23ibid., p. 5.

r a discussion of the relationship to the xirban crisis and

welfare, see Helen Ginsburg, Unemployment, Subamployment and P\jblic
Policy, ch. 5, or "Needed: A National Commitment to Full Employment,"
Current History, 65 (August 1973), pp. 74-75 and 88.
25u.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Achieving the Goals
of the Employment Act of 1946—Thirtieth Anniversary Review, Vol. 1,
Paper 5, Estimating the Social Costs of National Economic Policy:
Implications for Mental and Physical Health, and Criminal Aggression,
by Harvey Brenner (Washington, D . C : U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976), p. 5. This excellent study also contains a review of the
literature and a bibliography.
26por a discussion of the politics of this coalition and on the
development of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill in its early versions, see
Helen Ginsburg, "Jobs for All: Congressional Will-o'the-Wisp,"
The Nation, February 5, 1977, pp. 138-143.
27p.L. 523, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

THE EVOLUTION OF HUMPHREY-HAWKINS*

Harvey L. Schantz, State University of New York—Plattsburgh
Richard H. Schmidt, United States Department of Labor

ABSTRACT

Humphrey-Hawkins, enacted into law as the Full Employment and

Balanced Growth Act of 1978, is the most important step the Federal
government has taken for overall economic coordination since passage
of the Employment Act of 1946. The centerpiece of the new law is
specific goals for unemployment and inflation. All Federal programs
and policies are to work toward achieving a 3 percent adult and
4 percent overall jobless rate within five years, and inflation
rates of 3 percent by 1983 and 0 percent by 1988. The present
article outlines the major changes made in Humphrey-Hawkins from its
introduction in June 1974 to its enactment in October 1978, the con-
tents of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, and
the politics surrounding its passage.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. On June 26, 1974, Augustus F.

Hawkins, a black Democratic congressman representing the Watts, Los
Angeles congressional district, received a minute to address the U.S.
House about the Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Bill

*This article is adapted from Planning for Employment, a full-

length study being jointly conducted by the two authors. Sources in-
clude interviews with certain principals (many not for attribution),
the public record (media, scholarly, and congressional), and working
congressional documents (including party, committee, group, and member
sources), as well as participant observation (in the U.S. House and
Senate). This article was co-authored by Richard H. Schmidt in his
private capacity. The authors are solely responsible for all errors
of fact and interpretation.
368
(HR 15476) which he and Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D., WI)
had introduced the week before. "Assuring full employment," began
Congressman Hawkins, "is the single most important step in the
national interest at this time." Furthermore, according to Hawkins,
"an authentic full employment policy rejects the narrow, statistical
idea of full employment measured in terms of some tolerable level of
unemployment—the percentage game—and adopts the more human and
socially meaningful concept of personal rights to an opportunity for
useful employment at fair rates of compensation." ^

The failure of the economy to provide adequate employment

opportunity for its almost 92 million civilian labor force was the impe-
tus for Hawkins' action. After holding at an average annual rate of
4.7 percent for the years from 1962 through 1973, ^the rate of unem-
ployment began to grow precipitously in 1974. From a 5.2 percent unem-
ployment rate in June 1974, the jobless rate rose to 5.8 percent in Sep-
tember, 6.6 percent in November, and 8.2 percent in January 1975.
During 1974, unemployment (seasonally adjusted) increased from 4.66
million to 7.53 million workers—the largest single yearly increase in
unemployment during the post-world war period.

Although unemployment increased in every sector of the work

force during 1974, blacks, youth, and women—groups having, even
in the best of circumstances, a relatively high unemployment rate—
absorbed a disproportionate share of this increase in joblessness.
Minority unemployment, for example, increased from 9.2 percent to
13.4 percent; the rate of unemployment among black youth rose from
28.7 percent to 41.1 percent during 1974.^ Vernon E. Jordan, J r . ,
executive director of the National Urban League, commented that this
situation "amounts to a major depression for black workers."*^

The bill introduced by Hawkins and Reuss, and its Senate coun-
terpart introduced August 22, 1974 by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
(D., MN) ,5 sought to establish in law a personal right for all Ameri-
cans willing and able to work an opportunity for employment that
would be enforceable in court; require the President to submit an
annual economic report to Congress with recommendations that would
assure full employment; expand the Local Planning Councils under
CETA to assess community needs and create a reservoir of public
service projects as a potential for job references; provide for the
delivery of an actual job by a Job Guarantee Office, an organiza-
tional unit in the proposed U.S. Full Employment Service; create a
Standby Jobs Corps for jobs of last resort if the private sector could
not supply adequate employment; and require a full employment
society within five years of enactment.

The central idea behind Hawkins' bill—planning and coordi-

nating the Federal economic mechanisms to assure a full employment
economy—was not novel. Planning for full employment had informed
the efforts of Senators James E. Murray (D., MT) and Robert A.
Wagner (D., NY) during the mid 1940s. The resulting Employment
Act of 1946 is generally looked upon as a milestone in the economic
history of the United States.^ The Act declared that it is the policy
of the Federal Government to "coordinate and utilize all its plans,
functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining,
in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enter-
prise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be

369
afforded useful employment for those able, willing, and seeking to
work, and to promote maximum employment, production, and pur-
chasing power." Subsequent sections of the 1946 Employment Act
provide the statutory basis for the annual economic report of the
President, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress.

Many liberal and labor groups were disappointed in the Employ-

ment Act of 1946. Not only had the opposition succeeded in deleting
the term "full employment" from the title of the Act, they had
deflected its purpose by requiring the President to equally consider
other economic goals. It was partly "to reverse this calamitous out-
come and return to the original intent of the Murray-Wagner full
employment bill as introduced in 1945," that Hawkins launched his
campaign for full employment legislation. '^

PLANNING FOR EMPLOYMENT. On May 21, 1975, Senators Hubert

H. Humphrey and Jacob Javits (R., NY) introduced S 1795, The
Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act of 1975. The thrust of
this comprehensive national economic planning measure was much
wider than the then current version of Humphrey-Hawkins. A key
provision of S 1795 sought to create an Economic Planning Board in
the Executive Office of the President to appraise the nation's total
fiscal needs and establish an outline of economic goals. These goals
were to be submitted by the President to the Congress' Joint Economic
Committee for review and for eventual approval by a concurrent
resolution of the House and Senate.

On June 11 and 12, the Joint Economic Committee, with Chairman

Hubert H. Humphrey presiding, held hearings on "National Economic
Planning, Balanced Growth, and Full Employment." One of the high-
lights of these hearings was the forceful argument of Leonard Wood-
cock, President of the United Auto Workers, as to the need for im-
proved national economic planning mechanisms. Woodcock argued that
the Humphrey-Javits bill and Humphrey-Hawkins "are complimentary
pieces of legislation.. .The Humphrey-Javits bill deals with the entire
issue of long rangje national planning. The Humphrey-Hawkins bill
makes it clear that the primary goal of any such national planning must
be the achievement of full employment." ^ Future versions of the
Humphrey-Hawkins legislation provided an amalgam of these two bills:
a national economic planning bill which called for full employment as
the primary goal.

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS.
The 1976 Campaign and Election. As the 1976 presidential campaign
got underway, many Democratic party leaders sought to exploit the
unemployment problem—and Humphrey-Hawkins was looked to as the
appropriate legislative vehicle. Hubert Humphrey and his staff, as
well as organized labor, however, were very concerned with the cost
of some of the specific provisions of Humphrey-Hawkins. Humphrey
and other Democratic leaders feared that the bill had the potential of
becoming an "albatross" around the neck of any Democratic party
presidential candidate, as the guaranteed annual income had to George
McGovern in his 1972 presidential bid. Already, the Republican admin-
istration had publicly attacked the cost of the bill, estimated at
$30-60 billion annually.

370
 Representatives of organized labor, Humphrey's office, and
Hawkins' office met to discuss their concerns. After long and pro-
tracted negotiations, a new version of Humphrey-Hawkins—one that
could safely be used as a presidential campaign issue—was agreed
upon.

On March 12, 1976, Hubert Humphrey and Augustus Hawkins

introduced the new version of their bill at a joint news conference.
Their announcement was coordinated with a burst of announced sup-
port for Humphrey-Hawkins by black, labor, and liberal groups.
The following week, a two day conference on unemployment, in com-
memoration of the 30th anniversary of the Employment Act of 1946,
was held by the Joint Economic Committee. ^

The version introduced in March 1976, although calling for

3 percent unemployment within four years, did acknowledge the
importance of national production and purchasing power, as well as
the need to curb inflation. In short, it reflected the influence of the
Humphrey-Javits planning bill, and the increasing saliency of
inflation.

The new version of Humphrey-Hawkins is "a piece of legisla-

tion around which candidates can base their campaigns," Hubert
Humphrey noted at the March 12th news conference. And indeed.
Democratic presidential hopefuls were doing just that. Humphrey
had, from the beginning, viewed Humphrey-Hawkins as a means of
returning to the national limelight. Representative Morris K. Udall
(D., AZ) and former Senator Fred Harris (D., OK) had both en-
dorsed the earlier version of Humphrey-Hawkins. Senator Henry M.
Jackson (D., WA) was expected to support the new version of the
legislation.^^

Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, through his economic

adviser Lawrence Klein, other prominent economists, and freshman
Democratic House members indicated that they did not share
Humphrey's enthusiasm with the legislation, however. To meet the
objections of these parties, "extensive revisions" were made. The
fall 1976 draft—which was reintroduced on January 4, 1977, the
first day of the 95th Congress—reflected greater emphasis upon the
goal of curbing inflation and contained specific anti-inflation pro-
visions, as well as made clear that the last resort reservoir of fed-
erally funded jobs would consist of low paying employment so as not
to encourage inflation or employee migration from the private to the
public sector. ^^

The Carter Administration. During the initial months of the Carter

presidency Senator Hubert Humphrey was, in the opinion of many
Washington observers, the president's most effective congressional
advocate. In the words of one well placed staffer, Humphrey time
after time rescued the President's "legislative chestnuts from the
fire." Humphrey understood the difficulties of setting up a new
administration and therefore did not press the White House for
btrong support of Humphrey-Hawkins. By June, however, Humphrey
began to push for action. It was to take considerable pressure—from
Humphrey, labor, black leaders, and Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D.,
MA)—and compromise to win the administration's support for
Humprhey-Hawkins.
371
 On November 14, 1977, in a joint news release, the Offices of
Senator Hubert Humphrey and Representative Augustus Hawkins
announced that an agreement had been reached with the President
over a new version of the bill. The new draft contained "the pro-
vision that adult unemployment be reduced to 3 percent and overall
unemployment reduced to 4 percent within five years, in lieu of
the earlier provision that adult unemployment only be reduced to
3 percent within four years."^2 Also, the President was granted a
"bailout" clause; he was given the right to request Congress to alter
these goals for the third and subsequent years that the bill was in
effect.
The President also received more leeway in the bill's anti-
inflationary provisions. The new version of the bill did not require
the President to maintain inflation at or below the level at enactment,
as did the fall 1976 draft.

The new version further stressed the expansion of private

employment. The creation of reservoirs of last-resort public service
jobs were delayed for at least two years after enactment, and
required to have a separate authorization.

In short, for his endorsement, the President exacted more flex-

ibility in the legislation's goals, and greater reliance on private
employment.

CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS.
The House. The Carter endorsed versions of HR 50 and S 50 were
introduced on the first day of the second session of the 95th Con-
gress. On February 8, 1978, the Employment Opportunities Subcom-
mittee of the House Education and Labor Committee, chaired by
Augustus Hawkins, approved the latest version of Humphrey-Hawkins.
The Subcommittee had rejected an amendment by Ronald A. Sarasin
(R, CT) that would have set a goal for reducing inflation to 3
percent by 1983. This amendment was subsequently rejected by the
full committee.

Although the liberal-labor oriented Education and Labor Com-

mittee quickly disposed of this attempt to establish an inflation goal
alongside of the unemployment goal, this issue was to become conten-
tious at almost every step of the legislative process. The importance
of the inflation goal grew as inflation rekindled, and continued to be
the dominant concern of the American public.^^

The House of Representatives, after four days of debate and

consideration of fifty amendments, passed HR 50 by a final vote of 257
to 152 on March 16, 1978. The legislative strategy of the opponents—
to alter the bill through the addition of specific goals—was partially
successful. The House rejected amendments which would have added
a goal of reducing inflation to 3 percent by 1983, and one that called
for a balanced federal budget by the same year. However, com-
promise versions of these amendments, offered by leadership Demo-
crats, were approved by the House. The first of these "requires
that the third and subsequent (Presidential) Economic report set
forth programs to reduce inflation and progress to that end." The
other added that it was one of the purposes of the Act "to achieve
372
a balanced budget consistent with the achievement of the
unemployment goal.. . " ^ ^

Additionally, a number of other amendments, including one

which called for a goal of 100 percent parity for farm products, were
approved. Among the amendments rejected were an attempt at man-
dating the use of a more restrictive definition of unemployment, and
an amendment which provided a reduction in personal and corporate
income taxes. In all, the large margin of the final vote did not sig-
nify the difficulty the House leadership had in maintaining the
integrity of the full employment purpose of the bill. That integrity
was going to meet a more severe challenge in the Senate.

The Senate. In the Senate the bill was jointly referred to the Com-
mittee on Human Resources and the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs. The Human Resources Committee, led by Employ-
ment, Poverty, and Migratory Labor Subcommittee Chairman Gaylord
Nelson (D., WI) and ranking Republican Jacob Javits, reported the
bill out without major changes on April 13, 1978. The Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, however, added four sub-
stantial amendments before approving the bill on June 28, 1978. Two
of these set goals of 0 percent inflation, and a balanced budget
by 1983. The other two were Chairman William Proxmire's (D., WI)
amendment which set a goal of limiting the federal budget to a maxi-
mum of 20 percent of the gross national product, and an amendment
offered by John Tower (R., TX) which gave the President the power
to modify the unemployment goal, of 4 percent or less by 1983, in
his first economic message subsequent to the bill's passage. The
differences between the two committee versions of the bill—particu-
larly the inclusion of the inflation goal by Banking—made it difficult
for the two committees to write up a joint report on the legislation.
The joint report, filed on September 6, 1978, followed two months of
tough negotiations in which few of the differences were resolved. ^5

By this time, the scheduled October adjournment made the

clock a strong ally of the opponents of Humphrey-Hawkins. The Con-
gress was confronted with a host of important issues and but a few
weeks to deal with them. Already, a group of conservative senators,
led by Orrin G. Hatcn (R., UT) had threatened a filibuster if the
legislation did not include an inflation goal. One senator on the
Banking Committee confided that the only way Humphrey-Hawkins
could pass was if Congress reconvened after the November elections.

Proponents of Humphrey-Hawkins—particularly the Black Con-

gressional Caucus and the Full Employment Action Council—pressed
the President and Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D., WV)
for action. President Carter and Senator Byrd responded. The
President once again reaffirmed his support. And Senator Byrd,
in an effort to reach a compromise and avoid a filibuster, appointed
an ad hoc committee consisting of key proponents and opponents
of the legislation. On October 13, 1978, the ad hoc committee came up
with a proposal acceptable to all concerned. In the words of Sena-
tor Bob Dole (R., KS), "we agreed to disagree on inflation and
spending goals."^6

The full Senate decided on the spending and inflation goals

on October 13, 1978, when it debated, amended, and passed
373
Humphrey-Hawkins. The version of the bill before the Senate,
HR 50, did not mention spending limits. Senator Proxmire, however,
introduced an amendment which called for a goal of reducing the fed-
eral budget to 21 percent of the GNP by fiscal 1981, and 20 percent
by fiscal 1983. Instead, the Senate approved language introduced
by Senator Edmund Muskie (D., ME) setting the goal of reducing
federal outlays to their "lowest level consistent with national needs."

Later on in the day, the Senate dealt with the inflation goal.
The version beiore the Senate called for an inflation goal of 3 percent
by 1983, and 0 percent by 1988. This inflation goal, however, was
not to "impede" achievement of the unemployment goals. Senators
Muskie and Muriel Humphrey (D., MN) offered an amendment calling
for a goal of reducing inflation to 3 percent "at the earliest possible
date." Their amendment—in what was perhaps the key vote on
Humphrey-Hawkins—was defeated by a coalition of Humphrey-Hawkins
supporters, who feared a filibuster if the amendment were approved,
and opponents of the bill.

The adoption of the specific inflation goals probably spelled the

difference between victory and defeat. It averted a threatened fili-
buster by amendment on the part of conservative Republicans, and
thus cleared the way for Senate approval, by a 70 to 19 vote, late in
the evening of October 13th. A number of conservative Republican
senators voted against final passage—rejecting increased Federal
economic planning—even though they had succeeded in modifying
the goals of the legislation.-^^

Several hours before adjournment on October 15, 1978, the

House approved in 15 minutes, by a standing vote of 56 to 14, the
Senate passed version. President Carter signed Humphrey-Hawkins
into law at a White House ceremony on October 27, 1978.

THE FULL EMPLOYMENT AND BALANCED GROWTH ACT OF 1978.

Humphrey-Hawkins—enacted into law as the Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978—is a much different mechanism than the
bill introduced by Representative Augustus Hawkins in June of 1974.
It does not create an absolute guarantee of a job for every able-
bodied American. Nor does it establish any employment creating
programs. The Act does, however, establish in law for the first time
a procedure by which basic economic goals are to be proposed, con-
sidered, and established by the President and his advisors. Con-
gress, and the Federal Reserve Board.

Specifically, the new Act requires the President to submit in

his economic report, annual numerical goals for employment, unemploy-
ment, production, real income, productivity, and prices during the
next five years. Short term goals are to be established for the first
two years, medium term goals for the following three years. The
purpose of these short and medium term goals is not only to achieve
full employment and production, but a balanced budget, improved
trade balance, and federal outlays at the lowest percentage share of
the GNP as practical.

The centerpiece of the new law is specific goals for unemploy-

ment and inflation. All programs and policies implemented under the
Act are to work toward achieving a 3 percent adult and 4

374
3 percent by 1983 and 0 percent by 1988.

Although specific inflation goals were added by the Senate, the

primacy of the attack on unemployment was preserved by the pro-
viso that "policies and programs for reducing inflation shall be so
designed so as not to impede achievement of the goal and timetables"
on unemployment.

Equally important, flexibility in goal setting as requested by

President Carter, was retained. Beginning with the second eco-
nomic report in January 1980, the President may modify both the 4
percent unemployment proal and the 3 percent inflation goal and
timetable where changed economic circumstance require it. In another
title of the Act Congress is given the opportunity to review, accept,
modify or reject the changed goals. However, the Act provides for a
continued commitment to the goal of reducing unemployment to 4
percent as soon as possible.

The other instrument of economic policy making, the Federal

Reserve Board, is also required to report to Congress. The Board
must report twice a year (February 20 and July 20) explaining the
monetary policies it is pursuing in furtherance of the unemployment
and inflation goal.

The legislation stresses that none of its provisions shall be used

to control production, employment, allocation of resources, wages,
or prices. The Act emphasizes that increases in available jobs should
come about by growth in the private sector. Only if the private
sector proves inadequate, can federally subsidized jobs, public
employment, and reservoirs of employment projects be used to
ameliorate unemployment.

The employment reservoir is a final option. It can only be

triggered by the President if he finds that the other procedures
listed are not working. It is further restricted by the requirement
that any new employment prog-ram, that involves more than an expan-
sion of existing law, must be authorized by Congress and can not go
into effect until after October 27, 1980. In addition, to satisfy the
critics that had opposed the employment reservoir because it would
be inflationary, this provision also required that any job must be in
the low pay range and should be designed so as not to draw workers
from private employment.

In order to coordinate the branches of government, the Act

amends the Congressional Budget Act to establish procedures for
Congressional review of the goals, programs, and policies recom-
mended in the President's annual economic report. The Joint Eco-
nomic Committee is to act on the President's recommendation and then
submit a report to the respective Senate and House Budget Commit-
tees. The Budget Committees are to address the goals and timetables
in their report on the first concurrent resolution on the budget.

The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 is the

first step the Federal government has taken for overall economic coor-
dination since 1946. The Act sets employment goals for the United
States, as well as procedures for planning how to meet these goals. In
a few short years, we may be able to tell if the United States govern-
ment is capable of planning for employment.
375
 NOTES
-^Congressional Record (CR) , 93d Congress, 2d Session, Jxine 26,
1974, pp. H 21278-21283, at 21278.
^Employment and Training Report of the President, transmitted
to the Congress 1978, p. 210, Table A-18.
^"Employment Status by Age, Sex, and Color, Seasonally
Adjusted," Monthly Labor Review 98 (March 1975), p. 88.
^Quoted in "Continuing High Rates of Minority Joblessness
Prompt Calls for Full Employment Legislation," Congressional Quar-
terly Weekly Report (CQ), July 19, 1975, pp. 1588-1589, at 1588.
paragraph is based upon information placed into the CR by
Representative Hawkins in the pages indicated in note 1. Virtually
identical versions of the bill were introduced in the House and
Senate at the outset of the 94th Congress, January 1975. These and
succeeding versions of Humphrey-Hawkins bore the designations HR 50
and S 50.
legislative history of this law is eloquently told in
Stephen Kiemp Bailey, Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the
Employment Act of 1946 (New York: Vintage Books, 1950).
'congressman Hawkins, CR, Jxme 26, 1974, p. H 21278.
^Leonard Woodcock, "Testimony," National Economic Planning,
Balanced Growth, and Full Employment, Hearings before the U.S. Con-
gress, Joint Economic Committee, June 11 and 12, 1975, pp. 4-8, at
6, 7.
^U.S. Congress, Thirtieth Anniversary of the Employment Act
of 1946—A National Conference on Full Employment, Hearings before
the Joint Economic Committee, March 18 and 19, 1976.
l^Martha V. Gottron, "New Bill: Full Employment," CQ, March 20,
1976, pp. 641-642; and Bob Rankin, "Candidates on the Issues: Full
Employment," CQ, March 6, 1976, pp. 513-514.
^^^, August 21, 1976, p. 2278; and U.S. Congress, House, Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978, H. Rept. 95-895, February 22, 1978, pp. 6-7.
^2H. Rept. 95-895, p. 8.
for example, Louis Harris, "Inflation Ranks Above Unem-
ployment as Problem," The Harris Survey (New York: Chicago Tribune-
N.Y. News Syndicate, March 20, 1978).
provisions are noted in a document printed for the
use of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Agenda: Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, S.50,
June 1978, pp. 7,5.
S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Human Resources and Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1977, S. Report 95-1177.
16
Quoted in Associated Press, "Senate Snaps Deadlock on
Employment Bill, Agrees to Final Vote," Fort-Lauderdale News and
Sun-Sentinel, October 14, 1978, p. 8A.
376
 I'See for example the statement by Senator Barry Goldwater
(R., AZ) just prior to passage of H.R. 50, in CR, October 13, 1978,
p. S 18968.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE CARTER ADMINIS-

TRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF REORGANIZATION OPTIONS
Charles M. Lamb, State University of New York at Buffalo

ABSTRACT

Responding to his 1976 campaign pledge. President Carter has

reorganized the federal government's enforcement of equal employ-
ment opportunity (EEO) laws. He has done so by shifting some EEO
responsibilities from the Civil Service Commission and the Depart-
ment of Labor to create a "Super-EEOC." This article examines why
President Carter chose the EEO reorganization that he did from the
standpoint of advantages and disadvantages. Also presented are
alternative reform options that the President could have selected
that would have involved increasing EEO coordination or reorgani-
zation entailing new legislation that would have gone far beyond
the creation of a "Super-EEOC."

Voters were regularly promised during the 1976 presidential

campaign that, if elected, Jimmy Carter would streamline the execu-
tive branch of the federal government. One area in which reorgani-
zation will probably have a significant impact is in equal employment
opportunity, especially since past equal employment programs have
been ineffective, inefficient, overlapping, and uncoordinated. In
light of President Carter's 1978 reorganization of federal equal em-
ployment opportunity programs, this subject looms large in the minds
of many interested in employment policy.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S REFORMS. In March, 1977, Congress author-

ized President Carter to reorganize the executive branch of the fed-
eral government, with his reorganization plans to go into effect unless
within sixty days they were rejected by either house of Congress.^
Carter then established a civil rights reorganization task force at
the Office of Management and Budget, headed by Howard Glickstein,
a former staff director of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights.
From the beginning it was clear that the task force would first deal
with the perplexing problem of equal employment opportunity before
moving on to civil rights enforcement in education and housing. 2

The task force's reorganization options were presented to

President Carter in the fall of 1977. After considering the alterna-
tives, which were never officially released to the public. Carter for-
warded his equal employment proposal to Congress on February 23,
1978. Calling his reorganization plan "the single most important
action to improve civil rights in the past decade," President Carter
transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
377