CRIMPRO RULE 112 –

Title G.R. No. 176033

AGUINALDO v. VENTUS Date: March 11, 2015
Ponente: PERALTA, J.:
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ, Petitioner REYNALDO P. VENTUS AND JOJO B. JOSON, Respondent.
Nature of the case:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the
Decision dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006 Resolution.

FACTS
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit for
estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to
be business partners in financing casino players, private respondents alleged that sometime in March and April
2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos
in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo,
but turned out to be owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.

Both parties submitted their respective Counter-Affidavit, Reply-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit. On February 25,
2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga issued a Resolution recommending both petitioners to be
indicted in court for estafa.

On July 16, 2003, an Information (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners with the crime of estafa under was filed
with Manila RTC. On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of Bail.

On the same day, petitioners filed l a Very Urgent Motion to Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest, alleging that the
Resolution dated February 25, 2003 has not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file a motion for
reconsideration. On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their “Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed With Manila RTC.”

On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order granting the motion for withdrawal of information, and
directing the recall of the arrest warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her motion
for reconsideration with the OCP. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment. On December
23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived pending resolution of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration with the OCP of Manila.

On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel, filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial,
considering that petitioners' motions for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit.  Public respondent issued an order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.

On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and Suspend Further Proceedings,
until their petition for review before the DOJ is resolved with finality.  public respondent granted

On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. De Castro
alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an
Opposition with Motion to Expunge, alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active file,
awaiting the resolution of their petition for review before the DOJ.

On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation informing the public respondent that the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution dated September 6, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. No. 02G-29349
& 02G-28820 for estafa, entitled “Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo.” Public respondent issued an Order
granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest,

On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest.On August
23, 2005, the public respondent DENIED BOTH, and setting petitioners' arraignment, as the ROC allows only a 60-day
period of suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul, he also ruled that the issuance of the warrant of arrest
is best left to the discretion of the trial court. He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the
petition for review.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65  CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. Petitioners filed a MR, but the CA denied. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S
WON the Preliminary investigation in the case at bar by the OCP of Manila has not yet been completed  NO!
RATIO
Petitioners take exception that even before they could receive a copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition
for review, and thus move for its reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-216182 had already been
filed with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend that such precipitate filing of the Information and issuance of a
warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been
completed because they were not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In
support of their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right; that an Information filed without affording the respondent his right to
file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a complete
preliminary investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his right to due process and infringes on his
constitutional right to liberty. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Petitionersare wrong in arguing that the Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a
motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. Petitioners in this case were afforded
their right to move for reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed
their “Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the
Manila RTC”.

Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit to the OCP of Manila before the filing of Information
for estafa, Perez cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary investigation was not completed. For her
part, while Aguinaldo was not personally informed of any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the
Information, she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation. In petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the
recommendation of the prosecutor to indict her for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for reconsideration was
held to be consistent with the principle of due process and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors,
she cannot complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation.

RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated December 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, areAFFIRMED. Considering that the proceedings in this criminal
case had been held in abeyance long enough, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court which is hereby directed
to try the case on the merits with dispatch in accordance with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.

NOTES
Other doctrine in this case: Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration before the
DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application of the limitation of the period for suspending
arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or
to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=2522S 2016-17 (MALLARI)