Edd Butagaz La Goulette - Chapitre 6 Part 2

Website of LA GOULETTE
Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

analysis of hazards and their consequences
on the environment
2.2. SUMMARY OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA
The following table presents the modeling results.
The scenarios whose effects are beyond the site are those which may lead to a major accident within the meaning of the order of 29
September 2005 amending the decree of 10 May 2000 [R2]. Only scenarios corresponding to this definition will be retained for the detailed
analysis of probability of occurrence and severity of the potential consequences, and for investment in the regulatory grid annexed to the
Decree of 29 September 2005 amending the order of May 10, 2000.
The orange colored boxes correspond to the thresholds outgoing effects of the site property lines.
750-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-00734 / CI - January 2012 Page 64/127

No. PhD
6.2 6.1 5.2 5.1 4.2 4.1 3.2 3.1 2.2 2.1 1.2 1.1
Website
overpressure
overpressure overpressure overpressure overpressure overpressure Effect Type
thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal
regulations of accident scenarios BUTAGA

UVCE
of LA
Effect Very Grave
Not reached Not reached Not reached
155 117 730

31 54 37 98
5 4
GOULETTE
and their Hazard
impact on Study C
the environm
generous
Distance
Page 65/127
Not reached Not reached Not reached Serious effect
155 117 167 146 977

39 47
7 5
6-
Significant effect
Not reached Not reached
1218
171 257 167 226 311
14 10 83 99
Z La Goulette
Broken windows
517 166 198 622

28 20
- - - - - -
- Jet ignited following the rupture of the supply line - Out of Site
UVCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the supply line - Out of Site
No. PhD
9.2 9.1 8.3 8.2 8.1 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3
Website
overpressure overpressure overpressure overpressure Effect Type
thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal
Jet ignited
of LA
Effect Very Grave
Not reached Not reached Not reached Not reached
226 228 163 174 176 149 176

81
8- GOULETTE
and their Hazard
impact on Study C
the environm
7-
9-
generous
Distance
Page 66/127 6-
Not reached Not reached Not reached Not reached Serious effect
breakage 6 -
255 228 183 174 199 149 199
81
Significant effect
116 293 251 338 210 191 267 229 164 217 229
90
Glass
235 655 520 440

- - - - - - - -
No. PhD
13.2 13.1 12.3 12.2 12.1 11.3 11.2 11.1 10.3 10.2 10.1
9.3
Website
VCE
and
of LA
Effect Very Grave
Not reached Not reached Not reached
breakage
38 13 - 85 87 38 35 48 37 86
-
GOULETTE
and their Hazard
impact on Study C
the environm
10 -
generous
Distance
Page 67/127
38 95 87 43 35 11 - 54 46 96
-
12A
Significant effect
109 120 110

42 47 96 49 39 43 62 99
-
Glass
234 198
89 81
- - - - - - - -
No. PhD
14.12 14.11 14.10

14.9 14.8 14.7 14.6 14.5 14.4 14.3 14.2 14.1 13.3
Website
thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal thermal
of LA
Effect Very Grave

Breakage
25 17 30 24 34 30 38 35 41
14 - 14 - 14 - GOULETTE
and their Hazard
impact on Study C
the environm
14 -
generous
Distance
Page 68/127
Not reached Not reached Not reached Not reached Serious effect
27 17 33 24 37 30 43 35 46
Significant effect
31 19 20 38 27 28 43 33 35 49 39 42 52
Glass
36 51 65 80
- - - - - - - - -
- Jet ignited following the opening of a ball valve due to an external fire
- Jet ignited following the opening of a ball valve due to overfilling
No. PhD
16B.3 16B.2 16B.1 16A.3 16A.2 16A.1

18.1 17.3 17.2 17.1 15.3 15.2 15.1
Website
overpressure overpressure overpressure overpressure overpressure Effect Type
UVCE
UVCE
of LA
Effect Very Grave
111
41 30 26 82 35 23 27
3
15 - GOULETTE
and their Hazard
impact on Study C
the environm
17 -
generous
Distance
Page 69/127

Not reached
262 102 149 16A -

55 34 35 23 33
16B - 3
Significant effect
134 130 193

39 29 30 39 70 26 94 41 14
4
Broken windows
306 148 217

55 33
- - - - - - - -
19 - gas oil pool fire retention
No. PhD
19.2 19.1 18.4 18.3 18.2

21 20
Website
overpressure overpressure Effect Type
overpressure
thermal thermal thermal thermal
of LA
Effect Very Grave
10 14 12 56 75 38
6
GOULETTE
and their Hazard
impact on Study C
the environm
generous
Distance
Page 70/127
Serious effect
13 23 16 75 96 50
8
Significant effect
184 234 122

16 10 35 21
Glass
419 534 280

- - - -

on the environment
3. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS DOMINOES
3.1. ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL EFFECTS DOMINOES
The purpose of this section is to verify whether BUTAGAZ facilities are likely to generate accidents that may affect the facilities on the site
and around the site.
3.1.1 domino effects related to BLEVE
3.1.1.1 BLEVE of a sphere
heat flow Rating:
The duration of the fireball with a radius of 291 m would be 31 seconds.
The thermal radiation of a very short duration, only facilities within the radius of the fireball may suffer serious damage.
The facilities impacted by the fireball and can suffer damage are:
target present in the

Distance to the center of the
TARGET radius of the fireball
nearest sphere (m)
Spheres of LPG 20 Yes
truck loading station 40 Yes
LPG pump station 15 Yes
parked tankers 50 Yes
Filling halls 30 Yes
bottle storage areas 70 Yes
administrative buildings 100 Yes
fire pump station 70 Yes
Reserve fire 66 Yes


on the environment
Outside the site, access road, the deposit of hydrocarbons VIVO ENERGY Tunisia, STLR company, grain silos and oil jetties and
cereals are also present in the radius of the fireball.
All these facilities may suffer im portant related damage BLEVE of a sphere of BUTAGAZ.
Evaluation of pressures:
The BLEVE causes effects of very violent blows near field, first due to the expansion of the vapor phase during the rupture of the
reservoir, then the explosive vaporization of the liquid contained in the reservoir.
The pressure levels calculated for the BLEVE scenario of a sphere highlight domino effects on structures up to 117 meters ( Δ P>
200 mbar).
The facilities impacted by the threshold domino effects and can be damaged are:
target within the

TARGET radius of domino
nearest sphere (m)
effects
truck loading station 40 Yes
parked tankers 50 Yes
bottle storage areas 70 Yes
fire pump station 70 Yes
Reserve fire 66 Yes
Conclusion:
The very high pressure levels achieved following the BLEVE of a sphere, in other spheres should generate their successive
BLEVE. So we will consider later, the BLEVE spheres as a whole.
The trucks for the post of bulk loading and parking are subjected to higher pressure levels than can cause their overthrow (350
mbar); they should suffer serious damage.


on the environment
The pumping station fire exposed to a pressure threshold of 300 mbar should be damaged.
The filling hall and LPG pipelines nearby could suffer serious damage (burst pipes).
The bottling lines are impacted by pressures well above 300 mbar (domino effects threshold for piping): they may be seriously
damaged.
Outside the site, the threshold domino effects reached the company VIVO ENERGY
Tunisia Grain Silo society, but imp enact their facilities
industrial. Thus, only a risk to the person nel of these companies is to be feared.
3.1.1.2 BLEVE truck (penalizing case of a cami one jumbo)
heat flow Rating:
The duration of the fireball with a radius of 84 m would be 12 seconds.
The thermal radiation of a very short duration, only facilities within the radius of the fireball may suffer serious damage.
The facilities impacted by the fireball and can suffer damage are:
target present in the

TARGET radius of the fireball
nearest truck (m)
tankers parked or bulk loading station

20 Yes
bottle storage areas 100 No
fire pump station 120 No
Reserve fire 110 No


on the environment
Outside the site, only the access road to the filling station and the wastelands of Silo Cereals are also present in the radius of the
fireball.
No outside industrial plant is s ocated in the radius of the ball

fire.
Evaluation of pressures:
The BLEVE causes effects of very violent blows near field, first due to the expansion of the vapor phase during the rupture of the
reservoir, then the explosive vaporization of the liquid contained in the reservoir.
The pressure levels calculated for the BLEVE scenario of a tractor trailer highlight domino effects on structures up to 37 meters ( Δ P>
200 mbar).
The facilities impacted by the threshold domino effects and can be damaged are:
target within the

TARGET radius of domino
nearest truck (m)
effects
Spheres of LPG 40 No
LPG pump station 60 No
tankers parked or bulk loading station

20 Yes
Filling halls 40 No
bottle storage areas 100 No
administrative buildings 50 No
fire pump station 120 No
Reserve fire 110 No
Conclusion:
The trucks for the post of bulk loading and parking are subjected to higher pressure levels than can cause their overthrow (350
mbar); they should suffer serious damage.
The pipes of the defense network against fire and feeding bulk loading station for LPG is affected by pressures well above 300
mbar (domino effects threshold for piping): they may be seriously damaged.


on the environment
Other facilities of the center should not suffer significant damage, including storage spheres.
No outside industrial plant is s ocated in the impact area

dominoes.
3.1.2 domino effects related UVCE
Thermal effects of UVCE are due to flame front pass. Generally, the thermal effect of a UVCE on structures is limited to superficial
damage (deformation of plastics, paints release, ...), and optionally a possible weakening of some light metal structures. In contrast, a
UVCE initiator can be a fire, and be followed by a fire torch, thermal effects which are to be feared (see risk fiery jets).
The dominoes to fear effects are due to pressure effects.
In free field, the overpressure generated by UVCE are less than or equal to 100 mbar and are not, therefore, likely to generate domino
effect. For against, the distances to the LEL different scenarios may achieve one or more congested areas likely to be, in case of
presence of an ignition source, the seat of secondary explosions.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the pressure ceilings for domino effects are:
• 300 mbar for pipes and trucks; this threshold of 300 mbar being between the threshold slight deformation of the piping
(200-300 mbar) and the threshold shift of a pipe rack, breakage of lines (350-400 mbar);
• 610 mbar for spheres; 610 mbar being the threshold rupture pressure storage horizontal tanks.
For each scenario assessed using multi-energy method, we consider the following side effects of exposures that can occur in
congested or confined areas affected by the LEL.


on the environment
areas
Degree of
Effects observed on the site
containment
NOT Designation
parking tankers (zone 300 mbar overpressure are likely to reach the bulk loading area.
Z AT loading / unloading, the

6
presence
The threshold domino effect hits the store, the shop, the maintenance
4 trucks)
area and the diesel tanks
The full bottles of storage area is affected by the threshold of 200 mbar:
parking custodians truck (truck bottles could be damaged.
traffic zone, the presence of 3
ZB
trucks) 6
The filling hall is also impacted by the threshold of 200 mbar, it could be
damaged.
300 mbar overpressure are likely to reach the parking area custodians
trucks, thus causing
the turning
Truck carrying LPG cylinders.
full bottles storage area The filling hall is impacted by the threshold of
ZC
6
200 mbar, it could be damaged.
The threshold of 200 mbar also impacts the company STLR and
lubricants storage tanks. Significant effects are to be feared for STLR
staff as well as for facilities.
300 mbar overpressure may reach the filling hall, which could suffer
significant damage.
The 300 mbar threshold also impacts freshwater reserves fire: it would
empty bottles storage suffer significant damage that could lead to breakage of the tank and thus
ZD
area 6
rendered ineffective.
The threshold of 200 mbar achieved two storage bins of the company
VIVO Tunisia ENERGY: they then suffer significant damage.


on the environment
areas
Degree of
Effects observed on the site
containment
NOT Designation
A truck bulk loading post is subject to higher pressure levels than can
generate its inversion (350 mbar); should suffer serious damage.
S2 and S3 spheres are affected by the effects of 200 mbar but should not
suffer major damage. However, the withdrawal pipe may be seriously
damaged by above 350 mbar overpressure.
VCE following the rupture of the

10 supply line 6 LPG pump station would suffer major damage (booster effect of the order
carousel of 500 mbar).
The defense network against fire would suffer significant damage (pipes,
sprayers, fire reserve)
The threshold of 200 mbar beyond the scope of rights of way and
reaches BUTAGAZ companies VIVO ENERGY Tunisia and STLR but
without impacting facilities: only affect the staff of these companies
located in these areas is therefore to be feared.
Table 4: domino effects caused by an exploded ion in a congested area
3.1.3 domino effects associated with burning jet
The assumption for the inclusion of damage to the facilities match the INERIS in its critical analysis: the facilities included in a circle
whose radius is the distance the LEL can be damaged.
Analysis of fiery jets domino effect is achieved in the determination of paintings of the probability of occurrence of hazards.
For each accident scenario, it is considered that the target inside the circle whose radius is the distance the LEL can be damaged.
When a target is in the domino effect radius of a jet fire, this jet fire is reinstated as initiator event of heat stress on that target. It can
thus generate a domino effect, a new hazard (inflamed jet of greater importance, BLEVE)


on the environment
When the fiery jets are reinstated as initiating events, they are considered as being:
• affecting; in this case, all irrigation means is considered ineffective;
• oriented; in this case, irrigation means are considered effective.
3.1.4 fire-related domino effects
3.1.4.1 gas oil pool fire
In case of fire ply in the retention of the gas oil storage for trucks and vehicles, the threshold domino effects (8 kW / m 2) reach the
two closest locations to the parking area for trucks.
So to avoid the risk of spread of fire of diesel tankers

BLEVE can lead to a truck, it is necessary not to park
trucks on the nearest locations e retention tanks
diesel.
In case of fire outside ply retention associated with a loss of containment of the gas oil storage for fire pumps, the threshold
domino effects (8 kW / m 2) reached the fire pump station, the interconnection pipe and terrain of the company VIVO ENERGY
Tunisia (without reaching the storage bins). Very significant damage is to be feared on the interconnection pipe, which may lead to
its rupture and lead to the release of an inventory of LPG. In addition, the fire pump station could be rendered inoperable.
So to avoid the risk of spread of fire pipe in diesel

interconnection and fire pump station, it is necessary to create a retention
in the diesel tank.
3.1.4.2 Fire in the paint booth
A fire in the paint booth may cause damage to the LPG supply line for filling halls and on the water line of network defense against
fire.
No effects to fear outside the filling plant.
The spray booth is used very little. the deposit lacing the paint booth
is studied.


on the environment
3.1.4.3 Store Fire
A fire in the warehouse would not cause damage to parked trucks in the parking lot or on the bulk loading station.
To maintain this level of safety, it is nec essary to install a retention

in the store.
3.1.5 Case projectiles
In a BLEVE, fragments of the projections are likely to induce domino effects.
The productions and fragments emissions are phenomena with random characters, which depend in particular energy implementation,
mass and shape of the fragments, their direction of emission as well as obstacles that may be on their path.
The number, shape and the initial velocity of the fragments of the shell of a pressure vessel subjected to BLEVE is random, depending
on the conditions in which occurs the failure and the failure mode (brittle, ductile or ductile fracture transition in brittle fracture).
The expertise of accidents shows that the number of significant projectiles is low and most penalizing of them in scope are those from
the circumferential breaking cylindrical tanks (the case of including trucks).
Different models for determining the initial velocities of the projectiles are based on the evaluation of the energy released by the
vaporization of the liquid product and the distribution of this energy (only a portion is used to speed up the fragments of the shell).
projection speeds are therefore determined from the moment one knows the type and number of shots that may be issued.
The projectiles can be classified into two distinct categories:
• Primary projectiles from the casing of the tank: this is the most energy projectiles, including the number and scope are
random. However, in the case of ductile steel tanks compounds the number of shots is low, generally less than 5 for cylindrical
tanks. Therefore, the potential risk is very limited if it incorporates the concept of probability of achieving.
• The secondary projectiles from the presence of objects neighbors capacity (pipes ...): these projectiles are significantly less
energy.
In addition, it should be stressed that the relative models to show fragments are available, such that described by CCPS (Center for
Chemical Process Safety). These models include banking on an estimate of the speed fragments from an assessment of the available
energy to move them. These approaches, purely energy, in particular assume implicitly or the projection of a single fragment whose
mass is equal to the mass of the capacity or the projection of several fragments of identical masses and whose total mass is equal to
that capacity. In addition the trajectory of the fragments can not


on the environment
not be calculated simply. Indeed, as the inner surface of the brightness is subjected to a drive pressure, it acquires speed.
The fragment thus impacted the ground at a distance which depends on the combined effects of the acquired speed of air friction and
gravity. Thus, in the case considered, it is not possible to make fine assumptions about the capacity of the fractionation method
(geometric shapes, masses, projection directions ...).
The methodological guide UFIP (French Union of Petroleum Industries) 2001 version states for all types of tanks maximum throw
distances:
• 80% of the fragments within 250 meters,
• 90% of the fragments within 400 meters.
In addition, a study of HOLDEN and REEVES [R3] based on an analysis BLEVE having occurred on spherical tanks for liquefied gas,
reports that 85% of the fragments have fallen within 200 m around the tank.
Thus, given the modeling limits ment ionnées previously and

orders of magnitude reported by Holden and REEVES, there is rather held,
concerning the projection of fragments induced by Bursting of reservoirs,
projection distances of the order of several hundred groins meters as
plausible.
3.2. DOMINO EFFECTS ANALYSIS RELATED INDUSTRIES NEIGHBOR
3.2.1 VIVO ENERGY Tunisia
According to information provided by the company VIVO ENERGY Tunisia, the area of thermal effects of 5 kW / m 2 After a fire bowl 3A
is 99 m from the edge of the basin. This field is therefore within BUTAGAZ properties (it penetrates 80 m in the property limits). This
therefore represents a significant risk to employees working on the site (the threshold of 3 kW / m 2 penetrates 120 m in the filling
station BUTAGAZ), but also for storage spheres then find the limit of the fire zone Z1 of the bowl 3A VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.
In the case of such a fire bowl, we can assume that in case of major accident, higher thermal effects (of about 16 kW / m 2) would be felt
in the area near the limits of VIVO ENERGY Tunisia. These effects would then have an important impact on BUTAGAZ structures
located in this area.
Given these potential impacts on BUTAGAZ facilities, it is important that all means are implemented to limit the consequences and
especially limit the duration of the fire bowl, because even low thermal radiation can long-term result of significant effects on metal
structures. As part of the mutual assistance protocol between the two companies, fire fighting means BUTAGAZ and VIVO ENERGY


on the environment
Tunisia can be pooled to fight against the risk of a major accident and of domino effect between the two sites. Joint exercises with the
presence of Civil Protection are made every year.
3.2.2 Grain Silo
The evaluation of domino effects caused by grain silos, was based on an estimate of 30 000 tonnes of stored grains. The evaluation of
a dust explosion involving such amounts would not reach directly the facilities of the filling station or BUTAGAZ
the oil wharf (overpressure would not

sufficient to generate damage on people and facilities).
However, a dust explosion in concrete silos would cause significant flying debris of the actual structure of the silos. In this case, the
projections could likely touch the center filling plant BUTAGAZ. However, the storage areas are located opposite the silos, which
means that the danger would mainly concern men and to a lesser extent the facilities.
3.2.3 STLR
The STLR company stores only lubricants.
Among the most important scenarios that may occur on the adjoining site STLR, the most important effects are related to the explosion
of boilers.
Given the dimensions of these boilers in STLR and proximity to the filling plant, it is likely that significant pressures are felt on the
center, particularly at the storage area filled bottles or so at the pipe spheres of power.
However most of the damage that may be caused by the explosion of a boiler are linked to missile projection. These metal fragments
of boiler designed by the blast wave can cause the breakage of a bottle or of a pipe. These projectiles can also cause extensive
damage to the personnel on site.
3.2.4 SCPCI
The SCPCI company stores only the sodium hydroxide solution and diesel (15 m tank 3). No domino effect of fear on the center packer
BUTAGAZ.


on the environment
3.2.5 TOTALGAZ
If BLEVE the sphere of 4000 m 3 TOTALGAZ, the radius of the fireball would be about 350 m around the sphere. The center of
BUTAGAZ is located at a distance, so the thermal effects of a BLEVE of the sphere of TOTALGAZ does not cause a domino effect on
the center. However, this represents a significant risk to the employees of the site.
The pressure effects of a BLEVE of the sphere 4000m 3 are of the order of about 150 m to the threshold of 200 mbar. No risk of domino
effect due to pressure effects is to be feared on the site BUTAGAZ.
3.2.6 OIL Lybia
According to reports, the most important areas domino effects from Terminal 1 of the company Oil Lybia are of the order of 200 m.
Terminal 1 is located more than 400 m from the center filling plant BUTAGAZ, so no risk of a domino effect related to the company Oil
Lybia is therefore to be feared on the site BUTAGAZ
3.2.7 TOTAL FUEL
According to reports, the areas of the most important domino effects from FUELS TOTAL Site are about a hundred meters for a tank
of 11 000 m 3 gas oil (tray pressurizing caught in a fire).
The oil depot TOTAL FUEL is located more than 500 m from the center filling plant BUTAGAZ, so no risk of a domino effect related to
the company TOTAL FUEL is therefore to be feared on the site BUTAGAZ
3.2.8 STEG Berth
According to reports, the most important of domino effects areas from the site of STEG Landing stage are about a hundred meters for
a reservoir 800 m 3 light fuel oil (boil-over of a reservoir).
The site of STEG Berth is located more than 350 m from the center filling plant BUTAGAZ, so no risk of a domino effect related to the
company STEG Landing stage is to be feared on the site BUTAGAZ
However, the site of STEG Berth is located about 100m from the oil wharf. Thus a risk of domino effect is to be expected when
unloading a LPG carrier. Nevertheless, the occurrence of a kinetic Boil Over is very long (several hours) and


on the environment
all precautionary measures (judgment of unloading, departure of the LPG carrier, evacuation of the area, ...) have been taken.
3.2.9 dangerous goods transportation pipelines them
A leak dangerous (LPG, hydrocarbon ...) could have an impact on oil wharf in cases of inflammation of the leak that can cause and,
depending on the product, a fiery jet, UVCE or a pool fire. However, preventive measures are in place at the oil zone:
• it is not possible to unload two ships simultaneously;
• after each discharge, the lines are emptied;
• systematic presence mundane pipes staff during unloading phases;
• check the availability of means of defense against fire before each discharge.
Thus, an accident during an unloading operation of a colleague society would have little impact on the supply pipe spheres BUTAGAZ.
Given the remoteness of transmission pipelines with the filling plant, it is unlikely that a fire or an explosion had effects on the
BUTAGAZ center.


on the environment
4. CHARACTERISTICS OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA TERM E Kinetics
According to the methodology explained in section 5.2 of Chapter 4 of this study, the kinetics of potential major accidents was determined in
the following table:
Table 5: Kinetics of major accidents potenti els BUTAGAZ La Goulette
dangerous phenomenon (estimated effects distanc're leaving the boundaries of the site) Kinetic
Scenario 1: Thermal effects and pressure of a BLEVE of a sphere Quick phenomenon but
delayed
Scenario 2: Thermal effects and pressure of a BLEVE of a tractor trailer Quick phenomenon but
delayed
Scenario 3: thermal effects and pressure of a BLEVE of a small truck Quick phenomenon but
delayed
Scenario 4: pressure effects of a BLEVE of a bottle B13 Quick phenomenon but

delayed
Scenario 6: thermal effects and pressure of a UVCE / Flashfire following the rupture of the very fast phenomenon
supply line (on the pier or on site)
Scenario 6: Thermal effects a jet ignited following the rupture of the supply line (on pier or on very fast phenomenon
site)
Scenario 7: thermal effects and pressure of a UVCE / Flashfire following the breakdown of the very fast phenomenon
interconnection line
Scenario 7: Thermal effects a jet ignited following the rupture of the interconnection line very fast phenomenon
Scenario 8: thermal effects and pressure of a UVCE / Flashfire following the breakdown of the very fast phenomenon
withdrawal line
Scenario 8: Thermal effects a jet ignited following the rupture of the withdrawal line very fast phenomenon
Scenario 9: Thermal effects and pressure of a UVCE / Flashfire following the rupture of the very fast phenomenon
carousel transfer line
Scenario 9: Thermal effects a jet ignited following the rupture of the carousel transfer line very fast phenomenon


on the environment
dangerous phenomenon (estimated effects distanc're leaving the boundaries of the site) Kinetic
Scenario 10: overpressure effects of VCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the carousel very fast phenomenon
supply line
Scenario 12: thermal effects and pressure of a UVCE / Flashfire following the pullout of the very fast phenomenon
loading arm or truck transfer line
Scenario 12: Effects of a thermal jet ignited following the tearing of the loading arm or the truck very fast phenomenon
transfer line
Scenario 13: Thermal effects and pressure of a UVCE / Flashfire following a stitching Out very fast phenomenon
Scenario 13: Effects of a thermal jet ignited after a break stitching very fast phenomenon
Scenario 14: Thermal effects and pressure of a UVCE / Flashfire following a leak of diameter very fast phenomenon
flange 3 '', 4 '', 6 '' and 8 ''
Scenario 14: Effects of a thermal jet inflamed due to leakage on diameter flange 3 '', 4 '', 6 '' very fast phenomenon
and 8 ''
Scenario 15: Effects of pressure UVCE / flash-fire following the opening of a valve line very fast phenomenon
Scenario 15: Effects of a thermal jet ignited following the opening of a valve line very fast phenomenon
Scenarios 16A and 16B: Effects of a pressure UVCE / flash-fire following the opening of a very fast phenomenon
sphere valve (following an external fire or overfilling)
Scenarios 16A and 16B: Effects of a thermal jet ignited following the opening of a sphere valve very fast phenomenon
(following an external fire or overfilling)
Scenario 18: overpressure effects of an explosion in a congested area very fast phenomenon
Scenario 19: Thermal effects of a fire diesel ply retention and outside retention very fast phenomenon
Scenario 20: Thermal effects of a fire in the paint booth very fast phenomenon
Scenario 21: Thermal effects of a store fire very fast phenomenon


on the environment
5. Characterization of PHENOMENES HAZARDOUS TERM E CHANCE OF OCCURRENCE
First, the "bow ties" leading to dangerous major phenomena were investigated. One bow can allow to represent several different major
hazards. The bow ties used for the characterization of hazards occurrence probability matters and annexed 6-2 are:
Annex 6-2: Nodes Site butterflies BUTAGAZ of La Goulette
• bowtie 1: Leaking sphere or any of its equipment (NP1.1) or BLEVE of a sphere (NP1.2);
• bowtie 2: Blow truck arm (NP 2.1), tearing of the truck arm (NP 2.2), leak position on truck (NP 2.3) and BLEVE truck at the loading
station (NP 2.4);
• Bow Tie 3: Leaking truck stationnem ent (NP 3.1) and parked truck BLEVE (NP 3.2);
• bowtie 4: Breaking a guillotine ization channel on the filling station (NP 4.1) on the pier (NP 4.2), between the wharf and the filling
station (NP 4.3) or interconnection line (NP4.4);
• bowtie 5: LPG leak in the em pleating hall;
• bowtie 6: stitching strain on the percent re packer (NP 6.1) or on the pier (NP 6.2);
• bowtie 7: flange Leak on the filling station (NP 7.1) or on the pier (NP 7.2);
• bowtie 8: Opening a valve lig not;
• bowtie 9: Opening a sphere valve gas phase period (NP 9.1) or liquid (NP 9.2);
• bowtie 10: gas oil pool fire in ret ention (NP 10.1) or non-retention (NP 10.2);
• bowtie 11: Painting By re store the fire;
• bowtie 12: BLEVE a LPG cylinder


on the environment
Secondly, and following the methodology explained in Section 5.3 of Chapter 4 of this study, the probability of occurrence of potential
major accident was determined. To do this, the international databases [R4] [R5] were used to assign a frequency to each initiating event if
the site does not have a sufficient feedback and assign a level of trust each of the identified safety barriers.
Justifications to values given to initiating event occurrence frequency (F EIN) and confidence levels (NC) barriers for each bowtie are
appended:
Annex 6-3: Textual F EIN CN and safety barriers
Note :
The domino effects (internal and / or external) have been included as an event initiator in calculating the occurrence of major accidents
probabilities. Only the domino effect that could create one accident were taken into account.
Example: a fiery jet resulting from a ruptured stitching has been integrated as initiating event of a pipeline rupture (and a UVCE or jet
ignited most important) but not vice versa.
The probability of occurrence of potential major accidents is given in the following table:
Table 6: Probability Class of da phenomena ngereux BUTAGAZ of La Goulette
probability class
Bow tie Frequency (according to the
hazard
per year order of
29/09/05)
1. BLEVE of a sphere NP 1.2 3,98.10- 6 E
NP NP 2.4
2. BLEVE of a tractor trailer 7,18.10- 6 E1
3.2
NP NP 2.4
3. BLEVE of a small truck 7,18.10- 6 E
3.2
4. BLEVE a bottle B13 NP 12 3,16.10- 5 D
6.1 / 6.2. UVCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the supply line
NP NP 4.2
- Out at 7,32.10- 6 E2
4.3
pier or between the pier and the site
1 The selected frequency is the largest among a BLEVE at the loading station or parking 2 The chosen frequency is the largest between a
rupture between the pier and the pier and the site


on the environment
probability class
hazard
per year order of
29/09/05)
6.3 Jet ignited following the rupture of the supply line

NP NP 4.2
- Out at 7,32.10- 6 E
4.3
pier or between the pier and the site
6.4 / 6.5. UVCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the supply line -
NP 4.1 8,78.10- 6 E
Out of Site
6.6 Jet ignited following the rupture of the supply line - Out of Site
NP 4.1 8,60.10- 6 E
7.1 / 7.2 UVCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the interconnection

NP 4.4 1,63.10- 6 E
line
7.3 Jet ignited following the breakdown of the interconnection line

NP 4.4 1,63.10- 6 E
8.1 / 8.2. UVCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the withdrawal line
NP 4.1 8,78.10- 6 E
8.3 Jet ignited following the breakdown of the withdrawal line

NP 4.1 8,60.10- 6 E
9.1 / 9.2 UVCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the carousel transfer
NP 4.1 8,78.10- 6 E
line
9.3 Jet ignited following the breakdown of the transfer line

NP 4.1 8,60.10- 6 E
10.1 / 10.2. VCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the carousel

NP 5 1,9.10- 4 C
supply line
12A.1 / 12A.2 UVCE / flash-fire following the breakout of the loading arm
NP 2.2 1,57.10- 5 D
12A.3 Jet ignited following the pullout of the loading arm

NP 2.2 1,57.10- 6 E
12B.1 / 12B.2 UVCE / flash-fire following the breakdown of the truck

NP 2.1 7,81.10- 4 C
transfer line
12B.3 Jet ignited following the breakdown of the truck transfer line
NP 2.1 7,81.10- 5 D
13.1 / 13.2 UVCE / flash-fire following a quilting break:

NP NP 6.1 6,36.10- 5 DC
- on center
6.2 6,33.10- 4
- on wharf


on the environment
probability class
hazard
per year order of
29/09/05)
13.3 Jet inflamed following a quilting break:

NP NP 6.1 2,01.10- 5 DC
- on center
6.2 6,33.10- 4
- on wharf
14.1 / 14.2 UVCE / flash-fire following a leak on flange:

NP NP 7.1 1,62.10- 5 DD
- on center
7.2 3,51.10- 5
- on wharf
14.3 Jet inflamed following a leak on flange:

NP NP 7.1 5,13.10- 6 ED
- on center
7.2 3,51.10- 5
- on wharf
15.1 / 15.2 UVCE / flash-fire following the opening of a valve line

NP 8 2.10- 5 D
15.3 Jet ignited following the opening of a valve line

NP 8 2.10- 5 D
16A.1 / 16A.2. UVCE / flash-fire following the opening of a ball valve due
NP 9.1 1,81.10- 5 D
to an external fire
16A.3 Jet ignited following the opening of a ball valve due to an external
NP 9.1 1,81.10- 5 D
fire
16B.1 / 16B.2 - UVCE / flash-fire following the opening of a ball valve

NP 9.2 1,78.10- 5 D
due to overfilling
16B.3 - Jet ignited following the opening of a ball valve due to overfilling
NP 9.2 1,78.10- 5 D
19.1 gas oil pool fire retention NP 10.1 2,28.10- 5 D
19.2 gas oil pool fire off retention NP 10.2 3,54.10- 6 E
21 Fire store NP 11 6,32.10- 5 D


on the environment
6. Characterization of PHENOMENES HAZARDOUS E TERM OF GRAVITY
According to the methodology explained in section 5.4 of Chapter 4, the severity of potential major accidents will be determined using the
following counting rules:
• Companies in the oil zone which signed the mutual assistance agreement (see list below) are not taken considered third under the
Code of the environment, and are therefore not included in the calculations of gravity :
- BUTAGAZ Tunisia (LPG filling center) ;;
- SNDP (Deposit liquid hydrocarbon + center packer AGILGAZ);
- STEG (thermal power plant);
- SOTRAPIL (Terminal liquid hydrocarbon);
- BTSA (Plant bituminous products);
- VIVO ENERGY Tunisia (Deposit of liquid hydrocarbons);
- STLR (blending plant lubricating oils);
- Lybia Oil Tunisia (Two liquid hydrocarbon deposits);
- Lubricants Tunisia (blending plant lubricating oils);
- TOTAL Tunisia (Deposit of liquid hydrocarbons);
- TOTALGAZ Tunisia (center filling plant LPG);
- Staroil (Deposit of liquid hydrocarbons);
- STPA, GSP & Chimex (manufacturing plant Complex / storage of chemicals);
- CPC (Thermal Power);
- BITUMED (Factory products tar);
- Maghreb coating (products Plant tar);
- SCPCI (Filing of sodium hydroxide solution);
- INTERMETAL (hot rolling plant).
• The company Silo Cereals has not signed the Convention on Mutual Assistance, its workforce is recognized. For counting people
impacted at Silo Cereal, two situations were selected:


on the environment
- If the effects reach the wastelands of Silo Cereal, considered the number is less than 1person;
- If the effects reach buildings silos Cereal, overall strength is considered to be 63 people.
• Enrollment in OMMP are not recognized;
• The staff of the oil dock is not counted because the staff is either part of the workforce of the OMMP or those of oil companies;
• The staff of the cereal Quai is not counted because the staff is either part of the workforce of the OMMP either of those silos Cereal;
• local services of the routes are not taken into account because it is assumed that those who use the work for the companies listed
before;
• railway Tunis - La Marsa: 12 people / km every 6 min (see Chapter 2);
• Goulette Port: Three ferries can be docked simultaneously, more than 1000 people;
• Regarding the city of La Goulette, he was selected for a population density of 20 persons per hectare (Source: Census 2004, 28 407
inhabitants on 1470 ha). The impacted areas and the population are:
- City of La Goulette: 7 hectares affected is 140 people;
- port area of La Goulette: 36 hectares or 720 people.
• For counting people in the area bounded by the irreversible effects threshold, the people in the area bounded by the threshold lethal
effects were not taken into account, so as not to double counting (same way proceed between the threshold and the lethal effects
threshold irreversible lethal effects);
The following tables show the count of people impacted for each accident and filing that results in the matrix:

cruise
Area
Companies
More than 10 people in the oil zone:
Grain Silo TOTALGAZ, Lybia

docks
Oil, Star Oil,
OMMP
local traffic Metalplast, Lybia
routes (road and

Oil Tunisia, VIVO
Website
rail transport)
ENERGY Tunisia SCPCI, STLR, Alki, BITUMED TOTAL Tunisia HNS located west of the
and goods Half of the port areaDocks
cereal of Laoil
Goulette
Docks (18 ha)
bounded by the threshold of significant lethal effects
of LA
feeder
Half Area GOULETTE Hazard Study C
and their impact on the environm
More than 100 people

generous
of the port
Disastrous
Page 92/127
HNS
road from
area of La PERLA CPC
Central heat bounded by the threshold lethal effects

RADES 2 SOTRAPIL
Goulette (18 ha) Fishing port of La Goulette RR 33 on 0.2 km
the seaport and the fishing port of El Beach Karraka few m

2
railway Tunis-La Marsa 2 km

Area
Thermal
RR 23 on 1 km (expressway)
Between City of La Goulette (25 ha)
Beach El Karraka
33 RR 1 km
Power STEG RADES STPA
bounded by the threshold of irreversible effects

Area Area
local local
More than 10 people
Grain Silo
<1personne
people in the area Tunisia oil
access
Website
bounded by the threshold of significant lethal effects bounded by the threshold of significant lethal effects
access roads (road and rail transport)
of LA
Quays Number of
roads (road and rail transport) waves pitches Silos Cereals
VIVO ENERGY Tunisia on some m

Area Area GOULETTE Hazard Study C
Between 10 and 100 people
generous
Catastrophic Grain Silo

Alki OMMP cereal ENERGY
Page 93/127 Disastrous <1personne
STLR
Alki pitches
bounded by the threshold lethal effects bounded by the threshold lethal effects
OMMP cereal
Quays
ENERGY Tunisia STLR
Area Area
VIVO VIVO
<1personne <1personne
bounded by the threshold of irreversible effects bounded by the threshold of irreversible effects
Area
Do not leave the site boundary
Website
bounded
of LA
Area GOULETTE Hazard Study C

Do not leave the site boundary
generous
Page 94/127
Moderate
bounded by the threshold lethal effects

Area
STLR few m
<1personne
2
Docks and
Area
Companies
More than 10 people

in the oil zone:
Grain Silo
VIVO ENERGY
OMMP
OMMP Cereal
Tunisia SCPCI, - -
Website
STLR, Alki, STEG

oil Quays
located in the northwest of the site local traffic routes (road and rail)
of LA
(road and rail)

generous
Page 95/127 <1personne

Disastrous
- - -
service roads bounded by the threshold lethal effects
Area
local
Companies
cereal docks Grain Silo in the oil

<1personne
zone: VIVO
ENERGY Tunisia SCPCI, STLR, Alki, TOTAL Tunisia, STEG located in the northw
Area
Companies
More than 10 people

in the oil zone:
Grain Silo
VIVO ENERGY
OMMP
Tunisia SCPCI,
Website
STLR, Alki, STEG

located in the northwest of the site local traffic routes (road and rail)
of LA
oil and grain Quays Quays
Area bounded by the threshold lethal effects
GOULETTE Hazard Study C

generous
<1personne
Page 96/127 Disastrous
Area
TOTAL Tunisia on some m
<1personne
2
Area
Societies
More than 10 people

OFDA: VIVO
Grain Silo
OMMP and Quays

ENERGY
- -
Website
Tunisia, SCPCI,
oil Quays
STLR, Alki, local traffic routes (road and rail transport)
of LA

Area and their impact on the environm
generous
Page 97/127
Disastrous <1personne
oil Docks
- - -
Area
Companies
in the oil zone: VIVO

Grain Silo
<1personne
ENERGY Tunisia
OMMP
-
SCPCI, STLR, Alki,,
STEG located in the bounded by the threshold of irreversible effects
northwest of the site
local traffic routes (road and rail) STEG located in the northwest of the site
Website
of LA

generous
Page 98/127
Area
Companies
More than 10 people

in the oil zone:
Grain Silo
VIVO ENERGY
OMMP
Tunisia SCPCI,
Website
STLR, Alki, STEG located in the northwest of the site local traffic routes (road and rail)
oil Quays
of LA

STEG and their impact on the environm
generous
Page 99/127 Disastrous

<1personne
located in the northwest of the site Cereal Docks
Area
<1personne

Area
Societies
OFDA: TOTALGAZ,
<1 person
Energy B., Lybia Oil
- -
Tunisia VIVO
Website
ENERGY Tunisia,
STLR, Alki local traffic

of LA
routes (road and rail transport) waves pitches Silos Cereals

generous
100/127 Page
<1personne
Important
- - -
Area
Societies
Metalplast few m Between 10 and 100 people
OFDA: TOTALGAZ,
Energy B., ELF,

Grain Silo
<1personne Metalplast, Lybia Oil
Tunisia VIVO
ENERGY Tunisia,
SCPCI, STLR, Alki local traffic routes (road and rail transport) OMMP
2
wastelands of Silo Cereals Area
Societies
OFDA:
<1 person
TOTALGAZ,
Energy B.,
Website
Metalplast few m2,

Lybia Oil Tunisia VIVO ENERGY Tunisia, STLR, Alki local traffic routes (road and rail tra
of LA

generous
Page 101/127 <1 person

Important Metalplast
ELF few m
2
Area
Grain Silo
ELF
Exxon Mobil
OMMP

Area
Companies
More than 10 people in the oil zone:
Grain Silo VIVO ENERGY
OMMP Tunisia STLR, Alki
local traffic routes - and Quays -

Website
(road and rail) STEG located in the northwest of the site on some m
2
cereal Quays
of LA

Area and their impact on the environm
generous
Page 102/127
<1 person
Disastrous
oil Docks
- - -
Area
Companies
in the oil zone: VIVO
ENERGY Tunisia
oil quays Grain Silo
<1 SCPCI, STLR, Alki
OMMP local traffic routes
(road and rail) STEG
located in the northwest of the site on some m

2
Area
More than 10 people VIVO

ENERGY Tunisia STLR
Grain Silo
Alki local traffic routes
OMMP (road and rail) STEG

located in the northwest
of the site on some m
Website
2
cereal Quays
of LA

generous
Page 103/127 oil quays

Disastrous <1 person
Area
<1
SCPCI

Area
VIVO
number of people in the
<1 person
ENERGY 0p
-
Website
Tunisia local vacant land Cereals

of LA
traffic routes (road and rail transport) waves pitches Silos Cereals
(road and rail) Silos Area GOULETTE Hazard Study C

generous

Important
0p
Alki local traffic routes
- -
ENERGY Tunisia STLR
Area
STLR few m VIVO
<1
<1 p
2
local
VIVO
<1 person
Website
ENERGY Tunisia STLRbyfew

bounded themthreshold of significant lethal effects
access roads 2(road and rail transport)
bounded
of LA

generous

Important
STLR
Alki few m
2
Area
<1
Alki
Area
- -
Website
bounded
of LA

generous
Page 106/127
Moderate
- -
Area
VIVO
<1 person
ENERGY Tunisia STLR

VIVO
<1 person
ENERGY - -
Website

Tunisia local traffic routes (road and rail transport)
bounded of LA

generous

Important
- - -
STLR few m VIVO
<1 <1 person

ENERGY
Tunisia STLR
2 local traffic routes (road and rail transport)

VIVO
<1 person
ENERGY
Website

Tunisia local traffic routes (road and rail transport)
bounded
of LA
Number of
Area
generous
<1 person
Page 108/127
Important
Area
<1
STLR
Area Area
oil Quays
VIVO VIVO
<1 person <1 person
ENERGY ENERGY
- -
Website
Tunisia OMMP oil Quays Tunisia OMMP oil Quays

bounded bounded of LA
Tunisia OMMP

generous
Page 109/127 <1 person <1 person

Important Important
- - - -
bounded by the threshold lethal effects ENERGY bounded by the threshold lethal effects
Area Area
VIVO
<1 <1 <1
- -
Area Area
VIVO oil Quays

VIVO
<1 person <1 person
ENERGY ENERGY
- -
Website
Tunisia OMMP oil Quays Tunisia OMMP oil Quays

Tunisia OMMP

generous

Important Important
- - - -
bounded by the threshold lethal effects ENERGY
Area Area
VIVO
<1 <1 <1
- -
Area Area
<1 person
- -
Website

generous
VIVO ENERGY Tunisia

Important
Moderate
- -

Area Area
<1 person <1 person
2
Area
VIVO ENERGY Tunisia
<1 person
- -
Website

generous
Catastrophic Grain Silo

Page 112/127
Moderate
STLR
- -
local traffic bounded by the threshold lethal effects bounded by the threshold lethal effects
routes (road and rail transport)

Area Area
wastelands of Silo Cereals
<1 <1 person
Alki
OMMP few m
2
2
Areaside Site
Sort only the ocean Area
<1 person side location
Tunisia Grain
- -
Website
wastelands of SiloArea
Cereals Area GOULETTE Hazard Study C
only the ocean generous

VIVO ENERGY Tunisia
Page 113/127 <1 personENERGY
Moderate Moderate
- -
Area Sort Area
VIVO
<1 <1 person

wastelands of SiloArea
Cereals wastelands of Silo Cereals Area
VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Number of VIVO
<1 person <1 person

ENERGY Tunisia
STLR Alki local
Website
traffic routes
(road and rail transport)
bounded
of LA
Quays Quays

generous
OMMP few m

Important Important
oil cereals
Area Area
Grain Silo
<1
OMMP SCPCI
STEG located in the North West

Area
wastelands of Silo Cereals
<1 person
roads
Website
bounded
of LA

generous
service

Important
Area
local
<1
e
Fast Fast Fast
but but but

Cinétiqu
delayed delayed delayed
Class
probability
E E E
ed
Website
serious
730
54 98
effects
of LA
Acute
117 167 977
effects
1218 Effects generous

167 226
significati
fs ls
Page 116/127 BUTAGAZ Goulette Distances thermal effects (m)
effects
serious
117
31 37
effects
Acute
146
39 47
effects
significant
311
83 99
effects
Broken
166 198 622
windows
catastrophic Disastrous Disastrous Severity
that
class
e
Fast
Very Very Very Very Very
but
Cinétiqu
fast fast fast fast fast delayed
Class
probability
E E E E E D
ed
Distances thermal effects (m) Website

serious
174 176 149 176 155 NA3
effects
of LA
Acute
174 199 149 199 155 N/A
effects
Effects generous
191 229 164 229 171 N/A significati
fs
Page 117/127
effects
serious
N/A N/A N/A
- - 4
effects
Acute
N/A N/A N/A
- - 5
effects
significant
267 217 257
10
- -
effects
Broken
520 440 517
20
- -
windows
Disastrous Disastrous Disastrous Disastrous Severity

Important
Moderate
class
e
Very Very Very Very Very Very Very Very Very
Cinétiqu
fast fast fast fast fast fast fast fast fast
Class
probability
C E D C E E E E E
ed

serious
226 228 163
87 85 87 86 81
- effects
of LA
12B. 1 12A. 3 12A. 1 Acute

255 228 183
87 95 87 96 81
-
effects
Effects generous
109 110 293 251 210
96 96 90 significati
-
fs
Page 118/127
effects
serious
N/A N/A 37 N/A N/A
- - - - effects
Acute
N/A N/A 46 N/A N/A
- - - -
effects
significant
120 120 116 338
99
- - - -
effects
Broken
234 234 198 235 655
- - - -
windows
Disastrous Disastrous Severity

Important Important Important Important Important Important
Moderate
class
e
Very Very Very Very Very
Cinétiqu
fast fast fast fast fast
Class
probability
D E D D C D C D D
ed

serious
38 35 41 38 85
effects
of LA
Acute
43 35 46 38 95
effects
UVCE /
Effects generous
109
49 39 52 42 significati
fs
Page 119/127
effects
serious
N/A N/A
- - - effects
Acute
N/A N/A
- - -
effects
significant
42 47
- - -
effects
Broken
80 89
- - -
windows
Important Important Important Important Important Severity
class
e
Very Very Very Very Very Very Very Very
Cinétiqu
fast fast fast fast fast fast fast fast
Class
probability
E D D D D D D D
ed

serious
111 111
14 12 23 23 27
3
effects
of LA
16B. 3 16A. 3 16A. 1 Acute

149 149
23 16 23 23 33
3
effects
Effects generous
193 193
35 21 26 26 41 significati
4
fs
Page 120/127
effects
as 16B. 1 serious
N/A N/A N/A
- - - - - effects
Acute
N/A N/A N/A
- - - - -
effects
significant
94 94 14
- - - - -
effects
Broken
217 217
33
- - - - -
windows
Catastrophic
Important Important Important Severity
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
class
e
Very
Cinétiqu
fast
Class
probability
D
ed

serious
10
effects
of LA
Acute
13
effects
Effects generous
16 significati
fs
Page 121/127
effects
serious
- effects
Acute
effects
significant
effects
Broken
-
windows
Important Severity
class
Figure 1: Current criticality matrix ACCIDE line break line break
UVCE following
transfer carousel Jet ignited after breaking online Jet transfer carousel ignited after tearing Jet truck ignited arm flange leakage after center on Fire web diesel off retention
Jet
UVCE
after tearing Jet truck arm
ignited following the breakdown

BLEVE
Page 122/127
of the transfer line truck UVCE
a B13 UVCE bottle after breaking stitching on
center Jet ignited after breaking

after opening a
stitching on center UVCE
Website
UVCE line valve following flange leak on center D
UVCE following flange leakage of LA

following the opening
on pier Jet ignited following
of a ball valve due to leak flange on pier Jet ignited GOULETTE Hazard Study Cha
following the opening of a line valve gas oil pool fire retention store Fire
an external fire UVCE
ignited following the opening of a ball valve due to an external fire generous and their impact on the
following the opening of a ball valve as a result overfilling Jet inflamed due to the opening of a ball valve due to overfilling
potential major nts BUTAGAZ La Goulette
UVCE
VCE
following the probability
breakdown of
the transfer line
C
UVCE truck
after breaking stitching on pier Jet ignited after breaking stitching on pier
following the breakdown of the carousel supply line
AT

on the environment
7.3. ASSESSMENT OF RISK ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENTS
7.3.1 Risk Analysis of Results
Given the final placement of hazards in the criticality matrix, it emerges that:
• hazardous phenomenon is located in an unacceptable risk to box,
• 28 hazards are positioned in a box at intermediate risk,
• 6 hazards are positioned in the lower risk zone.
Note again that BUTAGAZ initiated a process to improve the security

his vis-à-vis environmental installations E xtérieur. Thus, to achieve this level
risk control, BUTAGAZ agrees to implement the following compensatory measures
:
• Enslaving the high pressure alarm spheres to site safety mode (automatic valves closed, stopping LPG pumps and start-fire
groups);
• Establish a flame detector on the parking area and connected to the alarm center;
• Establish a gas detector on the parking area, connected to the central alarm.
BUTAGAZ has already implemented following the analysis r isks several measures
risk reduction, to know :
• Enlargement protections gantry's feet (at the inlet side VIVO ENERGY Tunisia) so as to encompass the conduit and protect by
slides all lines may be attacked by a vehicle;
• Development of the maintenance schedule of fuel tanks;
• Construction of a retention dam for the diesel tank of the fire pump station;
• Conducting the inspection of concrete pads of the fuel tank of the fire pump station;
• Turning retention storage of paintings.
These compensatory measures, highlighted by the detailed risk analysis, are all likely to improve the acceptability of the risk at the site
of La Goulette.


on the environment
It is important to note that the confidence level of the different barriers presented in bow ties, including compensatory barriers, is based
on values recognized by the industry and by the French and European regulations. In order not to degrade the level of risk in time, it
will be necessary to ensure the maintenance of confidence barriers through monitoring, maintenance and regular testing that will need
to keep traceability.
Other compensatory measures, the level of trust can be established easily but also contribute to improving security, were also
identified during the risk analysis:
• Enslaving the very low level of the spheres to the stopping of the pumps;
• Studying the repositioning of the parking area so that the tanks do not park in the center of the spheres;
• Studying the repositioning of the gas sensor of the filling hall;
• Add an emergency stop outside the station P35;
• Install an arrester type 1 in the electrical supply in the local TGBT and an arrester for communication networks arriving at the
telephone line;
• Install an arrester type 1 in the cabinet LPG pumps and surge arrester Type 2 in the rack of the fire extinguishing pumps and
the cabinet jockey pumps;
• Install a type 2 lightning arrester in the rack of the detection unit of the guard house.
BUTAGAZ has already implemented following the analysis r isks several measures
Improvement, to know :
• Added checking the pressure of the bypass vessel on the checklist reception;
• Transfer Agreement product cross-site;
• Marking the direction of fluid circulation in the SKID filling;
• Integration of maintenance sprays fire pump station in the maintenance plan;
• Adding a Signaling (flammable liquid) at the diesel tanks;
• Connect to the ground loop pillars of the metallic structure of the pump station LPG;
• Connect to earth ground extractors on the roof of the filling hall;
• Connect to ground the lower parts of the access stairs to the spheres and diesel fuel tanks;


on the environment
• Connect three earthing three pillars of the metal structure of the truck loading station;
• Connect the diesel tank of the fire pump station to ground.
7.3.2 future improvement Tracks
The acceptability criteria are based on French law, focusing on the protection of third parties and the control of urbanization. Aside
from the BLEVE scenario of a sphere, the disastrous severities are exclusively the distances the threshold of significant lethal
effects impacting society Silo Cereals
. The integration of the company Silo Cereals
Assistance Mutual protocol of the oil zone Rades would not recognize the employees of this company. Thus, the scenarios in the
matrix then present a lower risk.
Regarding BLEVE scenarios of a sphere, BUTAGAZ led reflections in order to reduce the criticality of this scenario, both by reducing
the probability and severity .
For the probability BUTAGAZ is committed to implement the servo of the high pressure of the spheres to the security setting of
the website: this allowed to pass
the occurrence of the phenomenon of probability class D class E.
For gravity, BUTAGAZ conducted two thoughts to decrease the distances of effects of this scenario:
• Or by limiting the spheres filling ratio LPG.
• Or by lowering the set pressure of the valve s spheres.
Limiting the filling rate of the GP spheres L:
BUTAGAZ studied the variation in distances effects of BLEVE scenario by limiting the rate of filling of LPG spheres 88.7% to 10%.
This study shows a significant drop effect distances (100 m for limited occupancy rate of 70%, 300 m to a limited occupancy rate of
50%, 500 m to a limited occupancy rate to 30%, ...) .


on the environment
Decrease in the calibration of the valve spheres:
The current calibration of the valve of the spheres is 13.2 bars. This value was determined as the storage spheres were dimensioned
to be able to store butapro (complex mixture of hydrocarbons based on butane and propane and propane whose concentration does
not exceed 25%).
For over 10 years, the spheres of BUTAGAZ not store as butane. However, the dimensioning of butane storage spheres allows a set
pressure of the valve 7.5 bar.
A risk reduction measures would gift c reviewing the calibration valve

and attach it to 7.5 bar.
Under these conditions, i l can be used to calculate the distan these effects
thermal BLEVE of the formulas of circular u May 10, 2010 summarizing the rules
Methodological applicable to hazard studies at the discretion of the process of risk reduction at source and technological
risk prevention plans (PPRT) in facilities classified for environmental protection (French regulation) [R8] .
These formulas are an application model TRC SHIELD and depend on the product in the presence and the maximum mass of liquefied
gas contained in the sphere
For example, keeping the current fill level of the spheres (88.7%), this measure reduces by about 25% effects distances (see table
below):
SALTS SALT SEI
(1800 (kW / m²) 4/3) (1000 kW / m²) 4/3. s) (600 (kW / m²) 4/3. s)
Sphere filled to 88.7%, with valves calibrated

730 m 977 m 1218 m
to 13.2 bar
Sphere filled to 88.7%, with valves

550 m 729 m 901 m
calibrated to 7.5 bar
The full lines of inquiry explored by BUTAGAZ to reduce the criticality of the BLEVE scenario of a sphere of LPG is attached.
Annex 6-4: Study of the variation in distances s BLEVE effects depending on the level
filling spheres


on the environment
7.3.3 Conclusion
The BUTAGAZ company, which operates a center fills ur LPG in the oil zone of Rades, strives to maintain a u nivea of the
highest possible security.
To meet the requirements of the standard profession and regulations

Tunisian and international, BUTAGAZ has égaleme nt engaged in a process to improve the security of its facilities
vis-à-vis the external environment.
This approach involves the implementation implementation of measures c ompensatoires BUTAGAZ that is committed to
achieving and ensuring their effectiveness years time.
These measures will reduce the risk to an n evel as low as possible in

Given the methods and quantities of products util ized.

Edd Butagaz La Goulette - Chapitre 6 Part 2

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Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

2.2. SUMMARY OF HAZARDOUS PHENOMENA

The following table presents the modeling results.

750-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-00734 / CI - January 2012 Page 64/127

regulations of accident scenarios BUTAGA

Effect Very Grave

Not reached Not reached Not reached

155 117 730

Not reached Not reached Not reached Serious effect

155 117 167 146 977

517 166 198 622

Effect Very Grave

Not reached Not reached Not reached Not reached

226 228 163 174 176 149 176

235 655 520 440

Effect Very Grave

Not reached Not reached Not reached

Not reached Not reached Not reached Serious effect

109 120 110

14.12 14.11 14.10

Effect Very Grave

Not reached Not reached Not reached Not reached

16B.3 16B.2 16B.1 16A.3 16A.2 16A.1

Effect Very Grave

Not reached Not reached Not reached Not reached

Not reached Not reached Not reached Serious effect

262 102 149 16A -

134 130 193

306 148 217

19.2 19.1 18.4 18.3 18.2

Effect Very Grave

184 234 122

419 534 280

Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

3. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS DOMINOES

3.1. ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL EFFECTS DOMINOES

3.1.1 domino effects related to BLEVE

3.1.1.1 BLEVE of a sphere

heat flow Rating:

The duration of the fireball with a radius of 291 m would be 31 seconds.

target present in the

Spheres of LPG 20 Yes

truck loading station 40 Yes

LPG pump station 15 Yes

parked tankers 50 Yes

Filling halls 30 Yes

bottle storage areas 70 Yes

administrative buildings 100 Yes

fire pump station 70 Yes

Reserve fire 66 Yes

750-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-00734 / CI - January 2012 Page 71/127

Study Hazards Chapter 6: Detailed

target within the

Spheres of LPG 20 Yes

truck loading station 40 Yes

LPG pump station 15 Yes

parked tankers 50 Yes

Filling halls 30 Yes

bottle storage areas 70 Yes

administrative buildings 100 Yes

fire pump station 70 Yes

Reserve fire 66 Yes