Probable
cause to believe the equipment was stolen was also necessary to support the search
here, whether legal authority to move the equipment could be found only as the
inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize it or also as a consequence of some
independent power to search objects in plain view. Pp. 480 U. S. 326-328.
3. The policeman's action cannot be upheld on the ground that it was not a "full-blown
search," but was only a "cursory inspection" that could be justified by reasonable
suspicion instead of probable cause. A truly cursory inspection -- one that involves
merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it -- is not a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore does not even require
reasonable suspicion. This Court is unwilling to create a subcategory of "cursory"
searches under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 480 U. S. 328-329.
146 Ariz. 533, 707 P.2d 331, affirmed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.
480 U. S. 329. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and
O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 330. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 333.
Page 480 U. S. 323
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lawphil

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 124442 July 20, 2001

vs.
ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Armando S. Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses ARMANDO COMPACION y Surposa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Bagonbon,
San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, of the crime of "VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659" committed as follows:
"That on or about 1:30 o'clock A.M., July 13, 1995, at Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without any authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally plant, cultivate or culture
two (2) full grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known as "Marijuana plants", more or less eleven (11) feet
tall, in gross violation of Section 9, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659."
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment on August 16, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
On January 2, 1996, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREAS, the Court finds the accused ARMANDO COMPACION Y SURPOSA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of "Violation of Section 9, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659" whereof he is charged in the information in
the instant case and sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of half a million (P500,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency. The portion of the backyard of his residence in the poblacion proper of Brgy.
Bagonbon this City and Province, in which the two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", subject-matter of this case,
were planted, cultivated and cultured, is hereby ordered confiscated and escheated in favor of the State,
pursuant to the aforequoted Sec. 13 R.A. 7659.
It would seem that the penalty imposed upon the accused in the instant case for having planted, cultivated
and cultured just two (2) marijuana plants is extremely harsh. But there is nothing in the law which allows the
Court to impose a lesser penalty in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances in this particular case.
Hence, dura lex, sed lex. The law is, indeed, harsh but it is the law.
The obvious message of the law is that people should not have a nonchalant or cavalier attitude towards
dangerous prohibited drugs. They should not dabble in it as if they were a flippant thing. These dangerous
and prohibited drugs are a terrible menace to the minds and morality of our people for their distortive and
pervertive effects on them resulting in rampant criminality. That is why the government wants this evil
exterminated from our country. It is too bad that the accused instead of helping the government in this drive,
in his capacity as barangay captain of his barangay, made a mockery of it by planting, cultivating and
culturing said two (2) marijuana plants himself.
A word of counsel and hope for the accused. This is a time of reflection forced upon him by the result of his
own act in violating the law. It is time for him to humbly submit to the compassion of God and of his only
begotten Son, whose birth on earth to become the Saviour of all sinners, we have just celebrated, to change
and transform his own life by his coming to Him for the purpose, so that with a changed life, God might be
gracious enough to move the heart of His Excellency, the President, of this Country, to pardon and let him
walk out of prison a freeman. It would be good for him to read God's Word daily while in prison for his
guidance, comfort and hope.
Accused convicted of the crime whereof he is charged in the information in the instant case.
SO ORDERED.2
The accused now appeals from the above judgment of conviction and asks the Court to reverse the same on the
following grounds, viz:
The lower court erred:
1. In holding that Exhibit "F" of the prosecution, consisting of two marijuana plants wrapped in plastic, is
admissible in evidence against the accused as the corpus delicti in the instant case, inspite of the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove that the specimens of marijuana (Exhibit "F") examined by the forensic
chemist were the ones purportedly planted and cultivated by the accused, and of the fact that the
prosecution failed to establish the evidence's chain of custody; and
2. In holding that the warrantless search of the residence of the accused at 1:30 o'clock in the morning of
July 13, 1995 at Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, and seizure of two eleven feet
tall, more or less, full grown suspected Indian Hemp, otherwise known as Marijuana plants, leading to the
subsequent arrest of the accused, were valid on the ground that the accused has committed the crime of
cultivating the said marijuana plants in violation of Sec. 9, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by RA 7659 in open view, inspite of the fact that they had to enter the dwelling of the accused to
get to the place where the suspected marijuana plants were planted, and in admitting in evidence the said
plants, later marked as Exhibit "F", against the accused, inspite of the fact that the said plants were the fruits
of the poisonous tree.3
The relevant facts are as follows:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing and cultivating
marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of
accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the
accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants.4
SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of
NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division
Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special Action Force. Two members of the
media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL Radio, were also included in the composite team.
On July 12, 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in
Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the
matter.5 The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around six-thirty in the evening,
then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to
do so because it was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge to go back in the
morning.6
Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in the
early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What
happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant
opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected
marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering
from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425
and informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. SPO1
Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a
positive result.7
On July 15, 1995, the plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod
City Police Command, particularly to Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio
weighed and measured the plants, one was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches
and weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the microscopic test, the
chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive results.8
On his part, accused-appellant maintains that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and
his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a
flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the
premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the
same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went
upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and
the premises.9
After about twenty (20) minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to the backyard. One of
the military men said: "Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at your backyard" to which accused-appellant
replied: "I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is that they are medicinal plants for my
wife" who was suffering from migraine.10
After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and
themselves. Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and the military men spent the night.11
At around ten o'clock that same morning, they brought him with them to the city hall. Accused-appellant saw that
one of the two (2) service vehicles they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military men
that said plants were marijuana.12 Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met with the mayor and then unloaded the
alleged marijuana plants. A picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as
back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF Headquarters.13
A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 was filed against
accused-appellant.
Turning to the legal defenses of accused-appellant, we now consider his allegation that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities.
The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy
and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v. Querubin,14 underscored their importance:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined.
What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise
in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. In the same vein, Landynski
in his authoritative work could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of "a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not
be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards."15
A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the constitutional provision.16 Evidence secured thereby,
i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."17
The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to the conduct of a search
and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as
when the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search;18 when the owner of the premises
waives his right against such incursion;19 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;20 when it is made on
vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;21 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws;22 when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;23 when it involves a
"stop and frisk" situation;24 when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances;25 or in cases of
inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.26 In these
instances, a search may be validly made even without a warrant.
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant
was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above
mentioned cases. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure
conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived
either expressly or impliedly,27 such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his
consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission
or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team
were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellant's lack of objection to
the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure.28 The case of People v. Burgos,29 is instructive. In Burgos, the Court ruled that
the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search "simply because he failed to object." There,
we held:
xxx To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v.
Locsin (supra);
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."30
Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their search of accused-appellant's premises by
invoking the necessity and urgency of the situation. It was admitted by the members of the arresting team that the
residence of accused-appellant had already been put under surveillance following a tip from a confidential
informant. The surveillance was conducted on July 9, 1995 while the alleged marijuana plants were seized four (4)
days later or on July 13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to have first secured a search
warrant before forcing their way into accused-appellant's premises. In fact, they earlier had approached then
Executive Judge Ponferrada of Bacolod City who declined to issue one on the ground that the matter was outside
his territorial jurisdiction. Then, they went to Executive Judge Javellana of San Carlos City in the evening of July
12, 1995 who asked them to come back in the morning as it was already nighttime and outside of office hours.
However, in their haste to apprehend the accused-appellant on the pretext that information of his impending arrest
may be leaked to him, the team proceeded to go to his residence to arrest him and seize the alleged marijuana
plants. The team's apprehension of a tip-off was unfounded. It is far-fetched that one could have gone to accused-
appellant's place before the following morning to warn him of his impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is an
isolated and difficult to reach mountain barangay. The road leading to it was rough, hilly and eroded by rain and
flood.31 A few hours delay to await the issuance of a warrant in the morning would not have compromised the
team's operation.
In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on July 13, 1995, the trial court ruled that the
accused-appellant was caught "in flagrante delicto of having planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana plants"
which was "easily visible from outside of the residence of the accused."32 Thus, the trial court concluded that:
xxx (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", were the very corpus delicti of the crime the accused has
been committing since the time he planted them in the backyard of his residence for whatever reason – a
corpus delicti which the NARCOM agents saw with their very own eyes as the same were in plain view when
they made a surveillance in the accused's place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus delicti has remained on the
spots in accused's backyard where they had been growing since the time they were planted there and,
therefore, any peace officer or even private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said plants and
recognized them as marijuana, was by law empowered and authorized to arrest the accused even without
any warrant of arrest.
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying marijuana, hence, committing a
crime, at the time of his arrest. The warrantless search which was conducted following a lawful arrest,
was valid.
- People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993)

226 SCRA 299, at p. 300
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto growing, cultivating and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants,
Exh. "F", in the backyard of his residence, which the NARCOM agents uprooted from there at the time they
arrested and apprehended him. Under said circumstances, a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest were
not legally needed before the NARCOM agents could effect the arrest of the accused.33
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure without a warrant.34 It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.35 Thus, the following
elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.36
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellant's premises without the
latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-
appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly
came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their
intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could
not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants
inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellant's residence.
In People v. Musa,37 the Court held:
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The
"plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations
on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed.
2d 502 (1983)]
It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants involved herein were indeed
marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a field test on said plants by using
a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed marijuana plants.38 Later, Senior Inspector
Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3) qualitative examinations to determine if the plants were
indeed marijuana.39
Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure, the same is tainted and
illegal and should therefore be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.40 In People v. Aruta,41
we held that:
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly
liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "he only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the
justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed."
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may
be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is
less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.42
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 58 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S. Compacion is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on ground of
reasonable doubt. He is ordered released from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.
The subject marijuana is ordered disposed of in accordance with law.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Records, p. 1.
2 Id., at 147-148.
3 Rollo, pp. 117-118.
4 TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 4-5.
5 Id., at 5-9.
6 Id., at 9.
7 Id., at 11-19.
8 Id., at 18; TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 6-13.
9 TSN, October 25, 1995, pp. 8-10.
10 Id., at 11-12.
11 Id., at 14.
12 Id., at 15.
13 Id., at 16.
14 48 SCRA 345 (1972).
15 Id., at 350.
16 People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791, 798 (1992).
17 People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988).
18 People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil 221 (1936).
19 Bagcal v. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525 (1983).
20 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
21 Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975).
22 Caroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
23 Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234 (1968)
24 People v. Salayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996).
25 People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994).
26 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
27 People v. Malasugui, supra; People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991); People v. Rodrigueza, supra;
People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998).
28 People v. Aruta, supra; Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424 (1994).
29 144 SCRA 1 (1986).
30 Id., at 16; Also cited in People v. Aruta, supra and People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).
31 TSN, November 9, 1995, p. 22.
32 Decision, p. 26, Rollo, p. 76.
33 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
34 Harris v. U.S., supra.
35 Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).
36 People v. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 (1999); People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999); Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 (1997).
37 217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993).
38 See Note 7.
39 TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 6-13, 22.
40 People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998).
41 Supra.
42 Id., at 652-653.
Search
lawphil

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139301 September 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY LEE, appellants.
DECISIO N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Metro Manila, Branch
259, convicting the appellants of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The Case for the Prosecution
Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) under the Department of Interior
and Local Government received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao,2 and
appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned
that appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking
activities of Lao and Chan.3 PO3 Belliardo Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted surveillance
operations and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. They
once spotted Chan, Lao, the appellants and two others, in a seafood restaurant in Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila,
once spotted Chan, Lao, the appellants and two others, in a seafood restaurant in Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila,
late in the evening. On another occasion, the policemen saw Chan, Lao, and the appellants, at the Celicious
Restaurant along R. Sanchez Street, Ermita, Manila, at about 8:30 p.m. They were spotted the third time at the
Midtown Hotel at about 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.4 The police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided at
Room Nos. 1245 and 1247, Cityland Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati City, and in a two-storey
condominium unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila.5
On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Search Warrant No. 96-801 for violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and Search Warrant No. 96-
802, for violation of Sections 12, 14 and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, from Judge William M. Bayhon,
Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila.6 Senior Police Inspector Lucio Margallo supervised the enforcement of
Search Warrant No. 96-801 at the Cityland Condominium at about 11:00 p.m. on October 29, 1996. With him were
PO3 Anciro, Jr., PO3 Wilhelm Castillo, SPO3 Roger Ferias and seven other policemen of the PARAC, who were all
in uniform, as well as a Cantonese interpreter by the name of Chuang. While no persons were found inside, the
policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, paraphernalia for its
production, and machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit cards.7
Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu at the
Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant at the corner of Dasmariñas and Mancha Streets, Manila. The policemen
rushed to the area on board their vehicles. It was 2:00 a.m. of October 26, 1996. The policemen saw Chan and
Lao on board the latter’s Honda Civic car. As the two men alighted, one of the men approached them and
introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between the members of the raiding
team and the two suspects. Chan and Lao were shot to death during the encounter. The policemen found two
plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu, in Lao’s car.
The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to enforce Search Warrant No. 96-
802. When the policemen arrived at the place, they coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of
security in the building.8 The men found that the Condominium Unit No. 19 was leased to Lao under the name
Henry Kao Tsung. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded to the
condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise,
knocked on the door.9 Appellant Lee peeped through the window beside the front door.10 The men introduced
themselves as policemen,11 but the appellant could not understand them as she could not speak English.12 The
policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her
to show that they were policemen. The appellant then opened the door and allowed the policemen, Pangan and
the security guards into the condominium unit.13 The policemen brought appellant Lee to the second floor where
there were three bedrooms – a master’s bedroom and two other rooms. When asked where she and Lao slept,
appellant Lee pointed to the master’s bedroom.14 Anciro, Jr., Margallo and PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then searched
the master’s bedroom, while Ferias and Pangan went to the other bedroom where appellant Zhen Hua was
sleeping.15 Ferias awakened appellant Zhen Hua and identified himself as a policeman. Appellant Zhen Hua was
surprised.16
Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the master’s bedroom about six feet high. He stood on a chair, opened the
cabinet and found two transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu,17 a feeding bottle, a plastic
canister18 and assorted paraphernalia.19 Inside the drawer of the bed’s headboard, Anciro, Jr. also found
assorted documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports
and identification cards of Lao and Lee.20 Anciro, Jr. asked appellant Lee who was the owner of the crystalline
substance, but the latter did not respond because she did not know English.21 Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for
instructions on what to do with the things he had found, and the latter told him to keep the same for future
reference,22 and as evidence against any other suspect for illegal drug transactions.23 Anciro, Jr., Pangan and
Margallo later showed the seized articles to the other members of the team.24
Anciro, Jr. told appellant Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC
headquarters. Appellant Lee did as she was told and took some clothes from the cabinet in the master’s bedroom
where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu.25
The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The following articles were found and
confiscated by the policemen in the condominium unit:
a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) Kilo each of white crystalline granules
later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing an undetermined quantity of suspected
Shabu;
c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Cannister also containing undetermined amount of suspected Shabu ….
d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for sniffing shabu,
Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;26
Anciro, Jr. placed the articles he found in the cabinet inside a box.27 The appellants were then brought to the
PARAC headquarters where they were detained. Pangan signed a Certification28 that the search conducted by
the policemen had been orderly and peaceful. Anciro, Jr. affixed his initials on the transparent plastic bags and
their contents, the transparent baby feeding bottle and the plastic cannister and their contents. On October 26,
1996, he and Ferias29 brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination30 along
with the letter-request31 thereon.
On the same day, Forensic Chemist Officer Isidro L. Cariño signed Chemistry Report No. D-1243-96 which
contained his findings on the laboratory examination of the items which were marked as Exhibits "A" to "A-4," viz:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. "A" – One (1) "must de Cartier Paris" carton containing the following:
Exh. "A-1" – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of white crystalline
substance.
Exh. "A-2" – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.10 grams of white crystalline
substance.
Exh. "A-3" – One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink cover containing 18.52
grams of white crystalline substance.
Exh. "A-4" – One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline
substance.
NOTE: The above-stated specimen were allegedly taken from the residence of the above-named subjects.
xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens, Exhs. "A-1" through "A-4" gave
POSITIVE result to the test for Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx32
The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest.33 Pangan and the two security guards signed a certification
stating that nothing was destroyed in the condominium unit and that the search was orderly and peaceful.34 The
policemen also accomplished an inventory of the articles seized during the search.35
The appellants were charged of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, in an Information filed in
the RTC of Parañaque, Metro Manila, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 26th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to possess
or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in their possession and under their control and custody, the
following to wit:
A. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of white crystalline
substance;
B. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.1 grams of white crystalline substance;
C. One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink cover containing 18.52 grams
of white crystalline substance;
D. One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline
substance
which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.36
Both appellants, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned on November 29, 1992, and pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
The Case for the Appellants

Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. She testified that she was a resident of Kwantong, China, a college
graduate who could not speak nor understand English. She was once employed in a real estate firm. One of her
co-employees was Huang Zhen Hua.37 She met Henry Lao in China sometime in 1995,38 and he brought her to
Belgium that same year. Lao also helped her procure a Belguim passport, for he explained that if she only had a
Chinese passport, it would be difficult to secure visas from countries she wanted to go to and visit; whereas many
countries did not require a Belgian passport holder to secure visas before allowing entry therein. In the process,
he and Lao fell in love and became lovers.
Upon Lao’s invitation, appellant Lee visited the Philippines as a tourist for the first time in April 1996. Lao met her
at the airport, and she was, thereafter, brought to a hotel in Manila where she stayed for less than a month.39 She
returned to the Philippines a second time and was again billeted in a hotel in Manila. All her expenses were
shouldered by Lao, who was engaged in the garlic business.40 As far as she knew, Lao was not engaged in any
other business.41 In June 1996, she invited her friend, appellant Huang Zhen Hua to visit the Philippines to enjoy
the tourist spots.42 They were then in China.
In the evening of October 1, 1996, appellant Lee returned to the Philippines on a tourist visa. She was fetched by
Lao, and she was brought to his condominium unit at No. 19, Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Niño,
Parañaque. She had been residing there since then. She and Lao used to go to the shopping malls43 and she
even saw Chan once when he cleaned his Nissan car in Lao’s garage.
On October 22, 1996, appellant Zhen Hua arrived from China at the NAIA and was met by Lao at the airport. He
tried to check in at the Diamond Hotel but Lee told him that he could stay in the condominium unit. Zhen Hua was
brought to the Villa where he had been staying since then. The appellants had made plans to visit Cebu.
At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the master’s bedroom at the condominium
unit. She had closed all the windows because she had turned the air conditioning unit on. Zhen Hua was sleeping
in the other bedroom in the second floor beside the master’s bedroom. Lao’s Honda Civic car and Chan’s Nissan
car were in the garage beside the condominium unit. Momentarily, Lee heard someone knocking on the bedroom
door. When she opened it, three (3) policemen barged into the bedroom and at the room where appellant Zhen
Hua was sleeping. Anciro, Jr. was not among the men. Lee did not hear the policemen knock at the main door
before they entered.44 The policemen were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who told her that
the policemen were going to search the house.45 Appellant Lee saw a policeman holding two papers, but no
search warrant was shown to her.46 She was so frightened.
The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the master’s bedroom. Appellant Lee
went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua and when she returned to the master’s bedroom, she saw shabu on the
bed.47 The policemen took her ring, watch and the P600,000 owned by Lao which had earlier been placed in the
cabinet, her papers and documents, and those of Lao’s as well. She had never seen any shabu in the room
before the incident. Thereafter, she and appellant Zhen Hua were brought to the PARAC headquarters where they
were detained. Chuang, the cantonese interpreter, informed her that shabu had been found in the condominium
unit and that the policemen were demanding P5,000,000 for her release. She was also told that if she did not pay
the amount, she would be charged with drug trafficking, and that the leader of the group who arrested her would
be promoted. However, she told Chuang that she had no money. Since she could not pay the amount, she was
boarded on a PARAC owner-type jeep and returned to the condominium unit where the policemen took all the
household appliances, such as the television, compact discs, washing machine, including laundry detergent. Only
the sofa and the bed were not taken. About ten (10) days later, the appellants secured the services of counsel.
Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to the condominium unit but that no one
responded. He shouted, "Sir Henry," referring to Lao, but there was no response from inside the condominium.
After about three (3) to five (5) minutes, a policeman kicked the door open and they entered the house. They went
to the second floor and saw the appellants sleeping.
Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen. He learned that shabu had been
found and taken from the condominium unit only when he saw someone holding up the substance on television
during the daily news program TV Patrol.48
Appellant Zhen Hua also denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of appellant Lee that upon her
invitation, he arrived in the Philippines on a tourist visa on October 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not see
Anciro, Jr. in the condominium unit when policemen arrived and searched the house. He testified that aside from
the PARAC policemen, he was also investigated by policemen from Taiwan.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on January 10, 1999, convicting both appellants of the crime charged. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and considering the
absence of any aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The properties seized in accordance with the
search warrants issued relative to this case are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and
the Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, the drugs and
paraphernalia subject hereof for proper disposition.
The Clerk of Court is also directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of both accused Jogy
Lee and Huang Zhen Hua from the Parañaque City Jail to the Bureau of Correccions (sic) in Muntinlupa
City.
SO ORDERED.49
The Present Appeal
On appeal to this Court, appellant Zhen Hua, asserts that:
First. The evidence for the prosecution, as a whole, is so far as self-contradictory, inherently improbable
and palpably false to be accepted as a faithful reflection of the true facts of the case;
Second. Appellant Huang Zhen Hua’s conviction was based merely on the trial court’s conclusion that he "is
not an epitome of first class tourist and that he appeared nonchalant throughout the proceedings;"
Third. In convicting said appellant, the court below completely disregarded the glaring facts and admissions
of the prosecution’s principal witnesses that no regulated drug was ever found in his possession;
Fourth. The trial court, likewise, ignored the fact that the appellant’s arrest was illegal and in violation of his
constitutional and basic rights against arrest without probable cause as determined by a Judge and that his
arraignment did not constitute a waiver of such right;
Fifth. The trial court failed to consider the fact that the presumption of regularity of performance of the
police officers who took part in the search had been overcome by prosecution's own evidence, thereby
wrongly giving such presumption substance over and above the constitutional presumption of innocence of
the appellant.50
For her part, appellant Lee contends that:
1.01 THE ALLEGED TWO KILOS OF SHABU FOUND INSIDE ONE OF THE ROOMS IN THE TOWNHOUSE
RENTED BY HENRY LAU WERE MERELY PLANTED BY PARAC OPERATIVES;
1.02 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS HIGHLY IRREGULAR, DUBIOUS AND
UNREASONABLE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF
THE ROOM TO BE SEARCHED, NOR WAS THERE ANY INTERPRETER TO ASSIST AND GUIDE JOGY
LEE, WHO NEITHER KNEW NOR UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, DURING THE SEARCH AND
EVEN DURING THE TRIAL;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED JOGY LEE UPON THE GROUND THAT
HER GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.51
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that appellant Zhen Hua should be acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of appellant Lee should be affirmed.
The Court’s Ruling
We shall delve into and resolve the assigned errors of the appellants Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee sequentially.
On Appellant Zhen Hua
The OSG contends that the prosecution failed to muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove appellant
Zhen Hua’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, thus:
Huang Zhen Hua denies having anything to do with the bags of "shabu" found in the townhouse unit of Henry Lau.
He claims that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist on October 22, 1996, upon the invitation of Jogy Lee.
Allegedly, at the time of his arrest, he had been in the Philippines for barely four days. He claims that he was just
temporarily billeted as a guest at the townhouse where Jogy Lee was staying. And that he had no control
whatsoever over said townhouse. He puts emphasis on the fact that the search of his room turned out to be
"negative" and that the raiding team failed to seize or confiscate any prohibited or regulated drug in his person or
possession. He, therefore, prays for his acquittal.
The People submits that Huang Zhen Hua is entitled to acquittal. The prosecution’s evidence fails to meet the
quantum of evidence required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence; thus, regardless of the
supposed weakness of his defense, and his innocence may be doubted, he is nonetheless entitled to an acquittal
(Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335 (1980), cited in People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15,
2000). The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and
the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence
for the prosecution.
In the instant case, as pointed out by appellant Huang Zhen Hua, the trial court erred when it did not give much
weight to the admission made by the prosecution witnesses that no regulated drug was found in his person. No
regulated drug was also found inside his room or in his other belongings such as suitcases, etc. Thus, he had no
actual or constructive possession of the confiscated "shabu."
Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the country for barely four (4) days at the time
when he was arrested. The prosecution was unable to show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua
committed acts which showed that he was in cahoots with the drug syndicate Henry Lau and Peter Chan. It was not
even shown that he was together with Henry Lau and Peter Chan on any occasion. As for Huang Zhen Hua,
therefore, there is no direct evidence of any culpability. Nor is there any circumstantial evidence from which any
culpability may be inferred.52
We agree with the OSG. In a case of recent vintage, this Court, in People vs. Tira,53 ruminated and expostulated
on the juridical concept of "possession" under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and the
evidence necessary to prove the said crime, thus:
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a) the accused is
found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala
prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove
that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidende) the drugs. Possession, under the law,
includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exits when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right
to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place
where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive
possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and
character of the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same
may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused
has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.54
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time, had actual or constructive possession
of the regulated drug found in the master’s bedroom where appellant Lee was sleeping; or that the appellant had
accessed the said room at any given time; or that he had knowledge of the existence of shabu in appellant Lee’s
bedroom. Appellant Zhen Hua had arrived in the Philippines upon the invitation of appellant Lee only on October
22, 1996 or barely four (4) days before the arrival of the policemen and the search conducted in the condominium
unit leased by Henry Lao. He was a mere visitor of appellant Lee. There is no evidence that appellant Zhen Hua
was aware of the alleged illegal drug activities and/or transactions of Henry Lao, Peter Chan and appellant Lee.
The policemen did not find any regulated drug in the room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping when they
made their search.
The evidence of the prosecution against appellant Zhen Hua falls short of the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove conspiracy between him, appellant Lee and Chan or Lao.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it.55 Conspiracy
cannot be presumed.56 Conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt like the crime subject of the
conspiracy.57 Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design.58
The bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant Zhen Hua from China, and before the
search conducted in Lao’s condominium unit, appellant Zhen Hua had been seen with Lao, Chan and appellant
Lee. Having dinner or lunch at a restaurant does not constitute sufficient proof that he had conspired with them or
with any of them to possess the subject-regulated drug. Mere association with the principals by direct participation
or mere knowledge of conspiracy, without more, does not suffice.59 Anciro, Jr. even admitted that during his
surveillance, he could have mistaken appellant Zhen Hua for another group of Chinese persons who were also
being watched.60 Appellant Zhen Hua should, thus, be acquitted.
On Appellant Lee
Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance and implementation of Search
Warrant No. 96-802, as follows: (a) the policemen who implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to show
to her the said warrant, inform her of their authority and explain their presence in the condominium unit; (b) the
policemen gained entry into the condominium unit by force while she was sleeping; and (c) articles and personal
effects owned by her and Lao were taken and confiscated by the policemen, although not specified in the search
warrant.
The appellant concludes that the articles procured by the policemen on the occasion of the search of the
condominium unit are inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant Lee, likewise, contends that she was a victim of a frame-up because the policemen planted the
regulated drug on her bed even before they searched the bedroom. She went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua
to find out if he was already awake, and when she returned to the bedroom, she noticed shabu on her bed. She
avers that the sole testimony of Anciro, Jr., that he found the regulated drug in the master’s bedroom, is incredible
because he was not with the policemen who barged into the bedroom. She notes that even Pangan, the caretaker
of the Villa, testified that he did not see any illegal drug confiscated by the policemen.
According to appellant Lee, the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime charged, considering that Lao and
Chan were the suspects identified in the search warrants, not her. She avers that she had no knowledge of the
alleged illegal drug transactions of her lover Lao. She contends that there was no probable cause for her arrest as
her mere presence in the condominium unit does not render her liable for the shabu found in the master’s
bedroom of the condominium unit leased by Lao. She further avers that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution are inconsistent; hence, barren of probative weight. The appellant also asserts that she was deprived
of her right to due process when the trial court conducted a trial without a Chinese interpreter to assist her.
The OSG, for its part, avers that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties. Based on the
testimony of Anciro, Jr., appellant Lee was shown the search warrant, through the window, and the policemen
identified themselves through their uniforms. The security guards of the condominium also explained the search
warrant to the appellant. Although she was, at first, reluctant to open the door, appellant Lee later voluntarily
opened the door and allowed them entry into the unit. There was no evidence of forcible entry into the unit and no
breakage of any door. The OSG further avers that the appellant had been in the country for quite sometime
already and could not have gotten around without understanding English. In fact, the OSG argues that when
Anciro, Jr. told the appellant to get some of her clothes since she would be brought to the police headquarters in
Quezon City, she did as she was told and took her clothes from the cabinet where the shabu were found by the
policemen.
The OSG further points out that Pangan, the chief of security of the subdivision who was a witness for appellant
Lee, even testified that the search was orderly. The OSG contends that there was probable cause for the
appellant’s arrest because an informant had tipped off the arresting officers that the appellant was a member of a
syndicate dealing with illegal drugs, and that she handled the accounts of Lao and Chan. The appellant was not a
victim of frame-up because she was present when the policemen searched the master’s bedroom where she was
sleeping and where she kept her clothes, and witnessed the discovery of the regulated drugs and paraphernalia.
We agree with the contention of the appellant that the constitutional proscription against unreasonable search and
seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens temporarily residing in the country. The rule against
unreasonable search and seizure forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all those suspected or
known to be offenders, as well as the innocent. The guarantee is as important and imperative as the guarantee of
the other fundamental rights of the citizens.61 All owes the duty for its effective enforcement lest there shall be an
impairment of the right for the purpose for which it was adopted.62
Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or
any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they be
allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search
warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is
known as the "knock and announce" principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of
an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as important considerations in assessing
whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable.63 In Gouled v. The United
States,64 it was held that a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would
violate the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, by illegal threat or mere show of
force.
The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275 providing that "if a person takes the beasts
of another and causes them to be driven into a castle or fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for the
deliverance of the beasts, and if the person did not cause the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the king shall
cause the said castle or fortress to be beaten down without recovery." Common law courts appended an important
qualification:
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors …,
for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the
habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no
default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had noticed, it is to be presumed
that he would obey it…65
Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff may justify breaking open doors if the possession be not
quietly delivered.66 The principle was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law and in the Fourth
Amendment in the United States Federal Constitution. It is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment as held in Wilson v. Arkansas.67
Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify themselves to the
accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them the
search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and
understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial
provision which safeguards individual liberty.68 No precise form of words is required. It is sufficient that the
accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It
must be emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the protection of the liberty of the person
to be searched or of his property but also the safety and well-being of the officers serving and implementing the
search warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched is
notified of the search warrant and apprised of the authority of the person serving the warrant, he may consider the
unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful aggression on his property which he will be justified in
resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he
would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility that the police serving and implementing the
search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations.
Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced
intrusion.69 Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure if the entry were illegal, whether
accomplished by force, or by threat or show of force or obtained by stealth, or coercion.70
Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the
possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of the
identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that
there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone
outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies
the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have no
constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence.71 However, the exceptions above are not exclusive
or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must
decide whether or not to make an unannounced intrusion into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a
dwelling might be constitutionally defective, if the police officers’ entry was without prior announcement, law
enforcement interest may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.72 Indeed, there is no
formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances.73 In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the existence of probable cause, the
courts are concerned only with what the officers had reason to believe and the time of the entry.74 In Richards v.
Wisconsin,75 it was held that:
[1] In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it
would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.
This standard—as opposed to a probable-cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance between the
legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy
interest affected by no-knock entries.76
As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida,77 what constitutes breaking includes the lifting of a latch, turning a
door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to or pushing open a closed door of entrance to the
house, even a closed screen door.78 However, entry obtained through the use of deception, accomplished without
force is not a "breaking" requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose because the reasons
behind the rule are satisfied – there was no real likelihood of violence, no unwarranted intrusion or privacy and no
damage to the residence of the accused.79
As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before breaking open any door cannot be
distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each case has to be decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an
examination of all the circumstances.80 The proper trigger point in determining, under the "knock and announce"
rule, whether the police waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is when those
inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant.81
In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police
officers were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions were
police officers and had a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that the officers were going to
search the condominium unit.82 The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of the policemen, who wore
PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose. Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to
bring some clothes with her as she was to be brought to the police headquarters. Without such request being
interpreted to the appellant, the latter did as she was directed and took some clothes from the cabinet atop the
headboard.83
The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on the outer door before entering the condominium
unit, and after a while, the appellant opened the door and allowed the policemen and Pangan to enter. Anciro, Jr.
testified, thus:
Q Do you still recall Mr. Witness the identities of the security guards who helped you or assisted you in
implementing said search warrants at Grand Villa Subdivision?
A The OIC of the Home Owners’ Association, Antonio Pangan, and the OIC of the Security Agency and two
(2) other security guards.
Q Do you recall the names of those persons you mentioned Mr. Witness?
A I can hardly recall their names.
Q After having been assisted or coordinated with said security officers and the OIC of the Home Owners’
Association, what did you do next?
A We told them that if we could ask them if they have a duplicate key and also knock and introduce
ourselves, knock on the said condominium.
Q Did they do that, the request?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning to say, you arrived at #19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa?
A Yes, Sir.
Q While you were already at the door of that targeted house to implement said search warrants, what
happened next, if any? What did you do after that?
A We knocked on the door and tried to find out if there was somebody there because the Home Owners’
Association doesn’t have any key for the door. We asked them to knock also because they are the ones
who have access with the tenants.
Q And after knocking, what happened next?
A There were around 5 minutes, no one was trying to open the door. By that time, we thought they were still
asleep.
Q And then after that what did you do, if any?
A We asked Mr. Pangan to knock and introduce himself and another security guard to try to knock on the
kitchen which is on the back door.
Q And then after that?
A And then after that, it was a female person who showed up to (sic) the window of the kitchen and asked
who we are in a sign language.
Q And this female person who showed up to (sic) the window … I withdraw. Were you able to have a good
look on that female person who showed herself thru the window?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And who is this person Mr. Witness?
A She was identified as Jogy Lee, Sir.84
The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain entry into the condominium unit. She
could have asked the court for an ocular inspection to show the door which was allegedly broken into by the
policemen, or at least adduce in evidence pictures showing the said breakage. The appellant failed to do so. The
testimony of the appellant is even belied by Pangan, who was a witness for the appellant, who certified, along with
three other security guards, that nothing was destroyed and that the search was conducted in a peaceful and
orderly manner.85
We are not impervious of the testimony of Pangan that the policemen kicked the outer door to gain entry into the
condominium unit, which testimony is seemingly in derogation of his certification. However, Pangan admitted that
the policemen did so only after knocking on the door for three (3) to five (5) minutes and after he had called Lao in
a loud voice and received no response from the appellants:
Q Did you come to know the persons wherein your presence was being required according to your security
guards?
A According to my security guards, they introduced themselves as police operatives.
Q Did you comply with the invitation of these police authorities?
A Yes, they called me and according to them, they will search Unit 19, that is what they told me.
Q Can you please tell us what time did the police operatives conduct the search?
A I cannot recall anymore because the incident happened in 1996. I don’t know what time was that.
Q When they conducted the search, were you there?
A I was there because that unit cannot be opened if the caretaker is not present.
Q Are you trying to say that you were the one who opened the door of that unit occupied by Henry Kau
Chung?
A They kicked the door and when nobody opened the door, they pushed the door and the door was
opened.
Q They forcibly opened the door when nobody opened it?
A Kaya naman po ginawa ‘yon dahil nandoon naman po ang caretaker, wala naman pong masamang
mangyayari dahil nandoon naman po ang namamahala.
Q From the time you knocked at the door of this unit up to the time that the police operatives forcibly break
open the door, how many minutes had elapsed?
A Matagal din po silang kumakatok sa pintuan. I said, "Mr. Henry, pakibuksan n’yo ang pinto, would you
mind to open the door, kasi merong mga police officers na gustong ma-search itong unit mo. Then, when
nobody was answering, they forcibly opened the door.
Q Was there any other occupant other than Henry Kau Chung in that unit at that time?
A At the second floor, they saw this Jogy Lee and her male companion whom I do not know.
Q But during the time that you were trying to seek entry to the door, there was no one who responded, is
that correct?
A Pardon, Sir?
Q At the time that you were trying to knock at the door, there was no one who responded to your knocking
at the door?
A Nobody was answering, Sir.
Q And that compelled the police operatives to open the door forcibly?
A Yes, Sir.86
COURT:
From the first time you knocked at the door, how long a time lapsed before the police officer broke open the
door?
A Matagal din po.
Q For how long?
A Maybe for about three to five minutes.
Q When nobody was answering, they forced open the door?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Continue.87
The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, her contention that Anciro, Jr. placed the shabu
on her bed before he continued his search in the bedroom, and that she was a victim of frame-up by the
policemen. She relied on her testimony and those of Pangan and Ferias that they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover
and take custody of the shabu in the cabinet.
The appellant’s defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While such defense cannot and should not always be
considered as contrived, nonetheless, it is generally rejected for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove.
Police officers are, after all, presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions, in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are motivated by ill-will.88
It is true, as testified by Pangan and Ferias that, they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover and take custody of the
shabu subject of this case. However, as explained by Pangan, he remained in the ground floor of the condominium
unit while Anciro, Jr., Castillo and Margallo searched the bedroom of appellant Lee and her lover Lao, and Ferias
proceeded to the room occupied by appellant Zhen Hua where he conducted his search. Thus, Pangan testified:
Q When the master’s bedroom was searched where Jogy Lee was then, according to you, sleeping, did you
accompany the PARAC members?
A No, Sir, because I was talking to a member of the PARAC downstairs.
Q What about the members of the security force?
A They were outside, Sir.
Q During the search made on the master’s bedroom?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How about when the search was made in the room occupied by Huang Zhen Hua, were you present then?
A No, Sir, I was still downstairs.
Q How about the other guards?

A They were also outside.89
For his part, Ferias declared:
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhenhua?
A He was surprised.90
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhen Hua?
A He was surprised.91
Pangan testified that before the police officers conducted their search in the second floor of the condominium unit,
he did not see them bring in anything:
Q But you are very sure that before the police officers searched the unit, you did not see them bringing
anything with them, they were all empty-handed?
A I did not see, Sir.92
No less than Pangan himself, a witness for the appellants, and three of the security guards of the subdivision, who
accompanied the policemen in implementing the search warrants, certified that, what was found inside the
condominium unit and confiscated by the policemen were two plastic bags which contained white crystalline
powder substances suspected to be shabu.93
The appellant admitted that she saw shabu in her bedroom while the policemen were there. She claimed that the
policemen placed the plastic bag on the bed before they started the search and that she noticed the shabu only
after he returned from the room of appellant Zhen Hua to see if he was already awake is hard to believe.
First. We find it incredible that the policemen placed the shabu on the appellant’s bed, in her full view, for which
the latter could be prosecuted for planting evidence and, if convicted, sentenced to death under Section 19 of
Rep. Act 7659:
SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and Officers and Members of Police
Agencies and the Armed Forces, ‘Planting’ of Evidence.— The maximum penalties provided for [in]
Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of
Article III shall be imposed, if those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials,
employees or officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous
drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer
the same penalty as therein provided.
Second. The appellant failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of evidence by the policemen; if she had
done so, for sure, the said counsel would have prepared her affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in court for
the suppression of the things/articles seized by the policemen.
Third. The appellant failed to charge the policemen with planting of evidence before or after she was charged of
violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
Fourth. The appellant cannot even identify and describe the policeman or policemen who allegedly planted the
evidence.
The fact is that, as gleaned from the affidavit of arrest signed by Anciro, Jr. and Ferias, the articles and
substances found and confiscated from the condominium unit of Lao and appellant Lee at Atlantic Drive and at the
Cityland condominium unit of Lao and Chan were itemized as follows:
a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) kilo each of white crystalline granules
later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing undetermined quantity of suspected Shabu;
c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Canister also containing undetermined amount of suspected Shabu …
d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for sniffing shabu,
Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;
a. TWO (2) Kettles/Pots containing more or less 1 ½ kilos of Raw Shabu or Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride;
b. Two (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing more or less Two (2) Kilos of Shabu;
c. Three (3) Plastic Basins, small, medium, large, used for containers of finished/cooked Shabu;
c. Several pieces of Plastic Strainers used for draining out liquids from finished Shabu;
e. One (1) Plastic Container with liquid chemical of undetermined element;
f. Several pieces of Spoons and ladles with traces of raw Shabu used in stirring mixtures
g. One (1) Electric Cooking Stove w/one coil burner;
h. One (1) Unit Card Making Machine;
i. One (1) Unit Card Stamping Machine;
j. Several pieces of Credit Cards and Telephone Cards;94
Anciro, Jr. placed his initials on the plastic bags containing white crystalline powder which were found and
confiscated at Atlantic Drive and, in the company of Ferias, delivered the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination, per the request of Police Superintendent Janice P. de Guzman, the chief of the PARAC.
We agree with the appellant that she was not one of the accused named in the search warrants. However, such
fact did not proscribe the policemen from arresting her and charging her of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended. There was, in fine, probable cause for her warrantless arrest independent of that found by Judge
William Bayhon when he issued the search warrants against Lao and Chan for search of the condominium units at
Atlantic Drive and Cityland.
Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the premises being searched when the
facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reliable and trustworthy information are
sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that an offense has been or is being
committed.95 It has been held that:
Probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Diane Ker, while not present at the time the officers entered the
apartment to arrest her husband, was nevertheless present at the time of her arrest. Upon their entry and
announcement of their identity, the officers were met not only by George Ker but also by Diane Ker, who
was emerging from the kitchen. Officer Berman immediately walked to the doorway from which she emerged
and, without entering, observed the brick-shaped package of marijuana in plain view. Even assuming that
her presence in a small room with the contraband in a prominent position on the kitchen sink would not
alone establish a reasonable ground for the officers’ belief that she was in joint possession with her
husband, that fact was accompanied by the officers’ information that Ker had been using his apartment as a
base of operations for his narcotics activities. Therefore, we cannot say that at the time of her arrest there
were no sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that Diane Ker, as well as her husband, were committing
the offense of possession of marijuana in the presence of the officers.96
In Draper v. United States,97 it was held that informations from a reliable informant, corroborated by the police
officer’s observations as to the accuracy of the description of the accused, and of his presence at a particular
place, is sufficient to establish probable cause. In this case, the police officers received reliable information and
verified, after surveillance, that appellant Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit and that appellant Lee handled the accounting of the payments and proceeds of the illegal drug
trafficking activities of Lao. Indeed, the policemen found that the appellant occupied the bedroom and slept in the
same bed used by Lao. The appellant took her clothes from the same cabinet where the subject shabu and
paraphernalia were found by Anciro, Jr. The appellant had been living in the same condominium unit with Lao
since October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October 25, 1996. Along with Lao, the appellant thus had joint control
and possession of the bedroom, as well as of the articles, paraphernalia, and the shabu found therein. Such facts
and circumstances are sufficient on which to base a reasonable belief that the appellant had joint possession of
the regulated drugs found in the bedroom along with Lao, her live-in partner, in line with our ruling in People v.
Tira.98 For the purpose of prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, possession can be constructive
and need not be exclusive, but may be joint.99
Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the appellant and Lao which were
not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does not
render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in evidence
such articles which were described in the warrant and seized pursuant thereto. Moreover, it bears stressing that
Anciro, Jr. saw the unlisted articles when he and the other policemen implemented the search warrants. Such
articles were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was authorized to seize the
said articles because of their close connection to the crime charged. As held in Coolidge, Jr. v. New Hampshire:100
An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant
to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article
of incriminating character. …
Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a
warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.
Thus, the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect. … And
an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under
existing law may be seized without a warrant.… Finally, the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. …101
It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and papers seen by the policemen
have an intimate nexus with the crime charged or, at the very least, incriminating. The passport of the appellant
would show when and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book would
indicate how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or earned the same. The
pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show her relationship to Lao and Chan.102
Contrary to the claim of the appellant, it is not true that the trial court failed to provide an interpreter when she
testified. The records show that a Cantonese interpreter attended the trial and interpreted her testimony. The
Rules of Court does not require the trial court to provide the appellant with an interpreter throughout the trial. An
interpreter is required only if the witness on the stand testifies in a language other than in English or is a deaf-
mute. The appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at her own expense.
Contrary to the claim of appellant Lee, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of her guilt of the
crime charged. She and Lao, her lover, had joint possession of the shabu which the policemen found and
confiscated from her bedroom.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, convicting him of the crime charged, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
said appellant is ACQUITTED of said charge. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to
release the said appellant from detention unless he is detained for another cause or charge, and to submit to the
Court, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a report of his compliance with the directive of the Court.
The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, convicting her of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario*, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* On leave.
1 Penned by Judge Zosimo V. Escano.
2 Henry Lao was also referred to as Henry "Lau" in the records.
3 TSN, 5 November 1997, p. 16.
4 Id. at 11-13.
5 TSN, 22 September 1997, p. 48.
6 Exhibits "E" and "F."
7 Exhibit "H."
8 TSN, 5 March 1997, p. 18.
9 Id. at 21.
10 TSN, 22 September 1997, pp. 9-10.
11 TSN, 22 November 1997, p. 29.
12 Id. at 40.
13 TSN, 22 September 1997, p. 10.
14 TSN, 3 December 1997, p. 17.
15 TSN, 22 November 1997, p. 31.
16 TSN, 3 December 1997, p. 18.
17 Exhibits "B" and "B-3."
18 Exhibit "E-4."
19 TSN, 22 September 1997, pp. 12-14.
20 TSN, 5 November 1997, pp. 3-9; Exhibits "J" to "W-1."
21 TSN, 22 November 1997, p. 40.
22 TSN, 5 November 1997, pp. 20-21.
23 Id. at 25-26.
24 TSN, 22 November 1997, p. 39.
25 Id. at 36-37.
26 Exhibit "H-1."
27 Exhibit "B;" TSN, 22 September 1997, p. 17.
28 Exhibit "G."
29 TSN, 22 September 1997, p. 25.
30 Exhibits "A" and "A-1."
31 Exhibit "A."
32 Exhibit "C."
33 Exhibit "H."
34 Exhibit "J."
35 Exhibit "I."
36 Records, p. 1.
37 TSN, 14 September 1998, p. 42.
38 Id. at 46.
39 Id. at 44.
40 Id. at 53.
41 Id. at 55.
42 Id. at 57-58.
43 Id. at 53.
44 Id. at 67-68.
45 Id. at 65.
46 Id. at 72.
47 TSN, 18 September 1998, p. 30.
48 TSN, 14 September 1998, pp. 1-3.
49 Rollo, pp. 189-190.
50 Id. at 83-84.
51 Id. at 134.
52 Rollo, pp. 247-248.
53 G.R. No. 139615, May 28, 2004.
54 Id. at 20-21.
55 Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
56 Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 13 (1995).
57 People v. Gomez, 275 SCRA 482 (1997).
58 People v. Woolcock, 244 SCRA 235 (1995).
59 U.S. v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600 (1985).
60 TSN, 22 November 1997, p. 53.
61 Gouled v. U.S., 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921).
62 Ibid.
63 Wilson v. Arkansas, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995).
64 Supra.
65 Semayne’s Case, Eng.Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
66 3 Blackstone 412.
67 Supra.
68 Gatewood v. U.S., 209 F.2d 789 (1953).
69 Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
70 Gouled v. United States, supra.
71 People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
72 Wilson v. Arkansas, supra.
73 U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950).
74 Johnson v. U.S., 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
75 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997).
76 Semayne’s Case, supra.
77 160 So.2d 706 (1964).
78 Sabbath v. U.S., 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968).
79 U.S. v. Salter, 815 F.2d 1150 (1987); U.S. v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432 (1993).
80 U.S. v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913 (1998).
81 Ibid.
82 TSN, 14 September 1998, pp. 25-27.
83 TSN, 22 September 1997, p. 61.
84 TSN, 5 March 1997, pp. 18-22.
85 Exhibit "G."
86 TSN, 14 September 1998, pp. 12-16.
87 Id. at 19-20.
88 People v. Lacap, 369 SCRA 124 (2001).
89 TSN, 18 September 1998, pp. 9-10.
90 TSN, 18 December 1997, p. 18.
91 TSN, 3 December 1997, p. 18.
92 TSN, 18 September 1998, pp. 12-13.
93 Exhibit "I."
94 Ibid.
95 Ker v. State of California, supra, citing Brinegar v. U.S., 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
96 Id. at 1631.
97 3 L.Ed.2d 38 (1959).
98 Supra.
99 Hernandez v. U.S., 300 F.2d 114 (1962); Gallego v. U.S., 277 F.2d 694 (1962); Arellanes v. U.S., 302
F.2d 603 (1962); Delgado v. U.S., 327 F.2d 641 (1964).
100 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
101 Id.
102 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.

C. Plain View Doctrine

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C. Plain View Doctrine

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Today is Friday, August 30, 2013

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

Q Could you please tell us?

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

1 Penned by Judge Pelagio S. Mandi.

4 RTC Decision, pp. 2-5.

5 RTC Decision, pp- 5-7.

7 TSN, pp. 18-19.

8 Id., at: 19.

18 People v. Simbulan, G.R. No. 100754, October 13, 1992.

20 G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50.

21 G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50 at 62.

22 TSN, pp. 55-56.

29 Supra, note 22.

33 Original Record, p. 26.

34 G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383.

35 Article III, Section 3(2).

36 76 Phil. 637 (1946).

39 People v. Paco, supra, note 19.

40 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 72 L. ed. 231 (1927).

41 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067(1968).

42 374 U.S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963).

43 Id., 10 L. Ed. 2d 744.

45 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).

48 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1981).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997

ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner,

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 47

(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

4. consented warrantless search, and

which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

And the certification which provides as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

PNFEO5 28 November 1992

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120

Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219

Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723

This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.

FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:

JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

4 RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

10 RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 57.

11 RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 48.

12 RTC Records, vol. II, p. 828.

15 CA Decision, p. 23; Rollo, p. 50.

16 Registry Return Receipt, attached to p. 343 of the CA Rollo.

17 Registry Receipt stamped August 9, 1995. See CA Rollo, pp. 403-430.

18 CA Rollo, pp. 463-464.

21 Signed by Padilla, Jurado and Saguisag.

22 Solicitor-General's Comment on the application for bail.

24 Rollo, pp. 258, 282.

25 Rollo, pp. 312-339.

27 Consisting of about 4,000 pages.