Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ISSUE/S
● W/N Ordinance No. 6537 violated the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation — YES
● W/N Ordinance No. 6537 violated the principle against undue designation of legislative power — YES
● W/N Ordinance No. 6537 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution — YES
HOLDING
● RTC Decision (which declared Ordinance No. 6537 null and void) AFFIRMED.
RATIO
● RE: Uniformity in taxation
○ Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be considered regulatory in nature.
■ The first part requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor, and
involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits. Therefore, it is regulatory in character.
■ But the second part, which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee’s fee, is not regulatory but a
revenue measure.
■ There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for
employment.
■ It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
○ The requirement of a P50.00 fee is unreasonable
■ It is excessive, and it also fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it.
○ The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification
■ However, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
■ The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual
or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive
● RE: Undue delegation of legislative power
○ Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion.
■ It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a
permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits,
such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent
an activity per se lawful.
○ Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the
mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
● RE: Due process and equal protection
○ The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
○ Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood.
○ While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law.
■ This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
■ The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.
ISSUE/S
● W/N constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of
taxation, were infringed — YES
HOLDING
● CFI Decision REVERSED. Ordinance No. 4, s. 1964 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Defendants-appellees are
ORDERED to REFUND P12,087.50 to plaintiff-appellant.
RATIO
● The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated. It does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation.
○ A classification is reasonable where:
■ It is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences
■ These are germane to the purpose of the law
■ The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present
■ The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class
● It is clear that the questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites of reasonable classification, for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
○ It is true that, at the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
○ Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
■ The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax.
■ As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
levied upon.
● Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
○ At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being
then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise
Respondents’ Contentions:
● BSP: Does not violate equal protection clause; it can stand constitutional test, provided it be construed in harmony
with other provisions, such as “fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP”
● SolGen: Valid; classification is based on actual/real differentiation
ISSUE/S:
● W/N the Sec. 15(C) of RA 7653 violates the equal protection clause -- YES
HOLDING:
● Petition GRANTED, SEC. 15(C) of RA 7653 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO:
● Under the present standards of equal protection, Sec. 15(C) of RA 7653 is valid; shown by the legislative
deliberations, the exemption of certain BSP officers from SSL was intended to address the lack of
competitiveness in attracting competent officers and executives
○ If the end result did lead to a disparity of treatment, this was unintended
● HOWEVER, the enactment of subsequent laws renders the continued application of the proviso a violation of
the equal protection clause (Laws exempting all other rank-and-file employees of GFIs from the SSL were
enacted)
Re: Relative Constitutionality
● A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances; thus if in its
practical operation a statute becomes arbitrary/confiscatory, its validity is open to inquiry/investigation in the
light of changed conditions
○ A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation
ISSUE/S
● W/N the classification freeze provision violates the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the
Constitution — NO
HOLDING
● MR DENIED.
RATIO
● In the instant case, there is no question that the classification freeze provision meets the geographical uniformity
requirement because the assailed law applies to all cigarette brands in the Philippines.
○ And, for reasons already adverted to in our August 20, 2008 Decision, the four-fold test has been met in the
present case.
● As held in the assailed Decision, the instant case neither involves a suspect classification nor impinges on a
fundamental right.
● Consequently, the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face
of an equal protection challenge.
○ It has been held that "in the areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification."
○ Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to achieving
some legitimate State interest.
● Petitioner's reliance on Ormoc Sugar Co. is misplaced.
○ In said case, the controverted municipal ordinance specifically named and taxed only the Ormoc Sugar
Company, and excluded any subsequently established sugar central from its coverage. Thus, the ordinance
was found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because its terms do not apply to future conditions as
well.
○ This is not the case here. The classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all cigarette brands whether
existing or to be introduced in the market at some future time. It does not purport to exempt any brand from
its operation nor single out a brand for the purpose of imposition of excise taxes.
ISSUE/S:
● W/N obesity can be a ground for dismissal under Labor Code -- YES
● W/N dismissal for obesity is predicated on the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification defense -- YES
● W/N there was undue discrimination in petitioner’s dismissal -- NO
HOLDING:
● Petition DISMISSED. CA Decision AFFIRMED + Yrasuegui entitled to separation pay of 1/2 month’s pay for every
year of service + regular allowances
RATIO:
Re: Obesity under Labor Code
● “Qualifying standards” - norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired; they apply prior to
employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet to be hired, and they apply
after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job to keep his job
○ An employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of w/n
failure to qualify was willful or intentional
○ That petitioner was able to reduce weight during the period given shows that it is possible; petitioner himself
claimed that he could do it
○ Petitioner cited a case wherein the person involved was well over 100 pounds the ideal weight-- petitioner in
this case is not morbidly obese and the cited jurisprudence shall not have bearing
● Obesity of petitioner becomes an analogous cause under Labor Code that justifies his dismissal; may be
unintended but is nonetheless voluntary
○ CA: Voluntariness means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions
○ Gross and habitual neglect = considered voluntary although it lacks element of intent, but is also a recognized
just cause
● PAL as a common carrier, has the obligation to safely transport its passengers with extraordinary diligence;
pursuant to this, it imposed weight standards for cabin crew with the primary objective of flight safety
○ Body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors in emergency situations
○ No need to individually evaluate ability, undisputed that an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a
slim one
○ Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility; in an emergency situations, it is critical that cabin
crew make the most of the limited time and demonstrate agility-- that which an obese flight attendant
may not possess
Re: Discrimination
● Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming supposed cabin crew allegedly similarly situated
with him, substantial proof must be shown as to how and to prove the differential treatment between them
○ Failed to indicate their ideal weights and all other circumstances, relevant data that could have adequately
established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL
○ Misplaced invocation of Bill of Rights (not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals)
Re: Reinstatement
● The option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer
○ There is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in
accordance with the order of LA, petitioner even duly received the return to work notice, and affixed
his signature
○ Petitioner failed to prove that he complied with his return to work order, nor does it appear on record that he
actually rendered services from the moment he was dismissed
Re: Separation Pay
● Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay, but may be granted as an act of “social
justice” or based on “equity”, but it is required that the dismissal:
1. Was not for serious misconduct
2. Does not reflect on the moral character of the employee
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and
who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or
justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or
both, in the discretion of the court.”
● Respondents were directed to submit their counter-affidavits, but instead, they filed separate Motions to Quash on the
ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
○ The MTC denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits.
○ The MTC also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power.
○ The MTC also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that
there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants
and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.
■ Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut
the evidence.
● Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC of Davao City.
○ They directly challenged the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the
crime of vagrancy under Art. 202(2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of
violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing
ordinary peaceful acts.
○ They likewise claimed that Art. 202(2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution
because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.
● The State, through the OSG, argued that:
○ The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes.
○ Article 202(2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this
presumption.
● The Regional Trial Court then issued the assailed Order granting the petition, and declaring Art, 202(2) of the RPC
unconstitutional.
○ The RTC opined that the law is vague and it violated the equal protection clause.
○ It held that the “void for vagueness” doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes.
○ They used Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, as a precedent.
■ “The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present
runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable
classification between those covered by the law and those who are not.”
■ “Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or
inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case
offending.”
■ “Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised
Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have
no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum
around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its
constitutionality.”
● Hence, this petition
● Petitioner’s contentions:
○ Every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
○ The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
○ Respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under
the standards set out by the Courts.
○ The State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police
power.
● Respondents’ contentions:
○ The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines does not have a limited application.
○ Article 202(2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal
protection of the laws.
■ The due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is
adequate to declare Article 202(2) unconstitutional and void on its face.
■ The presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.
ISSUE/S
● W/N Art. 202(2) of the RPC is constitutional — YES
HOLDING
● Petition GRANTED. Decision of Davao City RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Art. 202(2) of the RPC is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO
● The streets must be protected. This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202(2) belongs.
○ These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society.
○ These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated
with the struggle to improve the citizens’ quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.
○ Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts — from public indecencies and immoralities,
to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct.
■ The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to society’s basic sensibilities and their
adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society.
■ Public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property by members of a community.
● Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed.
○ Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but
for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community.
○ Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral
conduct.
● Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive.
○ It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time
which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a
justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
○ Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train its eye
on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties.
○ The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Substantive Issues/Facts:
● 11th Congress: 57 cityhood bills were filed, 33 of which eventually became laws, and 24 remained not acted upon
○ Later developments saw the introduction to amend the Local Gov’t. Code (LGC)
■ RA 9009: To increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20M
average annual income to P100M locally generated income
● 12th Congress: HR adopted a Joint Resolution seeking to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose conversions were not acted upon during the previous Congress
○ This Joint Resolution was not approved by the Senate though
● 13th Congress: HR re-adopted Joint Resolution
○ Again, Senate failed to approve of the Joint Resolution
○ Senator Nene Pimentel however asserted that passage of such would allow a wholesale exemption from
the income requirement, so he suggested the filing by the HR of individual bills to effectuate those
municipalities into cities and forwarding them to Senate
○ Following this, 16 municipalities filed individual cityhood bills, all containing a provision exempting it from
the P100M income requirement
● Both Houses of Congress had approved of the individual cityhood bills and eventually lapsed into law, each
directing the COMELEC, within 30 days from approval, to hold plebiscites on whether or not voters approve of the
conversion
Petitioner’s Contentions:
● Unconstitutional for violating Sec. 10, Art. 10
○ Criteria for becoming a city strictly limited to only those written in the LGC
● Violates equal protection clause because provides for exemptions from the P100M income requirement
● Wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of IRA set aside for all cities under LGC
● Deliberations on the cityhood bills and joint resolution were undertaken in 11th and/or 12th Congress; such
deliberations are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing cityhood laws passed
during the 13th Congress; Congress not being a continuing body
ISSUE/S:
● W/N the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10, Art. 10 of the Constitution and/or equal protection clause -- NO
HOLDING:
● Petition DISMISSED. Cityhood laws VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO:
Re: Must be strictly only in LGC
● The power to create political subdivisions/LGUs is essentially legislative in character, but even without any
constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, boundaries of a province, city, or municipality.
○ Provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions “in accordance with the criteria
established in the local gov’t code” subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned
● The only conceivable reason why the Consti employs the clause “in accordance with the criteria established in
the LGC” is to lay stress that it is the Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria-- does not
mean that specifications shall come only from the LGC
○ When the 1987 Consti speaks of the LGC, reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws,
let alone the 1991 LGC
○ At the time of adoption of the 1987 Consti, BP 337 (then LGC) was in effect, framers of 1987 Consti if
they really wanted to isolate embodiment of criteria only in LGC, they would have actually referred to
BP 337-- would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in the Art.
10, Sec. 3
● Congress can via a consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment, impose the verifiable criteria of viability
○ Congress through the cityhood laws, decreased the income criterion but without necessarily being
unreasonably discriminatory, by reverting to the P20M what it earlier raised to P100M
Re: RA 9009
● Rationale behind enactment of RA 9009 to amend LGC 1991 based on Senator Pimentel’s speech: “There is a
mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities… the nation will be a nation of cities and no
municipalities, thus the financial requirement shall be raised”
○ Floor exchange between Sen. Pimentel and Sen. President Drilon: Not fair to make RA 9009 retroact to those
bills already pending in the Senate for conversion into cities, thus they will not be affected by the passage of
such
● The intent is the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent
Re: Deliberations made 11th and 12th Congress, only passed on 13th
● Deliberations having been made in the previous Congresses before passage is immaterial; what is important is
that the debates, deliberations, proceedings of Congress, aids in the interpretation of the law
Re: Equal Protection Clause
● Respondent LGUs are entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned, since they are artificial
persons; cannot invoke equal protection clause
○ LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be reduced is presumptuous; cannot already stake a claim
on the IRA as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated
○ Conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect the status as a political unit, but not its property
● Fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality-- all persons/things similarly situated be
treated alike, both as to rights and privileges concerned
● Requisites of Valid Classification
● Favorable treatment accorded to the 16 municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction;
they are substantially different because they had pending cityhood bills before passage of RA 9009, and had
already met the income criterion under LGC 1991
○ It was only due to extraneous circumstances that the bills remained unacted upon by Congress
○ Sen. Lim’s speech: Much of the proponents of 24 cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the
effectivity of the law, events hindered the Congress from acting on said bills (Impeachment of Estrada,
May 2001 elections, jueteng scandal, EDSA PP2)
● To deny the respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to 33 other municipalities
is tantamount to denying them protection under equal protection clause
○ Exemption clause would only apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the
passage of RA 9009, and were compliant with LGC 1991
○ Existence of cities consequent to approval of the now challenged cityhood laws is now an operative fact
ISSUE/S
● W/N assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Consti — NO
HOLDING
● MR GRANTED. December 1, 2009 Decision of SC REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petition DISMISSED. Assailed
provisions declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO
● Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
○ The foregoing issue has already been ruled by the SC in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.
○ It is held in this case that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as
there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials.
■ The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification.
■ The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
■ Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
■ The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected
to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.
■ On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority.
■ Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
○ In this case, stare decisis applies.
● Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
○ The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction.
○ What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
○ Requisites of a valid classification/test of reasonableness:
■ The classification rests on substantial distinctions
■ It is germane to the purposes of the law
■ It is not limited to existing conditions only
■ It applies equally to all members of the same class
○ In the assailed Decision, it was acknowledged that the 1st, 3rd and 4th requisites of reasonableness were
satisfied.
■ It holds, however that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is
not germane to the purpose of the law, because “whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.”
○ In addressing a societal concern, the Legislature must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby
creating some inequity as to those included or excluded.
■ Nevertheless, as long as “the bounds of reasonable choice” are not exceeded, the courts must defer
to the legislative judgment.
■ The fact that a legislative classification does not include all classes will not render it
unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.
■ There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied.
○ The burden show that the law creates a classification that is “palpably arbitrary or capricious,” is upon the
person who challenges the law as violative of the equal protection clause.
■ This person must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, W/N the Legislature
cited those bases as reasons for the enactment.
■ In the case at bar, the petitioners failed — and in fact did not even attempt — to discharge this
heavy burden.
○ Under our constitutional system, it is the Legislature that is given the authority to balance competing interests
and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times.
■ Therefore, the SC cannot interfere with this.
● Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
○ Mancuso v. Taft was a decision of the First Circuit of the US CA (March 1973), which struck down as
unconstitutional a similar statutory provision.
○ The assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
■ The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms – freedom
of expression and association
■ Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to
strict equal protection review
■ While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public
work force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner
as to render them unconstitutional
○ This reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. The US SC effectively overruled Mancuso.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUMAWAN
G.R. No. 187495 || April 21, 2014 || REYES, J.
(equal protection)
FACTS
● Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
● On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped
her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
● As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her and
the accused-appellant.
○ It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm.
○ However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed.
■ He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
■ His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual
ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
● One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed.
○ Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously
order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
○ KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation.
■ Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor.
■ Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
○ The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not
feeling well.
○ The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her
panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her
legs.
○ The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them.
She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her.
○ As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don’t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.”
● Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because
he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.
● In his defense, Jumawan argues that the two incidents were consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim
were a legally married and cohabiting couple.
○ He argues that consent is presumed between a cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proven.
○ Furthermore, the case should be viewed and treated differently from an ordinary rape case and that the
standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof should be adjusted on the ground that
sexual community between a husband and wife is a mutual right and obligation.
ISSUE/S
● W/N there should be a different standard for marital rape – NO
HOLDING
● CA Decision AFFIRMED
RATIO
● The consent theory of Jumawan has already been superseded by global principles and international conventions such
as:
○ CEDAW – The PH as State Party to the CEDAW, recognizes that a change in the traditional role of men as
well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
○ UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women – Identified marital rape as a species of
sexual violence.
● Based on these conventions, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage.
○ A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her,
and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes
the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997 – note that this law reclassified rape as a crime
against a person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity)
● Furthermore, to treat marital rape cases from non-marital rape cases in terms of their elements and in the
rules of evidence infringes on the equal protection clause.
○ Under this doctrine, similar subjects should not be treated differently.
○ As discussed under RA 8353, the definition of rape pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator’s own spouse.
○ The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between
rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection
to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
■ To uphold the argument of Jumawan would discriminate against married rape victims over
unmarried ones because it deprives them the penal redress equally granted by law to ALL
rape victims.
ISSUE/S
● W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to second-level courts is constitutional — YES
HOLDING
● Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO
● RE: Procedural Issues
○ The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable.
■ The JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
■ However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the
petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC’s
constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with
GADALEJ in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
■ The SC can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court’s power of supervision
over the JBC.
○ The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC’s policy.
■ The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
■ The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial.
○ The petition for declaratory relief is improper.
■ “An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance.”
■ “The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of
the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.”
● RE: Equal Protection
○ While the 1987 Consti has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the
JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
■ The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC’s
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the Pres.
■ However, the Consti did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in
determining applicants’ qualifications.
■ In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing
its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required
by the Consti and law for every position.
■ The JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be all
accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified
among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
○ The equal protection clause of the Consti does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction.
■ What it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
■ Requisites of a valid classification (not in this case, but it’s good to take note of these)
■ It is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences
■ These are germane to the purpose of the law
■ The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present
■ The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class
■ If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.
○ In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional
requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.
○ Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a
violation of the equal protection clause.
■ The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition.
■ The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which
may be measured by experience, among other factors.
■ “Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the
stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven
competence.” In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications,
experience and performance.”
■ “for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level court, it
would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on
the bench.”
○ The classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.
■ Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with 5 year experience and those with
less than 5 years of experience, like the petitioner.
■ The classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose.
○ Therefore, the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Said policy is valid and
constitutional.
● RE: Due Process
○ The assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is
confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government.
○ Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the SC, it is not covered by the publication requirements of
the Administrative Code.
ISSUE/S
● W/N the Socialized Housing Tax was valid — YES
● W/N the imposition of Garbage Fee was valid — NO
HOLDING
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the
“Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City,” is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7279. On
the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon
City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with
reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected relative to its enforcement.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2095. In
contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.
RATIO
● RE: SHT
○ Quezon City Government has the power to tax
■ SC held that SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to
impose.
■ Cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs and
projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings.
■ The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects.
■ SC held that the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue.
■ It is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police
power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest.
Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and
homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well.
■ The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the
same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of
life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business
products.
○ There is no violation on the rule of equality.
■ SC held that equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
■ The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
■ Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.
■ The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
■ An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law.
■ The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
■ 1. It must rest on substantial distinctions;
■ 2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
■ 3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
■ 4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
■ For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes
are too obvious and need not be discussed at length.
■ The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution.
■ Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled
the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another.
■ It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation.
■ Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation.
○ SHT is not confiscatory nor oppressive.
■ SC held that the tax being imposed is below what RA 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992 (UDHA) actually allows.
■ SC held that while the law authorizes LGU’s to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of
more than Php 50,0000, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value
exceeding Php 100,000.
■ Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total
amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity.
■ SC held the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.
● RE: Garbage Fee
○ No double taxation
■ SC held that the garbage fee is not a tax.
■ Not being a tax, SC held that there is NO double taxation.
○ BUT, there is a violation of equality
■ SC held that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC
that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay,
and not unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.
■ For the purpose of garbage collection, there is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a
lot, on one hand, FROM an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, on the other hand.
■ Garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a
large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.
■ The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable.
■ The classifications under the ordinance are NOT germane to its declared purpose of “promoting
shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming
the present resources and in generating waste.”
■ Quezon City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount
of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. (i.e. household age and size,
accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to
pay, and actual occupancy of the property).
■ SC held that a lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The
establishment of classifications and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not
unreasonable and does not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity.
■ Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between
those in like circumstances having equal rights and privileges.
■ Discrimination with respect to rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and
without a reasonable fact basis or justification.
■ Also, the penalty imposed in the ordinance lacked the limitation of the interest of 36 months under
the LGC.
ISSUE/S
● W/N Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are valid regulations — NO
HOLDING
● Petition GRANTED. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 declared
NULL and VOID.
RATIO
● RE: Free Speech
○ Resolution No. 9615, or any part thereof, must not run counter to the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
■ The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.
○ Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on
speech.
■ Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment.
■ Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination.
■ Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications,
whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative
or judicial branch of the government.
○ The assailed provisions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech.
■ Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in
their property, and convince others to agree with them.
■ Adiong v. COMELEC: The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
○ COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by private
persons.
■ The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public commuters,
likewise remains private.
■ Although owners of public transport terminals may be required by local governments to obtain
permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to circumstances affecting the operation of the
transport terminal as such.
○ The freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression.
■ A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of
the democratic way of life.
● RE: Equal Protection
○ Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates the
equal protection clause.
■ Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
■ Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some
and unjustly discriminate against others.
○ The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws to all
citizens of the state.
■ Equality of operation of statutes does not mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights.
■ The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different.
■ Requisites of valid classification
■ It must be based upon substantial distinctions
■ It must be germane to the purposes of the law
■ It must not be limited to existing conditions only
■ It must apply equally to all members of the class
○ The classification in the case at bar is constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial
distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law.
■ A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties
in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise
or a permit to operate.
■ Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport
terminals
■ The prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV
and transport terminals.
■ As regards ownership:
■ There is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and other properties. The ownership of PUVs and transport
terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private.
■ If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political
ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no
cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
■ In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
■ The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties.
■ Any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals
would be seen by many people.
■ However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g., commercial establishments, would also be seen by many
people.
■ Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the
prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
■ Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private vehicles
and other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to candidates in elections.
■ To stress, PUVs and transport terminals are private properties.
■ The connection between the restriction on the freedom of expression of owners of PUVs
and transport terminals and the government’s interest in ensuring equal time, space, and
opportunity for candidates in elections was not established by the COMELEC.